Weaving a Web of Trust.ppt by suchufp

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									Weaving a Web of Trust




IRUS Bay Area Roundtable     Rohit Khare
October 9, 1998            (Adam Rifkin)
Weaving a Web of Trust

 Mission                                      Introduction
        How can users decide                  Principles        Why
            what to trust on the               Principals        What
            Web?                               Policies          When
 Mechanism                                    Pragmatics        How
        Does X have                           Applications
            permission to do Y                 Limits of Trust
            with resource Z?                   Implications


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Introduction
         Clara Customer fires up her favorite Web browser one morning
            and connects to her Bank to pay her rent. The Bank's computer
            duly opens up an encrypted session, and Clara fills out the
            payment form from her landlord
A Welter of Decisions...
        Can the Bank really believe it’s Clara? Vice versa?
        What kind of ‘receipt’ can Clara rely on?
        Has the rent bill been delegated accurately?
Cryptography answers ‘how’, not ‘why’
        Tamper-proofing is not the same as entrusting

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New Conflicts in Open Systems
The Bank no longer controls both ends
        Assumptions about trusted hardware, ATM card
         scanners, private communications links invalidated
        Furthermore, Web applications tend towards
         interoperable infrastructure technology
                  Common cryptographic channel security
                  Common certificate formats and repositories
                  Common user interface hooks
 How can [online banks] convey
      trustworthiness without marble?

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Scenario: Entrusting an Applet
         Sara Surfer hears about a whiz-bang new financial applet from
            Jesse Jester. She hops over to FlyByNight.Com and downloads
            their latest and greatest auto-stock-picker
Automated support for trust decisions:
        Helping Sara decide whether to trust the applet’s
         advice: third party ratings, endorsements, &c
        Controlling the privileges of that applet: to read
         portfolios, even execute trades, but not leak info




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Scenario: Content Filtering
Many transactions can be ‘rolled-back’
        Often some recourse if trust is violated: files
         recovered, money refunded, boarding denied
Social effects cannot
        “Should Johnny view page P?” is another trust issue
        Indecency and inappropriateness is in the eye of
         several beholders
                  Intersection of school, parents, and political policy
        Need to integrate several mechanisms
                  Black- and White- lists
                  Entrusting publishers vs contents
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Trust Management
Traditional, ‘closed’ security falls short
        Access Control Lists and user databases operate over
         a known, finite universe of principals & resources
PolicyMaker introduced a new approach
                  Blaze, Feigenbaum, et al. at IEEE Oakland 1996
        A TM engine strings together assertions into proofs
        ...Where assertions can come from many sources
        ...And the crytpography falls out as just one way to
         entrust the binding of an assertion to a speaker
We need to ask why rather than how
October 9, 1998                       Weaving a Web of Trust        7
Principles                                            Why
Digital TM engines can be more exacting
 in establishing authority, so:

Be Specific
        Broader assertions are less reliable
Trust Yourself
        All trust decisions must loop back to own axioms
Be Careful
        Logical design doesn’t preclude implementation holes

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Principle: Be Specific
In real life, holistic judgments are vague:
        “I trust my spouse” — for what?
        “I trust my Bank” — that’s not how they see it
General-purpose Web tools frustrate:
        Web servers deal in bags of bits between machines
                  Not easy to distinguish a medical record file
                  Not easy to identify the actual user
        Web client interfaces don’t understand either
                  ‘Do you want to submit this data unencrypted’ - swat!
        Underlying OS security can thwart limits
                  Sandboxing mobile code, redistribution limits
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Principle: Trust Yourself
Assertion Chains should lead back to self
        “My credit card number is xxxx”
                  CreditCorp’s certificate  Issuing Bank  own records
        “United.com is the airline”                                  (it isn’t)
                  Local DNS  Root Servers  ICANN  Jon Postel      (oops!)
        “Jon’s public key is yyyy”                                   (X.509)
                  Signed by USC  Signed by state of CA  Signed by Feds
        “Jon’s public key is zzzz”                                     (PGP)
                  Signed by Jon  Signed by Fred  Signed by self
        “Public key nnnn is Jon”                                 (SDSI/SPKI)
                  “Self’s DNS’s Jon is nnnn” — root your own naming tree
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Principle: Be Careful
Identify (& Justify) every trust decision
        Can be buried in operational logic
 Example: Is Scooter a Member?
        W3C has Public, Member, and Team web access
        Originally, Member IP address masks were used
        Verbal contracts trusted employees to protect info
        AltaVista’s web crawler was seen as a Member
                  ... And information leaked out to the index!
        Required coordination of password database,
         filesystem permissions, and Robot Exclusion file

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Principals                                                        What
         Microsoft Authenticode entrusts ActiveX controls based on:
            encrypted communication between machines; signed identity of
            the author(s); and a ‘safe applet pledge’ certificate from MS and
            a ‘commercial sw publisher’ certificate from Verisign/D&B
People                                                           Names
        An identity which persists across transactions; liable
Computers                                                    Addresses
        Limited lifetime; can only prove correct execution
Organizations                                              Credentials
        Persistent lifetime; can link People & Computers

October 9, 1998                    Weaving a Web of Trust                   12
Principal: People
Trust = behavioral consistency
        Legal and social precedent holds individuals liable
        Ultimately, people back computers and organizations
Human identity should be established
 outside of any particular application
        E.g. Verisign’s multiple levels, from email to notary to
         credit check to personal investigation
Identity alone is not trustworthy
        Bank trusts Clara Customer, not Clara Beekham
                  Once the organization establishes a role linking the two

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Principal: Computers
The Web’s Trusted Computing Base?
        Client PCs have many points of failure
        Even https: relies on routing and domain naming
Entrusting Devices as Devices
        To execute cryptographic operations correctly
        To modify internal state or trigger peripherals
        Checksums, clock freshness, channel security, etc
         can only prove a consistent address
        Example: Cellphone cloning fraud conflates device
            authentication (ser #) with user authorization (bill)

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Principal: Organizations
Organizations are much like people
        Literally and legally, as ‘incorporation’ suggests
Scale has a quality all its own
        Easier to trust a group of people over time with
         internal checks and balances and standards
                  Anytime trust has to be shared with a different principal
Credentials bind people to devices
        It is more efficient to intermediate relationships
                  Reflects the same transaction costs as optimal firm-size
                    theory does in real world economics

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Policies                                                                          When
Principal-Centric                                                         Who you are
Object-Centric                                                          What you have
Action-Centric                                                         What you can do
        TM Engines take a proposition (principal, action, object),
         assertions, and a policy evaluator as input to generate an
         authorization matrix
        Policies can be composable on behalf of several stakeholders

                              Credit Line           Savings Account              Vault
     Branch Manager        Create, Read/Write Create, Read/Write            Deposit, Withdraw
                  Teller         Read                    Read/Write              Deposit
                  Guard          None                            None           Withdraw

October 9, 1998                         Weaving a Web of Trust                                  16
Policies: Principal-Centric
Placing trust in principals (or roles)
Typically, classify individuals into groups
        [Denning 76] proved information flow w/lattices
        Principle of least privilege encourages specificity
... and label each object or action with a
 minimum or maximum authorization level
        [Bell and LaPadula] compartmentalization of
         processes
         — read downwards, write upwards, sanitization

                  Useful when there are fewer users than objects or actions
October 9, 1998                    Weaving a Web of Trust                17
Policies: Object-Centric
Placing trust in objects (or keys)
Typically, protect resources with keys
        Hand out the combination to a vault
        Secret-sharing can require multiple cooperating
         keyholders (e.g. a safe-deposit box)
Optionally compartmentalize access
        Different interfaces have different keys
        Deposit and Withdraw handles in MS COM-speak
                  Possession of the right pointer limits the visible functions

                    Useful when there are fewer objects than users or actions
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Policies: Action-Centric
Placing trust in demonstrated abilities
Typically test and compile into an
 authorization certificate
        Driver’s License or swimming test
Manage classes of capabilities
        Bank might be factored into Account Creation,
         Bookkeeping, and Vault Access
        ... Then map onto personnel and objects as needed
        Example: Drinking age laws are intrinsic, not from a
            registry of drinkers or access controls on bottles
October 9, 1998                 Weaving a Web of Trust           19
Policies: Implementation
Trusting someone to drive a car:
        By identity: a list of authorized drivers
        By object: a set of keys to be handed out
        By capability: rent a car with license & insurance
Choice of ‘primary axis’ depends on:
        Simplicity: which is the smallest set? bank employees
        Dynamism: avoid enumerating the volatile. drivers
        Efficiency: what’s easiest to check?          Licenses
Watch for conflicting policy styles
        Hotel erred in using payment-ability as identity
October 9, 1998              Weaving a Web of Trust           20
Pragmatics                                                How
        The topological shift from a single secure node to a
            net of separately administered domains is driving the
            development of a new generation of Web TM tools

Identifying Principals   Decentralized PKI
Labeling Resources          Web Metadata
Codifying Policies       Policy Languages
Automating the Web of Trust    TM Engines


October 9, 1998                Weaving a Web of Trust           21
Pragmatics:
Identifying Principals
Digital Certificates alone aren’t trustworthy
        [Kohnfelder78] introduced Certification Authorities
CA Utility is proportional to its reach
        Clearinghouse simplifies group-membership
... But its power is inversely related
        The further up the pyramid, the greater the liability
Unprincipled compared to PGP/SPKI/SDSI:
        Identity certificates are not specific about authorization
        Hierarchy ends in God, not self
        Logistical difficulties of updating global revocation lists
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Pragmatics:
Labeling Resources
Traditional fixed set of security attributes
        UNIX file permissions, AFS ACLs, process handles
Separable security labels as metadata
        PICS labels, Resource Description Framwork (RDF)
        Deliverable in, with, or from third parties
Self-description of schemas
        Loadable rating scales or attribute vocabularies
Difficulty of binding to variable Web pages
        Languages, obsolescence, bundling together pages

October 9, 1998              Weaving a Web of Trust         23
Pragmatics:
Codifying Policies
Web’s ‘trust problems’ are too varied to
 compile in
        PICS filtering, applet authorization; soon payment
         method selection and privacy policy negotiation
Externalized policy evaluators
        More flexible to put in a general-purpose TM Engine
        Possible to compose policies written in several
         languages and styles
        Example: REFEREE can load in policy interpreters as
            well as policies, rather than PICSRulz alone

October 9, 1998                Weaving a Web of Trust          24
Applications
Collaborative Authoring & Publication
        Extending trust to push networks, readers
Content Filtering
        Acceptable content; rights management; privacy
        Highlights composable policy, diverse label stores
Electronic Commerce
        Negotiating by assertion rather than policy      JEPI
Downloadable Code
        Trusted applet; trusted runtime/OS

October 9, 1998              Weaving a Web of Trust           25
Limits of Trust
Limits of Web Security
        Security services below, at, and above HTTP layer
Trust as a Social Contract
        Game-theoretic model of rational opponents [Axelrod]
                  Trust is a learning process; how can tools help?
Trust in the Mirror
        Moving the world into the box magnifies latent flaws
         in existing relationships
                  The Social Security PEBES Case (“mail vs. e-mail”): speed,
                   anonymity of electronic queries changes the risk profile

October 9, 1998                        Weaving a Web of Trust                   26
Limits: Web Servers
Unprincipled
        Not able to specifically identify resources at risk
         within a server (“medical records”)
        Not responsible for own security; varies by OS
        Not careful in logging anomalies or for rollback
Principal identification scattered
        E.g. SSL client-auth info cannot pass up to HTTP
        Lower-layer IP source or DNS lookup spoofable
Inflexible policies
        Typically limited to user-and-password configurations
October 9, 1998               Weaving a Web of Trust           27
Limits: Web Clients
Unprincipled
        Does not adapt behavior to specific site IE4 Zones
        Requires trusting monolithic sw vendor instead of
         self
        Not carefully integrated with OS: cache leaks,
         cookies
Principal identification scattered
        Desktop PCs & Macs have a weak concept of User
        User interface hides computer address — spoofable
        Organizational identification relies on images, DNS
Inflexible Policies
October 9, 1998             Weaving a Web of Trust             28
Implications
Web Developers
        Commit to developing standardized TM infrastructure
Web Users
        Awareness of the flood of trust decisions of “mere”
         surfing motivates developers to do their part
Application Stakeholders
        Identify and justify your systems’ trust decisions
Citizens
        What are the social consequences of fragmenting our
            trust communities into self-contained world-views?
October 9, 1998                Weaving a Web of Trust            29
For Further Information...
 This Talk                   http://www.ics.uci.edu/~rohit/web-of-trust
 Our Paper              http://www.cs.caltech.edu/~adam/papers/www
 The Book                                        http://www.w3j.com/7/
 Digital Signature Labels                      http://www.w3.org/DSig/
 Simple PKI         http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/spki-charter.html
 REFEREE         http://www.research.att.com/~jf/pubs/www6-97.html
 PolicyMaker                       ftp://dimacs.rutgers.edu/pub/dimacs/
                            TechnicalReports/TechReports/1996/96-17.ps.gz
 Contact Us                              rohit@ics.uci.edu, adam@cs.caltech.edu




October 9, 1998              Weaving a Web of Trust                         30

								
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