Joel Hayward, "Current and Future Command Challenges for New Zealand Defence Force Personnel"

Document Sample
Joel Hayward, "Current and Future Command Challenges for New Zealand Defence Force Personnel" Powered By Docstoc
					A U S T R A L I A N


      EN
D E FForceC E
                                                          JOURNAL


           JOURNAL OF THE AUSTRALIAN PROFESSION OF ARMS




                                                          NO.155

                                                          JULY/AUGUST

                                                          2002
Australian Defence Force Journal

Board of Management
Air Commodore Peter McDermott, AM, CSC (Chairman)
Lieutenant Colonel Ian Campbell
Group Captain Ian MacFarling
Colonel David McKaskill
Captain Richard Menhinick, RAN


Contributions of any length will be considered but,
as a guide, between 2000-5000 words is the ideal length.
Articles should be typed double spaced, on one side of the
paper, or preferably submitted on disk in a word processing
format. Hardcopy should be supplied in duplicate.

All contributions and correspondence should be
addressed to:
The Editor
Australian Defence Force Journal
R8-LG-001
Russell Offices
CANBERRA ACT 2600
(02) 6265 1193
Fax (02) 6265 6972

Copyright
The material contained in the Australian Defence Force Journal
is the copyright of the Department of Defence. No part of
the publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval
system, or transmitted in any form or by any means,
electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise
without the consent of the Editor.

Email: adfj@ozemail.com.au
www.defence.gov.au/pacc/dfj/

© Commonwealth of Australia 2002
ISSN 1320-2545
Published by the Department of Defence
Canberra 2002
                                                           A U S T R A L I A N


                                                                EN
                                                          D E FForceC E
                                                                               JOURNAL
                                                         NO. 155     CONTENTS
                                                     JULY/AUGUST      3. Contemporary Perspectives on
                                                                         National Missile Defence
                                                            2002         Lieutenant Reuben R.E. Bowd,
                                                                         RAAOC
                                                                     19. Dissecting Command and
                                                                         Control with Occams’s Razor or
                                                                         Ask not what “Command” and
Editor                                                                   “Control” means to you but
Irene M. Coombes                                                         what you mean by “Command
                                                                         and Control”
Contributors are urged to ensure the
                                                                         Dr Noel Sproles, University of South
accuracy of the information contained in
their articles; the Board of Management
                                                                         Australia
accepts no responsibility for errors of fact.                        27. Australian Leadership – Leading
Permission to reprint articles in the Journal                            Edge or Luddite?
will generally be readily given by the
                                                                         Captain Christopher Ruff, Aus Int
Editor after consultation with the
author. Any reproduced articles should bear
                                                                     34. Does Risk Management
an acknowledgement of source.                                            Cultivate a Culture of Risk
The views expressed in the articles are the                              Avoidance?
author’s own and should not be construed as                              Captain I.D. Langford, RAInf
official opinion or policy.
                                                                     39. Current and Future Command
                                                                         Challenges for New Zealand
Front Cover
Chief of Defence Force Change of Command Ceremony,                       Defence Force Personnel
3 July 2002                                                              Dr Joel Hayward, Centre for Defence
Photograph by Corporal Mark Eaton                                        Studies, Massey University, New
                                                                         Zealand
                                                                     46. Reviews
Printed in Australia

by National Capital Printing,

Fyshwick, ACT, 2609
Australian Army Blackhawks from the 5th Aviation Regiment during Operation Tanager.
                                                                  Photograph by WO2 Gary Ramage
                                                                                                     3


     Contemporary Perspectives on National
               Missile Defence
                       By Lieutenant Reuben R.E. Bowd, RAAOC
    The concept of the development of a National Missile Defence (NMD) has been a contentious
issue since the 1960s.1 However, technological constraints have, to date, rendered any attempt to
deploy such a system both impractical and premature. Furthermore, a variety of agreements, such
as the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty ratified by both Russia and the US, specifically
prohibit the deployment of defensive measures such as those presently being proposed by the US
under the umbrella of the NMD project.2 The proposal, and more recently the decision, by the US
to deploy NMD today forms a focal issue of debate both within the US and across the international
community due to a myriad of uncertainties and global security concerns which such a deployment
may present. Fears for the future of bilateral and unilateral agreements, aimed at the non-
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), especially in a time of post-Cold War
goodwill and disarmament, are paramount. Some experts even go as far as anticipating a renewed
global arms race which would, instead of creating a more secure environment for the US (the very
object of NMD), present new and increased dangers not only for that nation but across the globe.3
These fears are by no means unfounded and a global increase in such weapons, within nuclear
states currently not technologically capable of NMD, as a counter to the strategic advantage
afforded the US by such a system should not come as a surprise. However, a moderate, rather than
extreme response, is anticipated by adversaries of the US. The reason for this is that the US has
proposed the deployment of “limited” NMD whilst simultaneously expressing its inclination to
unilaterally reduce, rather than aggressively increase, US nuclear forces.4
    This article seeks to discuss the potential outcome of an NMD deployment as proposed by the
Bush Administration in defence of US territory. It will briefly cover NMD in an historical context
as a legacy of the Cold War and will outline the NMD deployment system, as advocated by
President Bush. Additionally, technological merits of NMD in its present context will be explored
as will the arguments for and against deployment, its vulnerabilities, and the likely military and
political reactions by adversaries of the US to any deployment.

Historical Perspective                              Safeguard anti-missile system, designed
    Historically, NMD is no new concept. Its        initially to protect US missile silos, with an
origins can be directly traced as a legacy of the   “expansion option” to allow the system to
Cold War. As early as 4 July 1945, despite          protect population centres against the “North
conclusions by US industry that available           Country Threat”.6 However, this system was
technology precluded building an effective          abandoned on completion because it simply
missile defence, the Army made its first            did not work. In fact by the time this early
recommendation to begin a research and              form of NMD came online it was realised that
development effort to counter ballistic missiles    the new Soviet multiple independent re-entry
(BM).5 NMD, to date, boasts a lineage of            vehicle (MIRV) program would easily
failure. During the 1960s, Presidents Johnston      overwhelm it. It was also vulnerable to direct
and Nixon launched a program which                  attack and technical problems (such as radar
culminated in deployment, in 1975, of the           blinding by electromagnetic pulse) from
4   A U S T R A L I A N D E F E N C E F O R C E J O U R N A L NO. 155 JULY / AUGUST   2002

    exploding nuclear warheads which made the                          of any NMD system was to protect all US
    system unreliable, and even threatened the                         territory against limited ballistic missile attacks
    survivability of American missiles it was                          launched deliberately by “rogue states” and to
    assigned to protect.7                                              provide defensive measures to counter an
        During the 1980s the prospect of an NMD                        accidental or unauthorised launch from any
    was resurrected by Ronald Reagan with his                          source. Clinton’s statement, rather than
    “astrodome defence” dubbed “star wars”,                            indicating a change in the traditional Democrat
    aimed at creating a layered defence system for                     stance on opposing NMD, was primarily made
    the US and making ballistic weapons                                in an attempt to silence Republican opponents
    “impotent and obsolete”.8 This was a program                       who were criticising Clinton for, in their
    largely driven by an attempt to counter the                        opinion, neglecting US defence issues. Clinton
    threat presented by Soviet MIRVs. Like                             placed provisos on his plan to deploy which
    Safeguard, the proposed NMD system was                             proved, in reality, unachievable during his
    beset with technological impediments and was                       term in office. He stated that his final decision
    premature in concept. Instead of ending the                        on deployment would be based on
    global nuclear arms build-up it caused the                         considerations of technical performance, threat
    opposite to occur.9 “Star Wars” was perceived                      assessments, all the costs and arms control
    by the Soviet Union as affording the US a                          implications.15 On 1 September 2000, the
    strategic advantage during a period of “nuclear                    debate was temporarily put on hold when
    freeze”.10 Both proposals did not fail in concept                  Clinton decided not to authorise the
    but rather proved to be technologically                            deployment of NMD due to technology
    premature for their time. However, recent                          constraints, the refusal by Russia to agree to
    developments suggest that the requisite                            modify the ABM to permit deployment, and
    technology required for effective NMD may                          the reluctance of America’s allies to endorse
    not elude the scientific community for much                        NMD unless strategic stability could be assured
    longer.       What these two attempted                             through a modified ABM Treaty. Clinton’s
    deployments do demonstrate clearly is the                          assessment was supported by the Union of
    likely reaction which nuclear opponents of the
                                                                       Concerned Scientists, which in a news
    US will have to any NMD system coming on-
                                                                       conference during June 2000 described the
    line.
                                                                       NMD programme as scientifically unsound and
        Russia is currently the only country with
                                                                       a “fatal rush…with a system that can’t work”.16
    an operational BMD system which protects its
                                                                           However, on assuming office in 2001,
    capital Moscow. This system is compliant with
                                                                       President George W. Bush announced that it
    the ABM Treaty and even to this day continues
                                                                       was his Administration’s intention to deploy a
    to be upgraded.11 It began development in the
                                                                       Capability 1 system comprising 100
    late 1950s with the most recent upgrade
                                                                       interceptors as early as 2005 with a Capability
    coming on-line in 1989. However, the
                                                                       3 system being deployed by 2011 with 125
    Moscow BMD is the technological equivalent
                                                                       interceptors located at two sites in Alaska and
    to Safeguard, sharing that system’s limitations
                                                                       North Dakota.17
    and vulnerabilities.12
        President Clinton on July 22 1999 declared                     The ABM Treaty
    it to be US policy to “deploy as soon as                               By seeking to shake off restrictions imposed
    technologically possible an effective NMD                          by treaties such as the ABM, the current NMD
    system”. 13 This was an extension of his                           proposal breaks with previous US policy which
    Administration’s “3+3” NMD plan which was                          aimed at “limited” NMD within the framework
    announced in April 1996.14 The stated purpose                      of the treaty. For example, on 5 December
                                  CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENCE               5

1994, President George Bush signed the Missile     that US internal policy would not be dictated
Defence Act mandating to:                          by Russia.23 However, if the US was willing to
    Develop for deployment by the earliest date    throw away the ABM Treaty then what would
    allowed by the availability of appropriate     prevent Russia from doing the same, and by
    technology or by Fiscal Year 1996 a cost       doing so set back hard won agreements of the
    effective, operationally effective, and ABM    post-Cold War era? It is true that many
    Treaty-compliant18 anti-ballistic missile      elements of the ABM are in fact a product of
    system. . . designed to protect the United     specific political and technological
    States against limited ballistic missile       circumstances of the Cold War; however,
    threats, including accidental or               should the US choose to repudiate it Russia
    unauthorised launches or Third World           may choose in turn to absolve itself of other
    attacks.19                                     international obligations, debts and
    The Act also specifically directed that        responsibilities made by the Soviet Union.24
Brilliant Pebbles (space-based interceptors        These concerns were realised when, in response
which were under development) was not to be        to the proposed NMD deployment, President
part of any initial deployment as it threatened    Putin of Russia addressed the Duma saying:
current agreements on the militarisation of            If… the US proceeds to destroy the 1972
space.                                             ABM Treaty - and I want to make this clear -
    Presently, under the restraints of the ABM     … if that happens, we can and will withdraw
Treaty signed on 26 May 1972, the deployment       not only from the START II Treaty, but from
of NMD is prohibited. However, an                  the whole system of treaty relations having to
amendment on 3 July 1974 does permit each          do with the limitation and control of strategic
side one deployment site limited to 100            and conventional arms.25
interceptors.20 In August 1997, in response to         Russia, in the words of Putin, is “against
the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the        having a cure that is worse than the disease”.26
newly formed nuclear states also signed the        It also has condemned US NMD tests and has
ABM which the US now wishes to part with or        warned the US that the breaking of ground for
at the very least amend. On 20 June 1999, US       a firing range at a missile defence site in
President Bill Clinton and Russian President       Alaska will be considered a breach of the ABM
Boris Yeltsin issued a joint statement affirming   Treaty.27 Like many other countries, Russia
their commitment to the ABM Treaty which           takes the view that the US’s unilateral
was described as “a cornerstone of strategic       withdrawal from the ABM Treaty would lead
stability”, pledging “to [continue] efforts to     to the destruction of strategic stability, a new
strengthen the treaty, to enhance its viability    arms race, particularly in space, and the
and effectiveness in the future”.21                development of means for overcoming the
    However, all this changed when on 1 May        NMD system. Vladimir Rushailo, the head of
2001 President George W. Bush delivered a          Mr Putin’s security council, said that “The
speech in which he said that a new framework       international community should consolidate its
was needed, “beyond the constraints of the 30-     efforts to prevent such developments”.28
year old ABM Treaty” that allows the US to             The events of 11 September 2001 gave a
“build missile defences to counter the different   new perspective to the NMD debate. President
threats of today’s world”.22 In June 2001, US      Bush used the disaster to emphasise the
Secretary of State Colin Powell stated that the    urgency for NMD deployment whilst
US would break with the 1972 ABM Treaty as         opponents pointed out a need to concentrate
soon as it became a hindrance to the               on conventional means of preventing
Government’s plans for a NMD system and            terrorism. On 23 October an agreement was
6   A U S T R A L I A N D E F E N C E F O R C E J O U R N A L NO. 155 JULY / AUGUST   2002

    struck between the US and Russia that allowed                      to that envisaged under the Strategic Defence
    for progress toward NMD deployment in return                       Initiative (“Star Wars”) in the 1980s in that its
    for sharp decreases in US missile holdings.                        effectiveness will be measured by its ability to
    This was cemented on 15 November when                              successfully intercept some tens or low
    President Bush announced a 2/3rd reduction in                      hundreds of incoming missiles, not thousands.
    the US nuclear arsenal.29 The certainty of the                         The National Missile Defence (NMD)
    future direction of the program was made clear                     program has been described by the Pentagon
    when President Bush announced on 13                                as a “system of systems”.36 It involves a vast
    December 2001 that the US had given “formal                        and global network of tracking and monitoring
    notice to Russia” of its intention to withdraw                     sites linked by high speed data
    from the ABM Treaty. This commenced a six                          communications and involving the most
    month timeline toward withdrawal.30 Bush                           advanced technologies.            In order to
    emphasised that the two nations had come to a                      successfully work all parts of the network must
    new relationship no longer based on mutually                       perform their part perfectly. Currently, there
    assured destruction but instead on mutual                          are seven parts to the Bush NMD deployment
    cooperation. Despite Russian insistence that                       system, as follows:
    the decision was not seen as posing any
    serious security threat President Putin did                        1. The initial launch detection and tracking
    describe the decision as a mistake and                                system that consists of the satellites of the
    emphasised the urgent need for a new                                  Defence Support Program (DSP). In 2006 or
    international framework to be put in place of                         2007 these will be replaced by the Spaced
    the ABM. Likewise, China expressed concern                            Based InfraRed System-High (SBIRS-High)
    as to the impact of the US decision. Australia,                       constellation of five (plus one in reserve)
    on the other hand, wholeheartedly supported                           geosynchronous satellites.
    the US position sharing US concerns toward
    the increasing global missile threat.31                            2. Five ground-based early warning radars
                                                                          (including one each in the UK and
    The NMD System as Proposed by Bush                                    Greenland) that receive the initial tracking
         Deployment of NMD as envisaged under                             data from DSP or SBIRS-High through the
    the present Bush Administration will not                              system’s command and control network.
    comply with the ABM Treaty largely because
    the system under development (although                             3. Four but possibly as many as nine
    “limited”) is to be programmed to have a                              (including one each in the UK, Greenland,
    maximum of 250 interceptors at two                                    and South Korea) X-band (high frequency,
    locations.32 The project will cost American                           short wavelength) radars whose function is
    taxpayers at most conservative estimates $60                          to discriminate between incoming real
    billion dollars.33 This expenditure adds to                           warheads and decoys. The first is to be built
    current estimates that since 1983 the Pentagon                        on Shemya Island in Alaska.
    has spent $95 billion on BMD and roughly $44
    billion on NMD alone.34 The system is expected                     4. An interceptor booster, which carries an
    to use ground based interceptors and forward-                         exoatmospheric kill vehicle (EKV) to close
    deployed radars, sea-based interceptors                               proximity of the planned intercept point.
    deployed near states of concern, and space                            While in flight the EKV receives updated
    based early warning, tracking and queuing                             information on the changing location of
    radars, as well as conventionally armed space-                        the incoming missile and passes this
    based interceptors.35 This system is dissimilar                       information to the booster until separation.
                                     CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENCE               7

5. EKV, whose on-board computer processes             development of TMD’s.39 It is worth while at
   updates on the location of the hostile             this stage briefly describing both types of BMD.
   missile after the EKV has separated from               In simplistic terms, TMD is designed to
   the booster. The EKV has a combined                intercept short-range missiles whilst NMD
   optical and infrared (multiple waveband)           concentrates on a long-range missile threat.
   sensor on board through which it acquires,         Both use similar technologies which include
   tracks, and discriminates its target.              satellite-based infared sensors that detect and
                                                      track launches, radar to follow a threat and
6. The Battle Management, Command,                    interceptors to destroy a target. Eventually,
   Control, and Communications (BMC3)                 both systems may also include space-based
   network, the heart of NMD. It links the            lasers although today this aspect remains
                                                      purely academic. The US already deploys a
   separate elements, receiving and processing
                                                      version of TMD (the Patriot) which, although
   data of every kind. A critical sub-element
                                                      far from perfected, goes some way towards
   is the In-Flight Interceptor Communications
                                                      demonstrating the potential of pending
   System (IFICS) through which information
                                                      technological enhancements which may easily
   is sent to the interceptor as it flies toward
                                                      be converted for NMD application.40
   the target.
                                                          Arguably, the greatest difference between
                                                      the two forms of MD is not technological but
7. A constellation of 24 low orbit SBIRS-Low          rather political. While TMD enjoys wide
   satellites that will improve launch detection      support in the US policy debate, NMD remains
   and warhead-decoy discrimination, is to be         highly contentious.41 The popularity of TMD is
   added later but is currently at the                easily explained. Put simply, TMD addresses a
   “experimental” level.37                            non-contentious, real and visible military need
                                                      in today’s world having been proven necessary
    As outlined, the seven complex                    through its application in recent military
components of the NMD system must perform             confrontations involving the US. 42 TMD
perfectly, first as separate parts, and then mesh     gained essential popularity from its role during
together if the system is to successfully             the 1991 Gulf War where the early Patriot
intercept a hostile missile. Technology is            system was deployed against Iraqi Scud
proving to be the brake on deployment.                missiles being launched at Israel. Although the
                                                      system demonstrated its technological
                                                      limitations and did not intercept many Scuds
Technological Concerns
                                                      at all, its deployment did avert Israel from
    To many, expectations of NMD are
                                                      launching retaliatory strikes against Iraq which
unrealistic taking the form of a “field of            could have seriously fractured the US-led
dreams” attitude based on the premise which           coalition. 43 By filling this role TMD
states that “if we build it, it will work”, placing   development and deployment was legitimised,
a blind faith in technology.38 To date the            not merely as a necessary element in modern
greatest technological developments in Ballistic      warfare, but indeed an essential one. The
Missile Defence (BMD) have been in the field          ideological debate over NMD is much more
of Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) rather than          fractured.
NMD. This is primarily due to a decision in               With few exceptions NMD tests to date,
May 1993 by then-Secretary of Defense Les             conducted under ideal conditions, have been
Aspin to reorientate the Ballistic Missile            dismal failures.44 Exceptions occurred on 14
Defence Organisation (BMDO) toward the                July and 4 December 2001. The 14 July test
8   A U S T R A L I A N D E F E N C E F O R C E J O U R N A L NO. 155 JULY / AUGUST   2002

    was only a “qualified” success whilst the 4                        Regardless, the NMD projects future was
    December test is yet to be fully scrutinised,                      guaranteed when on 14 December 2001
    although the Pentagon has proclaimed all tests                     Congress allocated $343 billion dollars to fully
    as successful based on the ability to learn so                     fund NMD.52
    much even from a failure.45 Discrimination
                                                                       Reasons For and Against NMD deployment
    (the ability to distinguish real warheads from
                                                                           The reasons for controversy over the
    decoys) is by far the most complex and
                                                                       proposed deployment of an NMD can best be
    controversial technological hurdle to be
    overcome.46 However, at present all elements of                    shown by considering the US political
    the proposed system are yet to be proven as                        arguments advocated by the two major schools
    technologically feasible with even reliable                        of thought. Indeed these arguments are largely
    tracking and monitoring of a target often                          representative of those being voiced by both
    eluding currently available technologies. It                       opponent and supporter around the world.
    was exposed by Defence Week that the                               Supporters of NMD, largely Republicans,
    warhead hit by a Pentagon missile during the                       justify their argument on a real national
    14 July test was carrying a global positioning                     security need, that being, to protect the US
    satellite beacon that made it easy to track.                       from direct ballistic missile attack. They cite
    Critics say that the missiles would have had                       the existence of politically unstable “rogue
    little chance of pinpointing the warhead’s path                    states” which as “nuclear equipped adversaries
    without the help of the beacons.47 Defence                         will not always [act] rationally or at least
    Week also reported that the beacon helped the                      operate with the same logic” as the US does.53
    defence missile compensate for deficiencies in                     Arms controllers, namely Democrats, 54
    US radar tracking technology on the ground.                        consider that the solution to any security threat
    To this end, opponents liken the enormous                          facing the US lies not in a costly NMD system,
    technical challenges of NMD to “attempting to                      but instead through securing reductions in
    hit a bullet with a bullet”.48 As evidence of the                  global nuclear arsenals through the
    technical difficulties confronting the project                     strengthening of bilateral agreements, such as
    many point to a decision on 15 December                            START and the ABM, and consider it of vital
    2001 to cancel the multi-billion missile defence
                                                                       importance to improve US-Russian relations.55
    system for Navy ships occurring due to poor
                                                                       Anti-NMD advocates argue that these goals
    performance and excessive cost.49 Opponents
                                                                       would be seriously threatened if NMD was
    of NMD cite this as an example that goes some
                                                                       approved and that the outcome of such a
    way to proving that getting such a complicated
                                                                       decision may be a renewed global arms race of
    system to work even in the most simple
                                                                       Cold War magnitude.
    circumstances is at present doubtful.
         The future test program is fluid and is to                        French President Jacques Chirac, a vocal
    incorporate at least 15 more tests, and the                        opponent of NMD deployment, expressed
    system could become operational, however                           exactly this concern saying:
    unlikely,50 as early as 2005. Many consider it                         How do you convince (nations) to stop
    nonsensical to deploy an inadequately tested                           piling up new arms when more powerful
    defensive system before any clear offensive                            countries say it’s necessary to develop
    threat is realised virtually guaranteeing that                         technologies that put hard-won strategic
    any threat which subsequently appears will be                          balances into question? 56
    able to penetrate the system. Missile intercept                        He added to the debate when, during an
    systems will be incapable of keeping pace with                     interview with the New York Times on 17
    improvements in offensive capabilities. 51                         December 1999, he observed:
                                   CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENCE                9

     If you look at world history, ever since men   in nuclear history. For example, the
     began waging war, you will see that there’s    intelligence         community         seriously
     a permanent race between sword and             underestimated the USSR following the first
     shield. The sword always wins. The more        atomic detonation in 1945. At this time
     improvements that are made to the shield,      military planners anticipated that the Soviets
     the more improvements that are made to         would take a decade to produce a similar
     the sword. We think that with these            weapon. Instead, by 1949 the Soviets
     [NMD] systems, we are just going to spur       detonated their own bomb and thus nullified
     swordmakers to intensify their efforts.57      any strategic advantage enjoyed by the US.
     Supporters counter this argument by            This action-reaction dynamic typified the
emphasising that defences would reduce the          entire Cold War period and goes some way to
utility of enemy missiles, deterring their          demonstrating the potential dangers of
acquisition.58 Each argument has merit and          underestimating any potential foe.63
will be addressed in greater detail.                    This argument can also be used by
     Supporters of NMD draw largely on the          opponents of NMD. To date, throughout the
truism that the global missile threat to the US     nuclear era, Washington has gained no
is growing. The nuclear club of nations now,        discernible diplomatic or strategic advantage
largely as a result of the collapse of the Soviet   through its technological innovations,
Union, includes some two dozen states, many         primarily because the Eastern Bloc has very
of which are at present highly politically          quickly matched, copied or developed
unstable and unpredictable.59 This concern is       countermeasures. The same, it is argued, will
doubled with the fact that the range of ballistic   quickly occur to counter the effectiveness of
missiles is currently increasing, suggesting that   any deployed NMD system, therefore nullifying
shortly many of these volatile states may           its existence and success. Perhaps the most
develop deployment systems capable of               obvious means of countering NMD is through
reaching the US, which, when combined with a        rearmament, by developing greater numbers of
political will to strike, poses a real concern.     ballistic weapons, new delivery systems and
Nations such as North Korea, Iran and Iraq          decoys so as to overwhelm any shield
have been identified by advocates of NMD for        established by the US. This would mean the
these reasons as possible “rogue” states. It is     shaking off of related arms-limitations treaties
currently anticipated that North Korea will         in a world that can ill-afford such action. This
become capable of posing such a threat to the       is predominantly what the anti-NMD camp
US by 2005, Iran by 2010 and Iraq by 2015.60        fears with justification.
In 1998 a Congressionally mandated                      The implication of NMD for outer space has
commission led by former US Secretary of            been afforded little attention, yet will pose one
Defence Donald H. Rumsfeld produced a report        of the greatest avenues for instability. 64
which overwhelmingly confirmed the concerns         Currently, outer space is a weapons free
of the pro-NMD lobby.61 Rumsfeld was highly         environment “supported by a limited regime
critical of the US intelligence community           (the Outer Space Treaty)65 and a number of
which anticipated that it would have at least a     tacit agreements against weaponisation”.66 US
decade’s prior notice before any such missile       deployment of an NMD is heavily reliant on
threat materialised.62 Rumsfeld’s report warned     space-based components. However, presently
that missiles could appear much sooner. This        there exists no treaty banning anti-satellite
criticism of the intelligence community is not      (ASAT) weapons and therefore a key
historically unfounded and precedent for such       vulnerability in the NMD network is presented
concern exists dating from the earliest periods     when possible responses by US opponents are
10   A U S T R A L I A N D E F E N C E F O R C F E J O U R N A L NO. 155 JULY / AUGUST   2002

     considered. The militarisation of space, it is                     ICBMs as it is currently doing under the
     argued, could inhibit future manned, scientific                    present disarmament framework.72 This move
     and commercial activities in space, as well as                     was confirmed when, following summit talks
     US arms control monitoring capabilities.67                         in Slovenia during July 2001 with President
         The vulnerabilities inherent in NMD                            Bush, President Putin expressed “that despite it
     deployment add to the arguments against                            being in violation of the START II agreement,
     NMD. Compared to offences, sophisticated                           Russia would strengthen its nuclear forces in
     defences are much more vulnerable to attack                        response to US NMD and could eventually
     because of their reliance on forward-based                         counter an American defence system by
     tracking installations and space-based                             implementing multiple warheads on its
     components. The task of the defender is far                        ICBMs”. 73 This response, in reality, will
     more difficult than that of the attacker. At                       culminate in a breakdown in the disarmament
     each step in an NMD process the defender is                        process but little increase in numbers of
     vulnerable to possible mistakes and to attacks                     missiles. This is because Russia already has
     on system components.68 Furthermore, the                           enough warheads to overwhelm the proposed
     timeframe during which Bush will deploy NMD                        system.74
     will allow considerable time for adversaries to                        China is staunchly opposed to the
     “size-up” the system and develop means of                          deployment of NMD or TMD both in America
     subverting it. Many argue that should Bush                         and East Asia. Many analysts within the US
     continue to insist on flouting the ABM Treaty                      and abroad argue that the NMD initiative is
     and “this coincides with an increase in US-                        prompted, not by a threat from “rogue states”
     Russian or US-Chinese tensions…It might also                       but instead by a perceived “China threat”.75
     include multinational approaches, as states                        China only has a small stockpile of missiles, 76
     feeling threatened by the system may begin to                      and it is this fact that poses greatest concern
                                                                        for China when it comes to the US NMD
     coordinate their military responses in the
                                                                        deployment. On 2 September 2001 it was
     classic form of a preventative alliance”.69 In
                                                                        alleged by the New York Times that the White
     such a scenario, Russia could provide China
                                                                        House had told the Chinese that it would not
     with the technology to develop manoeuvrable
                                                                        object to China’s plan to expand its limited
     warheads to enhance their capabilities.70 This
                                                                        arsenal of nuclear missiles if support for its
     fear is already becoming a reality as seen
                                                                        NMD proposal was forthcoming. However
     through the signing of a “Good Neighbourly
                                                                        administration officials have since rejected the
     Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation” on 16
                                                                        report reaffirming their commitment to
     July 2001 between China’s President Jiang
                                                                        reducing the global arms stockpile. 77
     Zemin and Russian President Vladimir Putin.
                                                                        Condoleezza Rice, President Bush’s national
     This treaty superseded an outdated 1950
                                                                        security adviser, said the US “is not about to
     version and committed both Russia and China
                                                                        propose to the Chinese that in exchange for
     to a further 20-year pact. Also, North Korean
                                                                        Chinese acceptance of MD, we will accept a
     leader Kim Jong-il has recently visited Russia
                                                                        nuclear buildup” adding that while
     for bilateral talks with President Putin.71                        Washington does not believe the Chinese have
     Likely Military Responses to NMD Deployment                        reason to expand their nuclear forces, “their
     Including Russia and China                                         modernisation has been under way for some
         Potential adversaries will react to US NMD                     time”. One senior official added: “We know
     deployment differently depending on their own                      the Chinese will enhance their nuclear
     circumstances. For Russia, the most logical                        capability anyway, and we are going to say to
     response would be to stop de-MIRVing its                           them, `We’re not going to tell you not to do
                                    CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENCE                 11

it’”.78 Also, The Bush administration plans to       any international treaties or agreements and as
offer China an early look at plans for testing       they are not categorised as “weapons” are
the proposed NMD system in an effort to ease         politically favourable.85 Further, penetration
Beijing’s opposition to the US shield.79 Clearly,    aids will prove highly effective against NMD.
China would be prompted to more actively             Recent US NMD tests have proven that dealing
pursue options such as mobile missiles and           with large numbers of decoys will severely
MIRVs and many believe that should                   inhibit the system.86 Hence, even if a global
deployment occur a “head on collision with           proliferation of ballistic missiles does not
China will be difficult to avoid”.80                 occur, a build-up of penetration aids, which
     Hence, in response to NMD deployment, it        may render the NMD system ineffective, will.
can be surmised that large and technologically       The problems faced by the current NMD
capable states will seek “step level” increases in   system when discriminating warheads from
sophistication and modest increases in the           decoys has already been mentioned.
number of launchers. Middle powers, such as              The NMD system and its elements could
North Korea, may seek numerical increases in         also be exposed to potential attack from the
ballistic missiles, especially where these can       ground, sea and in space by adversaries. Many
also be used to counter local adversaries, whilst    of its elements are susceptible to attack
smaller states will build a few weapons but will     especially the forward based radar in Alaska
be unable to afford a sustained build-up. All        and those facilities to be located on foreign soil
of these adversaries, it is anticipated, will turn   such as in the UK and Greenland. 87 For
to penetration aids to ensure the success of the     example, air strikes or special forces
missiles they have. Less technological states        operations,88 or terrorist attack, could inflict a
posing a threat to the US may find it most           substantial blow against the NMD system. A
beneficial to turn to asymmetric responses.81        low yield nuclear attack on any of the remote
     This course of action has already been          elements would be impossible to defend
alluded to by senior Chinese diplomats and           against.89 This vulnerability could increase the
military specialists who emphasise that China        demand for tactical nuclear missiles among
may pursue an “Andropov solution” (building          NMD opponent states some of whom,
countermeasures) in response to any US NMD           especially those with fewer resources, may
deployment.82 The Andropov solution would            focus on sea launch and cruise missile
be more economical with some Chinese                 capabilities which would not be able to be
arguing that they could develop                      defeated by the NMD umbrella. Also, the sea-
countermeasures to the US NMD system “at a           based elements of the system which are to be
cost of two per cent of their defence budget. At     carried by the Aegis-class destroyers may
the same time, they had heard that the US            result in an increased procurement and
system would cost two per cent of the US             development of quiet submarines, of the type
defence budget. Given the huge disparity             now widely available from Russia.90
between the two budgets, they asked, were                Space-based components, critical to any
they not getting the better end of the               NMD system, are particularly vulnerable to
bargain?” 83. As long as countermeasures             attack with opponents only having to be
proved effective no strategic build-up would be      capable of launching medium-range ballistic
necessary to overwhelm the US system.84              missiles with some accuracy to attack these
     The primary reason why penetration aids         assets. Low Earth Orbiting (LEO) satellites are
will prove attractive to US adversaries is that      most vulnerable and due to their tracking and
they are inexpensive and do not require              queuing taskings would be a high priority
advanced technology. They also do not violate        target.91 Hence, direct ascent ASAT weapons
12   A U S T R A L I A N D E F E N C E F O R C E J O U R N A L NO. 155 JULY / AUGUST   2002

     would become a likely focus for some states as                     be highly effective and not easily detected
     a counter to NMD and would be capable of                           especially if deployed on a commercial vessel
     blinding the system and rendering it                               in international waters off the coast of the US.
     inoperative. Co-orbital and permanent space                        Short-range ballistic missiles could also be
     based ASATs may also see deployment                                launched in a similar fashion with little chance
     especially as these weapons (unless nuclear                        of detection by any planned NMD system.96
     armed) do not represent any direct violation to                    Other options may include delivery of a
     any standing agreements on weapons in                              weapon on a rubber raft, or another vessel
     space.92 Should the US deploy NMD and shrug                        which is hard to detect, as occurred in the USS
     off the ABM, it would have no grounds for                          Cole incident in Yemen.97 One senior member
     objecting to space-based weapons being                             of the Bush administration readily admitted
     deployed in large quantities. Furthermore, in                      during a conference in 1999 that “he expects
     an effort to undermine the US NMD system                           NMD to cause “the bad guys’ to redouble their
     Russia could sell ASATs with impunity to                           efforts to acquire asymmetrical means of
     China, India, Iraq, or other states of its                         attacking the US homeland or US allies and
     choosing. Such weapons could also be nuclear                       their assets.98 Hence, it is very likely that NMD
     armed offering considerably greater range and                      will fuel development of WMD and less
     impact, although this would violate the Outer                      traceable means of delivery. Advocates of
     Space Treaty. Once deployed ASATs could                            NMD argue that such developments are
     render near earth space unusable for civilian or                   “inevitable” and that the US would be better
     passive military use. Some ardent pro-NMD                          off with at least some means of self-defence
     supporters in the US continue to press for                         against missile attack. Asymmetric means of
     space-based interceptors (Brilliant Pebbles)                       attack will mean that many states will respond
     which would only encourage states to develop                       to NMD deployment by “spending on areas
     and deploy countermeasures and would                               where they believe the US to be vulnerable”.99
     counter any agreements aimed at the                                This will prove taxing on the US military and
     demilitarisation of space.93                                       enforcement agencies and may see opponents
         Regardless, the most likely focus of “rogue”
                                                                        exacerbating the situation by testing US bases
     states to NMD will be in the form of
                                                                        and defences.100 Moreover, it is likely that
     asymmetric military responses.               The
                                                                        “rogue” states and terrorist groups will be
     asymmetric response is appealing due to the
                                                                        likely to receive “more assistance in their
     fact that weapons are inexpensive and unlike
                                                                        efforts if US NMD policy is conducted in a way
     ballistic missiles, which are highly transparent
                                                                        that alienates either Russia or China, or both”.
     and easily detected, are best suited for stealthy
                                                                        These countries are in a “good position to
     attack. A state would merely need a means of
                                                                        assist third countries in their efforts to acquire
     delivery, (not necessarily a missile) such as a
                                                                        alternative delivery systems and weapons” in
     suitcase bomb smuggled in vehicles or by foot,
                                                                        an effort to undermine the US NMD.101
     small aircraft, small boats or other means, to
     attack the US. Even terrorists lacking any state                   Conclusion
     backing have been capable of launching                                 It appears likely that the response of other
     internal attacks on the US through this means,                     states to NMD deployment would be limited
     as in the case of the World Trade Centre                           mainly to reactive missile deployments and a
     attacks in New York and on the Pentagon.94                         build-up of penetration aids. However, any
         This is not to say that missiles can not                       NMD deployment by the US will be met by
     feature in any asymmetric response. Cruise                         some certainties, these being that NMD is
     missiles, easily available off the shelf,95 would                  unlikely to revolutionise the strategic
                                     CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENCE                     13

environment or render offensive weapons                positive steps than the deployment of a
obsolete, and that it will be met by active            contentious NMD.105 Such measures, in the
military countermeasures from a variety of             longer term, may also result in a global
states, dependant on each state’s unique               armaments reduction thereby nullifying any
circumstances. It may also trigger action-             need for an NMD.
reaction dynamics and lead other states into               This article has not sought to address the
unilateral arms build-ups; and, NMD is likely          standpoint of US allies, particularly in Europe
to increase rather than reduce the worldwide           and Asia. However, it can be said that all hold
armaments stockpile.102 It will also complicate        reservations toward NMD and oppose any
the future international environment for arms          deployment that violates the ABM Treaty.106
control and increase world tensions. The               This was also the stance of the United Nations
militarisation of space would also make the            General Assembly when on 5 November 1999
peaceful use of space, especially for arms             it voted overwhelmingly in favour of a
control monitoring, very difficult.                    resolution to preserve the ABM Treaty.107 There
    It can clearly be seen that NMD                    is little popular support for a system which,
deployment will open a Pandora’s box of                whilst possibly offering the US increased
uncertainty for which the global community is          security within a unilateral framework, will
unprepared and which it is largely unwilling to        expose her allies and alliances especially NATO
accept. Although the system faces many                 to a new, dangerous and uncertain world.108
technological challenges it appears likely that        These sentiments were echoed by former
some “limited” NMD system will be deployed             Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser who
by Bush in his first term of office. It is felt that   warned that participation in NMD would make
this system, like the earlier “Safeguard” NMD,         countries like Australia “hostage to US actions”
will be a “rush to failure”. Not only will the         and “a first-rate target in the event of
system, at present, fail technologically, but also     hostilities between America and another
hard-won non-proliferation agreements will be          country”.109 NMD deployment by the US
reneged on and any groundwork which has                could lead to regional and even global arms
been made in arms control lost.                        races, polarising the world anew and making
    NMD is not without its alternatives. A US          enemies of countries that are now at worst
attempt at promoting international cooperation
                                                       only competitors”.110
and non-proliferation regimes as an attempt at
missile proliferation, instead of the isolationist
                                                                              NOTES
path currently being taken through NMD,
would be a much more permanent and positive            1.   John Isaacs, “A Political Decision”, in Bulletin
                                                            of Atomic Scientists, March/April 2000, p. 23.
method of addressing the US security concerns.         2.   Michael O’Hanlon, “Star Wars Strikes Back”, in
Also, the long standing US policy, commonly                 Foreign Affairs, November/December 1999,
referred to as “deterrence”, has served the US              p. 71.
well for years and no evidence suggests that it        3.   http://www.stopstarwars.org. (Green Peace
                                                            Website).
would not continue to work against “rogue
                                                       4.   James Clay Moltz, “Forecasting the Strategic-
states” or terrorists.103 Treaty compliant missile          Military Implications of NMD Deployment”, in
defences aimed at TMD, offensive arms                       International Perspectives on Missile
reductions within the framework of existing                 Proliferation and Defenses, Occasional Paper
treaties such as SALT, strengthening of the                 No. 5 (Monterey: Montery Institute of
                                                            International Studies, March 2000), p. 35.
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR),104           5.   http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/roguestate.
and the negotiation of an ASAT-ban for the             6.   Ronald E. Powaski, Return to Armageddon:
demilitarisation of space would be much more                The United States and the Nuclear Arms Race,
14   A U S T R A L I A N D E F E N C E F O R C E J O U R N A L NO. 155 JULY / AUGUST   2002

           1981-1999, New York: Oxford University                       23. ibid.
           Press, 2000, pp. 32-33.                                      24. O’Hanlon, “Star Wars Strikes Back”, Foreign
     7.    http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/roguestate.                       Affairs, November/December 1999, p. 71.
     8.    Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, March/April 2000,             25. http://www.stopstarwars.org.
           p. 23. On 23 March 1983, President Reagan                    26. ibid.
           delivered a national television address in which             27. Guardian Newspapers Limited 2001 at
           he called for research into defences that would                  http://www.commondreams.org/headlines01/
           make “nuclear weapons impotent and                               0713-01.htm.
           obsolete”. On 24 March 1983, opponents in                    28. ibid.
           Congress labelled President Reagan’s vision of a             29. http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/roguestate.
           defensive umbrella “Star Wars”. See also,                    30. ibid.
           http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/roguestate.                   31. ibid.
     9.    In particular there was a substantial Soviet                 32. Michael E. O’Hanlon, Defence Policy Choices for
           build-up of penetration aids such as chaff,                      the Bush Administration 2001-05, p. 154.
           balloons and dummy missiles in response to                   33. Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, March/April 2000,
           “Star Wars”.                                                     p. 24.
     10.   Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, March/April 2000,             34. Powaski, Return to Armageddon, p. 189. See
           p. 23.                                                           also, http://www.stopstarwars.org.
     11.   There have been three system developments                    35. International Perspectives on Missile
           since the late 1950s. These being the ABM-                       Proliferation and Defenses, Occasional Paper
           1/A-135, ABM-2/S-225 and the most recent,                        No. 5, p. 34.
           commenced in 1978 and operational in 1989,                   36. Daniel Smith, “Technological Challenges in
           the ABM-3/A-135. www.fag.org/starwars/                           National Missile Defence” [2001 ?] at
           program/soviet.                                                  http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/roguestate.
     12.   http://news6.thdo.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/                37. ibid.
           europe/newsid_1177000/1177889.stm, and                       38. O’Hanlon, “Star Wars Strikes Back”, Foreign
           http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreignp/                           Affairs, November/December 1999, p. 82.
           usstrat-e.asp                                                39. ibid., pp. 68-69.
     13.   John Steinbruner, “National Missile Defence:                 40. ibid., pp. 68-69.
           Collision in Progress”, in Arms Control Today,               41. ibid., pp. 68-69.
           November 1999, p. 3.                                         42. Michael E. O’Hanlon, Defence Policy Choices for
     14.   Powaski, Return to Armageddon, pp. 32-33.The                     the Bush Administration 2001-05, pp. 143-44.
           plan allowed three years for development of                  43. ibid., pp. 143-44.
           NMD and, if warranted, three more years to                   44. Daniel Smith, “Technological Challenges in
           deploy a system. pp. 190-91.                                     National Missile Defence” [2001 ?] at
     15.   John Steinbruner, “National Missile Defence:                     http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/roguestate.
           Collision in Progress”, p. 3.                                45. ibid.
     16.   http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/roguestate. See               46. ibid.
           also note 46.                                                47. http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/roguestate.
     17.   Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, March/April 2000,                 Exposure of US authorities rigging tests for
           p. 24. The Capability 3 system will also                         ideal conditions should come as no real
           comprise 3 command centres, 5                                    surprise. On 10 June 1984, under the Reagan
           communications relay stations, 15 radars (6                      Administration, an interceptor package guided
           early warning and 9 high resolution UHF or X-                    by infrared sensors and a computer destroyed
           band), and 29 satellites (Space Based Infrared                   its target in a similar fashion. In this instance
           High and Low). See also Colonel Daniel Smith,                    the General Accounting Office in 1994 noted in
           USA (Ret.), “Technological Challenges in                         its report that the target had been artificially
           National Missile Defense” [? 2001] at                            heated to increase its infrared signature.
           http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/roguestate.                   48. ibid., This analogy has been asserted since 1955
     18.   ibid. Own emphasis added.                                        when, after 50,000 simulated ballistic missile
     19.   ibid.                                                            intercepts on an analog computer, Bell
     20.   Michael E. O’Hanlon, Defence Policy Choices for                  Laboratory scientists concluded that “hitting a
           the Bush Administration 2001-05, Washington                      bullet with another bullet” was possible.
           D.C: Brookings University Press, 2001, p. 145.                   Although not valid today this test gives some
     21.    http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/roguestate.                      perspective of how long the NMD testing and
     22.   ibid.                                                            debate has been underway in the US.
                                      CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENCE                    15

49. http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/roguestate.          71. Dr. Bruce Blair, “Impact of NMD on Russia,
50. In February 1998 the first Welch review                 Nuclear Security” [2001?], http://www.-
    criticised shortcomings and overambitious time          abc.net.au/4corners/roguestate.
    lines that amounted in its findings to a “rush to   72. International Perspectives on Missile
    failure” in various missile programs including          Proliferation and Defenses, Occasional Paper
    NMD. See Foreign Affairs, November/December             No. 5, p. 35-36.
    1999, p. 73.                                        73. Dr. Nicholas Berry, “U.S. National Missile
51. John Steinbruner, “National Missile Defence:            Defense: Views from Asia” [2001?], at
    Collision in Progress”, in Arms Control Today,          http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/roguestate.
    November 1999, p. 3.                                74. Peter Van Ness, Ballistic Missile Defenses: A
52. http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/roguestate.              Response, (Canberra: ANU, 1999), p. 2.
53. Stated in May 1992 by the House Armed               75. ibid., p. 2.
    Services Committee Chairman Les Aspin.              76. ibid., p. 2. The International Institute for
    http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/roguestate.              Strategic Studies notes that “China’s strategic
54. See also page 3 for an explanation of why               capability is comprised of less than 200 nuclear
    Clinton, a Democrat, launched NMD projects.             warheads, of which perhaps 20-30 would be
55. Foreign Affairs, November/December 1999, pp.            operational at any given time”.
    69.                                                 77. Robert Burns, “US Says China Nuke Buildup
56. http://www.stopstarwars.org.                            Unnecessary”, Associated Press, 5 September
57. Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, March/April 2000,        2001, on internet at National Missile Defence
    p. 25.                                                  Organisation http://www.acq.osd.mil/bmdo/
58. International Perspectives on Missile                   bmdolink/html/ nmd.html.
    Proliferation and Defenses, Occasional Paper        78. No author, “China to See U.S. Missile Plan”,
    No. 5, p. 35.
                                                            Washington Post, 2 September 2001 at
59. Foreign Affairs, November/December 1999, p.
                                                            http://dailynews.yahoo.com/h/ap/20010902/pl/
    70.
                                                            us_china_4.html.
60. ibid., pp. 70-71.
                                                        79. ibid.
61. Rumsfeld has reassumed the appointment of
                                                        80. Peter Van Ness, Ballistic Missile Defenses: A
    Secretary of Defence under the current Bush
                                                            Response, (Canberra: unpublished, 1999), p. 2.
    Administration.
                                                        81. These include the use of weapons, other than
62. ibid., pp. 70-71. In November 1995, a National
                                                            ballistic missiles, such as conventional
    Intelligence Estimate (NIE 95-19) judged that
                                                            explosives, or biological and chemical weapons,
    “No country, other than the major declared
    nuclear powers, will develop or otherwise               against the US. International Perspective’s on
    acquire a ballistic missile in the next 15 years        Missile Proliferation and Defenses, Occasional
    that could threaten the contiguous 48 states or         Paper No. 5, p. 36.
    Canada”.                                            82. Rose Gottemoeller, “If China Builds More
63. International Perspective’s on Missile                  Warheads”, Washington Post, 6 September
    Proliferation and Defenses, Occasional Paper            2001, p. A23 at http://www.washingtonpost.
    No. 5, p. 33.                                           com/wp-dyn/articles/A48967-2001Sep5.html.
64. ibid., pp. 33-34.                                       “In the 1980s, faced with the necessity of
65. The treaty opened for signature at Moscow,              responding to the Reagan administration’s ‘Star
    London and Washington on 27 January 1967                Wars’ initiative with an economy that was
    to “contribute to broad international co-               already in crisis, the Communist Party general
    operation in the scientific as well as the legal        secretary, Yuri Andropov, decreed an approach
    aspects of the exploration and use of outer             that was an innovation in Soviet policy at the
    space for peaceful purposes”. See,                      time: Instead of trying to match U.S. strategic
    http://www.iasl.mcgill.ca/space_law/conventions         defenses or engage in a strategic offensive
    /outerspace.html.                                       buildup, as had been past practice, the Soviet
66. International Perspective’s on Missile                  Union would concentrate on developing
    Proliferation and Defenses, Occasional Paper            countermeasures to the system — chaff,
    No. 5, p. 33-34.                                        balloons and other technologies that would
67. ibid., pp. 33-34.                                       defeat the system without destroying it. In that
68. ibid., p. 34.                                           way, Andropov argued, he could maintain
69. ibid., pp. 34-35.                                       Soviet security on the cheap, without having to
70. ibid., pp. 34-35.                                       match or mirror U.S. programs”.
16   A U S T R A L I A N D E F E N C E F O R C E J O U R N A L NO. 155 JULY / AUGUST   2002

     83. Rose Gottemoeller, “If China Builds More                       100. The recent attacks on the World Trade Centre
         Warheads”, at http://www.washingtonpost.                            in New York and the Pentagon in Washington
         com/wp-dyn/articles/A48967-2001Sep5.html.                           D.C have stretched US military and
     84. ibid.                                                               enforcement agencies (i.e. FBI, Fire Brigade and
     85. International Perspective’s on Missile                              Police Forces) to the limit, and were not
         Proliferation and Defenses, Occasional Paper                        anticipated by the US intelligence agencies.
         No. 5, p. 36.                                                       Therefore what hope would the US have of
     86. ibid., p.37.                                                        preventing strikes against NMD elements on
     87. ibid.                                                               foreign soil let alone on their own? NMD will
     88. North Korean commandos have infiltrated                             be incapable of addressing these real threats.
         South Korea with ease for years despite the best                    See also footnotes 82, 88 and 91.
         efforts of the US and South Korea to prevent                   101. International Perspectives on Missile
         them. And terrorists have struck deep within                        Proliferation and Defenses, p. 41.
         the heart of US territory. See also notes 91 and               102. ibid., p. 41.
         94.                                                            103. Peter Van Ness, Ballistic Missile Defenses, p. 3.
     89. International Perspectives on Missile                          104. The MTCR is an informal political arrangement
         Proliferation and Defenses, pp. 37-38.                              formed in 1987 to control the “proliferation of
     90. Such as the Kilo-class 636 model.                                   rocket and unmanned air vehicle systems
     91. International Perspectives on Missile                               capable of delivering weapons of mass
         Proliferation and Defenses, pp. 38-39.                              destruction and their associated equipment and
     92. The USSR conducted tests in the 1960s and                           technology. The Regime’s controls are
         1970s on a space-based ASAT weapon leading                          applicable to such rocket and unmanned air
         the US to declare it “operational”.                                 vehicle systems as ballistic missiles, space
                                                                             launch vehicles, sounding rockets, unmanned
     93. International Perspectives on Missile
                                                                             air vehicles, cruise missiles, drones, and
         Proliferation and Defenses, p. 39.
                                                                             remotely piloted vehicles”. MTCR also
     94. The first attack occurred on 26 February 1993
                                                                             has considerable range limitations.
         when a vehicle loaded with explosives was
                                                                             http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/np/
         detonated beneath the complex killing six
                                                                             mtcr/mtcr.html.
         people, injuring thousands and causing
                                                                        105. Rear Admiral Eugene J. Carroll, Jr., USN (Ret.)
         extensive damage. On 11 September 2001 the
                                                                             “Why Should You/We Care?” at
         complex was completely destroyed when
                                                                             http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/roguestate.
         terrorists hijacked two commercial aircraft                    106. Peter Van Ness, Ballistic Missile Defenses, pp.
         crashing them into the towers killing a yet to                      4-5. See also, http://www.abc.net.au/
         be disclosed number of people. The Pentagon                         4corners/roguestate.
         was also attacked in the same fashion.                         107. Peter Van Ness, Ballistic Missile Defenses, p. 4.
     95. Examples of conventional missiles (cruise and                  108. Jeremy Stoker, “Briefing Missile Defence”, in
         other) which are widely held and capable of                         Janes Defence Weekly, 22 August 2001,
         such tasking are the Soviet SA-2,3,6,10 and 12,                     pp. 23-25.
         the SS-18, SS-24, and SS-25 and the Scud. In                   109. Christopher Hellman “The Costs of Ballistic
         America the D-5, Tomahawk and Harpoon. To                           Missile Defense” [2001?] at http://www.abc.
         name but a few amongst hundreds.                                    net.au/4 corners/roguestate.
     96. International Perspectives on Missile                          110. Peter Van Ness, Ballistic Missile Defenses, p. 5.
         Proliferation and Defenses, p. 40.
     97. The USS Cole suffered severe damage on 12                                            BIBLIOGRAPHY
         October 2000 in a terrorist bombing attack                     Books:
         when the ship was in the port of Aden, Yemen,                  Centre for Nonproliferation Studies, Occasional
         for a routine fuel stop. A rubber raft loaded                      Paper No. 5: International Perspectives on
         with explosives was ploughed into the ship                         Missile Proliferation and Defences, (Monterey:
         killing 17 sailors and injuring 39 in the blast                    Monterey Institute of International Studies,
         which blew a hole in the port side of the                          2001).
         destroyer. http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/                         Marshall, A.W., Martin, J.J., and Rowen, H.S. (eds),
         navpalib/news/news_stories/cole.html.                              On Not Confusing Ourselves: Essays on
     98. International Perspectives on Missile                              National Security Strategy in Honour of Albert
         Proliferation and Defenses, p. 40.                                 and Roberta Wohlstetter, (Boulder: Westview
     99. ibid., p. 41.                                                      Press, 1991).
                                        CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENCE                          17

O’Hanlon, M., Defence Planning for the Late 1990s:          Internet Sources:
     Beyond the Desert Storm Framework,                     Christopher Hellman “The Costs of Ballistic Missile
     (Washington D.C: Brookings Institution, 1995).              Defense” [2001?] at http://www.abc.net.au/4
O’Hanlon, M., Technological Change and the Future                corners/roguestate.
     of Warfare, (Washington D.C: Brookings                 Daniel Smith, “Technological Challenges in
     Institution Press, 2000).                                   National Missile Defense” [2001 ?] at
O’Hanlon, M.E., Defence Policy Choices for the Bush              http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/roguestate.
     Administration, 2001-05, (Washington D.C:              Dr. Bruce Blair, “Impact of NMD on Russia, Nuclear
     Brookings Institution Press, 2001).                         Security” [2001?], http://www.abc.net.au/-
Osgood, R.E., The Nuclear Dilemma in American                    4corners/roguestate.
     Strategic Thought, (Boulder: Westview Press,           Dr. Nicholas Berry, “U.S. National Missile
     1988).                                                      Defense: Views from Asia” [2001?], at
Patton, T., Strategic Arms Limitations: An Analysis              http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/roguestate.
     of Factors that Impact Arms Control Progress           Guardian Newspapers Limited 2001 at
     and Weapon System Selection, (Michigan:                     http://www.commondreams.org/headlines01/
     Dissertation Information Service, 1981).                    0713-01.htm
Paulsen, R.A., The Role of US Nuclear Weapons in            no author, “China to See U.S. Missile Plan”,
     the Post-Cold War Era, (Alabama: Air                        Washington Post, 2 September 2001 at
     University Press, 1994).                                    http://dailynews.yahoo.com/h/ap/20010902/pl/
Payne, K.B., Deterrence in the Nuclear Age,                      us_china_4.html.
     (Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky,               Rear Admiral Eugene J. Carroll, Jr., USN (Ret.)
     1996).                                                      “Why Should You/We Care?” at
Powaski, R.E., Return to Armageddon: The United                  http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/roguestate.
     States and the Nuclear Arms Race, 1981-1999,           Robert Burns, “US Says China Nuke Buildup
     (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).                  Unnecessary”, Associated Press, 5 September
                                                                 2001, on internet at National Missile Defence
Journal Articles:                                                Organisation http://www.acq.osd.mil/bmdo/
Isaacs, J., “A Political Decision”, in Bulletin of               bmdolink/html/nmd.html.
     Atomic Scientists, March/April 2000.                   Rose Gottemoeller, “If China Builds More
Isaacs, J., “Go Slow”: The People Speak on Missile               Warheads”, Washington Post, 6 September
     Defence, in Arms Control Today,                             2001, p. A23 at http://www.washingtonpost.
     January/February 2000.                                      com/wp-dyn/articles/A48967-2001Sep5.html.
O’Hanlon, M., “Star Wars Strikes Back”, in Foreign          http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/news/
     Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 6., November/December                 news_stories/cole.html.
     1999.                                                  http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreignp/usstrat-e.asp.
Steinbruner, J., “National Missile Defence: Collision       http://www.fag.org/starwars/program/soviet.
     in Progress”, in Arms Control Today, November          http://www.iasl.mcgill.ca/space_law/conventions/
     1999.                                                       outerspace.html.
Stoker, J., “Briefing Missile Defence”, in Janes            http://www.news6.thdo.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/
     Defence Weekly, 22 August 2001.                             europe/newsid_1177000/1177889.stm.
Van Ness, P., Ballistic Missile Defences: A                 http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/np/mtcr/
     Response, Canberra, ANU, 1999.                              mtcr.html.




Lieutenant Reuben Bowd (RAAOC) graduated from ADFA in 1998 with an Arts degree double majoring in History
and Politics and sub-majoring in Asia-Pacific Studies. In 1999 he attended RMC, Duntroon and was allocated to
RAAC. Lieutenant Bowd has been posted as an instructor at ALTC, Bandiana and is presently serving in 3 CSSB,
Townsville. In 2001 he returned to ADFA to undertake history honours. In addition to coursework that included air
power evolution and theory, he researched a thesis on a little known yet important intelligence unit, the Allied
Geographical Section. In December 2001 he was awarded first class honours and the L.C.F. Turner prize for
“outstanding performance in history”. Lieutenant Bowd is keenly interested in military intelligence and maintains an
ambition to serve in the Australian Army Intelligence Corps.
18   A U S T R A L I A N D E F E N C E F O R C E J O U R N A L NO. 155 JULY / AUGUST   2002




                                     The Australian Army
                                     and the Vietnam War
                                          1962-1972
                                           The 2002 Chief of Army's
                                           Military History Conference




                                                3-4 October 2002
                                           National Convention Centre,
                                                    Canberra

                                              Conference Enquiry Line
                                               Phone: (02) 6266 2744
                                                                                                      19


    Dissecting Command and Control with
                Occam’s Razor
                     or
   Ask not what “Command” and “Control”
    means to you but what you mean by
           “Command and Control”
                        By Dr Noel Sproles, University of South Australia

    Command and Control (C2) provides coordination and smooth functioning in a military
operation, but as a topic it more often than not causes confusion and disagreement amongst
military professionals. One such cause for confusion is the view that “command and control” is a
phrase and that an examination of its constituent words can contribute to an understanding of
what command and control really is. The result is rarely satisfactory and leads one to ponder why
it is that two such familiar words should develop such difficult-to-understand concepts when
grouped together in this way? More often than not, the explanations offered seem more forced than
logical and are never very enlightening. They bring to mind the scene in an ancient temple where
priests and seers pore over the entrails of an animal in an attempt to read the future or ascertain
the meaning of some natural phenomenon. The only certainty in this approach is that if a
particular meaning is sought, then that meaning can be contrived.
    A more fruitful approach may be to             the command arrangements instituted by the
recognise that every word or expression in our     Allies from 1941 onwards. Placing the usage
language has a history commencing from the         of the separate words “command” and
time when someone, somewhere, first                “control” in the context of those times will
associated it with something. This history,        show that the meanings attributed to them in
which traces the development of a word or          the 1940s are different from those currently
expression from its inception through any          given them when associated with “command
subsequent derivations, is called its etymology.   and control”. Although “command and
Treating “command and control” simply as a         control” started out as a phrase sometime in
phrase while neglecting to study its etymology     the 1940s, it will be suggested that it has
is ignoring an approach that promises to offer     evolved to become a compound word and
a more edifying explanation of the term than       should now be treated as such. While it is not
those usually provided.                            suggested that the explanation that will be
    This article suggests a possible etymology     offered can claim to be definitive, it is
for “command and control” commencing from          supported by strong historical evidence. In
its roots in the efforts to achieve unified        providing a simpler explanation of what this
command amongst the Western Allies in              term means, based on its etymology, it is
WWII. It will show that terms that could well      suggested that it also provides a more plausible
be the precursors of “command and control”         explanation than those usually found in the
appear throughout the literature surrounding       literature.
20   A U S T R A L I A N D E F E N C E F O R C E J O U R N A L NO. 155 JULY / AUGUST   2002

     Origins                                                            references can still be found to “command and
          There seems to be agreement that                              control” in the literature of this period.
     “command and control” appeared either during                       McCarthy (1959, p. 15) referred to the
     or sometime soon after WWII. While                                 agreement “…between Britain and America
     Ashworth (1987, p. 34) suggests that it had its                    regarding the machinery to be set up for the
     origins in WWII, Alberts and Hayes (1995, p. 6)                    strategical command and control of their
     is more emphatic in noting that the term did                       military resources”. That McCarthy did not feel
     not appear until after WWII. It is difficult to                    it necessary to explain this term either in the
     argue with the contention that “command and                        text or in footnotes indicates that he expected
     control” is a post-WWII term as a search of the                    it to be a term familiar to the reader. The term
     literature contemporaneous to WWII has so far                      “command and control” was used in the 1964
     failed to reveal its use before 1945. The                          film Dr Strangelove by George C. Scott acting
     earliest mention found in the search for                           the part of the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
     background material for this article was by                        of Staff thereby suggesting that by then it was
     General Morgan who was responsible for much                        a widely accepted expression.
     of the early planning for the Normandy                                  While there may not be evidence that the
     invasion. When discussing the issue of                             term “command and control” per se was used
     directives to the naval and air Commanders-in-                     during the war years, there is ample evidence
     Chief for Operation Overlord, he made                              that expressions closely resembling it were in
     reference to “…the solution to the air command                     common use during that period. In a letter
     and control problem” (Morgan, 1950, p. 226).                       from the RAAF Chief of Air Staff to General
     Murphy (1948, p. 146) refers to Admirals                           Macarthur’s HQ early in 1944, reference is
     Ramsay and Mountbatten in 1942 disagreeing                         made to “command and administrative
     on who “…should be in command and control                          control” (Odgers, 1957, p. 199). The Australian
     of the Naval Assault Forces during their                           Prime Minister, Mr. John Curtin, in a 1945
     training in Combined Operations”. While                            letter to General MacArthur twice made
     Murphy (1948) indicates an early date for the                      reference to “operational control and
     use of the term, it is possible that Morgan                        command”, once in relation to 1st Australian
     (1950) presents proof of even earlier use as the                   Corps (Long, 1963, p.45) and secondly in
     Forward to Morgan (1950) was signed and                            relation to the RAAF (Odgers, 1957, p. 437).
     dated by General Eisenhower in March 1947.                         Again, in 1945 the Australian Defence
     Whichever one is the earlier may be open to                        Committee referred to the need for “…unified
     dispute but what is clear is that the term                         operational and administrative control of the
     “command and control” was in use in the                            whole RAAF …under one command” (Odgers,
     period immediately after WWII leaving it open                      1957, p. 438).
     to the possibility that it was in fact in use                           The terminology was not restricted to US
     during the war.                                                    and Australian usage. Stacey (1948, p. 48)
          Its usage in the immediate post-war era                       associates “command” with “operational
     was not as popular as it is now. For instance,                     direction” when discussing the internal
     Wilmot (1952, p. 51) when discussing the                           command arrangements for 1st Canadian
     German attacks on the British radar and                            Corps. “Direction” and “control” are
     communications installations during the Battle                     synonymous and the phrase “command and
     of Britain, refers to them as attacks on “…the                     direction” was used when now “command and
     network of control”. It is almost certain that a                   control” would be used. Field Marshal
     present-day writer would refer to them instead                     Montgomery provides evidence of this when in
     as attacks on command and control. However,                        October 1945, he stated “On 1 September, the
                                     DISSECTING COMMAND AND CONTROL WITH OCCAM’S RAZOR                  21

Supreme Commander assumed command and             between a unified commander and subordinate
direction of the Army Groups himself…”            commanders of a joint or multi-national force.
(Montgomery, 1945, p.12). When he referred        These command arrangements established the
to the same event some years later, he changed    operational and administrative constraints or
“direction” to “operational control” when he      boundaries placed on the unified commander’s
wrote “…from the 1st September 1944               authority. When establishing the origin of the
onwards, I was not satisfied that we had a        meaning of “command and control”, the
satisfactory organisation for command or          effects of this overriding need to achieve
operational control” (Montgomery, 1958, p.        unified command arrangements across
326).                                             organisational boundaries must be kept in
    The German General, Adolf Galland,            mind. These arrangements encompassed not
describes the amalgamation of the Luftwaffe       only procedures but also political decisions on
day fighter and night fighter control systems     the nationality and Service of Allied
late in WWII. He states that “The unification     commanders.
of command and organisation of the day and             Modern definitions of command and
night fighters …was at last achieved” (Galland,   control describe “command” in terms of a
1955, p. 193). Whether the term “command          commander’s authority. A typical example is
and organisation” was used by Galland or was      that given by the US Marines who see the
the translator’s interpretation of the original   “command” component of the term “…as
German is not known, but its intent and usage     exercise of authority”(MCDP 1996). While the
is that usually associated at that time with      WWII commanders would have been aware of
“command and control”.                            this nexus between command and authority, it
                                                  is suggested that this is not the meaning that
Command Arrangements                              they were referring to when using expressions
    In the instances quoted, the terms            such as “command and operational control”.
“command and control”, “command and               In the context in which the expression was
operational control”, “command and                used, they were referring instead to the identity
administrative control”, “command and             of the individual commander, to his
direction”, and even “command and                 nationality, or to his Service. In that era when
organisation” are referring to command            great multi-national operations were being
arrangements. This supports the view of           mounted, the nationality of a commander was
Ashworth (1987, p. 34) that “command and          often a politically significant issue, as indeed it
control” originated to “…cover a set of           still is. Churchill (1952, p. 76) illustrates the
procedures related to the control of joint and    delicacy of such issues as nationality when he
combined operations”. The high degree of          records that as the US provided the unified
unification of command and integration of         commander in Africa, then the British should
staff functions that was achieved during WWII     provide the commander for Operation Overlord.
by the Western Allies, particularly at theatre    This was then overruled when it was realised
level, created an intense interest in what        that the US would have the preponderance of
Ashworth (1987, p. 34) referred to as “…the       troops in Europe in 1944 and so “…an
exercise of command across organisational         American commander should be appointed for
boundaries…”. It became necessary to              the expedition to France”. To placate British
implement command arrangements that were          public opinion, it was agreed that all the
the formal basis for establishing at the very     subordinate Commanders-in-Chief would be
least a minimum level of cooperation to be        British. While General Montgomery acted as
achieved in the pursuit of unity of effort        land commander for the initial period of the
22   A U S T R A L I A N D E F E N C E F O R C E J O U R N A L NO. 155 JULY / AUGUST   2002

     invasion, US public opinion would not accept                       developed into an acrimonious debate with the
     a British officer as land commander over the                       result that command in the Pacific was
     US Army Groups for the remainder of the                            eventually split between the US Army and the
     campaign (Sixsmith, 1972, p. 157). General                         US Navy.
     Eisenhower’s deputy commander and chief of                             Those attempting to dissect “command and
     staff for the Allied invasion of North Africa                      control” and provide meaning for the
     had to be Americans “…to create the                                individual words offer many explanations for
     impression that the liberation of French Africa                    the supposed meaning of “control”. The US
     was an American, not a British venture…”                           Navy, for instance, states that “Control is the
     (Bryant, 1957, p. 498). The degree of political                    means by which a commander guides the
     sensitivity surrounding the nationality of the                     conduct of operations” (NDP6, 1995,p. 9).
     commanders is further illustrated by Burns                         Another version is provided by the US Marines
     (1970, p. 182) who wrote about the concern of                      who see control as “…feedback about the
     Churchill’s staff at the appointment of General                    effects of the action taken”(MCPD6, 1996).
     Wavell, a British officer, as Supreme Allied                       These explanations do not allow for the
     Commander of ABDA (American, British,                              possibility that the inclusion of “control” in
     Dutch, Australian) Command in 1942. It was                         “command and control” can be explained
     their concern that “…Wavell was slated to be a                     solely from its association with command
     British scapegoat who would preside over a                         arrangements.
     rapidly disappearing command”. The boot was                            The manner in which the terms
     on the other foot when Churchill (1968, p.                         “operational control” and “administrative
     659), following the 1943 US defeat at the                          control” were used by WWII politicians and
     hands of Rommel at the Kasserine Pass in                           military commanders indicates that they
     Tunisia, said:                                                     understood them to mean the limits to a
         What a providential thing it was that I                        unified joint or multi-national commander’s
         perpetually pressed for General Eisenhower                     authority over the forces of other Services or
         to take the command, as the defeat of the                      nations. WWII commanders had a similar
         American corps, if it had been under a                         understanding as their modern-day
         British general, would have given our                          counterparts on the restrictions imposed by
         enemies in the United States a good chance                     limited delegation of operational or
         to blaspheme.                                                  administrative control or authority. For
         In addition to his nationality, the armed                      example, while the Australian Government
     service to which a unified commander                               delegated operational control of assigned
     belonged was also an important issue.                              Australian forces to General MacArthur in his
     Churchill (1968, p. 118), when discussing the                      capacity as Supreme Allied Commander, he
     appointment of General Wavell to ABDA                              acknowledged the restrictions inherent in not
     command in 1942, notes that “It was staffed in                     having administrative control of these same
     strict proportion to the claims of the different                   forces. In a letter to Prime Minister Curtin,
     Powers, and all in triplicate for the Army,                        General MacArthur referred to his not being
     Navy, and Air”. Unified command of the                             able to move a RAAF headquarters into the
     Pacific foundered on the issue of whether it                       operational area because “…the major
     should be a Navy or an Army appointment.                           proportion of the administrative personnel in
     The US Navy felt that as it had acknowledged                       the headquarters is composed of W.A.A.A.Fs
     that command of the European theatre should                        (Women’s Auxiliary Australian Air Force)
     be an Army appointment, then the Pacific                           who…are forbidden to leave Australia” (Odgers,
     should be a Navy appointment. This                                 1957, p. 438). On the rare occasion when the
                                       DISSECTING COMMAND AND CONTROL WITH OCCAM’S RAZOR                23

Supreme Commander’s staff overstepped the           Van Crevald (1985, p. 1), perhaps the pre-
limits of their administrative authority they       eminent authority in the field, chose to use
were quickly made aware of the situation. In        “command” in preference to “command and
1945 Allied Air Headquarters unilaterally           control” when writing “Command in War”.
designated Air Vice Marshal Bostock as Air          Ashworth (1987, p. 34) refers to “command
Officer Commanding-in-Chief RAAF                    and control” as “…a subset of command”.
Command and were immediately advised by                 There is some evidence in the literature for
the RAAF Chief of Air Staff that such matters       this development of separate meanings being
were his prerogative and that the order should      associated with the term “command and
be withdrawn (Odgers, 1957, p. 439).                control”. General Brooke, the British Chief of
   While early usage included the modifiers         the Imperial General Staff from 1941 to 1946,
“operational” and “administrative”, these were      referred to his having selected General Hobart
soon dropped as evidenced from the immediate        to “control and command” the experimental
post-war usage of the term. A possible              79th Division (Bryant, 1957, p. 597). This
explanation for this is that command                application of the term, curiously reversed in
arrangements should spell out not only the          the same manner as that used by Curtin, is in
commander’s operational authority but also the      the sense of “command”. Frequent reference to
level of administrative authority delegated.        expressions such as “control and direction”,
This realisation would have made the separate       “operational direction and control”, “direct and
identification of the types of control              control”, and “directing and controlling” will
unnecessary in any general reference to             be found in Montgomery (1958). In most
command arrangements.                               instances they refer to command arrangements
A Compound Word                                     but on other occasions they refer to
    Alberts et al. (1995, p.6) states that “Prior   “command”. Another illustration is to be
eras referred only to command…no one knows          found in the way the term was intended in
why the language changed…”. The historical          Dr Strangelove (1964). In this instance the
evidence presented here suggests that the           reference is to what would now be called
change may have commenced in the attempts           command support systems yet only a short
to resolve the complex political and                time before this, “control systems” was being
organisational issues surrounding command           used to describe the same thing. Bryant (1957,
arrangements for the unified command of             p. 213), when referring to the German attacks
WWII joint and multi-national forces. Urban         on British air defence control centres and
legend has it that “C2” gained its current          radars during the Battle of Britain noted the
popular acceptance after it was used as a           “…growing damage to its control system and
means to gain funds from the US Congress for        airfields”. When statements such as “Air
a military project.                                 power was used to destroy the enemy’s
    “Command and control” may now refer to          command and control”, it is command support
more than just command arrangements. The            systems that were being destroyed. Indeed, the
reference may instead be to command itself, or      most common use of “command and control”
to command support systems, or any                  now seems to be associated with command
combination of these three (Sproles, 2001, pp.      support systems. This interest is expressed in
15-22). When “command and control” is used          the proliferation of terms such as C3I
in the sense of “command”, the separate words       (Command, Control, Communications, and
“command” and “control” are synonymous              Intelligence), which Van Crevald (1985, p. 1)
and serve no real purpose in combination.           dismisses as “jargon”, to indicate an interest in
24   A U S T R A L I A N D E F E N C E F O R C E J O U R N A L NO. 155 JULY / AUGUST   2002

     a particular element of the command support                        concentrate on the relationship between the
     system.                                                            two component words of the expression. This
         It is suggested that this is evidence of the                   article argues against this idea of treating
     gradual evolution of the term as it                                “command and control” as a phrase. It
     metamorphosed to become what is known as a                         suggests that “command and control” has
     compound word, i.e. two or more words that                         evolved over time to become a compound
     together express a single idea. An open                            word with three possible meanings, none of
     compound word consists of two or more words                        which can be ascertained without an
     written separately, such as “chief of staff”,                      understanding of the context in which the
     “rock and roll”, and, dare we say, “command                        word is being used. Acceptance of “command
     and control”.                                                      and control” as a compound word then makes
         “Command and control” is not the only                          pointless any attempt to find meaning from
     example of a military term that has                                any of its constituent words. The question to
     metamorphosed over the years into an open                          be asked is which of the available explanations
     compound word. Kemp (1954, p. 108)                                 is to be accepted? Is “command and control” a
     provides an historical background to the                           set of words whose individual meaning is
     compound word “Fleet Air Arm” and its                              pertinent to the meaning of the whole or
     origins in the term “Fleet Air Arm of the Royal                    should it be treated as a compound word
     Air Force”. In 1937 operational and                                expressing a single idea? Does it make sense
     administrative control of the Fleet Air Arm was                    to attempt to define the constituent words or
     passed over to the RN and it ceased to be an                       should they be considered to be a single entity
     arm of the RAF. Since then the role and very                       just as they are in other compound words such
     nature of naval aviation has developed and                         as “chief of staff” or “rock and roll”.
     bears little resemblance to what it was in the                         The argument presented in this article is
     1930s. To dissect this compound word into its                      that the meaning of “command and control”
     component words and attempt to associate                           has evolved over time and that this meaning is
     special significance to each in isolation does                     no longer to be found in an examination of the
     not add to the understanding of the single idea                    discrete words making up the term.
     that “Fleet Air Arm” conjures up today. It is                      Unfortunately there does not appear to be
     even more pointless to try to do so with the                       proof positive one way or the other as to which
     Fleet Air Arm of the RAN which has never had                       of the various explanations on offer is the
     an organisational link with the RAF. “Fleet Air                    correct explanation. One person’s view, it
     Arm” is a compound word with an interesting                        would seem, is as good as anyone else’s.
     history that expresses an idea that is now                         However, the explanation of the meaning of
     different from that when it was formulated as a                    the term “command and control” offered here
     phrase. The origin of the word lies in the                         has the virtue of simplicity and, according to
     command arrangements established between                           Occam’s razor, it should therefore qualify as
     the RN and the RAF but it has evolved over                         the most likely explanation under the
     time to mean something else other than this. It                    circumstances.
     shares this property with “command and                             Occam’s Razor
     control”.                                                             Occam’s razor is a principle stated by a
     Which Explanation?                                                 medieval monk, William of Occam, that
        During the past several decades, many                           “Plurality should not be posited without
     alternative explanations for the term                              necessity”. Although its application can be
     “command and control” have been offered that                       subtler than just as a mere application of the
                                      DISSECTING COMMAND AND CONTROL WITH OCCAM’S RAZOR                    25

KISS principle, it is generally understood to      that the explanation provided in this article, by
mean that given two explanations, then the         giving the simplest explanation of the term, is
simpler is more likely to be correct. When         more likely to be correct.
applied to the term “command and control”,             Therefore, to paraphrase words used by
which of the explanations offered is the           President Kennedy in his inaugural address in
simpler? Is it amongst those that attempt to       January 1961, it may be best to “Ask not what
find a variety of seemingly obtuse meanings        ‘Command’ and ‘Control’ means to you but
that are often difficult to comprehend and         what you mean by ‘Command and control’”.
seem to serve little purpose? Or is it the one                         REFERENCES
that places the origin of the term in the          Alberts, D.S. and Hayes, R. 1995, Command
historical context from which it has developed          Arrangements for Peace Operations, National
and acknowledges its evolution over time into           Defense University Press Publications,
a new set of meanings? The choice is                    Washington, D.C., USA.
                                                   Ashworth, N. F. 1987, “Command and Control”,
ultimately the reader’s.                                Defence Force Journal, No. 63, March/April
Conclusion                                              1987, pp. 34-36, Department of Defence,
                                                        Canberra, Australia.
    It is suggested that the origin of the term    Burns, J.M. 1970, Roosevelt – The Soldier of
“command and control” lies in its association           Freedom, Konecky & Konecky, New York, USA.
with the command arrangements developed in         Bryant, A. 1957, The Turn of the Tide, Collins,
WWII to achieve unified command amongst                 London, UK.
                                                   Churchill, W.S. 1952, The Second World War.
the Allies. Over the intervening half century or        Closing the Ring, Vol. V, Cassell, London, UK.
so, the term has come to be used to refer not      Churchill, W.S. 1968, The Second World War. The
only to command arrangements but also to                Hinge of Fate, 4th Ed, Vol. IV, Cassell, London,
command itself and to command support                   UK.
                                                   Galland, A. 1955, The First and The Last, (English
systems. The term has also metamorphosed                ed), Methuen & Co. Ltd, London, UK.
over that period from being a phrase to being a    Kemp, P.K. 1954, Fleet Air Arm, Herbert Jenkins,
compound word. Any relationship between                 London, UK.
the separate words “command” and “control”         Long, G. 1963, “Australia in the War of 1939 –
                                                        1945”, Series One, Army, Vol. VII, The Final
is an historical curiosity that should be               Campaigns, Australian War Memorial,
accepted as such. Attempts to attribute special         Canberra, Australia.
significance to these words serve little purpose   McCarthy, D 1959, “Australia in the War of 1939 –
and add nothing to the understanding of what            1945”, Series One, Army, Vol. V, South West
                                                        Pacific Area – First Year, Kokoda to Wau, 1962
the word is trying to convey.                           reprint, Australian War Memorial, Canberra,
    It is worth repeating once more at this             Australia.
juncture that the explanation offered in this      MCDP6 1996, “Marine Corps Doctrine Publication
                                                        6, ‘Command and control’”, United States
article for the meaning of “command and
                                                        Marine Corps 4 October 1996 [Online, accessed
control” cannot claim to be definitive, at least        13 Jun. 97], URL:http://ismo-www1.mqg.usmc
not at this stage of the enquiry. However,              .mil/docdiv/6/ch1.htm
unlike other attempts to explain the term, this    Montgomery, B.L. 1945, 21st (British) Army Group
                                                        in the Campaign in North West Europe 1944 –
article provides a plausible history and
                                                        45, Lecture to the Royal United Service
derivation of the term that fits in with                Institution London, October 1945, Printing and
documented history and the mindset of the               Stationery Service, BAOR, Germany.
people who initiated the term. Attempts to         Montgomery, B.L. 1958, The Memoirs of Field-
                                                        Marshal Montgomery, Fontana Monarchs,
associate other meanings complicate the issue
                                                        London, UK.
and only serve to add to the confusion             Morgan, F. 1950, Overture to Overlord, Hodder &
surrounding the term. Occam’s razor indicates           Stoughton Limited, London, UK.
26   A U S T R A L I A N D E F E N C E F O R C E J O U R N A L NO. 155 JULY / AUGUST   2002

     Murphy, R. 1948, Last Viceroy. The Life and Times                  Sproles, N. 2001, “The Command and Control Triad
         of Rear-Admiral The Earl Mountbatten of                            or Making Muddy Waters Clear”, Australian
         Burma, Jarrods, London, UK.                                        Defence Force Journal, No. 151,
     NDP6 1995, Naval Doctrine Publication 6, “Naval                        November/December 2001, pp. 15-22,
         Command and Control”, US Navy Doctrine                             Canberra, Australia.
         Command, Norfolk, Virginia.                                    Stacey, C.P. 1948, The Canadian Army 1939 –
     Odgers, G. 1957, Australia in the War of 1939 – 45,                    1945. An Official Historical Summary, King’s
         Air War Against Japan 1943 - 1945, (1968                           Printer, Ottawa, Canada.
         reprint), Series 3(Air), Vol. II, Australian War               Van Crevald, M. 1985, Command in War, Harvard
         Memorial, Canberra, Australia                                      University Press, Cambridge, USA.
     Sixsmith, E.K.G. 1972, Eisenhower as Military                      Wilmot, C. 1952, The Struggle for Europe, The
         Commander, Stein and Day, New York, USA.                           Reprint Society Ltd, London, UK.




     Dr Sproles is a Senior Research Fellow with the Systems Engineering and Evaluation Centre, a research group of the
     University of South Australia. He spent 23 years in the Australian Army, retiring in 1982 as a lieutenant colonel. In
     1999 he was awarded a PhD from the University of South Australia. Dr. Sproles is currently working with DSTO
     Edinburgh under an agreement between the University of South Australia and DSTO. His current research interests
     are in measures of effectiveness and C2. He has published widely in Australia and overseas on both topics.
                                                                                                        27


    Australian Leadership – Leading Edge or
                   Luddite?
                               By Captain Christopher Ruff, Aus Int

    As Great Britain underwent the Industrial Revolution during the late 18th and early 19th
centuries, many of the old manufacturing systems gave way to new innovative processes based on
mass production and mechanisation. As the physical processes themselves underwent this change,
the attitudes and values of the people themselves were changing just as rapidly. Resistance to this
change was common, and a group known as the Luddites established a reputation for action in this
area. The Luddites were predominantly handloom weavers who, fearing the loss of their lifestyles to
the new factory based machinery, resorted to acts of vandalism in order to resist the introduction of
the new processes. Because the Luddites were financially secure under the old system, with its
removal, they saw their way of life (and their influence) being destroyed. The authorities ultimately
responded to their actions, but their movement has gone down in history as being representative of
those who do not readily embrace changes in their respective environments.

   ust as the processes, skills and systems of      comfortable with these changes and the pace
J  the agricultural era were removed to meet
the demands of the industrial era; new ways
                                                    at which they are occurring. These people are
                                                    very likely to resist this change and attempt to
are today being sought to take advantage of         retain the old processes within which they felt
the opportunities offered by the information        comfortable (and powerful). It is these people
age. This new age has brought with it a host of     who I choose to refer to as the new Luddites,
changes particularly in the way people are led.     and just like their predecessors they have the
Traditional career structures no longer exist       potential to cause considerable damage and
and managers are required to take more              inconvenience when they choose to actively
responsibility for their own development. They      resist change within their respective
are expected to coach and empower rather            organisations.
than to control, and temporary roles and                Australia is not immune to this
competencies are replacing job descriptions.        phenomenon and it is because of this
Flexible contracts are becoming the norm and        vulnerability that this article will seek to
traditional systems of hierarchy are giving way     examine whether Australians are at the leading
to flatter structures based on processes and        edge of leadership or whether they are
teams. 1 If leaders are to keep pace with           Luddites. The main focus of this article is to
workplace        changes      of    individual      highlight that whilst Australians take pride in
accountability, global competitiveness and          the way they conduct leadership in their
continuous learning, they need to adopt new         respective environments; many people appear
leadership approaches and philosophies such as      to refuse to adapt their particular leadership
those described above. This new approach is         approaches to reflect the changing demands of
necessary for the trend to globalisation is         their organisation, despite the advantages in
probably the most important issue affecting         doing so. In order to highlight this point, the
Australian leaders in the 21st century.             first part of this article will be devoted to
    Just as it was 200 years ago, there are         summarising the theoretical perspectives of
many people today who do not feel                   what constitutes Australian leadership.
28   A U S T R A L I A N D E F E N C E F O R C E J O U R N A L NO. 155 JULY / AUGUST 2002

         Secondly a description of the environment                    learning; the importance of changing and
     that Australia operates within will provide a                    improving the existing management workforce
     useful context with which to approach the                        rather than waiting for a newly educated
     final stage of this article. Finally, the issue will             workforce to arrive. He also stressed the
     be highlighted that whilst Australians attempt                   importance for leadership of building teams
     to embrace new approaches to leadership, they                    and building cultures.2
     are often prevented from doing so primarily by                       The works of James Sarros, Oleh
     a resistance to change. Many leaders seek to                     Butchatsky and Joe Santora recommend a key
     retain their positions and influence under the                   shift in the approach to leadership, an
     old approaches and just like their Luddite                       approach that can be found in the work titled
     companions from 200 years before, they                           “Australian Leadership”.3 This recommendation
     attempt to damage the process and delay the                      is based on an analysis of interviews with
     adoption of new techniques.                                      senior Australian executives, which resulted in
         In a presentation to the Senior Executive                    the generation of a model of “breakthrough
     Service in Canberra on 16 April 1998, Dr Ken                     leadership”. Breakthrough leaders rethink the
     Parry from the University of Southern                            structures, processes, values and ideals of the
     Queensland presented the findings of a                           realities of organisational life with the purpose
     recently completed synthesis of leadership                       of improving existing practices, or replacing
     research in Australia and New Zealand. This                      them with something better or more relevant.
     research examined the practice and nature of                     It results in the four Cs – continuous learning,
     leadership in various organisational settings.                   confidence, competence and commitment.
     The researchers interviewed over 5000                                Another perspective on Australian
     Australians from both private and public sector                  leadership is that put forward by Parry and
     organisations with the results being compared                    Sarros where, with the increasing globalisation
     with similar research conducted in the United                    of both the business and government
     States. Because of its depth, this study provides                environment, flexibility and adaptability of
     the background to the examination of the                         leadership styles to suit different markets and
     theoretical aspects of Australian Leadership in                  clients is becoming essential.
     this article.                                                        All of the researchers described in this
         Transformational leadership is a popular                     article agreed that certain aspects of leadership
     and current concept in leadership and this is                    need to be adopted regardless of career path
     evidenced by its concentration in the research                   and gender. These include:
     that is undertaken in Australia. Some                            • creating a vision and having strategic
     authorities in this field include Bruce Avolio,                      skills;
     James Sarros, Oleh Butchatsky and Joe                            • communication and people management
     Santora. Avolio for example presents his                             skills; and
     interpretation       of      the     ways      that              • knowledge of the industry and/or expertise
     transformational leadership can deal with the                        in the subject matter.
     challenges experienced in Australia. His work                        Other aspects include drive; innovative
     discusses the component aspects of                               thinking; political awareness; engendering
     transformational leadership and outlines its                     trust and negotiation skills. The opinions
     benefits from the individual, team and Total                     expressed in this study were consistent with
     Quality Management (TQM) perspectives. The                       the known values, abilities, and skills of
     main themes that arise are the criticality of                    leadership. The traditional leadership aspects of
     changes to the existing mindset of                               communication, strategic thinking, valuing
     management; the criticality of organisational                    people, personal qualities and values-based
                                           AUSTRALIAN LEADERSHIP – LEADING EDGE OR LUDDITE?              29

behaviour were reaffirmed as important for              From the materials obtained in the research
both present and future leaders.                    for this article, it is evident that Australia
    This research is just as relevant for           recognises the concepts of transformational
followers in organisations as it is with the        leadership and it attempts to encourage their
leaders and this is an important point when         use within the workplace. This should be
examining the impact of leadership in               successful given the nature of Australia’s
Australia. Transformational leadership is able      culture and national psyche. Australians like to
to change the motivations, beliefs, and             see themselves as an easy-going and athletic
attitudes of followers more so than other           nation, and the habit of combining business
approaches to leadership. The ability to affect     with sport indicates this. The deeply ingrained
this change has a significant impact on their       cultural traits in Australian society as well as
behaviour and values as their perceptions of        institutional factors such as the legislative
satisfaction; effectiveness and output are          framework underpinning workplace behaviour
influenced by the actions of their leaders. As      adds value to the adoption of this approach to
their behaviours and values are influenced, so      leadership. In keeping with an increased global
too is the culture of the organisation and          perspective, a more competitive business
ultimately this can develop into improved           climate has produced a more inclusive
                                                    leadership style according to Paul Kerin,
organisational performance. Whilst this
                                                    Managing Director of the management
influence is hoped to be seen in a positive
                                                    consultancy AT Kearney.5 Authority is being
light, any negative perceptions in this process
                                                    devolved, shared with the emphasis on
can have an equally significant impact in these
                                                    cooperation. Teamwork, partnerships and the
areas. This will be covered later in this article
                                                    entrusting of employees further down the line
when the behaviours of current leaders are
                                                    with greater responsibility are the key issues
examined.
                                                    for the people running Australian companies.
    In his presentation, Parry states that
                                                        Yet whilst these traits share a commonality,
Australian leaders are currently grappling with
                                                    certain negative aspects of Australian culture
the implementation of technology,
                                                    exist that can prohibit the development of
globalisation and change management
                                                    effective leadership. Australians are inclined to
throughout their organisations. Innovation,         be sceptical of leadership. Whereas American
creative thinking and cultivating knowledge         leaders receive the respect of their followers
capture and dissemination are considered to be      until they demonstrate themselves to be
essential for leaders in order to handle these      untrustworthy, Australian followers start with
developments. Also important is the ability to      a negative aspect of their leaders until they
achieve cultural transformation and corporate       deserve their respect. 6 Quite simply, in
agility through influencing people and values.      Australia, leadership is a tenuous occupation,
From this statement it appears that the             because once one is in the role, there is often
adoption of transformational styles of              someone waiting in the wings to take over.
leadership is necessary when it mirrors the         Research for the Australian Industry Taskforce
skills required to handle the changes in            on Leadership and management skills found
technology and globalisation.4 Many leaders         that Australian managers tended to possess a
mention transformational leadership, but as the     cultural mindset that fails to recognise the
next part of this article will demonstrate, there   need for changes in management styles. 7
appears to be some resistance to this change        Perhaps the most troubling sign is the failure
and the leading edge Australian is replaced by      among leaders to identify the uniqueness of
the Australian Luddite.                             Australia. This is in part a measure of isolation:
30   A U S T R A L I A N D E F E N C E F O R C E J O U R N A L NO. 155 JULY / AUGUST   2002

     There is no strong sense of identity because                       organisational structure, however painful that
     identity relies on being noticed, and at times                     may be but they often fail to change the soft
     the rest of the world rarely notices Australia.                    elements of the organisation. Cross-functional
     Whilst it is important to gain the benefits from                   teamwork, delegation of responsibility, and
     seeing the world and absorbing different                           broadly defined roles for employees are key
     cultures, one should come back to the local                        drivers of the potential benefits in most
     culture and embrace it. To impress others, it is                   redesign initiatives – yet they are frequently
     first necessary to understand yourself and this                    neglected. These issues become that much
     is perhaps highlighted by this extract from                        more important as the scope and level of
     Sarros’s book Australian Leadership, a quote                       change desired increases.10
     that highlights the unique position that                               As indicated, there exists within Australian
     Australia is in the world.                                         leadership (especially at the higher levels) a
          Historically, Australia is the progeny of the                 distinct reluctance to practice effective
          United Kingdom. Ideologically, we are                         leadership styles. When it comes to leadership,
          closely aligned with the United States.                       Australians appear to display a cultural quirk
          Geographically, Australia is firmly in the                    that can make the adoption and acceptance of
          Asia Pacific region. Is it any wonder                         new styles of leadership difficult. Added to this
          Australian Executives have some trouble                       is insecurity when it comes to asserting
          leading their firms when confronted with                      themselves in the wider international arena. It
          contradictory conditions such as these?8                      is well known that Australian cricketers and
          The examination of Australian leadership                      rugby players are the best in the world and
     soon makes it clear that it is culture specific;                   that our Olympic Games were one of the best.
     for what leadership means in Australia may be                      However, when it comes to competing in the
     different to the concept in the United States,                     global marketplace, problems can occur. The
     Middle East or Asia. Americans generally are                       institution of the changes necessary to be more
     committed to leadership yet whilst the British                     competitive are recognised by senior leaders
     share the same language, their concept of                          within organisations, but it appears that they
     leadership is more restrained. The key                             are unwilling to make the hard but necessary
     differences appear to be in the areas of people                    changes. Those leaders who encourage
     orientation, skills in negotiation, skills in                      (whether intentionally or not) the resistance to
     managing national diversity, and the capacity                      the adoption of change are causing significant
     to manage between extremes. Evaluating the                         problems for the future. If the leader acts in
     quality of Australia’s leaders requires taking a                   this way within an organisation, then those
     longer perspective of national progress and                        followers who wish to do so may attach their
     assessing performance not just against what is                     values and beliefs to this leader. This may
     achieved but also against what might have                          result in the spreading of this resistance further
     been done. The implication is that leaders are a                   down the leadership chain.
     long way from knowing how to place Australia                           The first part of this article mentioned the
     in the emerging global economy.9                                   Luddite movement and the motives for their
          Many operating managers however                               actions. If a suitable example could be found
     consider culture change or organisational                          today within Australian leadership then this
     improvement the “forbidden zone”. They                             could be it. “Australian Luddites” by the virtue
     recognise the opportunity in doing this for the                    of their positions of influence within the
     organisation, but are uncomfortable or                             leader/follower relationship are capable of
     overwhelmed addressing it. Many companies                          inflicting greater damage to an organisation
     are prepared to make dramatic changes to                           than simply smashing a handloom. This does
                                            AUSTRALIAN LEADERSHIP – LEADING EDGE OR LUDDITE?            31

not mean that there exists a nationwide              today’s economy. Traditional rules of
conspiracy to thwart the development of              management and organisational design need
effective leadership. Many of these people           to be broken and new paths to success need to
simply fear the consequences of the rapid            be defined. By focusing on alignment, a better
developments that are being seen today and           understanding of the differences in thinking
they feel that they may not be able to handle        and behaviours required of leaders can be
them. Because of this, their actions are a means     obtained. Creating alignment involves three
of coping with their situation. It is almost as if   broad categories of activities: generating
they are slowing down the pace of change to a        context, co-creating challenging and
level to which they are comfortable with. This       compelling commitments and realising them.
form of resistance whilst not endemic is             Leaders must embody the organisation’s
sufficiently well entrenched to constitute a         commitments. Leaders do this through
problem that needs to be recognised and dealt        changing their behaviours and actions so that
with.                                                they become the personification of the
    As     younger       generations       adopt     commitments. 11        Avolio’s      view     on
transformational approaches to leadership,           transformational leadership mentioned that it
these issues should be reduced over time. Those      examines the criticality of changing cultural
people who represent Generation “X” and “Y”          mindsets as well as emphasising learning
have greater exposure to rapid change and the        throughout organisations. This perhaps is the
onset of globalisation. As a result, they are        most useful way to handle the new Luddite.
better equipped to embrace change. As these          Essentially their existence is based on fear and
people progress throughout their organisations,      a lack of understanding as to what is
they are more likely to utilise transformational     occurring. If these fears are removed, then the
styles of leadership and enable the changes to       process can be allowed to resume and these
develop within the organisation that will            leaders can play their role in the change.
hopefully improve organisational performance.            It has been a continual process since then
Tough markets for products and services drive        of developing programs in leadership and
ongoing major workplace change at a                  management development that look at
relentless pace. For these reasons, the              values, ethical issues and leadership as an
leadership skills required to create a stable yet    all-encompassing aspect of a person’s life. In
innovative future to inspire and motivate            the global context, Australian managers are
people to commit to the new, are required            not going to be successful if they do not
more than ever at all levels of the organisation.    learn relationship skills of a very high order.
This is a belated recognition that we need a         It is insufficient to take Australian leaders
different balance of skills for the situation at     and tell them that they have to be better at
the moment, and that these skills are                relating to people in different cultures and
everybody’s business.                                understanding workforce and strategic
    Can anything be done for the “Australian         alliance partners in different cultures. Many
Luddite”? In the 19th century, Luddites were         Australian executives do not understand
imprisoned and sometimes executed for their          themselves well enough to be effective
actions. Whilst many would like to wish the          leaders. Australia is coming of age in terms
same fate on various leaders they have met           of business leadership and to share in the
during their lives, measures such as these are       rewards, Australia needs leaders who have
not necessary in today’s environment. The key        vision and the capacity to achieve that vision
lies in developing critical cultural capabilities    with the commitment and conviction of a
that will make companies competitively fit for       challenged, educated and energetic
32   A U S T R A L I A N D E F E N C E F O R C E J O U R N A L NO. 155 JULY / AUGUST   2002

     workforce. Therefore, Australian leaders                                                  NOTES
     require international experience, language                         1 . Pam Jones, “The New Business Age: Delivering
     capabilities, experience of managing cross-                            Exceptional Performance”, Mt Eliza Business
                                                                            Review: 54-61.
     culturally, and an understanding of cultural                       2. Ken W. Parry, “Leadership Profiles Beyond
     nuances pertaining to social, economic and                             2000: How Australian Leadership is Different”,
     political relationships overseas.12 This change                        National Press Club Canberra. 16 April 1998.
                                                                        3. James C. Sarros, Oleh Butchatsky, “Leadership.
     will not be easy for it goes to the very core of
                                                                            Australia’s Top CFO’s: Finding out what makes
     the organisation, challenging the culture,                             them the best”, Harper Business, Sydney 1997.
     values and beliefs that brought success in the                     4. Ken W. Parry, “Leadership Profiles Beyond
     previous decades.13                                                    2000: How Australian Leadership is Different”,
                                                                            National Press Club Canberra. 16 April 1998.
         In some circles of Australian leadership,                      5. James Dunn, “The Stuff of Leadership”,
     there exists a fear, not necessarily of change                         Management Today, May 1998, pp.14-18.
     itself, but at the pace of change and its                          6. Amanda Sinclair, Doing Leadership Differently.
                                                                            Melbourne University Press, Melbourne 1998.
     perceived direction. Just as the handloom
                                                                            p. 47.
     workers feared the loss of their positions, so                     7. Catherine R. Smith, Leonie V. Still, “Breaking
     too do some of our leaders and it is due to                            the Glass Barrier: Barriers to Global Careers for
     this negativity that a Luddite attitude may be                         Women in Australia”, International Review of
                                                                            Women and Leadership (1996), 2(2), pp. 60-72.
     perceived as being prevalent in Australian                         8. James C. Sarros, Butchatsky Oleh, “Leadership.
     leadership. This should not be a long-term                             Australia’s Top CEO’s: Finding out what makes
     issue, for as the industrial evolution                                 them the best”, Harper Business Sydney 1997.
                                                                            p. 263.
     progressed and provided the impetus for
                                                                        9. David James, “Do Australian Leaders Rate Our
     change in other areas, so to will the changes                          Interest?” Management Today, March 2001,
     present in 21st century life allow for                                 pp.14-19.
     significant improvements in the field of                           10. Gustafson, Grant; Thrum, Andrew: “Braving
                                                                            the Forbidden Zone”. HR Monthly, April 1998,
     technology and globalisation. The Luddite                              pp. 24-27.
     phenomenon appears when old processes                              11. Mark Youngblood, “Leading at the Edge of
     undergo dramatic and significant changes.                              Chaos”, HR Monthly, May 2000, pp. 32-33.
                                                                        12. Catherine R. Smith, Leonie V. Still, “Breaking
     The use of education and the continued use
                                                                            the Glass Barrier: Barriers to Global Careers for
     of new approaches and the resolving of                                 Women in Australia”, International Review of
     deeper cultural issues within both the leaders                         Women and Leadership (1996), 2(2), 60-72.
     and the followers can handle situations such                       13. Pam Jones, “The New Business Age: Delivering
                                                                            Exceptional Performance”, Mt Eliza Business
     as these. The applications of transformational                         Review: pp. 54-61.
     leadership styles are one way of helping
     resolve these issues. Australia is able to                                           BIBLIOGRAPHY
                                                                        Arbuthnot, Scott. “Taking It Personally”.
     contribute to the wider global community,
                                                                            Management Today. August 2000. p. 19.
     but first the cultural issues covered in this                      Avery, Gayle. “The Australian Way”. HR Monthly.
     article need to be addressed. Once Australians                         March 2000. pp. 38-39.
     are able to understand themselves in a wider                       Cottrell, David. “The Need For Speed in New
                                                                            Millennium Leadership Styles”. Employment
     global context then they can attempt to                                Relations Today”. Spring 2000. pp.61-71.
     resolve the negative issues affecting their                        Davis, Ed, “Towards Improved People Management-
     performance. Whilst a Luddite attitude can be                          An Analysis”. Journal of the Australian and
     seen at the moment, Australian leadership                              New Zealand Academy of Management
                                                                            1997.3(2). pp.28-33.
     can look forward to be being seen as leading                       Dunn, James; “The Stuff of Leadership”.
     edge in the near future.                                               Management Today. May 1998. pp. 4-18.
                                                AUSTRALIAN LEADERSHIP – LEADING EDGE OR LUDDITE?                      33

Goleman, Daniel. “Leadership That Gets Results”.            Murrill, Maureen. “Category Leaders”. Management
     Harvard Business Review. March/April 2000.                  Today. June 1998. pp. 3-4.
     pp.78-90.                                              Parry, Ken W. “Leadership profiles Beyond 2000:
Gustafson, Grant; Thrum, Andrew; “Braving the                    How Australian Leadership is Different”.
     Forbidden Zone”. HR Monthly April 1998. pp.                 National Press Club Canberra. 16 April 1998.
     24-27.                                                 Pratt, Richard. “Leadership, A Fine Distinction”.
Hartmann, Linley; “What Do Managers Like to Do?
                                                                 Management Today. January/February 2001. p. 9.
     Comparing Women and Men in Australia and
                                                            Prescott, John. “Management Challenges for
     the US”. Australian Journal of Management.
     June1997 22(l), pp. 71-91.                                  Australia in the Asian Century”. Mt Eliza
Hauschild, Susanne, Light, Thomas and Stein,                     Business Review. pp.38-45.
     Wolfram. “Knowledge Must be Spread                     Ruff, David; The Fourteen Obligations of Top
     Around”. BRW Magazine. March 2 2001. pp.                    Management. 1997.
     64-68.                                                 Sarros, James C., Butchatsky, Oleh. “Leadership.
Hickman, Gill. R. Leading Organisations:                         Australia’s Top CEO’s.- Finding out what makes
     Perspectives for a New Era. Sage Publications.              them the best”. Harper Business Sydney 1997.
     California 1998.                                       Saville, James, Higgins, Mark, Australian
James, David. “BHP Management School will                        Management: A First-Line Perspective.
     Nurture New Management Style”. Business                     McMillan Education Australia, Melbourne
     Review Weekly. 10 February 1997. pp. 44-46.                 1994.
James, David. “Do Australian Leaders Rate Our               Simons, Fran. “Heroes, Warriors, Leaders,
     Interest?”. Management Today. March 2001.
                                                                 Managers”. The Australian Financial Review
     1pp. 4-19.
                                                                 Magazine.
Jones, Pam. “The New Business Age: Delivering
     Exceptional Performance”. Mt Eliza Business            Sinclair, Amanda. Doing Leadership Differently.
     Review. Pp 54-61.                                           Melbourne University Press, Melbourne 1998.
Kavanagh, John. “Australia’s Most Admired”.                 Smith, Catherine R. Still, Leonie. V. “Breaking the
     Business Review Weekly. 15 October 1999. pp.                Glass Barrier: Barriers to Global Careers for
     68-73.                                                      Women in Australia”. International Review of
Kelly, Paul. Future Tense, Australia beyond Election             Women and Leadership (1996),2(2). pp.60-72.
     1998. Allen and Unwin, St Leonards, 1999.              Stanton, Dennis. “The Emergent Leader”. HR
Kingsley, Hugh;. “Just For A Change”. Management                 Monthly. March 2000 pp. 48-49.
     Today. April 2000. pp. 20-22.                          Thompson, Ian, Morgan, David, E. “The World
Lamond, David. “If Management is ‘Common Sense’,                 According to Karpin”. Journal of Industrial
     why is Sense in Management So Uncommon”.                    Relations. December 1997, 39 (4) pp 457-477.
     Journal of the Australian and New Zealand              Ulrich, Dave. “A Time To Get Results”. Management
     Academy of Management 1998..4(2). pp.1-9.
                                                                 Today. April 2001. p.12.
Mair, David. Managing in Australia. Landsdowne
                                                            Way, Nicholas. “Leadership at the Barriers”.
     Publishing, Sydney 2000.
Mant, Alistair. Intelligent Leadership. Allen and                Business Review Weekly. October 6 2000: pp.
     Unwin, St Leonards 1997.                                    56-62.
Martin, John. “Leadership”. Local Government                Way, Nick. “Battle of the Chromosomes”.
     Management. February 1999. pp.16-19.                        Management Today. August 2000. pp. 16-18.
McColl, Gina. “Engendering Good Management”.                Youngblood, Mark. “Leading at the Edge of Chaos”.
     Management Today. May 1999. pp.16-19.                       HR Monthly. May 2000. pp. 32-33.



Captain Christopher Ruff graduated from the Royal Military College Duntroon in December 1994 into the Australian
Intelligence Corps and is currently posted to Sydney as the Second in Command of the 3rd Intelligence Company, 1st
Intelligence Battalion. Captain Ruff has a Bachelor of Arts Degree from the University of Adelaide (Politics) and a
Masters of Management Studies (Human Resource Management) from the University of New South Wales.
34


      Does Risk Management Cultivate a Culture
                 of Risk Avoidance?
                                        By Captain I. D. Langford, RAInf

         An Army not prepared for combat is like an orchestra without instruments.
                                                                   The Fundamentals of Land Warfare1

         The safe management of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) materials and personnel has
     received significant attention over the past few years both operationally and non-operationally.
     Deployments such as East Timor, Bougainville, and Afghanistan, events such as the Blackhawk
     accident, the HMAS Supply fire, and the ADF Everest team tragedy in 2001 have brought the
     management of risk into the spotlight.
         The ADF, including the Australian Army, has introduced mechanisms of Risk Management
     (RM) identification and mitigation into the decision-making process. This is aimed at maximising
     force preservation whilst encouraging intuitive decision-making. This mechanism has been
     incorporated into military doctrine and is applied entirely across the operational continuum (peace,
     conflict, and war).
         The Army has both a legal and moral requirement to minimise risks whilst maintaining
     capabilities largely concerned with the exercise and application of violence. This training is
     inherently dangerous, and it is this balance between realistic training and risk minimisation that
     has led to a culture of risk avoidance being encouraged to ensure no loss of life or equipment.
         The aim of this article is to assess whether RM doctrine and procedures encourage risk
     mitigation or total risk avoidance. Much of this analysis is derived from terms and definitions
     within the doctrinal risk management process, so therefore a review of the key terms and elements
     of risk management must be included.


     Risk Management and Avoidance                             The RM process is broken down into seven
         Risk is defined as:                               stages. They are:
         the potential for injury or loss, the potential       a. Step One: Establish context;
         for a hazardous event or hostile action to            b. Step Two: Identify risks;
         occur. It is a combination of consequence,            c. Step Three: Analyse          risks   (the
         exposure, probability/likelihood of a                                   likelihood and consequence
                                                                                 of each event should be
         specified hazardous event or hostile action.2
                                                                                 determined);
         It is this potential which RM attempts to
                                                               d. Step Four: Evaluate risks;
     mitigate against through examination of the
                                                               e. Step Five: Treat risks (identify
     activity and the level of risk determined to be
                                                                                 treatment options);
     acceptable.                                               f. Step Six: Monitor and review; and
         Risk Management is defined as:                        g. Step Seven: Communication            and
         a process whereby decisions are made and                                consultation.
         actions implemented to eliminate or reduce            Once this process is complete, the
         the effect of hazards and threats to the          commander must then be willing to accept the
         achievement of a mission or task.3                identified risks. This may minimise or exclude
                            DOES RISK MANAGEMENT CULTIVATE A CULTURE OF RISK AVOIDANCE?                35

some components of the capability                   accidents that did occur then we may find that
development which, whilst expedient for the         many are in fact within “residual risk”
commander in the short term, impacts on             probability zones.4 (For example, if we knew
realism in training and creates a culture of risk   that the probability of death by accidental
avoidance over the long term.                       discharge of a weapon is 1:1,000,000 we would
Limitations of Risk Management                      not bother trying to manage it since it was well
    There are a few limitations within the          within acceptable and community standards).
standard RM framework that could restrict its       Risk Avoidance and Risk Acceptance
effectiveness as a command tool. Firstly, RM            Risk avoidance is defined as the informed
assumes that the activity being analysed must       decision not to become involved in a risk
be conducted in the general manner specified.       situation.5 In relation to RM in the Australian
Treatment options (i.e. Step 5 of the process),     Army, it is argued that as a result of the focus
do not incorporate alternate means of               of risk management in doctrine, commanders
conducting the activity (e.g. fly/steam/drive),     are unwilling to accept the higher risks
and it would not be valid to embed alternatives     identified at a cost of the realism of training.
within the existing framework. This would           The commander that chooses to not accept
therefore mean an individual, stand-alone RM        reasonable risk therefore becomes an inhibitor
analysis for each activity option is required,      to the maintenance of individual and collective
despite it being a component of the same            capability of his/her force element. This is, of
operation/exercise.                                 course, in direct doctrinal contrast to the
    A further limitation of the nature of RM        Australian Army’s vision, which is:
concerns the management of time. RM                     ...to become a world class Army, ready to
implicitly assumes that all selected treatment          fight and win as part of the Australian
options must be implemented immediately in              Defence Force team, to serve the nation and
order to be effective, but in some                      make Australians proud.6
circumstances this assumption is not correct.           Risk acceptance is the calculated decision
This will arise in the context of deliberate        taken by commanders accepting risks once
planning, and any other risks seen on the           they have assessed that the outcome is worth
horizon are deferred until that stage.              the risk “exposure”. It is a command decision
    The other significant limitation to the RM      based on balancing the mission, the personnel,
process assumes that all risks are independent      and the outcome. On operations the results are
of each other. As a result, the structure of the    fairly obvious, with success gauged by the
RM is very straightforward, with a list of risks    accomplishment of the mission, casualties
and mitigators the result. However, there is in     taken, etc. In training, success is determined
fact a very complex inter-relationship between      predominantly by the safe conduct of the
risk and circumstance, which should be              activity, and the improvement of capability. It
considered when examining treatment options         is in training, however, that the commander
(e.g. a vehicle accident could be the cause of a    can limit the improvement of capability
gunshot injury; this could be mitigated against     through refusal to accept reasonable risk.
if the requirement to unload prior to boarding          The acceptance of reasonable risk is an
a vehicle was identified).                          essential quality of commanders, who as a
    RM also fails to take into its calculations     consequence of their actions determine both
any historical or statistical analysis when         operational success and realism in training.
determining the probability of occurrence. If in    Realism in training develops in individuals and
fact we did proper statistical analysis of those    teams the knowledge, skills, and attitudes
36   A U S T R A L I A N D E F E N C E F O R C E J O U R N A L 155 JULY / AUGUST   2002

     required to win the operation. Quality training                     driving element for the rationale for RM. It is
     ensures that commanders and their soldiers are                      achieved through the acquiring of a knowledge
     fit to carry out their tasks and responsibilities.                  edge a process beginning with information and
     Such involvement is central to the                                  ending with decisive action.12 The application
     development of a mutual trust, and it is the                        of the knowledge edge in training and combat
     commander that must engender this in training                       allows commanders to pursue professional
     to ensure it continues in battle.                                   mastery, which provides the means to realise
     The Australian Army and Risk Management                             the potential benefits of superior situational
        As stated, RM in the Australian Army is a                        awareness.13
     method undertaken to achieve force                                      Doctrinally, the Australian Army
     preservation and preserve combat power.7 The                        encourages manoeuvre warfare utilising
     authoritative       documents       for    the                      directive control.14 This ability to manoeuvre
     implementation of the Army’s risk                                   relies on effective command. One of the
     management policy are Training Information                          principle components of command concerns
     Bulletin No. 83 (TIB 83), Risk Management8                          itself with decision making. RM of course aids
     and the Defence Occupational Health and                             the commander to fulfil doctrinal obligations,
     Safety Manual (DOHSMAN).9                                           but also gives the commander the freedom of
        It is the TIB 83 which links RM to doctrine,                     action to focus on the key issues, rather than
     clearly articulating the responsibility for                         being distracted or overwhelmed by the
     commanders and all key stakeholders to                              unimportant.15
     incorporate RM into their exercise and
     operational planning (via the Military                              Risk Management and the Military Appreciation
     Appreciation Process). The DOHSMAN details                          Process (MAP)
     the actual implementation of RM in the                                  TIB 83 articulates exactly the relationship
     workplace, the formulation of policy, and the                       between RM and the MAP:
     ownership of responsibility onto all                                    The risk management process is not a
     commanders and their soldiers. Of particular                            remedy for poor planning or execution.
     note however, the DOHSMAN considers                                     It is not a separate planning process to the
     impartially the acceptance or avoidance of risk                         MAP. Indeed, the MAP is primarily
     as competing options, although it points out                            concerned with the identification of risks
     that avoidance of risk is the only option                               associated with each possible COA,
     requiring no additional effort from the                                 determination of methods to control risk,
     commander.10 This in a sense makes it a more                            and acceptance of risk inherent in the final
     seemingly attractive option to a risk-averse                            plan.16
     commander. Despite this however, both of the                            It is the thought processes that are involved
     aforementioned documents offer sound policy                         in the formulation of RM that is applied
     and advice to commanders to enable them                             informally within the Intelligence Preparation
     to achieve an effective balance                                     of the Battlefield (IPB). This step gives scope to
     between capability development and                                  the commander to consider the risks from the
     operational/exercise safety.                                        threat (i.e. enemy), and the environment
     Risk Management and Doctrine                                        (terrain, weather, etc). Accordingly, during the
         RM is firmly embedded into the Australian                       Course of Action Analysis, the commander
     Army’s parent philosophical doctrinal                               wargames plans, auditing them informally for
     publication, The Fundamentals of Land                               risk and risk controls. This is the operational
     Warfare.11 Force preservation is the principle-                     implementation of RM.
                              DOES RISK MANAGEMENT CULTIVATE A CULTURE OF RISK AVOIDANCE?                  37

    As stated, through the doctrinal application      the realism of training and the acceptance of
of RM throughout the process of the MAP,              risk by the commander in training that will
professional mastery at all levels of command         reduce the risk to personnel and equipment on
is enhanced. This engenders an intuitive              operations. Risk avoidance is the act of
decision-making cycle at all levels. This lessens     commanders who by virtue of their risk refusal
the effect of the “fog of war” which is derived       in training, increases risk on operations.
from misinformation, contradictory evidence,          Conclusion
and intelligence sensor confusion.                        This article has demonstrated the
Application of Risk Management on Operations          importance of RM across the operational
and Training                                          continuum in the Australian Army. Whilst
    RM on operations is somewhat easier to            some believe that the articulation of the RM
accommodate than in training. For the                 process encourages a process of “risk
commander, operational risk is an ongoing             avoidance”, this article contends that this
consideration in all aspects of military              avoidance is more to do with the refusal of
appreciation whilst deployed. Owing to this           some commanders to accept risk rather than
fact, it is easier for the commander to accept        the requirement to conduct the RM process as
an operational risk because it is put into a          per the TIB 83, DOHSMAN, and The
context in relation to the strategic aim (e.g.        Fundamentals of Land Warfare.
Military Operations in the Littoral                       As discussed, it is the preservation of force
Environment, Forced Entry from the Air and            that is the fundamental aim of RM in both
Sea, etc). Casualties on operations are also          peace and war. Commanders at all levels have
seemingly more acceptable to Government in            an obligation to provide realistic training and
the pursuit of its strategic agenda rather than       accept risk in order to minimise that risk when
in training.                                          on operations. It is in the pursuit of the
    In training, RM is a much more involved           “knowledge edge” that will lessen the
process, which places risk into a training            likelihood of an accident in training, or a
context, the benefits of which are much harder        tactical disaster in war.
to identify. This has the potential for the                                NOTES
commander to make the assessment the risk is          1. Australian Army, The Fundamentals of Land
not worth the reward. The price of this, is of            Warfare, 1998, p. 6-1(since superseded by
course, a loss of realism in training and a               LWD-1, The Fundamentals of Land Warfare,
                                                          2002).
reduction in individual and collective                2. Australian Army, TIB 83, p xiv.
capability. This “risk-averse” culture is             3. ibid., p. xv.
perpetuated not necessarily by the RM process,        4, Email MAJ Mike Cook/Brig Peter Lambert
but from a refusal from commanders to accept              (AAA President) dated 2 Apr 02.
                                                      5. Australian Army, The Fundamentals of Land
that despite our best efforts, managed risks will         Warfare, 2002, p 3.
sometimes occur. These commanders disregard           6. ibid., p 3.
doctrinal guidance (to provide realistic              7. John F. Antal, Manoeuvre Warfare: An
                                                          Anthology, 1993, p. 1-1.
training) in order to eliminate risk.
                                                      8. Australian Army, Training Information Bulletin
    TIB 83 begins with the premise that both              No.83 Risk Management, 1998.
operations and training are hazardous and will        9. Australian Defence Force, Defence Occupational
be rarely free from risk. It is the doctrinal             Health and Safety Manual, 2001, Chapter 5.
                                                      10. Australian Defence Force, Defence Occupational
responsibility of commanders to utilise RM
                                                          Health and Safety Manual, op. cit., para. 506.
tools both formally and informally in order to        11. Australian Army, The Fundamentals of Land
facilitate realistic training. Paradoxically, it is       Warfare, 2002, p. 87.
38   A U S T R A L I A N D E F E N C E F O R C E J O F U R N A L 155 JULY / AUGUST   2002

     12.   ibid., Ch 4.                                                  Command Staff & Operations Wing 2002,
     13.   ibid., Ch 4.                                                      Operations Notebook 2002.
     14.   ibid., Ch 1-6.                                                Department of Defence 1996, Australian Army
     15.   ibid., Ch 3-6.                                                    Manual of Occupational Health and Safety.
     16.   LWP-G 0-1-4, Ch 4, Ann D.                                     Department of Defence 1998, Training Information
                       BIBLIOGRAPHY                                          Bulletin No.83 Risk Management.
                                                                         Department of Defence 2002, The Fundamentals of
     Antal, J.F. 1993, Manoeuvre Warfare: An Anthology,
         edit. R.D. Hooker, Jr, Presidio Press.                              Land Warfare.
     McLennan, P. 2002, The Application of Risk                          Department of Defence 1998, The Fundamentals of
         Management Methods to the Employment of                             Land Warfare.
         Civilians in the Area of Operations, Royal                      Department of Defence 2001, LWP-G 0-1-4 The
         Australian Air Force Aerospace Centre.                              Military Appreciation Process.




     Captain Ian Langford joined the Army in 1992, and after serving as a soldier with the 8/12th Medium Regiment, was
     selected to attend The Royal Military College, Duntroon which he graduated from in 1995, winning the Sword of
     Honour. Upon commissioning, he was posted to the 1st Battalion, the Royal Australian Regiment where he served in
     both Rifle Company and Support Company appointments. In 1999 he successfully completed the Combined Special
     Forces Selection Course and was posted to the 4th Battalion (Commando), The Royal Australian Regiment. Whilst in
     that tenure he served in Malaysia, the United States of America, and in 2001, East Timor. His most recent
     appointment is as the Staff Officer Grade Three-Operations at Headquarters Eight Brigade in Sydney. Captain
     Langford has a degree in Management, and is currently studying a degree in Law.
                                                                                                         39


   Current and Future Command Challenges
   for New Zealand Defence Force Personnel
         Dr Joel Hayward, Centre for Defence Studies, Massey University, New Zealand

    The Berlin Wall’s destruction in 1989 initiated a two year period in which the Soviet Union
struggled to hold together and prove it still had political and economic relevance in a world that no
longer cared so much about the communism-capitalism rivalry that had dominated international
relations for 40 years. In 1991 the Soviet Union could limp on no longer and, in essence, gave up
the fight. The Union collapsed, eventually replaced by a weaker and smaller Commonwealth of
Independent States.
    Although the likelihood of global war has since become remote, the Soviet Union’s dissolution
brought an end to the power balance that had created a degree of certainty in international
relations. Whereas the great powers had generally kept a lid on their subject or satellite nations’
internal tensions and squabbles — often through the threat or use of force — their new “hands off”
policies and practices have allowed those tensions to re-emerge.

    he first example of this occurred even while    ethnic groups to seek self-determination or
T   the Soviet Union was gasping its last
breaths in 1991. In June of that year Croatia
                                                    sovereignty in states and regions where the
                                                    attainment of their goals without violent
and Slovenia decided they would not remain          struggle is highly unlikely.
part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This        Only the United States, as sole superpower,
initiated a bloody four-year intra-state conflict   has the ability to take the lead in major
(that is, a war within a state, not between         security problems. Yet its foreign activities are
states) that pitted various south Slavic ethnic     themselves sources of tension to many peoples
groups against each other.                          who accuse the US of heavy-handed
    Without the superpower interference that        behaviour, favouritism towards certain states,
kept ethnic disturbances and state failures at      self-serving foreign policy and cultural
a “manageable” level, such crises have              imperialism. Even the widespread sympathy
escalated in number and intensity. The dawn         the US gained in the wake of the 11 September
of the 21st century reveals a world that is         2001 terrorist attacks is evaporating with
highly fractured, with the United Nations           surprising speed. Any mismanagement of the
(UN) supporting an ever increasing number           Americans’ “War on Terrorism” could be
of peacekeeping missions in countries where         greatly destabilising, particularly in the already
cultural, religious and ethnic tensions have        volatile Middle Eastern and Central Asian
turned violent.                                     regions.
    The UN has not, however, proven entirely            The fragility of world peace naturally
successful at easing tensions and fostering         impacts on New Zealand and its security and
peace in many hot spots around the globe, and       foreign policy concerns, especially as its own
its record of successful peacekeeping is poor.      “neck of the woods” — the Asia Pacific region
The UN’s apparent support of the right to self-     — has not remained free of coups, ethnic
determination for all peoples (most easily          disturbances and failed states. Aspirations of
defined by ethnicity and cultural uniqueness)       self-determination or freedom from external
may be an attractive by-product of de-              controls have emerged in several places around
colonisation. Yet this ideal has itself inspired    the Pacific Rim. UN and regional coalition
40   A U S T R A L I A N D E F E N C E F O R C E J O U R N A L 155 JULY / AUGUST   2002




                                                  New Zealand troops in East Timor

     peace-support missions are consequently no                          to keep defence spending at a mere one per
     longer occurring only on the other side of the                      cent of GDP. Nonetheless, seeing no obvious
     globe; they are happening in New Zealand’s                          threats to New Zealand’s sovereignty, and with
     backyard. Since September 1999, for instance,                       a global war now highly unlikely, the
     New Zealand has maintained a large                                  Government has sought a new role for its
     peacekeeping force of 700 or so Service men                         armed forces. Judging peace-support missions
     and women in East Timor.                                            to be the NZDF’s best means of contributing to
        The point of all these observations, of                          regional security, the Government has tried to
     course, is that there is something paradoxical                      make the NZDF a more flexible, effective and
     and disturbing about the way successive New                         deployable asset for the United Nations and
     Zealand governments have handled defence                            any potential regional coalitions.
     and strategic issues since the end of the Cold                          It has, therefore, significantly re-prioritised
     War over a decade ago. Between 1991 and                             its meagre defence spending in order to
     2002 the percentage of New Zealand’s GDP                            achieve different objectives to those set by
     devoted to defence almost halved, with the                          previous governments which were purportedly
     National Government being responsible for                           locked into Cold War thinking. Its decision that
     most of the reduction in defence spending.                          New Zealand no longer needs an air strike
        The Labour-led Coalition Government                              capability, announced in May 2001 and
     formed in 1999 has not reversed the trend.                          actualised through the dissolution of three
     Despite having more New Zealand Defence                             RNZAF squadrons by year’s end, represents
     Force (NZDF) personnel deployed overseas                            New Zealand’s greatest departure from
     (most in East Timor) at any time since the                          traditional defence and foreign policy thinking
     Vietnam War, the Government seems willing                           in several generations.
              CURRENT AND FUTURE COMMAND CHALLENGES FOR NZ DEFENCE FORCE PERSONNEL                     41

    Some people in the NZDF and the wider          resentment and staying in an Air Force that
community consider the Government’s actions,       will no longer have much possibility of a direct
policies and plans to be reckless and unwise,      combat function. Many RNZAF officers,
while other see them as courageous, timely and     including senior officers, feel that their raison
appropriate. Debate between these two              d’être no longer exists, and that air logistical
“camps” raged throughout 2001 and into 2002,       support of the Army and Navy cannot possibly
with bitter public accusations of conspiracies     give them command opportunities of a
and leaks of official information                  genuine military type. Yet, at least for the next
overshadowing and stifling genuine debate on       few years, the RNZAF’s senior officers will
the most important strategic and security          have powerful command challenges to rise to:
issues.                                            keeping personnel aware of their constitutional
    It is within these challenging global and      loyalty to a government they may still feel
national contexts that the NZDF’s officers must    hostile to; maintaining order and discipline in
strive for command, leadership and managerial      spite of dissatisfaction; providing strong and
excellence as they undertake the nation’s wide-    inspiring leadership to raise morale;
ranging demands as defined and articulated by      demonstrating managerial efficiency and
the Government.                                    effectiveness as they re-organise the Air Force
    Perhaps right now the greatest challenge       for its new roles and challenges.
for any potential or serving commanders,               The Navy, on the other hand, will benefit
especially at higher levels (Army lieutenant       from the Labour-led Government’s decision
colonel or equivalent), is keeping their own       (announced in January 2002) to purchase a
and their subordinates’ morale high. Morale        large multi-purpose warship and several off-
throughout the NZDF has clearly taken a            shore patrol ships to go with its two ANZAC-
battering from savage media criticism and          class frigates. With more hulls in the water,
microscopic scrutiny, fuelled by self-serving      and with the officer in charge of each ship
politicians who are using defence issues as        exercising command, leadership and
“ammunition” to fire at their enemies on the       management responsibilities (even on a limited
other side of the Debating Chamber. Seemingly      scale in the case of small vessels) the Navy
endless claims of dysfunctionality, inter-         looks set to provide more command
Service hostility and conspiracies have            opportunities than it has been able to for
increased, not decreased, the tensions and         several decades.
inter-Service suspicions.                              Tensions between the three armed Services
    Junior, intermediate and senior leaders in     are not new, of course. At least a little inter-
all three Services have a heavy command            Service rivalry has always existed, particularly
responsibility (which almost all recognise, of     over capital acquisitions and upgrade/-
course) to prevent their own and their             modernisation programs. The run-down in
subordinates’ feelings about recent and current    defence spending during the last decade or so
defence policies from becoming divisive. They      has even occasionally turned the Services
must pull their units and Services together, not   against each other in an unwanted, but
apart.                                             seemingly inescapable, competition for
    This won’t be easy for all personnel. The      resources.
Government’s disbanding of the air combat              Yet the Services have, by and large,
and jet training squadrons in 2001 seriously       committed themselves to the concept of
wounded morale within the RNZAF. For               jointness; that is, their closely synchronised
remaining airmen and airwomen their primary        employment, under unified command, to
challenge may well be overcoming their             achieve common objectives in a range of
42   A U S T R A L I A N D E F E N C E F O R C E J O U R N A L 155 JULY / AUGUST   2002

     situations across the broad spectrum of                             brethren-in-arms. They must tolerate no inter-
     conflict. Although the Labour-led Coalition                         Service rivalry and they must try to gain fuller
     Government’s scrapping of the RNZAF’s air                           understandings of the limitations and
     strike capability has undoubtedly damaged                           capabilities of the other Services.
     inter-Service relations, in the short term                              This naturally raises the issue of
     anyway, the future is not bleak. In July 2001                       technology. Since around the time of the
     that same Government established New                                Persian Gulf War of 1991, new weapons,
     Zealand’s first operational Joint Forces                            information technologies and tactics have
     Headquarters, with personnel drawn from all                         purportedly been transforming warfare to
     three Services to form a staff that will plan and                   enable battles to be fought “over the horizon”
     oversee future NZDF operational deployments.                        with little face-to-face contact between
     This is a significant step towards the                              belligerents. Military professionals commonly
     attainment and maintenance of true jointness.                       describe this transformation as the “RMA”, or
         Yet jointness itself creates tremendous                         Revolution in Military Affairs. The more ardent
     challenges for those exercising command.                            and techno-centric proponents of this RMA
     Joint commanders need to know far more than                         claim that the fundamental nature of warfare is
     single-Service commanders ever did. They                            changing. Digitisation and remotely operated
     need at least a basic understanding of the                          weapons, they say, have already made
     terminologies, technologies, doctrines,                             redundant the chaotic, frightening and violent
     limitations and capabilities of all three                           close combat that has always characterised
     Services, as well as how best to utilise elements                   warfare. The “norm” will now be less chaotic
     from each at any given moment. Because this                         and more manageable “stand-off” battles
     places unrealistic expectations on any one                          (hitting the enemy from positions of safety)
     individual, the Joint Force Commander (a                            and long-range precision strike.
     major general or equivalent) has to rely heavily                        Other more cautious commentators,
     on his or her three Service component                               including the author of this article, accept that
     commanders. They, in turn, have to work                             the means of prosecuting warfare have
     harmoniously as a united team of experts as                         changed dramatically, so that a joint or
     they offer advice, make plans and coordinate                        combined-arms battle today would be
     efforts. Appropriate training for these joint                       incomprehensible to, say, one of General
     command positions will be difficult; the US                         Patton’s soldiers. Yet we also believe that
     leads the world in this area, but New Zealand                       warfare’s fundamental nature has not changed
     and the US now have very limited officer                            at all. Rather than being in a military
     exchange programs.                                                  revolution, it seems clear that we are merely in
         At the very heart of jointness is the notion                    a period of rapid change in the technologies
     that, although a particular Service may                             available with which to do the same old jobs:
     sometimes seem to be the dominant force                             intimidating, coercing, punishing, taking,
     because of its largest contribution to a                            crushing; in short, threatening or inflicting
     particular mission, all three Services are equal                    bloodshed.
     partners and all have critically important roles                        Having said that, New Zealand
     to play. Effective jointness is certainly a force                   commanders must stay abreast of those new
     multiplier, and should be pursued with zeal.                        and constantly-improving technologies if they
         Commanders not only within the Joint                            want to remain professionally competent and
     Forces Headquarters, but also those within the                      military competitive. Thanks to satellites and
     single Services, must ensure that their staffs                      aircraft and shipboard tracking and sensor
     and teams respond to the other Services as                          equipment, for instance, they can have
              CURRENT AND FUTURE COMMAND CHALLENGES FOR NZ DEFENCE FORCE PERSONNEL                    43

fantastic battlespace awareness. But they will     New Zealand commanders (and all their
have it only if they strive to master the          subordinates) in former generations.
technologies and the corresponding new                  This is not the only change during recent
practices and procedures (and sometimes even       decades. Since around the time of the Vietnam
new doctrines) and recognise the full potential    War, most Western nations have become less
of the new capabilities they provide. They must    willing to commit their armed forces to
also take great care when assessing or             conflicts unless the cause is (or can be “sold”
exploiting all new capabilities that they don’t    as) primarily humanitarian and not merely
become, or let their subordinates become, so       national-political. Public expectations of
smitten by the technology that they take their     warfare have also shifted. Whereas death and
eyes off the time-honoured and proven              privation were accepted as ever-present
principles of war.                                 features of armed conflict as recently as the
    Education is thus becoming more                Second World War, now the public want iron-
important, not only in terms of the great mass     clad guarantees of minimal casualties, no
of technical information now available, but        collateral damage, and the quick return of
also in terms of understanding the                 combatants. The growing Western sensitivity
complexities of the constantly changing world,     to casualties has been manifest on many
                                                   occasions in the quarter-century since
region and nation. With peace-support
                                                   Vietnam. The clearest case is perhaps the
missions becoming more frequent and
                                                   dramatic drop in American public support for
substantial, NZDF personnel are called on
                                                   the United Nations peace-enforcement mission
increasingly to operate in wider and less
                                                   in Somalia that followed the October 1993
familiar roles throughout the west and south
                                                   killing of 18 American soldiers in Mogadishu.
Pacific regions. These roles include
                                                   President Clinton and Congress responded
peacekeeping, truce monitoring, conflict
                                                   promptly by withdrawing the entire American
resolution, disaster relief and civil defence.
                                                   force.
    With these new demands in mind, the New
                                                        These new attitudes place intense pressures
Zealand Army has gained a slight lead in terms
                                                   on the commanders who must plan and lead
of providing tertiary education to its officers
                                                   all operations, including peace-support
and senior NCOs, but the other Services are not    missions. These should, by their very nature, be
far behind. All are now providing at least a       far safer than combat missions, yet deaths
basic education in: military history; the wider    inevitably occur despite the very best
international environment; the origins and         command efforts, actions and decisions. Single
character of this region’s diverse cultures; the   deaths, however, can be sensationalised (and
distinctive foundations and nature of New          even trivialised) by news-hungry media and
Zealand society; the organisation and              insensitive politicians hell-bent on scoring
governance of its communities; and the nature      points against their opposition. This often
of civil society, democracy and public             unfair and ill-informed scrutiny can be
discourse.                                         psychologically traumatising to those in
    All this, of course, must be learned in        command positions. They find serious
addition to the routine, the promotion-related     accidents and deaths almost unbearable at the
and the specialised professional training that     “best” of times. Dealing with intense and
all military personnel undertake in order to       perhaps accusatory scrutiny only adds to their
master the particular tasks that their Services    distress.
assign to them. The whole weight of learning            Becoming “media-savvy” is now
has thus become heavier than that carried by       critically important for commanders, whose
44   A U S T R A L I A N D E F E N C E F O R C E J O U R N A L 155 JULY / AUGUST   2002

     troops, squadrons or crews are exposed to                           violence of “hot” combat (which might even
     far more media interest than ever before.                           result from an unexpected incident during a
     They need to find a balance between, on the                         peace mission) will place commanders under
     one hand, providing the public with basic                           different pressures in terms of the use of
     operational information in a transparent and                        manoeuvre and firepower and the maintenance
     honest fashion and, on the other hand,                              of force protection. Issues of life and death
     maintaining an appropriate level of                                 become far more important, as do the
     operational secrecy as well as protecting                           commanders’ own grasp and experience (or
     their subordinates’ right to some privacy.                          lack thereof) of tactics and operational art.
     Moreover, commanders need to learn how to                           These are things that must be trained for;
     handle improper media intrusiveness without                         intensively. Peacekeeping alone cannot provide
     causing offense, and how to remain within                           all the insights and skills needed.
     their constitution boundaries when quizzed                               Training with other national armies, air
     on current political actions and decisions.                         forces and navies may help to prepare the
     Having sworn oaths to obey and serve their                          Services and their commanders for combat,
     government they clearly cannot publicly                             especially as some of New Zealand’s stated and
     challenge or condemn decisions they don’t                           likely allies have experienced real and major
     like. Commanders must especially watch out                          combat in recent decades. It is probable, in
     for the so-called “CNN factor,” the ability of                      fact, that if and when New Zealand ever sends
     intrusive media to cause political and social                       a sizeable force overseas for combat it will be
     disruption back home by reporting                                   part of a coalition led by the United States,
     inaccurately or putting a negative spin on                          Britain or Australia. Kiwi commanders, then,
     benign events.                                                      must ensure that they and their subordinates
         One thing that some serving military                            understand their likely partners’ forces,
     personnel don’t especially care for is recent                       doctrines, systems and procedures. Given New
     governments’ high commitment to                                     Zealand’s relatively low level of training with
     peacekeeping. Some see this as a potentially                        US forces, its current and future commanders
     costly distraction from their training for war.                     unfortunately get little exposure to, and
     With over 700 military personnel deployed                           experience with, US military personnel and
     overseas on peace-support missions one                              their awesome array of state-of-the art
     cannot doubt that the NZDF is pulling its                           weaponry and systems. This situation — a
     weight in terms of regional security. This                          result of the “ANZUS rift” caused by New
     heavy overseas commitment is nonetheless a                          Zealand’s anti-nuclear stance — is a factor that
     double-edged sword: it gives many more                              the New Zealand Government needs to
     Service men and women opportunities to                              address.
     exercise authority while on operations that                              Perhaps the last of the major issues
     they would otherwise get during periods of                          affecting, or likely to affect, New Zealand
     relative inactivity. Yet it removes them from                       military commanders are those of gender and
     training and exercise opportunities that focus                      ethnicity. Increasing numbers of women are
     more directly on preparing for command in                           joining the three Services, and even entering
     combat.                                                             roles (such as flying fighters, at least before the
         Commanding forces in combat, they know,                         air strike capability disappeared) traditionally
     is very different to commanding them on                             reserved for men. They are also rising through
     peace-support missions. While no-one doubts                         the ranks and assuming significant
     that peacekeeping involves grave risks and                          responsibilities, including that of command.
     often places personnel in mortal peril, the                         Although there has not yet been a woman of
                CURRENT AND FUTURE COMMAND CHALLENGES FOR NZ DEFENCE FORCE PERSONNEL                                  45

one-star rank (brigadier or equivalent), there              divisions, and also sponsors a Mutual
have been several of colonel or equivalent                  Assistance Programme to provide academic
rank. Likewise, the NZDF continues to attract               and skills-based training to members of other
many Maori, with a far higher percentage of                 Pacific-rim nations’ armed forces. The Royal
the uniformed strength being Maori than                     New Zealand Air Force Command and Staff
found in almost any other employment sector.                College at Whenuapai includes officers from
There are currently Maori at almost all ranks,              other nations and ethnic backgrounds on its
including Major General Jerry Mateparae,                    annual senior course.
Chief of Army General Staff (CGS). He is not                    Ethnic issues, therefore, cannot be ignored
the first Maori warrior to have gained this                 by leaders and commanders if harmonious
position.                                                   relations are to develop within the NZDF and
     All commanders, male and female, Maori                 between it and other national forces.
and others, need to be aware of society’s                   Sensitivity, tolerance and inclusiveness must
changing values, including increased                        become integral to every commander’s
sensitivity towards gender and ethnic issues.               behaviour and leadership style, and it must
Women can now be committed to combat (at                    become the norm at all levels of his or her unit,
the time of writing, for example, one of the                right down to the private soldier or other
rifle platoons in East Timor has had a woman                Service equivalent.
commander) and they must be treated fairly                      All in all, then, New Zealand’s current
and without discrimination in every instance.               crop of military commanders, and those
Harassment must not be tolerated, and                       rising through the ranks to succeed them in
commanders need to remain mindful of all                    due course, have demanding challenges to
Equal Opportunities issues. They must also                  face as they strive for excellence. Yet, if their
demand, and use discipline to enforce, a zero-              forebears are any example, New Zealand has
tolerance policy on discrimination and                      every reason to expect that its officers will
harassment. Their best means of                             meet their challenges with passion,
accomplishing this is to remove all                         determination, commitment and great
objectionable behaviour, even that usually                  professionalism. They will strive to overcome
associated with mirth, from their own                       the frustrations of resource constraints,
conduct, and to make their expectations clear               unpopular political decisions, occasionally
to all subordinates.                                        testing inter-Service relations and so forth to
     It is the same with ethnic and racial issues.          create motivated teams that can fulfil their
Not only will commanders need to recognise                  government’s requirements effectively, safely
that the NZDF is as multi-cultural as wider                 and credibly. In doing so, they will doubtless
New Zealand society, with a strong Maori                    emerge as exemplary citizens of both New
participation, but they must also remain                    Zealand and the world’s community of
sensitive to the ethnic dynamics of regional                nations. We can, therefore, be optimistic that
situations. New Zealand has peacekeepers in                 New Zealand commanders will live up to the
nations or territories marked by ethnic                     high standards of their predecessors.



    Dr Joel Hayward is a Senior Lecturer within the Centre for Defence Studies at Massey University in New Zealand.
With a particular interest in joint doctrine and operational art, he has published widely on military and strategic
matters and lectures at New Zealand’s RNZAF Command and Staff College and the RNZN Naval College.
                                           Reviews
GALLIPOLI 1915 by Richard Reid, ABC                  caption for an illustration being adjacent to it,
Books 2002, hardcover, dust jacket, 154              almost invariably the captions are on another
pages, $39.95                                        page, sometimes in a block of captions,
Reviewed by Lex McAulay                              sometimes above or below a piece of text, and
                                                     this is compounded by the fact that there is no
                             This book is timely,
                                                     standard presentation, so one is continually
                             in that our last
                                                     searching for the correct piece of information
                             veteran of Gallipoli,
                                                     relating to an image.
                             Alec     Campbell,
                             recently     passed
                                                     THE ELEVEN DAYS OF CHRISTMAS
                             away. It is sad to
                                                     AMERICA’S LAST VIETNAM BATTLE by
                             read this book with
                                                     Marshall L. Michel III, Encounter Books, USA;
the certain knowledge that no one in any
                                                     ISBN 1-893554-24-4 hardcover, dust jacket,
photo is alive. Richard Reid, has created a
                                                     324pp, 20 photos, 4 appendices, notes.
book with a different aspect on the Gallipoli
campaign. The illustrations are selected from        Reviewed by Lex McAulay
those taken by the soldiers themselves, and          This book will be painful
from those published by the newspapers of the        reading for those veterans of
time. Richard Reid’s text provides a general         the USAF B-52 bombing
background to the photos and drawings, which         campaign against Hanoi in
are accompanied by good captions.                    December 1972, for the
    Dr. Reid has widened the horizons, as it         families of those killed or
were, of this book, by reminding the Australian      badly injured in the strikes,
reader that as well as Australians and New           and presumably, also, for the
Zealanders, there were British, French and           families of the senior officers concerned, as
Indian forces involved, and the Turks and            their incompetence, arrogance and sheer lack
Germans.                                             of understanding of leadership in war are
    The book is well structured, and in              described in detail.
sequence covers The Allied Navies, The                   President Richard M. Nixon had become
Landing, Battle, Daily Warfare, Medical              fed up with the North Vietnamese attitude to
Services, Beaches and Harbours, Daily Life,          serious discussions about ending the war in
Dwellings, Evacuation, Gallipoli Portraits, The      Vietnam. Though the Vietcong had been
Gallipoli Drawings of Captain Leslie Hore, and       annihilated and the North Vietnamese forces
Remembering Gallipoli 1915-1930.                     defeated everywhere, the Politburo in Hanoi
    It’s all there – the ships, the men, the         tried to achieve maximum advantage from the
terrain, the lifestyle, death and burial, and the    anti-war attitude of the US Congress. Nixon
aftermath. Hopefully, this book will be a            wanted an end to the war before Congress
success and so will be followed by others using      convened for the 1973 year. He decided to use
personal photos taken in France and Palestine.       the B-52s of Strategic Air Command (SAC) to
    The book does have one major irritation –        attack targets in and close to Hanoi to show
to this reviewer, anyway. Instead of the             the Hanoi leadership just what a fearsome
                                                                                         REVIEWS      47

force he could send against the city, but which   defences; detailed plans from SAC staff were to
had not been so used before.                      be followed to the finest degree, but losses
    It was a close run thing. Nixon had a         were the fault of the subordinate ranks and
narrow window of only a few weeks to force        success due to the expertise of the commander
the Vietnamese to agree, before Congress          and his staff.
would bring a halt to the bombing by refusing         SAC, in existence solely to execute nuclear
funds for the war, but the Vietnamese defences    retaliation in the event of such an attack by the
achieved remarkable success against the           USSR, became almost a separate armed service
bombers. Today, both sides claim victory – the    rather than a branch of the USAF. SAC created
USA because the bombing forced the Hanoi          for itself an unassailable position – only SAC
leadership back to the peace talks, so the        knew how to maintain the force of bombers
fighting ceased and the US POWs were              which alone kept the USSR at bay.
returned, but the Vietnamese claim that the US    Advancement in SAC was achieved by slavish
left Vietnam because the B-52s were defeated.     observance of every little rule and regulation,
However, Marshall Michel points out that the      and instant unquestioning obedience to
North Vietnamese did not begin their final        procedures and decisions from SAC itself –
offensive in 1975 until Nixon was no longer in    even an aircraft captain with a problem was
office, and not able to deploy US air power to    told by direct radio link with Omaha what to do
support South Vietnam, as had happened in         in an inflight emergency; his unit commander
the April 1972 offensive.                         was a mere listener to the transmissions.
    Marshall Michel, himself a USAF veteran of    Qualifications and experience gained outside
320 combat missions in F-4s and RF-4s, has        SAC were frowned upon – everything
provided a thoroughly researched account of       necessary for an enlisted man or officer to
the “Christmas bombing”, with contributions       perform any task or assigned duty was known
from participants in the White House, through     and taught in SAC by SAC methods.
the USAF chain of command to the squadrons            But by 1972, the commander of SAC and
and aircrews who flew the missions, and also      the commander of the B-52 force deployed to
from veterans on the Vietnamese side, backed      the western Pacific were fighter aces from
by official and personal documents.               WWII, and in this campaign were shown to be
    The faults of the British high command in     out of their depth, perhaps another example of
WWI have been well researched and reported.       the Peter Principle – promoted that one fatal
The hierarchy at SAC mirrored all those           time above their level of competence.
shortcomings: the British generals lived and          The Vietnamese, while infuriating their
planned in chateaux remote from the battle,       Soviet teachers, did deduce ways to make their
and SAC planned and issued detailed orders for    obsolescent SA-2 weapons system effective
operations over North Vietnam from the HQ in      against the B-52s, though in this they only
the USA; the British generals had no              exploited the many errors in the original SAC
experience of modern warfare, and SAC was         plan.
run by generals with no or little bombing             If the results of the studies by staffs at
experience, and that was gained in 1944-45;       subordinate operational headquarters had been
British generals sent overloaded men across       accepted by SAC, it is quite probable that no
morasses into unbroken defences, and SAC          B-52s would have been lost. The campaign
orders sent formations time after time at the     would have been a resounding success. As it
same height along the same single approach        was, 15 B-52s were shot down, though some
route at the same time intervals to the same      struggled back to base or to an area where the
unsuitable targets over the concentrated          crews could be rescued.
48   A U S T R A L I A N D E F E N C E F O R C E J O U R N A L NO. 155 JULY / AUGUST   2002

         The author is unbiased, but it is difficult to                     After the campaign, commanding generals,
     find anything planned or ordered by SAC that                       with one exception, ordered self-adulatory
     was not wrong, and then only changed after                         “histories” compiled. Crew members still resent
     heavy losses. The first attacks were made at                       the lack of awards to their colleagues who
     the same times; with the same long interval                        repeatedly faced the missiles, compared to
     between waves which allowed the defences to                        awards to senior staff who did not fly or flew
     recover and prepare; along the same approach                       one mission, but who went along with the
     route, at the same altitude, to the same targets;                  headquarters         version      of    events:
     with the same exit procedure which took the                        “unprofessional” crews brought losses on
     aircraft over the highest concentration of                         themselves, and SAC’s actions were beyond
     defences and negated the effect of their on-                       reproach. The official version, produced only
     board EW jammers; turned the aircraft back                         after thorough vetting by senior officers had
     into the 100mph jetstream, and back over                           removed all reference to shortcomings in the
     enemy territory rather than out to sea; wrong                      USAF, is in use at staff colleges today. This
     targets were selected and wrong sub-model B-                       book provides the “unvarnished truth”.
     52s sent to them. The funnel-neck in the air
                                                                            One crumb of comfort for Australians
     defence system, the missile storage and
                                                                        reading this book is that Australian
     assembly depots, was ignored.
                                                                        commanders serving under operational
         Crews were ordered not to take evasive
                                                                        command of an Allied power retain the right
     action under threat of court-martial; a colonel
                                                                        to consult their own national defence HQ and
     ordered a fuel state report from the entire
                                                                        Government before joining any operation
     airborne force during the approach to the
                                                                        about which they have doubts. The Hanoi
     target, and insisted, despite being told this
                                                                        missions planned by SAC abandoned every
     would inform the enemy how many aircraft
                                                                        tenet of commonsense.
     were coming and their location. A crew was
     charged with violating a “no-fly” zone near                            This is an absorbing account of a military
     China, but as it was deemed aircrew did not                        campaign which had the potential to make a
     have “a need to know” these zones, the maps                        failure of the US policy of disengagement from
     were classified too highly to issue them to                        Vietnam. The situation arose because of the
     crews. A survivor could not understand why                         global responsibilities of the US Defense forces,
     no one came to rescue him, and surrendered                         in which “side-shows” diverting attention and
     only when almost dead from exposure and                            resources from the major aim of keeping the
     starvation – HQ had decided his radio                              USSR in check were deeply resented. The
     transmissions were a Vietnamese trap. SAC                          events of September 11, 2001, show that some
     bombed elsewhere than Hanoi rather than                            things remain constant.
     comply with the political aim of the campaign.                         (This review copy is a US edition, and in
     At one stage, Nixon had to tell the most senior                    June the publishers advised it will be available
     military officer that unless the bombing was                       in bookshops in Australia or direct from
     conducted as ordered, that officer’s resignation                   Wakefield Press, Kent Town, South Australia;
     was required.                                                      or www.wakefieldpress.com.au. )

				
DOCUMENT INFO
Description: Joel Hayward, "Current and Future Command Challenges for New Zealand Defence Force Personnel", Australian Defence Force Journal, No. 155 (July/August 2002), pp. 39-45.