Omarova post macro 4/19/2012 4:29 PM
Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Guardians: Toward Tripartism
in Financial Services Regulation
Saule T. Omarova*
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 622
II. REGULATORY CHALLENGES IN THE FINANCIAL SERVICES SECTOR ............................ 625
A. Financial Regulation Reform After the Crisis: Systemic Risk and
Regulatory Capture ......................................................................................... 625
1. Systemic Risk Regulation ............................................................................ 625
2. The Problem of Regulatory Capture ........................................................... 629
B. Reframing the Dilemma: Systemic Risk Regulation as a Political Choice ....... 632
III. TRIPARTISM AND GUARDIANSHIP IN ACADEMIC DEBATE ......................................... 634
A. Tripartism as a Counterweight to Regulatory Capture .................................... 635
B. Grappling with Public Interest in the Debate on Financial Regulation
Reform ............................................................................................................. 637
1. Improving Governance of Financial Regulation ......................................... 637
2. Broadening Regulators’ Intellectual Perspective ....................................... 639
IV. ELEMENTS OF TRIPARTISM IN PRACTICE: “QUASI-GUARDIANS” AT WORK .............. 642
A. Public Interest Organizations .......................................................................... 643
1. Functions and Activities .............................................................................. 643
2. Potential Limitations ................................................................................... 646
B. Government Actors: Proxy Advocates and Agency Monitors .......................... 648
1. Proxy Advocates ..........................................................