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Lecture 10 Lecture 5 International Finance ECON

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Lecture 10 Lecture 5 International Finance ECON Powered By Docstoc
					        Lecture 5

   International Finance
ECON 243 – Summer I, 2005
  Prof. Steve Cunningham
          International Lending
   International capital movement: the flow of
    capital claims between lenders and borrowers
    across international boundaries.
   These are usually broken down by:
       Private vs. Government (official)
       Long term vs. Short term
   Note that we do not differentiate between equity
    and debt, other than equity positions are always
    considered long term.
   What is “equity”? “Debt equity”?
                                                       2
             Breakdown of Capital
   Private lending and investing
       Long Term
            Direct Investment (lending to or purchasing shares in, a foreign
             enterprise largely owned and controlled by the investor)
            Loans (to a foreign borrower) with maturity of more than one year,
             mostly by banks
            Portfolio Investment (purchasing stock or bonds with a maturity of
             more than one year, issued by a gov’t or foreign enterprise not
             controlled by the investor)
       Short Term (lending to a foreign borrower, or purchasing bonds
        issued by the gov’t or a foreign enterprise not controlled by the
        investor, maturing in a year or less)
   Official lending and investment (by a gov’t or institution
    like the IMF or World Bank. Mostly lending, both long
    term and short term.

                                                                                  3
          Who is doing the lending?
   From WWII until the early 1980s, the U.S. was the
    single largest lender, joined in the 1970s by the
    newly rich oil exporters.
       The major type of lending was official loans from
        governments and direct foreign investments (DFI)
   Since the early 1980s, the dominant lender has
    been Japan.
       The major type of lending has been private loans and
        portfolio investment.



                                                               4
          Benefits of Int’l Lending
   It amounts to intertemporal trade
       The lender gives up resources today in order to receive
        more in return in the future.
       The borrower gets resources today, but will be able to
        generate more product in the future, which he must
        share with the lender.
   It allows lenders and investors to enjoy broader
    diversification, lowering the overall risk of their
    portfolios.
       What is diversification?
       There may be no equivalent domestic
        investment/lending opportunity.

                                                                  5
          Gains to Lending and Borrowing
   Optimality depends upon:
       The world being stable and predictable,
       Borrowers fully honoring their commitments to
        repay
   In such a world, lending is Pareto optimal.
   The welfare effects of international lending
    exactly parallel the welfare effects of free
    trade.

                                                        6
           Gains from Int’l Lending
   Free international lending raises world product
    and national incomes—world product is
    maximized.
   If a country is dominant enough to have power
    over the world market rate of return, it can
    exploit this market power to its own advantage,
    at the expense of other countries, and the world
    as a whole.
       Just as oil producers are able to raise world oil prices by
        controlling supply, a world lender (like Japan) could raise world
        interest rates.

                                                                            7
          Lending Among Industrialized Countries

   Int’l lending and borrowing between industrialized
    countries is generally well-behaved and nonpredatory.
       This may be because even though one country may
        dominate lending, other countries have other areas that they
        dominate, and each is afraid of retaliation in another
        market.
       Also, these countries present little default risk.
   The record of int’l lending by industrialized countries to
    developing countries has been quite different.
       It has been risky, highly political, and, at times predatory.



                                                                        8
          Lending to Developing Countries
   A developing country sometimes runs into
    problems, and is unable to service its debts.
       Such countries sometimes must default—fail to
        make their loan payments as required under
        the loan agreements.
       Lenders then cut back or stop new lending,
        worsening the problems within the developing
        country.



                                                        9
           1974 - 1982
   Oil shocks of the 1970s led to a surge in private int’l lending to
    developing countries.
   Between 1970 and 1980, developing country debt increased by 7 times.
   Oil shocks caused the price of oil to skyrocket, causing high inflation
    and recession in the industrialized countries.
   The windfall profits to the oil producers went primarily to saving (and
    lending), reaching investments in the U.S. and world money centers.
   Productivity was not growing in the large, industrialized nations, so
    people were becoming pessimistic about the profitability of capital
    formation in these countries. Therefore, the lenders targeted
    developing nations.
   Developing countries had also come to dislike FDI because it meant
    giving up domestic control of its businesses. This made more attractive.
   Banks too aggressively sought to lend, taking on too risky loans.

                                                                               10
           Debt Crisis of 1982
   August 1982, Mexico defaults on its large foreign debt.
    Other countries quickly followed with defaults.
   In 1982, driven by fed actions attempting to end the high
    inflation of the 1970s, interest rates in the U.S. increased
    sharply.
   The U.S. and other industrialized countries fell into deep
    recession.
   Developing countries’ exports and export prices fell
    dramatically.
       Their interest payments were rising, but their revenues were
        falling!


                                                                       11
        Debt Crisis of 1982 (Continued)
   With such large loans defaulting, some banks
    were in financial danger.
   Larger banks couldn’t get rid of the bad loans,
    and wound up rescheduling the payments and
    making more smaller loans to allow the gov’ts to
    attempt to work through their short-term
    problems. (“Too large to fail” problem.)
   While this prevented immediate problems, it
    greatly reduced the flow of lending to these
    countries.

                                                       12
          Debt Crisis of 1982 (Continued)
   Brady Bill
       U.S. Treasury plan to help the debtor countries
        restore growth and financial viability.
       The debts were reduced and most of the
        remaining debt was refinanced at much better
        terms via “Brady bonds.”
       By 1994 most of the bank debt had been
        converted and repackaged as bonds.
       The debt crisis was over.

                                                          13
              1980-2001
              Long-term financial flows
      Billions of U.S. dollars
200
                 Bank Loans
                 FDI
150              Official


100



 50



  0



-50
  1980                    1985   1990   1995   2000
                                                      14
             The 1990s
   Around 1990, lending to developing countries
    began to recover.
       The Brady Plan restored confidence.
       As each country agreed to a Brady deal, it was usually
        able to achieve private loans immediately.
       U.S. interest rates were very low.
       The gov’ts of developing countries, eager to attract
        capital, made changes that made them much more
        attractive to lenders.
            Deregulation
            Privatization of gov’t-owned enterprises
            Trade policy liberalization
                                                                 15
           Mexican Crisis, 1994-1995
   Investors began to move heavily into Mexico in the early 1990s
    when that country made significant economic reforms and entered
    NAFTA.
   The exchange rate of the peso rose.
   Mexican inflation was higher than the U.S.
   Mexico’s CA deficit rose to 8% of its GDP in 1994.
   Mexican bank supervision and regulation was poor by int’l
    standards.
   Bank lending grew rapidly, as did defaults.
   1994 was an election year, there were two political assassinations,
    and an a political uprising, leading to concerns about the stability
    of the government.


                                                                           16
          More on the
          Mexican Crisis, 1994-1995
   These events put increasing downward pressure on the peso. The gov’t
    used sterilized intervention to defend the exchange rate, causing a
    drain on int’l reserves.
   The gov’t replaced the peso-denominated debt with short-term dollar-
    indexed gov’t debt (tesobonos).
   The citizens began to fear currency devaluation, and capital flight
    ensued. This created a huge supply of pesos on the int’l market.
   The Mexican gov’t was forced to allow the peso to depreciate against
    major currencies, and attempted to “roll over” the dollar-indexed debt.
   Investors refused to roll-over in tesobonos, and wanted to receive
    repayment of principal in dollars. Mexico could probably not repay
    them all at once…
   Investors pulled out of Mexico, but also many other developing (esp.
    Latin American) countries—the “tequilla effect”.
   The U.S. arranged a bail-out package, allowing Mexico to borrow up
    $50 billion from the U.S. and the IMF.
                                                                              17
           The Asian Crisis, 1997
   Impressed with their rapid growth rates, budget surpluses, liberal trade
    policies, and low inflation, investors were attracted to Southeast and
    East Asian countries in the 1990-1996 period.
   Gov’t bank regulation and supervision was poor. Banks took on
    excessive risks by engaging in foreign exchange speculation, and risky
    local lending practices.
   Probably as a result of high real exchange rates, the countries began
    to suffer worsening trade balances.
   In 1996, the prospect of worsening export sales caused a collapse in
    Thailand’s stock market. The Thai real estate market began to dive.
    Finally the exchange rate of the Thai baht took a nosedive, and the
    gov’t had to let it depreciate in 1997.




                                                                               18
         More on
         The Asian Crisis, 1997
   Those Thai citizens with uncovered positions began to sell
    off baht to move into foreign currency assets.
   Banks that had speculated and made risky loans came
    under pressure.
   The fear spread to other Asian countries, especially
    Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and the Phillipines.
   The IMF put together a large array of loan packages to
    the countries involved.




                                                                 19
          The Russian Crisis, 1998
   Russia still hasn’t solidified its economic position since the
    break-up of the USSR.
   In 1998 it had large fiscal budget deficits and heavy
    government borrowing.
   Ultimate, lenders said “no more”.
   The IMF organized a bail-out including a credit line of $23
    billion, with the IMF contributing $5 billion.
   Russia failed to enact policy changes required as conditions
    for the loan package.
   Capital flight ensued, and the ruble crashed. This was
    followed by a collapse in Russian stock and bond prices.

                                                                     20
         More on
         The Russian Crisis, 1998
   In August 1998, Russia unilaterally defaulted on ruble-
    denominated debt, wiping out most of the value due the
    lenders. This nearly brought down Brazil, who required an
    IMF loan to survive. Brazil floated its currency, the real.
   It placed a 90-day freeze on payments of foreign currency
    obligations to protect Russian banks.
   It allowed the ruble to float and depreciate.
   Russia asked for the next installment of loans from the IMF,
    but given these actions, the IMF refused.
   Foreign investors were in shock, and pulled out of any and
    all Russian investments they could.
   The stock market crashed.
                                                                   21
         The Brazilian Crisis, 1999
   Brazil was hard hit by the Russian crisis.
   In November 1998, the IMF arranged for Brazil to be able
    to borrow up to $41 billion, but demanded fiscal reforms.
   Brazil had a large current account deficit.
   Brazil was defending a crawling exch rate with
    intervention and high interest rates.
   January 1999, Brazil allowed its currency to float, and the
    real depreciated.
   Brazil’s banking system remained sound, and ultimately
    Brazil was able to sell new bonds to foreign investors.


                                                                  22
          The Turkish Crisis, 2001
   Turkey had borrowed continually from the IMF
    since 1958.
   In January 2000, Turkey borrowed $8 billion more
    from the IMF and World Bank. As part of the
    deal, Turkey pledged to:
       Reduce its inflation rate (100%)
       Improve bank regulation
       Privatize state-owned businesses
       End subsidies
       Reduce its fiscal deficit
       Adopt a crawling exchange rate, pegged to the euro
        and dollar
                                                             23
           More on
           The Turkish Crisis, 2001
   Turkey made progress on inflation, but:
       Continued to run large budget and current account deficits
       Suffered more bank corruption
       Foreign lenders pulled back
       Overnight interest rates rose to 2000%
   The IMF promised $7.5 billion more in loans
   February 2001, the gov’t was in gridlock over passing
    reforms, interest rates skyrocketed, and the gov’t was
    expending enormous resources trying to defend its fixed
    exchange rate.
   The gov’t finally gave up and let the lira float. It lost a
    third of its value in two days. Banks too huge losses.
   More IMF loans…
                                                                     24
             Financial Crises: What goes wrong?
   It seems that five major forces can and do lead to
    financial crises:
       Waves of over-lending and over-borrowing
            Explain in next slide
       Exogenous international shocks
            Can make repayment difficult
       Exchange rate risk
            Can make repayment difficult
       Fickle international short-term lending
            Countries structure their debt badly, relying too much on short-
             term loans
       Global contagion (social psychology, herding behavior,
        generalizing notions, reacting on too little information)
                                                                                25
          Over-borrowing/Over-lending
   Is this a coordination failure? Herding behavior?
       Investors all move toward what appears to be a region
        with high expected returns.
       Too much is lent and borrowed.
   This leads to debt-overhang: the amount by
    which the debt obligations exceed the present
    value of the resource transfer that will be made to
    service the debt. (Trans.: They can’t possible make
    a high enough return to pay their loan
    payments!)
   For the borrower, the benefits of default exceed
    the costs!
                                                                26
          Rescue Packages
   Structure and Purposes:
       Loans in the package compensate for lack of
        availability of private lending during the crisis.
       Restore investor confidence by supporting the currency
        and government. Hopefully, this will help reduce the
        capital flight.
       Reduce contagion effects that could spread the crisis to
        other countries.
       IMF imposes conditions requiring policy changes to
        change the fundamentals. This usually includes tighter
        money (anti-inflation policy) and tighter fiscal policy
        (reduced deficits and gov’t debt). May include
        tightening regulation of banks and trade liberalization.
                                                                   27
        Can this lead to a moral hazard?
   Moral hazard: insurance leads the insured to
    to be more less careful and more likely to
    incur the very thing that the insured is
    trying to protect against. The insurance
    makes the event less costly.




                                                   28
         Handling the Debt
   Debt restructuring is simply changing when the payments
    are due, allowing the borrower more time to make the
    payments.
   Debt reduction lowers the amount of debt. Banks or gov’ts
    either “forgive” part of the debt in an effort to get some of
    their principal back (instead of none). This leads to “too
    big to fail.” Governments or IMF may used its funds or issue
    bonds to pay off some of the private debt.
   There is a coordination problem with either as individual
    lenders try to hold out. Each wants the others to make the
    adjustments so that they can get all of their principal back
    now. This is a form of the free-rider problem.

                                                                    29
        DFI: The Fear
   Developing countries are afraid that
    foreigners will end up owning all the
    industry, and therefore re-patriot all the
    profits. Morever, they fear that this will
    reduce the long-term prospects for raising
    their standard of living.
   Perhaps this is a fear of colonization?
   What about national security issues? Do you
    want foreigners controlling critical
    industries?
                                                  30
          DFI: The Fear (Continued)
   For this reason, developing countries often
    require:
       A significant degree of local ownership and
        management,
       Local R&D,
       Local training programs,
       Locally purchased raw materials,
       Profits to stay in the country (perhaps through
        tax laws)

                                                          31
          DFI: The Incentives
   To attract DFI, countries offer:
       Subsidies
       Tax incentives
       Free real estate
       Special privileges




                                       32
        DFI
   Direct foreign investment is defined as any
    flow of lending to, or purchases of ownership
    in, a foreign enterprise that is largely owned
    by residents (usually firms) of the investing
    country.
   A multinational firm is a firm that controls
    enterprises in more than one country. Often
    this involves a parent corporation and
    foreign subsidiaries.
                                                     33
          DFI (Continued)
   Often little financial capital is moved
    initially. By borrowing in the country in
    which they are investing, the firm can
    minimize:
       Exchange rate risk, and
       Political risk.
   What is more important is the firm’s
    intangible assets—its name, its reputation,
    its management skill, its technology, its
    marketing skills and access to markets.
                                                  34
          Why DFI?
   It is a form of financial capital flow, seeking
    the highest risk-adjusted return.
       Does not explain why firms would choose to
        establish managerial control over the firm.
   Perfect competition? Probably not.
       DFI is not easy to accomplish. It is hard to run
        companies at a distance, and the investing firm
        does not know the local market, laws, customs,
        etc.
       DFI does not happen randomly.
                                                           35
          DFI as Imperfect Competition
   The Hymer View
       In essence, the DFI investor is seeking a
        monopoly or oligopoly position in a market.
       The investor seeks to fight off competition and
        protect its market power.
       The investor seeks to preserve market share or
        preemptively establish market share.
       This is defensive investment.


                                                          36
          DFI as Imperfect Competition
   The Appropriability Theory (Magee)
       The firm wishes to appropriate all available
        potential gains, and often finds that it is better
        to keep control and ownership to do this.
       If it did not keep such control, its firm-specific
        advantages might be lost.
       The firm also would not want to share its
        secrets with a foreign partner who might
        eventually become a competitor.

                                                             37
          Tax Issues
   Firms seek out the best tax environment for
    their operations as they attempt to minimize
    their tax liability. They shop taxes.
   Multinational firms engage in international
    transfer pricing to move profits to the lowest
    tax countries.
       Much of international trade occurs as intra-firm
        trade, between units of the multinational firm
        located in different countries.

                                                           38

				
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