North Koreas Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Programs by yurtgc548


									    The North Korean
   Nuclear/Missile Crisis

            Dr. Clay Moltz
  Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Monterey Institute of International Studies
              October 2003
             Current Crisis
• October 2002—U.S. accuses DPRK of cheating
• U.S. cuts off heavy fuel oil
• DPRK withdraws from NPT; demands security
• DPRK restarts reactors, ousts IAEA inspectors
• DPRK now says it is building bombs
• How did we get here?
• Roots of “Korean Peninsula”
  nuclear crisis:
   – no treaty to end Korean War
   – South Korean crisis (1970s)
   – last communist state
• Crisis raises alliance and security
• Poses questions for future
  nuclear/missile controls
  History of the North Korean
       Nuclear Program
• Soviet assistance in civilian nuclear field
• Post-Korean War agreement on nuclear
  training (1956)
• Soviet provision of a 2 MWt research
• Yongbyon reactor installed in 1965
• Possible planning for weapons capability
 South Korean Nuclear Program

• Nuclear power program in 1950s and 60s
• U.S. deploys tactical nuclear weapons in S.
  Korea; but begins force cuts in 1970s
• South Korean reacts with domestic nuclear
  weapons program in 1970s
• U.S. negotiates end to S. Korean program,
  but with a cost
• Precedent of “rewarding” a proliferator
DPRK Decision-Making: 1970s
• Fear of ROK cheating
• Increasing political isolation from China
  and Soviet Union
• Beginning to lose economic race with South
• Drive to develop independent nuclear
  capability (for power, weapons, or both)
     Nuclear Expansion in 1980s
• Weapons research, uranium
  mining/milling, and fuel
  fabrication facilities opened
• 20 MWt (5 MWe) research
  reactor in Yongbyon
• Construction of two power          Outside of Yongbyon-1 reactor
  plants begun (gas-graphite
• Power reactor deal with
  Soviets; DPRK forces to join
  NPT (1985)

                                  Yongbyon 20 MWt (5 MWe) reactor
Fuel rod fabrication plant in Yongbyon
Uncompleted Yongbyon-2 , 50 MWt power reactor
Unfinished 200 MWt power reactor in Tae’chon
     DPRK Missile Program
• Attempts to produce Chinese missiles
• Scuds from Egypt reverse-engineered
• Development of independent production
• Cooperation with states in Middle East;
  exports to Iran (War of the Cities)
• Development of Nodong missile
 International Nuclear Issues:
          Early 1990s
• U.S. withdraws tactical nuclear weapons
  from ROK
• Bilateral denuclearization agreement with
  South (1991)
• IAEA safeguards agreement (1991) and
  DPRK facilities declaration (1992)
• IAEA inspections reveal discrepancies
  Agreed Framework and KEDO
• IAEA calls for special inspection
  (February 1993)
• DPRK initiates withdrawal from
  NPT (March 1993)
• Jimmy Carter visits Pyongyang
  (July 1994)
• Agreed Framework (October 1994)
• Korean Peninsula Energy
  Development Organization (KEDO)
Map of DPRK Nuclear Sites
    Emerging Missile Concerns
           (late 1990s)
•   Beyond the Nodong
•   Rumsfeld Commission Report (July 1998)
•   Taepodong I test over Japan (August 1998)
•   Satellite or missile test?
•   Exports and financial incentives
Taepodong I Launch Site
Taepodong I Test
 (August 1998)
DPRK Missile Facilities
  Other North Korean WMD
• Biological Weapons
  – Several facilities
  – Inadequate technologies
  – Problems of domestic health system/control
• Chemical Weapons
  – Numerous facilities (stockpile of 5,000 tons)
  – Evidence of warheads
  – Threat to U.S. forces and ROK
DPRK Chemical Weapons Facilities
      Progress and Problems
• Delays in Agreed Framework
• Missile test/moratorium for food aid
• Normalization of relations (Italy, Australia,
  UK); economic engagement (South Korean
• But apparent DPRK nuclear cheating
• Clinton fails to reach missile deal
  U.S.-DPRK Relations Today
• Pres. Bush’s distrust of Agreed Framework
• “Axis of evil” speech and DPRK fears
• October 2002, April 2003, August 2003
  DPRK threats and nuclear claims
• Agreed Framework frozen
 How Far is DPRK from a Bomb?

• Pu on hand: 12-20 kg.
• Pu in spent fuel rods that could be
  reprocessed: 25 kg.
• Pu production of 5 kg./year at Yongbyon
• Future uranium enrichment and other Pu
How Far is the DPRK
  from an ICBM?
  • Limitations (payloads,
    CEPs, numbers)
  • Multiple stages and
    range extension
  • Taepodong II and
    CONUS: terror weapon
  • Japan?
  • Is a deal possible?
         Current Dilemmas
• DPRK need for electricity, food,
  investment, and security
• U.S. distaste for “propping up” Kim; but
  lack of attractive military options
• Mutual dissatisfaction with Agreed
  – DPRK’s view: no reactors, no security
  – U.S. view: weapons research ongoing, reactors
Ship Terminal at KEDO Site
Simulator Building at KEDO site
Reactor Foundation at KEDO Site
     Current Policy Options
• Pressure DPRK (join with allies/IAEA and
  force Kim to back down)
• Appease Kim (buy him off using security
  guarantees and economic tools)
• Deal with Kim (negotiate destruction of
  weapons programs, but provide aid for
• Nuclear/missile threat is increasing over
  time (how to stop the clock?)
• Using incentives while ensuring compliance
• Longer-term requirement: halting “demand”
  for weapons within North Korea
• New framework for Korean Peninsula

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