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					Marriage Incentives Neg
DDW 2009
Yu Jin Jung and Matthew Chernick + The Marriage Aff Team

                                                             MARRIAGE Neg
MARRIAGE Neg ...................................................................................................................................... 1
MARRIAGE Neg Strategies .................................................................................................................... 3
Inherency Frontline – No Incentives Now .............................................................................................. 4
Case Frontline ........................................................................................................................................... 5
AT: Welfare Good – Logical Fallacy ...................................................................................................... 6
AT: Welfare Good – Child Poverty ......................................................................................................... 7
AT: Welfare Good – Child Poverty ......................................................................................................... 8
AT: Welfare Good – Employment........................................................................................................... 9
TANF Bad - AT: TANF Good ............................................................................................................... 10
TANF Bad - AT: TANF Good ............................................................................................................... 11
AT: TANF Good – Education Tradeoff Disad [1/2] ............................................................................ 12
AT: TANF Good – Education Tradeoff Disad [2/2] ............................................................................ 13
Incentives Good – A2: Incentives Bad – Frontline [1/2] ...................................................................... 14
Incentives Good – A2: Incentives Bad – Frontline [2/2] ...................................................................... 15
Incentives Good – A2: Incentives Fail ................................................................................................... 16
Incentives Good – A2: Incentives Fail ................................................................................................... 17
Incentives Good – AT: Marriage Incentives good for Economy ........................................................ 18
Incentives Good – Abuse [1/2] ............................................................................................................... 19
Incentives Good – Abuse [2/2] ............................................................................................................... 20
Incentives Good – Abuse – A2: Incentives Bad [1/2] ........................................................................... 21
Incentives Good – Abuse – A2: Incentives Bad [2/2] ........................................................................... 22
Incentives Good – Poverty [1/2] ............................................................................................................. 23
Incentives Good – Poverty [2/2] ............................................................................................................. 24
Alt. Causes to Marriage .......................................................................................................................... 25
AT: Domestic Violence Advantage ........................................................................................................ 26
Alt. Causes of Impact – AT: Domestic Violence Impact ..................................................................... 27
Alt. Causes of Impact – AT: Domestic Violence Impact ..................................................................... 28
AT: Discrimination Advantage .............................................................................................................. 29
AT: Patriarchy ........................................................................................................................................ 30
AT: Patriarchy ........................................................................................................................................ 31
AT: Discrimination – Heteronormativity Scenario ............................................................................. 32
                                                                                                                                                               1
Marriage Incentives Neg
DDW 2009
Yu Jin Jung and Matthew Chernick + The Marriage Aff Team

AT: Discrimination – Heteronormativity Scenario ............................................................................. 33
AT: Discrimination – Racism against Black Women Scenario .......................................................... 34
States CP .................................................................................................................................................. 35
States – A2: No authority ....................................................................................................................... 36
AT: States CP .......................................................................................................................................... 37
Improve Marriage Incentives CP [1/2] ................................................................................................. 38
Improve Marriage Incentives CP [2/2] ................................................................................................. 39
Courts CP ................................................................................................................................................ 40
Courts CP ................................................................................................................................................ 41
Courts CP ................................................................................................................................................ 42
AT: Courts CP......................................................................................................................................... 43
Not Increase Funding CP ....................................................................................................................... 44
Politics – Marriage Incentives Popular ................................................................................................. 45
Politics – Marriage Incentives Unpopular ............................................................................................ 46
Politics – TANF Popular ........................................................................................................................ 47
Politics – TANF Unpopular.................................................................................................................... 48
Politics – TANF Unpopular.................................................................................................................... 49
Politics – TANF Unpopular.................................................................................................................... 50




                                                                                                                                                                  2
Marriage Incentives Neg
DDW 2009
Yu Jin Jung and Matthew Chernick + The Marriage Aff Team

                                 MARRIAGE Neg Strategies
Option 1.
    -   Politics DA with TANF unpopular → costs Obama political capital
    -   Fiscal Discipline DA
    -   Not increase funding CP—just reallocate, don’t increase with Politics as net benefit
    -   No solvency: Marriage Incentives good and/or aren’t bad
    -   Answer Domestic Abuse Advantage: domestic abuse is decreasing and alt. cause of impact
    -   Answer:
            o Patriarchy—No patriarchy or alt. cause of patriarchy
            o Heteronormativity—Alt. cause of heteronormativity
            o Racism against Black Women?

Option 2.
    -   Courts CP or States CP
    -   Politics DA with Marriage Incentives are popular (so eliminating them would be unpopular)
    -   Fiscal Discipline DA (probably only a net benefit to states)
    -   No solvency: Marriage Incentives good and/or aren’t bad
    -   Answer Domestic Abuse Advantage: domestic abuse is decreasing and alt. cause of impact
    -   Answer:
            o Patriarchy—No patriarchy or alt. cause of patriarchy
            o Heteronormativity—Alt. cause of heteronormativity
            o Racism against Black Women?




                                                                                                    3
Marriage Incentives Neg
DDW 2009
Yu Jin Jung and Matthew Chernick + The Marriage Aff Team

                          Inherency Frontline – No Incentives Now
Obama not expanding marriage: economy.
USA Today 2-17-09, “Federally funded ad campaign holds up value of marriage,”
http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2009-02-17-marriage-campaign_N.htm
  Ron Haskins, co-director of the Brookings Center on Children and Families, disagrees. He advised the Bush
  administration on welfare policies and the related marriage initiative. "The government finances campaigns on
  smoking, seat-belt use, drug use," he says. "We spend millions of dollars supporting public campaigns to change
  public behavior. From that perspective, this is entirely appropriate." But that was then. Now, with dwindling
  federal dollars and a change in political power, the future of many programs is unclear, says Jenny Backus, a
  spokeswoman for the Department of Health and Human Services. Although she says President Obama
  supports marriage and fatherhood programs, the struggling economy is forcing the administration to "make
  choices based on shrinking budgets and a worsening economy." "One of the areas we want to take a hard look
  at is the effectiveness of advertising across the agencies that fall under HHS," she says. "We have not made any
  decisions in regards to programs or specific ad campaigns, but we are looking carefully at everything."




                                                                                                                     4
Marriage Incentives Neg
DDW 2009
Yu Jin Jung and Matthew Chernick + The Marriage Aff Team

                                                 Case Frontline
Not all incentives are marriage incentives: some just encourage both parents to help raise the child.
Gene Falk and Jill Tauber, Domestic Social Policy Division at the Congressional Research Service,
October 30, 2001, “Welfare Reform: TANF Provisions Related to Marriage and Two-Parent Families,”
https://www.policyarchive.org/bitstream/handle/10207/1292/RL31170_20011030.pdf?sequence=1
  Two-Parent Families or “Married Couple” Families? The goals of the program regarding two-parent families are
  not limited to marital unions. Not all two-parent families are married couple families. For example, two
  cohabiting parents of a child represent a “two-parent,” but not a married couple family. Moreover, the TANF
  goal regarding two-parent families might not even relate to two parents living in the same household. Some
  states report that they advance the TANF goal to promote two-parent families through initiatives that seek to
  have both parents be active in their children’s lives, such as responsible “fatherhood” initiatives that focus on the
  noncustodial parents of children.

No real impact – only 3 states provide “two-parent” incentives, only 1 state provides marriage
incentives, and some states even disincentivize marriage.
Gene Falk and Jill Tauber, Domestic Social Policy Division at the Congressional Research Service,
October 30, 2001, “Welfare Reform: TANF Provisions Related to Marriage and Two-Parent Families,”
https://www.policyarchive.org/bitstream/handle/10207/1292/RL31170_20011030.pdf?sequence=1
  According to TANF state plans and a Congressional Research Service (CRS) telephone survey of state TANF
  eligibility and benefit rules, five states distinguish between two-parent and single-parent families in their rules
  for determining financial eligibility and benefit amounts. Four of the five states are more generous for
  twoparent families. Among these states, only Alaska, which reduces cash payments for two-parent families during
  July-September, provides lower benefits for two-parent families than single parent families. Of the four
  remaining states, only West Virginia conditions its higher benefits on the two parents’ being married. It provides
  a $100 “marriage bonus.” Table 5 shows the five states with special rules for two-parent or married couple families.

State marriage incentives means their impacts are inevitable.
Amy DePaul, Professor of Journalism at the University of California, Irvine and California State
University, Fullerton, 6-1-09, "You May Kiss the Bride: Government Is Still Pushing Marriage,"
http://www.alternet.org/sex/140371/bush-
era_moral_crusaders_still_pushing_marriage_on_the_rest_of_us/?page=1
  Even if the marriage program were to be eliminated by Congress, activists have made initial strides in securing
  continued government support at the state level. The "1 percent solution" is a campaign organized by Chris
  Gersten, a former official at the federal agency that administers the marriage grants and currently the chairman of the
  Fatherhood and Marriage Leadership Institute. Under the FAMLI "1 percent" campaign, some states have pledged
  to dedicate funds to marriage-education programs, usually setting aside a small percentage of their federal block
  grants for public assistance. Nine states have dedicated the funds, with mostly Republican states participating,
  although New Mexico recently joined up. Another policy initiative to preserve marriage is to make divorce
  harder, which is an effort under way already in Texas. There, under a new law, marriage licenses are cheaper to
  couples who take marriage-education courses before the wedding. The sponsor of that legislation also has proposed
  a bill that would require one person in a couple seeking a no-fault divorce to attend 10 hours of marriage-crisis
  education. Further, leaders of the marriage-education movement are seeking to broaden their coalition, a
  significant portion of which is devoutly Christian and traditionalist, by reaching out to minorities, who have been
  targeted in the federal grant programs. (Hispanic and black rates of childbirth outside marriage are higher than
  whites’.) "My effort has been to focus on members of the Congressional Black Caucus. A lot of the grantees are
  African American," said Gersten. In fact, FAMLI’s home page announces, "URGENT… We need to build ties with
  members of the Congressional Black Caucus in order to save the federal TANF Healthy Marriage and Fatherhood
  Funding."
                                                                                                                            5
Marriage Incentives Neg
DDW 2009
Yu Jin Jung and Matthew Chernick + The Marriage Aff Team

                                AT: Welfare Good – Logical Fallacy
Correlation-causation fallacy – strong economy and other social programs play a more important role than welfare reform
Ron Haskins, Senior Fellow of Economic Studies, 3-16-06, Brookings

Although welfare reform is a major cause of these felicitous outcomes, at least two additional factors are important.
First, the economy of the 1990s was exceptionally strong and produced a net increase of 16 million jobs. Second, in the
decade leading up to the welfare reform law and in the welfare reform law itself, Congress enacted a series of
expansions in social programs — including child care, the child tax credit, Medicaid, the standard deduction and the
personal exemption in the tax code, and the Earned Income Tax Credit — that were designed to help low-income
families that work.




                                                                                                                          6
Marriage Incentives Neg
DDW 2009
Yu Jin Jung and Matthew Chernick + The Marriage Aff Team

                                  AT: Welfare Good – Child Poverty
Welfare exacerbates poverty – loss of food stamps and welfare benefits
Diana Zuckerman, Ph. D, October 1999, National Center for Policy Research for Women and Families

All the reports ask the same key question: were single mothers who left welfare to go to work able to earn as much as they
had received in welfare benefits? The Children's Defense Fund (CDF) report is the only one to focus on the impact on
children. The CDF compared the number of children in extreme poverty in 1996 and 1997, focusing on families headed by
mothers. It did its own analysis of a very large national Census Bureau survey, known as the Current Population Survey.
According to the CDF, the number of children in these families who were living in extreme poverty increased from
1996 to 1997 as a result of welfare reform. Extreme poverty was defined as less than half the poverty level (for example,
less than $6,401/year or $123/week for a family of three). All kinds of income were included: wages and salaries, child
support, government assistance checks, and non-cash benefits such as food stamps.       The author, Arloc Sherman, is a
senior program associate who has worked on poverty issues at CDF for nine years, and was previously at the Center on
Budget and Policy Priorities. He points out that child poverty had been decreasing slowly in recent years, from 1.7
million children in 1993 to 1.4 million in 1996. In 1997, the number of children increased 26 percent, to 1.8 million. One
of the reasons is that 28 percent of former welfare families earned less than $125 per week. This would keep them
below half the poverty level even if they worked all year, which many didn't. Sherman speculates that the loss of food
stamps was a major reason for the rise in poverty. Increased employment would have made up for the loss of welfare
benefits, but not for the loss of food stamps too. Although families leaving welfare are often still eligible for food
stamps, the statistics show that many stop getting them. Similarly, most legal immigrants lost food stamp eligibility under
the 1996 revamping of eligibility for welfare-linked benefits.     The report also describes how larger families that leave
welfare struggle more, because welfare benefits were more generous for families with more children. Although these
"larger" families average only 3.5 children, many single mothers can't earn the larger salaries needed to make up for the
loss of slightly larger welfare benefits.    Compared to many other advocacy reports, this CDF report provides solid
research data and makes an important contribution by focusing on the poorest families. By including food stamps and other
non-cash benefits in its analysis, the CDF avoids some of the usual criticisms made by conservative groups, who claim
that progressive groups overestimate poverty rates by excluding the value of food stamps and other
benefits.     Although the CDF's statistics do not prove that food stamps could help bring more than a half million families
out of poverty, the apparent drop in food stamps deserves attention. Individuals that work with low income children and
families can help some of the poorest families by making sure parents know that food stamps are still available to working
poor families.




                                                                                                                               7
Marriage Incentives Neg
DDW 2009
Yu Jin Jung and Matthew Chernick + The Marriage Aff Team

                                   AT: Welfare Good – Child Poverty
The welfare system entrenches kids further into poverty.
Robert E. Rector(Robert Rector is a leading national authority on poverty, the U.S.welfare system and immigration and is a
Heritage Foundation Senior Research Fellow.) and Patrick F. Fagan, (A former Deputy Assistant Health and Human
Services Secretary, Patrick Fagan examines the impact of family life and religious practice on the key areas of social policy:
health, mental health, education crime and income.) June 5, 19 96. How Welfare Harms Kids.
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Welfare/bg1084.cfm

The simple fact is that children are suffering because the U.S. welfare system has failed. Designed as a system to help
children, it has ended up damaging and abusing the very children it was intended to save. The welfare system has failed
because the ideas upon which it was founded are flawed. The current system is based on the assumption that higher
welfare benefits and expanded welfare eligibility are good for children. According to this theory, welfare reduces
poverty, and so will increase children's lifetime well-being and attainment. This is untrue. Higher welfare payments
do not help children; they increase dependence and illegitimacy, which have a devastating effect on children's
development. Americans often are told that the current welfare system does not promote long-term dependence. This also is
untrue. The 4.7 million families currently receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) already have
spent, on average, six-and-a-half years on welfare. When past and estimated future receipts of AFDC are combined, the
estimated average length of stay on AFDC, among those families currently receiving benefits, is 13 years. Among the 4.7
million families currently receiving AFDC, over 90 percent will spend over two years on the AFDC caseload. More than 75
percent will spend over five years on AFDC. It is welfare dependence, not poverty, that has the most negative effect on
children. Recent research by Congressional Budget Office Director June O'Neill shows that increasing the length of
time a child spends on welfare may reduce the child's IQ by as much as 20 percent. Welfare dependency as a child has a
negative effect on the earnings and employment capacity of young men. The more welfare income received by a boy's
family during his childhood, the lower the boy's earnings will be as an adult, even when compared to boys in families
with identical non-welfare income.

Welfare causes illegitimacy, increasing the likelihood of child poverty.
Robert E. Rector(Robert Rector is a leading national authority on poverty, the U.S.welfare system and immigration and is a
Heritage Foundation Senior Research Fellow.) Patrick F. Fagan, (A former Deputy Assistant Health and Human Services
Secretary, Patrick Fagan examines the impact of family life and religious practice on the key areas of social policy: health,
mental health, education crime and income.) June 5, 1996. How Welfare Harms Kids.
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Welfare/bg1084.cfm

Welfare also plays a powerful role in promoting illegitimacy. Research by CBO Director O'Neill also shows, for example,
that a 50 percent increase in monthly AFDC and food stamp benefit levels will cause a 43 percent increase in the
number of illegitimate births within a state. Illegitimacy, in turn, has an enormous negative effect on children's
development and on their behavior as adults. Being born outside of marriage and raised in single parent homes:
Triples the level of behavioral and emotional problems among children; Nearly triples the level of teen sexual activity;
Doubles the probability a young woman will have children out of wedlock; and, Doubles the probability a boy will
become a threat to society, engage in criminal activity, and wind up in jail. Overall, welfare operates as a form of
social toxin. The more of this toxin received by a child's family, the less successful the child will be as an adult. If
America's children are to be saved, the current welfare system must be replaced. The automatic and rapid growth of
welfare spending must be curtailed. Welfare should no longer be a one-way handout; recipients should be required to work
for benefits received. Steps must be taken to reduce future illegitimacy, beginning with restricting cash welfare to
unmarried teen mothers. Finally, Americans must help children rise upward out of poverty and despair by enlisting the
support of those institutions that have a record of real success. The evidence is clear that religious institutions have enjoyed
dramatic success in reducing teen sexual activity, crime, drug use, and other problems among young people. In order to help
poor children, America must rely on the healing and guiding force of the churches. This can be done by giving poor parents
government-funded education vouchers which could be used to send their children to private schools, including religious
schools.



                                                                                                                                   8
Marriage Incentives Neg
DDW 2009
Yu Jin Jung and Matthew Chernick + The Marriage Aff Team

                                    AT: Welfare Good – Employment
Welfare reform hurts income – minimal employment and low wages
Diana Zuckerman, Ph. D, October 1999, National Center for Policy Research for Women and Families

The Urban Institute has probably received more funding for welfare reform research than all the other progressive
organizations put together (more than $65 million in foundation grants for their New Federalism Project, which includes
welfare reform). Although often described as a progressive think tank, it has bent over backwards to include Reagan
Administration appointees for its welfare research, so that it could not be accused of liberal bias.    In its €fourth year of a
six-year project, the Urban Institute has produced a regular flow of brief, easy-to-read reports that are available for free.
Reports on child care, food stamps, and other important issues are expected in the next few months. The August report is
based on the government's 1997 National Survey of America's Families.          This report compares families of women who left
welfare with "low income families" with income under 200 percent of the poverty level, and the "near-poor," with incomes
below 150 percent of the poverty level. It finds that, not surprisingly, women who have left welfare are working at low-
paying jobs. Unfortunately, more than one in four of all these mothers, whether or not they were formerly on welfare, work
mostly at night, which raises important and troubling questions about the quality of care and supervision available for their
children.    Report author Pamela Loprest (a senior research associate who specializes in disability programs, welfare
reform, and health insurance for the elderly) found that 20 percent of former welfare recipients are not working, do not
have a working spouse, and are not relying on government disability payments. This raises questions about how they are
surviving and what is happening to their children. Presumably these families were receiving help from families, friends,
or charitable groups, or were supporting themselves with "off the books" work that they did not report or with illegal
activities.   Loprest found that very few (6 percent) of the women who left welfare work less than 20 hours a week,
and most (69 percent) work more than 35 hours a week. Their work hours are slightly longer than those of other near-poor or
low income workers who are not former welfare recipients.         More than half the adults who left welfare were earning more
than $6.61 an hour, which is considerably more than the minimum wage ($4.75 an hour at the time of the survey). Again, this
is somewhat higher than the earnings of near-poor and low-income workers who were not formerly on welfare. The income
differences apparently reflect other differences, such as educational attainment, race/ethnicity, marital status, and region
where they live. The economic status of these families is similar to the other families in the study: on average, former
welfare recipients earn approximately $100 less per month than low-income workers, and only $100 more than near-
poor workers.      Many of these families are barely surviving economically: one in every three mothers who left
welfare reported that they had to cut the size of or skip meals because there was not enough food, compared with one in four
of the other near-poor or low-income mothers. More than 38 percent reported that there was at least one time when they
could not pay their rent, mortgage, or utility bills, which was almost twice as many as the other near poor and low
income families.      The report concludes that policy makers should focus on helping families who are poor, not just on
former welfare recipients, since all these families face similar economic problems. Like the CDF, the Urban Institute
concludes that there are probably families in all three groups that are not receiving food stamps or other government benefits
to which they are entitled.

TANF fails – overstated employment rates
Wade F. Horn, Ph. D. 2005. July 14. Assistant Secretary for Children and Families, U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services on Employment Levels of Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families (TANF) Families. Before Human Resources Subcommittee, House Ways and
Means Committee, U.S. House of Representatives. (http://www.hhs.gov/asl/testify/t050714.html)
Now there is even better news related to employment and TANF from a growing body of evidence suggesting more TANF
recipients may be working than many believe. First, TANF data on reasons for case closure have persistently understated
the role of employment. We alluded to this problem in the Sixth Annual TANF Report to Congress, where we said,
�understanding the reasons for case closure is limited by the fact that States reported 26.4 percent of all cases as closed
due to �other� unspecified reasons. For example, while independent studies of the reason for families leaving welfare
typically find that somewhat over half leave as a result of employment, States reported only 17.2 percent of cases
closing due to employment, clearly an understatement of the true rate. Many closures due to employment are coded as
failure to cooperate or as some other category because at the point of closure, the agency often is unaware that the client
became employed.�

                                                                                                                                   9
Marriage Incentives Neg
DDW 2009
Yu Jin Jung and Matthew Chernick + The Marriage Aff Team

                                       TANF Bad - AT: TANF Good
TANF bad—current TANF system works against two-parent families.
Irwin Garfinkel, Mitchell I. Ginsberg Professor of Contemporary Urban Problems at Columbia
University, Fragile Families, Welfare Reform, and Marriage, 07/02/09,
http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2001/12childrenfamilies_mclanahan.aspx
  Services alone are unlikely to substantially strengthen fragile families. To the extent that welfare policies or
  practices favor one-parent families over two-parent families, they discourage marriage and cohabitation and push
  biological fathers out of the picture. Although many state TANF programs appear to have reduced or eliminated
  restrictions for two-parent families, others still retain such restrictions. Similarly, many states and localities give
  preference to one-parent families in allocating scarce child care and housing subsidies. If the goal is to promote
  marriage and family stability, states should eliminate this kind of unfavorable treatment of two-parent families.
  The absence of categorical restrictions, however, is still not sufficient to make welfare policy neutral with respect to
  family formation. Because welfare is income tested, it creates an incentive for fathers with earnings and mothers
  without earnings to live apart (or feign living apart). To reduce this disincentive, only a portion of a resident
  father's earnings-say 50 percent-should be counted when determining a family's eligibility and benefits for
  TANF. Although doing so will increase welfare costs and caseloads in the short run, the time limits and work
  requirements of the new TANF program would limit these extra costs, and the long-term gains in
  strengthening two-parent families will be considerable for families as well as society.

TANF fails—It reduces education for mothers.

William E. Spriggs, Director of Research and Public Policy of the National Urban League,
06/25/02, Welfare Politics at its Worst
  Now, however, studies are showing that mothers on AFDC were in some ways better off.
  Research is showing that mothers on AFDC were more likely to get married than mothers on TANF. Apparently,
  mothers on AFDC spent time developing and nurturing relationships that led to marriage, and often led out of
  poverty, too.
  And recently, the National Urban League Institute for Opportunity and Equality published results showing that
  mothers on AFDC were more likely to go to college than mothers on TANF.
  In fact, from 1996 to 1998 college enrollment for welfare recipients dropped by 20 points although it
  simultaneously increased for other poor women during those years.
  The decline can be partially explained by examining state policies toward postsecondary education. In 1996, only nine
  states did not allow welfare recipients to count college as a work activity. But by 1998, 25 states did not allow
  welfare recipients to count college as a work activity. State policies implemented after welfare reform accounted for at
  least 13 percent of the decrease in the probability that recipients would go to college compared to other non-recipient poor
  women ages 18 to 35.

Money On TANF has Negative Impacts
  Hughes, ’07, The Roundtable on Religion and Social Welfare Policy,
  http://www.pewroundtable.org/homepage/article.cfm?id=5924 Hughes is a Correpondent
  for The Roundtable.
  But not everyone agrees that the government should be spending its money this way. Legal
  Momentum (formerly the NOW Legal Defense Fund) has lobbied against spending TANF dollars
  on marriage promotion. The group argues, among other things, that government-sponsored
  marriage promotion could encourage women to stay in abusive relationships, or disparage single
  parents who are working hard to raise their children. They also contend that marriage is a private
  realm that should remain protected from government intrusion. And they question whether
  shrinking government resources might better be spent on programs that provide job training and
  child care for the poor.

                                                                                                                                 10
Marriage Incentives Neg
DDW 2009
Yu Jin Jung and Matthew Chernick + The Marriage Aff Team

                                 TANF Bad - AT: TANF Good
TANF are not being done to full Potential
Leavitt ’06, Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/research/welfare/hl947.cfm
Mr. Leavitt is the former Governor of Utah
  Last year—this is a statistic that will startle you—on average, states reported that nearly 60
  percent of able-bodied adult TANF recipients had not participated in even a single hour of activity
  related to work or preparing for work over the course of a month. Nearly 60 percent!




                                                                                                        11
Marriage Incentives Neg
DDW 2009
Yu Jin Jung and Matthew Chernick + The Marriage Aff Team

                       AT: TANF Good – Education Tradeoff Disad [1/2]
1. TANF tradesoff with college education – work over education model
Charles Price, Associate Professor of Anthropology, Sept 2005, Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare

 During 1995-96, more than 650,000 welfare recipients were enrolled in postsecondary education (Department of Education,
1999). The total is likely far greater than this since many colleges and universities do not identify their public assistance-
receiving students, and some students prefer not to be identified as welfare recipients. By 1999, however, the number these
students had been nearly halved, declining to almost 358,000 (Department of Education, 1999). This pattern materialized
across the country. For instance, the City University of New York (CUNY) saw its enrollment of public assistance recipients
plummet from 27,000 in 1996-97 to less than 10,000 by 2000 (CUNY Office of Institutional Data, 2001). What caused such a
precipitous decline in the participation of public assistance recipients in postsecondary education (PSE)? Welfare reform
was the reason that so many public assistance recipients were leaving college. The Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA), also known as welfare reform, marked the end of welfare as an
entitlement. PRWORA mandated a new form of block grant-structured assistance, Temporary Assistance to Needy Families
(TANF), that put, among other things, maximum limits on receipt of assistance and participation in PSE. Assistance was
restricted to a lifetime maximum of 60 months, and participation in PSE limited to one year of vocational education. Most
states interpreted TANF stringently, offering far less than the maximum limits. The TANF proscription on higher
education became another barrier to poor women's social and economic advancement. TANF's mandatory work
requirements began at 20 hours in 1997 and incrementally increased to 35 hours in 2002 (the rules are slightly different
for two parent families). For single parents, coordinating child care, course schedules, study time, attending mandatory
meetings with social service agencies, and getting to a TANF work placement, meant that many were pushed beyond
their capacity to cope with so many challenges. TANF's emphasis on labor force attachment embodied a view that
any job is better than none, and that the poor need to learn discipline, workplace norms, and middle class behaviors
and values, even where recipients have work experience or desire education over work (Riemer, 1997). To
further dampen participation in PSE, case workers unaware of the new rules often told recipients that they could not
attend college at all if they wanted to continue receiving public assistance. Countless numbers of public assistance
recipients ended up leaving school in order to maintain TANF, their primary source of income, health care, and child
care. Combined, the TANF policies and welfare bureaucracy interpretations of the policies became the focus of reform
movements, beginning as early as 1997 in Maine. Recognition of TANF's chilling effect on higher education began soon
after implementation of TANE News reporters, often tipped off by college faculty or welfare advocates, provided coverage,
albeit spotty. Stories were coming from places as disparate as Caspar, Wyoming (Rea, 1997), Boston, Massachusetts
(Chacon, 1998), San Francisco, California (Irving, 1997), and Milwaukee, Wisconsin (Thompson, 1997). What was not being
covered was the beginnings of resistance to the burdensome restrictions, as recipients and advocates began to organize and
mobilize.


2. Turns solvency - higher education is key employment, self-sufficiency, and income
Charles Price, Associate Professor of Anthropology, Sept 2 005, Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare

Welfare recipients have much to gain from acquiring higher education credentials. According to Occupational Outlook
Quarterly, the 1998 median earnings of a full-time worker with a bachelor's degree was $40,387, more than $15,000--or 61
percent--greater than that of a high school graduate (Crosby, 2001). Education beyond the bachelor's further enhances earning
potential, although age plays a role in determining this outcome. Postsecondary education is likely to become more
important to social mobility as the pace of technological change increases and affects the job prospects of ever larger
numbers of Americans. The Bureau of Labor Statistics predict that the fastest growing occupations in the first decade of the
twenty-first century will require at least an associate's degree (1999, p. 2). Higher education is beneficial in other ways. The
more education people have the less likely they are to experience unemployment. According to 1998 data, the
unemployment rate for high school graduates was four percent compared to 1.9 percent for bachelor's degree holders
(Occupational Outlook Quarterly, 1999). And the highest paying occupations typically require at least a bachelor's degree
(although some occupations such as
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Yu Jin Jung and Matthew Chernick + The Marriage Aff Team

                       AT: TANF Good – Education Tradeoff Disad [2/2]
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electrician or machinist pay well, but do not require a college degree). Minorities and women, whose earnings and income
continue to lag behind those of Whites and men, find higher education to be one of the most reliable means for
improving their socio-economic position. Black women, for instance, profit greatly as a result of additional schooling
(Mizzell, 2000). Black women with a high school degree earned $365 per week in 1998, in contrast to those with a bachelor's
degree who earned $605 (Current Population Survey Annual Demographic Supplement, 1998). Higher education, especially
a liberal arts education, increases human capital formation by amplifying cognitive, verbal, and mathematical
capacities, and by positively influencing attitudes, values, and behaviors in ways that make for a broadly educated
citizenry (Pandey, Zhan, Neeley-Barnes, & Menon, 2000, pp. 110-111). An early study of welfare recipients and higher
education demonstrated that all of the study participants who acquired bachelor's degrees completely ended their
welfare dependency, while 81 percent of associate degree holders did the same (Gittell, Schehl, & Fareri, 1990). In a related
study of 840 recipients in five states, the findings made clear that while an associate degree enhances the earning power of
welfare recipients, it is a bachelor's degree that provides the greatest economic independence (Gittell, Gross, & Holdaway,
1993). Prior to welfare reform, one study estimated that approximately 27% of welfare recipients were capable of
immediately entering bachelor degree programs, and another third could, with one semester of remediation, enter associate
degree programs (Carnevale & Desrochers, 1999). There is research that suggests that the performance of welfare recipients
on measures such as time to complete the degree and grade point average is about the same as for non-welfare receiving
students; their performance is bolstered where there are PSE programs that focus on the needs of welfare recipients (Gittell,
Vandersall, Holdaway, & Newman, 1996; Price, Steffy, & McFarlane, 2003). Welfare recipients also stand to gain from the
"soft" benefits of higher education. Recipients report that their self-esteem and confidence improve as a result of going to
college (Price, 2000). Mothers describe how their children are positively impacted by seeing a parent studying and
completing college (Gittell, Gross, & Holdaway, 1993). Increasing and widespread (higher) education is associated with a
demographic transition whereby child mortality and birthrates decrease and standards of living improve (Pandey et al., 2000),
along with the possibility for a vibrant democracy energized by an astute, discerning, and participatory citizenry. In addition,
the more a person earns the more he or she is able to contribute as a taxpayer. Welfare reform forced those who could
have benefitted from getting a credential into the low-wage job market because they were the most "work-ready."
Many low wage jobs do not provide the experience that can be used to improve a person's job marketability, and
rarely provide benefits such as health care or pensions. The Children's Defense Fund found that among welfare leavers in
New York State, the only group likely to escape poverty by relying on earnings alone were those who had at least two years
of higher education or a vocational degree (Children's Defense Fund, 2000). While the steep decrease in the welfare rolls
and increases in labor force participation have been taken as illustrative of the success of welfare reform, the situation is far
more complex. The robust 1990s economy contributed greatly to welfare reform's success, especially the increase in service
sector occupations. However, these are among the lowest paying and most impermanent jobs in the labor market. And even
where there are gains in employment and earnings, the benefits are questionable. The Urban Institute asked the question
"Does work pay?," noting that "The work incentives under TANF are heavily weighted toward inducing non-working
families to move to work. However, the benefits of increased work effort and higher wage rates beyond part-time minimum
wage work are offset by declines in cash aid and the phaseout of earned income tax credits (Urban Institute, 1998, p. 27)." A
study of welfare reform in 13 southern states concluded that views that "work pays" for welfare recipients does not consider
the extra expenses that come with work (Tootle, 1999). A similar observation was made in a study of a major work first
program in California: "... gains in income [through earned tax credits and work] were almost exactly counterbalanced by
reductions in income from lower welfare and Food Stamp payments and by higher payroll taxes" (Freeman, Knab, Gennetian
& Navarro, 2000, p. 5).




                                                                                                                                    13
Marriage Incentives Neg
DDW 2009
Yu Jin Jung and Matthew Chernick + The Marriage Aff Team

                       Incentives Good – A2: Incentives Bad – Frontline [1/2]
Government doesn’t force couples into the program-------the program is voluntary.
Robert Rector and Melissa G. Pardue, Senior Research Fellow and Policy Analyst in the Domestic Policy Studies
Department at the Heritage Foundation, March 30, 2004, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Family/bg1744.cfm

Furthermore, participation in marriage programs will be voluntary; no one will be "coerced" to participate. In addition,
marriage-promotion programs do not assume that all relationships should be saved. In fact, rather than pushing women
further into abusive relationships, the programs would urge women to leave situations where significant abuse is occurring.
Marriage education programs teach couples how to resolve disagreements peacefully: A primary effect of these programs is
to de-escalate conflict and significantly reduce strife and acrimony within relationships. Consequently, the programs have
been shown to reduce domestic violence, not increase it.

Turn – the program is voluntary and strengthens marriages, preventing abuse while being realistic
about failed marriages.
Robert Rector and Melissa G. Pardue, Senior Research Fellow and Policy Analyst in the Domestic Policy Studies
Department at the Heritage Foundation, March 30, 2004, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Family/bg1744.cfm

Furthermore, participation in marriage programs will be voluntary; no one will be "coerced" to participate. In addition,
marriage-promotion programs do not assume that all relationships should be saved. In fact, rather than pushing women
further into abusive relationships, the programs would urge women to leave situations where significant abuse is occurring.
Marriage education programs teach couples how to resolve disagreements peacefully: A primary effect of these programs is
to de-escalate conflict and significantly reduce strife and acrimony within relationships. Consequently, the programs have
been shown to reduce domestic violence, not increase it. The NOW Legal Defense Fund also incorrectly assumes that the main target group
of the Healthy Marriage Initiative would be older, single mothers on welfare (i.e., mothers enrolled in the TANF program). However, because most older
welfare mothers have relationships with the fathers of their children that collapsed years ago, they would not be a suitable target group for marriage-
promotion programs. Instead, the Healthy Marriage Initiative will provide skills to unmarried couples before their relationships turn bitter and acrimonious.
By providing skills training at an early stage in a relationship, marriage-promotion programs will help couples to build happy and stable families in the
future. The Healthy Marriage Initiative will focus primarily on unmarried, young adult couples around the time of their child's birth or--even better--prior to
their child's conception. These couples have been referred to as "fragile families." The domestic abuse rate among "fragile family" couples--the targets for
healthy marriages programs--is only around 2 percent. This represents one-tenth of the domestic abuse level found among current welfare mothers. By
helping these couples build enduring and harmonious relationships, the Healthy Marriage Initiative can substantially reduce future domestic abuse. What the
Fragile Families Survey Shows The Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study provides the best information about the low-income couples who would be
the focal point of the President's Healthy Marriage Initiative. The study, which has been conducted by a team of researchers at Princeton University's Center
for Research on Child Wellbeing and Columbia University's Social Indicators Survey Center, is a joint academic survey of new parents. The study is based
on a nationally representative sample of parents--both married and unmarried--at the time of a child's birth.6 Overall, the Fragile Families Survey reveals
much surprising information.       * Most out-of-wedlock births occur among young adult women--not teenagers in high school. The median age for women
having children out of wedlock is 22. * Roughly half of unmarried mothers were cohabiting with the child's father at the time of the baby's birth. Nearly
75 percent were romantically involved with the father at the time of the child's birth. * Very few unmarried fathers had drug or alcohol problems. About
98 percent of fathers had been employed during the prior year. Overall, the median annual income of the unmarried fathers was $17,500. * Most of the
unmarried couples had a strong interest in marriage: Approximately 73 percent of mothers and 88 percent of fathers believed that they had at least a 50-50
chance of marrying each other in the future. * Among all the unmarried couples in the Fragile Families Survey, the domestic violence rate was 4 percent;
however, among the roughly 75 percent of unmarried couples who were cohabiting or romantically involved, the domestic violence rate was lower--1.8
percent. These cohabiting and romantically involved couples would be the main target group of healthy-marriage programs. Marriage as a Protective
Institution Contrary to the views of the NOW Legal Defense Fund, marriage tends to protect women from domestic abuse rather than increasing it. In
general, domestic violence is more common in cohabiting relationships than in marriages. Analysis from the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS),
administered by the Department of Justice, also shows that mothers who are, or have been, married are far less likely to suffer from violent crime than are
mothers who have never married. Specifically, data from the NCVS survey show that:7          * Marriage dramatically reduces the risk that mothers will suffer
from domestic abuse. The incidence of abuse by a spouse, boyfriend, or domestic partner is twice as high among mothers who have never been married as it
is among mothers who have been married (including those who have separated or divorced). * Marriage dramatically reduces the prospect that mothers
will suffer from violent crime in general at the hands of intimate acquaintances or of strangers. Mothers who have never married--including those who are
single and living either alone or with a boyfriend, and those who are cohabiting with their child's father--are twice as likely to be victims of violent crime as
are mothers who have been married.9 The pattern of cohabiting relationships among low-income women is a major factor in the increased risk for partner
violence. More than half of all children in poverty come from homes with a never-married mother, and nearly two-thirds of welfare dependence occurs
among households with mothers who have never married. By intervening at an early point in the lives of women, marriage programs would seek to break
this cycle of cohabitation and out-of-wedlock childbearing. They would provide the skills and training needed to help women form loving, stable, and
committed relationships before becoming pregnant or moving in with a violent or abusive partner. The 1996 welfare reform law established national goals
of reducing out-of-wedlock childbearing and increasing two-parent families. President Bush's Healthy Marriage Initiative would seek to meet these original


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                                                                                                                                                                    14
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Yu Jin Jung and Matthew Chernick + The Marriage Aff Team

                      Incentives Good – A2: Incentives Bad – Frontline [2/2]
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goals of welfare reform by proposing--as part of welfare reauthorization--a new model program to promote strong marriages. His proposed program would
seek to increase healthy marriage by providing at-risk individuals and couples with:  * Accurate information on the value of marriage in the lives of men,
women, and children; * Marriage-skills education that will enable couples to reduce conflict and increase the happiness and longevity of their
relationships; and * Experimental reductions in the financial penalties against marriage that are currently contained in all federal welfare programs. All
participation in the President's marriage program would be voluntary. The initiative would utilize existing marriage-skills
education programs that have proven effective in decreasing conflict and increasing happiness and stability among couples.
These programs have also been shown to be effective in reducing domestic violence.11 The pro-marriage initiative would not
merely seek to increase marriage rates among target couples, but would also provide ongoing support to help at-risk couples
maintain healthy marriages over time. A well-designed marriage initiative would target participants early in their lives, when attitudes and
relationships are initially being formed. Typically, such marriage-promotion programs would provide information to at-risk high school students about the
long-term value of marriage. They would teach relationship skills to unmarried adult couples before the women become pregnant--with a focus on
preventing pregnancy before couples have made a commitment to healthy marriages. The programs would also provide marriage-skills training and
relationship education to unmarried couples at the "magic moment" of a child's birth and would offer marriage-skills training to low-income married couples
to improve the quality of their marriage and to reduce the likelihood of divorce. The primary focus of these marriage programs would be
preventative, not reparative. They would seek to prevent the isolation and poverty of welfare mothers by intervening at an
early point, before a pattern of broken relationships and welfare dependence has emerged. By fostering better life decisions
and stronger relationship skills, marriage programs can increase child well-being and adult happiness and reduce child
poverty and welfare dependence. Critics of the President's initiative often claim that there is no evidence showing that the marriage education
                                          Ddfjdfkjbsdjkfbjsdfbjkdbj




and enrichment programs envisioned by the Healthy Marriage Initiative would work. This charge is simply false. There is overwhelming evidence that
programs that provide marriage-skills training help couples to increase happiness, improve their relationships, and avoid negative behaviors that can lead to
marital breakup. No fewer than 29 peer-reviewed social-science journal articles provide ample evidence (from actual experience) that marriage education,
training, and counseling programs--some of which have been around for more than 30 years--have significantly strengthened the marriages of the couples
that have taken advantage of such programs.12 These studies--integrating findings from well over 100 separate evaluations--show that a wide variety of
marriage-strengthening programs can reduce strife, improve communication, increase parenting skills, increase stability, and enhance marital happiness. *
One analysis--referred to by scientists as a "meta-analysis"--integrated 85 studies involving nearly 4,000 couples enrolled in more than 20 different marriage-
enrichment programs. It found that the average couple, after participating in a program, was better off than more than two-thirds of couples that did not
participate.13 * A 1999 meta-analysis of 16 studies of one of the oldest marriage-enhancement programs, Couple Communication, observed meaningful
program effects with regard to numerous measures: Couples who took the training experienced moderate-to-large gains in communication skills, marital
satisfaction, and other relationship qualities.14 For example, in the critical area of marital communication, the average Couple Communication-trained
participants outperformed 83 percent of couples who had not participated in the program. * An analysis of the Relationship Enhancement program shows
that it significantly improves marital relationships. As a result of the program, participating couples reported better relationships than 83 percent of couples
that did not participate. (Participants in the Relationship Enhancement program were predominantly lower-income couples.) * A study conducted in 2002
documents the effectiveness of premarital inventory questionnaires and counseling in preventing marital distress. This approach yielded a 52 percent
increase in the number of couples classified as "most satisfied" with their relationship. Among the remaining couples, more than half reported improved
assessments of their relationship. Among the highest-risk couples, more than 80 percent moved up into a more "positive" category.15 * A 1993 meta-
analysis of marriage and family counseling noted that, among 71 studies that compared the results of counseling to no-counseling, couples who participated
in marriage counseling were better off than 70 percent of couples that did not participate in counseling.16 * An extensive review of the literature on the
effectiveness of marital counseling in preventing separation and divorce found dozens of studies demonstrating that counseling was effective in reducing
conflict and increasing marital satisfaction.17 This scientific research demonstrates that marriage programs--whether they are called marital preparation,
enhancement, counseling, or skills training--are effective. These studies make a strong case that marriages are not merely enabled to survive, but can also
thrive when couples learn the skills necessary to make their relationships work. Moreover, the research shows that these programs are effective in a variety
of socioeconomic classes. Polls also indicate that the overwhelming majority of low-income couples that are at risk for out-of-wedlock childbearing or
marital breakup would like to participate in programs that would help them improve their relationships. The institution of marriage has been shown to be
overwhelmingly beneficial to children, adults, and society. However, for more than 50 years, government policy has discouraged marriage through the
penalties inherent in the means-tested welfare system. There is now a broad consensus that this trend should be reversed and that government should
promote healthy marriage. Marriage promotion has the potential to significantly decrease poverty and dependence, increase child well-being and adult
happiness, and provide the safest environment for women and children . Opponents of the President's Healthy Marriage Initiative, who
claim that such a program would force women into violent and dangerous relationships by coercing or encouraging them to
get married, misrepresent the goals of the program. By specifically targeting young adult men and women and at-risk high
school students with information about the long-term value of marriage, marriage programs are preventative, not reparative,
in nature. They seek to prevent the isolation and poverty of welfare mothers by intervening at an early point, before a pattern
of broken relationships and welfare dependence has emerged. By fostering better life decisions and stronger relationship
skills, marriage programs can increase the well-being of both children and adults and can reduce the likelihood of poverty,
welfare dependence, and violent relationships.




                                                                                                                                                                   15
Marriage Incentives Neg
DDW 2009
Yu Jin Jung and Matthew Chernick + The Marriage Aff Team

                                Incentives Good – A2: Incentives Fail
A Claim that Marriage Incentive doesn’t work is false-------these studies prove
Robert Rector and Melissa G. Pardue, Senior Research Fellow and Policy Analyst in the Domestic Policy Studies
Department at the Heritage Foundation, March 30, 2004, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Family/bg1744.cfm

Critics of the President's initiative often claim that there is no evidence showing that the marriage education and enrichment
programs envisioned by the Healthy Marriage Initiative would work. This charge is simply false. There is overwhelming
evidence that programs that provide marriage-skills training help couples to increase happiness, improve their relationships,
and avoid negative behaviors that can lead to marital breakup.

No fewer than 29 peer-reviewed social-science journal articles provide ample evidence (from actual experience) that
marriage education, training, and counseling programs--some of which have been around for more than 30 years--have
significantly strengthened the marriages of the couples that have taken advantage of such programs. These studies--
integrating findings from well over 100 separate evaluations--show that a wide variety of marriage-strengthening programs
can reduce strife, improve communication, increase parenting skills, increase stability, and enhance marital happiness.

   * One analysis--referred to by scientists as a "meta-analysis"--integrated 85 studies involving nearly 4,000 couples enrolled
in more than 20 different marriage-enrichment programs. It found that the average couple, after participating in a program,
was better off than more than two-thirds of couples that did not participate.
   * A 1999 meta-analysis of 16 studies of one of the oldest marriage-enhancement programs, Couple Communication,
observed meaningful program effects with regard to numerous measures: Couples who took the training experienced
moderate-to-large gains in communication skills, marital satisfaction, and other relationship qualities.14 For example, in the
critical area of marital communication, the average Couple Communication-trained participants outperformed 83 percent of
couples who had not participated in the program.
   * An analysis of the Relationship Enhancement program shows that it significantly improves marital relationships. As a
result of the program, participating couples reported better relationships than 83 percent of couples that did not participate.
(Participants in the Relationship Enhancement program were predominantly lower-income couples.)
   * A study conducted in 2002 documents the effectiveness of premarital inventory questionnaires and counseling in
preventing marital distress. This approach yielded a 52 percent increase in the number of couples classified as "most
satisfied" with their relationship. Among the remaining couples, more than half reported improved assessments of their
relationship. Among the highest-risk couples, more than 80 percent moved up into a more "positive" category.

         Marriage Incentive Programs Positive-Break Cycle of Poverty and Isolation
         Rector, Pardue, and Noyes, '03, The Heritage Foundation,
         http://www.heritage.org/Research/Welfare/BG1677.cfm#pgfId-1046600

         Typically, such marriage-promotion programs would provide information about the long-term value of marriage
         to at-risk high school students. They would teach relationship skills to unmarried couples before the woman
         became pregnant, with a focus on preventing pregnancy before a couple has made a commitment to healthy
         marriage; they would also provide marriage and relationship education to unmarried couples at the "magic
         moment" of a child's birth and offer marriage-skills training to low-income married couples to improve marriage
         quality and reduce the odds of divorce.
         The primary focus of these marriage programs would be preventative, not reparative. They would seek to
         prevent the isolation and poverty of welfare mothers by intervening at an early point before a pattern of broken
         relationships and welfare dependence had emerged. By fostering better life decisions and stronger relationship
         skills, marriage programs can increase child well-being and adult happiness and reduce child poverty and
         welfare dependence.




                                                                                                                                   16
Marriage Incentives Neg
DDW 2009
Yu Jin Jung and Matthew Chernick + The Marriage Aff Team

                              Incentives Good – A2: Incentives Fail
Marriage promotion incentives are actually an effective solution to poverty – marriage increases
income and helps children grow up with less poverty.

Jennifer Garrett, a researcher in domestic policy studies for The Heritage Foundation, a
Washington-based public policy research institute, 03/22/02, “Let Them Eat Their Words ?
Marriage Reduces Poverty,” http://www.heritage.org/research/family/wm88.cfm
  The Alternatives to Marriage Project (ATMP) and several women's groups oppose President Bush's plan to
  include marriage promotion in welfare reauthorization, claiming that marriage promoting policies harm more
  children and families than they help.
  Their newly released report, "Let Them Eat Wedding Rings: The Role Of Marriage Promotion in Welfare Reform,"
  comments on the misguided attempts to end poverty by using welfare dollars to promote marriage. The report falsely
  concludes that marriage is not an effective solution to poverty and that there is no clear relationship between
  marriage rates and child poverty.
  This is quite to the contrary. In fact, studies show that the fastest way to escape poverty is to get married. On
  the contrary, the fastest way into poverty is divorce. The reason: two incomes are better than one. Or in the
  case where a spouse is unemployed, one income is better than none. A child born and raised outside of
  marriage will spend 51 percent of his childhood in poverty. By contrast, a child born inside marriage and
  raised by both parents in an intact marriage will spend only 7 percent of his childhood in poverty. And a child
  raised by a never-married mother is more than 7 times more likely to be poor than a child raised in an intact
  marriage. Children who grow up with absent fathers are also more likely to drop out of school, become
  addicted to drugs, have a child out-of-wedlock, or end up in prison. But instead of embracing these findings,
  women's groups such as the ATMP choose to repudiate them, in an attempt to preserve their own "marriage to
  the government."

TANF marriage promotion incentives lead to less dependence on welfare funds and encourage
healthy, stable relationships.

Jennifer Garrett, a researcher in domestic policy studies for The Heritage Foundation, a
Washington-based public policy research institute, 03/22/02, “Let Them Eat Their Words?
Marriage Reduces Poverty,” http://www.heritage.org/research/family/wm88.cfm
  These studies illustrate the importance of encouraging healthy marriages and two-parent married families as a major
  goal of welfare reform. Which is why the President's plan directs up to $300 million in block grants to states for
  programs that encourage healthy, stable marriages. These programs include pre-marital education and
  counseling, as well as research and technical assistance into promising approaches that work.
  Too many Americans have been injured by helping hand of the state. The welfare system has become the enemy of
  individual effort and responsibility, with dependence passed from one generation to the next. Overall caseloads
  increased substantially over the last 30 years. Between 1965 and 1995, federal and state spending on the poor
  increased from around $40 billion to more than $350 billion a year. Yet, during the same 30-year period, we've
  made virtually no progress in reducing child poverty. Perhaps it's time to try something else. Perhaps it's time to
  change the system that rewards failure and punishes success; that encourages dependency and illegitimacy and
  discourages marriage and work. Many welfare recipients will concur. In fact, the majority of former welfare
  families feel that it is more rewarding to be a responsible citizen than a welfare client; it is better to be a
  breadwinner respected by your family. And despite what ATMP believes, most women don't want to be married
  to the government. They want to be free to make their own decisions, choose their own destiny, and make their
  children's lives better - without the government encroachment. Raising children by themselves is an incredibly
  difficult job. In many cases, their lives and their children lives would be better if they and the fathers of their
  children were united in marriage. The government is no substitute for a spouse.
  Which is why welfare reform's priorities should be the reduction of dependency and poverty through work and
  marriage. We must face the impact of deteriorating marriage forthrightly. There is no better time to start than now. So let
  the ATMP eat their words. After all, it's only themselves they're hurting.

                                                                                                                                17
Marriage Incentives Neg
DDW 2009
Yu Jin Jung and Matthew Chernick + The Marriage Aff Team

         Incentives Good – AT: Marriage Incentives good for Economy
  Marriage has economic incentives on to itself
  Lerman, Urban Institute, '02, http://www.urban.org/publications/310499.html

  Married-couple families with children have much higher living standards and are less poor than other families.
  Although this observation tells us little about poverty's causes, research shows that additional marriages would likely
  reduce poverty, especially among low-income women. As shown in two recent simulation studies, marriages among
  unwed parents could reduce child poverty by as much as 25 percent (Lerman 1996; Thomas and Sawhill 2001).
  Among unwed mothers, marriage's positive effect on poverty rates appears greater among women at higher risk of
  being poor than among women at lower risk of being poor (Lichter, Graefe, and Brown 2001).
  Marriage appears to benefit cohabiting-couple households as well as single parents. Even among lower-income
  families, married parents with children have a higher standard of living than single parents or cohabiting couples (see
  figure). Not surprisingly, children in married-couple families are less likely to face material hardship (such as
  inadequate food) than children in single-parent families. However, children in cohabiting-couple households also
  suffer more material hardship than children in married-parent families, despite the presence of two potential earners.
  Among couples with the same earning capacity, the economic advantages of marriage over cohabiting remain
  significant (Lerman 2001).
  These research findings make marriage promotion programs worth investigating. They also make policies
  discouraging marriage hard to justify. Often, benefit programs indirectly reduce or eliminate marriage's economic
  benefits. Among poor nonmarital families who wed, "marriage penalties" can arise because the couple's combined
  income causes benefits to phase out at a faster rate. Congress has taken initial steps to solve this problem. In , for
  example, it changed the income caps for the earned income tax credit (EITC); the credit now phases out at a higher
  income level for married couples than for single parents.
  But significant disincentives remain: Consider an unmarried mother with two children earning $13,000 annually who
  lives with a man earning $13,000 per year. Through the couple's marriage, the family loses about $3,000 in EITC and
  food stamp benefits. Although marriage sometimes increases a family's benefits, among low-income couples marriage
  penalties are more common.
  Greater progress in eliminating marriage penalties would send a consistent, positive message to couples. Though the
  impact of such changes is uncertain, one recent experiment found that changing income support programs to offer
  better marriage incentives reduced divorce and increased marriage (Miller et al. 2000). Such measures, however, can
  be costly and are less transparent to the public than programs directly promoting marriage




                                                                                                                            18
Marriage Incentives Neg
DDW 2009
Yu Jin Jung and Matthew Chernick + The Marriage Aff Team

                                     Incentives Good – Abuse [1/2]
President’s Healthy Marriage initiative increases stability of marriage and decreases abuse.
Robert Rector and Melissa G. Pardue, Senior Research Fellow and Policy Analyst in the Domestic Policy Studies
Department at the Heritage Foundation, March 30, 2004, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Family/bg1744.cfm

In the United States today, one child in three is born outside of marriage. The decline of marriage is a prominent cause of
child poverty, welfare dependence, and many other social problems. In response to these concerns, President George W.
Bush has proposed the Healthy Marriage Initiative to promote and encourage strong marriages. The proposed program
would provide $300 million annually in federal and state Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) money to state-
level programs that promote marriage and marriage skills, particularly among low-income and "fragile" families. All
participation in the President's marriage program would be voluntary. The program would utilize existing marriage-skills
education that has proven effective in decreasing conflict--and increasing happiness and stability--among target couples.
However, critics of the President's Healthy Marriage Initiative often assert that such a program would encourage or force
vulnerable women into violent and dangerous relationships. Specifically, critics argue that a substantial portion of many low-
income women who would participate in the marriage program are in abusive relationships and that the program would push
women into marriages with abusive men, thereby increasing the rate of domestic abuse. These arguments by opponents of
the Healthy Marriage Initiative are erroneous for a number of reasons: 1. Marriage-education programs that would be
funded under the President's Healthy Marriage Initiative have been shown to reduce--not increase--domestic abuse. 2. The
primary target groups for the healthy marriage programs would be unmarried couples at the time of a child's birth, or young,
at-risk couples prior to a child's conception. The rate of domestic abuse in these groups is extremely low--around 2 percent.
3. The prevalence of domestic abuse among low-income women is often exaggerated by the use of statistics regarding
whether or not a woman has ever been abused in her lifetime rather than whether or not abuse is occurring within a current
romantic relationship. 4. Critics incorrectly assume that the target population for the Healthy Marriage Initiative would be
older, single mothers in the TANF program. Typically, older welfare mothers have already severed ties with the fathers of
their children. Such relationships have often been dead for several years: These mothers, therefore, are not good candidates
for a marriage program. Rather, healthy marriage programs would seek to improve the stability and quality of relationships
for low-income women at a younger age. Couples at this stage of life--generally termed "fragile families"--have relatively
good prospects for entering into healthy, stable marriages.        The rate of domestic violence among these couples is low--
around 2 percent. Although the rate of current abuse suffered by older mothers on welfare is far higher--around 20 to 30
percent)--as noted, these women would not be a target group of the Healthy Marriage Initiative.        Thus, the assertion that
welfare mothers experience high rates of domestic abuse is irrelevant to an assessment of the prospects of the Healthy
Marriage Initiative. By intervening at a younger age, the Healthy Marriage Initiative would seek to improve the well-being of
children and to reduce future child poverty and welfare dependence.

Turn – Marriage lowers Domestic Abuse--------the couples that participated in the program had
less abuse than the non-participated couples.
Robert Rector and Melissa G. Pardue, Senior Research Fellow and Policy Analyst in the Domestic Policy Studies
Department at the Heritage Foundation, March 30, 2004, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Family/bg1744.cfm

   * Marriage dramatically reduces the risk that mothers will suffer from domestic abuse. The incidence of abuse by a spouse,
boyfriend, or domestic partner is twice as high among mothers who have never been married as it is among mothers who
have been married (including those who have separated or divorced).
   * Marriage dramatically reduces the prospect that mothers will suffer from violent crime in general at the hands of intimate
acquaintances or of strangers. Mothers who have never married--including those who are single and living either alone or
with a boyfriend, and those who are cohabiting with their child's father--are twice as likely to be victims of violent crime as
are mothers who have been married.




                                                                                                                                  19
Marriage Incentives Neg
DDW 2009
Yu Jin Jung and Matthew Chernick + The Marriage Aff Team

                                      Incentives Good – Abuse [2/2]
Incentives good – education programs help abusive marriages.
Robert Rector and Melissa G. Pardue, Senior Research Fellow and Policy Analyst in the Domestic Policy Studies
Department at the Heritage Foundation, March 30, 2004, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Family/bg1744.cfm

5. Many low-income mothers are trapped in patterns of serial cohabitation, moving through a sequence of fractured, failed
relationships with men. Domestic violence is most likely to occur within this pattern of serial cohabitation. The Healthy
Marriage Initiative could help prevent couples from falling prey to this destructive pattern by providing them with the
knowledge and skills needed to build healthy, stable relationships. The proper time for such training is when couples are at a
relatively young age--either prior to a child's conception or at the time of a child's birth--before self-defeating patterns of
distrust and acrimony have developed.

   By helping couples to avoid the pitfalls of serial failed relationships, the Healthy Marriage Initiative will substantially
reduce, rather than increase, domestic violence. Indeed, unless couples are equipped with the skills they need to develop
healthy relationships, it is difficult to imagine how the current rates of domestic violence in low-income communities can be
reduced.

  6. Prototype healthy marriage programs, such as the Oklahoma Marriage Initiative, have not led to increases in domestic
violence. In Oklahoma, more than 14,000 individuals have received training, but not a single instance of domestic abuse
linked to the program has been reported. The marriage initiative works closely with local domestic violence prevention
groups, and these groups have made no complaints regarding the operation of the program.

Marriage key to keep women and children from being abused.
Robert E. Rector, (Robert Rector is a leading national authority on poverty, the U.S.welfare system and immigration and is
a Heritage Foundation Senior Research Fellow.) Patrick F. Fagan, (A former Deputy Assistant Health and Human Services
Secretary, Patrick Fagan examines the impact of family life and religious practice on the key areas of social policy: health,
mental health, education crime and income.) Kirk A. Johnson, (senior policy analyst for the Heritage Foundation, has held
research positions at George Mason University, the U.S. Census Bureau, the Mackinac Center for Public Policy, and the
University of North Texas.) March 9, 2004. http://www.heritage.org/Research/Family/bg1732.cfm

The institution that most strongly protects mothers and children from domestic abuse and violent crime is marriage.
Analysis of ten years worth of findings from the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS), which the U.S. Department
of Justice (DOJ) has conducted since 1973, demonstrates that mothers who are or ever have been married are far less
likely to suffer from violent crime than are mothers who never marry.
Specifically, data from the NCVS survey show that:
Married women with children suffer far less abuse than single mothers. In fact, the rate of spousal, boyfriend, or
domestic partner abuse is twice as high among mothers who have never been married as it is among mothers who
have ever married (including those separated or divorced).
Married women with children are far less likely to suffer from violent crime in general or at the hands of intimate
acquaintances or strangers. Mothers who have never married--including those who are single and living either alone or
with a boyfriend and those who are cohabiting with their child's father--are more than twice as likely to be victims of
violent crime than are mothers who have ever married.
Other social science surveys demonstrate that marriage is the safest place for children as well. For example:
Children of divorced or never-married mothers are six to 30 times more likely to suffer from serious child abuse than
are children raised by both biological parents in marriage.2
Without question, marriage is the safest place for a mother and her children to live, both at home and in the larger
community. Nevertheless, current government policy is either indifferent to or actively hostile to the institution of marriage.
The welfare system, for example, can penalize low-income parents who decide to marry. Such hostility toward marriage is
poor public policy; government instead should foster healthy and enduring marriages, which would have many benefits for
mothers and children, including reducing domestic violence.



                                                                                                                                  20
Marriage Incentives Neg
DDW 2009
Yu Jin Jung and Matthew Chernick + The Marriage Aff Team

                    Incentives Good – Abuse – A2: Incentives Bad [1/2]
Target Women are not abused-----in fact, they are less abused than other married couples.
Robert Rector and Melissa G. Pardue, Senior Research Fellow and Policy Analyst in the Domestic Policy Studies
Department at the Heritage Foundation, March 30, 2004, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Family/bg1744.cfm

Opponents of the President's Healthy Marriage Initiative claim that the policy will target women who are likely to be in
abusive relationships. Critics also charge that the marriage program will push these vulnerable women further into dangerous
and violent relationships and possibly even endanger their lives. For example, the NOW Legal Defense Fund asserts:

   Because of the prevalence of intimate violence among women receiving public assistance, promotion of marriage will
jeopardize the safety and lives of women and children. As many as 60 percent of welfare recipients are survivors of domestic
violence. Marriage-promotion programs, which target a population that is made up to such a large degree of women who are
domestic violence survivors, can have disastrous results.... [I]f [the healthy marriage initiative] goes forward, survivors may
well be coerced into abusive marriages that they may not survive.3

These ominous claims are based on a misunderstanding of marriage-promotion programs and the characteristics of the
couples who would participate in them. First, the figure that 60 percent of welfare mothers are "survivors of domestic
violence" indicates that a high percentage of welfare mothers have experienced some level of domestic violence at some
point during their lives; it does not mean that 60 percent of welfare mothers are experiencing violence in a current
relationship. The figures for current (or recent) domestic abuse among welfare mothers are considerably lower: Some 20
percent to 30 percent have experienced violence in a current relationship or within the past year. 4 While these figures are
still regrettably high, they indicate that most welfare mothers, at present, are not in abusive relationships.

Furthermore, participation in marriage programs will be voluntary; no one will be "coerced" to participate. In addition,
marriage-promotion programs do not assume that all relationships should be saved. In fact, rather than pushing women
further into abusive relationships, the programs would urge women to leave situations where significant abuse is occurring.
Marriage education programs teach couples how to resolve disagreements peacefully: A primary effect of these programs is
to de-escalate conflict and significantly reduce strife and acrimony within relationships. Consequently, the programs have
been shown to reduce domestic violence, not increase it.

The NOW Legal Defense Fund also incorrectly assumes that the main target group of the Healthy Marriage Initiative would
be older, single mothers on welfare (i.e., mothers enrolled in the TANF program). However, because most older welfare
mothers have relationships with the fathers of their children that collapsed years ago, they would not be a suitable target
group for marriage-promotion programs. Instead, the Healthy Marriage Initiative will provide skills to unmarried couples
before their relationships turn bitter and acrimonious. By providing skills training at an early stage in a relationship,
marriage-promotion programs will help couples to build happy and stable families in the future.


Target Women are neither teenage students nor abused severely-----couples participates in this
program have strong interest in marriage.
Robert Rector and Melissa G. Pardue, Senior Research Fellow and Policy Analyst in the Domestic Policy Studies
Department at the Heritage Foundation, March 30, 2004, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Family/bg1744.cfm

    Most out-of-wedlock births occur among young adult women--not teenagers in high school. The median age for women
having children out of wedlock is 22.
   * Roughly half of unmarried mothers were cohabiting with the child's father at the time of the baby's birth. Nearly 75
percent were romantically involved with the father at the time of the child's birth.
   * Very few unmarried fathers had drug or alcohol problems. About 98 percent of fathers had been employed during the
prior year. Overall, the median annual income of the unmarried fathers was $17,500.
   * Most of the unmarried couples had a strong interest in marriage: Approximately 73 percent of mothers and 88 percent of
fathers believed that they had at least a 50-50 chance of marrying each other in the future.


                                                                                                                                  21
Marriage Incentives Neg
DDW 2009
Yu Jin Jung and Matthew Chernick + The Marriage Aff Team

                   Incentives Good – Abuse – A2: Incentives Bad [2/2]
Can’t solve from domestic abuse – statistic prove non-married mothers also suffer
Robert E. Rector, (Robert Rector is a leading national authority on poverty, the U.S.welfare system and immigration and is
a Heritage Foundation Senior Research Fellow.) Patrick F. Fagan, (A former Deputy Assistant Health and Human Services
Secretary, Patrick Fagan examines the impact of family life and religious practice on the key areas of social policy: health,
mental health, education crime and income.) Kirk A. Johnson, (senior policy analyst for the Heritage Foundation, has held
research positions at George Mason University, the U.S. Census Bureau, the Mackinac Center for Public Policy, and the
University of North Texas.) March 9, 2004. http://www.heritage.org/Research/Family/bg1732.cfm

The DOJ's National Crime Victimization Survey collects data on victimization through an ongoing survey of a nationally
representative sample of Americans. The survey defines violent crime as rape, sexual assault, robbery, aggravated
assault, and simple assault. Domestic or intimate abuse is defined as violent crimes performed by a spouse, former
spouse, boyfriend, or former boyfriend.3
Ten years of NCVS data (from 1992 to 2001) reveal interesting patterns among mothers (ages 20-50) with children under the
age of 12.4 Specifically:
Never-married mothers experience more domestic abuse. Among those who have ever married (those married,
divorced, or separated), the annual rate of domestic violence is 12.9 per 1,000 mothers. Among mothers who have
never married, the annual domestic violence rate is 26.3 per 1,000.
Thus, never-married mothers suffer domestic violence at more than twice the rate of mothers who have been or currently are
married. (See Chart 1).
Never-married mothers suffer more violent crime. The NCVS provides data on total violent crime against mothers
with children under the age of 12. Total violent crime covers rape, sexual assault, robbery, aggravated assault, and
simple assault committed against the mother by any party. Total violent crime covers violence against mothers by former
and current spouses and boyfriends as well as by relatives, acquaintances, and strangers.

As Chart 2 shows, never-married
mothers with children suffer from overall violent crime at an annual rate of 38.5 crimes per 1,000 mothers. Never-married
mothers with children, by contrast, suffer 81.0 violent crimes per 1,000 mothers.
Thus, never-married mothers experience violent crime at more than twice the rate of ever-married mothers. Based on
these data, the institution of marriage best shelters mothers from the specter of violence.

These differences in crime rates across married versus single mothers are statistically significant.5




                                                                                                                                22
Marriage Incentives Neg
DDW 2009
Yu Jin Jung and Matthew Chernick + The Marriage Aff Team

                                   Incentives Good – Poverty [1/2]
Marriage incentives good: poverty.
Emily Amick, The Nation, March 6, 2007, “Marrying Absurd: The Bush Administration's attempts to
encourage marriage,” http://www.thenation.com/doc/20070319/marrying
  Bush argues that strengthening marriage is important because it is in the best interest of children. In a 2003
  speech announcing Marriage Protection Week, Bush said, "Research has shown that, on average, children raised
  in households headed by married parents fare better than children who grow up in other family structures....
  By supporting responsible child-rearing and strong families, my administration is seeking to ensure that every child
  can grow up in a safe and loving home." Advocates for marriage promotion programs frame this issue, like many
  other "family values" issues, as a decision about which women must make the "right" choice if they are to be
  good mothers. The interplay between marriage and child well-being has been subject to debate in the cultural
  zeitgeist for the past decade. Theodora Ooms, a consultant for the Center for Law and Social Policy, told Campus
  Progress that there is strong scientific evidence for the long-term benefits of growing up in a stable, two-parent
  household on children, even taking socioeconomic differences into consideration. Compared to children raised
  by their biological parents, children who are born out of wedlock or whose parents divorce are more likely to
  have behavioral and emotional problems, have lower academic achievement, use drugs, and end up on welfare
  as adults. In their book Growing Up with a Single Parent, sociologists Sarah McLanahan and Gary Sandefur also
  conclude that divorce and single parenthood diminish children's well-being.

Marriage incentives good: poverty.
Robert Rector, leading national authority on poverty, the U.S.welfare system and immigration and
Heritage Foundation Senior Research Fellow, 2006, “Marriage Promotion,”
http://www.heritage.org/research/features/issues/issuearea/marriagepromotion.cfm
  Marriage is a fundamental social institution, deeply rooted in all societies, that has been tested and reaffirmed
  over thousands of years. The erosion of the institution of marriage over the past four decades has had large-scale
  negative effects on children and adults and lies at the heart of many social problems with which government is
  currently grappling. The beneficial effects of marriage, both for individuals and for society, are beyond
  reasonable dispute. There is a broad and growing consensus that government policy should promote rather
  than discourage healthy marriage. Recommendations                 * Expand President George W. Bush’s Healthy Marriage
  Initiative. Despite the fact that the landmark 1996 welfare reform legislation set forth clear goals to increase the
  number of two-parent married families and reduce out-of-wedlock childbearing, little has been done to promote and
  encourage healthy marriage. Out of more than $100 billion available to states over the past seven years through the
  federal Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) program, only 0.02 percent ($20 million) has been spent
  promoting healthy marriage. President Bush’s Healthy Marriage Initiative, designed to implement welfare reform’s
  original goal of strengthening marriage, would spend one cent to promote healthy marriage for every $7 spent
  subsidizing single parents. This program was enacted in February 2006.           The Healthy Marriage Initiative will
  provide individuals and couples with information on the value of marriage to men, women, and children; teach
  conflict resolution skills that will increase marital happiness and stability; and experiment in reducing the financial
  penalties against marriage among welfare programs. All participation in the program would be voluntary. The primary
  focus of these marriage programs would be preventative, not reparative. They would seek to prevent the isolation
  and poverty of welfare mothers by intervening at an early point before a pattern of broken relationships and
  welfare dependence had emerged. By fostering better life decisions and stronger relationship skills, marriage
  programs can increase child well-being and adult happiness and reduce child poverty and welfare dependence.
  Congress should promote healthy marriage within other social service programs that address problems related
  to the collapse of marriage, such as domestic violence programs within the Department of Justice. * Reduce
  penalties for married couples under government means-tested welfare programs. All government means-tested
  programs (such as the welfare system) penalize marriage financially. This lamentable public policy must be reversed.
  While it is difficult to eliminate the anti-marriage bias fully in programs such as the welfare system, it is possible to
  reduce it. The most effective way to do so would be to increase the value of the Earned Income Tax Credit for married
  couples with children.

                                                                                                                              23
Marriage Incentives Neg
DDW 2009
Yu Jin Jung and Matthew Chernick + The Marriage Aff Team

                                  Incentives Good – Poverty [2/2]

Marriage incentives good: poverty.
Gene Falk and Jill Tauber, Domestic Social Policy Division at the Congressional Research Service,
October 30, 2001, “Welfare Reform: TANF Provisions Related to Marriage and Two-Parent Families,”
https://www.policyarchive.org/bitstream/handle/10207/1292/RL31170_20011030.pdf?sequence=1
  Welfare Recipients Who Marry. Marriage is one of the routes off of welfare. TANF “leaver” studies indicate that
  between 2% and 9% of those who left welfare recently did so because of marriage.11 A new spouse often brings
  additional income to the family, making its income too high for further assistance. Though a TANF recipient might
  marry someone who is a biological parent of her children (or at least one child), she might also marry someone else
  who would become a stepparent to her children.

Marriage incentives good: poverty.
Gene Falk and Jill Tauber, Domestic Social Policy Division at the Congressional Research Service,
October 30, 2001, “Welfare Reform: TANF Provisions Related to Marriage and Two-Parent Families,”
https://www.policyarchive.org/bitstream/handle/10207/1292/RL31170_20011030.pdf?sequence=1

  The impact of welfare policies on discouraging or encouraging marriage has long been a topic of discussion. Welfare
  programs, by providing single parents with the economic means to support their children, are thought to
  discourage marriage by their nature.1 The negative economic effects of single motherhood are well-known. In
  2000, the poverty rate for children raised in female-headed families was 39% compared with 8% for children
  raised in married couple families.2

Marriage incentives good: poverty.
Wei-Yin Hu, Department of Economics, University of California, Los Angeles, October 1998
“Marriage and Economic Incentives: Evidence from a Welfare Experiment,”
http://www.northwestern.edu/ipr/jcpr/workingpapers/wpfiles/Hu_Marriage.pdf
  “The decline of the American family” has been a catch-phrase applied to a variety of demographic trends in recent
  decades. The trend that is probably most responsible for this view is the increasing prevalence of families headed by
  unmarried women. The proportion of children living with only one parent increased from 12 percent in 1970 to 28
  percent in 1996 (U.S. Department of Commerce 1997a). Female headship is of interest to economists because it is
  highly correlated with poverty: the poverty rate for female-headed families was 33 percent in 1996 compared to
  just 6 percent for married couple families (U.S. Department of Commerce 1997b). Thus, two avenues that
  policymakers have taken to reduce poverty are to discourage women from having children out of wedlock and
  to encourage couples to stay married.1 A central policy concern is whether economic incentives can be used
  effectively toward these ends.




                                                                                                                          24
Marriage Incentives Neg
DDW 2009
Yu Jin Jung and Matthew Chernick + The Marriage Aff Team

                                          Alt. Causes to Marriage
Alternate causality to marriage—unmarried couples are likely to get married without financial
incentives.

Irwin Garfinkel, Mitchell I. Ginsberg Professor of Contemporary Urban Problems at Columbia
University, Fragile Families, Welfare Reform, and Marriage, 07/02/09,
http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2001/12childrenfamilies_mclanahan.aspx
  One of the most striking findings from the Fragile Families Study thus far is the high rate of cohabitation among
  unmarried parents. At the time of birth, half of unmarried mothers are living with the fathers of their children.
  Another third are romantically involved with the fathers, but living apart in what are called "visiting
  relationships." Eight percent of parents are "just friends" and 9 percent have "little or no contact."
  The majority of unwed parents are optimistic about their future together. Nearly three quarters of the mothers
  believe their chances of marrying the father of their child are "50-50" or better. Almost two thirds "agree" or
  "strongly agree" with the statement, "it is better for children if their parents are married." There is also strong
  consensus among unmarried parents about what qualities are necessary for successful marriage. Roughly 90 percent of
  mothers rate "husband having a steady job" and "emotional maturity" as very important qualities for a successful
  marriage. In addition, 69 percent of mothers rate "wife having a steady job" as very important.
  Most fathers are highly involved during the pregnancy and around the time of birth. According to the mothers
  surveyed, four out of five fathers provided some financial support during the pregnancy, 84 percent will have
  their name on the birth certificate, and 79 percent of the children will take the father's surname. Most fathers say they
  want to help raise their child, and the overwhelming majority of mothers say they want the fathers to be
  involved.
  At the time their child is born, the vast majority of unmarried parents are committed to each other and to their
  child. Most mothers and fathers have high hopes about their future together and most view marriage as a
  positive institution that benefits children. Clearly, these parents are likely to respond positively to programs and
  policies that promote marriage, which is good news for policymakers who favor this strategy.




                                                                                                                              25
Marriage Incentives Neg
DDW 2009
Yu Jin Jung and Matthew Chernick + The Marriage Aff Team

                               AT: Domestic Violence Advantage
Domestic violence for is declining.

Shannan Catalano, Ph.D., Bureau of Justice Statistics Statistician, 12/19/07, Bureau of Justice
Statistics, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/intimate/ipv.htm
  Intimate partner violence has been declining.
  Nonfatal intimate partner violence has declined since 1993.
  Homicides of intimates have declined, especially among male victims.
  Nonfatal violence has declined since 1993, regardless of the relationship between the victim and the offender.
  Between 1976 and 2005—the number of white females killed by intimates rose in the mid-1980's, then declined after
  1993 reaching the lowest recorded in 2002.The number fluctuated slightly after 2002.
  The number of intimate homicides for all other race and gender groups declined over the period; the number
  of black males killed by intimates dropped by 83%, white males by 61%, black females by 52%, and white
  females by 6%.
  Rates of nonfatal intimate partner violence for females who were married, divorced, separated, or never married were
  lower in 2005 than in 1993.

Married females are the least abused victims by spouses.

Shannan Catalano, Ph.D., Bureau of Justice Statistics Statistician, 12/19/07, Bureau of Justice
Statistics, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/intimate/ipv.htm
  Females who were —
  Separated reported higher rates than females of other marital status
  Married reported the lowest rates of nonfatal intimate partner violence.
  On average from 2001 to 2005, both females and males who were separated or divorced had the greatest risk of
  nonfatal intimate partner violence while persons who were married or widowed reported the lowest risk of
  violence.
  Most intimate homicides involved spouses, although in recent years the number of deaths by boyfriends and
  girlfriends was about the same.




                                                                                                                         26
Marriage Incentives Neg
DDW 2009
Yu Jin Jung and Matthew Chernick + The Marriage Aff Team

               Alt. Causes of Impact – AT: Domestic Violence Impact
Violence is not caused by gender roles, and cannot be fixed by social projects.

Cal Thomas, staff writer of the Chattanooga Times Free Press, 09/06/02, Denying Human Nature,
lexis
  Pinker believes, "The romantic notion that all evil is a product of society has justified the release of dangerous
  psychopaths who promptly murdered innocent people. And the conviction that humanity can be reshaped by
  massive social engineering projects has led to some of the greatest atrocities in history."
  Communism and Fascism are only two of the more obvious ones. Zimbabwe President Robert Mugabe, who
  denounced British Prime Minister Tony Blair in Johannesburg for Blair's criticism of him, has his own form of "ethnic
  cleansing" going as he forcibly removes white farmers from their land, handing it over to black farmers.
  Pinker skewers the liberal dogma that violence is caused by ignorance, discrimination, poverty and disease. "But this
  mantra is not based on any sound research," he writes. "Wild swings in American crime rates -- up in the 1960s and
  late 1980s, down in the late 1990s -- continue to defy any simple explanation. And the usual suspects for
  understanding violence are completely unproven and sometimes patently false."
  One after another, Pinker knocks down various social myths and explanations for violence. Noting that feminists,
  especially, have blamed the American conception of maleness for most violent acts, Pinker notes that "Spain
  has its machismo, Italy its braggadocio and Japan its rigid gender roles, yet their homicide rates are a fraction
  of that of the more feminist-influenced U.S."

International power struggle causes international conflict, not domestic violence.

Charles S. Gochman, PhD, University of Michigan, 1973, Review: Studies of International Violence:
Five Easy Pieces?, Pg. 541, The Journal of Conflict Resolution
  Once he has applied his scythe to this yielding field of popular belief, Blainey turns his hand to sowing his own
  interpretation of why states fight. His thesis is an interesting, if familiar, one. Simply put, “war is a dispute about the
  measurement of power” (p.114). Wars are most likely to occur when decision makers in rival states disagree about
  the relative power capabilities of their respective countries. Wars usually end when they reach agreement on this issue.
  In this sense, war serves the function of accurately measuring the relative power of states
  What is particularly appealing about Blainey’s arguments is its simplicity and its symmetry. He contends that wars are
  never accidental, that they “can only occur when two nations decide that they can gain more by fighting than by
  negotiating” (p.159). This is most likely to occur when decision makers overestimate, and thereby become
  overconfident about, their state’s bargaining strength. To the extent that neither side can muster a decisive power
  advantage, and so long as the intervention of additional states appears to the combatants to be improbable or incapable of
  tipping the power scales, wars are likely to be prolonged. But once a decisive power difference is established,
  hostilities will most probably cease. For, as Blainey says, “the conflicting aims of rival nations are always conflicts fo
  power” (p.150), and the decisions to resolve these issues by warlike methods, to prolong hostilities and to sue for peace
  are largely determined by assessments of relative strength.




                                                                                                                                27
Marriage Incentives Neg
DDW 2009
Yu Jin Jung and Matthew Chernick + The Marriage Aff Team

               Alt. Causes of Impact – AT: Domestic Violence Impact
Violence toward ethnic minorities causes international violence, not domestic violence toward
women.

Mary Caprioli and Peter F. Trumbore, Department of Political Science at University of Tennessee
and Oakland University, 2003, Ethnic Discrimination and Interstate Violence: Testing the
International Impact of Domestic Behavior, Journal of Peace Research, p. 8
  Given the above discussion, we contend that the treatment of ethnic minorities by the state is a potentially important
  predictor of a state’s likelihood to use force and to use force first international disputes. Van Evera (1997: 29)
  makes this connection explicit when he hypothesizes that the more severely nationalities oppress minorities living in
  their states, the greater the risk of war. Thus, in keeping with other equality-based explanations for state use of force
  internationally, we posit that states that repress or discriminate against minority groups within their territory
  exhibit domestic policies of violence and inequality that are transferred to the international arena. This
  hypothesized effect of state discrimination and violence against minorities would be an overall greater likelihood of
  violent international behavior. Such a finding would add further depth to the established literature pointing to the role
  of domestic political factors in predicting state violence at the international level.

International violence occurs because of the lack of an international authority, not domestic
violence.

Robert Jervis, Adlai E. Stevenson Professor of International Affairs at Columbia University, 1993,
Arms Control, Stability, and Causes of War, Political Science Quarterly, p. 239,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2152010
  If the main objective of arms control is to make war less likely, then any theory of arms control must rest on a theory
  of the causes of war.1 Most analysts start with the premise that the anarchical nature of the international system is
  crucial: armed conflicts occur because no higher authority can prevent them.2 This is consistent with the realist
  tradition, which has dominated American thinking since World War II. The central assumptions are that states are the
  main actors in international affairs, that the external environment is more important in determining states'
  behavior than their domestic characteristics, that this behavior was conditioned by the absence of an
  international sovereign, and that in this context states must be preoccupied with their own security.




                                                                                                                              28
Marriage Incentives Neg
DDW 2009
Yu Jin Jung and Matthew Chernick + The Marriage Aff Team

                              AT: Discrimination Advantage
Women’s sexual discrimination may be self imposed
MacKinnon ’79, Sexual Harassment of Working Women, Yale Universty Press

  Within the differences perspective, an alternative to the male standard appears to be a female
  standard: measure women by standards for women only. But the different female standard is
  implicitly but inescapably (again beucase of social inequality discrimination law purports to stand
  against) cast an inferior by comparison with the male standard, which remains the real one. So
  women come up short because when they are compared to men they are less fully male, or because
  they are measured by a set of female requirements that are shortened by definition.

Women are sexually discriminated due to the materlist side of society
Long, ’06, Social Problems, http://www.delmar.edu/socsci/rlong/problems/chap-09.htm

  The most compelling explanations of gender inequality are materialist theories that use cross-
  cultural data on the status of women and men. Materialist theories explain gender inequality as
  an outcome of how women and men are tied to the economic structure of society. Such
  theories stress control and distribution of valued resources as crucial facts in producing
  stratification.
  They point out that women's roles of mother and wife, although vital to the well-being of society,
  are devalued and also deny women access to highly valued public resources. They point out that
  gender stratification is greater where women's work is directed inward to the family and men's
  work is directed outward to trade and the marketplace (Eitzen, 2000:251).
  When women do enter the labor markets, they often are concentrated in lower-paying
  jobs. Women also enter the labor market later than men and often have to leave periodically
  because of child care responsibilities. Historically, women have had lower levels of
  education than men, but recently this trend seems to have begun to reverse.




                                                                                                        29
Marriage Incentives Neg
DDW 2009
Yu Jin Jung and Matthew Chernick + The Marriage Aff Team

                                                  AT: Patriarchy
Patriarchy is minimal or nonexistent in society and in the home.

Sharon Jayson, USA Today, 09/26/2008, At Home Women Hold the Power,
http://www.usatoday.com/money/perfi/basics/2008-09-25-gender-power-side_N.htm
  Women have the upper hand at home, a new Pew Research Center study suggests. But is it because the house and
  children always have been women's territory, or is gender equality making its way into the family household?
  The answer is as mixed as the data, experts say.
  Of 1,260 individuals surveyed in four areas of decision-making in the typical American home, women had the final
  say in 43% of couples — almost twice that of men. Yet 31% of couples volunteered the information that they
  share in the decision-making, a response that wasn't even listed on the survey.
  Sociologist and gender studies expert Michael Kimmel of Stony Brook University-New York says the responses
  suggest the path for couples is "far grayer" these days as couples weave in more equality.
  "There's far more fluidity in family decision-making around these topics than ever before, and that's the real news," he
  says. "Sometimes she makes the plans, sometimes he does. It's who has the spare time."
  Kimmel offers three ways to interpret the findings: "One is 'Only43% of women make most of the decisions.' Another
  way is 'Couples are in their homes navigating and negotiating equality far more than ever before.' A third way
  to read it is 'In both very traditional couples and in very egalitarian couples, women's sphere of influence has always
  been the family purse. She pays the bills, decides which dinner parties they go to. He goes along with family projects.'
  "
  Tiffany Winbush, 26, of Manhattan has been married for 16 months after dating her husband almost four years. She
  says she manages the family's finances because she has always been more budget-conscious.
  "I balance my checkbook every day, and my husband is a little bit more free," she says. "I decided to take the initiative
  when the bills came in."
  That move was fine with her husband, 25-year-old Amos Winbush III.
  "I never had a great interest in it, and it's tedious to go through the bills … she likes doing that sort of thing. I
  completely relinquished all of that to her," he says. "We go over bills when she's paying the bills."
  She says they never sat down and had a conversation about dividing up their decision-making. "Everything
  just really fell in place and has worked out thus far."
  In the Indianapolis family of Kathleen Schuckel, 45, Greg Andrews, 43, and their two sons, the division of labor is
  fairly typical.
  "I've tended to be the person who handles bills and finances and taxes," Andrews says. "The roles have ended up
  being more traditional, where she's more planning for meals and making sure laundry has been done. Neither of us
  would make a major purchase without talking to the other."
  Schuckel agrees. "I can't imagine making a major purchase without talking to Greg first," she says. "We're pretty
  flexible and have similar temperaments; after 18 years of marriage, we know where each other stands."
  Making decisions equally is the "socially desired response" for couples today, but it's not necessarily the reality,
  says Megan Murphy, director of the marriage and family therapy program at Iowa State University-Ames and co-
  author of a study of 72 couples that also found women in charge at home.
  "When it comes down to it, I really don't think we're there yet," she says. "People really don't make decisions equally.
  Women tend to make more decisions in terms of the home and taking care of the home and taking care of the kids.
  Men make more decisions in terms of the finances and around jobs."
  Pew also looked outside the home and found many people are just as comfortable dealing with a man or woman in
  certain jobs, including doctor, banker, lawyer, police officer, airline pilot, teacher and surgeon.
  Linda Basch, president of the New York City-based National Council for Research on Women, a network of
  research and policy centers, says the poll's responses appear to mirror our changing society.
  "It shows that increasingly men, as well as women, see women taking on leadership positions and non-
  traditional roles, and see women having important leadership traits," she says.




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Marriage Incentives Neg
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Yu Jin Jung and Matthew Chernick + The Marriage Aff Team

                                                   AT: Patriarchy
Patriarchy is caused by the lack of the presence of women in the labor force, not marriage
incentives.

Michael Ross, Associate Professor of UCLA Department of Political Science, 02/2008, Oil, Islam
and Women, American Political Science Review, Cambridge Journals
  Oil production affects gender relations by reducing the presence of women in the labor force. The failure of
  women to join the nonagricultural labor force has profound social consequences: it leads to higher fertility rates,
  less education for girls, and less female influence within the family. It also has far-reaching political consequences:
  when fewer women work outside the home, they are less likely to exchange information and overcome collective
  action problems; less likely to mobilize politically, and to lobby for expanded rights; and less likely to gain
  representation in government. This leaves oil-producing states with atypically strong patriarchal cultures and
  political institutions.1

Patriarchy is caused by underrepresentation of women politically, not marriage—patriarchy can be
solved with better strategies for acquiring political influence.

Ajeet N Mathur and Anja Salmi, Professor in Strategic Management and International Business
in the Business Policy area at the Indian Institute of Management and medical doctor, clinical
psychiatrist, and psychoanalytic psychotherapist, 09/2006, The Politics of Disharmony in
Management of Gender Differences
  Harmonious inter-generational continuities require the male and the female of the species to engage with each other
  through interdependence. The chronic under-representation of women in politics everywhere, long after women
  secured justiciable equal rights in many democracies, intrigues scholars. Political participation varies by ethnicity, age,
  religion, and culture but that does not account for gender. Patriarchy, discrimination, domination, and oppression
  are historically castigated but there can also be other reasons. This study explains that underrepresentation of
  women persists because motives and power-bases to improve their political participation are not easily
  mobilized due to psychological differences in how men and women acquire and exercise political influence.
  Strategies suiting intra-group mobilization of women for securing greater inter-group influence are different
  from those that suit men. Thus, what appear as ‘deficits’ of political skills inhibiting acquisition of political
  power by women are dissolvable with designed interventions. Indeed, men may appear challenged were they to
  compete with strategies more suited to women.

Religious fundamentalism enforces patriarchy, not marriage incentives.

Shahin Gerami and Melodye Lehnerer, professor and assistant professor of sociology and gender
studies at Southwest Missouri State University, 08/2001, Women's Agency and Household
Diplomacy: Negotiating Fundamentalism, Gender and Society, JSTOR
  When evaluating the impact of Islamic orthodoxy on women's status, some scholars and many leaders of Islamic
  groups have disputed the usefulness of the fundamentalist label (Muadudi 1982; Piscatori 1994; Sidahmed and
  Ehteshami 1996). It is not the purpose of this article to enter into that debate. Nevertheless, to clarify our
  understanding of the term "fundamentalism," we refer to active contemporary movements organized against a
  perceived assault on the religious foundation of social order. We propose that despite the diversity of their format
  and ideology, two issues stand out in these movements: the role of the state and the conceptualization of gender
  (Gerami 1996; Klatch 1987; Lazarus-Yefeh 1988; Martin and Appleby 1994). A characteristic of these movements
  is the basic assumption that modernism or secularism is to blame for society's moral degeneration. To correct
  this moral degeneration, the ideal society, which is created following divine order, enforces female domesticity
  and modesty through a protected and private family with woman as the functionary and man as the gatekeeper.
  In short, fundamentalism stands as "a protest against the assault on patriarchal structural principles" (Riesebordt 1993,
  202).


                                                                                                                                31
Marriage Incentives Neg
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Yu Jin Jung and Matthew Chernick + The Marriage Aff Team

                     AT: Discrimination – Heteronormativity Scenario
Early childhood education ingrains heteronormativity, not marriage policies by the government.

Kerry H. Robinson, senior lecturer in sociology, cultural diversity and social justice education in
the School of Education at the University of Western Sydney, Australian Journal of Early
Childhood, 2005, 'Queerying' Gender: Heteronormativity in Early Childhood Education.
  Over the past decade or so, research has increasingly documented the process of gender construction in early
  childhood. This research has highlighted how children themselves are active and knowing agents in this process,
  engaging in the policing of gender performances of other children (and adults), within rigid boundaries of what
  is widely considered 'appropriate' masculine and feminine behaviours (Alloway, 1995; Davies, 1989; 1993;
  Grieshaber, 1998; MacNaughton, 2000). In addition, research has begun to identify the significant role of the
  curriculum and educators' pedagogical practices in constructing and normalising children's gendered identities
  (Robinson & Jones Diaz, 2000; Robinson & Jones Diaz, in press). However, a critical issue that seems to have
  received limited focus within the exploration of gender construction in children's lives is the way gender is
  inextricably constituted within and normalised through the process of 'heterosexualisation' (Butler, 1990). The
  construction of children's gendered identities cannot be fully understood without acknowledging how the dominant
  discourses of femininity and masculinity are heteronormalised in their everyday lives, including through their
  educational experiences. That is, by the processes of gendering, children are constructed as heterosexual beings.
  This paper, through an exploration of heteronormativity in early childhood education, aims to 'queery' the construction
  of gender in early childhood, highlighting the intimate links between gender and sexuality.

Heteronormativity good—it guarantees a stable family structure for children.

David Blankenhorn, president of Institute for American Values and the author of "The Future of
Marriage", 09/18/08, Los Angeles Times, http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-oe-
blankenhorn19-2008sep19,0,2093869.story
  Marriage as a human institution is constantly evolving, and many of its features vary across groups and cultures. But
  there is one constant. In all societies, marriage shapes the rights and obligations of parenthood. Among us
  humans, the scholars report, marriage is not primarily a license to have sex. Nor is it primarily a license to receive
  benefits or social recognition. It is primarily a license to have children.
  In this sense, marriage is a gift that society bestows on its next generation. Marriage (and only marriage) unites the
  three core dimensions of parenthood -- biological, social and legal -- into one pro-child form: the married
  couple. Marriage says to a child: The man and the woman whose sexual union made you will also be there to love and
  raise you. Marriage says to society as a whole: For every child born, there is a recognized mother and a father,
  accountable to the child and to each other.
  These days, because of the gay marriage debate, one can be sent to bed without supper for saying such things. But until
  very recently, almost no one denied this core fact about marriage. Summing up the cross-cultural evidence, the
  anthropologist Helen Fisher in 1992 put it simply: "People wed primarily to reproduce." The philosopher and Nobel
  laureate Bertrand Russell, certainly no friend of conventional sexual morality, was only repeating the obvious a few
  decades earlier when he concluded that "it is through children alone that sexual relations become important to
  society, and worthy to be taken cognizance of by a legal institution."
  Marriage is society's most pro-child institution. In 2002 -- just moments before it became highly unfashionable to say
  so -- a team of researchers from Child Trends, a nonpartisan research center, reported that "family structure clearly
  matters for children, and the family structure that helps children the most is a family headed by two biological
  parents in a low-conflict marriage."




                                                                                                                            32
Marriage Incentives Neg
DDW 2009
Yu Jin Jung and Matthew Chernick + The Marriage Aff Team

                     AT: Discrimination – Heteronormativity Scenario
Homophobia is caused by stereotypes, not marriage incentives.

Kevin Moss, University of San Francisco, 03/2002, Legitimizing Same-sex Marriages, Peace
Review, EBSCOhost
  Homosexuals have long been the victims of invalid stereotypes. It has long been incorrectly asserted, for
  example, that homosexuals attempt to entice young children to “convert” to homosexuality and that
  homosexuals are more inclined to molest children than heterosexuals. Evidence to support such claims is
  unfounded, yet homosexuals are continually stigmatized by such blatantly false assertions. Since the inception of the
  AIDS epidemic, there has been a renewed focus on the supposed promiscuity of the homosexual community and
  condemnation of homosexuality in general. In fact, many heterosexuals blame homosexuals, as a group, for the
  proliferation of the disease. Fallacious stereotypes such as these have socially stigmatized homosexuals and forced
  them to endure discrimination that permeates all aspects of their lives.

Homophobia exists in federal legislation because legislators regard homosexuals as unimportant
voters.

Kevin Moss, University of San Francisco, 03/2002, Legitimizing Same-sex Marriages, Peace
Review, EBSCOhost
  Some have argued that homosexuals have considerable political power and therefore do not deserve a strict
  scrutiny guarantee. But the political status of homosexuals as a group reveals a much different reality. According
  to the majority in High Tech Gay v. Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office (668 F. Supp. 1361),
  homosexuals are a small minority that is unlikely to find much support among legislators. Few lawmakers are
  willing to openly support “gay rights” legislation for fear of falling into disfavor among their constituency. This
  reluctance is further induced by their own misunderstandings of homosexuality. Also, few homosexuals are
  willing to admit their homosexuality publicly and make an issue of their discriminatory treatment, for fear of open
  ridicule and ostracism.




                                                                                                                          33
Marriage Incentives Neg
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Yu Jin Jung and Matthew Chernick + The Marriage Aff Team

           AT: Discrimination – Racism against Black Women Scenario
It’s a choice of black women to get married or not get married—no governmental racism.

Joy Jones, Washington Post writer and author of "Between Black Women: Listening With the
Third Ear”, 03/26/06, ‘Marriage is for White People’, The Washington Post,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/03/25/AR2006032500029.html
  Among African Americans, the desire for marriage seems to have a different trajectory for women and men.
  My observation is that black women in their twenties and early thirties want to marry and commit at a time
  when black men their age are more likely to enjoy playing the field. As the woman realizes that a good
  marriage may not be as possible or sustainable as she would like, her focus turns to having a baby, or possibly
  improving her job status, perhaps by returning to school or investing more energy in her career.
  As men mature, and begin to recognize the benefits of having a roost and roots (and to feel the consequences of their
  risky bachelor behavior), they are more willing to marry and settle down. By this time, however, many of their
  female peers are satisfied with the lives they have constructed and are less likely to settle for marriage to a man
  who doesn't bring much to the table. Indeed, he may bring too much to the table: children and their mothers from
  previous relationships, limited earning power, and the fallout from years of drug use, poor health care, sexual
  promiscuity. In other words, for the circumspect black woman, marriage may not be a business deal that offers
  sufficient return on investment.




                                                                                                                          34
Marriage Incentives Neg
DDW 2009
Yu Jin Jung and Matthew Chernick + The Marriage Aff Team

                                                       States CP
States play a crucial role in ensuring successful marriages and family formation.

(Danielle White and Jan Kaplan, 06 03, “The State’s Role in Supporting Marriage and Family
Formation”, http://76.12.61.196/publications/supportingmarriageandfamilyformationIN.htm)
States can also address tax provisions, TANF requirements, and other government program rules that may discourage
marriage. For example, states can revise income-based eligibility policies under TANF and Medicaid that result in decreased
benefits or ineligibility for married couples. Specific changes in TANF include eliminating eligibility rules that require a
work history for two-parent families. Instead, states can base TANF eligibility solely on financial status for both single and
married parents. They can also disregard all or some of a second parent’s income when determining cash assistance levels. In
addition, some states are using state-only funds to provide TANF services to two-parent families and are not subjecting them
to higher federal work requirements. Other states include stepparents as eligible members of an assistance unit when
determining cash benefit levels. Finally, some states have added incentive payments to monthly benefits for married couples
and are training TANF staff to teach marriage skills to their clients.




                                                                                                                                 35
Marriage Incentives Neg
DDW 2009
Yu Jin Jung and Matthew Chernick + The Marriage Aff Team

                                       States – A2: No authority
New TANF regulations give states almost complete control.
Gene Falk and Jill Tauber, Domestic Social Policy Division at the Congressional Research Service,
October 30, 2001, “Welfare Reform: TANF Provisions Related to Marriage and Two-Parent Families,”
https://www.policyarchive.org/bitstream/handle/10207/1292/RL31170_20011030.pdf?sequence=1
  TANF gives states almost complete flexibility in the design and operation of their cash welfare programs. States
  also had considerable discretion in the design of their AFDC programs, determining standards of “need” for
  eligibility and benefit amounts. However, the AFDC program had federal rules that prescribed who was eligible for
  benefits, what types and the amount of income to consider when determining a family’s eligibility and amounts of
  cash welfare, and special restrictions for two-parent families. TANF ended federal rules regarding categories of
  families eligible for assistance and the counting of income; it also ended federal rules restricting assistance for
  two-parent families.




                                                                                                                        36
Marriage Incentives Neg
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Yu Jin Jung and Matthew Chernick + The Marriage Aff Team

                                                    AT: States CP
States are ineffective at legislation that helps women against gender-based violence.

Joseph R. Biden Jr., Former Chairman of Committee on the Judiciary and current vice president,
07/94, Congress and the Courts: Our Mutual Obligation, Stanford Law Review, p. 1301,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1229159
  In drafting legislation known as the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA),93 I have tried to adhere to the above
  principles. Because I believe that many states have been largely unwilling to provide women effective relief from
  gender-based violence, federal legislation is necessary. While for the most part the VAWA is designed to assist
  states' efforts to protect women from violent crime, including rape and family violence,94 its Title III creates a
  federal civil rights cause of action for violent crimes motivated by gender bias, permitting a victim of such crime
  to seek mandatory restitution from the perpetrator in damages and injunctive relief.95
  Although some mistakenly believe Title III of the VAWA will bring every "domestic relations dispute" into federal
  court,96 the distinction I have tried to maintain in drafting it is precisely that found in the post-Civil War civil rights
  laws.97 Consider the difference between the mugging of a person who happens to be an African-American and the
  lynching of an African-American by an all- white mob. The first is not a federal crime; the second is subject to federal
  civil rights laws.98 The Violence Against Women Act specifically provides that "random" crimes not motivated by
  gender bias are not covered.99 Proof of discriminatory motive is explicitly required.100 If we recognize, for example,
  that racially motivated assaults violate African-Americans' right to be free and equal, we should guarantee the same
  protection to this country's women. Thus, Title III conforms with established federal jurisdictional principles
  governing civil rights remedies. Like existing civil rights remedies, its animating principle is the national ideal of
  equality. It addresses conduct that burdens an individual because of an immutable and morally irrelevant characteristic
  such as race or gender. The bill creates a federal cause of action because Congress traditionally has vested the
  federal courts with the responsibility of enforcing national principles of equality, and also because state
  remedies have too often proven inadequate.




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Marriage Incentives Neg
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Yu Jin Jung and Matthew Chernick + The Marriage Aff Team

                              Improve Marriage Incentives CP [1/2]
<INSERT TAG>
Deborah A. Harris and Domenico “Mimmo” Parisi, Department of Sociology, Anthropology, and
Social Work within the Social Science Research Center at Mississippi State University, November 29,
2005, Gender Role Ideologies and Marriage Promotion: State Policy Choices and Suggestions for
Improvement, Review of Policy Research, Volume 22 Issue 6, Pages 841 – 858
  Policy Suggestions and Conclusion While the initial focus of post-PRWORA welfare policy has been on moving
  clients into the workforce, lately the issue of marriage and what it can mean for low-income families has been the
  source of considerable attention. States have taken a myriad of approaches to encourage marriage and no clear best
  practices have emerged. Despite the numerous attempts by states to encourage marriage, the results of such programs
  are mixed. While some states cite modest increases in marriage rates, there are still questions of whether these
  increases are the result of marriage promotion policies or other factors. There also remains the issue of whether
  marriage has been followed by an improvement in the quality of life for these families. We maintain a neutral position
  over whether the government should be involved in promoting marriage. Our goal is to examine and evaluate the
  marriage promotion as it has been applied as a social policy. Thus, we present five suggestions meant to improve
  marriage promotion policies and make marriage a more viable, safe option for women and children, as well as to make
  sure these families have the supports they need to have a successful life together. Acknowledge the Multiple Factors
  Affecting Marital Decisions The role that economics plays in couples’ decisions to marry is often taken for granted.
  However, research indicates that many low-income couples desire to reach a certain level of financial security before
  they wed even if they already have a child together (Edin & Kefalas, 2005). Another study on the effects of
  neighborhood economics finds high male unemployment related to low marriage rates (Blau, Kahn, & Waldfogel,
  2000). In such places, encouraging job growth can be expected to have a positive affect on marriage rates. While
  economics does play a large role in marriage decisions among the lowincome, culture also plays a part. One of the
  biggest social changes of the last halfcentury is the acceptance of nonmarital births. In many low-income
  communities, having children prior to marriage is considered the normal sequencing of life events. Many of the
  marriage education and media programs acknowledge the role of culture in shaping expectations about childbearing
  and marriage; however, these programs often focus on convincing the individual about the importance of marriage.
  What may be better is to try and address these issues at the community level. Currently, community involvement in
  marriage promotion is one of the major foci of the DHHS. Local church and civic leaders can be instrumental in
  stressing the benefits of marriage while tailoring these programs to their local populations. Create Programs More
  Applicable to the Low-Income Population Many of the current marriage education programs are geared toward a
  middleclass audience. As a result, many of the relationship skills, such as conflict resolution, may not touch on the
  issues faced by welfare clients and their partners. The language and examples given in these programs also need to be
  adapted to fit the family and cultural patterns of different ethnic-racial groups. Without addressing these differences,
  clients may not feel that these programs are beneficial to them and may drop out of the programs. Differences in place
  need to be addressed, as well. While inner-city clients may cite the lure of the drug trade and other criminal activities
  as major stressors to their relationships, rural clients may be more burdened with social and spatial isolation that may
  leave them far from sources of support. Integrate the Program with Other Services Just as there are one-stop centers
  focusing on employment barriers, counties should also have a central place where clients can receive information
  about available marriage support programs. Orth and Goggin (2003) found that, in some states, the number of women
  who took part in available marriage promotion services was actually quite small. One reason for this is that clients are
  not informed about what services are available. While some states have begun integrating marriage promotion
  programs with other services, such as county extension offices, these efforts need to be expanded. Community
  outreach could be useful in this case also. If local leaders discuss these programs with clients, this will help increase
  word of mouth within low-income neighborhoods and help convince clients of the program’s worth. Provide More
  Carrots, Less Sticks This suggestion refers to the incentives and punishments built into marriage promotion policies.
  Support programs such as child care and transportation assistance can help clients move into the workforce. These
  same supports can also impact marital decisions by decreasing the stressors in family life. They can allow both

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                              Improve Marriage Incentives CP [2/2]
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  partners to work—a situation that low-income women tend to favor because it reduces power inequalities in a
  relationship—even though this does not fit into the breadwinner-homemaker model that some marriage promotion
  programs seem to advocate. Other important “carrots” states should consider can include increasing the number of and
  funding to emergency services programs to ensure that women and children live in safe environments and have help
  available if they find themselves in abusive or otherwise dangerous situations. Create Programs with Evaluations in
  Mind The federal government has encouraged innovation among the states in regard to their marriage promotion
  policies. While several states have created unique programs to encourage marriage among their low-income, welfare-
  reliant populations, many of these programs have not been exposed to rigorous evaluation of their outcomes. States
  need to set clear, realistic goals in regard to marriage policies. Statements such as “creating a culture of marriage”
  need to be replaced with specific goals and guidelines. Programs also need more rigorous evaluation. Experimental
  programs that use random assignment control groups and samples representative of the larger, low-income population
  need to be encouraged and the results assessed before statewide implementation. We have seen how the social views
  of women and motherhood have impacted past and current welfare policy. It is important that we understand the
  ideology underlying social policy and how they may create unrealistic demands for these women and their families.
  We acknowledge that two-parent families do provide benefits to both parents and children and that, in the right
  environment, help lead families out of poverty. However, family and relationship issues do not exist in a vacuum and
  low-income women face more barriers than most to providing a stable and safe home for their families. Thus, any
  efforts to encourage marriage must be based on sound knowledge of these women’s life experiences and not outdated
  notions of how a family should be—particularly when the rest of society has found such arrangements impossible.
  Most importantly we believe that the philosophy guiding these programs need to place emphasis on equality,
  tolerance, and compassion, and although we advocate a scientific approach to policy creation and evaluation, we still
  believe that state policymakers must always keep in mind that their actions have the opportunity to impact the lives of
  many families.

Marriagiability CP?
Michele Hirsch, The Alternatives to Marriage Project, June 2007 “Let Them Eat Wedding Rings: The
Role of Marriage Promotion in Welfare Reform,” Second Edition, http://www.unmarried.org/rings2.pdf
  In 2003, I attended a conference where a speaker was talking about government-funded programs to promote marriage
  and stable families. One of the goals she discussed for these programs was to increase the “marriageability” of poor,
  disadvantaged unmarried people. My gut response was to laugh. The government is going to fund programs designed
  to increase marriageability? Would the Department of Health and Human Services hire dating consultants and pay for
  matchmaking services? But as I listened to this policy expert describe marriageability programs, I stopped laughing.
  The kinds of things she was calling “marriageability” programs were good old social service programs. Helping
  substance abusers get clean makes them more likely to get married. Men who are employed are more marriageable,
  too, since women generally don’t rush to marry guys who can’t earn a living. Research shows that people with more
  education are more likely to get married and stay married. Call me crazy, but maybe we’ve uncovered an unexpected
  diamond, however rough, among the crackerjack-box jewelry of marriage-promoting rhetoric. I think substance abuse
  programs have value quite apart from whether they can help someone get married, but if “marriageability” is the
  buzzword that puts smiles on grant reviewers’ faces in this era of marriage-fanaticism, we’d be fools not to start using
  it. Since poor people are less likely to marry, living wage activists can argue that paying the working class living
  wages is fundamentally a marriageability program. Domestic violence shelters might be a longterm marriageability
  strategy, since they can help women leave a violent relationship and someday find a better prospect for marriage.
  When it comes down to it, nearly any social program that improves people’s lives also boosts their marriageability,
  because people who are hungry, cold, sick, jobless, or poor are usually too busy trying to survive to worry about
  planning a wedding. I’m not a marriage-promoter by any stretch of the imagination. But do I support using
  “marriageability” if that’s what it takes to get funding and support for programs to help people? I don’t use these
  words often, but – I do.



                                                                                                                             39
Marriage Incentives Neg
DDW 2009
Yu Jin Jung and Matthew Chernick + The Marriage Aff Team

                                                      Courts CP
The courts have a moral obligation to act against gender oppression.
Robin L. West, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, 05, 17 Yale J.L. & Feminism
385, lexis
  Here, then, is the heart of MacKinnon's legal formalism: If justice requires formal equality; and formal equality
  demands the like treatment of likes; and women like men are human, then women, like men, must be treated
  with equal dignity and respect. What MacKinnon has added to this syllogism is nothing other than the premise that
  treating women like men, with equal dignity and respect, requires an end to sexual terrorism. She hasn't
  attacked the edifice of the western tradition. What she has done is to articulate, and pretty powerfully, exactly what it
  requires. There is nothing here, then, that courts should not do. In fact, everything here courts must do. There is no
  attempt here to transcend history, occupy an Archimedian point outside it, upend anything, or turn the ideals of
  western culture inside out. Rather, by reference to the best understanding of formal equality, MacKinnon has
  articulated what that mandate requires: that women are human beings, and so must be treated as such. What is it,
  though, to treat all as human? Here again, what is distinctive about Feminism, Modified as revealed in the structure as
  well as content of Sex Equality is its striking continuity with - rather than any earth-shattering challenge to - the
  western tradition. From the book's structure we learn the unexceptional claim that work, love, autonomy, family,
  education, political participation, and community are the components of the good life; enjoying them is what it
  means to be human. n92 We learn that sexual subordination, exploitation, appropriation, and terror are the
  obstacles to women's enjoyment of these human rights and capacities. We are presented with the ethically
  unassailable claim that the fact that women are so barred is unjust. We encounter the ethical mandate that women
  must have access to these lives. We re-encounter - meet anew - the familiar bromide that the work of law and the
  courts is to justice. We are led to conclude that law must be the vehicle of justice. The courts must ensure the
  delivery. The core, albeit unstated, ethical commitments of Sex Equality, of Feminism, Modified, and of Catharine
  MacKinnon's life work are that justice is the ethical mandate that demands all of this, and that, because justice
  demands it, this equality is a legal entitlement, not simply a political goal. The point of the book, of the theory, and
  of all of this advocacy, is not the political point that women as an interest group operating within a decent political
  system ought to be able to extract some measure of equality from a more or less representative legislative assembly.
  The point of all of this work is not that the community, as a community, would be better off if women's labor were put
  to [*419] better use, or if women's health were better protected, or if women's nurturing capacity were not so
  exploited, or if women's safety were better ensured. The point is certainly not that efficiency, or overall utility, or
  overall well-being, or social welfare would thereby be increased, or even that all of this - were it to transpire tomorrow
  - would simply be a very good thing, all things considered. All of that may be true, but it is so clearly just not the
  point. The point is that justice demands it. Justice demands that this be done. Sex equality is a mandate; it is an
  imperative. It is not just a good idea. It is not a policy that might ensure better governance. It is what justice
  requires, with as much force and potency, as much inevitability, as much universality, as much clarity, and as
  much power as propels the laws of arithmetic and logic from premises to inferences. Justice defines the end of
  law and the point of adjudication - not politics, legislation, education, or culture. The law must engage this project.
  Therefore the courts must. Ought, though, implies can. If courts ought to do this, through law, then it must be
  the case that they can. So the text of Sex Equality turns out to be a lawyer's argument: This picture of equality is the
  deep and deeply forgotten meaning of two thousand years of western adjudication, two hundred years of American
  constitutionalism, and fifty-plus years of civil rights law. There are, no doubt, other possible readings of our law, of
  our constitution, and of our history, and Catharine MacKinnon has provided plenty of scathing ones: law as
  complicitous, law as mendacious, law as hypocritical, law as legitimation, and law as mystification. At the end of the
  day, though, the message of her casebook and life is not law's mendaciousness, but law's nobility. Law, MacKinnon
  clearly believes, can do this audaciously hopeful thing that justice requires. Readers - judges and lawyers - must and
  can provide the ethical ballast. But the legal materials - the materials, that is, for a highly ethical reading of real
  equality, and sex equality, as at the heart of the impulse for justice - are there. They may be hidden, and they are not
  self-actualizing; they do not realize themselves. But they are there. Underneath the gauze of a dreary and familiar
  legal history that readily prompts despair - the legitimation, the mystification, the reification, the hypocrisy, the
  complicity, the mendacity, the mind-boggling stupidity, and the willful illogic, in which courts have engaged, all
  toward the end of securing women's inequality in cement - MacKinnon has found in law, in adjudication, in courts,
  and in legal process an ethical impulse. She has enlarged upon it, insisted upon it, used it, magnified it, and made it
  grow, in theory and in practice, in the world of ideas and in our lives.
                                                                                                                               40
Marriage Incentives Neg
DDW 2009
Yu Jin Jung and Matthew Chernick + The Marriage Aff Team

                                                       Courts CP
Courts have the ability and jurisdiction to improve current issues with domestic violence policy (in
this case, protective orders against their abusers).

Marya Kathryn Lucas, Georgetown Journal of Gender and Law, Spring 2004, An invitation to
Liability?: Attempts at Holding Victims of Domestic Violence Liable as Accomplices When They
Invite Violations of Their Own Protective Orders, lexis
  As the Ohio Supreme Court demonstrated, legal and policy reasons do not support the court practice of assigning
  accomplice liability to victims who invite protective order violations. However, the issue of re-contact appears to be
  a [*789] significant problem for judges and a burden for the judicial system, and is admittedly frustrating.
  Therefore, the judicial, social and government systems should seek alternatives to accomplice liability to
  promote victim compliance with protective orders. For example, in one jurisdiction, after the court issues
  protective orders, law enforcement officials will mail letters and provide follow-up visits to victims. n253 This method
  maintains the legal focus on the abuser, helps determine who is violating the order and reaffirms the victim. n254
  Legislatures should also consider rewriting the warning language that appears in an order so that the language
  is easily comprehensible for the layperson. To further maximize comprehension, legislatures should include, in
  clear and simple language, specific examples of what constitutes a violation of the order. Pictorial representations
  might even be appropriate in order to clarify meaning. Additionally, judges should provide explicit, standardized,
  comprehensible verbal instructions to both the victim and the abuser as to what a violation of the protective
  order means.

Congress agrees that the federal courts have power to enforce equality for women.

Joseph R. Biden Jr., Former Chairman of Committee on the Judiciary and current vice president,
07/94, Congress and the Courts: Our Mutual Obligation, Stanford Law Review, p. 1301,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1229159
  In drafting legislation known as the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA),93 I have tried to adhere to the above
  principles. Because I believe that many states have been largely unwilling to provide women effective relief from
  gender-based violence, federal legislation is necessary. While for the most part the VAWA is designed to assist
  states' efforts to protect women from violent crime, including rape and family violence,94 its Title III creates a
  federal civil rights cause of action for violent crimes motivated by gender bias, permitting a victim of such crime
  to seek mandatory restitution from the perpetrator in damages and injunctive relief.95
  Although some mistakenly believe Title III of the VAWA will bring every "domestic relations dispute" into federal
  court,96 the distinction I have tried to maintain in drafting it is precisely that found in the post-Civil War civil rights
  laws.97 Consider the difference between the mugging of a person who happens to be an African-American and the
  lynching of an African-American by an all- white mob. The first is not a federal crime; the second is subject to federal
  civil rights laws.98 The Violence Against Women Act specifically provides that "random" crimes not motivated by
  gender bias are not covered.99 Proof of discriminatory motive is explicitly required.100 If we recognize, for
  example, that racially motivated assaults violate African-Americans' right to be free and equal, we should
  guarantee the same protection to this country's women. Thus, Title III conforms with established federal
  jurisdictional principles governing civil rights remedies. Like existing civil rights remedies, its animating
  principle is the national ideal of equality. It addresses conduct that burdens an individual because of an
  immutable and morally irrelevant characteristic such as race or gender. The bill creates a federal cause of action
  because Congress traditionally has vested the federal courts with the responsibility of enforcing national
  principles of equality, and also because state remedies have too often proven inadequate.




                                                                                                                                41
Marriage Incentives Neg
DDW 2009
Yu Jin Jung and Matthew Chernick + The Marriage Aff Team

                                                     Courts CP
The courts can and have expanded women’s rights. (ACLU = American Civil Liberties Union)

  Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, 02/04/00, A
  Special Kind of Equality: Remarks for the Acceptance of the Wendy Webster Williams
  Award for Significant Contributions to Gender Equality through Law on Behalf of Award
  Recipient the Honorable Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, p. 150
  Justice Ginsburg, about whom I will say much more, founded the ACLU’s Women’s Rights Project in 1971; she
  litigated many of the “germinal” (note I didn’t say seminal) gender equality cases in the 1970s, arguing for (and
  achieving) the constitutional recognition that gender discrimination in our society is not just, as well as not fair.
  Wendy Webster Williams served, for many years, as the Chair of the Advisory Board of the ACLU’s Women’s Rights
  Project and she too litigated cases (and then later drafted legislation) to secure equality for both genders. Together,
  these two women are the intellectual architects of the “equality principle” for women, which has just as often meant
  the “gender equality principle” as women’s rights have been expanded through legal protections and rulings
  which have recognized both men and women’s legal rights. Successfully arguing, as advocates, that “equal
  protection of the laws” is meant to provide equality of treatment for both men and women, Justice Ginsburg
  herself now personifies that equality as she sits on the highest court of the land and on occasion, can rule on
  issues of gender equality.




                                                                                                                            42
Marriage Incentives Neg
DDW 2009
Yu Jin Jung and Matthew Chernick + The Marriage Aff Team

                                                   AT: Courts CP
Congress is historically proven to pass successful legislation regarding marriages and domestic
violence, not the courts.

Marya Kathryn Lucas, Georgetown Journal of Gender and Law, Spring 2004, An invitation to
Liability?: Attempts at Holding Victims of Domestic Violence Liable as Accomplices When They
Invite Violations of Their Own Protective Orders, lexis
  During the feminist movement of the late 1960s and 1970s, studies on domestic violence and the lobbying efforts of
  victims' advocates led to the recognition of domestic violence as a social problem. n37 This recognition prompted state
  legislatures to begin enacting criminal and civil domestic violence laws in the 1970s. n38 By 1983, forty-three states
  and the District of Columbia had passed domestic violence legislation. n39 State legislatures also enacted
  procedural and organizational reforms that included mandatory arrest procedures, n40 the creation of domestic
  violence units within prosecutors' offices, the implementation of treatment programs for abusive spouses and
  relief programs such as counseling for victims, n41 as well as the creation of shelters for victims. n42 Legislatures
  and legal reformers also implemented reform by abolishing the marital rape exception and the spousal immunity
  privilege. n43
  Finally, state reform efforts culminated with the passage of the federal [*768] Violence Against Women's Act
  (VAWA) in 1994. This legislation, enacted pursuant to Congress' powers under the Commerce Clause and the
  Fourteenth Amendment, reflected the recognition of domestic violence as a national social problem. n44 The Act
  provided for the prevention of gender-motivated violence through federal funding to states, education, deterrence,
  remedies for victims, new federal domestic violence crimes and full faith and credit for protection orders. n45
  Congress enacted the VAWA after more than four years of extensive hearings, debates, testimony and
  legislative findings, all demonstrating the deleterious effects of domestic violence on women and over society as
  a whole. n46 However, the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Morrison recently undermined the VAWA
  by ruling that a key provision, Title III, which established a federal, civil right cause of action for victims of gender-
  motivated violence, was in violation of the U.S. Constitution's Commerce Clause and Fourteenth Amendment. n47 By
  abolishing this key provision, the Supreme Court thus relegated the problem of domestic violence to the state courts --
  historically the locale of victims' gender discrimination -- and deprived victims of the alternative federal venue. n48




                                                                                                                               43
Marriage Incentives Neg
DDW 2009
Yu Jin Jung and Matthew Chernick + The Marriage Aff Team

                                   Not Increase Funding CP
The United States federal government should require allocation of Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families funds without consideration of marriage status.

Observation 1: It’s competitive

A. The counterplan does not increase social services – it merely re-allocates current social service
funding.
B. It’s not topical – checks all abuse

Observation 2: It solves

1AC Hirsch, Solot and Miller evidence only indicates that allocations should be given without regard to
marriage status – NOWHERE in the 1AC is there any evidence that justifies an increase in social
services.




                                                                                                          44
Marriage Incentives Neg
DDW 2009
Yu Jin Jung and Matthew Chernick + The Marriage Aff Team

                              Politics – Marriage Incentives Popular
Marriage incentives popular: GOP.
Michele Hirsch, Dorian Solot, and Marshall Miller, The Alternatives to Marriage Project, June 2007
“Let Them Eat Wedding Rings: The Role of Marriage Promotion in Welfare Reform,” Second Edition,
http://www.unmarried.org/rings2.pdf
  Why did the Bush Administration and the Republican-dominated Congress dedicate three quarters of a billion
  dollars to unproven marriage programs while cutting other welfare initiatives? The Wall Street Journal notes that
  Mr. Horn “pushed to include funding for marriage promotion, despite some reluctance from his boss, HHS Secretary
  Tommy Thompson. ‘It wasn’t my first priority,’ Mr. Thompson acknowledges, but says he came to see the political
  advantages. ‘The religious right certainly found this a plus and we could find more supporters for the
  legislation.”[17] The so-called “religious right” is not alone in seeking more government emphasis on marriage.
  Conservatives (or neoconservatives) who are generally considered secular, and who generally oppose
  government-funded social programs, also support marriage money. For example, influential New York Times
  columnist David Brooks writes: “Once you acknowledge that there is a basic tear in the way the market economy is
  evolving, you begin trying to figure out the causes. In declining order of importance, they seem to be: First, the
  generally rising education premium. … Second, the widening marriage gap. Middle-class people are increasingly
  likely to raise kids in stable two-parent homes, while kids in poorer families are increasingly less likely to have these
  advantages.”[18] “[T]he most important thing we can do to increase social mobility is to come up with second-
  generation human capital policies. The first-generation policies gave people access to schools, colleges and training
  facilities. The second-generation policies will help them develop the habits, knowledge and mental traits they need to
  succeed once they are there. … [This] means strengthening marriage. Only half of American kids can expect to live
  with both biological parents at age 15 (compared with two-thirds of kids in Western Europe). That has calamitous
  effects on education and development.”[19]




                                                                                                                              45
Marriage Incentives Neg
DDW 2009
Yu Jin Jung and Matthew Chernick + The Marriage Aff Team

                            Politics – Marriage Incentives Unpopular
Marriage incentives are unpopular: Dems and lobbies hate it.
(Mary Leonard, Globe Staff and Correspondent, 05 22 01, “Marriage incentives for poor considered,”
http://lists101.his.com/pipermail/smartmarriages/2001-May/000639.html)
The marriage-promotion issue is difficult for many Democratic lawmakers. While most acknowledge that two-parent
families help lift children out of poverty, and some, including Vice President Al Gore in the past campaign, have advocated
responsible-fathering programs, many fear that earmarking money for untested marriage-promotion initiatives will
deny assistance to single parents in need. A senior Democratic aide said the big question is whether Republicans are
going to force states to set up marriage programs or take money from the Temporary Assistance block grant and fund
a separate marriage initiative. ''Both would be very controversial and set off a very partisan fight,'' the aide said. The
fight already has been joined by the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund, which last week launched an attack on
Horn's nomination. If confirmed by the Senate, Horn, who was at HHS in the previous Bush administration and then
founded the private National Fatherhood Initiative, would be the administration's point man on the welfare legislation.
''Wade Horn wants the government to discriminate against families that don't meet his ideal,'' said Tim Casey, a lawyer for
the NOW fund. ''In benefit programs where there is not enough for everybody, single-parent families would go to the back of
the line.'' Feminist groups generally are suspicious of marriage-promotion programs, arguing that social conservatives
want men to be head of the household and have little regard for the women who leave marriage, or won't marry,
because of domestic violence.




                                                                                                                              46
Marriage Incentives Neg
DDW 2009
Yu Jin Jung and Matthew Chernick + The Marriage Aff Team

                                             Politics – TANF Popular
Both the Democrats and Republicans love the TANF block grant – they would pass an increase on it.
National Association of Social Workers, 03 11 05, “Senate Finance Committee Approves Bipartisan TANF Bill,”
http://www.socialworkers.org/advocacy/updates/2005/031105.asp)

On Wednesday, March 9, 2005 , the Senate Finance Committee approved the Personal Responsibility and Individual
Development for Everyone (PRIDE) Act by voice vote. The PRIDE Act would reauthorize the 1996 Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) through fiscal year 2010. PRWORA replaced
the entitlement under AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children) with the TANF (Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families) block grant. Further Action. The bill is not expected to be debated on the Senate floor until sometime after
the spring congressional recess (March 21 - April 1). Therefore Congress will need to pass another TANF extension; the
current extension expires March 31. In the House, the Human Resources Subcommittee of the Ways and Means Committee
may mark up its version of the PRWORA reauthorization bill, the Personal Responsibility, Work, and Family Promotion Act,
as early as next week. A Love Fest Unlike the Finance Committee mark-up last year, when the bill was voted out of
Committee on a strict party-line vote (all Republicans voted "yes" and all Democrats voted "no"), this year bipartisan
cooperation was the order of the day. The only "no" vote on the bill came from Senator Trent Lott (R-MS), who
opposed the amount of child care funding in the bill and the number of activities that states can count as work. Senator
Rick Santorum (R-PA) also opposed the increased child care funding saying that "the child care issue is a Washington-based
issue. It is not an issue out in the states," but he did not vote against the bill. Speaking in support of the child care funding
was its lead sponsor, Senator Olympia Snowe (R-ME) and Sens. Orrin Hatch (R-UT), Blanche Lincoln (D-AR), and
Chairman Chuck Grassley (R-IA). Other Committee members present for the mark-up were Ranking Member Max Baucus
(D-MT), Jeff Bingaman (D-NM), Gordon Smith (R-OR), Craig Thomas (R-WY), and Ron Wyden (D-OR).’




                                                                                                                                    47
Marriage Incentives Neg
DDW 2009
Yu Jin Jung and Matthew Chernick + The Marriage Aff Team

                                         Politics – TANF Unpopular
TANF funding is contentious.
National Advocacy Center 2005, “The Familiar Tune – TANF Stalled Again,”
http://www.gsadvocacy.org/tanf_stalled.html
  After promising developments in the Senate earlier this year, TANF reauthorization fell victim to the politics of the
  budget debate. A floor vote had been expected in early April, but was postponed after the Senate Budget Committee
  Chairman, Judd Gregg (R-NH), and other conservatives objected to the cost of the PRIDE (Personal Responsibility
  and Individual Development for Everyone) Act reported on a bipartisan vote by the Senate Finance Committee.
  Senator Gregg has indicated that he wants more spending cuts to offset the increased costs of the PRIDE Act – even
  though these costs are modest, especially when compared with the $70 billion in new tax cuts (that are NOT offset)
  called for by the budget resolution. The PRIDE Act’s costs include $4 billion to extend Transitional Medical
  Assistance (for families leaving welfare for work) for 5 years, $5.5 billion over 5 years in new funding for child care
  (partially offset by some controversial changes to the Earned Income Tax Credit), $1 billion in new funding for the
  Social Services Block Grant (SSBG), and $1 billion for transitional jobs and employment placement linked to
  business needs. These are all critical components to support states’ efforts to help families move off and stay off of
  welfare. It remains unclear how this Senate impasse will be resolved. With the recently passed budget resolution
  calling for a number of cuts to mandatory spending programs through the reconciliation process, it will be
  difficult for the Senate to move a TANF bill that calls for spending increases. However, Sen. Chuck Grassley (R-
  IA), Chairman of the Finance Committee, has been a staunch defender of the PRIDE Act produced by his committee
  and the bill likely has enough support to beat back any budget points of order that might be raised if it was brought to
  the floor for a vote. On the House side, TANF reauthorization remains at the committee level and no action is
  currently scheduled. House conservatives have also expressed opposition to the costs of the PRIDE Act and
  remain committed to the more punitive\ provisions of previously passed House reauthorization bills. These concerns
  over costs again stand in sharp contrast to the House’s willingness to pass expensive estate tax repeal.

The Democrats leaders are wasting money, causes problems with Republicans
Jindal, ’09, CNN, Govener of Louisana,
http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/02/24/sotn.jindal.transcript/

  But Democratic leaders in Congress -- they rejected this approach. Instead of trusting us to make wise decisions with
  our own money, they passed the largest government spending bill in history, with a price tag of more than $1 trillion
  with interest. While some of the projects in the bill make sense, their legislation is larded with wasteful spending. It
  includes $300 million to buy new cars for the government, $8 billion for high-speed rail projects, such as a "magnetic
  levitation" line from Las Vegas to Disneyland, and $140 million for something called "volcano monitoring." Instead
  of monitoring volcanoes, what Congress should be monitoring is the eruption of spending in Washington, D.C.

US policy makers do not support traditional welfare without work requirements.

Anne Daguerre, Middlesex University, UK, 07/10/08, Social Policy and Administration, The
Second Phase of US Welfare Reform, 2000–2006: Blaming the Poor Again?, pg.362
  There is no comprehensive US welfare state in the European sense of the word with universal coverage of social
  risks such as the loss of employment, old age and poor health. 2 Instead, US social policy is a two-tier system, with the
  upper tier being Social Security, mostly contributory old-age benefits, survivors' and disability benefits administered
  by the federal government. From theoutset, anti-poverty culture and negative views about the poor impregnated
  the mindset of US administrators ( Katz 1996; King 1995, 1999). In particular, able-bodied adults were not
  considered as deserving poor and were therefore expected to work. Whether single mothers with young
  children should be forced to work became the focus of the political debate in the1980s and 1990s.




                                                                                                                              48
Marriage Incentives Neg
DDW 2009
Yu Jin Jung and Matthew Chernick + The Marriage Aff Team

                                        Politics – TANF Unpopular
Neo-liberals (Republicans) dislike US welfare programs—welfare dependency is considered bad.

Anne Daguerre, Middlesex University, UK, 07/10/08, Social Policy and Administration, The
Second Phase of US Welfare Reform, 2000–2006: Blaming the Poor Again?, pg.362
  The lack of legitimacy of US social assistance programmes rendered them especially vulnerable to neo-liberal
  attacks. With the exception of the brief episode of the War on Poverty in the 1960s, welfare dependency always had
  a pejorative meaning. Only the deserving poor – those willing to work or who are incapable of working, such as
  handicapped people – are considered worthy of public support. The 1960s have been analysed as a missed opportunity
  for advocates of comprehensive anti-poverty policies based on structural measures such as large-scale job creation and
  training programmes. Rather than focusing on the structural causes of poverty and unemployment, the debate
  focused on the individual characteristics of adult welfare recipients. The culture of poverty thesis, with its focus
  on individual characteristics of welfare recipients, echoed the arguments developed in the 1980s by conservative
  writers. Worklessness was explained in terms of voluntary unemployment, and portrayed as a behavioural problem
  rather than a demand-side issue due to the lack of job offers.

The Republicans want to reduce funding for welfare to save money.

Mike Kaszuba, Star Tribune, 01/22/09, GOP sees welfare as area to start tightening belt
  Armed with those statistics, and with an eye on the state's $4.8 billion budget deficit, House Republicans said
  Wednesday they want to tighten the state's welfare rules on a variety of fronts, moves they say could save as much
  as $50 million over a two-year period.
  Under the centerpiece proposal of the GOP initiative, anyone who applied for state welfare benefits within a year of
  moving to Minnesota would be limited to no more than they received in benefits in their previous state. The limits
  would continue to apply until their eligibility ran out. Only people who moved to Minnesota after the measure became
  law would be affected.
  A leading DFL legislator quickly labeled the proposal "short-term thinking." House Minority Leader Marty
  Seifert and other Republicans acknowledged that the initiatives by themselves would do little to remedy the state's
  budget woes but viewed them in a broader context.

Republicans do not support welfare by Democrats.

John Ashcroft, former Attorney General, 08/04/95, Which Will Survive: The Welfare State or the
Republican Revolution?, The Heritage Foundation
  Washington has promoted welfare programs which encourage illegitimacy, discourage work, mock marriage,
  and require dependence, consigning generations to hopelessness and despair.
  It was to the Republican Party that the American people turned last fall as they sought someone to help restore the
  survival values repudiated by the last three decades of government behavior and programs. Our party has begun that
  task in earnest. We have moved in the right direction by passing a balanced budget resolution which signals to the
  public the right message of integrity and responsibility; by passing a crime bill in the House that begins to restore
  justice to an unjust system which devalues human life; and by having the House pass an education reform bill that
  restores to states the right to demand educational achievement rather than self-indulgent feel-good programs that teach
  baseless self-esteem.




                                                                                                                            49
Marriage Incentives Neg
DDW 2009
Yu Jin Jung and Matthew Chernick + The Marriage Aff Team

                                        Politics – TANF Unpopular
Welfare is unpopular with conservative Republicans.

Jeremy Johnson, Brown University Ph.D., 04/02/09, Beyond Retrenchment: Republicans and the
Welfare State
  Are conservative Republicans committed to the principles of retrenchment of the American welfare state?
  Most of the scholarly literature take the answer to be an unequivocal yes. Many observers acknowledge that
  Republicans have so far failed to dismantle much of the established welfare state. Nonetheless, the G.O.P is still seen
  as an agent seeking to wage an assault against the foundations of social provision through the indirect strategies
  of stealth and obfuscation. An influential early study provides a framework for understanding the limited success
  Republicans had in curtailing programmatic benefits during the Reagan administration. 1 Subsequent studies have
  argued that through the privatization of individual risk and in the novel conceptions of intergovernmental cooperation,
  Republican politicians have deliberately employed strategies to facilitate retrenchment without a frontal attack
  on programmatic benefits. 2 Morgan discusses various Republican ploys aiming to “constrict” the welfare state,
  including “starve the beast” strategies of cutting taxes in order to increase deficits, which would theoretically
  force reductions in welfare state expenditures. 3

TANF Money often Misused

Wagner, ’08, SALT, Richmond Legislative Wrap Up, http://www.s-a-l-
t.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=16&Itemid=16
  The legislators were in agreement that several factors were responsible for the "misuse" of the TANF funds: the
  elimination of the Virginia estate tax left an approximate $120 million yearly deficit, the "no-tax" pledge signed by
  one half of the committee members, "structural imbalance in revenues", and tax cuts. There are many challenges of
  protecting the TANF money: it can be diverted in the budget bill and there are limited opportunities for change it
  when it comes out of the Appropriations Committee, and generally the vote is up or down. At present the economy
  plays an important part, making it harder not to skim monies from TANF to fund state projects because there are
  inadequate general funds. In some cases the money is diverted from TANF to non-critical, non-basic needs, but nice to
  have, programs.

TANF funding contentious to fuel existing stereotypes.

Arrighi and Maume, ’04, Child Poverty in America Today: The Promise of
Educationhttp://books.google.com/books?id=k0tisFxayGwC&source=gbs_navlinks_s
  However, morality is no stranger to or poor women on welfare. A few influential works on welfare policy and poverty
  portray the problems of the poor as individual idiosyncrasies or pathologies. Much of this literature blames the poor
  for their disadvantage and fueled racially charged stereotypes of poor single women mothers. The dominate image of
  the “welfare” mother is that she resists supporting her children through paid and work and chooses to remain on
  welfare, thereby transmitting her lack of initiative and motivation to her children.




                                                                                                                            50

				
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