The members agree to implement export controls based on the Technology Annex, which lists ballistic and cruise missile-related technologies, accepting an "unconditional strong presumption of denial" against exports of highly sensitive technologies and "exercis[ing] restraint" in approving export of others.2 The MTCR has grown from seven original parties in 1987 to 34 with the acceptance of the latest in 2004, and several other countries unilaterally committed to abide by the rules but not formally join the regime. The normative consensus against chemical weapons or anti-personnel landmines- facilitating complete disarmament- is much weaker against missiles.26 Stigmatizing ballistic missiles can reach only so far if security fears and symbolic appeal remain, while every use of cruise missiles makes their spread all the more likely.
By Aaron Karp Stemming the Spread of Missiles: Hits, Misses, and Hard Cases T wenty-five years after it was publicly accepting an “unconditional strong
Pages to are hidden for
"Stemming the Spread of Missiles: Hits, Misses, and Hard Cases"Please download to view full document