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                        Democracy Assistance Wording Work – 6-7-11

  Democracy Assistance Wording Work – 6-7-11 .......................................................................................................1
***Democracy Assistance Definitions - General ........................................................................ 3
  Democracy Assistance – Budgetary Category ...........................................................................................................4
  Democracy Assistance – Foreign Assistance Framwork Budget Allocation .............................................................9
  Democracy Assistance – Four Categories ............................................................................................................... 11
  Democracy Assistance – Four Categories – Rule of Law........................................................................................ 14
  Democracy Assistance – Four Categories – Civil Society....................................................................................... 15
  Democracy Assistance – Four Categories – Elections............................................................................................. 17
  Democracy Assistance – Four Categories – Governance ........................................................................................ 19
  Democracy Assistance – Funds, Expertise, Materials ............................................................................................. 20
  Democracy Assistance – Political System ............................................................................................................... 25
  Democracy Assistance – Includes Electoral Programs, Constitution, Promises, Civic Education Programs .......... 28
  Democracy Assistance – Election Assistance .......................................................................................................... 29
  Democracy Assistance – Includes Institution-Building ........................................................................................... 31
  Democracy Assistance – Focuses on Constitutional Protections ............................................................................. 33
***Democracy Assistance Definitions – Contested Areas ....................................................... 34
  Democracy Assistance – Limited, Direct ................................................................................................................ 35
  Democracy Assistance – Includes Good Governance ............................................................................................. 38
  Democracy Assistance – Excludes Governance Promotion .................................................................................... 41
  Democracy Assistance – Includes Democracy Promotion ...................................................................................... 43
  Democracy Assistance – Excludes Most Democracy Promotion ............................................................................ 44
  Democracy Assistance – Includes Diplomacy ......................................................................................................... 49
  Democracy Assistance – Includes Diplomacy, Devt, Military & Political Support, Withdrawal of Support .......... 51
  Democracy Assistance – Not Diplomacy ................................................................................................................ 52
  Democracy Assistance – Includes Development ..................................................................................................... 58
  Democracy Assistance – Excludes Development Assistance .................................................................................. 62
  Democracy Assistance – Includes Security Apparatus ............................................................................................ 66
  Democracy Assistance – Includes Military ............................................................................................................. 67
  Democracy Assistance – Not Military ..................................................................................................................... 68
  Democracy Assistance – Includes International Law .............................................................................................. 71
  Democracy Assistance – Democracy Assistance Vague ......................................................................................... 72
  Democracy Assistance – AT – Democracy Vague .................................................................................................. 74
***Democracy Assistance Definitions – Implementation ....................................................... 75
  Democracy Assistance – Programs.......................................................................................................................... 76
  Democracy Assistance – Actors/Programs .............................................................................................................. 77
  Democracy Assistance – Actor – USAID Primary .................................................................................................. 79
  Democracy Assistance – Actor – Multiple Actors................................................................................................... 80
  Democracy Assistance – Can Be Multilateral ......................................................................................................... 83
  Democracy Assistance – Recipients ........................................................................................................................ 84
  Democracy Assistance – Not Exclusively Government-to-Government ................................................................. 85
  Democracy Assistance – Not Exclusively In Country ............................................................................................. 87
  Democracy Assistance – Requires Country Consent ............................................................................................... 89
  Democracy Assistance – Does Not Require Country Consent ................................................................................ 90
  Democracy Assistance – Requires Democratic Opening ........................................................................................ 93
  Democracy Assistance – Does Not Require Democratic Opening .......................................................................... 94
  Democracy Assistance – Can Be At Any Stage ...................................................................................................... 95
  Democracy Assistance – Excludes Conditioning .................................................................................................... 96
  Democracy Assistance – Includes Conditioning ................................................................................................... 100
  Democracy Assistance – Can Be Covert ............................................................................................................... 101

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  Democracy Assistance – Not Secret ...................................................................................................................... 102
***Alternative Phrases ............................................................................................................. 103
  Democracy Promotion – Broad ............................................................................................................................. 104
  Democracy Promotion – Unlimits Mechanism ...................................................................................................... 111
  Democracy Promotion – Includes Diplomacy ....................................................................................................... 114
  Democracy Promotion – Includes Military............................................................................................................ 116
  Democracy Promotion – Includes Development Programs ................................................................................... 117
  USAID Democracy & Governance Programs ....................................................................................................... 118
  Democracy and Governance Promotion Programs – Free Press, Rule of Law, Government Services, Civic
  Culture, Elections, Corruption ............................................................................................................................... 120
  Democracy Programs – Governing Justly & Democratically/Four Categories ..................................................... 121
  Democracy Programs – Includes Democratic Capacity-Building for Parties, Governments, NGOs, Citizens ..... 122
***Theory Arguments .............................................................................................................. 123
  Democracy Assistance – Theory – Precision Good ............................................................................................... 124
  Democracy Assistance – Theory – Limits Good ................................................................................................... 126
***Democracy Assistance Definitions – Defenses .................................................................. 128
  Democracy Assistance – AT – Your Authors Assume European Democracy Assistance .................................... 129
***Status of Assistance ............................................................................................................. 130
  Status of Democracy Assistance – Amounts ......................................................................................................... 131
  Status of Democracy Assistance – Rising ............................................................................................................. 133
  Status of Democracy Assistance – Declining ........................................................................................................ 134
  Status of Democracy Assistance – Poorly Coordinated ......................................................................................... 135
  Status of Democracy Assistance – Recipients ....................................................................................................... 137
  Status of Democracy Assistance – Middle East..................................................................................................... 138
  Status of Democracy Assistance – Egypt .............................................................................................................. 141
  Status of Democracy Assistance – Yemen ............................................................................................................ 143
  Status of Democracy Assistance – Jordan ............................................................................................................. 147
  Status of Democracy Assistance – Morocco ......................................................................................................... 150
  Status of Democracy Assistance – Iran ................................................................................................................. 152
***Neg Counterplan Ground................................................................................................... 153
  Counterplan – Agent (General).............................................................................................................................. 154
  Counterplan – International Actor – Europe .......................................................................................................... 155
  Counterplan – NGOs ............................................................................................................................................. 156
  Counterplan – Study .............................................................................................................................................. 157



Contributors: Dave Arnett, Dan Bagwell, Adrienne Brovero, Paul Johnson, Kevin Kuswa,
Tom Pacheco




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            ***Democracy Assistance Definitions - General




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                    Democracy Assistance – Budgetary Category

Democracy assistance is a separate budgetary category in the foreign assistance budget - as
of 2009, $2.5 billion was allocated yearly, most of which was provided through USAID and
other organizations including the Department of State, the Department of Defense and the
National Endowment for Democracy.
Carothers ’09
[Thomas, vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, overseer of the Democracy
and Rule of Law Program, Middle East Program, and Carnegie Europe, and founder and director of the Democracy
and Rule of Law Program, “Revitalizing U.S. Democracy Assistance the challenge of USAID,”
http://www.scribd.com/doc/21802142/Revitalizing-U-S-Democracy-Assistance-The-Challenge-of-USAID]

    Over the past 25 years, the United States has built up a substantial body of democracy assistance and now
    devotes approximately $2.5 billion a year to it (with about half of the assistance directed at Iraq and
    Afghanistan). Tree organizations serve as the main funders of such aid: the United States Agency for
    International Development (USAID), the Department of State, and the private, nonprofit National Endowment
    for Democracy (NED). Beyond USAID and the State Department, several other parts of the government also
    sponsor assistance programs that include efforts to support democratic institutions and practices abroad,
    including the Department of Defense, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), and the Department of
                                                                                         -related assistance emanating
    from many governments, international organizations, and private foundations. Nevertheless, the weight of the
    United States as a geopolitical actor and the substantial amount of U.S. funding committed to this area ensure
    that the United States remains to many people around the world the single most important player in the
    democracy aid domain.


In terms of the recent foreign assistance budget proposals, democracy assistance funding is
allocated under the “Governing Justly and Democratically” portion, which happens to be
the smallest section of the budget at about $3.15 billion requested.
Trister ‘11
[Sarah, Congressional liaison for Freedom House, an NGO dedicated to international research on democracy and
human rights, “Investing in Freedom: Analyzing the FY 2012 International Affairs Budget Request,” May,
http://freedomhouse.org/uploads/special_report/100.pdf]

    Foreign Assistance Request The President’s request for international affairs for FY 2012 is $61.5 billion, of
    which $37.2 billion is for foreign assistance. This represents an 11% increase over FY 2010 actual levels. For
    the first time, the Obama Administration chose to break their FY 2012 request for State and Foreign Operations
    into two parts, one for “core” activities, and one for “extraordinary temporary costs in Iraq, Afghanistan, and
    Pakistan.” 5 For the purposes of clarity and comparison this report includes both the temporary Overseas
    Contingency Operations (OCO) and Core requests in numbers cited for FY 2012 unless otherwise noted. The
    Foreign Assistance funding is broken down into six categories of spending that reflect the objectives of US
    Foreign Assistance: “Peace and Security,” “Governing Justly and Democratically (GJ&D),” “Investing in
    People,” “Economic Growth,” and “Humanitarian Assistance, and “Program Support.” This report focuses on
    the GJ&D portion of the request which encompasses funding for human rights and democracy activities. In the
    FY 2012 request, as in every year since these categorizations have been used, GJ&D funding represents the
    smallest apportionment of Foreign Assistance funding, aside from program support, with only $3.15 billion
    being requested.



GJ&D funding is aimed at increasing governmental accountability, bolstering rule of law
and fair elections and general societal stability- it is broken down further into four specific


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categories: Rule of Law and Human Rights, Good Governance, Political Competition and
Consensus-Building and Civil Society.
Trister ‘11
[Sarah, Congressional liaison for Freedom House, an NGO dedicated to international research on democracy and
human rights, “Investing in Freedom: Analyzing the FY 2012 International Affairs Budget Request,” May,
http://freedomhouse.org/uploads/special_report/100.pdf]

    Funds that fall under the Governing Justly and Democratically category are meant to protect basic rights and
    strengthen effective democracies by helping countries to increase their governments’ accountability, relying on
    rule of law, free and fair electoral processes, vibrant civil society, and independent media. GJ&D funding is
    further broken down into four more specific funding categories: Rule of Law and Human Rights, Good
    Governance, Political Competition and Consensus-Building, and Civil Society. The combined FY 2012 GJ&D
    request, including both OCO and Core funding, is $3.15 billion. This is a decrease of more than 7% from FY
    2010 actual numbers. As in past years, the small percentage of the GJ&D funding allocated to assisting civil
    society remains concerning. Despite many pledges by the United States Government to dedicate more attention
    and funding to helping civil society rather than governments, the overall percentage of GJ&D funding for civil
    society in the FY 2012 request actually falls from 19% of GJ&D in FY 2010 to 16% in FY 2012. The recent
    movements in the Middle East and North Africa underscore the importance of U.S. support for civil society and
    individuals and not relying solely on government-to-government aid. These specific funding categories are
    broken down as follows: Rule of Law and Human Rights funding intended to advance and protect individual
    rights as embodied by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, promote societies in which the state and its
    citizens are accountable to laws that are publically promulgated, equally enforced, independently adjudicated,
    and consistent with international human rights. Good Governance funding intended to promote government
    institutions that are democratic, effective, responsive, sustainable, and accountable to citizens. Activities funded
    under this program support public participation and oversight of governmental institutions, measures that curb
    corruption, and enhance the separation of powers through a functional system of checks and balances. Political
    Competition and Consensus-Building funding is used to encourage the development of transparent and
    inclusive electoral and political processes, as well as democratic, responsive, and effective political parties.
    Civil Society funding supports the means through which citizens can freely organize, advocate, and
    communicate with fellow citizens, members of their own and other governments, international bodies, and other
    elements of civil society.


To get more specific, here’s how USAID assistance is categorized within GJD spending:
Government Accountability Office ’09
[September, “DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE U.S. Agencies Take Steps to Coordinate International Programs but
Lack Information on Some U.S.-funded Activities,” http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PCAAB950.pdf]

    USAID, State DRL, and NED fund democracy assistance programs in countries throughout the world. USAID’s
    and State DRL’s foreign assistance programs are funded under the Foreign Operations appropriation and
    tracked by State as part of GJD funding, while NED’s core budget is funded under the State Operations
    appropriation and is not tracked as part of GJD foreign assistance funding.


Agencies like USAID have lacked extensive data on the specifics of how funds are used. In
recent years, however, the “Good Governance” portion of the budget has received the most
funding.
Government Accountability Office ’09
[September, “DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE U.S. Agencies Take Steps to Coordinate International Programs but
Lack Information on Some U.S.-funded Activities,” http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PCAAB950.pdf]

    Although State/F information systems enable reporting of democracy assistance allocations to operating units
    and by program area, these systems do not include funding information by implementing entity for the years we
    reviewed—fiscal years 2006 through 2008.23 Consequently, State/F data on GJD funding allocations to
    implementing entities—including the portion of allocations to field-based operating units that is programmed by


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    each implementing entity—are not centrally located.24 However, in response to our request for information on
    USAID democracy assistance funding, State/F and USAID compiled data provided by USAID missions on GJD
    funding allocated to USAID for most country-based operating units for fiscal years 2006 through 2008.25
    According to these data, USAID implements the majority of the democracy funding provided in most countries.
    In addition, State/F data show that the largest portion of GJD funding in fiscal year 2008 was allocated for the
    Good Governance program area (see fig. 3). (App. II shows amounts of USAID, State DRL, and NED funding
    distributed to all countries in fiscal years 2006-2008 as well as each country’s Freedom House rating.)


Although funds are mainly allocated under GJ&D, the USFG still funds organizations
within the foreign assistance budget that don’t fall under the category, including the
National Endowment for Democracy.
Trister ‘11
[Sarah, Congressional liaison for Freedom House, an NGO dedicated to international research on democracy and
human rights, “Investing in Freedom: Analyzing the FY 2012 International Affairs Budget Request,” May,
http://freedomhouse.org/uploads/special_report/100.pdf]

    The National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) both receive
    direct funding from the U.S. Government to undertake activities that directly impact international democracy
    and human rights efforts. Because these organizations are semi-autonomous, the funding is not listed in the
    GJ&D section of the Foreign Operations request. Nevertheless, both of these organizations play a valuable role
    in promoting democracy and human rights overseas and the funding levels requested by the administration
    should be maintained.


As far as how funding is spent, FY2008 had a total of $2.25 billion allocated for democracy
assistance. Around 15 percent was reserved for bases of operation within the US (USAID,
Department of State, etc.) with the other 85 percent for operations in the field.
Government Accountability Office ’09
[September, “DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE U.S. Agencies Take Steps to Coordinate International Programs but
Lack Information on Some U.S.-funded Activities,” http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PCAAB950.pdf]

    Data available from State/F show total democracy assistance allocations of about $2.25 billion for fiscal year
    2008. Approximately $306 million, or almost 15 percent of the total allocation, was allocated to operating units
    in Washington, D.C., including USAID and State regional and functional bureaus, and to offices such as State
    DRL; more than $1.95 billion, or about 85 percent of the total allocation, went to field-based operating units,
    primarily country missions.10 The State/F data systems do not include funding information by implementing
    entity for the years we reviewed, and complete data on USAID funding per country were not available;11
    however, USAID mission data that State/F and USAID provided at our request show that in our 10 sample
    countries, most democracy funds are programmed by USAID. The estimated average annual funding for
    democracy assistance projects active in our 10 sample countries as of January 2009 was about $18 million for
    USAID, $3 million for State DRL, and $2 million for NED; annual funding per project averaged more than $2
    million for USAID, $350,000 for State DRL, and $100,000 for NED. In fiscal year 2008, more than half of
    State DRL funding for democracy assistance went to Iraq, followed by China, Cuba, Iran, and North Korea, and
    NED funding for democracy programs was highest for China, Iraq, Russia, Burma, and Pakistan.


One should be careful not to lump democracy assistance in with military assistance- they’re
recognized as two separate categories within the overall budget.
McInerney ’10
[Stephen, Director of Advocacy for the Project on Middle East Democracy, “The Federal Budget and
Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2011,” http://pomed.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2010/04/fy11-budget-
analysis-final.pdf]



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   Support for democracy goes far beyond funding levels or assistance programs. How funds are spent matters
   as much as the amounts being spent. Moreover, diplomatic support and a range of other policy tools must
   complement any funding or programming. The levels of funding found in the annual budget merely reflect
   one component of what necessarily must be a complex, multifaceted task. These levels, however, certainly
   deserve to be examined, not only for their substantive impact, but also for the signals they send both to
   reformers and to the region’s governments. Finally, in a report examining funding levels and budget
   priorities, it must be noted that despite the Obama administration’s stated intention to support
   “broader engagement” with Middle Eastern countries, U.S. assistance to the region remains dominated
   by aid for regional militaries. Leaving aside Iraq, the FY11 budget requests $5.1 billion for military
   assistance to the Middle East but only $1.3 billion for non-military assistance and initiatives, of which
   $225.9 million is designated to support democracy and governance. Moreover, these figures are
   dwarfed by the $159.3 billion requested for Department of Defense expenditures in Iraq and
   Afghanistan. If the U.S. intends to credibly convey support for the region’s people and not merely its
   authoritarian governments, the vast disparity between military and soft power spending in the region
   must be reconsidered.


As the largest US promoter of democracy assistance, USAID allocates funding under
“democracy and governance” programs, which include many within the Department of
State.
National Research Council ’08
[Committee on Evaluation of USAID Democracy Assistance Programs, “Improving Democracy Assistance:
Building Knowledge Through Evaluations and Research,”
http://sitemason.vanderbilt.edu/files/dFNH0I/Improving_Democracy_Assistance__Final_report.pdf]

    Over the past 25 years, the United States has made support for the spread of democracy to other nations an
    increasingly important element of its national security policy. Many other multilateral agencies, countries, and
    nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) also are involved in providing democracy assistance. These efforts
    have created a growing demand to find the most effective means to assist in building and strengthening
    democratic governance under varied conditions. Within the U.S. government the U.S. Agency for International
    Development (USAID) has principal responsibility for providing democracy assistance. Since 1990, USAID has
    supported democracy and governance (DG) programs in approximately 120 countries and territories, spending
    an estimated total of $8.47 billion (in constant 2000 U.S. dollars) between 1990 and 2005. The request for DG
    programs for fiscal year 2008 was $1.45 billion, which includes some small programs in the U.S. Department of
    State.


The practice of fiscal discipline seems flexible in the context of democracy assistance, as the
administration has pledged to make room for more assistance by “reprogramming” funds
to countries of interest. Democracy assistance for FY2012 has shown a substantial increase
from previous years.
Trister ‘11
[Sarah, Congressional liaison for Freedom House, an NGO dedicated to international research on democracy and
human rights, “Investing in Freedom: Analyzing the FY 2012 International Affairs Budget Request,” May,
http://freedomhouse.org/uploads/special_report/100.pdf]

    With democratic transitions in progress in Egypt and Tunisia, ongoing violence and protests in Syria, Bahrain,
    and Yemen, and full-out war in Libya, the Middle East and North Africa has become one of the highest
    priorities in terms of assistance for Congress and the Administration. Since the revolutions, the State
    Department has announced it would immediately make $150 million in aid available for support to Egypt and
    an additional $20 million available in support for Tunisia for FY 2011 by reprogramming funds that have
    already allocated. 10 Additionally, the United States has announced billions more in loans and other economic
    support to Egypt as it attempts to build its economy after 30 years of stagnation. Moving toward democracy in
    Egypt and Tunisia will be a lengthy and complicated process. The United States has an opportunity to make an
    important impact by supporting improvements in electoral processes, robust civil society participation in


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    elections and constitutional debates, institutional reforms, and efforts to address human rights abuses, as well as
    by promoting gender equality and religious freedom, so that members of these societies are able to thrive in a
    free and open environment. In terms of the FY 2012 request for the Near East, Freedom House is pleased to see
    that the request for the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) has received a 68% increase over FY 2010
    amounts. MEPI has been an invaluable instrument for providing democracy and human rights assistance since
    its inception in 2002. Funds provided through MEPI are especially vital now, as they have the flexibility
    required to respond to the constantly changing environment in the region. The ongoing protests and
    crackdowns in the Middle East have drawn attention to the disproportionate amount of assistance that the
    United States is giving to Middle Eastern governments to support military capabilities compared with the
    amounts given for democracy and human rights. In the Middle East region as a whole, democracy and human
    rights funding makes up about 6 percent of United States foreign assistance. In contrast, Foreign Military
    Financing (FMF) makes up more than 71% of foreign assistance.


Democracy assistance has been budgeted under USAID (refers to FY2001)
USAID Website ‘2
http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/cbj2003/cent_prog/dcha/dg.html

   USAID efforts to strengthen democracy and good governance worldwide anchor a balanced foreign policy
   approach. USAID extends democracy assistance worldwide; 80% of USAID field missions
   promote democracy and good governance as one of their development objectives. Of the total
   funding for USAID democracy programs in FY 2001, 20% was attributed to rule of law, 6%
   to elections and political processes, 39% to civil society, and thirty-five percent to governance.




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    Democracy Assistance – Foreign Assistance Framwork Budget
                            Allocation


Democracy assistance programs are part of the Foreign Assistance Framework “Governing
Justly and Democratically” strategic objective
United States Government Accountability Office, Report to Congressional Committees,
September 2009
“DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE: U.S. Agencies Take Steps to Coordinate International Programs but Lack
Information on Some U.S.-funded Activities” http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PCAAB950.pdf p. 8-10

   Under the Foreign Assistance Framework developed by State/F in 2006, the strategic objective GJD has
   four program areas—”Rule of Law and Human Rights,” “Good Governance,” “Political Competition
   and Consensus-Building,” and “Civil Society”—each with a number of program elements and
   subelements. State/F’s information systems, FACTS and FACTS Info, track funding allocated for assistance
   in support of GJD and these four program areas. Table 1 shows the four program areas and associated
   program elements.
   In fiscal years 2006 through 2008, funds allocated for the GJD strategic objective were provided for
   democracy assistance programs in 90 countries around the world. Almost half of all democracy
   funding over this period was spent in Iraq and Afghanistan; the next highest funded countries, Sudan,
   Egypt, Mexico, Colombia, and Russia, accounted for more than 25 percent of the remaining GJD
   funding allocated to individual countries other than Iraq and Afghanistan. Of the 20 countries with the
   largest GJD allocations, 8 have been rated by Freedom House, an independent nongovernmental
   organization, as not free; 8 have been rated aspartlyfree;and4 have been rated as free.16

   [Note – GJD = Governing Justly and Democratically]

   [Posted on Forums, by Stables, 5-30-11,
   http://www.cedadebate.org/forum/index.php?topic=2422.msg4916#msg4916]


Governing Justly and Democratically is the official language to describe democracy
assistance programs. Using it is the best measure of assessing all such funding.
McInerney, Director of Advocacy for the Project on Middle East Democracy, April 2010,
[Stephen, “The Federal Budget and Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2011: Democracy, Governance, And Human
Rights In The Middle East”, p. 9, http://www.boell.org/downloads/fy11-budget-analysis-final.pdf]

   As previously mentioned, the Department of State breaks down the budget for international affairs into
   five broad strategic objectives: Governing Justly and Democratically (GJD); Peace and Security; Investing
   in People; Economic Growth; and Humanitarian Assistance. Several of these areas are interconnected – it
   could certainly be argued that promoting peace, security, and economic development are themselves
   essential components of democratic development. Nonetheless, the GJD objective is the best, though
   imperfect, measure of funding for supporting democracy, governance and human rights. The GJD objective
   is further divided into four program areas:8
   Rule of Law and Human Rights: • Assists constitutional and legal reform, judicial independence and
   reform, the administration of and access to justice, protection of human rights, prevention of crime,
   and community-based efforts to improve security.
   Good Governance: • Strengthens executive, legislative, and local government capabilities and improves
   transparency and accountability for government institutions; also strengthens anticorruption
   programs.
   Political Competition and Consen• sus Building: Promotes free, fair, and transparent multiparty el
   Civil Society:• Strengthens independent media, nongovernmental organizations (particularly advocacy
   functions), think tanks, and labor unions.


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  These four categories are used to classify all funds designated for GJD, whether through bilateral
  assistance or multi-country programs via USAID, the Department of State and MEPI. Because of large
  cuts in assistance to Iraq in conjunction with the drawing down of the U.S. military presence in Iraq,
  the raw totals for GJD funding for the Near East are all significant decreases relative to FY10.
  However, when excluding the Iraq numbers from the region, a different picture emerges – total GJD
  funding for the region is $225.7 million, a 10% increase over the $204.3 million granted in FY10.
  Further, the budget request reflects increases to three of the four GJD program areas: for Rule of Law
  and Human Rights (up 39% from $49.4 million to $68.7 million); Political Competition and Consensus
  Building (up 13% from $23.2 million to $26.2 million); and Civil Society (up 3% from $83.6 million to
  $86.3 million). Only the Good Governance program area sees a modest (8%) decrease in requested funding.
  It should be noted that this is a reverse from last year, when funding for Good Governance programming was
  increased 16%.




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                       Democracy Assistance – Four Categories


Democracy assistance has 4 subsectors – Among the four types of democracy assistance,
Civil Society receives 38%, Governance receives 29%, Rule of Law is 19% and Elections
14%.
Azpuru, Finkel, Perez-Linan, and Seligson, Vandy, Pitt, Pitt, Vandy, ’08
(“What has the United States Been Doing?” Journal of Democracy Volume 19, Number 2, April 2008 pp. 150-159)

   It is often said that Western donors are satisfied simply to see electoral or procedural democracies set up in
   countries that previously had authoritarian governments. But does this mean that democracy assistance is
   geared only toward holding "free and fair" elections? Some years ago, Peter Burnell noted that
   international attention was shifting away from the promotion of elections to other kinds of assistance,
   such as civil society development. 8 To assess whether elections in fact have been the main goal of U.S.
   democracy assistance, we have examined the distribution of aid among the four subsectors of
   democracy assistance identified by USAID: Elections and Political Processes, Rule of Law, Civil
   Society, and Governance. 9 As Table 4 shows, in the post–Cold War era the Civil Society subsector, not
   Elections, has received the bulk of USAID's democracy assistance (38 percent of the total), followed by
   Governance, which garners between a quarter and a third of the total aid (29 percent). By contrast,
   investment in the Rule of Law has amounted to a mere 19 percent of the total, and only 14 percent has gone
   to support electoral processes. While Civil Society was long the steady leader, the Governance subsector has
   expanded markedly over the years, surpassing even Civil Society after 2003.10 This area of growth is a
   reflection of the rising concern over corruption and how to control it, as well as the increasing attention to
   decentralization and local government.

   8. Peter J. Burnell, Democracy Assistance: International Co-operation for Democratization (London: Frank
   Cass, 2000). 9. The area of Elections and Political Processes includes activities corresponding to various
   aspects of electoral assistance, support for the development of a political-party system, and legislative
   representation; Rule of Law includes human rights programs and funding for legal and judicial development;
   Civil Society includes programs promoting independent mass media, civic education, and labor; and
   Governance (a very broad category) covers anticorruption projects, decentralization, and local-government
   activities, among others. 10. See Table D (Distribution of U.S. Democracy Assistance by Sector, 1990–2005)
   at www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/gratis/AzpuruGraphics-19-2.pdf.


Democracy assistance has four main parts: rule of law, civil society, elections and political
processes, and governance sub-sectors
McMahon, Dean’s Prof. Applied Politics @ Binghamton, ’02
(Edward R., Director, Center on Democratic Performance, “The Impact of U.S. Democracy and Governance
Assistance in Africa: Benin Case Study.” acsd 5/23/11, Aug 29-Sept 1,
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PCAAB068.pdf)

    The paper examines USAID efforts to promote democracy in Benin in the rule of law, civil society, elections
    and political processes, and governance sub-sectors of democracy assistance. The challenge of extrapolating
    conclusions too broadly from one case study is clear. This paper does conclude, however, that a qualitative
    analysis of the effectiveness of U.S. democracy/governance assistance to Benin is consonant with other
    assessments which determine that such assistance can be helpful in supporting indigenous moves towards
    democratic development and consolidation.


Democratic assistance is primarily under the auspices of US AID and occurs within four
categories: rule of law, civil society, the elections process, and governance.
McMahon, Dean’s Prof. Applied Politics @ Binghamton, ’02

                         Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
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(Edward R., Director, Center on Democratic Performance, “The Impact of U.S. Democracy and Governance
Assistance in Africa: Benin Case Study.” acsd 5/23/11, Aug 29-Sept 1,
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PCAAB068.pdf)

    U.S. Democracy Assistance
    Donor agencies may differ somewhat in their definition of democracy assistance, and some may direct their
    resources towards one or two sub-categories. The model developed by USAID covers many of the themes
    addressed by donors. It is divided into four main subcategories. These areas of focus include rule of law, civil
    society, elections and political processes, and governance.


Democracy assistance includes aid for the promotion of the rule of law, civil society,
elections, and good governance.
McMahon-Director, Center on Democratic Performance Department of Political Science
Binghamton University-2
The Impact of U.S. Democracy and Governance Assistance in Africa: Benin Case Study
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PCAAB068.pdf

   U.S. Democracy Assistance Donor agencies may differ somewhat in their definition of
   democracy assistance, and some may direct their resources towards one or two sub-
   categories. The model developed by USAID covers many of the themes addressed by donors.
   It is divided into four main sub- categories. These areas of focus include rule of law, civil
   society, elections and political processes, and governance. The rule of law area
   addresses both constitutional and actual guarantees of basic human rights and basic
   principles of equal treatment of all people before the law. In many states with weak or nascent
   democratic traditions, existing laws are not equitable or equitably applied, judicial independence is
   compromised, individual and minority rights are not truly guaranteed, and institutions have not yet developed
   the capacity to administer existing laws. Three inter- connected key sub-areas include supporting
   legal reform, improving the administration of justice, and increasing citizens’ access to
   justice. Since this paper is focused on assessing the impact of assistance programming, it is useful to
   highlight how USAID itself has defined how progress can be identified. In USAID’s Handbook of
   Democracy and Governance Program Indicators, rule of law activities are deemed to have been successful if
   they have resulted in strengthened rule of law and respect for human rights. This general notion is
   disaggregated into the following sub-categories: foundations for protection of human rights and gender
   equity conform to international standards; laws, regulations, and policies promote a market-based economy;
   equal access to justice; and effective and fair legal sector institutions.11 Civil society has been defined
   as the “associational realm between state and family populated by organizations which are
   separate from the state, enjoy autonomy in relation to the state, and are formed voluntarily
   by members of society to protect or extend their interests or values.”12 A wide variety of
   groups, including women’s rights organizations, business and labor federations, media
   groups, coalitions of professional associations, civic education groups, bar associations,
   environmental activist groups, and human rights monitoring organizations receive assistance
   from USAID in this domain. The role of civil society in promoting greater political pluralism has been
   largely championed in democracy-related literature as a central element in the recent, “Third Wave”
   expansion of democracy around the world, although there have been an increasing number of critiques of
   civil society’s impact, questioning, for example, the extent of partisanship, commitment, funding, and quality
   of organizations that make up civil society.13 In evaluating the impact of civil society programming, USAID
   looks at the “increased development of a politically active civil society.” This includes a legal framework to
   protect and promote civil society, increased citizen participation in the policy process and oversight of public
   institutions, increased institutional and financial viability of civil society organizations, an enhanced free
   flow of information, and a strengthened democratic politic culture.14 There are a whole series of
   challenges that complicate the ability of nascent democracies to implement legitimate
   electoral processes. These can include inefficient or poorly organized election administration,
   insufficient education on the part of citizens about different stages of the political process,

                         Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
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  including elections; and a lack of effectively structured political parties. USAID programs to
  address these problems have included election planning and implementation, political party
  development, voter education, and support for domestic and international monitoring
  groups. USAID’s criteria for program effectiveness in this sub-sector are centered on the theme of “more
  genuine and competitive political processes.” More specific issues include the development of impartial
  electoral frameworks, credible election administrations, an informed and active citizenry, effective oversight
  of the electoral process, a representative and competitive multiparty system, inclusion of women and other
  disadvantaged groups, and effective transfer of political power.15 The concept of governance applies to
  a basket of issues dealing with the functioning of democratic institutions. These include anti-
  corruption activities, decentralization, civil-military relations, and legislative and local
  government functioning. USAID’s programming in this sub- sector is designed to encourage and assist
  nascent democratic governments to integrate key principles such as transparency, accountability, and
  participation as they develop, and to improve their institutions and processes. USAID defines progress in
  governance activities as resulting in “more transparent and accountable government institutions.” This is
  achieved by increased government responsiveness to citizens at the local level, heightened access by citizens
  to improved government information, strengthening of government ethical practices, improved civil-military
  relations supportive of democracy, more effective, independent, and representative legislatures, and more
  effective policy processes in the executive branch.16 Obviously, it is not realistic to expect that in a country
  study all of these categories would be shown to reflect across-the-board improvements as a result of U.S.
  assistance.




                        Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
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          Democracy Assistance – Four Categories – Rule of Law


Within the Rule of Law, the focus is human rights in three key areas: legal reform,
administering justice, and increasing citizen’s access to justice.
McMahon, Dean’s Prof. Applied Politics @ Binghamton, ’02
(Edward R., Director, Center on Democratic Performance, “The Impact of U.S. Democracy and Governance
Assistance in Africa: Benin Case Study.” acsd 5/23/11, Aug 29-Sept 1,
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PCAAB068.pdf)

    The rule of law area addresses both constitutional and actual guarantees of basic human rights and basic
    principles of equal treatment of all people before the law. In many states with weak or nascent democratic
    traditions, existing laws are not equitable or equitably applied, judicial independence is compromised,
    individual and minority rights are not truly guaranteed, and institutions have not yet developed the capacity to
    administer existing laws. Three interconnected key sub-areas include supporting legal reform, improving the
    administration of justice, and increasing citizens’ access to justice. Since this paper is focused on assessing the
    impact of assistance programming, it is useful to highlight how USAID itself has defined how progress can be
    identified. In USAID’s Handbook of Democracy and Governance Program Indicators, rule of law activities are
    deemed to have been successful if they have resulted in strengthened rule of law and respect for human rights.
    This general notion is disaggregated into the following sub-categories: foundations for protection of human
    rights and gender equity conform to international standards; laws, regulations, and policies promote a market-
    based economy; equal access to justice; and effective and fair legal sector institutions.11…10 See Edward R.
    McMahon, “Assessing USAID's Assistance for Democratic Development: Is it Quantity Versus Quality?”
    Evaluation: The International Journal of Theory, Research, and Practice 7, no. 4 (Winter 2001). 11 U.S. Agency
    for International Development, Handbook of Democracy and Governance Program Indicators (Washington,
    DC: Management Systems International, 1998), 17.




                         Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
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          Democracy Assistance – Four Categories – Civil Society


The Civil Society component of democracy assistance is crucial, yet highly contested.
McMahon, Dean’s Prof. Applied Politics @ Binghamton, ’02
 (Edward R., Director, Center on Democratic Performance, “The Impact of U.S. Democracy and Governance
Assistance in Africa: Benin Case Study.” acsd 5/23/11, Aug 29-Sept 1,
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PCAAB068.pdf)

    Civil society has been defined as the “associational realm between state and family populated by organizations
    which are separate from the state, enjoy autonomy in relation to the state, and are formed voluntarily by
    members of society to protect or extend their interests or values.”12 A wide variety of groups, including
    women’s rights organizations, business and labor federations, media groups, coalitions of professional
    associations, civic education groups, bar associations, environmental activist groups, and human rights
    monitoring organizations receive assistance from USAID in this domain. The role of civil society in promoting
    greater political pluralism has been largely championed in democracy-related literature as a central element in
    the recent, “Third Wave” expansion of democracy around the world, although there have been an increasing
    number of critiques of civil society’s impact, questioning, for example, the extent of partisanship, commitment,
    funding, and quality of organizations that make up civil society.13, 12 Gordon White, “Civil Society,
    Democratization and Development (I): Clearing the Analytic Ground,” Democratization 1, no.3 (Autumn
    1994): 379. 13 See Michael Clough, “Reflections on Civil Society” and David Rieff, “The False Dawn of Civil
    Society,” The Nation 268, no. 7 (February 1999). In evaluating the impact of civil society programming,
    USAID looks at the “increased development of a politically active civil society.” This includes a legal
    framework to protect and promote civil society, increased citizen participation in the policy process and
    oversight of public institutions, increased institutional and financial viability of civil society organizations, an
    enhanced free flow of information, and a strengthened democratic politic culture.14


Civil society includes media, trade unions, business associations, women, inter-religious
dialogue, and human rights – even Arab Sesame Street
Huber, Hebrew University of Jerusalem Department of International Relations, 8
[Daniela, Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 13, No. 1, 43–62, March 2008, “Democracy Assistance in the Middle East
and North Africa: A Comparison of US and EU Policies”, p. 50,
http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/69109__790479070.pdf, accessed 6-3-11]

   Civil society programmes include strengthening of independent media, trade unions, business
   associations, as well as of women, inter-religious dialogue and human rights. Also supported were
   grassroots programmes. Sample programmes were support for Egyptian media for the ‘promotion of
   local, decentralized media, business development of private media, advertising markets and support of
   media legal reforms’ (USAID, 2006a: 1–2). MEPI strengthened Egyptian women’s NGO networks to
   increase their influence on regional government policies; a women’s leadership network with women
   from business and civil society was established and trained in leadership. In 2002/03 USAID funded an
   Arabic version of Sesame Street to promote inter-religious tolerance (US Department of State, 2003: 136). In
   Iraq, strengthening civil society concentrated on human rights, anti-corruption, women, minority rights,
   professionalization and independent media. A NGO resource centre for training and technical assistance was
   established. A further focus was to involve citizens in their local communities (USAID, 2006b: 1–2).


Civil society can include promoting civil society via local grassroots organizations
The National Committee on American Foreign, Saltzman Institute of War and Peace at
Columbia, The Atlantic Council-‘8
ENHANCING DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE
http://www.acus.org/files/publication_pdfs/65/Enhancing%20Democracy%20Assistance.pdf


                          Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
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   Strengthen Civil Society Democratizing countries often lack the necessary social capital for establishing trust
   and cooperation, nurturing civil society, and building democracy. Elite NGOs are largely, if not entirely,
   dependent upon foreign financial support. They can contribute meaningfully to a country’s political growth,
   but their presence and activities should not be mistaken for a strong, sustainable civil society. Civil society
   work supporting elite NGOs should be buttressed by a civil society development approach
   that is considerably more grass-roots in nature. These include, for example, local soccer
   clubs, dance and music associations, parent and student societies, as well as other communal
   organizations that tend to the everyday life and activities of citizens. Such associational
   groups need relatively little financial support and minimal guidance. In recent years, NGOs
   supported by the United States have been perceived with suspicion. They are harassed and, in
   some countries, new laws have been adopted restricting their ability to receive and use
   foreign assistance. Accordingly, to effectively promote the development of civil society, US
   officials must tone down rhetoric that links NGOs with regime change.


Civil society includes supporting watchdog groups and grassroots organizations
The National Committee on American Foreign, Saltzman Institute of War and Peace at
Columbia, The Atlantic Council-‘8
ENHANCING DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE
http://www.acus.org/files/publication_pdfs/65/Enhancing%20Democracy%20Assistance.pdf

   Recommendations for free-wheeling kleptocracies focus on strengthening civil society through support for
   watchdog groups and grassroots organizations that stimulate local associational life, rather than elite NGOs.
   This report also stresses long-term work with political parties, so that when an election leads to a shift in
   power it will result in durable democratic reform.




                         Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
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             Democracy Assistance – Four Categories – Elections


The Elections element of democracy assistance includes the entire process of elections.
McMahon, Dean’s Prof. Applied Politics @ Binghamton, ’02
(Edward R., Director, Center on Democratic Performance, “The Impact of U.S. Democracy and Governance
Assistance in Africa: Benin Case Study.” acsd 5/23/11, Aug 29-Sept 1,
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PCAAB068.pdf)

    There are a whole series of challenges that complicate the ability of nascent democracies to implement
    legitimate electoral processes. These can include inefficient or poorly organized election administration,
    insufficient education on the part of citizens about different stages of the political process, including elections;
    and a lack of effectively structured political parties. USAID programs to address these problems have included
    election planning and implementation, political party development, voter education, and support for domestic
    and international monitoring groups. USAID’s criteria for program effectiveness in this sub-sector are centered
    on the theme of “more genuine and competitive political processes.” More specific issues include the
    development of impartial electoral frameworks, credible election administrations, an informed and active
    citizenry, effective oversight of the electoral process, a representative and competitive multiparty system,
    inclusion of women and other disadvantaged groups, and effective transfer of political power.15


Election assistance includes voter registries
The National Committee on American Foreign, Saltzman Institute of War and Peace at
Columbia, The Atlantic Council-‘8
ENHANCING DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE
http://www.acus.org/files/publication_pdfs/65/Enhancing%20Democracy%20Assistance.pdf

   For post-conflict states, it is important to balance the need for elections as visible evidence of democracy’s
   progress with concerns that elections may empower anti-democratic leaders. Voter registries should
   accurately reflect pre-war populations, and a transitional justice system should be instituted to promote
   reconciliation and help address the legacy of violence as the political transition unfolds. Improving security
   and cultivating social and economic development will also help break the cycle of violence that undermines
   democracy assistance efforts.


Election support includes party development, resources for campaigns, polling, and
elections
Huber, Hebrew University of Jerusalem Department of International Relations, 8
[Daniela, Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 13, No. 1, 43–62, March 2008, “Democracy Assistance in the Middle East
and North Africa: A Comparison of US and EU Policies”, p. 50,
http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/69109__790479070.pdf, accessed 6-3-11]

   Party development is part of the election support of USAID DG, but there are also special
   programmes, conducted by the HRDF’s main contractor – the National Endowment for Democracy
   (NED). The NED, for example, worked with the two party institutes, the International Republican
   Institute (IRI) and the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), which received
   approximately US$11 million in 2004 for party development in Iraq. They set up resource centres with
   computers and basic material and offered campaign and poll-watcher training for parties (NED, 2006).
   MEPI trained young Egyptian party members to employ democratic practices inside the parties and to
   participate in domestic election monitoring (US Department of State, 2006b,c).


Democracy assistance includes assisting development of political parties


                          Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
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The National Committee on American Foreign, Saltzman Institute of War and Peace at
Columbia, The Atlantic Council-‘8
ENHANCING DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE
http://www.acus.org/files/publication_pdfs/65/Enhancing%20Democracy%20Assistance.pdf

   Rethink Political Party Work
   For over a decade, campaign training and short-term election work has been the centerpiece
   of US efforts to strengthen political parties and the electoral process. While there is still some
   value in such assistance, helping parties become more competitive in election campaigns is
   only part of what needs to be done to foster multi-party democracies. Advisory and
   consultative work is critical to political party development. Such activities need to be fully
   understood by donors who are usually reluctant to become involved with politics . In many countries
   today, parties are able to engage in sophisticated campaign techniques and have the resources
   to hire Western political consultants. However, this does not mean that there is no role for
   democracy assistance organizations. The political party institutes and democracy assistance
   organizations can support political parties by helping them develop internal democracy,
   build coalitions for elections, and strengthen relations between party leaders and members.
   Parties should also be encouraged to think beyond politics and focus on governance and
   service delivery.




                        Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
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          Democracy Assistance – Four Categories – Governance


The Governance component of democracy assistance covers the overall functioning of
democratic institutions
McMahon, Dean’s Prof. Applied Politics @ Binghamton, ’02
(Edward R., Director, Center on Democratic Performance, “The Impact of U.S. Democracy and Governance
Assistance in Africa: Benin Case Study.” acsd 5/23/11, Aug 29-Sept 1,
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PCAAB068.pdf)

    The concept of governance applies to a basket of issues dealing with the functioning of democratic institutions.
    These include anti-corruption activities, decentralization, civil-military relations, and legislative and local
    government functioning. USAID’s programming in this subsector is designed to encourage and assist nascent
    democratic governments to integrate key principles such as transparency, accountability, and participation as
    they develop, and to improve their institutions and processes. USAID defines progress in governance activities
    as resulting in “more transparent and accountable government institutions.” This is achieved by increased
    government responsiveness to citizens at the local level, heightened access by citizens to improved government
    information, strengthening of government ethical practices, improved civil-military relations supportive of
    democracy, more effective, independent, and representative legislatures, and more effective policy processes in
    the executive branch.16 Obviously, it is not realistic to expect that in a country study all of these categories
    would be shown to reflect across-the-board improvements as a result of U.S. assistance.




                         Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
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             Democracy Assistance – Funds, Expertise, Materials


Democracy assistance includes the transfer of funds, expertise and materials to groups and
institutions working toward democracy
Lappin, University of Leuven (Belgium) Centre for Peace Research and Strategic Studies
PhD candidate, 10
[Richard, participant in democracy assistance missions with the UN, EU, OSCE, and Carter Center, University of
Belgrade political sciences visiting scholar, Central European Journal of International & Security Studies, Volume 4
Issue 1, “What we talk about when we talk about democracy assistance: the problem of definition in post-conflict
approaches to democratization” http://www.cejiss.org/issue/2010-volume-4-issue-1/lappin, p.187-8, accessed 5-16-
11, TP]

   Democracy assistance can be most accurately defined as the non-profit transfer of funds, expertise,
   and material to foster democratic groups, initiatives and institutions that are already working towards
   a more democratic society (De Zeeuw and Kumar 2006: 20). These transfers are usually funded through
   governmental development agencies, such as the United States Agency for International Development
   (USAID) the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), or the UK’s Department for
   International Development (DfID). The programmes themselves are undertaken by a diverse group of
   inter-governmental organisations (IGOs), non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and, to a lesser
   extent, through bilateral agreements. Chief amongst the IGOs are the Organisation for Cooperation and
   Security in Europe (OSCE), the European Union (EU), and the Organisation of American States (OAS). The
   most prominent NGOs include the Carter Center, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES)
   and the Centre for Electoral Promotion and Advice (CAPEL). In addition, within a given country, there
   will also be a range of local counterparts who receive democracy funding including electoral
   commissions, state institutions, civil society groups, media groups and political parties.


Democracy assistance is provision of technical & financial support through projects and
programs
Peter Burnell, Department of International Studies, University of Warwick, 2008, ―From
Evaluating Democracy Assistance to Appraising Democracy Promotion‖ Political Studies,
(Vol 56, 414–434), p. 420-1

   Democracy assistance, which consists of the concessionary and, usually, consensual provision of
   practical, advisory, technical and financial support through projects and programmes, is not the only
   game in town.
   The instruments, tools or approaches that are associated with efforts to promote democracy abroad
   are wide-ranging and can be described or categorised in a number of ways. Thus we could make use of
   Joseph Nye‘s (2005) distinction between ‘soft’ and ‘hard power’, the former being the ability to get what you
   want through attraction, and the latter employing coercion or payments. Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way
   (2005) offer an alternative typology: ‘leverage’ and ‘linkage’. Leverage plays on governments’ vulnerability
   to external pressure; linkage operates via general ‘ties to the West’. A more flexible way of capturing the
   diversity rests on the idea of a continuum expressing different gradations of power, where power is
   understood as an umbrella concept that contains non-coercive ways of exercising influence at one end
   and physical coercion at the other. In the context of democracy promotion the middle ground is
   occupied by a cluster of more or less coercive relations such as diplomatic pressure, the attachment of
   political conditionalities to offers of commercial, financial or other concessions, and sanctions or threat
   of sanctions in the event of non-compliance. ‘Diplomatic pressure’ is an often-used term that while
   something of a black box to onlookers refers to more than just ‘political dialogue’ and ‘quiet
   diplomacy’. Conditionalities can be either negative, which means a threat of penalties in the event of
   failing to comply, or positive, in which case they resemble incentives. How far the actual conditionalities
   resemble coercion in practice depends in part on the baseline expectations, including any sense of


                         Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
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   entitlements that might normally have been in place, and how constrained are the choices facing the party on
   the receiving end. A positive conditionality can be compelling if the party is desperate and no alternatives are
   available. Diane Ethier’s (2003, p. 100) notion of pseudo-conditionality adds a further twist, describing
   situations where the targeted party believes the threat of penalties is not credible, perhaps because the
   rewards for compliance are delivered early and cannot be reversed.

[Arab Spring Controversy Paper, p. 16-17]]


Democracy assistances amounts vary from country-to-country – but commonality is that it
is mostly technical assistance
Azpuru, Finkel, Perez-Linan, and Seligson, Vandy, Pitt, Pitt, Vandy, ’08
(“What has the United States Been Doing?” Journal of Democracy Volume 19, Number 2, April 2008 pp. 150-159)

    It is also instructive to examine the relative share of USAID's total DG disbursements in the different regions of
    the world vis-à-vis other types of assistance.6 In some localities, DG assistance has become one of the largest
    elements in the U.S. foreign-aid portfolio. This is true, for example, in the former Soviet-satellite countries of
    Central and Eastern Europe, where DG aid formed less than 10 percent of USAID's regional spending up to
    1995. From 1995 on, DG assistance to the countries of this region began to increase until in 2004 it accounted
    for nearly half the funds allocated there. USAID democracy programs in Eurasian states such as Ukraine began
    in 1992, and until 1996 they represented only about a tenth of all the USAID money flowing into the region.
    After 2001, however, DG funding steadily increased from 20 percent of USAID's total funding to Eurasia that
    year to 36 percent in 2005. Across the rest of the globe, DG assistance has not bulked quite so large vis-à-
    vis other types of U.S. aid. In 2005, for instance, USAID spent about 20 percent of its total Latin
    American budget, 12 percent of its Middle Eastern budget, 8 percent of its African budget, and just 5
    percent of its Asian budget on aid to promote democracy and improve governance. We have examined
    democracy funding in comparison to other types of assistance across the various global regions. But how
    do regional totals for democracy funding compare to one another? The regional allocation of democracy
    assistance helps to paint a picture of USAID's priorities during the period under study. Between 1990 and
    2005, Latin America and the Caribbean received the largest aggregate share (20 percent) of USAID
    democracy funds, followed by the Middle East, Africa, Eurasia, and Europe, with about 16 percent in
    each case (see Table 2). Comparatively, Asia received the smallest share of the DG aid provided by USAID
    during that period, getting only 12 percent of the total. Overall, though, there appears to be surprisingly little
    regional variation in the distribution of democracy assistance. Yet when we examine the last column in Table 3,
    we see that on a per-country basis, the differences are sharp. Excluding the Pacific-island region of Oceania,
    African countries received the lowest allocation per country, while the former Soviet Bloc received the highest.
    Some of these differences are in part a response to the variation in per-capita GNP, but much of the DG
    funding is spent in ways that vary little from one region of the world to another—contracts for
    international technical assistance, for example—and thus the variation reflects real differences in the
    amount of DG "effort" per country. There are, moreover, sharper distinctions in the regional distributions
    over time, as Table 3 on p. 156 shows. 6. See Table A (USAID Democracy Assistance as a Percentage of the
    Total Aid Received by Regions, 1990–2005). This and other supplementary graphics are available at
    www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/gratis/AzpuruGraphics-19-2.pdf.


Democracy assistance is provision of support (either financial, cultural, or material) to
“democratic agents”
Acuto, Australian National University Asia-Pacific College of Diplomacy School of Social
Sciences and Department of International Relations, 8
[Michele, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political October, 2008 33: 461,
“Wilson Victorious? Understanding Democracy Promotion in the Midst of a Backlash”, Academic Search
Complete, accessed 6-3-11]

   Democracy, of course, is a notoriously contested concept, and promoters of democracy usually give only
   the vaguest account of what it is they are promoting.21 The concept of democracy promotion presents
   similar difficulties. Five core terms may be distinguished:

                         Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
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    • Democracy promotion is an umbrella term that covers various activities aimed at fostering,
   improving, and sustaining good governance at several political levels. It comprises assistance,
   consolidation, dissemination, and advocacy.22
    • Democracy assistance is the provision of support (either financial, cultural, or material) to
   “democratic agents” in the process of democratization, without entailing direct intervention. It seeks to
   foster the conditions for the rise of a democratic regime, such as NGOs’ patronage or diplomatic pressure,
   and is thus, as Thomas Carothers put it, “a quiet support for democracy.”23
    • Democracy consolidation is another type of support, more direct and explicit, toward newly formed
   governments, weak institutions, or systems in decay, with the goal of enforcing the procedural side of
   the targeted polities, and is aimed at “avoiding democratic breakdown and avoiding democratic
   erosion” while strengthening preexisting structures.24
    • Democracy dissemination comprises all those activities that seek to advance democratic governance
   structures by intervening directly in the internal affairs of nondemocratic polities, reshaping
   authoritarian, fragile, or collapsed states through explicit pressures, or enforcing instruments of
   international law with democratization goals.
   • Democracy advocacy is, contrary to the two prior types, a noninterventionist form of promotion,
   usually involving of mass-media-related activities and nongovernmental organizations like think tanks.


Democracy assistance programs provide technical and material assistance to governments
and NGOs to consolidate democracy
Gershman, NED president & Allen, Democracy Digest editor and special assistant to the
NED vice-president for government and external relations, 6
[Carl & Michael, Journal of Democracy, Volume 17, Number 2, April 2006, “Assault on Democracy Assistance”, p.
36, Project Muse, accessed 5-17-11]

   Since the fall of communism in Central Europe in 1989 and the cresting of the “third wave” of
   democratization in the early 1990s, there has been a steady trend toward the acceptance of democracy
   promotion as a norm of practice within the international system.1 Underlying this trend has been the
   incorporation of “a right to democracy” into international law, a growing consensus that democracy is the
   only system which confers legitimacy upon a government, and a widespread agreement that democracy
   promotes human rights, development, and peace.
   The practical manifestation of this trend has been a proliferation of democracy-assistance programs
   funded by governments, multilateral bodies such as the United Nations and the European Union,
   international financial institutions, and independent foundations. Such programs, which have gained
   broad international support, provide technical and material assistance to governments that are trying
   to consolidate democracy, as well as to nongovernmental groups that seek to monitor public
   institutions and processes, promote human rights and access to information, and encourage
   democratic participation.




                        Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
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Democracy Assistance – Facilitates Democracy


Democracy assistance is financing programs that are aimed at facilitating democracy.
Toornstra, European Parliament Office for Promotion of Parliamentary Democracy
Director, 10
[Dick, “Getting Acquainted: Setting the Stage for Democracy Assistance”
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdf/oppd/Page_8/getting_acquainted_web.pdf, p.6, accessed 5-17-11, TP]

   One phenomenon that has accompanied all democratisation processes of the last decades is democracy
   promotion, that is to say, explicit efforts by foreign actors to facilitate domestic political reform processes.
   States, international bodies, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and numerous other actors
   have developed an increasing number of different instruments with which they attempt to foster
   democratic institutions and processes in authoritarian and democratising states. One democracy
   promotion tool that has gained particular attention is democracy assistance, in other words financing
   projects and programmes aimed at facilitating democratisation in third countries. The European
   Union (EU) has been increasingly active in this area with assistance programmes in numerous non-
   democratic or democratising states.


Democracy assistance facilitates political change
Lappin, University of Leuven (Belgium) Centre for Peace Research and Strategic Studies
PhD candidate, 10
[Richard, participant in democracy assistance missions with the UN, EU, OSCE, and Carter Center, University of
Belgrade political sciences visiting scholar, Central European Journal of International & Security Studies, Volume 4
Issue 1, “What we talk about when we talk about democracy assistance: the problem of definition in post-conflict
approaches to democratization” http://www.cejiss.org/issue/2010-volume-4-issue-1/lappin,
p.191-2, accessed 5-16-11, TP]

   Democracy assistance, therefore, is rarely the overriding reason, but it can help a country move more
   quickly in a direction that it is already going. As Carothers (2004: 60) reminds us, democracy assistance
   ‘is at most a facilitator of locally rooted forces for political change, not the creator of them ’ These
   sentiments are particularly salient to collapsed post-conflict states which offer few favourable internal
   pre-conditions for democratization. Additionally, within a post-conflict context, democracy assistance
   may have to play a subordinate role to the aims of the broader peace process (Lyons 2002: 221). As
   Krishna Kumar and Jeroen de Zeeuw (2006: 14) stress, ‘the promotion of democracy is not necessarily the
   only goal, and there are circumstances under which the international community has to make compromises
   in pursuit of competing objectives, such as avoiding a resumption of war.’ Indeed, it is worth stressing that
   although democracy assistance may have assumed a more central and influential role in the foreign
   policy of western states, it has not become the central organising principle (Carothers 1999: 37; Smith
   2007: 132). Sometimes, democracy assistance may be complementary to a wider foreign policy, but at times
   it will also come into competition with other, stronger economic and security interests. For example, in the
   US, democracy assistance funding remains a fraction of other areas of public spending such as defence,4
   whilst the country maintains strong relations with several undemocratic, but strategically important, regimes
   such as Saudi Arabia, China and Egypt.


Democracy assistance is the transparent transfer of money to reform institutions in order
to consolidate democracy.
Toornstra, European Parliament Office for Promotion of Parliamentary Democracy
Director, 10
[Dick, “Getting Acquainted: Setting the Stage for Democracy Assistance”
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdf/oppd/Page_8/getting_acquainted_web.pdf, p.7-8, accessed 5-17-11, TP]




                         Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
Document1                                                                                        Page 24 of 157


  Democracy assistance – one of the tools of democracy promotion – can be defined as: all programmes
  and projects which are openly adopted, supported and/or (directly or indirectly) implemented by
  (public or private) foreign actors, (mainly) take place in target countries, in principle with the consent
  or toleration of these countries’ authorities, and are explicitly designed to directly contribute to the
  liberalisation, democratisation or consolidation of democracy of the target country. 14 Thus, key
  characteristics of democracy assistance are that it works through programmes or projects which focus
  on changing behaviours and attitudes, or reforming institutions and processes in target states.
  Foreign actors can to different degrees be involved in the planning and implementation of activities, but
  usually bear most of the financial costs. In order to work, and intensively engage with local actors and
  institutions, democracy assistance is in principle implemented within the target state rather than
  abroad. The nature of some assistance projects, such as study visits, may exceptionally involve
  assistance implemented externally. Democracy assistance programmes and projects are implemented
  openly rather than secretly. However, individual aid recipients can at times, for their own protection,
  remain unidentified. Secret money transfers may help democratisation processes, but are different in
  nature to assistance. Democracy assistance requires, in theory, the consent of or at least toleration by
  the target state’s authorities, otherwise it cannot be transparent, nor can it be implemented or reach its
  potential. Finally, by definition, democracy assistance exists to facilitate democratisation and excludes
  activities which might only indirectly affect democratisation, in particular socio-economic assistance.




                       Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
Document1                                                                                              Page 25 of 157



                       Democracy Assistance – Political System


Democracy assistance includes strengthening civil society, political party training, and
election support
Mitchell, Columbia University School of International and Political Affairs International
Politics professor, and Phillips, National Committee on American Foreign Policy Project
Director, 8
 [Lincoln A. and David L., Columbia University Center for the Study of Human Rights visiting scholar, Jan 08,
“Enhancing Democracy Assistance” ,
http://www.acus.org/files/publication_pdfs/65/Enhancing%20Democracy%20Assistance.pdf, p.9-11, accessed 5-21-
11, TP]

   A toolbox of approaches and methods has come to define democracy assistance since the Cold War.
   However successful, these efforts have tended to be applied in a mechanistic and boilerplate fashion. It is
   necessary to hone the most frequently used democracy assistance techniques.
   Strengthen Civil Society
   Democratizing countries often lack the necessary social capital for establishing trust and cooperation,
   nurturing civil society, and building democracy. Elite NGOs are largely, if not entirely, dependent upon
   foreign financial support. They can contribute meaningfully to a country’s political growth, but their
   presence and activities should not be mistaken for a strong, sustainable civil society. Civil society work
   supporting elite NGOs should be buttressed by a civil society development approach that is considerably
   more grass-roots in nature. These include, for example, local soccer clubs, dance and music associations,
   parent and student societies, as well as other communal organizations that tend to the everyday life and
   activities of citizens. Such associational groups need relatively little financial support and minimal guidance.
   In recent years, NGOs supported by the United States have been perceived with suspicion. They are harassed
   and, in some countries, new laws have been adopted restricting their ability to receive and use foreign
   assistance. Accordingly, to effectively promote the development of civil society, US officials must tone down
   rhetoric that links NGOs with regime change.
   Rethink Political Party Work
   For over a decade, campaign training and short-term election work has been the centerpiece of US efforts to
   strengthen political parties and the electoral process. While there is still some value in such assistance,
   helping parties become more competitive in election campaigns is only part of what needs to be done to
   foster multi-party democracies. Advisory and consultative work is critical to political party development.
   Such activities need to be fully understood by donors who are usually reluctant to become involved with
   politics. In many countries today, parties are able to engage in sophisticated campaign techniques and have
   the resources to hire Western political consultants. However, this does not mean that there is no role for
   democracy assistance organizations. The political party institutes and democracy assistance organizations can
   support political parties by helping them develop internal democracy, build coalitions for elections, and
   strengthen relations between party leaders and members. Parties should also be encouraged to think beyond
   politics and focus on governance and service delivery.
   Support Elections
   Because support for elections has become the most visible form of democracy assistance, elections have been
   conflated with democracy as a simplistic and often erroneous yardstick of democratization. To be sure,
   elections are integral to democratization but they do not necessarily represent the culmination or
   confirmation of a country’s democratic development. Free and fair elections start with an electoral law and a
   law on the formation of political parties. These are part of the institutional arrangements of the country, and
   should not be considered as stand-alone activities. Frequently, however, in transition processes particularly in
   post-conflict contexts- negotiation of the electoral law precedes negotiation of the constitution. Therefore,
   special attention should be devoted to addressing the links between constitution-making and electoral
   assistance. The administrative framework for conducting elections- the Electoral Management Body (EMB)-
   is critical. It requires a voter registry, an elections commission to print and distribute ballots and count the
   votes, as well as mechanisms for adjudicating disputes and managing the conflicts that may arise around
   elections. Another important though often overlooked function of the EMB is the management of perceptions


                         Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
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   and the cultivation of trust among both elites and the citizenry. The EMB must also implement mechanisms
   that incorporate both civil and political elites in the preparation of the election and that educate and inform
   the populace of the scope, aims, and limits of elections. To ensure an election’s integrity, local and
   international election monitors should be allowed to work unhindered. Elections are just one step toward a
   sustainable democracy, and after the election, democracy assistance efforts should not be scaled down. No
   matter what the outcome, the need for assistance is just as great even if the nature of assistance changes to
   reflect the needs of the post-election environment. Elections are part of a larger process of
   institutionalization, liberalization and democratization. Therefore, event-driven election assistance should
   evolve into longer-term electoral assistance that may have the added benefit of catalyzing the capacity of
   democracies to run local services, building confidence in democratization.

Democracy assistance promotes democratic reforms in sectors of the political system –
including institutions, procedures, political and civil societies
Huber, Hebrew University of Jerusalem Department of International Relations, 8
[Daniela, Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 13, No. 1, 43–62, March 2008, “Democracy Assistance in the Middle East
and North Africa: A Comparison of US and EU Policies”, p. 46,
http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/69109__790479070.pdf, accessed 6-3-11]

   On the basis of these definitions, the three leading questions to compare US and EU democracy
   assistance are: What is promoted? How is it promoted? Who is promoted? To answer these questions
   three indicators are set up: substance, method and recipient countries.
   Substance can analyze either the subject matter of what the US or the EU claim they intend to promote
   (e.g. rule of law) or the actual screws of a recipient political system that they in fact try to turn in order
   to achieve this objective (e.g. supporting public prosecutors). This article focuses on the latter, as it
   shows the actual practice rather than the conception. A political system consists of different interacting
   institutions: in the state sphere there are the state institutions, which encompass the executive,
   judicative and legislative, as well as local authority (decentralization). Also formal rules and procedures
   such as the constitution and elections belong to this category. Between the state and the private sphere
   stands political and civil society. Political society looks at political parties or political societies (such as
   in Bahrain in face of the absence of political parties). Civil society ‘is the realm of organized social life
   that is open, voluntary, self-generating, at least partially self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and
   bound by a legal order or set of shared rules’ (Diamond, 1999: 221). It stands between the private
   sphere and the state and includes the media, but excludes economic society, which is ‘the profit-making
   enterprise of individual business firms’ (Diamond, 1999: 221). This section also covers civic education.
   As civil society is very diverse topic-wise, democracy promoters can set different thematic priorities here,
   which will also be analyzed.


Democracy assistance can target 3 spheres – civil society, state institutions, and political
society
Huber, Hebrew University of Jerusalem Department of International Relations, 8
[Daniela, Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 13, No. 1, 43–62, March 2008, “Democracy Assistance in the Middle East
and North Africa: A Comparison of US and EU Policies”, p. 46,
http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/69109__790479070.pdf, accessed 6-3-11]

   Additionally, this section examines the balance of the three spheres that receive DA: a bottom-up
   approach tries to initiate or assist democratization through the support of civil society, whereas a top-
   down approach focuses on the reform of state institutions. Funding of political society stands
   somewhat in between. Some programmes cut through the categorization of state institutions, political
   society and civil society. Elections and decentralization, for example, can be supported by pure
   technical assistance, but the programmes usually also include civic education in case of elections, or
   cooperative civil society – municipality work in case of decentralization. The same is true of assistance
   for parliaments, whose support can embrace the strengthening of parties as well.

   [Note – DA = democracy assistance]


                         Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
Document1                                                                                             Page 27 of 157


Democracy assistance includes civil society – which is not exclusively procedural
dimensions of democracy
Azpuru, Finkel, Perez-Linan, and Seligson, Vandy, Pitt, Pitt, Vandy, ’08
(“What has the United States Been Doing?” Journal of Democracy Volume 19, Number 2, April 2008 pp. 150-159)

   The increases in USAID Democracy and Governance expenditures since 1990 reflect a clear shift in U.S.
   priorities regarding democracy assistance, one that pre-dated the controversial military actions in Afghanistan
   and Iraq. Democracy assistance had already risen by 2001 to become one of the largest categories of USAID
   outlays worldwide, with a particular focus on regions such as Eastern Europe. Furthermore, the data show
   that electoral assistance per se has been only one area in which democracy funds have been invested, and
   clearly not the major one.
   In fact, civil society has been the key area of intervention—a sign that USAID democracy funding aims to
   promote more than the merely procedural dimensions of democracy. Moreover, the distribution of democracy
   assistance within each subsector varies by region—in other words, there is no "one-size-fits-all" model.
   Finally, the data show that democracy assistance is typically not short-term. Rather, at the country level
   USAID on average has provided democracy aid for about a decade.




                         Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
Document1                                                                                           Page 28 of 157



Democracy Assistance – Includes Electoral Programs, Constitution,
             Promises, Civic Education Programs


Democracy assistance includes electoral programs, presidential diplomacy/promises,
constitution writing and civic education programs.
Lappin, University of Leuven (Belgium) Centre for Peace Research and Strategic Studies
PhD candidate, 10
[Richard, participant in democracy assistance missions with the UN, EU, OSCE, and Carter Center, University of
Belgrade political sciences visiting scholar, Central European Journal of International & Security Studies, Volume 4
Issue 1, “What we talk about when we talk about democracy assistance: the problem of definition in post-conflict
approaches to democratization” http://www.cejiss.org/issue/2010-volume-4-issue-1/lappin, p.183-4, accessed 5-16-
11, TP]

   Although democracy assistance did not assume a distinct profile in Western foreign policies until after
   the Cold War, its roots can be traced back further. Several sources have pointed to US sponsored
   electoral programmes in the Caribbean following the Spanish-American War in the early 20th century,
   Woodrow Wilson’s promise to ‘make the world safe for democracy’ in the aftermath of the First
   World War, and political assistance, such as constitution writing and civic education, to Japan and
   Germany following the Second World War (Burnell 2000a; Carothers 1999: ch 2). One interesting element
   of all of these early examples of democracy assistance is that they all occurred in post-conflict contexts.




                         Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
Document1                                                                                              Page 29 of 157



                     Democracy Assistance – Election Assistance


Democracy assistance enhances the ability for a country to have genuine elections.
Lappin, University of Leuven (Belgium) Centre for Peace Research and Strategic Studies
PhD candidate, 10
[Richard, participant in democracy assistance missions with the UN, EU, OSCE, and Carter Center, University of
Belgrade political sciences visiting scholar, Central European Journal of International & Security Studies, Volume 4
Issue 1, “What we talk about when we talk about democracy assistance: the problem of definition in post-conflict
approaches to democratization” http://www.cejiss.org/issue/2010-volume-4-issue-1/lappin, p.183, accessed 5-16-11,
TP]

   Since the early 1990s, one of the most striking characteristics to emerge in post-conflict peacebuilding
   has been the prime position assumed by democratisation; an approach we can term post-conflict
   democracy assistance. This focus has hinged on an unerring belief that democratic governance,
   provided by periodic and genuine elections, offers the most effective mechanism for managing and
   resolving societal tensions without recourse to violence (Annan 2001; Boutros-Ghali 1992, 1996) Indeed,
   the benefits of post-conflict democracy assistance have been promulgated for its capacity to advance peace,
   development and human rights (Jarstad 2006; Lappin 2009; Rich and Newman 2004), and it has been
   embraced at the highest stratums of peacebuilding with, for example, Boutros-Ghali declaring that ‘peace,
   development and democracy are inextricably linked’ (1996: 116).


Democracy assistance includes support for elections
The National Committee on American Foreign, Saltzman Institute of War and Peace at
Columbia, The Atlantic Council-‘8
ENHANCING DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE
http://www.acus.org/files/publication_pdfs/65/Enhancing%20Democracy%20Assistance.pdf

   Support Elections
   Because support for elections has become the most visible form of democracy assistance, elections have been
   conflated with democracy as a simplistic and often erroneous yardstick of democratization. To be sure,
   elections are integral to democratization but they do not necessarily represent the culmination or
   confirmation of a country’s democratic development. Free and fair elections start with an electoral law and a
   law on the formation of political parties. These are part of the institutional arrangements of the country, and
   should not be considered as stand-alone activities. Frequently, however, in transition processes- particularly
   in post-conflict contexts- negotiation of the electoral law precedes negotiation of the constitution. Therefore,
   special attention should be devoted to addressing the links between constitution- making and electoral
   assistance. The administrative framework for conducting elections- the Electoral Management Body (EMB)-
   is critical. It requires a voter registry, an elections commission to print and distribute ballots and count the
   votes, as well as mechanisms for adjudicating disputes and managing the conflicts that may arise around
   elections. Another important though often overlooked function of the EMB is the management of perceptions
   and the cultivation of trust among both elites and the citizenry. The EMB must also implement mechanisms
   that incorporate both civil and political elites in the preparation of the election and that educate and inform
   the populace of the scope, aims, and limits of elections. To ensure an election’s integrity, local and
   international election monitors should be allowed to work unhindered. Elections are just one step toward a
   sustainable democracy, and after the election, democracy assistance efforts should not be scaled down. No
   matter what the outcome, the need for assistance is just as great even if the nature of assistance changes to
   reflect the needs of the post-election environment. Elections are part of a larger process of
   institutionalization, liberalization and democratization. Therefore, event-driven election assistance should
   evolve into longer-term electoral assistance that may have the added benefit of catalyzing the capacity of
   democracies to run local services, building confidence in democratization.




                         Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
Document1                                                                                             Page 30 of 157


Democracy assistance is the support provided to electoral laws, processes, and institutions
International Foundation for Electoral Systems ‘11
http://www.ifes.org/Content/Topics/Democracy-Assistance.aspx

   Democracy assistance can be defined as the legal, technical and logistic support provided to electoral laws,
   processes and institutions.




                         Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
Document1                                                                                            Page 31 of 157



            Democracy Assistance – Includes Institution-Building


Democracy assistance can aim at modernization and liberalization of political institutions
Dunne, Ph.D. Carnegie Scholar, ’04
(Michele, House International Relations Committee Hearing on "United States Economic Assistance to Egypt: Does
it Advance Reform?" June 17, 2004 Visiting Scholar, Democracy and Rule of Law Program The Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace,
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=1562&proj=zdrl, acsd 5/22/11)

    Third, in planning a coordinated strategy of policy engagement and assistance programs, it is important to be
    honest and clear about the current political situation in Egypt. The Egyptian government has shown a readiness
    to modernize certain institutions - for example, the judiciary - and is now allowing discussion of liberalizing
    aspects of political life. It has not, however, shown any intention to democratize, by which I mean giving the
    Egyptian people the right and ability to change their government. All of the U.S. democracy assistance
    programs so far, and most under contemplation, aim at modernization and liberalization, which can certainly
    improve people's lives but do not necessarily lead to democratic transformation. Such transformation could
    eventually happen when the governing elite decides that it can no longer resist strong internal pressure for
    change, or as a result of visionary leadership.


Democracy assistance institution-building programs include governance training at all
political levels and sectors – federal and municipal, judicial, legislative, voter, and
administrative
Huber, Hebrew University of Jerusalem Department of International Relations, 8
[Daniela, Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 13, No. 1, 43–62, March 2008, “Democracy Assistance in the Middle East
and North Africa: A Comparison of US and EU Policies”, p. 49-50,
http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/69109__790479070.pdf, accessed 6-3-11]

   State institutions’ programmes, for example, included in the justice sector the training of Iraqi judges
   on judicial independence, rule of law, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, current
   European law on human rights, and anti-corruption initiatives, run by the US Department of Justice in
   2004/05 (US Department of State, 2004b: 190). In the legislative sector, the capacity of the Palestinian
   legislature to propose legislation, formulate policy and monitor the executive was nurtured (USAID,
   2006f: 1). Election support in Iraq totalled US$59.175 million for the elections of the Transitional
   National Assembly, the Governorate Provincial Councils and the Kurdistan Regional Assembly. For
   the Constitutional Referendum and the Permanent National Council programmes provided for voter
   education, domestic observers and technical assistance (USAID, 2006b: 1–2). For the Palestinian
   presidential, parliamentary and local elections technical assistance and equipment like ballot boxes
   and paper were provided, as well as international observation. The programme also covered voter
   education and information campaigns.
   The vast majority (87 per cent) of the USAID DG state institution share, however, went to
   decentralization and local government (USAID, 2006a–g). The figures remain the same when Iraq is not
   included. The new trend to support decentralization in general development aid in recent years seems
   to have spilled over to democracy assistance. This is also remarkable, because the European Commission –
   as we will see later – hardly funds decentralization in its DA programmes. Examples of decentralization
   activity include the capacity building of local administration in Iraq which included projects such as
   the strengthening of fiscal and administrative management and leadership training (USAID, 2006b: 1–
   2). Similarly, local government in Lebanon received support concerning the standardizing procedures
   for municipalities, the training of municipal staff and officials, as well as the strengthening of
   administrative and financial capabilities of municipal unions. There were policy dialogue trips between
   Lebanese municipal officials and US counterparts, especially of women officials, encouragement of
   citizen participation in municipalities, and training for the Lebanese parliament to work with municipalities
   (USAID, 2006d: 1–2).


                         Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
Document1                                                                                          Page 32 of 157



Democracy assistance builds democratic institutions at a variety of potential levels
Rih ckov -EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy August 2008
EU Democracy Assistance through Civil Society - Reformed?
www.pasos.org/content/download/.../Pasos_paperEU_demass_10sept08.pdf

   “Democracy assistance” is not a mainstream term in EU discourse, and no Community definition or concept
   of a democratisation strategy is envisaged1. On the other hand, the “promotion of human rights and
   democracy” has become a well established element of EU external policy, with multiple references to it at
   various institutional levels and financial instruments. For the purpose of this paper, democracy assistance
   is defined as the policy aimed at helping third countries build institutions of democratic
   governance, foster public participation in democratic governance, support pluralism in the
   shape of multiparty politics, freedom of expression and independent media, promote and
   protect human rights, and work towards establishing the rule of law.




                        Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
Document1                                                                                             Page 33 of 157



     Democracy Assistance – Focuses on Constitutional Protections


Democracy assistance is primarily focused on constitutional protections of individual and
minority rights
Phillips, American University Program on Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Director,
9
[David L. Phillips, 12-22-9, Atlantic Council, “New Frontier In Democracy Assistance”,
http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/new-frontier-democracy-assistance, accessed 5-27-11]

   Democracy assistance typically focuses on constitutional arrangements protecting and promoting
   individual and minority rights. It often emphasizes electoral assistance and measures to strengthen
   political parties, independent media and civil society. This is anathema to political Islam, which emerged
   in the 20th century as an effort by fundamentalists to address challenges of the modern world. Rejecting
   innovation, they believe that any Muslim who deviates from Shari’a, the strict interpretation of Islamic law,
   is impure. Linking piety with an end to political corruption and misrule, they reject constitutional democracy
   as the basis for secular government that empowers human rulers over the law of God. Iran’s President
   Mahmoud Ahmedinejad is the primary proponent of this radical political theology. He maintains that Islam
   and democracy are fundamentally incompatible: “Liberalism and Western-style democracy have not been
   able to realize the ideals of humanity. Today, these two concepts have failed. Those with insight can already
   hear the sounds of the shattering and fall of the ideology and thoughts of liberal democratic systems.” (Open
   letter to President George W. Bush, May 2006). While Ahmedinejad believes that democracy represents the
   secularization of Christian and Western values and therefore lacks universal appeal, many Muslims reject
   fanaticism, citing Islam’s traditions of pluralism, cosmopolitanism, and open-mindedness. Hundreds of
   millions of Muslims live in democratic countries, either as minorities or majorities in countries ranging from
   Turkey and Indonesia to Western Europe, and enjoy democratic freedoms. They maintain that the Islamic
   process of consultation is entirely consistent with democratic debate. The democracy deficit in the Arab and
   Muslim world is more a problem of supply than demand.”

   [posted on Forums by Kuswa, 5-26-11,
   http://www.cedadebate.org/forum/index.php?topic=2428.msg4901#msg4901]




                         Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
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       ***Democracy Assistance Definitions – Contested Areas




               Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
Document1                                                                                              Page 35 of 157



                          Democracy Assistance – Limited, Direct

Democracy is technical assistance – that is direct, positive and active – to support
democratic institutions at various levels of democratic spectrum
Huber, Hebrew University of Jerusalem Department of International Relations, 8
[Daniela, Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 13, No. 1, 43–62, March 2008, “Democracy Assistance in the Middle East
and North Africa: A Comparison of US and EU Policies”, p. 45-6,
http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/69109__790479070.pdf, accessed 6-3-11]

   What is Democracy Assistance?
   The term democracy assistance is used in academic literature, as well as in the programmes of the US and the
   EU, without comprehensive clarifications. This section will therefore outline the actor’s comprehensions of
   the term and the (however insufficient) academic literature on it. On this basis it will develop a definition of
   the term democracy assistance, which will be followed by the elaboration of a methodological framework.
   The US and EU have quite similar concepts of DA. USAID defines it as
          technical assistance and other support to strengthen capacity of reform-minded governments,
          nongovernmental actors, and/or citizens in order to develop and support democratic states and
          institutions that are responsive and accountable to citizens. These efforts also include promoting
          democratic transitions in countries that are not reform minded. Democracy programs promote
          the rule of law and human rights, transparent and fair elections coupled with a competitive
          political process, a free and independent media, stronger civil society and greater citizen
          participation in government, and governance structures that are efficient, responsive, and
          accountable. (USAID, 2005: 4)
   Similarly, the EU specifies the following categories of DA:
          These can include questions of democratic participation (including universal suffrage, free election,
          multiparty structure, equality of access to political activity, participatory decision making); human
          rights (including adherence to, and implementation of, commitments under international human rights
          Treaties and Conventions, protection of civil liberties, including freedom of speech and of assembly,
          effective operation of human rights monitoring); and the rule of law (including an independent and
          effective judiciary, transparent legal framework, equality of all citizens before the law, police and
          public administration subject to the law, enforcement of contractual obligations). (EC 2003a: 10)
   The American researcher Thomas Carothers gives a definition of DA which is closest to the understanding
   of this article: ‘Democracy aid is all aid, for which the primary purpose, not the secondary or indirect
   purpose, is to foster democracy in the recipient countries. It does not therefore include economic and
   social aid programs’ (Carothers, 2000: 188). In addition, two further characteristics of democracy
   assistance are introduced in order to differentiate it from other efforts at democracy promotion: first,
   it is not only an explicit or direct, but also a positive measure of foreign policy as opposed to negative
   measures such as sanctions or even military means.4 Second, it represents an active instrument, as the
   democracy promoter takes measures itself, whereas a passive instrument such as positive political
   conditionality implies that the democracy promoter rewards internal democracy promotion efforts.
   Table 1 visualizes the different democracy promotion instruments.

   Table 1. Democracy promotion instruments
                                 Explicit instruments                                      Implicit instruments

   Positive instruments             Democracy assistance (active instrument),              Classical development
                                    positive political conditionality                      aid
                                    (passive instrument)

   Negative instruments             Negative political conditionality, naming              Military action
                                    and shaming, military action

   Democracy assistance is the type of foreign policy that aims explicitly at positively and actively
   initiating democratization, supporting democratization or strengthening democracy, as well as human
   rights in foreign countries. This definition accounts for differing DA policies depending on the level of

                          Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
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   democratization in a recipient country ranging from non-democracies to countries in transition to
   consolidating or delegative democracies. Democratization is the process of transition from a non-
   democratic to a democratic political system. The term human rights is included in the definition, as the
   actors understand it as an important part of their democracy assistance. Democracy is understood
   according to Robert Dahl’s concept of Polyarchy (Dahl, 1982) with its dimensions of competition and
   participation. This concept is narrow enough to exclude only liberalizing countries and it is wide enough for
   different understandings of democracy by the US and the EU. It also implies that DA is more than electoral
   assistance.


Democracy assistance must be directly tied to democratization and must support existing
efforts. It excludes development aid and conditional aid
Lappin-Faculty of Political Sciences at the University of Belgrade-10
What we talk about when we talk about democracy assistance
2010 - Volume 4, Issue 1 http://www.cejiss.org/sites/default/files/8.pdf

   In defining democracy assistance, it is paramount that the distinction be tween
   democracy assistance and democracy promotion is established . Although democracy
   promotion is often used interchangeably with democracy assistance, the latter should be
   recognised as only a small and distinct part of a much broader democracy promotion
   approach . As the table below illustrates, democracy promotion comprises several instruments,
   both positive and negative, both explicit and implicit, of which democracy assistance is only
   one distinct part . On the negative side, there is direct military action, which includes armed
   intervention to promote democracy and can be either explicit (to install a demo- cratic regime, as
   in Afghanistan) or implicit (to curb an anti-democratic regime, as in the first Iraq war) . In
   addition, there is also the explicit tool of negative political conditionality, or ‘naming and
   shaming’, in which membership from international organisations may be suspended,
   economic sanctions applied, and embargoes enforced . On the positive side, there is the
   implicit instrument of classical develop ment aid which seeks to foster improved
   socioeconomic conditions which may consequently lead to democratic developments .
   Additionally, there is the positive instrument of international interim administrations, as was
   the case in East Timor, where the democratic transition is directly controlled and managed in
   its entirety by international actors . There is also the explicit instrument of positive political
   conditionality, which can include offers of membership in intergovernmental organisations,
   security guarantees, or economic and trade benefits . Finally, on the positive side, there is
   the distinct instrument of democracy assistance . Democracy assistance differs
   from all other forms of democracy promotion in several important ways . First, it is
   distinct from military action insofar that it does not ‘enforce’ democracy, and from
   international interim administration insofar that it does not ‘manage’ democracy .
   Second, democracy assistance is directed primarily and exclusively at fostering
   democracy, as opposed to classical development aid in which democracy is usually
   only a secondary concern . Third, democracy assistance is distinct from positive political
   conditionality insofar that it encompasses direct and active measures, rather than passive
   tools . Democracy assistance can be further differentiated from political
   conditionality insofar that it is neither a reward nor a punishment, neither a carrot
   nor a stick, but rather a ‘booster’ to internal groups already working towards
   democratisation . Democracy assistance is not concerned with ‘exporting democracy’
   (Schraeder 2002) or ‘spreading democracy’ (Hobsbawm 2004) irrespective of the readiness of a
   given country; rather, democracy assist ance explicitly recognises that ‘the primary motive
   force for democratisation is and must be internal to the country in question’ (Burnell 2000c:
   9), and that the exclusive intention is ‘to help domestic actors achieve what they have already
   decided they want for themselves’ (Carothers 2007b: 22) . Democracy assistance is
   therefore a very precise instrument within a broader democracy promotion paradigm .

                         Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
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Democracy assistance should be considered all aid for which the primary purpose, not the
secondary purpose or indirect purpose, is to foster democracy in the recipient countries---
Including indirect aid explodes the topic. Just because the USAID calls development
programs democracy assistance does not make them so.
Lappin-Faculty of Political Sciences at the University of Belgrade-10
What we talk about when we talk about democracy assistance
2010 - Volume 4, Issue 1 http://www.cejiss.org/sites/default/files/8.pdf

   Problems Resulting From Definitional Uncertainty Establishing the definitional clarity of democracy
   assistance is an important step towards understanding how three core problems have
   developed as a direct result of definitional uncertainties in democracy promotion terminology
   . The resultant problems concern, imprecise democracy assistance data, a neglect of the inherent limitations
   of democracy assistance, and the fostering of negative perceptions of democracy assistance . Imprecise
   Democracy Assistance Data The lack of definitional concreteness over what may be classified as democ-
   racy assistance has meant that ‘the available data concerning how much and by whom remains relatively soft,
   variable in quality and far from complete’ (Burnell 2000b: 339) . Typically, different countries and
   organisations use different classifications and indicators to define and record democracy
   assistance . Moreover, these figures are often merged into standard development projects,
   thus presenting major complications for the disaggregation of precise and direct democracy
   assistance from broad development statistics (Crawford and Kearton 2002; Green and Kohl 2007:
   159; Knack 2004: 266) . In one of the few detailed cross-national studies of democracy assistance, Richard
   Youngs et al . (2006: 21) lamented that ‘no standard or easily comparable classification of political aid
   existed across states’ and, worryingly, that several countries had to compile the data upon request .
   Therefore, even seemingly comparable data, such as that from the Creditor Reporting System (CRS) of
   OECD-DAC, can be decidedly misleading due to the inability to accurately disaggregate the data .
   Furthermore, as democracy has become increasingly associated with post- conflict
   peacebuilding, almost any international assistance effort that addresses any development or
   peacebuilding issues can arguably be labelled as ‘democracy assistance .’ In their study,
   Youngs et al. (2006: 21), note that ‘many states included in their democracy and
   governance categories aid projects that could not be reasonably said to have any
   meaningful bearing on political reform .’ Whilst Burnell (2000b: 339) has posited that some
   development agencies simply renamed their traditional development programmes as
   ‘democracy assistance’ to demonstrate that they were in tune with fashionable governance
   themes . Such fastidiousness on the boundaries of what should be considered as democracy
   assistance is not to undermine the impact that broader development assistance can have on
   democratisation . As Steve Finkel et al. (2007: 410) explain, indirect assistance ‘may promote
   modernisation, encourage better economic performance, and foster class transformations, all
   of which may have long-term implications for democratic development .’ However, the
   concern is that such a broad definition can lead to an expansive laundry list of things which
   ‘assist’ democracy, such as general poverty alleviation or the build ing of schools . Burnell
   (2000c: 12) claims that, although at times beneficial, this is problematic because ‘if democracy
   assistance is defined as whatever helps democratisation directly or indirectly, sooner or later,
   then our sense of it could be so generous as to undermine the value of the term .’ Carothers
   (2000: 188) offers a route out of this dilemma in his argument that democracy assistance
   should be considered all aid ‘for which the primary purpose, not the secondary purpose or
   indirect purpose, is to foster democracy in the recipient countries . It does not therefore
   include economic and social aid programmes .’




                         Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
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             Democracy Assistance – Includes Good Governance


Democracy assistance now includes “good governance.”
Azpuru, Finkel, Perez-Linan, and Seligson, Vandy, Pitt, Pitt, Vandy, ’08
(“What has the United States Been Doing?” Journal of Democracy Volume 19, Number 2, April 2008 pp. 150-159)

    Using a newly constructed dataset of all U.S. expenditures in foreign assistance channeled via the United States
    Agency for International Development (USAID) from 1990 through 2005, this essay traces the growth of global
    democracy assistance since the end of the Cold War. It shows that what had begun as a largely regional effort in
    Latin America in the late 1980s has grown into a world-wide effort, expanding in magnitude and diversity,
    branching out into areas such as "good governance" (essentially decentralization and the fight against
    corruption) that were given little attention in the early 1990s.


Democracy assistance includes aid for the promotion of the rule of law, civil society,
elections, and good governance.
McMahon-Director, Center on Democratic Performance Department of Political Science
Binghamton University-2
The Impact of U.S. Democracy and Governance Assistance in Africa: Benin Case Study
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PCAAB068.pdf

   U.S. Democracy Assistance Donor agencies may differ somewhat in their definition of
   democracy assistance, and some may direct their resources towards one or two sub-
   categories. The model developed by USAID covers many of the themes addressed by donors.
   It is divided into four main sub- categories. These areas of focus include rule of law, civil
   society, elections and political processes, and governance. The rule of law area
   addresses both constitutional and actual guarantees of basic human rights and basic
   principles of equal treatment of all people before the law. In many states with weak or nascent
   democratic traditions, existing laws are not equitable or equitably applied, judicial independence is
   compromised, individual and minority rights are not truly guaranteed, and institutions have not yet developed
   the capacity to administer existing laws. Three inter- connected key sub-areas include supporting
   legal reform, improving the administration of justice, and increasing citizens’ access to
   justice. Since this paper is focused on assessing the impact of assistance programming, it is useful to
   highlight how USAID itself has defined how progress can be identified. In USAID’s Handbook of
   Democracy and Governance Program Indicators, rule of law activities are deemed to have been successful if
   they have resulted in strengthened rule of law and respect for human rights. This general notion is
   disaggregated into the following sub-categories: foundations for protection of human rights and gender
   equity conform to international standards; laws, regulations, and policies promote a market-based economy;
   equal access to justice; and effective and fair legal sector institutions.11 Civil society has been defined
   as the “associational realm between state and family populated by organizations which are
   separate from the state, enjoy autonomy in relation to the state, and are formed voluntarily
   by members of society to protect or extend their interests or values.”12 A wide variety of
   groups, including women’s rights organizations, business and labor federations, media
   groups, coalitions of professional associations, civic education groups, bar associations,
   environmental activist groups, and human rights monitoring organizations receive assistance
   from USAID in this domain. The role of civil society in promoting greater political pluralism has been
   largely championed in democracy-related literature as a central element in the recent, “Third Wave”


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   expansion of democracy around the world, although there have been an increasing number of critiques of
   civil society’s impact, questioning, for example, the extent of partisanship, commitment, funding, and quality
   of organizations that make up civil society.13 In evaluating the impact of civil society programming, USAID
   looks at the “increased development of a politically active civil society.” This includes a legal framework to
   protect and promote civil society, increased citizen participation in the policy process and oversight of public
   institutions, increased institutional and financial viability of civil society organizations, an enhanced free
   flow of information, and a strengthened democratic politic culture.14 There are a whole series of
   challenges that complicate the ability of nascent democracies to implement legitimate
   electoral processes. These can include inefficient or poorly organized election administration,
   insufficient education on the part of citizens about different stages of the political process,
   including elections; and a lack of effectively structured political parties. USAID programs to
   address these problems have included election planning and implementation, political party
   development, voter education, and support for domestic and international monitoring
   groups. USAID’s criteria for program effectiveness in this sub-sector are centered on the theme of “more
   genuine and competitive political processes.” More specific issues include the development of impartial
   electoral frameworks, credible election administrations, an informed and active citizenry, effective oversight
   of the electoral process, a representative and competitive multiparty system, inclusion of women and other
   disadvantaged groups, and effective transfer of political power.15 The concept of governance applies to
   a basket of issues dealing with the functioning of democratic institutions. These include anti-
   corruption activities, decentralization, civil-military relations, and legislative and local
   government functioning. USAID’s programming in this sub- sector is designed to encourage and assist
   nascent democratic governments to integrate key principles such as transparency, accountability, and
   participation as they develop, and to improve their institutions and processes. USAID defines progress in
   governance activities as resulting in “more transparent and accountable government institutions.” This is
   achieved by increased government responsiveness to citizens at the local level, heightened access by citizens
   to improved government information, strengthening of government ethical practices, improved civil-military
   relations supportive of democracy, more effective, independent, and representative legislatures, and more
   effective policy processes in the executive branch.16 Obviously, it is not realistic to expect that in a country
   study all of these categories would be shown to reflect across-the-board improvements as a result of U.S.
   assistance.


Governance is a subset of democracy assistance
Aspinall-Senior Fellow at Australian National University-‘10
Assessing Democracy Assistance:Indonesia1
www.fride.org/download/IP_WMD_Indonesia_ENG_jul10.pdf

   There are starkly differing views about the state of Indonesian democracy. According to Indonesia’s
   government and many governments with which it enjoys close relations, Indonesia is a democratic success
   story. After more than ten years of transition, which began with the collapse of the authoritarian Suharto
   government in May 1998, democracy in Indonesia is being consolidated, symbolised by the 2009 national
   elections, the second to be held since the first transition elections in 1999. These were peaceful and widely
   considered to be free and fair. Moreover, the presidential race produced a remarkable first round victory for
   incumbent leader Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who received 60.8 per cent of the vote, pointing to high
   satisfaction with the government. Yet even, those with positive views admit that, problems remain.
   For example, rule of law institutions are weak, and the government face difficulties delivering
   high-quality services to the population. Such problems point to one conclusion: what is
   needed now is not so much democracy assistance broadly defined, but governance assistance.


Democracy assistance builds democratic institutions at a variety of potential levels
Rih ckov -EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy August 2008
EU Democracy Assistance through Civil Society - Reformed?
www.pasos.org/content/download/.../Pasos_paperEU_demass_10sept08.pdf


                         Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
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  “Democracy assistance” is not a mainstream term in EU discourse, and no Community definition or concept
  of a democratisation strategy is envisaged1. On the other hand, the “promotion of human rights and
  democracy” has become a well established element of EU external policy, with multiple references to it at
  various institutional levels and financial instruments. For the purpose of this paper, democracy assistance
  is defined as the policy aimed at helping third countries build institutions of democratic
  governance, foster public participation in democratic governance, support pluralism in the
  shape of multiparty politics, freedom of expression and independent media, promote and
  protect human rights, and work towards establishing the rule of law.




                       Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
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         Democracy Assistance – Excludes Governance Promotion


Promoting democratic governance is distinct from democracy assistance
Mitchell, Columbia University School of International and Political Affairs International
Politics professor, and Phillips, National Committee on American Foreign Policy Project
Director, 8
 [Lincoln A. and David L., Columbia University Center for the Study of Human Rights visiting scholar, Jan 08,
“Enhancing Democracy Assistance” ,
http://www.acus.org/files/publication_pdfs/65/Enhancing%20Democracy%20Assistance.pdf, p.10-11, accessed 5-
29-11, AFB]

   Promote Democratic Governance
   While governance and democracy assistance are closely linked and have significant overlap, they are
   not the same. Supporting good governance can complement democracy assistance, but it cannot
   replace it. Governance support should reinforce democracy assistance, but in authoritarian or post-
   authoritarian countries, supporting governance without a democratization component often undermines
   democratization itself. Governance support is especially important in countries where reform-oriented
   governments have recently come to power. If they cannot deliver on expectations by providing improved
   services and economic growth, a backlash will likely ensue, both against the government and against the
   concept of democracy. Efforts to support governance and service delivery should incorporate key
   components of democracy such as participation, contestation, and accountability.


Governance and democracy assistance are distinct-this excludes social service back door
The National Committee on American Foreign, Saltzman Institute of War and Peace at
Columbia, The Atlantic Council-‘8
ENHANCING DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE
http://www.acus.org/files/publication_pdfs/65/Enhancing%20Democracy%20Assistance.pdf

   For authoritarian regimes, this report stresses advocacy to expand the space for political activity and to
   diffuse political power. It describes strategies for nurturing and supporting underground media and discreetly
   assisting in-country NGOs, minimizing the risk of regime reprisals. This report also maintains that
   although support for governance should reinforce democracy assistance, under
   authoritarian regimes such support must include a democratization component to avoid the
   risk of undermining the overall process of democratization. Governance support is especially
   important in countries where reform-oriented governments have recently come to power. If
   they cannot deliver on expectations by providing improved social services and economic
   growth, a backlash will likely ensue against both the government as well as the concept of
   democracy as a viable form of government.


Democracy assistance is distinct from governance, human rights, and civil society support
Youngs-director of the democratization program at FRIDE in Madrid-8
Trends in Democracy Assistance What has EuropE BEEn Doing? Journal of Democracy Volume 19, Number 2
April 2008
http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/FRIDE_JOD_trendsindemoasst_whathasEuropebeendoing.pdf

   Making a direct comparison between European and U.S. levels of democracy assistance is
   nearly impossible. European donors—the EU itself as well as individual member states—
   actively work on political- reform issues and administer numerous democracy-related
   budgets. These initiatives are often defined in a variety of ways and combine democracy

                         Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
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  assistance with governance, human rights, and civil society support (see Table 1 on p. 162).
  European donors generally resist the notion that democracy aid can be separated from these related issues. In
  most cases, assistance to political reform, broadly defined, has increased incrementally, if unspectacularly,
  during the last decade.




                        Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
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        Democracy Assistance – Includes Democracy Promotion


Democracy assistance is assistance to promote democracy
Ishaq Rahman-Hasanuddin University, Makassar-10
DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE IN INDONESIA (1999 – 2009): BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL LIBERALISM
AND POLITICAL REALISM www.scribd.com/.../Democracy-Assistance-in-Indonesia-1999-2009-Between -
International-Liberalism-and-Political-Realism

  In this study, democracy assistance is defined as assistance from developed countries to promote
  democratization and strengthen democracy in countries that have not fully adopted democracy, especially in
  developing countries. This assistance aims to strengthen democratic political culture, democratic political
  behavior, and political institutions of democracy.




                       Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
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Democracy Assistance – Excludes Most Democracy Promotion


Democracy assistance is a form of democracy promotion – it is not a carrot or a stick but a
booster to internal organizations – excludes military intervention, development aid,
sanctions, and conditional diplomacy.
Lappin, University of Leuven (Belgium) Centre for Peace Research and Strategic Studies
PhD candidate, 2010
[Richard, participant in democracy assistance missions with the UN, EU, OSCE, and Carter Center, University of
Belgrade political sciences visiting scholar, Central European Journal of International & Security Studies, Volume 4
Issue 1, “What we talk about when we talk about democracy assistance: the problem of definition in post-conflict
approaches to democratization” http://www.cejiss.org/issue/2010-volume-4-issue-1/lappin, p.188-9, accessed 5-16-
11, TP]

   In defining democracy assistance, it is paramount that the distinction between democracy assistance
   and democracy promotion is established. Although democracy promotion is often used interchangeably
   with democracy assistance, the latter should be recognised as only a small and distinct part of a much
   broader democracy promotion approach. As the table below illustrates, democracy promotion
   comprises several instruments, both positive and negative, both explicit and implicit, of which
   democracy assistance is only one distinct part. On the negative side, there is direct military action,
   which includes armed intervention to promote democracy and can be either explicit (to install a
   democratic regime, as in Afghanistan) or implicit (to curb an anti-democratic regime, as in the first Iraq
   war). In addition, there is also the explicit tool of negative political conditionality, or ‘naming and
   shaming’, in which membership from international organisations may be suspended, economic
   sanctions applied, and embargoes enforced. On the positive side, there is the implicit instrument of
   classical development aid which seeks to foster improved socioeconomic conditions which may
   consequently lead to democratic developments. Additionally, there is the positive instrument of
   international interim administrations, as was the case in East Timor, where the democratic transition is
   directly controlled and managed in its entirety by international actors. There is also the explicit
   instrument of positive political conditionality, which can include offers of membership in
   intergovernmental organisations, security guarantees, or economic and trade benefits. Finally, on the
   positive side, there is the distinct instrument of democracy assistance. Democracy assistance differs from
   all other forms of democracy promotion in several important ways. First, it is distinct from military
   action insofar that it does not ‘enforce’ democracy, and from international interim administration
   insofar that it does not ‘manage’ democracy. Second, democracy assistance is directed primarily and
   exclusively at fostering democracy, as opposed to classical development aid in which democracy is
   usually only a secondary concern. Third, democracy assistance is distinct from positive political
   conditionality insofar that it encompasses direct and active measures, rather than passive tools.
   Democracy assistance can be further differentiated from political conditionality insofar that it is
   neither a reward nor a punishment, neither a carrot nor a stick, but rather a ‘booster’ to internal groups
   already working towards democratization. Democracy assistance is not concerned with ‘exporting
   democracy’(Schraeder 2002) or ‘spreading democracy’(Hobsbawm 2004) irrespective of the readiness of
   a given country; rather, democracy assistance explicitly recognises that ‘the primary motive force for
   democratisation is and must be internal to the country in question’ (Burnell 2000c: 9), and that the
   exclusive intention is ‘to help domestic actors achieve what they have already decided they want for
   themselves’ (Carothers 2007b: 22). Democracy assistance is therefore a very precise instrument within
   a broader democracy promotion paradigm.


Assistance is a distinct form of positive democracy promotion – excludes coercive and
conditional tools
Toornstra, European Parliament Office for Promotion of Parliamentary Democracy
Director, 10

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[Dick, “Getting Acquainted: Setting the Stage for Democracy Assistance”
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdf/oppd/Page_8/getting_acquainted_web.pdf, p.7-8, accessed 5-17-11, TP]

   There are three major approaches to democracy promotion (see Table 1): 1) the coercive approach,
   2) conditionality, and 3) the consensual approach. The coercive, or ‘negative’ or ‘punitive’ approach,
   involves the use of military, economic or political force or pressure to (re)establish a democratic
   regime against the will of a state’s authorities. Major coercive instruments of democracy promotion
   include military intervention, general economic sanctions and targeted diplomatic, economic, financial
   and military sanctions. Political conditionality links benefits to the fulfilment of conditions relating to
   the protection of democratic principles and human rights. Benefits can be removed by way of
   punishment or used to reward the completion of certain actions. Examples of conditionality include:
   suspension or redirection of assistance away from governmental channels to civil society; suspension
   of trade and cooperation agreements; EU membership conditionality; and EU incentive schemes, such
   as the General System of Preferences + (GSP+), 11 ‘Governance Facility’ for European Neighbourhood
   (ENP) states 12 and ‘Governance Initiative’ for African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states. 13 The
   consensual or positive approach is characterised by the consent or at least toleration of the target
   state’s authorities, the absence of coercion, active and positive engagement by the foreign actor, pro-
   active rather than reactive involvement, and by direct engagement with local individuals and
   institutions. Consensual tools of democracy promotion include human rights dialogue, EU human
   rights monitoring mechanisms, election monitoring, diplomatic measures and – highly important and
   the focus of this paper – democracy assistance.


Assistance is a sub-set of Democracy Promotion, a description of any form of action
designed to support democracy in a country. Democracy assistance is only one form--the
form of promotion that involves providing funds or direct assistance for democracy.
Azpuru, Finkel, Perez-Linan, and Seligson, Vandy, Pitt, Pitt, Vandy, ’08
(“What has the United States Been Doing?” Journal of Democracy Volume 19, Number 2, April 2008 pp. 150-159)

    In the post–Cold War era, U.S. foreign-policy discourse has consistently underscored the importance of aid
    designed to foster democracy and economic development. Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush both
    have emphasized that supporting the growth of democracy in the world is an essential task. President Clinton in
    his 1994 State of the Union address called the promotion of democracy and human rights the "third pillar" of his
    foreign-policy agenda,1 and President Bush has time and again highlighted the prominence that democracy
    building around the world takes among his foreign-policy goals. Before beginning, it is vital to make a
    conceptual distinction between democracy promotion and democracy assistance, as this essay focuses
    exclusively on the latter. Democracy promotion refers to an array of measures aimed at establishing,
    strengthening, or defending democracy in a given country. Such measures may range from diplomatic
    pressure to conditionality on development aid to economic sanctions, and even to military intervention.
    Democracy assistance is a form of democracy promotion. It provides funds or direct assistance to
    governments, institutions, or civil society actors that are working either to strengthen an emerging
    democracy or to foster conditions that could lead to democracy's rise where a nondemocratic regime
    holds power. This analysis examines democracy assistance only—what Thomas Carothers has called "the quiet
    side" of U.S. democracy promotion.2 Until now, the absence of comprehensive and systematic data on the
    magnitude and distribution of U.S. democracy assistance—where, on what, and in which quantities these funds
    have been spent—has prevented analysts from identifying patterns of assistance and has frustrated rigorous
    empirical research into democracy aid's impact. Earlier studies rest on data regarding foreign assistance that fail
    to distinguish democracy assistance from other types of development aid. Our use here of a newly assembled
    dataset showing all U.S. foreign-assistance through USAID over a sixteen-year period (1990 through 2005)
    allows us to clarify some of those questions and to identify patterns in the data. Our major aim is to describe
    where U.S. democracy assistance went during those years and in what amounts, using the most comprehensive
    multiyear data currently available, so as to provide a solid point of departure for future studies.3 This analysis
    will clear up at least some of the confusion and ambiguities that currently muddy the topic of U.S. democracy
    aid. The database we use tracks USAID democracy-assistance funds from 1990 to 2005 and comprises 44,958
    records that capture the composition of USAID budgets for specific activities in all sectors for that period.4 The



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    dataset contains the most extensive and finely grained information on USAID expenditures in the democracy
    and governance sector (hereafter DG) currently available for scholarly analysis. 5

    1. James Meernik, Eric L. Krueger, and Steve C. Poe, "Testing Models of U.S. Foreign Policy: Foreign Aid During and
    After the Cold War," Journal of Politics 60 (February 1998): 63–85. 2. Thomas Carothers, U.S. Democracy Promotion
    During and After Bush (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007), 10; available at
    www.carnegieendowment.org/files/democracy_promotion_after_bush_final.pdf. 3. See Steven E. Finkel, Aníbal Pérez-
    Liñán, and Mitchell A. Seligson, "The Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990–2003," World
    Politics 59 (April 2007): 404–39. 4. The database is available at www.pitt.edu/~politics/democracy/democracy.html. Part
    of the data was initially compiled by John Richter at USAID and the database was later expanded by Andrew Green, a
    USAID Democracy Fellow, in 2004–2005. The database includes the funds allocated to democracy assistance by USAID. In
    consultation with Andrew Green, we developed a series of aggregation routines to generate yearly totals for: a) DG spending
    at the country level; b) DG subsectors [Elections, Rule of Law, Civil Society, and Governance] at the country level; c) non-
    DG sectors [Agriculture and Economic Growth, Education, Environment, Health, Humanitarian Assistance, Human Rights,
    and Conflict Management and Mitigation] at the country level; d) programs that operate at the regional level [in any of the
    fields just described]; and e) programs that operate at the subregional level [in any of the fields]. 5. Although USAID is the
    main channel for U.S. democracy assistance, it should be noted that not all DG money goes through USAID. We do not
    include funding from other institutions such as the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). According to the data
    presented by the annual report on U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, funds allocated internationally by NED between 1990
    and 2004 represented on average 5.1 percent of the annual USAID Democracy and Governance budget during the same
    period. See James Scott and Carrie Steele, "Assisting Democrats or Resisting Dictators: The Nature and Impact of
    Democracy Support by the United States National Endowment for Democracy, 1990–1999," Democratization 12 (August
    2005): 439–60.


Democracy assistance is a subset of democracy promotion, and does not include military
means or conditioning
Huber, Hebrew University of Jerusalem Department of International Relations, 8
[Daniela, Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 13, No. 1, 43–62, March 2008, “Democracy Assistance in the Middle East
and North Africa: A Comparison of US and EU Policies”, p. 44
http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/69109__790479070.pdf, accessed 6-3-11]

   Democracy promotion employs different instruments including military means, political conditionality
   or democracy assistance. This article focuses on the latter, as despite the increasing national and
   international budgets assigned to DA, systematic research about it is still lagging behind. Nonetheless,
   Carothers (2003, 2004) provides detailed accounts of democracy assistance for the US and Youngs (2001a, b,
   2004a) for the EU, specifically also for EU efforts in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)2 (Youngs,
   2004b; Gillespie and Youngs, 2002). US and EU efforts at democracy promotion are briefly compared by
   Hu¨llen and Stahn (2007), Kopstein (2006), Youngs (2001a: 46–52) and Whitehead (1986).3 To the
   knowledge of the author, there is no work, however, that compares US and EU democracy assistance on the
   basis of an extended empirical study and this article will thus fill this research gap.


Democracy assistance is distinct from democracy promotion - it must be active and focused
on reinforcing internal support for democracy. No military action or negative
conditionality is topical.
Lappin, Ph .D . candidate at the Centre for Peace Research and Strategic Studies at the
University of Leuven in Belgium, 10
[‘What We Talk About When We Talk About Democracy Assistance: The Problem of Definition in Post-Conflict
Approaches to Democratisation’ Central European Journal of International & Security Studies, Vol.4, No.1, May
(2010), http://www.cejiss.org/sites/default/files/8.pdf (GS)]

   As such, it is critically important that researchers are cognizant of the breadth of meaning attached to
   democracy assistance by different people and practice precision in their own usage and definition of
   the term . Indeed, if we are unable to achieve accuracy in our terminology, the utility of the approach,
   both in theory and in practice, will ultimately be undermined. Democracy assistance can be most
   accurately defined as the non-profit transfer of funds, expertise, and material to foster democratic

                           Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
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   groups, initiatives and institutions that are already working towards a more democratic society (De
   Zeeuw and Kumar 2006: 20) . These transfers are usually funded through governmental development
   agencies, such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) the European
   Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), or the UK’s Department for International Devel-
   opment (DfID) . The programmes themselves are undertaken by a diverse group of inter-governmental
   organisations (IGOs), non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and, to a lesser extent, through bilateral
   agreements . Chief amongst the IGOs are the Organisation for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE),
   the European Union (EU), and the Organisation of American States (OAS) . The most prominent NGOs
   include the Carter Center, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) and the Centre for
   Electoral Promotion and Advice (CAPEL) . In addition, within a given country, there will also be a range of
   local counterparts who receive democracy funding including electoral commissions, state institutions, civil
   society groups, media groups and political parties .In defining democracy assistance, it is paramount that
   the distinction be- tween democracy assistance and democracy promotion is established . Although
   democracy promotion is often used interchangeably with democracy assistance, the latter should be
   recognised as only a small and distinct part of a much broader democracy promotion approach . As
   the table below illustrates, democracy promotion comprises several instruments, both positive and
   negative, both explicit and implicit, of which democracy assistance is only one distinct part . On the
   negative side, there is direct military action, which includes armed intervention to promote democracy and
   can be either explicit (to install a demo- cratic regime, as in Afghanistan) or implicit (to curb an anti-
   democratic regime, as in the first Iraq war) . In addition, there is also the explicit tool of negative political
   conditionality, or ‘naming and shaming’, in which membership from international organisations may be
   suspended, economic sanctions applied, and embargoes enforced .On the positive side, there is the implicit
   instrument of classical develop- ment aid which seeks to foster improved socioeconomic conditions which
   may consequently lead to democratic developments . Additionally, there is the positive instrument of
   international interim administrations, as was the case in East Timor, where the democratic transition is
   directly controlled and managed in its entirety by international actors . There is also the explicit instrument
   of positive political conditionality, which can include offers of membership in intergovernmental
   organisations, security guarantees, or economic and trade benefits .
   Finally, on the positive side, there is the distinct instrument of democracy assistance . Democracy
   assistance differs from all other forms of democracy promotion in several important ways . First, it is
   distinct from military action insofar that it does not ‘enforce’ democracy, and from international
   interim administration insofar that it does not ‘manage’ democracy . Second, democ- racy assistance is
   directed primarily and exclusively at fostering democracy, as opposed to classical development aid in
   which democracy is usually only a secondary concern . Third, democracy assistance is distinct from
   positive political conditionality insofar that it encompasses direct and active measures, rather than
   passive tools . Democracy assistance can be further differentiated from political conditionality insofar
   that it is neither a reward nor a punishment, neither a carrot nor a stick, but rather a ‘booster’ to
   internal groups already working towards democratisation . Democracy assistance is not concerned
   with ‘exporting democracy’ (Schraeder 2002) or ‘spreading democracy’ (Hobsbawm 2004) irrespective
   of the readiness of a given country; rather, democracy assist- ance explicitly recognises that ‘the
   primary motive force for democratisation is and must be internal to the country in question’ (Burnell
   2000c: 9), and that the exclusive intention is ‘to help domestic actors achieve what they have already
   decided they want for themselves’ (Carothers 2007b: 22) . Democracy assistance is therefore a very
   precise instrument within a broader democracy promotion paradigm .


Democracy assistance is a subset of promotion, and is distinct from consolidation,
dissemination, and advocacy
Acuto, Australian National University Asia-Pacific College of Diplomacy School of Social
Sciences and Department of International Relations, 8
[Michele, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political October, 2008 33: 461,
“Wilson Victorious? Understanding Democracy Promotion in the Midst of a Backlash”, Academic Search
Complete, accessed 6-3-11]




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  Democracy, of course, is a notoriously contested concept, and promoters of democracy usually give only
  the vaguest account of what it is they are promoting.21 The concept of democracy promotion presents
  similar difficulties. Five core terms may be distinguished:
   • Democracy promotion is an umbrella term that covers various activities aimed at fostering,
  improving, and sustaining good governance at several political levels. It comprises assistance,
  consolidation, dissemination, and advocacy.22
   • Democracy assistance is the provision of support (either financial, cultural, or material) to
  “democratic agents” in the process of democratization, without entailing direct intervention. It seeks to
  foster the conditions for the rise of a democratic regime, such as NGOs’ patronage or diplomatic pressure,
  and is thus, as Thomas Carothers put it, “a quiet support for democracy.”23
   • Democracy consolidation is another type of support, more direct and explicit, toward newly formed
  governments, weak institutions, or systems in decay, with the goal of enforcing the procedural side of
  the targeted polities, and is aimed at “avoiding democratic breakdown and avoiding democratic
  erosion” while strengthening preexisting structures.24
   • Democracy dissemination comprises all those activities that seek to advance democratic governance
  structures by intervening directly in the internal affairs of nondemocratic polities, reshaping
  authoritarian, fragile, or collapsed states through explicit pressures, or enforcing instruments of
  international law with democratization goals.
  • Democracy advocacy is, contrary to the two prior types, a noninterventionist form of promotion,
  usually involving of mass-media-related activities and nongovernmental organizations like think tanks.




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                    Democracy Assistance – Includes Diplomacy


Democracy assistance includes diplomacy – Wilson proves
Lappin, University of Leuven (Belgium) Centre for Peace Research and Strategic Studies
PhD candidate, 10
[Richard, participant in democracy assistance missions with the UN, EU, OSCE, and Carter Center, University of
Belgrade political sciences visiting scholar, Central European Journal of International & Security Studies, Volume 4
Issue 1, “What we talk about when we talk about democracy assistance: the problem of definition in post-conflict
approaches to democratization” http://www.cejiss.org/issue/2010-volume-4-issue-1/lappin, p.183-4, accessed 5-16-
11, TP]

   Although democracy assistance did not assume a distinct profile in Western foreign policies until after
   the Cold War, its roots can be traced back further. Several sources have pointed to US sponsored
   electoral programmes in the Caribbean following the Spanish-American War in the early 20th century,
   Woodrow Wilson’s promise to ‘make the world safe for democracy’ in the aftermath of the First
   World War, and political assistance, such as constitution writing and civic education, to Japan and
   Germany following the Second World War (Burnell 2000a; Carothers 1999: ch 2). One interesting element
   of all of these early examples of democracy assistance is that they all occurred in post-conflict contexts.


Democracy assistance includes cooperative diplomatic measures
Grossman, former senior American diplomat, 2009
p. http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2010/0912/comm/grossman_pluralism.html

   First, as the Atlantic Council concluded in its 2008 publication Enhancing Democracy Assistance,
   “America’s role should be to stand behind, not in front of democracy movements.”12 U.S. diplomats will
   need to emphasize “coordination” in democracy assistance, and underline their cooperation with local NGOs,
   activists, and, where possible, governments. Given that “promoting has become synonymous with imposing
   democracy,” 13 a focus on the constituent parts of democratic systems—rule of law, governance, corruption
   reform—rather than an abstract endpoint may be in order. As Alexander T.J. Lennon notes in the CSIS study
   “Democracy in U.S. Security Strategy,” reframing democracy assistance as a campaign to bolster freedoms
   might avoid local backlash and might encourage action from international third parties.14 Larry Diamond
   suggests that, “Partnership…implies an important operational change in programming, with indigenous
   democratic actors – that is, the candidate recipients of support – defining their own initiatives and priorities
   to which we respond, rather than our determining a priori what they need and then issuing a ‘request for
   proposals’ or an ‘indefinite quantity contract.’”15 Since open endorsement from the U.S. government might
   delegitimize some democratic groups abroad, America’s diplomats must know when to speak out on behalf
   of their native partners and when to emphasize the roles of a local NGO.


Assistance includes cooperative and diplomatic endeavors
Mitchell, Columbia University School of International and Political Affairs International
Politics professor, and Phillips, National Committee on American Foreign Policy Project
Director, 8
[Lincoln A. and David L., Columbia University Center for the Study of Human Rights visiting scholar, Jan 08,
“Enhancing Democracy Assistance” ,
http://www.acus.org/files/publication_pdfs/65/Enhancing%20Democracy%20Assistance.pdf, p.11, accessed 5-29-
11]

   Advocate Democracy

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  Diplomatic tools can promote democracy by recognizing and spotlighting the work of democracy activists
  and visibly expressing solidarity with their cause. In response to specific country conditions, the Executive
  Branch and Members of Congress can support democratization by publicly criticizing regimes for anti-
  democratic behavior, downgrading in-country diplomatic representation, and issuing demarches to express
  concern. US officials can support democracy activists by granting them high-level meetings and/or publicly
  praising them. Economic approaches can use a combination of carrots and sticks, such as awarding trade
  benefits based on positive performance and conditioning aid and trade benefits when the performance falls
  short. Public diplomacy activities, such as the Fulbright and International Visitors Programs, are effective
  tools for presenting the United States as a political model and developing a local appetite for
  democratization. NGOs can also play an important advocacy role.




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    Democracy Assistance – Includes Diplomacy, Devt, Military &
            Political Support, Withdrawal of Support


Democracy assistance is broad – includes diplomacy, sanctions, development, military and
political support, and withdrawal of support
National Research Council Report, '08
(Improving Democracy Assistance: Building Knowledge Through Evaluations and Research (2008) IMPROVING
DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE, Building Knowledge Through Evaluations and Research, Committee on Evaluation
of USAID Democracy Assistance Programs, Development, Security, and Cooperation Policy and Global Affairs,
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES,
http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12164&page=23, acsd 5/25/11)

    In recent years democracy assistance has become not merely a goal for diplomacy (although it remains that)
    but an increasingly frequent practical problem. A host of international and multilateral donor agencies and
    even military forces (both NATO and U.S.) have taken on the task of helping build democracies in highly
    challenging environments, including authoritarian and semi-authoritarian states, recently emerging and
    transitional democracies, and societies scarcely out of, or even in the midst of, violent conflicts (e.g.,
    Ukraine, Bosnia, Egypt, Afghanistan, Iraq, Haiti, Democratic Republic of the Congo). U.S. efforts to assist the
    spread of democracy encompass a host of activities: diplomatic pressures, trade sanctions, economic
    development aid, military and political support for democratic forces, or in some cases (e.g., Zaire,
    Philippines) withdrawal of support for dictators.




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                        Democracy Assistance – Not Diplomacy

Democracy assistance is distinct from diplomacy method
Adesnik and McFaul, 6
[David & Michael, Spring 2006, Washington Quarterly, “Engaging Autocratic Allies to Promote Democracy”,
(29:2), p. 7.

   The democracy-promotion toolbox has been filled for more than two decades with various
   standard assistance programs, including technical support for reforming government
   agencies; training for lawyers, journalists, political party leaders, and trade unionists; direct
   financial aid for civil society organizations; and exchanges and scholarships for students.
   Today, the U.S. government, particularly the U.S. Agency for International Development
   (USAID) and an army of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) often funded by USAID, the National
   Endowment of Democracy, or the Asia and Eurasia Foundations, continue to use such nonmilitary
   methods to promote democracy in dozens of countries around the world. In rare cases,
   democracy promotion has been the by-product of military intervention. The American public will support the
   decision to go to war only when persuaded that a direct threat to U.S. national security exists. Yet, once the
   opposing dictatorship has fallen, Washington is confronted with a moral obligation to replace it with a
   democratic government, as it did in Germany and Japan after World War II, attempted to do after
   interventions in the Dominican Republic and South Vietnam in the 1960s, and is presently trying to
   accomplish in Afghanistan and Iraq. Yet, a third method for promoting democratic regime change
   receives little attention, if any, from the media or from scholars: diplomacy. Although NGOs
   and foundations are usually the primary actors engaged in democracy promotion in countries that have
   recently experienced the collapse of an autocratic regime, U.S. diplomats have a special role to play in
   countries still ruled by dictatorships. Democratization involves not only building up the democratic
   opposition -- a key ingredient for successful democratic breakthrough -- but also weakening or dividing the
   autocrats in power.n1 NGOs, whose focus in these cases is usually and rightly to strengthen the opposition,
   lack the ability to confront the regime directly. In contrast, the U.S. government has the power and resources
   to challenge autocratic regimes, through what Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has called
   "transformational diplomacy."n2 Admittedly, there are valid reasons why the role of the diplomat does not
   figure prominently in the current analysis of U.S. democracy-promotion efforts. The vast majority of
   diplomats from the secretary of state to a consular officer working abroad spend little if any of their time
   promoting democracy. Indeed, throughout most of U.S. history, diplomats have not defined democratization
   as part of their job description. In the rare moments when they do engage in promoting democracy, diplomats
   often do so quietly behind the scenes, making it difficult for outside observers to study or analyze them. Yet,
   understanding the conditions under which diplomacy can be effective represents a critical step toward
   improving all U.S. efforts to promote democracy abroad. At key moments, U.S. diplomatic leverage has
   played a positive role in nudging a regime change in a democratic direction. Learning the lessons of how and
   why diplomats were able to make a difference in earlier, successful transitions to democracy can help guide
   today's foreign policy makers seeking to influence the course of political liberalization in autocratic regimes.


These official papers for USAID make a clear distinction between democracy assistance
and separate diplomatic functions
USAID, 5
GEORGIA: CAUSES OF THE ROSE REVOLUTION AND LESSONS FOR
DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE , 2005 p. htto:// csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/ci.causesroserevolution.03.05.pdf

   Democracy Promotion: Assistance and Diplomacy Democracy promoters, official and otherwise, pursued
   a number of policies that improved the chances a democratic election would occur and which, in the end,
   contributed to regime change. High-level U.S. diplomacy in support of a clean election (including a pre-
   election visit of former Secretary of State James Baker, who urged the regime to accept the PVT and reform
   of electoral commissions); USAID funding for voter list reform, PVT training and implementation, and


                         Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
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   the cultivation of local election monitoring NGOs; and Soros Foundation-funded training for the youth
   organization Kmara are all credibly cited as factors that increased pressure on the government to hold a
   reasonably democratic election, while increasing the likelihood that fraud would be detected.


And, the United Nations explicitly separates the two in its official cables
United Nations, 5/9/11
p. http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2011/110509_UNDEF.doc.htm

   Better integration between democracy assistance and diplomatic efforts was needed, correspondents
   were told today, at a Headquarters press conference on the issue of how the international democracy family
   can support activists in the field. Many civic organizations have stated that what they would most value
   from the international community was not a little bit more money or slightly more flexible funding, but
   the feeling that the money granted by donors was backed up with diplomacy at a high level, said Richard
   Youngs, Director General of Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior, while
   outlining concerns of civil society members that his organization helped survey in 18 different countries
   around the world. The press conference was held by the United Nations Democracy Fund (UNDEF), and
   brought together Mr. Youngs; Roland Rich, Executive Head of UNDEF; Larry Diamond, Senior Fellow at
   the Hoover Institution at Stanford University; and Joel Barken, Senior Associate at the Center for Strategic
   and International Studies. The participants were part of an initiative by UNDEF, a voluntary fund that makes
   grants to support democratization efforts around the world, to analyse and improve the work of democracy
   activists based on feedback from aid recipients, said Mr. Rich. The genesis of the initiative occurred at the
   2008 meeting of the World Democracy Movement in Kyiv, Ukraine, where democracy assistance
   organizations met to discuss and conduct a peer review of their activities. Mr. Youngs added that tighter
   linkages between project funding and diplomatic relations between donor governments and non-
   democratic regimes were needed, perhaps more than anything else in this area of activity today. “The
   argument was put to us that it makes no sense for donors to be offering a few million in project
   assistance for democracy-related issues if the concern with political reform doesn’t also permeate the
   full panoply of foreign policy instruments articulated by donor governments, as they cut across issues
   of trade, energy, and development.” In response to a question about whether the approach from donors
   would move from being technical in nature towards more political work, Mr. Youngs said that it depended on
   the individual donor and its geographical area. Some donors, such as the United States Agency for
   International Development, Canadian International Development Agency and the United Kingdom
   Department for International Development, as well as Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands, had begun to
   question the current bias towards a technical approach, while others were more hesitant and shied away from
   more innovative, political projects. “Donors are really squeezed quite hard,” he said. “On the one hand,
   recipients are saying, ‘You must get more political. Technical governance is not a panacea.’ On the other
   hand, they’re then often saying to donors, ‘Stay out of the local politics. Don’t make things worse’.” He
   noted the thin line that donors needed to navigate between being perceived as too political and not political
   enough. If democracy assistance was contradicted by international diplomacy, then that sent mixed
   messages and was disheartening for democracy activists, agreed Mr. Diamond, discussing recent research
   that evaluated democratic assistance and showed a decline in freedom and civil rights around the world.


Legal guides for the promulgation of guidelines on democracy promotion and foreign
assistance distinguish between diplomacy and democracy assistance
The Diplomat’s Toolbox, 2011
p. www.diplomatshandbook.org/pdf/Handbook_CH3.pdf

   There is, of course, considerable activity in multilateral fora on human rights and democratic development.
   The Handbook project is itself an undertaking of a multilateral organization, the Community of
   Democracies. “When the United Nations can truly call itself a community of democracies, the Charter’s
   noble ideals of protecting human rights and promoting social progress in larger freedoms’ will have been
   brought much closer.” -Secretary-General Kofi Annan, at the founding conference of the Community of
   Democracies, Warsaw, 2000 Democratic development is now a major theme at the UN, particularly
   through the United Nations Democracy Fund. The UN provides extensive commitment to free and fair

                         Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
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   elections through its electoral support unit and the assistance provided by the United Nations Development
   Program to democracy development. The UN Human Rights Council is meant to be a central instrument in
   the search for the advancement of human rights, although its effectiveness remains stymied by the
   maneuvering of some non-democracies determined to block scrutiny of their human rights abuses. The
   doctrine of non-interference in internal affairs continues to be invoked as a principle protecting such states
   for not safeguarding the human rights of their citizens. Other intergovernmental organizations, such as the
   OSCE and its Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the OAS, or the
   Commonwealth of Nations, consider democracy to be inter- dependent with the imperatives of economic
   development and human security and commit programs to democracy development support. There is an
   important regional dimension. Evidence shows that mentoring of emerging democracies from regional
   partners is particularly effective because of the shared perspectives of regional and often social adjacency.
   Strengthening the capacity for democracy assistance within regional organizations is a current
   multilateral theme, including in Asia, the Americas, and across Europe. However, this Handbook does
   not attempt to cover conference activity of diplomats associated with the development and guidance of
   the human rights and democratization agendas of multilateral fora. The Handbook’s focus is on “in-
   country” mandates and activity associated with bilateral accreditations. Scholars in the social sciences
   we have consulted in the preparation of this Handbook have recommended a ranking of “best practices” in
   an evidence-based analysis from the growing catalogue of examples of democracy development support.
   Clearly, some support practices will be more effective than others depending on all the circumstances and
   the mix of contextual issues. But there is reluctance within the Community of Democracies to generalize or
   theorize with prescriptive recommendations. In this Chapter, the Handbook follows methodology that is a)
   fact-based; b) descriptive rather than prescriptive; but c) which attempts to identify some general principles
   and approaches by citing specific cases of diplomatic engagement.


Assistance and diplomacy are considered separate—this source currently works for the
NSA
Spence, assistant to NSA director, 2003
p. www.irex.org/system/files/spence.pdf

   My research trip sought to explore the link between USAID democracy assistance and diplomacy in US
   democracy promotion but found that link to be tenuous. Several million dollars of USAID training and
   exchange programs alone are unlikely to convince the governments of democratizing countries to behave
   differently. The US government must mobilize its more powerful diplomatic tools—such as offers of
   membership in international organizations, official visits, and investment treaties—to discourage
   governments’ undemocratic behavior. More specifically, my research suggests that the US government think
   more broadly about responding to the undemocratic behavior of a transition government. That is, countering
   government harassment of the media is not simply about funding training programs for journalists or even
   protesting at high diplomatic levels when the government shuts down a newspaper. Instead, it is a weak
   economy and poor court system that create an enabling environment for government harassment of the
   media. Therefore, a strategy to promote an independent media must take into larger factors that enable the
   media to resist government control. Granted, this requires a longer commitment and more resources but is
   far less likely to produce results that will disappoint policymakers.


Official US policy is that assistance is a subset of a broader diplomatic policy but does not
itself include negotiations
National Research Council, members of the national academies, 2008
(Improving Democracy Assistance, p. 19)

   USAID’s current democracy and governance (DG) activities date from the mid-1980s when a series of
   countries in Latin America, Asia, Africa, and then Central Europe and the former Soviet Union began the
   transition from various forms of authoritarian rule. Presidents Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and Clinton gave
   USAID the tasks of providing assistance to countries trying to develop democratic forms of
   government and creating programs to encourage other countries to embark on similar reforms. The


                         Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
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   administration of George W. Bush has continued and in some cases expanded this aid as a key element in
   its policy of “transformational diplomacy.”



USAID documents do not mention negotiations in their official text
National Research Council, members of the national academies, 2008
(Improving Democracy Assistance, p. 19)

   USAID programs to promote DG focus on four distinct but related goals, which are now collectively
   called “Governing Justly and Demo- cratically,” under the reforms of foreign assistance undertaken by
   the Bush administration. As shown on the USAID Web site (2007), these are:            *      Strengthening the
   rule of law and respect for human rights           The term ‘rule of law’ embodies the basic principles of equal
   treatment of all people before the law, fairness, and both constitutional and actual guarantees of basic human
   rights. A predictable legal system with fair, transparent, and effective judicial institutions is essential to the
   protection of citizens against the arbitrary use of state authority and lawless acts of both organizations and
   individuals…. Without the rule of law, the executive and legislative branches of government operate without
   checks and balances, free and fair elections are not possible, and civil society cannot flourish. Beyond the
   democracy and governance sector, the accomplishment of other USAID goals also relies on effective rule of
   law. *         Promoting more genuine and competitive elections and political processes                Free and
   fair elections are vital to a functioning democracy. When a country is emerging out of a protracted civil war,
   or in cases where a country’s government has lost the confidence of its citizens, it is often necessary to hold
   elections very quickly…. Competitive political parties are central to any democracy. They perform a number
   of functions that, in combination, distinguish them from any other civic or social organization. *
   Increased development of a politically active civil society          The hallmark of a free society is the ability
   of individuals to associate with like-minded individuals, express their views publicly, openly debate public
   policy, and petition their government. ‘Civil society’ is an increasingly accepted term which best describes
   the nongovernmental, not-for-profit, independent nature of this segment of society. *             More
   transparent and accountable governance             A key determinant for successful democratic consolidation is
   the ability of democratically-elected governments to provide ‘good governance.’ … ‘Good governance’
   assumes a government’s ability to maintain social peace, guarantee law and order, promote or create
   conditions necessary for economic growth, and ensure a minimum level of social security. Yet many new
   governments fail to realize the long-term benefits of adopting effective governance policies.


Assistance is about building infrastructure and civil society, not negotiations
National Research Council, members of the national academies, 2008
(Improving Democracy Assistance, p. 19)

   The four broad goals are supported by program components such as Promote Media Freedom,
   Support Credible Elections, Strengthen Politi- cal Parties, Strengthen Justice Sector, and Reduce
   Corruption. In the field these program components are translated into projects, each of which may
   include many separate activities.4 For example, a large stock of projects has been developed to train
   political parties to compete, to increase civic participation, and to encourage judicial or legislative
   competence and autonomy. Many DG missions are supporting activities to improve democratic
   practices within political parties, heighten women’s participation in politics, provide technical support
   to judges or legislators, increase the number of active NGOs, and promote decentralization of
   government services. As discussed further in the next section, the design and implementation of all of these
   efforts depend on knowledge and assumptions about what causes, sustains, or hinders the process of
   democratization.


Assistance can be coupled with diplomatic negotiations, but assistance itself is NOT
negotiation—Bush admin proves
Guirguis, staff writer at a European political affairs magazine, 2009
(Dina, http://www.eurasiacritic.com/articles/promoting-democracy-egypt)

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   Between 2003 and 2005, the Bush administration heightened its emphasis on political reform, and
   coupled democracy assistance with pro-democracy diplomacy, tying U.S. concessions, including a free
   trade agreement, to progress on key democratic reforms and freedoms. This emphasis was crystallized
   in then Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice's speech at the American University in Cairo in 2005 in which she
   declared the U.S. intention to "support the democratic aspirations of all people" in lieu of the old policy of
   supporting "stability at the expense of democracy" only to fail on both fronts. External U.S. pressure on
   Egypt between 2003 and 2005 catalyzed the "Arab Spring," and led to a brief opening up of political space
   and resulted in unprecedented citizen engagement, the proliferation of independent newspapers, a flood of
   new bloggers and other encouraging signs of a robust emerging polity.


Authorization for democracy assistance originates in Congressional appropriations
committees, not diplomatic sources
Epstein et al., foreign policy specialists and CRS researchers, 2007
p. www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34296.pdf

   With the fall of communism in central and eastern Europe and the collapse of the Soviet Union between 1989
   and 1991, Members of Congress took a strong interest in the evolution of the region. They supported
   and promoted U.S. government democracy assistance programs through the authorization,
   appropriations, and oversight process, first in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, and then in the
   Baltic states and other countries of central and eastern Europe. Major legislation supporting democratic
   assistance to the region included the Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act of 1989 (P.L.101-
   179) and the FREEDOM Support Act (FSA) of 1991 (P.L. 102-511), the latter directed at the newly
   independent countries of the former Soviet Union. A portion of the assistance provided under these acts
   has gone to the strengthening of democratic institutions


Democracy assistance is a subset of comprehensive democracy reform, under which
umbrella diplomatic negotiations are understood as a separate subset
Dobriansky, former undersecretary of State in global affairs, 2005
p. http://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/nss/state/46358.pdf

   Today, I want to share with you an overview of what the State Department is doing to put the President’s
   priorities into practice, and explore how we can deepen our partnership in this shared goal. The President’s
   vision is being implemented with bold new programs and initiatives. No less important, his agenda is also
   being carried out through the countless daily acts of faithful service performed by thousands of State
   Department staff around the globe. In particular, the Secretary has directed our Ambassadors to give priority
   to democracy promotion, to make it central to their mission strategies and their daily diplomatic activities.
   Our comprehensive democracy strategy, constantly being adapted even as it is being carried out,
   includes technical assistance, reporting and advocacy, public and private diplomacy, educational and
   cultural exchanges, and punitive measures. It is bilateral and multilateral. It is willing to consider and use
   a wide array of means to achieve a common end: the advance of democratic institutions, the affirmation of
   human dignity, and the ultimate end of tyranny around the globe.


Democracy assistance is not equivalent with other foreign diplomatic initiatives
Spence, former assistant to the National Security Adviser, 2004
p. http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/20741/Spence-_CDDRL_10-4_draf1.pdf

   Comparing American and European approaches to democracy promotion requires defining what American
   democracy promotion entails. It is an elusive task. In the 1990s, for example, some twenty-three different
   departments and independent agencies of the U.S. government carried out programs to promote political and
   economic change in the former Soviet Union.1 Around the world, U.S. government efforts to promote
   democracy involve far more than self-defined “democracy assistance” programs administered by


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   USAID, or the familiar cast of American diplomats overseas. 2 In fact, a host of less expected players —
   such as the Pentagon, Treasury Department, and individual Congressmen — devote millions of dollars and
   countless man-hours to promoting internal political change abroad. It is too simplistic to say that only
   USAID cares about democracy, and the Pentagon worries only about weapons.

They are distinct
Carothers, CEIP researcher, 2008
p. http://www.acus.org/publication/enhancing-democracy-assistance

   As President Obama and his team engage at the levels of high-profile diplomacy and law to reformulate U.S.
   democracy promotion policy, they should not neglect the less visible, quieter side of the democracy support
   endeavor. This is the domain of democracy assistance, the aid programs that the U.S. government funds to
   stimulate, facilitate, and help consolidate attempted or ongoing democratic transitions around the world.




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                  Democracy Assistance – Includes Development

Development aid is a major component of USAID democracy assistance
Carothers- vice-president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace-9
democracy assistance: political vs. developmental?
Journal of Democracy Volume 20, Number 1 January 2009
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/01_20_1_carothers.pdf

   The United States: Mixed Approach, Political Profile The U.S. Agency for International Development
   (USAID), which is by far the largest funding source for U.S. democracy assistance, often
   follows the developmental approach. USAID is primarily a development organization, and
   the story of USAID’s taking up democracy support over the last twenty years is one of the
   often hesitant, awkward inclusion of democracy work into an organizational culture
   dominated by the goal of promoting socioeconomic development. Many USAID democracy
   programs are cautious, technocratic efforts to support incremental political change, often in
   the governance domain, with a studious avoidance of the political, even when political institutions
   and processes are being reached. At the same time, however, USAID does sometimes take a more
   political approach—supporting relatively assertive elections-related work, assisting political
   parties campaigning for an upcoming election, bolstering civil society through support for
   politically oriented advocacy groups, and providing aid to outspoken independent media
   outlets. Whether USAID tilts in a particular country toward a developmental or a political
   approach depends considerably on the overall U.S. relationship with the government of that
   country. Roughly speaking, the more positive the overall relationship, the more
   developmental the approach usually is; the more negative the relationship, the more political
   the approach. USAID’s very large but highly indirect, nonconfrontational approach to
   democracy aid in Egypt in the 1990s is an example of the former, and its political aid in
   Serbia and Belarus in the 1990s are examples of the latter. The basic orientation of USAID’s
   democracy assistance also depends on the outlook of the USAID mission director in a
   particular country. Many mission directors are traditional developmentalists who are wary
   of political aid and strongly inclined to the developmental approach. Only a minority bring a
   more political orientation to their work. With the greater centralization of control over USAID’s work as a
   result of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s reorganization of U.S. foreign assistance over the past two
   years, this variability may diminish some- what.5 Moreover, with the Department of State playing a
   greater role in overseeing USAID’s work, the agency’s efforts may shift more toward the
   political approach. The two other principal funders of U.S. democracy aid—the National
   Endowment for Democracy (NED) and the Department of State—generally follow the political
   approach, as do the most prominent nonprofit democracy-promotion organizations that they
   (and USAID) support, including the two political-party institutes (the National Democratic Institute
   [NDI] and the International Republican Institute [IRI]), IFES, and Freedom House. As a private organization,
   NED operates at a partial remove from U.S. foreign policy, and its political approach is thus largely its own.
   NED’s core credo is to find and support democrats around the world engaged in the struggle for
   democracy—the essence of the political approach. Although NDI and IRI do some work on governance
   issues and give some attention to long-term, incremental institutional change, the thrust of most of their work
   is on the political process—above all, elections, parties, parliaments, and democratic civic activists, such as
   election-monitoring groups. The greater part of U.S. democracy aid, taken together from all
   sources and simply measured in dollar terms, probably goes to programs that
   proceed more from the developmental approach than the political one. This reflects
   USAID’s major role in the field. Yet the perceived profile of U.S. democracy aid, both domestically and
   internationally, is much more political than developmental. This disjunction reflects several fac- tors. The
   politically oriented U.S. democracy-promotion organizations, particularly NDI and IRI, are much more
   visible than the many for-profit consulting firms that carry out most of USAID’s developmentally oriented
   democracy assistance. Moreover, the activities that these politically ori- ented organizations carry out tend to

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   be much more visible—support for a high-profile group of student activists challenging a semi-authoritarian
   ruler, for example, attracts far more attention than a larger, long-term program of technocratic aid to
   strengthen rural municipal governance. In short, both the organizations that carry out the more political side
   of U.S. democracy aid as well as the kinds of programs that these organizations sponsor tend to “brand” U.S.
   democracy aid on the international scene. Political branding also occurs at another level. As noted above,
   during this decade the world has come to equate U.S. democracy promotion with the U.S.-led intervention in
   Iraq, an intervention that might be considered an extreme application of the political approach. Moreover, the
   U.S. involvement in supporting the color revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan—support that
   embodied the political approach—also attracted global attention, further branding U.S. democracy support as
   highly political. More generally, over the past twenty years, the U.S. foreign-policy establishment (beyond
   the specific community of democracy-aid provid- ers) has come to view democracy promotion as a
   fundamentally political rather than developmental challenge. The mainstream U.S. foreign-policy community
   pays primary attention to those U.S. programs that follow a political approach while largely ignoring the
   quieter, longer-term democracy-aid efforts that follow the developmental approach. 16 Journal of Democracy
   This inclination of the U.S. foreign-policy establishment toward the political approach to democracy aid and
   democracy promotion gener- ally is not hard to explain. As an assertive superpower for more than sixty
   years, the United States has a long-established habit, rooted in the belief that political outcomes in countries
   all around the world will have a direct bearing on U.S. security, of viewing the developing world (in fact, the
   whole world) as an arena for direct U.S. political engagement. Promoting democracy, through democracy aid
   and other means, is an important form of such political engagement, one way of trying to shape political
   outcomes favorable to the United States. Since the 1950s, the United States has taken some interest in
   supporting development around the world, but that interest has been based less on a concern for development
   per se than on development as a way to bolster political goals. These goals have included anticommunism
   during the Cold War and other U.S. security interests since then, from peace to antiterrorism.


Democracy assistance is made up of two major components, political and developmental
Carothers- vice-president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace-9
democracy assistance: political vs. developmental?
Journal of Democracy Volume 20, Number 1 January 2009
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/01_20_1_carothers.pdf

   As the field of international democracy assistance ages and to some extent matures, it is
   undergoing a process of diversification—in the ac tors involved, the range of countries where it
   operates, and the kinds of activities it comprises. Strategic differentiation is an important element
   of this diversification—democracy-aid providers are moving away from an early tendency to
   follow a one-size-fits-all strategy toward exploring varied strategies aimed at the increasingly
   diverse array of political con- texts in the world. A defining feature of this process of
   differentiation is the emergence of two distinct overall approaches to assisting
   democracy: the political approach and the developmental approach. The political
   approach proceeds from a relatively narrow conception of democracy—focused, above all,
   on elections and political liberties— and a view of democratization as a process of political
   struggle in which democrats work to gain the upper hand in society over nondemocrats. It
   directs aid at core political processes and institutions—especially elections, political parties,
   and politically oriented civil society groups—often at important conjunctural moments and
   with the hope of catalytic effects. The developmental approach rests on a broader notion of
   democracy, one that encompasses concerns about equality and justice and the concept of
   democratization as a slow, iterative process of change involving an interrelated set of political
   and socioeconomic developments. It favors democracy aid that pursues incremental, long-
   term change in a wide range of political and socioeconomic sectors, frequently emphasizing
   governance and the building of a well-functioning state.

Two approaches to democracy assistance – political and developmental


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Toornstra, European Parliament Office for Promotion of Parliamentary Democracy
Director, 10
[Dick, “Getting Acquainted: Setting the Stage for Democracy Assistance”
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdf/oppd/Page_8/getting_acquainted_web.pdf, p.14, accessed 5-17-11, TP]

Table 3: The Basic Approaches to Democracy Assistance




Democracy assistance includes political and socio-economic reform programs
Toornstra, European Parliament Office for Promotion of Parliamentary Democracy
Director, 10
[Dick, “Getting Acquainted: Setting the Stage for Democracy Assistance”
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdf/oppd/Page_8/getting_acquainted_web.pdf, p.15, accessed 5-17-11, TP]



                        Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
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   The Political and the Developmental Approach to Democracy Assistance The political approach is
   influenced by narrow, political conceptions of democracy and by the abovementioned genetic theories of
   democratisation. It therefore focuses on core political actors, institutions and processes and recognises
   the importance of crucial moments, particularly during the transition phase. Political democracy
   assistance typically concentrates on elections, for instance central electoral commissions and civic and
   voter education programmes, political parties, leading politicians, the media, civil rights-focused
   NGOs, parliaments and, to a more limited extent, the independent judiciary. It can at times be hugely
   challenging to the political regime, especially if it focuses on supporting the political opposition,
   dissidents, or external media that broadcasts into an authoritarian state. However, in most cases political
   assistance is less directly oppositional and carries out many of the examples of political assistance
   mentioned within the authoritarian or newly democratic state and hence with the acceptance of its
   government. 35 The developmental approach is inspired by broader concepts of democracy, in particular
   those encompassing the social dimension, 36 and by structural theories of democratisation. It therefore
   considers democratisation as a slow, gradual process entailing many small changes and reforms that
   eventually give rise to democracy, with the idea of the inter-linked nature of socio-economic and
   political reform playing a key role. It stresses, although not exclusively, the bottom-up approach and
   focuses on local-level reforms of which the decentralisation focus is the most prominent. It frequently
   combines democracy promotion with human rights promotion, due to conceptual overlaps and the
   fact that the latter is considered less ‘interfering’ and more acceptable than the former. All in all, the
   developmental approach avoids being confrontational and overtly political and prefers more neutral
   terminology to the language of democracy, politics or regime change.



Democracy assistance overlaps with development – USAID proves
USAID website ‘2
http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/cbj2003/cent_prog/dcha/dg.html

   USAID efforts to strengthen democracy and good governance worldwide anchor a balanced foreign policy
   approach. USAID extends democracy assistance worldwide; 80% of USAID field missions
   promote democracy and good governance as one of their development objectives. Of the total
   funding for USAID democracy programs in FY 2001, 20% was attributed to rule of law, 6%
   to elections and political processes, 39% to civil society, and thirty-five percent to governance.




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        Democracy Assistance – Excludes Development Assistance

Democracy assistance should be considered all aid for which the primary purpose, not the
secondary purpose or indirect purpose, is to foster democracy in the recipient countries---
Including indirect aid explodes the topic. Just because the USAID calls development
programs democracy assistance does not make it so.
Lappin-Faculty of Political Sciences at the University of Belgrade-10
What we talk about when we talk about democracy assistance
2010 - Volume 4, Issue 1 http://www.cejiss.org/sites/default/files/8.pdf

   Problems Resulting From Definitional Uncertainty Establishing the definitional clarity of democracy
   assistance is an important step towards understanding how three core problems have
   developed as a direct result of definitional uncertainties in democracy promotion terminology
   . The resultant problems concern, imprecise democracy assistance data, a neglect of the inherent limitations
   of democracy assistance, and the fostering of negative perceptions of democracy assistance . Imprecise
   Democracy Assistance Data The lack of definitional concreteness over what may be classified as democ-
   racy assistance has meant that ‘the available data concerning how much and by whom remains relatively soft,
   variable in quality and far from complete’ (Burnell 2000b: 339) . Typically, different countries and
   organisations use different classifications and indicators to define and record democracy
   assistance . Moreover, these figures are often merged into standard development projects,
   thus presenting major complications for the disaggregation of precise and direct democracy
   assistance from broad development statistics (Crawford and Kearton 2002; Green and Kohl 2007:
   159; Knack 2004: 266) . In one of the few detailed cross-national studies of democracy assistance, Richard
   Youngs et al . (2006: 21) lamented that ‘no standard or easily comparable classification of political aid
   existed across states’ and, worryingly, that several countries had to compile the data upon request .
   Therefore, even seemingly comparable data, such as that from the Creditor Reporting System (CRS) of
   OECD-DAC, can be decidedly misleading due to the inability to accurately disaggregate the data .
   Furthermore, as democracy has become increasingly associated with post- conflict
   peacebuilding, almost any international assistance effort that addresses any development or
   peacebuilding issues can arguably be labelled as ‘democracy assistance .’ In their study,
   Youngs et al. (2006: 21), note that ‘many states included in their democracy and
   governance categories aid projects that could not be reasonably said to have any
   meaningful bearing on political reform .’ Whilst Burnell (2000b: 339) has posited that some
   development agencies simply renamed their traditional development programmes
   as ‘democracy assistance’ to demonstrate that they were in tune with fashionable
   governance themes . Such fastidiousness on the boundaries of what should be considered
   as democracy assistance is not to undermine the impact that broader development assistance
   can have on democratisation . As Steve Finkel et al. (2007: 410) explain, indirect assistance ‘may
   promote modernisation, encourage better economic performance, and foster class
   transformations, all of which may have long-term implications for democratic development .’
   However, the concern is that such a broad definition can lead to an expansive laundry
   list of things which ‘assist’ democracy, such as general poverty alleviation or the build
   ing of schools . Burnell (2000c: 12) claims that, although at times beneficial, this is problematic
   because ‘if democracy assistance is defined as whatever helps democratisation directly or
   indirectly, sooner or later, then our sense of it could be so generous as to undermine the
   value of the term .’ Carothers (2000: 188) offers a route out of this dilemma in his argument
   that democracy assistance should be considered all aid ‘for which the primary
   purpose, not the secondary purpose or indirect purpose, is to foster democracy in
   the recipient countries . It does not therefore include economic and social aid
   programmes .’



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Democracy is technical assistance – that is directed primarily at democratic reform – not
socio-economic development
Huber, Hebrew University of Jerusalem Department of International Relations, 8
[Daniela, Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 13, No. 1, 43–62, March 2008, “Democracy Assistance in the Middle East
and North Africa: A Comparison of US and EU Policies”, p. 45-6,
http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/69109__790479070.pdf, accessed 6-3-11]

   What is Democracy Assistance?
   The term democracy assistance is used in academic literature, as well as in the programmes of the US and the
   EU, without comprehensive clarifications. This section will therefore outline the actor’s comprehensions of
   the term and the (however insufficient) academic literature on it. On this basis it will develop a definition of
   the term democracy assistance, which will be followed by the elaboration of a methodological framework.
   The US and EU have quite similar concepts of DA. USAID defines it as
          technical assistance and other support to strengthen capacity of reform-minded governments,
          nongovernmental actors, and/or citizens in order to develop and support democratic states and
          institutions that are responsive and accountable to citizens. These efforts also include promoting
          democratic transitions in countries that are not reform minded. Democracy programs promote
          the rule of law and human rights, transparent and fair elections coupled with a competitive
          political process, a free and independent media, stronger civil society and greater citizen
          participation in government, and governance structures that are efficient, responsive, and
          accountable. (USAID, 2005: 4)
   Similarly, the EU specifies the following categories of DA:
          These can include questions of democratic participation (including universal suffrage, free election,
          multiparty structure, equality of access to political activity, participatory decision making); human
          rights (including adherence to, and implementation of, commitments under international human rights
          Treaties and Conventions, protection of civil liberties, including freedom of speech and of assembly,
          effective operation of human rights monitoring); and the rule of law (including an independent and
          effective judiciary, transparent legal framework, equality of all citizens before the law, police and
          public administration subject to the law, enforcement of contractual obligations). (EC 2003a: 10)
   The American researcher Thomas Carothers gives a definition of DA which is closest to the understanding
   of this article: ‘Democracy aid is all aid, for which the primary purpose, not the secondary or indirect
   purpose, is to foster democracy in the recipient countries. It does not therefore include economic and
   social aid programs’ (Carothers, 2000: 188). In addition, two further characteristics of democracy
   assistance are introduced in order to differentiate it from other efforts at democracy promotion: first,
   it is not only an explicit or direct, but also a positive measure of foreign policy as opposed to negative
   measures such as sanctions or even military means.4 Second, it represents an active instrument, as the
   democracy promoter takes measures itself, whereas a passive instrument such as positive political
   conditionality implies that the democracy promoter rewards internal democracy promotion efforts.
   Table 1 visualizes the different democracy promotion instruments.

   Table 1. Democracy promotion instruments
                                 Explicit instruments                                      Implicit instruments

   Positive instruments             Democracy assistance (active instrument),              Classical development
                                    positive political conditionality                      aid
                                    (passive instrument)

   Negative instruments             Negative political conditionality, naming              Military action
                                    and shaming, military action

   Democracy assistance is the type of foreign policy that aims explicitly at positively and actively
   initiating democratization, supporting democratization or strengthening democracy, as well as human
   rights in foreign countries. This definition accounts for differing DA policies depending on the level of
   democratization in a recipient country ranging from non-democracies to countries in transition to
   consolidating or delegative democracies. Democratization is the process of transition from a non-


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   democratic to a democratic political system. The term human rights is included in the definition, as the
   actors understand it as an important part of their democracy assistance. Democracy is understood
   according to Robert Dahl’s concept of Polyarchy (Dahl, 1982) with its dimensions of competition and
   participation. This concept is narrow enough to exclude only liberalizing countries and it is wide enough for
   different understandings of democracy by the US and the EU. It also implies that DA is more than electoral
   assistance.


Democracy assistance must be directly related to liberalization and democratization---
excludes socio-economic assistance
Office for Promotion of Parliamentary Democracy, EU-10
Getting Acquainted: Setting the Stage for Democracy Assistance
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdf/oppd/Page_8/getting_acquainted_web.pdf

   "Democracy assistance – one of the tools of democracy promotion – can be defined as: all
   programmes and projects which are openly adopted, supported and/or (directly or indirectly)
   implemented by (public or private) foreign actors, (mainly) take place in target countries, in
   principle with the consent or toleration of these countries’ authorities, and are explicitly
   designed to directly contribute to the liberalisation, democratisation or consolidation of
   democracy of the target country.14 Thus, key characteristics of democracy assistance are that it works
   through programmes or projects which focus on changing behaviours and attitudes, or reforming institutions
   and processes in target states. Foreign actors can to different degrees be involved in the planning and
   implementation of activities, but usually bear most of the financial costs . In order to work, and
   intensively engage with local actors and institutions, democracy assistance is in principle
   implemented within the target state rather than abroad. The nature of some assistance
   projects, such as study visits, may exceptionally involve assistance implemented externally.
   Democracy assistance programmes and projects are implemented openly rather than
   secretly. However, individual aid recipients can at times, for their own protection, remain unidentified.
   Secret money transfers may help democratisation processes, but are different in nature to
   assistance. Democracy assistance requires, in theory, the consent of or at least toleration by
   the target state’s authorities, otherwise it cannot be transparent, nor can it be implemented
   or reach its potential. Finally, by definition, democracy assistance exists to facilitate
   democratisation and excludes activities which might only indirectly affect
   democratisation, in particular socio-economic assistance."


Democracy assistance is distinct from economic development programs – practice proves
Dobriansky, the Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs, (2005)
[Paula J, 6-20-05, “Strategies on Democracy Promotion”, Remarks to the Hudson Institute,
http://www.dwiprayogo.appspot.com/2001-2009.state.gov/g/rls/rm/2005/48394.htm, accessed 6-2-11]

   Economic, financial and technical assistance to foreign governments and non-governmental
   organizations is crucial to support democracy. This can range from funds to hold elections, to
   foreign aid conditioned on good governance to the denial of financial assistance to those
   unwilling to reform. Likewise, it is not just our democracy assistance that is supporting
   this goal. For example, the Millennium Challenge Account, a poverty reduction tool,
   is an example of how assistance tied to good governance can reinforce the values and
   objectives of our democracy promotion strategy. The Middle Eastern Partnership Initiative,
   which was founded to support economic, political, and educational reform efforts in the
   Middle East, is making significant progress in furthering democracy.




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Democracy assistance is distinct from governance, human rights, and civil society support
Youngs-director of the democratization program at FRIDE in Madrid-8
Trends in Democracy Assistance What has EuropE BEEn Doing? Journal of Democracy Volume 19, Number 2
April 2008
http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/FRIDE_JOD_trendsindemoasst_whathasEuropebeendoing.pdf

   Making a direct comparison between European and U.S. levels of democracy assistance is
   nearly impossible. European donors—the EU itself as well as individual member states—
   actively work on political- reform issues and administer numerous democracy-related
   budgets. These initiatives are often defined in a variety of ways and combine democracy
   assistance with governance, human rights, and civil society support (see Table 1 on p. 162).
   European donors generally resist the notion that democracy aid can be separated from these related issues. In
   most cases, assistance to political reform, broadly defined, has increased incrementally, if unspectacularly,
   during the last decade.




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            Democracy Assistance – Includes Security Apparatus


Democracy assistance includes military/police training
Mitchell, Columbia University School of International and Political Affairs International
Politics professor, and Phillips, National Committee on American Foreign Policy Project
Director, 8
 [Lincoln A. and David L., Columbia University Center for the Study of Human Rights visiting scholar, Jan 08,
“Enhancing Democracy Assistance” ,
http://www.acus.org/files/publication_pdfs/65/Enhancing%20Democracy%20Assistance.pdf, p.14-15, accessed 5-
29-11, AFB]

   Reform the Security Sector
   Organs of the security sector should exist to protect civil liberties, uphold human dignity, and serve the
   public good. Subordinate to civilian authority, they are accountable for their conduct and restrained from
   intervening in the private life of citizens except under specific circumstances. Instituting and maintaining
   accountability, respect for human rights, and budgetary oversight within the security forces is critical to
   democratization. To date, democracy assistance targeting the security services has usually been done “mil-to-
   mil” (e.g. the International Military Assistance and Training Program).
   - 14 -
   Recommendations:
   – Create standards drawing upon the Code of Civil-Military Conduct (Organization for Security and
   Cooperation in Europe) and country codes (e.g. Switzerland’s “Democratic Control of the Armed Forces”).
   – Offer instruction at staff colleges on “democratic policing” that will inform civil-military relations and
   subordinate the security services to the democratically elected government.
   – Guard against abuses by providing human rights training to security personnel helping them distinguish
   between legitimate law enforcement activities and human rights offenses.
   – Provide instruction on the norms that govern arrest, detention, and the use of force.
   – Pay adequate salaries and benefits to security personnel to discourage plunder and corruption.
   – Emphasize prevention through community-based policing that employs local residents and deploys
   them to areas where they have family or communal affiliations.
   – Mainstream security sector reform into an overall democratization strategy that uses both civilian and
   military agencies for implementation.
   – Enhance the role of civilians in military affairs, including legislative oversight of military budgets and
   operations.


Democracy assistance includes police training, human rights training
The National Committee on American Foreign, Saltzman Institute of War and Peace at
Columbia, The Atlantic Council-‘8
ENHANCING DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE
http://www.acus.org/files/publication_pdfs/65/Enhancing%20Democracy%20Assistance.pdf

   For illiberal democracies, this report highlights the importance of an independent judiciary and the rule of
   law in constraining despotic tendencies. To guard against inadvertently strengthening illiberal leaders, it
   recommends linking governance with democracy assistance while emphasizing participation, contestation,
   and accountability. In particular, it proposes security sector reform with a focus on democratic policing and
   human rights training.




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                      Democracy Assistance – Includes Military


Democracy assistance can involve working with the military
Democracy Digest, 6-1-11
[6-1-11, Democracy Digest, “Linking grass roots to government in the ‘democracy
bureaucracy’”http://www.demdigest.net/blog/2011/06/linking-grass-roots-to-government-in-the-democracy-
bureaucracy/, accessed 6-5-11, AFB]

   Democracy assistance is more of an art than a science, at least judging by Tom Melia’s experience.
   Formerly a senior official at the National Democratic Institute and Freedom House, he was last year
   appointed deputy assistant secretary in the State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights
   and Labor.
   Supporting democracy ‘in the most unlikely places’ entails seizing unanticipated opportunities and
   working with a diverse range of actors from grass roots NGOs and activists to government agencies,
   including the military, he tells The Washington Post:
   Q: You’ve been doing democracy promotion for 25 years or so, right? How did you get into this?
   A: I was working for [New York Sen.] Pat Moynihan in the 1980s when the idea of the National Endowment
   for Democracy was bouncing around and eventually came to fruition. And I got interested in this kind of
   nongovernmental kind of international relations.
   The idea that political parties and civic groups could cross borders, help one another out to care about what
   goes on in other countries …..
   You were at the National Democratic Institute for a number of years. I noticed from 1993 to 1996 you were
   doing their Middle East projects. At that time, did you glimpse the possibility of this tide of pro-democracy
   movements?
   Yes, because we had just spent several busy years in Eastern Europe. So I was fully persuaded that change
   was possible in the most unlikely places.
   The projects that you did back then, did they bear fruit?
   Yeah. I first went to Egypt in the autumn of 1995. …. We had translated into Arabic a manual on how
   domestic election-monitoring efforts had been organized in countries all over the world . ….. I would hand
   over copies of this Arabic-language manual [to journalists, activists, political parties], and say, ‘This is the
   kind of thing you could do maybe in five years, for the next elections.’ …..
   So the last meeting I had on my way to the airport was at the Ibn Khaldun Center [for Development Studies]
   ….. [Its director] grabs me at the door and says, ‘Come on in, they’re waiting for you’ and pulls me into a
   conference room. And half the people I’d met in the previous three days were in this conference room. …..
   And they all had the manuals out on the table. He said, ‘We’re going to do this, for next month’s election.’
   I said, ‘No, you don’t understand — this takes time and organizing and money.’ ….. He said, ‘Yeah, we
   understand all that stuff. It’s not going to be perfect, but we’re going to do it anyway.’ And I got back to
   Washington and I went to the National Endowment for Democracy and got an emergency grant of $25,000 to
   be wired. ….
   They created the first independent report about the conduct of elections in Egypt. And so, since then, in every
   election — presidential or parliamentary or local — there have been independent election monitors in Egypt.
   In 2006, you wrote a paper on how to reform the “democracy bureaucracy” and said there was too little
   strategic thinking, too much micromanagement. Now that you’re in government, is that still true?
   There are a lot of forces that conspire against strategic thinking and that encourage micromanagement. …..
   Stuff happens in the world that’s unexpected, that confounds one’s strategies, upsets assumptions. And
   the press of daily events in our lives here — what foreign governments say or do, what the press brings
   to us and what the Congress demands of us — crowds out, very often, strategic vision.




                         Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
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                          Democracy Assistance – Not Military

Democracy is positive – excludes military action
Huber, Hebrew University of Jerusalem Department of International Relations, 8
[Daniela, Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 13, No. 1, 43–62, March 2008, “Democracy Assistance in the Middle East
and North Africa: A Comparison of US and EU Policies”, p. 45-6,
http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/69109__790479070.pdf, accessed 6-3-11]

   What is Democracy Assistance?
   The term democracy assistance is used in academic literature, as well as in the programmes of the US and the
   EU, without comprehensive clarifications. This section will therefore outline the actor’s comprehensions of
   the term and the (however insufficient) academic literature on it. On this basis it will develop a definition of
   the term democracy assistance, which will be followed by the elaboration of a methodological framework.
   The US and EU have quite similar concepts of DA. USAID defines it as
          technical assistance and other support to strengthen capacity of reform-minded governments,
          nongovernmental actors, and/or citizens in order to develop and support democratic states and
          institutions that are responsive and accountable to citizens. These efforts also include promoting
          democratic transitions in countries that are not reform minded. Democracy programs promote
          the rule of law and human rights, transparent and fair elections coupled with a competitive
          political process, a free and independent media, stronger civil society and greater citizen
          participation in government, and governance structures that are efficient, responsive, and
          accountable. (USAID, 2005: 4)
   Similarly, the EU specifies the following categories of DA:
          These can include questions of democratic participation (including universal suffrage, free election,
          multiparty structure, equality of access to political activity, participatory decision making); human
          rights (including adherence to, and implementation of, commitments under international human rights
          Treaties and Conventions, protection of civil liberties, including freedom of speech and of assembly,
          effective operation of human rights monitoring); and the rule of law (including an independent and
          effective judiciary, transparent legal framework, equality of all citizens before the law, police and
          public administration subject to the law, enforcement of contractual obligations). (EC 2003a: 10)
   The American researcher Thomas Carothers gives a definition of DA which is closest to the understanding
   of this article: ‘Democracy aid is all aid, for which the primary purpose, not the secondary or indirect
   purpose, is to foster democracy in the recipient countries. It does not therefore include economic and
   social aid programs’ (Carothers, 2000: 188). In addition, two further characteristics of democracy
   assistance are introduced in order to differentiate it from other efforts at democracy promotion: first,
   it is not only an explicit or direct, but also a positive measure of foreign policy as opposed to negative
   measures such as sanctions or even military means.4 Second, it represents an active instrument, as the
   democracy promoter takes measures itself, whereas a passive instrument such as positive political
   conditionality implies that the democracy promoter rewards internal democracy promotion efforts.
   Table 1 visualizes the different democracy promotion instruments.

   Table 1. Democracy promotion instruments
                                 Explicit instruments                                      Implicit instruments

   Positive instruments             Democracy assistance (active instrument),              Classical development
                                    positive political conditionality                      aid
                                    (passive instrument)

   Negative instruments             Negative political conditionality, naming              Military action
                                    and shaming, military action

   Democracy assistance is the type of foreign policy that aims explicitly at positively and actively
   initiating democratization, supporting democratization or strengthening democracy, as well as human
   rights in foreign countries. This definition accounts for differing DA policies depending on the level of
   democratization in a recipient country ranging from non-democracies to countries in transition to

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   consolidating or delegative democracies. Democratization is the process of transition from a non-
   democratic to a democratic political system. The term human rights is included in the definition, as the
   actors understand it as an important part of their democracy assistance. Democracy is understood
   according to Robert Dahl’s concept of Polyarchy (Dahl, 1982) with its dimensions of competition and
   participation. This concept is narrow enough to exclude only liberalizing countries and it is wide enough for
   different understandings of democracy by the US and the EU. It also implies that DA is more than electoral
   assistance.


One should be careful not to lump democracy assistance in with military assistance- they’re
recognized as two separate categories within the overall budget.
McInerney ’10
[Stephen, Director of Advocacy for the Project on Middle East Democracy, “The Federal Budget and
Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2011,” http://pomed.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2010/04/fy11-budget-
analysis-final.pdf]

   Support for democracy goes far beyond funding levels or assistance programs. How funds are spent matters
   as much as the amounts being spent. Moreover, diplomatic support and a range of other policy tools must
   complement any funding or programming. The levels of funding found in the annual budget merely reflect
   one component of what necessarily must be a complex, multifaceted task. These levels, however, certainly
   deserve to be examined, not only for their substantive impact, but also for the signals they send both to
   reformers and to the region’s governments. Finally, in a report examining funding levels and budget
   priorities, it must be noted that despite the Obama administration’s stated intention to support
   “broader engagement” with Middle Eastern countries, U.S. assistance to the region remains dominated
   by aid for regional militaries. Leaving aside Iraq, the FY11 budget requests $5.1 billion for military
   assistance to the Middle East but only $1.3 billion for non-military assistance and initiatives, of which
   $225.9 million is designated to support democracy and governance. Moreover, these figures are
   dwarfed by the $159.3 billion requested for Department of Defense expenditures in Iraq and
   Afghanistan. If the U.S. intends to credibly convey support for the region’s people and not merely its
   authoritarian governments, the vast disparity between military and soft power spending in the region
   must be reconsidered.


Democracy assistance excludes military intervention
Lappin, University of Leuven (Belgium) Centre for Peace Research and Strategic Studies
PhD candidate, 2010
[Richard, participant in democracy assistance missions with the UN, EU, OSCE, and Carter Center, University of
Belgrade political sciences visiting scholar, Central European Journal of International & Security Studies, Volume 4
Issue 1, “What we talk about when we talk about democracy assistance: the problem of definition in post-conflict
approaches to democratization” http://www.cejiss.org/issue/2010-volume-4-issue-1/lappin, p.188-9, accessed 5-16-
11, TP]

   In defining democracy assistance, it is paramount that the distinction between democracy assistance
   and democracy promotion is established. Although democracy promotion is often used interchangeably
   with democracy assistance, the latter should be recognised as only a small and distinct part of a much
   broader democracy promotion approach. As the table below illustrates, democracy promotion
   comprises several instruments, both positive and negative, both explicit and implicit, of which
   democracy assistance is only one distinct part. On the negative side, there is direct military action,
   which includes armed intervention to promote democracy and can be either explicit (to install a
   democratic regime, as in Afghanistan) or implicit (to curb an anti-democratic regime, as in the first Iraq
   war). In addition, there is also the explicit tool of negative political conditionality, or ‘naming and
   shaming’, in which membership from international organisations may be suspended, economic
   sanctions applied, and embargoes enforced. On the positive side, there is the implicit instrument of
   classical development aid which seeks to foster improved socioeconomic conditions which may
   consequently lead to democratic developments. Additionally, there is the positive instrument of
   international interim administrations, as was the case in East Timor, where the democratic transition is

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   directly controlled and managed in its entirety by international actors. There is also the explicit
   instrument of positive political conditionality, which can include offers of membership in
   intergovernmental organisations, security guarantees, or economic and trade benefits. Finally, on the
   positive side, there is the distinct instrument of democracy assistance. Democracy assistance differs from
   all other forms of democracy promotion in several important ways. First, it is distinct from military
   action insofar that it does not ‘enforce’ democracy, and from international interim administration
   insofar that it does not ‘manage’ democracy. Second, democracy assistance is directed primarily and
   exclusively at fostering democracy, as opposed to classical development aid in which democracy is
   usually only a secondary concern. Third, democracy assistance is distinct from positive political
   conditionality insofar that it encompasses direct and active measures, rather than passive tools.
   Democracy assistance can be further differentiated from political conditionality insofar that it is
   neither a reward nor a punishment, neither a carrot nor a stick, but rather a ‘booster’ to internal groups
   already working towards democratization. Democracy assistance is not concerned with ‘exporting
   democracy’(Schraeder 2002) or ‘spreading democracy’(Hobsbawm 2004) irrespective of the readiness of
   a given country; rather, democracy assistance explicitly recognises that ‘the primary motive force for
   democratisation is and must be internal to the country in question’ (Burnell 2000c: 9), and that the
   exclusive intention is ‘to help domestic actors achieve what they have already decided they want for
   themselves’ (Carothers 2007b: 22). Democracy assistance is therefore a very precise instrument within
   a broader democracy promotion paradigm.


Assistance is a distinct form of positive democracy promotion – excludes coercive and
conditional tools
Toornstra, European Parliament Office for Promotion of Parliamentary Democracy
Director, 10
[Dick, “Getting Acquainted: Setting the Stage for Democracy Assistance”
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdf/oppd/Page_8/getting_acquainted_web.pdf, p.7-8, accessed 5-17-11, TP]

   There are three major approaches to democracy promotion (see Table 1): 1) the coercive approach,
   2) conditionality, and 3) the consensual approach. The coercive, or ‘negative’ or ‘punitive’ approach,
   involves the use of military, economic or political force or pressure to (re)establish a democratic
   regime against the will of a state’s authorities. Major coercive instruments of democracy promotion
   include military intervention, general economic sanctions and targeted diplomatic, economic, financial
   and military sanctions. Political conditionality links benefits to the fulfilment of conditions relating to
   the protection of democratic principles and human rights. Benefits can be removed by way of
   punishment or used to reward the completion of certain actions. Examples of conditionality include:
   suspension or redirection of assistance away from governmental channels to civil society; suspension
   of trade and cooperation agreements; EU membership conditionality; and EU incentive schemes, such
   as the General System of Preferences + (GSP+), 11 ‘Governance Facility’ for European Neighbourhood
   (ENP) states 12 and ‘Governance Initiative’ for African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states. 13 The
   consensual or positive approach is characterised by the consent or at least toleration of the target
   state’s authorities, the absence of coercion, active and positive engagement by the foreign actor, pro-
   active rather than reactive involvement, and by direct engagement with local individuals and
   institutions. Consensual tools of democracy promotion include human rights dialogue, EU human
   rights monitoring mechanisms, election monitoring, diplomatic measures and – highly important and
   the focus of this paper – democracy assistance.




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              Democracy Assistance – Includes International Law


International law is a form of democracy assistance
Lappin, University of Leuven (Belgium) Centre for Peace Research and Strategic Studies
PhD candidate, 10
[Richard, participant in democracy assistance missions with the UN, EU, OSCE, and Carter Center, University of
Belgrade political sciences visiting scholar, Central European Journal of International & Security Studies, Volume 4
Issue 1, “What we talk about when we talk about democracy assistance: the problem of definition in post-conflict
approaches to democratization” http://www.cejiss.org/issue/2010-volume-4-issue-1/lappin, p.186, accessed 5-16-11,
TP]

   Democracy assistance organisations themselves were also influenced by the wider external context.
   Democracy was arguably already on the march and Huntington’s (1991) ‘third wave’ thesis famously
   illustrated how a multitude of states were already taking the democratic leap from as early as 1974. In fact,
   since the 1960s, it is estimated that there has been more than 120 episodes of democratisation in nearly 90
   countries (Kapstein and Converse 2008: 57). This trend is further supported by Freedom House who have
   measured global trends in freedom and democracy since 1972 and report that both have demonstrated
   a steady increase in the past 35 years. Accompanying this already existing trend towards democracy,
   was a growing recognition of individual human rights. Within this area, civil society organisations, such
   as Amnesty International, have grown exponentially in the past twenty years and have reached across
   national borders in their efforts to promote the respect of individual rights. The impact was evidenced
   in international law, with both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
   International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights coming into force in 1976. Similarly,
   the US, often viewed as a leader of the ‘free world,’ witnessed a Congress that passed 25 pieces of
   legislation linking foreign policy to human rights under the presidency of Jimmy Carter (Burnell 2000a: 37).
   The growing recognition of international human rights is seen by many to provide a solid foundation
   for democracy assistance. As Hans Peter Schmitz (2004: 408) states, ‘transnational activists diffuse
   democratic principles, support domestic allies, and exert pressure on authoritarian regimes.’




                         Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
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            Democracy Assistance – Democracy Assistance Vague

Democracy assistance is made up on the fly
Michael McFaul, professor at Stanford, quoted in CRS Report to Congress, 12-26-7,
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34296.pdf

   Currently, there is a scarcity of literature to inform and guide the decisions of senior policymakers.... Every
   day, literally tens of thousands of people in the democracy promotion business go to work without training
   manuals or blueprints in hand. Even published case studies of previous successes are hard to find in the
   public domain, which means that democracy assistance efforts are often reinventing the wheel or making it
   up as they go along, as was on vivid display in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Even basic educational materials
   for students seeking to specialize in democracy promotion do not exist.

   [Posted on Forums, by Cram-Helwich, 5-16-11,
   http://www.cedadebate.org/forum/index.php?topic=2414.msg4802#msg4802]


Democracy assistance is art, not science – adapts to context
Democracy Digest, 6-1-11
[6-1-11, Democracy Digest, “Linking grass roots to government in the ‘democracy
bureaucracy’”http://www.demdigest.net/blog/2011/06/linking-grass-roots-to-government-in-the-democracy-
bureaucracy/, accessed 6-5-11, AFB]

   Democracy assistance is more of an art than a science, at least judging by Tom Melia’s experience.
   Formerly a senior official at the National Democratic Institute and Freedom House, he was last year
   appointed deputy assistant secretary in the State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights
   and Labor.
   Supporting democracy ‘in the most unlikely places’ entails seizing unanticipated opportunities and
   working with a diverse range of actors from grass roots NGOs and activists to government agencies,
   including the military, he tells The Washington Post:
   Q: You’ve been doing democracy promotion for 25 years or so, right? How did you get into this?
   A: I was working for [New York Sen.] Pat Moynihan in the 1980s when the idea of the National Endowment
   for Democracy was bouncing around and eventually came to fruition. And I got interested in this kind of
   nongovernmental kind of international relations.
   The idea that political parties and civic groups could cross borders, help one another out to care about
   what goes on in other countries …..
   You were at the National Democratic Institute for a number of years. I noticed from 1993 to 1996 you were
   doing their Middle East projects. At that time, did you glimpse the possibility of this tide of pro-democracy
   movements?
   Yes, because we had just spent several busy years in Eastern Europe. So I was fully persuaded that change
   was possible in the most unlikely places.
   The projects that you did back then, did they bear fruit?
   Yeah. I first went to Egypt in the autumn of 1995. …. We had translated into Arabic a manual on how
   domestic election-monitoring efforts had been organized in countries all over the world . ….. I would hand
   over copies of this Arabic-language manual [to journalists, activists, political parties], and say, ‘This is the
   kind of thing you could do maybe in five years, for the next elections.’ …..
   So the last meeting I had on my way to the airport was at the Ibn Khaldun Center [for Development Studies]
   ….. [Its director] grabs me at the door and says, ‘Come on in, they’re waiting for you’ and pulls me into a
   conference room. And half the people I’d met in the previous three days were in this conference room. …..
   And they all had the manuals out on the table. He said, ‘We’re going to do this, for next month’s election.’
   I said, ‘No, you don’t understand — this takes time and organizing and money.’ ….. He said, ‘Yeah, we
   understand all that stuff. It’s not going to be perfect, but we’re going to do it anyway.’ And I got back to
   Washington and I went to the National Endowment for Democracy and got an emergency grant of $25,000 to
   be wired. ….


                         Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
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   They created the first independent report about the conduct of elections in Egypt. And so, since then, in every
   election — presidential or parliamentary or local — there have been independent election monitors in Egypt.
   In 2006, you wrote a paper on how to reform the “democracy bureaucracy” and said there was too little
   strategic thinking, too much micromanagement. Now that you’re in government, is that still true?
   There are a lot of forces that conspire against strategic thinking and that encourage micromanagement. …..
   Stuff happens in the world that’s unexpected, that confounds one’s strategies, upsets assumptions. And
   the press of daily events in our lives here — what foreign governments say or do, what the press brings
   to us and what the Congress demands of us — crowds out, very often, strategic vision.


Democracy assistance in need of an overarching concept of democracy.
National Research Council Report, '08
(Improving Democracy Assistance: Building Knowledge Through Evaluations and Research (2008) IMPROVING
DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE, Building Knowledge Through Evaluations and Research, Committee on Evaluation
of USAID Democracy Assistance Programs, Development, Security, and Cooperation Policy and Global Affairs,
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES,
http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12164&page=23, acsd 5/25/11)

    Ideally, USAID and other providers of DG assistance would be guided in achieving their goals by a well-
    defined theory of democratic development that could identify where a recipient country stood on feasible
    trajectories toward stable democracy and which elements or driving factors needed to be supplied or
    strengthened in order to overcome obstacles and move forward on such a trajectory. It would then select among
    programs known to provide or strengthen those specific elements and tailor their implementation to that
    country’s specific needs.




                         Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
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                 Democracy Assistance – AT – Democracy Vague


Problems defining democracy haven’t prevented growth in democracy assistance
Goldstone, George Mason Public Policy professor and National Research Council
Committee on Evaluation of USAID Democracy Assistance Programs chair, 8
[Jack A., “Improving Democracy Assistance: Building Knowledge Through Evaluations and Research”,
http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12164&page=23, accessed 5-27-11]

   Unfortunately, the growth of widely accepted findings regarding the causes and consequences of
   democratization has lagged behind the growth of democracy assistance activities. Scholars continue to
   debate exactly how to define democracy, what pathways lead most reliably to full liberal democracy,
   what the necessary conditions are to achieve and stabilize democracies, and what the consequences are of
   transitions to democracy for various sets of institutions and geohistorical contexts (Lowenthal 1991, Lijphart
   1999, Cox et al 2000, Przeworski et al 2000, Diamond and Plattner 2001, Mansfield and Snyder 2002, Bunce
   2003, Chua 2003, Junne and Cross 2003, Acemoglu and Robinson 2005, Pevehouse 2005, Shapiro 2005,
   Bunce and Wolchik 2006, Tilly 2007). In policy terms this means that scholars can provide only
   qualified advice on how to move countries from dictatorship to stable and full liberal democracy; on how
   to shore up recently emerged or fragile democracies; or on precisely how to use democratization to
   address problems of terrorism, domestic or international conflict, or economic decay. It is probably
   fair to say that scholars know far more about what fully democratic countries look like and how they
   function than about how nondemocratic or partially democratic countries make the transition to stable
   full democracies.

        [posted by Kuswa, 5-26-11, http://www.cedadebate.org/forum/index.php?topic=2428.msg4901#msg4901]


Even if hard to quantify, examples of democracy assistance inputs exist
Peter Burnell, Department of International Studies, University of Warwick, 2008, ―From
Evaluating Democracy Assistance to Appraising Democracy Promotion‖ Political Studies,
(Vol 56, 414–434), p. 425
   First, there are the inputs into democracy promotion. These include: money; managerial ability;
   organisational expertise; professional competence; technical know-how; insights from political science;
   diplomatic skills; what President Bush calls ‘political capital’; trust or social capital among partners;
   military intelligence; and the ability to make credible threats and a capacity to coerce. In addition to
   such resources, all of which have played some part in attempts to promote democracy, there is the more
   passive side of international influence, where democracy effects have occurred but were not intended.
   Much of Nye’s (2005) idea of soft power probably works in this way. It is not obvious how rates of
   return to the different inputs to active promotion of democracy could be compared scientifically. There
   is no common unit of value for measuring them. Moreover, whereas some of the inputs must be
   regarded as consumables that are used up in the exercise, like money spent, other inputs could be self-
   generating and actually accumulate through use. In certain circumstances an exercise of power or
   influence begets yet more of the same, whereas different circumstances will see the stock drawn down.

[Arab Spring Controversy Paper, p. 15]




                         Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
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        ***Democracy Assistance Definitions – Implementation




                Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
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                            Democracy Assistance – Programs

USAID DG and State HRDF programs are purely democracy assistance initiatives
Huber, Hebrew University of Jerusalem Department of International Relations, 8
[Daniela, Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 13, No. 1, 43–62, March 2008, “Democracy Assistance in the Middle East
and North Africa: A Comparison of US and EU Policies”, p. 47,
http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/69109__790479070.pdf, accessed 6-3-11]

   The indicator for the who-question is recipient countries, as the other possible actors (state institutions,
   political society, civil society, project designers and implementers) are already covered by the substance and
   method indicators. The indicator recipient countries examines three topics: (1) the countries that receive DA
   and the countries that do not, (2) the amount of DA that they maintain and therewith the focus countries and
   (3) the criteria according to which DA is distributed.
   The programmes will be screened on the basis of these indicators. This is less important for USAID
   DG, HRDF and EIDHR, which are pure DA initiatives, but more important for MEPI and EMP/ENP,
   which are not purely DA initiatives. This study, however, only looks at the DA part of the latter.
   Information and data about the programmes are drawn from the information that the US and EU provide on
   their homepages, as well as from interviews with officials and experts.

   [Note – DG = Democracy and Governance Unit of USAID (USAID DG), HRDF = Human Rights and
   Democracy Initiative (HRDF), EIDHR, EMP/ENP = European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
   (EIDHR), the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).]


MEPI is not an exclusively democracy assistance initiative
Huber, Hebrew University of Jerusalem Department of International Relations, 8
[Daniela, Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 13, No. 1, 43–62, March 2008, “Democracy Assistance in the Middle East
and North Africa: A Comparison of US and EU Policies”, p. 47,
http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/69109__790479070.pdf, accessed 6-3-11]

   The indicator for the who-question is recipient countries, as the other possible actors (state institutions,
   political society, civil society, project designers and implementers) are already covered by the substance and
   method indicators. The indicator recipient countries examines three topics: (1) the countries that receive DA
   and the countries that do not, (2) the amount of DA that they maintain and therewith the focus countries and
   (3) the criteria according to which DA is distributed.
   The programmes will be screened on the basis of these indicators. This is less important for USAID
   DG, HRDF and EIDHR, which are pure DA initiatives, but more important for MEPI and EMP/ENP,
   which are not purely DA initiatives. This study, however, only looks at the DA part of the latter.
   Information and data about the programmes are drawn from the information that the US and EU provide on
   their homepages, as well as from interviews with officials and experts.

   [Note – DG = Democracy and Governance Unit of USAID (USAID DG), HRDF = Human Rights and
   Democracy Initiative (HRDF), EIDHR, EMP/ENP = European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
   (EIDHR), the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).]




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                      Democracy Assistance – Actors/Programs


US democracy assistance provided by USAID, State DRL and NED, and includes:
    USAID - Media, labor, judicial reforms, local governance, legislative strengthening,
      elections,
    State DRL – Grants to NGOs to strengthen democratic institutions, promote human
      rights, and build civil society,
    NED – half to “four core institutes”, half to grants to NGOs to promote human
      rights, independent media, rule of law, civic education, and the development of civil
      society in general.
United States Government Accountability Office, Report to Congressional Committees,
September 2009
“DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE: U.S. Agencies Take Steps to Coordinate International Programs but Lack
Information on Some U.S.-funded Activities” http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PCAAB950.pdf p. 11-14

   USAID, State DRL, and NED fund democracy assistance programs in countries throughout the world.
   USAID’s and State DRL’s foreign assistance programs are funded under the Foreign Operations
   appropriation and tracked by State as part of GJD funding, while NED’s core budget is funded under
   the State Operations appropriation and is not tracked as part of GJD foreign assistance funding.
   U.S. Agency for International Development. In fiscal years 2006 through 2008, USAID democracy programs
   operated in 88 countries worldwide. USAID’s Office of Democracy and Governance, based in Washington,
   D.C., supports USAID’s democracy programs worldwide, but these programs are primarily designed and
   managed by USAID missions in the field. USAID democracy programs cover a large variety of issues
   including media, labor, judicial reforms, local governance, legislative strengthening, and elections.
   USAID programs are managed by technical officers, typically based in missions in the field, who develop
   strategies and assessments, design programs, and monitor the performance of projects by collecting and
   reviewing performance reports from implementing partners and conducting site visits, typically at least
   monthly.
   Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. State DRL implements the Human Rights Democracy
   Fund, established in fiscal year 1998, providing grants primarily to U.S. nonprofit organizations to
   strengthen democratic institutions, promote human rights, and build civil society mainly in fragile
   democracies and authoritarian states. In 2006 through 2008, State DRL’s programs operated in 66
   countries worldwide. According to State, State DRL strives to fund innovative programs focused on
   providing immediate short term assistance in response to emerging events. In addition, State DRL can
   also fill gaps in USAID democracy funding (see app. II). Unlike USAID, State DRL manages its democracy
   grant program centrally. State DRL’s Washington-based staff monitor these grants by collecting and
   reviewing quarterly reports from grantees and conducting site visits, typically through annual visits to
   participating countries.17
   National Endowment for Democracy. In 1983, Congress authorized initial funding for NED, a private,
   nonprofit, nongovernmental organization.18 NED’s core budget is funded primarily through an annual
   congressional appropriation and NED receives additional funding from State to support
   congressionally directed or discretionary programs.19 The legislation recognizing the creation of NED
   and authorizing its funding, known as the NED Act, requires NED to report annually to Congress on its
   operations, activities, and accomplishments as well as on the results of an independent financial audit.20 The
   act does not require NED to report to State on the use of its core appropriation; however, State requires NED
   to provide quarterly financial reporting and annual programmatic reporting on the use of the congressionally
   directed and discretionary grants it receives from State.21 NED funds indigenous partners with grants
   that typically last for about a year. NED monitors program activities through quarterly program and
   financial reports from grantees and site visits, performed on average about once per year, to verify program
   and budgetary information. About half of NED’s total annual core grant funding is awarded to four
   affiliated organizations, known as core institutes.22 The remaining funds are used to provide hundreds



                         Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
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   of grants to NGOs in more than 90 countries to promote human rights, independent media, rule of law,
   civic education, and the development of civil society in general.

   Footnote 18
   The legislation authorizing funding for NED, National Endowment for Democracy Act, spells out six
   purposes for the endowment: encouraging democratic institutions through private sector initiatives;
   facilitating exchanges between U.S. private sector groups and democratic groups abroad; promoting
   U.S. nongovernmental participation in democratic training programs; strengthening democratic
   electoral processes abroad in cooperation with indigenous democratic forces; supporting the
   participation of U.S. private sector groups in fostering cooperation with those abroad "dedicated to the
   cultural values, institutions, and organizations of democratic pluralism;" and encouraging democratic
   development consistent with the interests of both the United States and the democratic groups in other
   countries receiving assistance from programs funded by the Endowment. See Pub. L. No. 98-164, Title
   V, 97 Stat. 1017 (1983).

   [Notes – DRL = Department of State’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, GJD = Governing
   Justly and Democratically]

   [Posted on Forums, by Stables, 5-30-11,
   http://www.cedadebate.org/forum/index.php?topic=2422.msg4916#msg4916]



Congress has tasked the House Democracy Assistance Commission (HDAC) with managing
legislative democracy assistance programs with governments across the world.
Katulis ’09
[Brian, senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, “Democracy Promotion in the Middle East and the
Obama Administration,” http://tcf.org/publications/pdfs/pb681/Katulis.pdf]

    In addition to executive branch agencies, private sector groups, and nongovernmental organizations, the United
    States should increase its efforts to boost ties between Congress and legislative institutions around the world.
    Members of the U.S. Congress often engage with the executive branches of other governments, and having
    more members of Congress develop ties with their counterparts in Arab legislatures is another avenue for
    pragmatically supporting reform that emphasizes more checks and balances in political systems in the Arab
    world. The bipartisan House Democracy Assistance Commission (HDAC), organized by
    Representatives David Dreier (R-CA) and David Price (D-NC), has worked to develop the
    institutional capacities of legislatures in several countries around the world, including Lebanon.
    14 Diversifying the U.S. democracy promotion toolbox to include efforts such as those of the
    HDAC, which include advice and support on all aspects of legislative management and
    governance, sends the right message to governments about the importance the United States
    places on democratic governances.




                         Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
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                Democracy Assistance – Actor – USAID Primary

USAID has primary responsibility over democracy assistance
Committee on Evaluation of USAID Democracy Assistance Programs, National Research
Council-‘8 Improving Democracy Assistance: Building Knowledge Through Evaluations and
Research http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/22159/12164_EXS.pdf

   Within the U.S. government the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has principal
   responsibility for providing democracy assistance. Since 1990, USAID has supported
   democracy and governance (DG) programs in approximately 120 countries and territories,
   spending an estimated total of $8.47 billion (in constant 2000 U.S. dollars) between 1990 and 2005. The
   request for DG programs for fiscal year 2008 was $1.45 billion, which includes some small programs in the
   U.S. Department of State.


Democracy assistance is one of the largest USAID categories
Azpuru, Finkel, Perez-Linan, and Seligson, Vandy, Pitt, Pitt, Vandy, ’08
(“What has the United States Been Doing?” Journal of Democracy Volume 19, Number 2, April 2008 pp. 150-159)

    Democracy assistance is now among the top categories to which the United States Agency for International
    Development (USAID) directs funds, the only larger ones being health and what USAID calls agriculture and
    economic growth. In 1990, by contrast, as the Cold War was nearing its end, democracy assistance was near the
    bottom, ahead only of funding for humanitarian concerns. In brief, what began as a largely regional effort in
    Latin America in the late 1980s has now become a worldwide endeavor—one that has expanded in magnitude
    and diversity, and that has branched out into areas, such as governance, that in the early 1990s received only
    scant attention.




                        Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
Document1                                                                                                   Page 80 of 157



                 Democracy Assistance – Actor – Multiple Actors

Many agencies provide democracy assistance
The National Committee on American Foreign, Saltzman Institute of War and Peace at
Columbia, The Atlantic Council-‘8
ENHANCING DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE
http://www.acus.org/files/publication_pdfs/65/Enhancing%20Democracy%20Assistance.pdf

   US Mechanisms COORDINATION AND COMMUNICATION The US Government will have spent
   $1 billion in 2007 on democracy assistance in 50 countries (excluding Iraq and Afghanistan).
   Tactical flexibility requires a variety of delivery systems that are suited to the type of
   assistance as well as the category and geographic location of the beneficiary country. US
   government agencies include USAID, the Millennium Challenge Account, the Middle East
   Partnership Initiative, the Office of Post-Conflict and Stabilization, the Bureau of
   Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL), the Department of Justice Rule of Law
   Program and Defense Department support for democratic policing.


Unlike other developed nations like Canada, the United States utilizes a large number of
organizations to administer democracy assistance
Schulz ’08
[Keith, legislative adviser at the Office of Democracy and Governance at the U.S. Agency for International
Development, “How the United States Supports Democratic Development Overseas,”
http://www.revparl.ca/31/1/31n1_08e_Schulz.pdf]

    I n Canada, the majority of democracy promotion funds are currently channeled through the Canadian
    International Development Agency (CIDA). 1 By contrast, a large number of different departments and
    agencies within the United States government, and n o n - g o v e r n m e n t a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s o u t s i d e
    o f t h e government, contribute to U.S. democracy promotion efforts. This creates a complex, and sometimes
    confusing a n d o v e r l a p p i n g m a n d a t e , a m o n g t h e d i f f e r e n t departments, agencies and
    organizations involved. This was not always the case. United States support for democratic development began
    in earnest more than three decades ago, first in certain countries in Latin America and then to support
    democratic transitions in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union following the collapse of communism.
    These early efforts were modest in scope and objectives. U.S. Government democracy assistance funding in
    1990 was little more than $100 million. Today it is well over $ 1 billion per year with a large percentage of that
    funding now going to democracy assistance efforts in the Middle East and Asia.


Multiple actors involved in implementing democracy assistance
Huber, Hebrew University of Jerusalem Department of International Relations, 8
[Daniela, Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 13, No. 1, 43–62, March 2008, “Democracy Assistance in the Middle East
and North Africa: A Comparison of US and EU Policies”, p. 47,
http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/69109__790479070.pdf, accessed 6-3-11]

   Method looks at the way DA is implemented. Firstly, this section can cover the modus operandi of the
   implementation process of a project from its creation through to its accomplishment. The usual path of
   a project is best described by the term external project method, which was introduced by the American
   researcher Carothers (2003: 257). It refers to a way of implementation in which the aid provider assesses
   what the country needs in order to become a democracy, an aid project is designed or the provider
   asks for local proposals and funds are then given to intermediary groups from the DA-providing
   country that carry out the project and work with local partners in turn. Therefore, a project runs
   through different stages with diverse actors: (1) the democracy-promoting agency that decides what to
   support; (2) the project designer, which can either be the democracy-promoting agency itself or local

                          Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
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   actors, who offer projects that correspond with a predetermined subject area; (3) the implementation
   partner, who can either be from the providing or receiving country, or an international partner.



No single agent in charge of democracy promotion
Melia, 5
[Thomas O., September 2005, “The Democracy Bureaucracy: The Infrastructure of American Democracy
Promotion” A discussion paper prepared for the Princeton Project on National Security Working Group on Global
Institutions and Foreign Policy Infrastructure by Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Walsh School of Foreign
Service, Georgetown University, http://www.wws.princeton.edu/ppns/papers/democracy_bureaucracy.pdf]

   There is, however, no ―command and control center‖ of the democracy promotion community, no single
   place where overarching strategy is developed or coordinated, even within the sub- community that is the
   United States Government. This may be due to the nature of the subject, or a reflection of the character of the
   actors. Perhaps the unique operating environments that arise in each case mean that a new configuration of
   players must be assembled. Though efforts are currently underway to bring greater strategic coherence to the
   effort, and the bureaucratic nomenclature has been modified to underscore the intention to do so, it may well
   be that political development cannot be controlled or directed in the way that military or diplomatic
   undertakings often can be.



USAID is largest provider of democracy assistance, but there are many sources
National Research Council Report, '08
(Improving Democracy Assistance: Building Knowledge Through Evaluations and Research (2008) IMPROVING
DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE, Building Knowledge Through Evaluations and Research, Committee on Evaluation
of USAID Democracy Assistance Programs, Development, Security, and Cooperation Policy and Global Affairs,
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES,
http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12164&page=23, acsd 5/25/11)

    USAID is the single largest provider of funding for democracy assistance. However, in many countries USAID
    is just one agency among many others providing democracy assistance. 3 Although each donor agency plans and
    carries out its own programs, coordination with other donors occurs on several levels: within countries among
    donors, through bilateral channels, and through such multilateral venues as the Development Assistance
    Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).


From 2006-08, US AID implemented democracy assistance in over 90 countries. State DRL
(Dept. of State’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor) and the private
National Endowment for Democracy (NED) all give democracy assistance.
G.A.O., Sept. ‘09
(“DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE: U.S. Agencies Take Steps to Coordinate International Programs but Lack
Information on Some U.S.-funded Activities,” acsd 5/22/11, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09993.pdf)

    In fiscal years 2006- 2008, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), which has primary
    responsibility for promoting democracy abroad, implemented democracy assistance projects in about 90
    countries. The Department of State’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (State DRL) and the
    private, nonprofit National Endowment for Democracy (NED) also fund democracy programs in many of these
    countries.



Democracy and Governance Assistance is supported by officers and personnel in D.C. and
overseas missions.

                         Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
Document1                                                                                         Page 82 of 157


National Research Council Report, '08
(Improving Democracy Assistance: Building Knowledge Through Evaluations and Research (2008) IMPROVING
DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE, Building Knowledge Through Evaluations and Research, Committee on Evaluation
of USAID Democracy Assistance Programs, Development, Security, and Cooperation Policy and Global Affairs,
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES,
http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12164&page=23, acsd 5/25/11)

    The programs are supported by hundreds of DG officers and other personnel in Washington and at overseas
    missions. As of 2004, DG comprised the agency’s largest category of technical expertise among direct hire
    personnel at just over 400 (USAID 2006), although not everyone in this category is doing DG work at any given
    time.




                        Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
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                    Democracy Assistance – Can Be Multilateral


Democracy assistance can be bilateral and multilateral
Azpuru, Finkel, Perez-Linan, and Seligson, Vandy, Pitt, Pitt, Vandy, ’08
(“What has the United States Been Doing?” Journal of Democracy Volume 19, Number 2, April 2008 pp. 150-159)

    Since the end of the Cold War, democracy assistance has become an explicit and increasingly large component
    of many bilateral and multilateral aid programs. This is in sharp contrast to the Cold War period itself, when
    democracy assistance was either absent entirely from donors' portfolios or was simply the byproduct of other
    programs. The recent expansion of democracy assistance, along with the U.S.-led military campaigns in Iraq
    and Afghanistan, has spurred a spirited debate on the ethics and efficacy of democracy-promotion activities. Yet
    too little is known about the overall trends in U.S. democracy assistance since the end of the Cold War. This
    essay fills that gap, and in so doing places Iraq within the broader context of what the United States has done in
    the realm of democracy assistance worldwide since 1990.




                         Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
Document1                                                                                                 Page 84 of 157



                             Democracy Assistance – Recipients

Democracy assistance can be top-down, bottom-up, or mixed
Huber, Hebrew University of Jerusalem Department of International Relations, 8
[Daniela, Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 13, No. 1, 43–62, March 2008, “Democracy Assistance in the Middle East
and North Africa: A Comparison of US and EU Policies”, p. 48,
http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/69109__790479070.pdf, accessed 6-3-11]

   Substance
   Whereas the much smaller HRDF programme follows a bottom-up approach, MEPI has a top-down
   approach. Wittes and Yerkes (2004) find that almost 71 per cent of MEPI’s funding went toArab
   governmental agencies and officials and only 18 per cent to American or Arab non-governmental
   organizations (NGOs). USAID DG follows a rather balanced bottom-up/top-down with a recent trend
   towards a top-down approach: between 1990 and 2003 51 per cent of all funding in MENA went to civil
   society, 40 per cent to state institutions and 9 per cent to political parties and elections 6 (Finkel et al., 2006:
   36); between 2004 and 2006 27 per centwent to civil society, 58 per cent to state institutions and 15 per cent
   to political parties and elections (USAID, 2006a–g).
   This substantial increase in funding state institutions instead of civil society cannot be explained by the
   reconstruction of state institutions in Iraq. Even without Iraq, 37 per cent went to civil society, 53 per
   cent to state institutions and 10 per cent to political parties and elections (USAID, 2006a, c–g).
   According to an experienced US practitioner and decision maker in the field,
         USAID embraces civil society capacity building as an alternative strategy in cases where there is a
         lack of political will for reform among central decision makers. When political will is deemed to
         exist, USAID tends to focus its efforts on bolstering state institutions, as is now evident in Iraq.7




                          Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
Document1                                                                                             Page 85 of 157



         Democracy Assistance – Not Exclusively Government-to-
                             Government


Democracy assistance utilizes various delivery mechanisms – including US-based NGOs
and contractors
Mitchell, Columbia University School of International and Political Affairs International
Politics professor, and Phillips, National Committee on American Foreign Policy Project
Director, 8
 [Lincoln A. and David L., Columbia University Center for the Study of Human Rights visiting scholar, Jan 08,
“Enhancing Democracy Assistance”
http://www.acus.org/files/publication_pdfs/65/Enhancing%20Democracy%20Assistance.pdf, p.18-9, accessed 5-21-
11, TP]

   The US Government will have spent $1 billion in 2007 on democracy assistance in 50 countries
   (excluding Iraq and Afghanistan). Tactical flexibility requires a variety of delivery systems that are
   suited to the type of assistance as well as the category and geographic location of the beneficiary
   country. US government agencies include USAID, the Millennium Challenge Account, the Middle
   East Partnership Initiative, the Office of Post-Conflict and Stabilization, the Bureau of Democracy,
   Human Rights, and Labor (DRL), the Department of Justice Rule of Law Program and Defense
   Department support for democratic policing. Even when most of their funding comes from the US
   Government, NGOs are formally independent and can act more efficiently than government
   bureaucracies involved in grant-making and assistance. These include NDI and IRI, the Center for
   International Private Enterprise (CIPE), IFES, the American Center for International Labor Solidarity,
   Freedom House, the United States Institute for Peace, the Eurasia Foundation, and the Asia Foundation.
   Other NGO activities can be undertaken by more than 70 foundations with headquarters in the United
   States (e.g. the Open Society Institute, the Ford Foundation, and the Rockefeller Brothers Fund). For-
   profit consulting groups play a prominent role in post-conflict settings where they receive more than
   half of the contracts issued by USAID’s Office of Transitional Initiatives (i.e. SWIFT-II contractors
   including ARD, Casals, Chemonics, Creative Associates, DAI and PADCO). OTI small grants to local
   partners and cooperative agreements with NGOs for specialized tasks maximizes their ability to work in the
   most flexible and responsive fashion. The National Endowment for Democracy (NED) occupies a unique
   and valuable role in this constellation. Its effectiveness is based on its ability to act significantly and
   decisively as a grant-making organization which provides substantial support for its four core grantees (NDI,
   IRI, CIPE, and the Solidarity Center) as well as numerous other organizations involved in various aspects of
   democracy work in over 90 countries. These different mechanisms offer a range of assets and skills for
   democracy assistance. In Washington, relevant government agencies and NGOs can agree on the broad
   outlines for democracy assistance in particular countries. Cooperation and communication should occur
   at multiple levels, since inconsistent and sometimes contradictory implementation of assistance reduces its
   overall impact. Implementers of democracy assistance would also benefit from sharing information, which is
   currently done largely on an ad hoc basis and focuses on short-term needs.


Democracy assistance NOT exclusively limited to government to government
Savun, University of Pittsburgh Political Science assistant professor and Tirone, University
of Pittsburgh political science Ph.D. Candidate, 11
[Burcu & and Daniel C., April 2011, American Journal of Political Science, "Foreign Aid, Democratization, and
Civil Conflict: How Does Democracy Aid Affect Civil Conflict?," Vol 55 Issue 2, p233-246, Wiley Online Library,
accessed 5-16-11]

   The critics of foreign aid efficacy also assume that foreign aid always goes to the government of the recipient
   country. Although most of the development aid goes to the governments of the recipient countries,
   democracy assistance aid is usually disbursed to a variety of sectors in the recipient country (Crawford


                         Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
Document1                                                                                           Page 86 of 157


   2001; Scott and Steele 2005). For example, Crawford (2001) shows that in 1994 and 1995 an average of 54%
   of the European Union's political aid programs were implemented by the recipient governments, and this
   percentage was only 5.1% for Swedish political aid (124). Similarly, Crawford reports that between 1992
   and 1995, central and local governments were the main beneficiaries of 54% of the EU political aid.
   This number was 35.4% for Sweden and 55.7% for the United States, and 92.9% for the United
   Kingdom. On the other hand, civil society organizations, such as prodemocracy groups and human
   right groups, were the main beneficiaries of 46% of the EU political aid, 64.6% of the Swedish aid,
   44.3% of the U.S. aid, and 7.1% of the U.K. democracy aid programs (138). These figures indicate
   that, unlike development aid, the majority of democracy aid goes to nonstate actors.

   [Posted on Forums by Struth, 5-24-11,
   http://www.cedadebate.org/forum/index.php?topic=2422.msg4882#msg4882,


Democracy assistance is not all government-to-government aid. Such aid is often
shortchanged in the budget process, but it is still an option now for US aid.
Trister, Congressional Liaison Officer – Freedom House, May 2011,
[Sarah, “Investing in Freedom: Analyzing the FY 2012 International Affairs Budget Request” p. 4
http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/special_report/100.pdf]

   Governing Justly and Democratically
   Funds that fall under the Governing Justly and Democratically category are meant to protect basic rights and
   strengthen effective democracies by helping countries to increase their governments’ accountability, relying
   on rule of law, free and fair electoral processes, vibrant civil society, and independent media.
   GJ&D funding is further broken down into four more specific funding categories: Rule of Law and Human
   Rights, Good Governance, Political Competition and Consensus-Building, and Civil Society. (In thousands
   $) FY 10 Actual FY 12 Request D




   The combined FY 2012 GJ&D request, including both OCO and Core funding, is $3.15 billion. This is
   a decrease of more than 7% from FY 2010 actual numbers.
   As in past years, the small percentage of the GJ&D funding allocated to assisting civil society
   remains concerning. Despite many pledges by the United States Government to dedicate
   more attention and funding to helping civil society rather than governments, the overall
   percentage of GJ&D funding for civil society in the FY 2012 request actually falls from 19% of
   GJ&D in FY 2010 to 16% in FY 2012. The recent movements in the Middle East and North Africa
   underscore the importance of U.S. support for civil society and individuals and not relying
   solely on government-to-government aid.




                         Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
Document1                                                                                            Page 87 of 157



             Democracy Assistance – Not Exclusively In Country

Democracy Assistance not geographically restricted
Office for Promotion of Parliamentary Democracy, EU-10
Getting Acquainted: Setting the Stage for Democracy Assistance
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdf/oppd/Page_8/getting_acquainted_web.pdf

   In order to work, and intensively engage with local actors and institutions, democracy assistance is in
   principle implemented within the target state rather than abroad. The nature of some assistance projects, such
   as study visits, may exceptionally involve assistance implemented externally.


Multiple actors involved in implementing democracy assistance – recipient can include an
international partner that is not the recipient country
Huber, Hebrew University of Jerusalem Department of International Relations, 8
[Daniela, Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 13, No. 1, 43–62, March 2008, “Democracy Assistance in the Middle East
and North Africa: A Comparison of US and EU Policies”, p. 47,
http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/69109__790479070.pdf, accessed 6-3-11]

   Method looks at the way DA is implemented. Firstly, this section can cover the modus operandi of the
   implementation process of a project from its creation through to its accomplishment. The usual path of
   a project is best described by the term external project method, which was introduced by the American
   researcher Carothers (2003: 257). It refers to a way of implementation in which the aid provider assesses
   what the country needs in order to become a democracy, an aid project is designed or the provider
   asks for local proposals and funds are then given to intermediary groups from the DA-providing
   country that carry out the project and work with local partners in turn. Therefore, a project runs
   through different stages with diverse actors: (1) the democracy-promoting agency that decides what to
   support; (2) the project designer, which can either be the democracy-promoting agency itself or local
   actors, who offer projects that correspond with a predetermined subject area; (3) the implementation
   partner, who can either be from the providing or receiving country, or an international partner.


Democracy assistance utilizes various delivery mechanisms – including US-based NGOs
and contractors
Mitchell, Columbia University School of International and Political Affairs International
Politics professor, and Phillips, National Committee on American Foreign Policy Project
Director, 8
 [Lincoln A. and David L., Columbia University Center for the Study of Human Rights visiting scholar, Jan 08,
“Enhancing Democracy Assistance”
http://www.acus.org/files/publication_pdfs/65/Enhancing%20Democracy%20Assistance.pdf, p.18-9, accessed 5-21-
11, TP]

   The US Government will have spent $1 billion in 2007 on democracy assistance in 50 countries
   (excluding Iraq and Afghanistan). Tactical flexibility requires a variety of delivery systems that are
   suited to the type of assistance as well as the category and geographic location of the beneficiary
   country. US government agencies include USAID, the Millennium Challenge Account, the Middle
   East Partnership Initiative, the Office of Post-Conflict and Stabilization, the Bureau of Democracy,
   Human Rights, and Labor (DRL), the Department of Justice Rule of Law Program and Defense
   Department support for democratic policing. Even when most of their funding comes from the US
   Government, NGOs are formally independent and can act more efficiently than government
   bureaucracies involved in grant-making and assistance. These include NDI and IRI, the Center for
   International Private Enterprise (CIPE), IFES, the American Center for International Labor Solidarity,
   Freedom House, the United States Institute for Peace, the Eurasia Foundation, and the Asia Foundation.


                         Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
Document1                                                                                          Page 88 of 157


  Other NGO activities can be undertaken by more than 70 foundations with headquarters in the United
  States (e.g. the Open Society Institute, the Ford Foundation, and the Rockefeller Brothers Fund). For-
  profit consulting groups play a prominent role in post-conflict settings where they receive more than
  half of the contracts issued by USAID’s Office of Transitional Initiatives (i.e. SWIFT-II contractors
  including ARD, Casals, Chemonics, Creative Associates, DAI and PADCO). OTI small grants to local
  partners and cooperative agreements with NGOs for specialized tasks maximizes their ability to work in the
  most flexible and responsive fashion. The National Endowment for Democracy (NED) occupies a unique
  and valuable role in this constellation. Its effectiveness is based on its ability to act significantly and
  decisively as a grant-making organization which provides substantial support for its four core grantees (NDI,
  IRI, CIPE, and the Solidarity Center) as well as numerous other organizations involved in various aspects of
  democracy work in over 90 countries. These different mechanisms offer a range of assets and skills for
  democracy assistance. In Washington, relevant government agencies and NGOs can agree on the broad
  outlines for democracy assistance in particular countries. Cooperation and communication should occur
  at multiple levels, since inconsistent and sometimes contradictory implementation of assistance reduces its
  overall impact. Implementers of democracy assistance would also benefit from sharing information, which is
  currently done largely on an ad hoc basis and focuses on short-term needs.




                        Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
Document1                                                                                         Page 89 of 157



             Democracy Assistance – Requires Country Consent

Democracy assistance requires host government consent
Office for Promotion of Parliamentary Democracy, EU-10
Getting Acquainted: Setting the Stage for Democracy Assistance
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdf/oppd/Page_8/getting_acquainted_web.pdf

   "Democracy assistance – one of the tools of democracy promotion – can be defined as: all
   programmes and projects which are openly adopted, supported and/or (directly or indirectly)
   implemented by (public or private) foreign actors, (mainly) take place in target countries, in
   principle with the consent or toleration of these countries’ authorities, and are explicitly
   designed to directly contribute to the liberalisation, democratisation or consolidation of
   democracy of the target country.14 Thus, key characteristics of democracy assistance are that it works
   through programmes or projects which focus on changing behaviours and attitudes, or reforming institutions
   and processes in target states. Foreign actors can to different degrees be involved in the planning and
   implementation of activities, but usually bear most of the financial costs . In order to work, and
   intensively engage with local actors and institutions, democracy assistance is in principle
   implemented within the target state rather than abroad. The nature of some assistance
   projects, such as study visits, may exceptionally involve assistance implemented externally.
   Democracy assistance programmes and projects are implemented openly rather than
   secretly. However, individual aid recipients can at times, for their own protection, remain unidentified.
   Secret money transfers may help democratisation processes, but are different in nature to
   assistance. Democracy assistance requires, in theory, the consent of or at least toleration by
   the target state’s authorities, otherwise it cannot be transparent, nor can it be implemented
   or reach its potential. Finally, by definition, democracy assistance exists to facilitate
   democratisation and excludes activities which might only indirectly affect democratisation, in
   particular socio-economic assistance."




                        Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
Document1                                                                                              Page 90 of 157



      Democracy Assistance – Does Not Require Country Consent


Democracy is technical assistance – to support democratic institutions at various levels of
democratic spectrum – including those in non-democratic countries
Huber, Hebrew University of Jerusalem Department of International Relations, 8
[Daniela, Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 13, No. 1, 43–62, March 2008, “Democracy Assistance in the Middle East
and North Africa: A Comparison of US and EU Policies”, p. 45-6,
http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/69109__790479070.pdf, accessed 6-3-11]

   What is Democracy Assistance?
   The term democracy assistance is used in academic literature, as well as in the programmes of the US and the
   EU, without comprehensive clarifications. This section will therefore outline the actor’s comprehensions of
   the term and the (however insufficient) academic literature on it. On this basis it will develop a definition of
   the term democracy assistance, which will be followed by the elaboration of a methodological framework.
   The US and EU have quite similar concepts of DA. USAID defines it as
          technical assistance and other support to strengthen capacity of reform-minded governments,
          nongovernmental actors, and/or citizens in order to develop and support democratic states and
          institutions that are responsive and accountable to citizens. These efforts also include promoting
          democratic transitions in countries that are not reform minded. Democracy programs promote
          the rule of law and human rights, transparent and fair elections coupled with a competitive
          political process, a free and independent media, stronger civil society and greater citizen
          participation in government, and governance structures that are efficient, responsive, and
          accountable. (USAID, 2005: 4)
   Similarly, the EU specifies the following categories of DA:
          These can include questions of democratic participation (including universal suffrage, free election,
          multiparty structure, equality of access to political activity, participatory decision making); human
          rights (including adherence to, and implementation of, commitments under international human rights
          Treaties and Conventions, protection of civil liberties, including freedom of speech and of assembly,
          effective operation of human rights monitoring); and the rule of law (including an independent and
          effective judiciary, transparent legal framework, equality of all citizens before the law, police and
          public administration subject to the law, enforcement of contractual obligations). (EC 2003a: 10)
   The American researcher Thomas Carothers gives a definition of DA which is closest to the understanding
   of this article: ‘Democracy aid is all aid, for which the primary purpose, not the secondary or indirect
   purpose, is to foster democracy in the recipient countries. It does not therefore include economic and
   social aid programs’ (Carothers, 2000: 188). In addition, two further characteristics of democracy
   assistance are introduced in order to differentiate it from other efforts at democracy promotion: first,
   it is not only an explicit or direct, but also a positive measure of foreign policy as opposed to negative
   measures such as sanctions or even military means.4 Second, it represents an active instrument, as the
   democracy promoter takes measures itself, whereas a passive instrument such as positive political
   conditionality implies that the democracy promoter rewards internal democracy promotion efforts.
   Table 1 visualizes the different democracy promotion instruments.

   Table 1. Democracy promotion instruments
                                 Explicit instruments                                      Implicit instruments

   Positive instruments             Democracy assistance (active instrument),              Classical development
                                    positive political conditionality                      aid
                                    (passive instrument)

   Negative instruments             Negative political conditionality, naming              Military action
                                    and shaming, military action

   Democracy assistance is the type of foreign policy that aims explicitly at positively and actively
   initiating democratization, supporting democratization or strengthening democracy, as well as human

                          Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
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   rights in foreign countries. This definition accounts for differing DA policies depending on the level of
   democratization in a recipient country ranging from non-democracies to countries in transition to
   consolidating or delegative democracies. Democratization is the process of transition from a non-
   democratic to a democratic political system. The term human rights is included in the definition, as the
   actors understand it as an important part of their democracy assistance. Democracy is understood
   according to Robert Dahl’s concept of Polyarchy (Dahl, 1982) with its dimensions of competition and
   participation. This concept is narrow enough to exclude only liberalizing countries and it is wide enough for
   different understandings of democracy by the US and the EU. It also implies that DA is more than electoral
   assistance.


Democracy assistance does not require consent of recipient country
Huber, Hebrew University of Jerusalem Department of International Relations, 8
[Daniela, Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 13, No. 1, 43–62, March 2008, “Democracy Assistance in the Middle East
and North Africa: A Comparison of US and EU Policies”, p. 47,
http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/69109__790479070.pdf, accessed 6-3-11]

   Secondly, this section will also cover an evaluation of the qualitative approach of the democracy
   promoter, which can be based on partnership with or against the will of a recipient country.
   Promoting democracy against the will of a government is impossible for projects affecting state
   institutions and difficult for projects allocated to political or civil society – the latter also depending on
   the stage of liberalization of the recipient country. Furthermore, a project can be against the will of a
   government, but favoured by (parts of) the society of the same country. As this is hard to measure, a
   better indicator for partnership is the establishment and institutionalization of platforms for dialogue that can
   be set up at different levels. They can be located at the state level (ministers, senior officials,
   parliamentarians, judiciaries), in political society or civil society. A further focus is their degree of
   institutionalization, which is asserted by the number of meetings per year. In addition, those platforms should
   be related to the democracy promotion efforts either directly by discussing democracy or human rights
   related questions or indirectly through the strengthening of networks.


Consent irrelevant – US assistance to “illegal” Yemeni NGOs proves
Burke, FRIDE Researcher, 6-14-10
[Edward, 6-14-10, “Assessing Democracy Assistance: Yemen”, p. 9, http://www.fride.org/publication/776/yemen,
accessed 6-5-11, AFB]

   Surprisingly given the US-led ‘war on terror’, the US government has continued to build relationships with a
   wide range of NGOs, including those deemed illegal or aligned firmly with the political opposition and its
   diplomats have, perhaps counterproductively, expressly declared democratic reform a means of countering
   terrorism in the long-term.19


Consent of host nation not essential to democracy assistance - Egypt proves
Wittes, Saban Center at Brookings & Youngs, 9,
[Tamara Cofman & Richard, January 2009, ANALYSIS PAPER, Number 18, “Europe, the United States, and
Middle Eastern Democracy: Repairing the Breach” p. 11 (GS)
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2009/01_middle_eastern_democracy_wittes/01_middle_eastern_
democracy_wittes.pdf]

   A third similarity is evident in the way that American and European democracy assistance funding for the
   Middle East has evolved, and on what the money has been spent. New funding initiatives have been intro-
   duced by U.S. and European donors that allocate ad- ditional resources for democracy assistance. MEPI was
   given over $534 million for the period 2002-2008; other U.S. democracy assistance to the Middle East —
   through the State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor and through the U.S.
   Agency for In- ternational Development—added at least another $370 million, excluding Iraq. Beginning in


                         Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
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   2006, however, funding for MEPI began to decline as the administra- tion’s enthusiasm began to wane and a
   Democratic Congress became more skeptical of the program’s value. The only other significant alteration in
   U.S. democracy spending in the region was when Congress, beginning in Fiscal Year 2005, compelled
   USAID to spend $50 million of its development assistance funds for Egypt on “democracy and governance”
   projects to be decided without Egyptian government approval.


Democracy assistance doesn’t require consent – democracy assistance to Syria proves
Wittes, Brookings Saban Center, 9
[Tamara Cofman & Richard Youngs, Fundación para las Relaciones, Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior, January
2009, “Europe, the United States, and Middle Eastern Democracy: Repairing the Breach”, p. 16,
http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2009/01_middle_eastern_democracy_wittes.aspx, accessed 6-3-11]

   Another notable difference is between the European willingness to engage with, and the American preference
   to isolate, unpalatable regional actors. For example, the European Union negotiated a new association
   agreement with Syria whereas the United States has pushed for isolation. Even though the European Union’s
   agreement has not been implemented—due to Syria’s alleged involvement in the Rafik Hariri killing in
   Lebanon rather than to Syria’s democratic shortfalls—the European Union still argues that reform in Syria
   can best be encouraged through critical engagement. A key element of the European approach toward
   Syrian reform is the backing of reformists within government through measures aimed at
   strengthening the presidential office and modernizing ministries. European governments have declined
   to back exiled opposition groups and failed to support a 2006 alliance-building efforts among various
   Syrian groups in London. By contrast, the United States has worked resolutely to isolate Syria,
   subjecting it to a range of sanctions. American democracy assistance in Syria has been entirely
   directed to nongovernmental activity, unlike the technical training and other “good governance”
   assistance it provides elsewhere in the region. President Bush has also met more than once with
   members of Syrian exile opposition groups, including an opposition coalition that includes the exiled head
   of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood.

Assistance should be given to NGOs in countries with oppressive regimes
NED, 6
[6-8-6, “The Backlash against Democracy Assistance”, A Report prepared by the National Endowment for
Democracy for Senator Richard G. Lugar, Chairman Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, p. 38,
http://www.ned.org/docs/backlash06.pdfccessed 6-3-11]

Congress should seek to ensure and increase assistance for democratic political parties, nongovernmental
organizations, and independent media in repressive or hybrid regimes while placing severe restrictions on all forms
of U.S. aid to these states and, in appropriate cases, prohibiting U.S. government agencies from providing loans and
investment to the governments concerned, except on humanitarian grounds.37

NGOs accept assistance despite regimes
NED, 6
[6-8-6, “The Backlash against Democracy Assistance”, A Report prepared by the National Endowment for
Democracy for Senator Richard G. Lugar, Chairman Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, p. 35,
http://www.ned.org/docs/backlash06.pdfccessed 6-3-11]

   Responding to local priorities: Local project partners and grantees are, of course, the most vulnerable to
   repressive measures. Nevertheless, civil society groups and other groups that engage with U.S.-funded
   democracy promotion groups tend to be of such political caliber that they are not readily intimidated by
   authorities’ official hostility. “The kinds of groups that openly work with us,” says one democracy promoter,
   “are fairly resilient and don’t scare easily.” There is relatively little evidence of current or prospective
   grantees declining to accept support from, or otherwise engage with, U.S. democracy promotion groups,
   either because of fear of official sanctions or retribution. In some cases, to the contrary, reports one
   democracy promotion group, “their fear is that we will capitulate and leave.”



                         Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
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           Democracy Assistance – Requires Democratic Opening

Democracy assistance is reactive, not proactive – countries begin democratization first.
Lappin, University of Leuven (Belgium) Centre for Peace Research and Strategic Studies
PhD candidate, 10
[Richard, participant in democracy assistance missions with the UN, EU, OSCE, and Carter Center, University of
Belgrade political sciences visiting scholar, Central European Journal of International & Security Studies, Volume 4
Issue 1, “What we talk about when we talk about democracy assistance: the problem of definition in post-conflict
approaches to democratization” http://www.cejiss.org/issue/2010-volume-4-issue-1/lappin, p.186-7, accessed 5-16-
11, TP]

   It can therefore be argued that a reverse causation was also occurring with democratic openings challenging
   established democracies to respond. As Carothers (1999: 44) explains: ‘the natural tendency to focus on
   the effects of democracy aid on democratisation in recipient countries overlooks the equally
   important causal relationship in the other direction – democratisation producing democracy aid.’
   Indeed, in many respects the approach of democracy assistance can often be described as reactive rather
   than proactive. Thus, an understanding of the emergence of democracy assistance requires an appreciation
   of how global events cause the democracy assistance community to respond to external stimuli (Burnell
   2008: 428).


Democracy assistance requires prior democratic opening
Lappin-Faculty of Political Sciences at the University of Belgrade-10
What we talk about when we talk about democracy assistance
2010 - Volume 4, Issue 1 http://www.cejiss.org/sites/default/files/8.pdf

   Democracy assistance can be most accurately defined as the non-profit transfer of funds,
   expertise, and material to foster democratic groups, initiatives and institutions that are
   already working towards a more democratic society (De Zeeuw and Kumar 2006: 20) . These
   transfers are usually funded through governmental development agencies, such as the United
   States Agency for International Development (USAID) the European Instrument for Democracy
   and Human Rights (EIDHR), or the UK’s Department for International Devel- opment (DfID) .
   The programmes themselves are undertaken by a diverse group of inter-governmental organisations
   (IGOs), non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and, to a lesser extent, through bilateral
   agreements . Chief amongst the IGOs are the Organisation for Cooperation and Security in Europe
   (OSCE), the European Union (EU), and the Organisation of American States (OAS) . The most
   prominent NGOs include the Carter Center, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems
   (IFES) and the Centre for Electoral Promotion and Advice (CAPEL) . In addition, within a given
   country, there will also be a range of local counterparts who receive democracy funding including
   electoral commissions, state institutions, civil society groups, media groups and political parties.




                         Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
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   Democracy Assistance – Does Not Require Democratic Opening


Can support existing democratic openings or promote democracy where it doesn’t
currently exist
Santiso-International Studies at Johns Hopkins-2
THE REFORM OF EU DEVELOPMENT POLICY IMPROVING STRATEGIES FOR CONFLICT
PREVENTION, DEMOCRACY PROMOTION & GOVERNANCE CONDITIONALITY CEPS WORKING
DOCUMENT NO. 182 MARCH 2002 se2.isn.ch/serviceengine/Files/RESSpecNet/.../182_The+Reform.pdf

   In financial terms, the EU contribution to the promotion of democracy and the strengthening of governance
   in developing countries and transitional economies is significant. Democracy assistance, defined
   narrowly as encompassing ‘aid specifically designed to foster opening in a non- democratic
   country or to further a democratic transition in a country that has experienced a democratic
   opening’ (Carothers 1999:6), takes mainly the form of ‘positive measures’ of support and
   inducement.


Democracy assistance can be given to countries prior to a democratic opening – i.e.
authoritarian nations
The National Committee on American Foreign, Saltzman Institute of War and Peace at
Columbia, The Atlantic Council-‘8
ENHANCING DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE
http://www.acus.org/files/publication_pdfs/65/Enhancing%20Democracy%20Assistance.pdf

   This report offers recommendations to hone proven approaches to democracy assistance, specifically,
   programs that strengthen civil society, prepare elections, assist political party development, and support
   democratic governance. It also identifies different regime types that are the focus of democracy assistance --
   authoritarian states, illiberal democracies, free-wheeling kleptocracies, and post-conflict states. While
   recognizing that the distinctions among them are not iron-clad, the report offers context-specific
   recommendations for each.


Democracy assistance can be given to non-democratic and/or transitioning countries
Santiso- Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies-1
INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION FOR DEMOCRACY AND GOOD GOVERNANCE: MOVING TOWARD
A SECOND GENERATION European Journal of Development Research, vol.13, no.1 (June 2001), pp.154 180.
http://www.eldis.org/fulltext/secondgeneration.pdf

   Aid donors use three general approaches to help promote democracy: direct support;
   indirect support (via, for instance, encouraging economic development); and pressure to
   encourage policy reform (including the threat of use of sanctions). The promotion of specific
   policies and policy changes within aid recipient countries can indeed take many forms,
   ranging from dialogue, persuasion and support to pressure. The most common and often
   most significant tool for promoting democracy is democracy aid. Democracy assistance
   can be defined narrowly as encompassing ‘aid specifically designed to foster
   opening in a non-democratic country or to further a democratic transition in a
   country that has experienced a democratic opening’ [Carothers, 1999:6].




                         Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
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                   Democracy Assistance – Can Be At Any Stage


Democracy assistance is a form of conflict prevention, before, during, or after conflict
Otero, Under Secretary for Democracy and Global Affairs, 6-1-11
[Maria, 6-1-11, “Panel Remarks at USIP's Conference on Preventing Violent Conflict”
http://www.uspolicy.be/headline/panel-remarks-usips-conference-preventing-violent-conflict, accessed 6-5-11,
AFB]

   Our approach to conflict prevention spans a wide-array of government activities, often executed in concert
   with the private sector. Through democracy assistance, security sector reform, and social-economic
   development activities, we work to create space for local-level actors to play an assertive role in the interest
   of muting the threat of violence before, during and after it is happening.


Democracy assistance can be given to facilitate transitions from authoritarianism and/or
conflict
Epstein, et al., Congressional Research Service Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade
Division foreign policy specialists, 7
[Susan B. Epstein, Nina M. Serafino, and Francis T. Miko, 12-26-7, CRS Report for Congress: Democracy
Promotion: Cornerstone of U.S. Foreign Policy?, p. 12, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34296.pdf, accessed
5-27-11]

   The United States provides democracy assistance to many countries in a variety of circumstances and
   with mixed degrees of success. Analysts categorize country circumstances and affects of assistance in
   different ways. Generally, analysts have viewed U.S. democracy aid as facilitating transitions either
   from authoritarian or communist rule, as in Latin America and Central Europe, or from conflict, as in
   Bosnia and African nations such as Sierra Leone and Liberia.38 The range of U.S. democracy promotion
   activities and programs also varies greatly, from assistance for elections to aid in developing institutions and
   to funding of civil society groups. (These types of assistance are discussed below.) Thus far, there is little
   agreement among experts and practitioners on the circumstances in which democracy promotion success may
   be achieved; the appropriate emphasis, sequencing, and mix of programs to achieve it; and the time frame
   necessary for an enduring democracy to take hold.




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                 Democracy Assistance – Excludes Conditioning


Democracy assistance is positive – not negative – not conditional
Santiso, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies-1
INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION FOR DEMOCRACY AND GOOD GOVERNANCE: MOVING TOWARD
A SECOND GENERATION European Journal of Development Research, vol.13, no.1 (June 2001), pp.154 180.
http://www.eldis.org/fulltext/secondgeneration.pdf

   Aid donors use three general approaches to help promote democracy: direct support;
   indirect support (via, for instance, encouraging economic development); and pressure to
   encourage policy reform (including the threat of use of sanctions). The promotion of specific
   policies and policy changes within aid recipient countries can indeed take many forms,
   ranging from dialogue, persuasion and support to pressure. The most common and often
   most significant tool for promoting democracy is democracy aid. Democracy assistance can be
   defined narrowly as encompassing ‘aid specifically designed to foster opening in a non-
   democratic country or to further a democratic transition in a country that has experienced a
   democratic opening’ [Carothers, 1999:6]. Most democracy aid takes the form of ‘positive
   measures’, which add a positive dimension (reward of good performance) to the negative one
   (denial of aid resources resulting from bad performance) often associated with political
   conditionality. Indeed, there exists now significant assistance available to transitional countries genuinely
   committed to and engaged in democratisation, but which lack resources or expertise. Sanctions and the
   broad range of ‘negative measures’ are increasingly seen as ineffective to redress violations of
   human rights and stagnation or reversals of democratic processes.


Democracy is positive and active – excludes conditioning
Huber, Hebrew University of Jerusalem Department of International Relations, 8
[Daniela, Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 13, No. 1, 43–62, March 2008, “Democracy Assistance in the Middle East
and North Africa: A Comparison of US and EU Policies”, p. 45-6,
http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/69109__790479070.pdf, accessed 6-3-11]

   What is Democracy Assistance?
   The term democracy assistance is used in academic literature, as well as in the programmes of the US and the
   EU, without comprehensive clarifications. This section will therefore outline the actor’s comprehensions of
   the term and the (however insufficient) academic literature on it. On this basis it will develop a definition of
   the term democracy assistance, which will be followed by the elaboration of a methodological framework.
   The US and EU have quite similar concepts of DA. USAID defines it as
         technical assistance and other support to strengthen capacity of reform-minded governments,
         nongovernmental actors, and/or citizens in order to develop and support democratic states and
         institutions that are responsive and accountable to citizens. These efforts also include promoting
         democratic transitions in countries that are not reform minded. Democracy programs promote
         the rule of law and human rights, transparent and fair elections coupled with a competitive
         political process, a free and independent media, stronger civil society and greater citizen
         participation in government, and governance structures that are efficient, responsive, and
         accountable. (USAID, 2005: 4)
   Similarly, the EU specifies the following categories of DA:
         These can include questions of democratic participation (including universal suffrage, free election,
         multiparty structure, equality of access to political activity, participatory decision making); human
         rights (including adherence to, and implementation of, commitments under international human rights
         Treaties and Conventions, protection of civil liberties, including freedom of speech and of assembly,
         effective operation of human rights monitoring); and the rule of law (including an independent and

                         Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
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         effective judiciary, transparent legal framework, equality of all citizens before the law, police and
         public administration subject to the law, enforcement of contractual obligations). (EC 2003a: 10)
  The American researcher Thomas Carothers gives a definition of DA which is closest to the understanding
  of this article: ‘Democracy aid is all aid, for which the primary purpose, not the secondary or indirect
  purpose, is to foster democracy in the recipient countries. It does not therefore include economic and
  social aid programs’ (Carothers, 2000: 188). In addition, two further characteristics of democracy
  assistance are introduced in order to differentiate it from other efforts at democracy promotion: first,
  it is not only an explicit or direct, but also a positive measure of foreign policy as opposed to negative
  measures such as sanctions or even military means.4 Second, it represents an active instrument, as the
  democracy promoter takes measures itself, whereas a passive instrument such as positive political
  conditionality implies that the democracy promoter rewards internal democracy promotion efforts.
  Table 1 visualizes the different democracy promotion instruments.

  Table 1. Democracy promotion instruments
                                Explicit instruments                                    Implicit instruments

  Positive instruments            Democracy assistance (active instrument),             Classical development
                                  positive political conditionality                     aid
                                  (passive instrument)

  Negative instruments            Negative political conditionality, naming             Military action
                                  and shaming, military action

  Democracy assistance is the type of foreign policy that aims explicitly at positively and actively
  initiating democratization, supporting democratization or strengthening democracy, as well as human
  rights in foreign countries. This definition accounts for differing DA policies depending on the level of
  democratization in a recipient country ranging from non-democracies to countries in transition to
  consolidating or delegative democracies. Democratization is the process of transition from a non-
  democratic to a democratic political system. The term human rights is included in the definition, as the
  actors understand it as an important part of their democracy assistance. Democracy is understood
  according to Robert Dahl’s concept of Polyarchy (Dahl, 1982) with its dimensions of competition and
  participation. This concept is narrow enough to exclude only liberalizing countries and it is wide enough for
  different understandings of democracy by the US and the EU. It also implies that DA is more than electoral
  assistance.


Democracy assistance is distinct from conditional approach
Peter Burnell, Department of International Studies, University of Warwick, 2008, ―From
Evaluating Democracy Assistance to Appraising Democracy Promotion‖ Political Studies,
(Vol 56, 414–434), p. 420-1

  Democracy assistance, which consists of the concessionary and, usually, consensual provision of
  practical, advisory, technical and financial support through projects and programmes, is not the only
  game in town.
  The instruments, tools or approaches that are associated with efforts to promote democracy abroad
  are wide-ranging and can be described or categorised in a number of ways. Thus we could make use of
  Joseph Nye‘s (2005) distinction between ‘soft’ and ‘hard power’, the former being the ability to get what you
  want through attraction, and the latter employing coercion or payments. Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way
  (2005) offer an alternative typology: ‘leverage’ and ‘linkage’. Leverage plays on governments’ vulnerability
  to external pressure; linkage operates via general ‘ties to the West’. A more flexible way of capturing the
  diversity rests on the idea of a continuum expressing different gradations of power, where power is
  understood as an umbrella concept that contains non-coercive ways of exercising influence at one end
  and physical coercion at the other. In the context of democracy promotion the middle ground is
  occupied by a cluster of more or less coercive relations such as diplomatic pressure, the attachment of
  political conditionalities to offers of commercial, financial or other concessions, and sanctions or threat
  of sanctions in the event of non-compliance. ‘Diplomatic pressure’ is an often-used term that while

                         Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
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   something of a black box to onlookers refers to more than just ‘political dialogue’ and ‘quiet
   diplomacy’. Conditionalities can be either negative, which means a threat of penalties in the event of
   failing to comply, or positive, in which case they resemble incentives. How far the actual conditionalities
   resemble coercion in practice depends in part on the baseline expectations, including any sense of
   entitlements that might normally have been in place, and how constrained are the choices facing the party on
   the receiving end. A positive conditionality can be compelling if the party is desperate and no alternatives are
   available. Diane Ethier’s (2003, p. 100) notion of pseudo-conditionality adds a further twist, describing
   situations where the targeted party believes the threat of penalties is not credible, perhaps because the
   rewards for compliance are delivered early and cannot be reversed.

   [Arab Spring Controversy Paper, p. 16-17]]


Democracy assistance excludes conditional aid
Lappin-Faculty of Political Sciences at the University of Belgrade-10
What we talk about when we talk about democracy assistance
2010 - Volume 4, Issue 1 http://www.cejiss.org/sites/default/files/8.pdf

   In defining democracy assistance, it is paramount that the distinction be tween
   democracy assistance and democracy promotion is established . Although democracy
   promotion is often used interchangeably with democracy assistance, the latter should be
   recognised as only a small and distinct part of a much broader democracy promotion
   approach . As the table below illustrates, democracy promotion comprises several instruments,
   both positive and negative, both explicit and implicit, of which democracy assistance is only
   one distinct part . On the negative side, there is direct military action, which includes armed
   intervention to promote democracy and can be either explicit (to install a demo- cratic regime, as
   in Afghanistan) or implicit (to curb an anti-democratic regime, as in the first Iraq war) . In
   addition, there is also the explicit tool of negative political conditionality, or ‘naming and
   shaming’, in which membership from international organisations may be suspended,
   economic sanctions applied, and embargoes enforced . On the positive side, there is the
   implicit instrument of classical develop ment aid which seeks to foster improved
   socioeconomic conditions which may consequently lead to democratic developments .
   Additionally, there is the positive instrument of international interim administrations, as was
   the case in East Timor, where the democratic transition is directly controlled and managed in
   its entirety by international actors . There is also the explicit instrument of positive political
   conditionality, which can include offers of membership in intergovernmental organisations,
   security guarantees, or economic and trade benefits . Finally, on the positive side, there is
   the distinct instrument of democracy assistance . Democracy assistance differs
   from all other forms of democracy promotion in several important ways . First, it is
   distinct from military action insofar that it does not ‘enforce’ democracy, and from
   international interim administration insofar that it does not ‘manage’ democracy .
   Second, democracy assistance is directed primarily and exclusively at fostering
   democracy, as opposed to classical development aid in which democracy is usually
   only a secondary concern . Third, democracy assistance is distinct from positive political
   conditionality insofar that it encompasses direct and active measures, rather than passive
   tools . Democracy assistance can be further differentiated from political
   conditionality insofar that it is neither a reward nor a punishment, neither a carrot
   nor a stick, but rather a ‘booster’ to internal groups already working towards
   democratisation . Democracy assistance is not concerned with ‘exporting democracy’
   (Schraeder 2002) or ‘spreading democracy’ (Hobsbawm 2004) irrespective of the readiness of a
   given country; rather, democracy assist ance explicitly recognises that ‘the primary motive
   force for democratisation is and must be internal to the country in question’ (Burnell 2000c:
   9), and that the exclusive intention is ‘to help domestic actors achieve what they have already

                         Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
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   decided they want for themselves’ (Carothers 2007b: 22) . Democracy assistance is
   therefore a very precise instrument within a broader democracy promotion paradigm .


Assistance is a distinct form of positive democracy promotion – excludes coercive and
conditional tools
Toornstra, European Parliament Office for Promotion of Parliamentary Democracy
Director, 10
[Dick, “Getting Acquainted: Setting the Stage for Democracy Assistance”
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdf/oppd/Page_8/getting_acquainted_web.pdf, p.7-8, accessed 5-17-11, TP]

   There are three major approaches to democracy promotion (see Table 1): 1) the coercive approach,
   2) conditionality, and 3) the consensual approach. The coercive, or ‘negative’ or ‘punitive’ approach,
   involves the use of military, economic or political force or pressure to (re)establish a democratic
   regime against the will of a state’s authorities. Major coercive instruments of democracy promotion
   include military intervention, general economic sanctions and targeted diplomatic, economic, financial
   and military sanctions. Political conditionality links benefits to the fulfilment of conditions relating to
   the protection of democratic principles and human rights. Benefits can be removed by way of
   punishment or used to reward the completion of certain actions. Examples of conditionality include:
   suspension or redirection of assistance away from governmental channels to civil society; suspension
   of trade and cooperation agreements; EU membership conditionality; and EU incentive schemes, such
   as the General System of Preferences + (GSP+), 11 ‘Governance Facility’ for European Neighbourhood
   (ENP) states 12 and ‘Governance Initiative’ for African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states. 13 The
   consensual or positive approach is characterised by the consent or at least toleration of the target
   state’s authorities, the absence of coercion, active and positive engagement by the foreign actor, pro-
   active rather than reactive involvement, and by direct engagement with local individuals and
   institutions. Consensual tools of democracy promotion include human rights dialogue, EU human
   rights monitoring mechanisms, election monitoring, diplomatic measures and – highly important and
   the focus of this paper – democracy assistance.




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                  Democracy Assistance – Includes Conditioning


Democracy assistance includes linking aid to democratic practices
Lappin, University of Leuven (Belgium) Centre for Peace Research and Strategic Studies
PhD candidate, 10
[Richard, participant in democracy assistance missions with the UN, EU, OSCE, and Carter Center, University of
Belgrade political sciences visiting scholar, Central European Journal of International & Security Studies, Volume 4
Issue 1, “What we talk about when we talk about democracy assistance: the problem of definition in post-conflict
approaches to democratization” http://www.cejiss.org/issue/2010-volume-4-issue-1/lappin, p.184, accessed 5-16-11,
TP]

   The period of decolonisation during the 1950s and 1960s provided a further precursor to contemporary
   democracy assistance, with many European countries exporting their own models of democracy to
   their former colonies. At the same time several countries began to introduce democracy and human
   rights clauses into their foreign aid packages, such as ‘Title IX’ of the 1966 US Foreign Assistance Act,
   which linked foreign aid to participatory politics. The profile of democracy assistance was
   significantly enhanced by the election of Ronald Reagan to the US presidency. In 1983 Reagan
   established the first specific US democracy promotion institution, the National Endowment for
   Democracy (NED), and consistently spoke with passion about the values of democracy and his vision of a
   ‘global democratic revolution’ (Reagan 1988).




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                       Democracy Assistance – Can Be Covert

Democracy assistance in hostile situations, is done discreetly
Burke, FRIDE Researcher, 6-14-10
[Edward, 6-14-10, “Assessing Democracy Assistance: Yemen”, p. 9, http://www.fride.org/publication/776/yemen,
accessed 6-5-11, AFB]

   The US government has enjoyed a mixed reputation as a democracy donor in Yemen. Firstly, receiving US
   funding is in itself potentially dangerous for Yemeni NGOs, and there have been instances of Yemeni
   conservative Members of Parliament and newspapers ‘outing’ US-backed NGOs and accusing their
   directors of spying for the United States. The US Embassy has therefore tried to be relatively discreet
   in its funding practices. MEPI has been widely praised for the flexibility of its funding arrangements,
   training NGOs to meet reporting requirements where necessary and engaging with those which have
   been harassed by the government. MEPI has also been commended for offering sophisticated training
   programmes for public representatives and reform of human rights legislation. USAID governance
   and democracy promotion, although usually on a larger scale in terms of grants than the small MEPI
   grant system, are crucial to maintaining civil society activities and pressure on the government to
   implement reforms. However some interviewees felt that this support was overly linked to the US anti-
   terrorism campaign and that the US focused on the al-Qaeda threat from Yemen at the expense of other
   reform needs. Several interviewees also claimed that USAID had disproportionately funded a significant
   number of NGOs that were closely aligned with the President, rather than being independent entities.




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                            Democracy Assistance – Not Secret


Democracy assistance is transparent – secret transfers are not assistance
Office for Promotion of Parliamentary Democracy, EU-10
Getting Acquainted: Setting the Stage for Democracy Assistance
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdf/oppd/Page_8/getting_acquainted_web.pdf

   Democracy assistance programmes and projects are implemented openly rather than
   secretly. However, individual aid recipients can at times, for their own protection, remain unidentified.
   Secret money transfers may help democratisation processes, but are different in nature to
   assistance




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                       ***Alternative Phrases




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                                Democracy Promotion – Broad


Democracy promotion is a broad umbrella term – includes assistance, consolidation,
dissemination, and advocacy
Acuto, Australian National University Asia-Pacific College of Diplomacy School of Social
Sciences and Department of International Relations, 8
[Michele, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political October, 2008 33: 461,
“Wilson Victorious? Understanding Democracy Promotion in the Midst of a Backlash”, Academic Search
Complete, accessed 6-3-11]

   Democracy, of course, is a notoriously contested concept, and promoters of democracy usually give only
   the vaguest account of what it is they are promoting.21 The concept of democracy promotion presents
   similar difficulties. Five core terms may be distinguished:
    • Democracy promotion is an umbrella term that covers various activities aimed at
   fostering, improving, and sustaining good governance at several political levels. It comprises
   assistance, consolidation, dissemination, and advocacy.22
    • Democracy assistance is the provision of support (either financial, cultural, or material) to
   “democratic agents” in the process of democratization, without entailing direct intervention. It seeks to
   foster the conditions for the rise of a democratic regime, such as NGOs’ patronage or diplomatic pressure,
   and is thus, as Thomas Carothers put it, “a quiet support for democracy.”23
    • Democracy consolidation is another type of support, more direct and explicit, toward newly formed
   governments, weak institutions, or systems in decay, with the goal of enforcing the procedural side of
   the targeted polities, and is aimed at “avoiding democratic breakdown and avoiding democratic
   erosion” while strengthening preexisting structures.24
    • Democracy dissemination comprises all those activities that seek to advance democratic governance
   structures by intervening directly in the internal affairs of nondemocratic polities, reshaping
   authoritarian, fragile, or collapsed states through explicit pressures, or enforcing instruments of
   international law with democratization goals.
   • Democracy advocacy is, contrary to the two prior types, a noninterventionist form of promotion,
   usually involving of mass-media-related activities and nongovernmental organizations like think tanks.


Democracy promotion is broad – 5 major methods – military action, development aid,
negative pressure, positive political conditionality, and democracy assistance
Huber, Hebrew University of Jerusalem Department of International Relations, 8
[Daniela, Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 13, No. 1, 43–62, March 2008, “Democracy Assistance in the Middle East
and North Africa: A Comparison of US and EU Policies”, p. 45-6,
http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/69109__790479070.pdf, accessed 6-3-11]

   What is Democracy Assistance?
   The term democracy assistance is used in academic literature, as well as in the programmes of the US and the
   EU, without comprehensive clarifications. This section will therefore outline the actor’s comprehensions of
   the term and the (however insufficient) academic literature on it. On this basis it will develop a definition of
   the term democracy assistance, which will be followed by the elaboration of a methodological framework.
   The US and EU have quite similar concepts of DA. USAID defines it as
         technical assistance and other support to strengthen capacity of reform-minded governments,
         nongovernmental actors, and/or citizens in order to develop and support democratic states and
         institutions that are responsive and accountable to citizens. These efforts also include promoting
         democratic transitions in countries that are not reform minded. Democracy programs promote
         the rule of law and human rights, transparent and fair elections coupled with a competitive
         political process, a free and independent media, stronger civil society and greater citizen
         participation in government, and governance structures that are efficient, responsive, and
         accountable. (USAID, 2005: 4)

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  Similarly, the EU specifies the following categories of DA:
        These can include questions of democratic participation (including universal suffrage, free election,
        multiparty structure, equality of access to political activity, participatory decision making); human
        rights (including adherence to, and implementation of, commitments under international human rights
        Treaties and Conventions, protection of civil liberties, including freedom of speech and of assembly,
        effective operation of human rights monitoring); and the rule of law (including an independent and
        effective judiciary, transparent legal framework, equality of all citizens before the law, police and
        public administration subject to the law, enforcement of contractual obligations). (EC 2003a: 10)
  The American researcher Thomas Carothers gives a definition of DA which is closest to the understanding
  of this article: ‘Democracy aid is all aid, for which the primary purpose, not the secondary or indirect
  purpose, is to foster democracy in the recipient countries. It does not therefore include economic and
  social aid programs’ (Carothers, 2000: 188). In addition, two further characteristics of democracy
  assistance are introduced in order to differentiate it from other efforts at democracy
  promotion: first, it is not only an explicit or direct, but also a positive measure of foreign
  policy as opposed to negative measures such as sanctions or even military means.4 Second,
  it represents an active instrument, as the democracy promoter takes measures itself,
  whereas a passive instrument such as positive political conditionality implies that the
  democracy promoter rewards internal democracy promotion efforts. Table 1 visualizes the
  different democracy promotion instruments.

  Table 1. Democracy promotion instruments
                                Explicit instruments                                    Implicit instruments

  Positive instruments            Democracy assistance (active instrument),             Classical development
                                  positive political conditionality                     aid
                                  (passive instrument)

  Negative instruments            Negative political conditionality, naming             Military action
                                  and shaming, military action

  Democracy assistance is the type of foreign policy that aims explicitly at positively and actively
  initiating democratization, supporting democratization or strengthening democracy, as well as human
  rights in foreign countries. This definition accounts for differing DA policies depending on the level of
  democratization in a recipient country ranging from non-democracies to countries in transition to
  consolidating or delegative democracies. Democratization is the process of transition from a non-
  democratic to a democratic political system. The term human rights is included in the definition, as the
  actors understand it as an important part of their democracy assistance. Democracy is understood
  according to Robert Dahl’s concept of Polyarchy (Dahl, 1982) with its dimensions of competition and
  participation. This concept is narrow enough to exclude only liberalizing countries and it is wide enough for
  different understandings of democracy by the US and the EU. It also implies that DA is more than electoral
  assistance.


Democracy promotion includes a wide array of tools, including diplomacy, sanctions,
conditioning
Peter Burnell, Department of International Studies, University of Warwick, 2008, ―From
Evaluating Democracy Assistance to Appraising Democracy Promotion‖ Political Studies,
(Vol 56, 414–434), p. 420-1

  Democracy assistance, which consists of the concessionary and, usually, consensual provision of practical,
  advisory, technical and financial support through projects and programmes, is not the only game in town.
  The instruments, tools or approaches that are associated with efforts to promote democracy abroad
  are wide-ranging and can be described or categorised in a number of ways. Thus we could make use of
  Joseph Nye‘s (2005) distinction between ‘soft’ and ‘hard power’, the former being the ability to get
  what you want through attraction, and the latter employing coercion or payments. Steven Levitsky and
  Lucan Way (2005) offer an alternative typology: ‘leverage’ and ‘linkage’. Leverage plays on

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   governments’ vulnerability to external pressure; linkage operates via general ‘ties to the West’. A
   more flexible way of capturing the diversity rests on the idea of a continuum expressing different
   gradations of power, where power is understood as an umbrella concept that contains non-coercive
   ways of exercising influence at one end and physical coercion at the other. In the context of
   democracy promotion the middle ground is occupied by a cluster of more or less coercive relations
   such as diplomatic pressure, the attachment of political conditionalities to offers of commercial,
   financial or other concessions, and sanctions or threat of sanctions in the event of non-compliance.
   ‘Diplomatic pressure’ is an often-used term that while something of a black box to onlookers refers to
   more than just ‘political dialogue’ and ‘quiet diplomacy’. Conditionalities can be either negative,
   which means a threat of penalties in the event of failing to comply, or positive, in which case they
   resemble incentives. How far the actual conditionalities resemble coercion in practice depends in part on the
   baseline expectations, including any sense of entitlements that might normally have been in place, and how
   constrained are the choices facing the party on the receiving end. A positive conditionality can be compelling
   if the party is desperate and no alternatives are available. Diane Ethier’s (2003, p. 100) notion of pseudo-
   conditionality adds a further twist, describing situations where the targeted party believes the threat of
   penalties is not credible, perhaps because the rewards for compliance are delivered early and cannot be
   reversed.

   [Arab Spring Controversy Paper, p. 16-17]]


Democracy promotion includes multiple instruments – positive and negative, explicit and
implicit – including military action, negative conditionality, development aid, interim
administration, positive conditionality, and democracy assistance
Lappin-Faculty of Political Sciences at the University of Belgrade-10
What we talk about when we talk about democracy assistance
2010 - Volume 4, Issue 1 http://www.cejiss.org/sites/default/files/8.pdf

   In defining democracy assistance, it is paramount that the distinction be tween
   democracy assistance and democracy promotion is established . Although democracy
   promotion is often used interchangeably with democracy assistance, the latter should be
   recognised as only a small and distinct part of a much broader democracy promotion
   approach . As the table below illustrates, democracy promotion comprises several
   instruments, both positive and negative, both explicit and implicit, of which democracy
   assistance is only one distinct part . On the negative side, there is direct military action, which
   includes armed intervention to promote democracy and can be either explicit (to install a demo-
   cratic regime, as in Afghanistan) or implicit (to curb an anti-democratic regime, as in the first Iraq
   war) . In addition, there is also the explicit tool of negative political conditionality, or ‘naming
   and shaming’, in which membership from international organisations may be suspended,
   economic sanctions applied, and embargoes enforced . On the positive side, there is the
   implicit instrument of classical develop ment aid which seeks to foster improved
   socioeconomic conditions which may consequently lead to democratic developments .
   Additionally, there is the positive instrument of international interim administrations, as was
   the case in East Timor, where the democratic transition is directly controlled and managed in
   its entirety by international actors . There is also the explicit instrument of positive political
   conditionality, which can include offers of membership in intergovernmental organisations,
   security guarantees, or economic and trade benefits . Finally, on the positive side, there is
   the distinct instrument of democracy assistance . Democracy assistance differs
   from all other forms of democracy promotion in several important ways . First, it is
   distinct from military action insofar that it does not ‘enforce’ democracy, and from
   international interim administration insofar that it does not ‘manage’ democracy .
   Second, democracy assistance is directed primarily and exclusively at fostering
   democracy, as opposed to classical development aid in which democracy is usually
   only a secondary concern . Third, democracy assistance is distinct from positive political

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   conditionality insofar that it encompasses direct and active measures, rather than passive
   tools . Democracy assistance can be further differentiated from political
   conditionality insofar that it is neither a reward nor a punishment, neither a carrot
   nor a stick, but rather a ‘booster’ to internal groups already working towards
   democratisation . Democracy assistance is not concerned with ‘exporting democracy’
   (Schraeder 2002) or ‘spreading democracy’ (Hobsbawm 2004) irrespective of the readiness of a
   given country; rather, democracy assist ance explicitly recognises that ‘the primary motive
   force for democratisation is and must be internal to the country in question’ (Burnell 2000c:
   9), and that the exclusive intention is ‘to help domestic actors achieve what they have already
   decided they want for themselves’ (Carothers 2007b: 22) . Democracy assistance is
   therefore a very precise instrument within a broader democracy promotion paradigm .


Democracy promotion includes 3 major approaches – coercive, conditional, consensual –
including the following tools:
       Military pressure – e.g. intervention
       Economic pressure – e.g. sanctions
       Political pressure – e.g. targeted sanctions
       Conditions – e.g. Suspension/shift of aid, suspension of trade/coop, membership conditions, incentive
        schemes
       Dialogue – e.g. Human rights
       Monitoring – e.g. Elections
       Diplomacy
       Democracy assistance
Toornstra, European Parliament Office for Promotion of Parliamentary Democracy
Director, 10
[Dick, “Getting Acquainted: Setting the Stage for Democracy Assistance”
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdf/oppd/Page_8/getting_acquainted_web.pdf, p.7-8, accessed 5-17-11, TP]

   There are three major approaches to democracy promotion (see Table 1): 1) the coercive approach,
   2) conditionality, and 3) the consensual approach. The coercive, or ‘negative’ or ‘punitive’ approach,
   involves the use of military, economic or political force or pressure to (re)establish a democratic
   regime against the will of a state’s authorities. Major coercive instruments of democracy promotion
   include military intervention, general economic sanctions and targeted diplomatic, economic, financial
   and military sanctions. Political conditionality links benefits to the fulfilment of conditions relating to
   the protection of democratic principles and human rights. Benefits can be removed by way of
   punishment or used to reward the completion of certain actions. Examples of conditionality include:
   suspension or redirection of assistance away from governmental channels to civil society; suspension
   of trade and cooperation agreements; EU membership conditionality; and EU incentive schemes, such
   as the General System of Preferences + (GSP+), 11 ‘Governance Facility’ for European Neighbourhood
   (ENP) states 12 and ‘Governance Initiative’ for African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states. 13 The
   consensual or positive approach is characterised by the consent or at least toleration of the target
   state’s authorities, the absence of coercion, active and positive engagement by the foreign actor, pro-
   active rather than reactive involvement, and by direct engagement with local individuals and
   institutions. Consensual tools of democracy promotion include human rights dialogue, EU human
   rights monitoring mechanisms, election monitoring, diplomatic measures and – highly important and
   the focus of this paper – democracy assistance.


Democracy promotion, is any form of action designed to establish, strengthen, or defend
democracy in a country – including democracy assistance, diplomacy, conditioning,
development aid, sanctions, and military intervention
Azpuru, Finkel, Perez-Linan, and Seligson, Vandy, Pitt, Pitt, Vandy, ’08
(“What has the United States Been Doing?” Journal of Democracy Volume 19, Number 2, April 2008 pp. 150-159)

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   In the post–Cold War era, U.S. foreign-policy discourse has consistently underscored the importance of aid
   designed to foster democracy and economic development. Presidents Bill Clinton and George W.
   Bush both have emphasized that supporting the growth of democracy in the world is an essential task. President
   Clinton in his 1994 State of the Union address called the promotion of democracy and human rights the
   "third pillar" of his foreign-policy agenda,1 and President Bush has time and again highlighted the prominence
   that democracy building around the world takes among his foreign-policy goals. Before beginning, it is vital to
   make a conceptual distinction between democracy promotion and democracy assistance, as this essay
   focuses exclusively on the latter. Democracy promotion refers to an array of measures aimed at
   establishing, strengthening, or defending democracy in a given country. Such measures may
   range from diplomatic pressure to conditionality on development aid to economic sanctions,
   and even to military intervention. Democracy assistance is a form of democracy promotion. It
   provides funds or direct assistance to governments, institutions, or civil society actors that are working
   either to strengthen an emerging democracy or to foster conditions that could lead to democracy's rise
   where a nondemocratic regime holds power. This analysis examines democracy assistance only—what
   Thomas Carothers has called "the quiet side" of U.S. democracy promotion. 2 Until now, the absence of
   comprehensive and systematic data on the magnitude and distribution of U.S. democracy assistance—where, on
   what, and in which quantities these funds have been spent—has prevented analysts from identifying patterns of
   assistance and has frustrated rigorous empirical research into democracy aid's impact. Earlier studies rest on
   data regarding foreign assistance that fail to distinguish democracy assistance from other types of development
   aid. Our use here of a newly assembled dataset showing all U.S. foreign-assistance through USAID over a
   sixteen-year period (1990 through 2005) allows us to clarify some of those questions and to identify patterns in
   the data. Our major aim is to describe where U.S. democracy assistance went during those years and in what
   amounts, using the most comprehensive multiyear data currently available, so as to provide a solid point of
   departure for future studies.3 This analysis will clear up at least some of the confusion and ambiguities that
   currently muddy the topic of U.S. democracy aid. The database we use tracks USAID democracy-assistance
   funds from 1990 to 2005 and comprises 44,958 records that capture the composition of USAID budgets for
   specific activities in all sectors for that period.4 The dataset contains the most extensive and finely grained
   information on USAID expenditures in the democracy and governance sector (hereafter DG) currently available
   for scholarly analysis. 5

   1. James Meernik, Eric L. Krueger, and Steve C. Poe, "Testing Models of U.S. Foreign Policy: Foreign Aid During and
   After the Cold War," Journal of Politics 60 (February 1998): 63–85. 2. Thomas Carothers, U.S. Democracy Promotion
   During and After Bush (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007), 10; available at
   www.carnegieendowment.org/files/democracy_promotion_after_bush_final.pdf. 3. See Steven E. Finkel, Aníbal Pérez-
   Liñán, and Mitchell A. Seligson, "The Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990–2003," World
   Politics 59 (April 2007): 404–39. 4. The database is available at www.pitt.edu/~politics/democracy/democracy.html. Part
   of the data was initially compiled by John Richter at USAID and the database was later expanded by Andrew Green, a
   USAID Democracy Fellow, in 2004–2005. The database includes the funds allocated to democracy assistance by USAID. In
   consultation with Andrew Green, we developed a series of aggregation routines to generate yearly totals for: a) DG spending
   at the country level; b) DG subsectors [Elections, Rule of Law, Civil Society, and Governance] at the country level; c) non-
   DG sectors [Agriculture and Economic Growth, Education, Environment, Health, Humanitarian Assistance, Human Rights,
   and Conflict Management and Mitigation] at the country level; d) programs that operate at the regional level [in any of the
   fields just described]; and e) programs that operate at the subregional level [in any of the fields]. 5. Although USAID is the
   main channel for U.S. democracy assistance, it should be noted that not all DG money goes through USAID. We do not
   include funding from other institutions such as the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). According to the data
   presented by the annual report on U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, funds allocated internationally by NED between 1990
   and 2004 represented on average 5.1 percent of the annual USAID Democracy and Governance budget during the same
   period. See James Scott and Carrie Steele, "Assisting Democrats or Resisting Dictators: The Nature and Impact of
   Democracy Support by the United States National Endowment for Democracy, 1990–1999," Democratization 12 (August
   2005): 439–60.


Democracy promotion instruments include military means, political conditionality, and
democracy assistance
Huber, Hebrew University of Jerusalem Department of International Relations, 8



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[Daniela, Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 13, No. 1, 43–62, March 2008, “Democracy Assistance in the Middle East
and North Africa: A Comparison of US and EU Policies”, p. 44
http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/69109__790479070.pdf, accessed 6-3-11]

   Democracy promotion employs different instruments including military means, political
   conditionality or democracy assistance. This article focuses on the latter, as despite the increasing
   national and international budgets assigned to DA, systematic research about it is still lagging behind.
   Nonetheless, Carothers (2003, 2004) provides detailed accounts of democracy assistance for the US and
   Youngs (2001a, b, 2004a) for the EU, specifically also for EU efforts in the Middle East and North Africa
   (MENA)2 (Youngs, 2004b; Gillespie and Youngs, 2002). US and EU efforts at democracy promotion are
   briefly compared by Hu¨llen and Stahn (2007), Kopstein (2006), Youngs (2001a: 46–52) and Whitehead
   (1986).3 To the knowledge of the author, there is no work, however, that compares US and EU democracy
   assistance on the basis of an extended empirical study and this article will thus fill this research gap.


Democracy promotion includes numerous foreign policy tools – aid, military intervention,
diplomacy, and public diplomacy
Epstein, et al., Congressional Research Service Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade
Division foreign policy specialists, 7
[Susan B. Epstein, Nina M. Serafino, and Francis T. Miko, 12-26-7, CRS Report for Congress: Democracy
Promotion: Cornerstone of U.S. Foreign Policy?, p. 9, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34296.pdf, accessed 5-
27-11]

   The high military and opportunity cost of some activities currently associated with democracy promotion is
   criticized by many observers, especially when democracy is imposed by outsiders rather than initiated by
   local citizens.27 Democracy promotion expenditures compete with domestic spending priorities. Critics note
   that using the various tools to promote democracy abroad — foreign aid, military intervention, diplomacy,
   and public diplomacy — can be very expensive and may provide little assurance that real long-term gains
   will be made. They add that it involves a high probability of sustaining costly long-term nation-building
   programs down the road. U.S. funding obligations supporting America’s democracy promotion effort in Iraq,
   for example, are estimated to be about $10 billion per month.28 Is spending this amount of money for
   democracy promotion rather than for domestic programs worth it to American taxpayers? Many Americans
   have come to view the military and opportunity cost of funding democracy promotion activities overseas
   rather than spending those funds on domestic programs or other pressing global concerns, such as infectious
   disease and extreme poverty, as being too great.


Democracy promotion includes multiple tools at the disposal of the Pentagon, Treasury,
and individual Congresspersons. During the 90s – 23 different departments and agencies
did democracy promotion in the former Soviet Union
Spence, former assistant to the National Security Adviser, 2004
p. http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/20741/Spence-_CDDRL_10-4_draf1.pdf

   Comparing American and European approaches to democracy promotion requires defining
   what American democracy promotion entails. It is an elusive task. In the 1990s, for example,
   some twenty-three different departments and independent agencies of the U.S. government carried
   out programs to promote political and economic change in the former Soviet Union.1 Around the
   world, U.S. government efforts to promote democracy involve far more than self-defined
   “democracy assistance” programs administered by USAID, or the familiar cast of American
   diplomats overseas. 2 In fact, a host of less expected players — such as the Pentagon, Treasury
   Department, and individual Congressmen — devote millions of dollars and countless man-hours to
   promoting internal political change abroad. It is too simplistic to say that only USAID cares about
   democracy, and the Pentagon worries only about weapons.




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Democracy promotion programs include programs that support governance, human rights,
independent media, rule of law, and “otherwise strengthen the capacity” to “support
development” of democracy
Epstein, et al., Congressional Research Service Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade
Division foreign policy specialists, 7
[Susan B. Epstein, Nina M. Serafino, and Francis T. Miko, 12-26-7, CRS Report for Congress: Democracy
Promotion: Cornerstone of U.S. Foreign Policy?, p. 6-7, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34296.pdf, accessed
5-27-11]

   Congress has demonstrated its concern for the lack of a consistent definition for democracy. The
   Senate Foreign Operations Appropriation Committee Report for FY2006 (S.Rept. 109-96/H.R. 3057)
   stated, “The Committee remains concerned that the State Department and USAID do not share a
   common definition of a democracy program. For the purposes of this Act, ‘a democracy program’
   means technical assistance and other support to strengthen the capacity of democratic political parties,
   governments, non-governmental institutions, and/or citizens, in order to support the development of
   democratic states, institutions and practices that are responsive and accountable to citizens.”14
   The following year, the Senate Appropriations Committee Report for FY2007 (S.Rept. 109-277/H.R.
   5522) asserted, “to ensure a common understanding of democracy programs among United States
   Government agencies, the Committee defines in the act ‘the promotion of democracy’ to include
   programs that support good governance, human rights, independent media, and the rule of law, and
   otherwise strengthen the capacity of democratic political parties, NGOs, and citizens to support the
   development of democratic states, institutions and practices that are responsible and accountable to
   citizens.”15




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                   Democracy Promotion – Unlimits Mechanism


Democracy promotion is too broad – Democracy assistance should be considered all aid for
which the primary purpose, not the secondary purpose or indirect purpose, is to foster
democracy in the recipient countries---Including indirect aid that may affect democracy
explodes the topic. Just because the USAID calls development programs “democracy
assistance” does not make them so.
Lappin-Faculty of Political Sciences at the University of Belgrade-10
What we talk about when we talk about democracy assistance
2010 - Volume 4, Issue 1 http://www.cejiss.org/sites/default/files/8.pdf

   Problems Resulting From Definitional Uncertainty Establishing the definitional clarity of democracy
   assistance is an important step towards understanding how three core problems have
   developed as a direct result of definitional uncertainties in democracy promotion
   terminology . The resultant problems concern, imprecise democracy assistance data, a neglect of the
   inherent limitations of democracy assistance, and the fostering of negative perceptions of democracy
   assistance . Imprecise Democracy Assistance Data The lack of definitional concreteness over what may be
   classified as democ- racy assistance has meant that ‘the available data concerning how much and by whom
   remains relatively soft, variable in quality and far from complete’ (Burnell 2000b: 339) . Typically,
   different countries and organisations use different classifications and indicators to define and
   record democracy assistance . Moreover, these figures are often merged into standard
   development projects, thus presenting major complications for the disaggregation of precise
   and direct democracy assistance from broad development statistics (Crawford and Kearton 2002;
   Green and Kohl 2007: 159; Knack 2004: 266) . In one of the few detailed cross-national studies of
   democracy assistance, Richard Youngs et al . (2006: 21) lamented that ‘no standard or easily comparable
   classification of political aid existed across states’ and, worryingly, that several countries had to compile the
   data upon request . Therefore, even seemingly comparable data, such as that from the Creditor Reporting
   System (CRS) of OECD-DAC, can be decidedly misleading due to the inability to accurately disaggregate
   the data . Furthermore, as democracy has become increasingly associated with post- conflict
   peacebuilding, almost any international assistance effort that addresses any development or
   peacebuilding issues can arguably be labelled as ‘democracy assistance .’ In their study,
   Youngs et al. (2006: 21), note that ‘many states included in their democracy and
   governance categories aid projects that could not be reasonably said to have any
   meaningful bearing on political reform .’ Whilst Burnell (2000b: 339) has posited that some
   development agencies simply renamed their traditional development programmes as
   ‘democracy assistance’ to demonstrate that they were in tune with fashionable governance
   themes . Such fastidiousness on the boundaries of what should be considered as democracy
   assistance is not to undermine the impact that broader development assistance can have on
   democratisation . As Steve Finkel et al. (2007: 410) explain, indirect assistance ‘may promote
   modernisation, encourage better economic performance, and foster class transformations, all
   of which may have long-term implications for democratic development .’ However, the
   concern is that such a broad definition can lead to an expansive laundry list of things which
   ‘assist’ democracy, such as general poverty alleviation or the build ing of schools . Burnell
   (2000c: 12) claims that, although at times beneficial, this is problematic because ‘if democracy
   assistance is defined as whatever helps democratisation directly or indirectly, sooner or later,
   then our sense of it could be so generous as to undermine the value of the term .’ Carothers
   (2000: 188) offers a route out of this dilemma in his argument that democracy assistance
   should be considered all aid ‘for which the primary purpose, not the secondary purpose or
   indirect purpose, is to foster democracy in the recipient countries . It does not therefore
   include economic and social aid programmes .’

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Democracy promotion is constantly evolving and includes daily diplomatic activities at
both public and private levels, technical assistance, reporting, advocacy, educational and
cultural exchanges, and punitive measures
Dobriansky, former undersecretary of State in global affairs, 2005
p. http://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/nss/state/46358.pdf

   Today, I want to share with you an overview of what the State Department is doing to put the President’s
   priorities into practice, and explore how we can deepen our partnership in this shared goal. The President’s
   vision is being implemented with bold new programs and initiatives. No less important, his agenda is also
   being carried out through the countless daily acts of faithful service performed by thousands of State
   Department staff around the globe. In particular, the Secretary has directed our Ambassadors to give
   priority to democracy promotion, to make it central to their mission strategies and their daily
   diplomatic activities. Our comprehensive democracy strategy, constantly being adapted even as it is
   being carried out, includes technical assistance, reporting and advocacy, public and private
   diplomacy, educational and cultural exchanges, and punitive measures. It is bilateral and multilateral. It
   is willing to consider and use a wide array of means to achieve a common end: the advance of
   democratic institutions, the affirmation of human dignity, and the ultimate end of tyranny around the globe.


Developmental approach to democracy assistance allows small changes and reforms that
eventually give rise to democracy
Toornstra, European Parliament Office for Promotion of Parliamentary Democracy
Director, 10
[Dick, “Getting Acquainted: Setting the Stage for Democracy Assistance”
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdf/oppd/Page_8/getting_acquainted_web.pdf, p.15, accessed 5-17-11, TP]

   The Political and the Developmental Approach to Democracy Assistance The political approach is
   influenced by narrow, political conceptions of democracy and by the abovementioned genetic theories of
   democratisation. It therefore focuses on core political actors, institutions and processes and recognises
   the importance of crucial moments, particularly during the transition phase. Political democracy
   assistance typically concentrates on elections, for instance central electoral commissions and civic and
   voter education programmes, political parties, leading politicians, the media, civil rights-focused
   NGOs, parliaments and, to a more limited extent, the independent judiciary. It can at times be hugely
   challenging to the political regime, especially if it focuses on supporting the political opposition,
   dissidents, or external media that broadcasts into an authoritarian state. However, in most cases political
   assistance is less directly oppositional and carries out many of the examples of political assistance
   mentioned within the authoritarian or newly democratic state and hence with the acceptance of its
   government. 35 The developmental approach is inspired by broader concepts of democracy, in
   particular those encompassing the social dimension, 36 and by structural theories of
   democratisation. It therefore considers democratisation as a slow, gradual process entailing many
   small changes and reforms that eventually give rise to democracy, with the idea of the inter-linked
   nature of socio-economic and political reform playing a key role. It stresses, although not exclusively,
   the bottom-up approach and focuses on local-level reforms of which the decentralisation focus is the
   most prominent. It frequently combines democracy promotion with human rights promotion, due to
   conceptual overlaps and the fact that the latter is considered less ‘interfering’ and more acceptable
   than the former. All in all, the developmental approach avoids being confrontational and overtly political
   and prefers more neutral terminology to the language of democracy, politics or regime change.


Democracy promotion is broader than assistance – allowing covert programs and socio-
economic programs that only indirectly affect democracy
Office for Promotion of Parliamentary Democracy, EU-10

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Getting Acquainted: Setting the Stage for Democracy Assistance
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdf/oppd/Page_8/getting_acquainted_web.pdf

   "Democracy assistance – one of the tools of democracy promotion – can be defined as: all
   programmes and projects which are openly adopted, supported and/or (directly or indirectly)
   implemented by (public or private) foreign actors, (mainly) take place in target countries, in
   principle with the consent or toleration of these countries’ authorities, and are explicitly
   designed to directly contribute to the liberalisation, democratisation or consolidation of
   democracy of the target country.14 Thus, key characteristics of democracy assistance are that it works
   through programmes or projects which focus on changing behaviours and attitudes, or reforming institutions
   and processes in target states. Foreign actors can to different degrees be involved in the planning and
   implementation of activities, but usually bear most of the financial costs . In order to work, and
   intensively engage with local actors and institutions, democracy assistance is in principle
   implemented within the target state rather than abroad. The nature of some assistance
   projects, such as study visits, may exceptionally involve assistance implemented externally.
   Democracy assistance programmes and projects are implemented openly rather than
   secretly. However, individual aid recipients can at times, for their own protection, remain unidentified.
   Secret money transfers may help democratisation processes, but are different in nature to
   assistance. Democracy assistance requires, in theory, the consent of or at least toleration by
   the target state’s authorities, otherwise it cannot be transparent, nor can it be implemented
   or reach its potential. Finally, by definition, democracy assistance exists to facilitate
   democratisation and excludes activities which might only indirectly affect
   democratisation, in particular socio-economic assistance."


Democracy promotion tools proliferating to foster democratic institutions
Toornstra, European Parliament Office for Promotion of Parliamentary Democracy
Director, 10
[Dick, “Getting Acquainted: Setting the Stage for Democracy Assistance”
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdf/oppd/Page_8/getting_acquainted_web.pdf, p.6, accessed 5-17-11, TP]

   One phenomenon that has accompanied all democratisation processes of the last decades is
   democracy promotion, that is to say, explicit efforts by foreign actors to facilitate domestic political
   reform processes. States, international bodies, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and
   numerous other actors have developed an increasing number of different instruments with which they
   attempt to foster democratic institutions and processes in authoritarian and democratising states. One
   democracy promotion tool that has gained particular attention is democracy assistance, in other
   words financing projects and programmes aimed at facilitating democratisation in third countries.
   The European Union (EU) has been increasingly active in this area with assistance programmes in numerous
   non-democratic or democratising states.




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                   Democracy Promotion – Includes Diplomacy


Democracy promotion includes diplomacy – which is hard to analyze
Adesnik and McFaul, 6
[David & Michael, Spring 2006, Washington Quarterly, “Engaging Autocratic Allies to Promote Democracy”,
(29:2), p. 7.

   The democracy-promotion toolbox has been filled for more than two decades with various
   standard assistance programs, including technical support for reforming government
   agencies; training for lawyers, journalists, political party leaders, and trade unionists; direct
   financial aid for civil society organizations; and exchanges and scholarships for students.
   Today, the U.S. government, particularly the U.S. Agency for International Development
   (USAID) and an army of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) often funded by USAID, the National
   Endowment of Democracy, or the Asia and Eurasia Foundations, continue to use such nonmilitary
   methods to promote democracy in dozens of countries around the world. In rare cases,
   democracy promotion has been the by-product of military intervention. The American public will support the
   decision to go to war only when persuaded that a direct threat to U.S. national security exists. Yet, once the
   opposing dictatorship has fallen, Washington is confronted with a moral obligation to replace it with a
   democratic government, as it did in Germany and Japan after World War II, attempted to do after
   interventions in the Dominican Republic and South Vietnam in the 1960s, and is presently trying to
   accomplish in Afghanistan and Iraq. Yet, a third method for promoting democratic regime change
   receives little attention, if any, from the media or from scholars: diplomacy. Although NGOs
   and foundations are usually the primary actors engaged in democracy promotion in countries that have
   recently experienced the collapse of an autocratic regime, U.S. diplomats have a special role to play in
   countries still ruled by dictatorships. Democratization involves not only building up the democratic
   opposition -- a key ingredient for successful democratic breakthrough -- but also weakening or
   dividing the autocrats in power.n1 NGOs, whose focus in these cases is usually and rightly to
   strengthen the opposition, lack the ability to confront the regime directly. In contrast, the U.S.
   government has the power and resources to challenge autocratic regimes, through what Secretary of
   State Condoleezza Rice has called "transformational diplomacy."n2 Admittedly, there are valid reasons
   why the role of the diplomat does not figure prominently in the current analysis of U.S. democracy-
   promotion efforts. The vast majority of diplomats from the secretary of state to a consular officer
   working abroad spend little if any of their time promoting democracy. Indeed, throughout most of U.S.
   history, diplomats have not defined democratization as part of their job description. In the rare
   moments when they do engage in promoting democracy, diplomats often do so quietly behind the
   scenes, making it difficult for outside observers to study or analyze them. Yet, understanding the
   conditions under which diplomacy can be effective represents a critical step toward improving all U.S. efforts
   to promote democracy abroad. At key moments, U.S. diplomatic leverage has played a positive role in
   nudging a regime change in a democratic direction. Learning the lessons of how and why diplomats were
   able to make a difference in earlier, successful transitions to democracy can help guide today's foreign policy
   makers seeking to influence the course of political liberalization in autocratic regimes.


Democracy promotion includes diplomacy
USAID, 5
GEORGIA: CAUSES OF THE ROSE REVOLUTION AND LESSONS FOR
DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE , 2005 p. htto:// csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/ci.causesroserevolution.03.05.pdf

   Democracy Promotion: Assistance and Diplomacy Democracy promoters, official and otherwise, pursued
   a number of policies that improved the chances a democratic election would occur and which, in the end,
   contributed to regime change. High-level U.S. diplomacy in support of a clean election (including a pre-
   election visit of former Secretary of State James Baker, who urged the regime to accept the PVT and reform
   of electoral commissions); USAID funding for voter list reform, PVT training and implementation, and

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   the cultivation of local election monitoring NGOs; and Soros Foundation-funded training for the youth
   organization Kmara are all credibly cited as factors that increased pressure on the government to hold a
   reasonably democratic election, while increasing the likelihood that fraud would be detected.


Democracy promotion would include diplomacy
Spence, assistant to NSA director, 2003
p. www.irex.org/system/files/spence.pdf

   My research trip sought to explore the link between USAID democracy assistance and diplomacy in
   US democracy promotion but found that link to be tenuous. Several million dollars of USAID
   training and exchange programs alone are unlikely to convince the governments of democratizing
   countries to behave differently. The US government must mobilize its more powerful diplomatic
   tools—such as offers of membership in international organizations, official visits, and investment
   treaties—to discourage governments’ undemocratic behavior. More specifically, my research suggests
   that the US government think more broadly about responding to the undemocratic behavior of a transition
   government. That is, countering government harassment of the media is not simply about funding training
   programs for journalists or even protesting at high diplomatic levels when the government shuts down a
   newspaper. Instead, it is a weak economy and poor court system that create an enabling environment for
   government harassment of the media. Therefore, a strategy to promote an independent media must take into
   larger factors that enable the media to resist government control. Granted, this requires a longer commitment
   and more resources but is far less likely to produce results that will disappoint policymakers.


Democracy promotion includes diplomacy
Carothers, CEIP researcher, 2008
p. http://www.acus.org/publication/enhancing-democracy-assistance

   As President Obama and his team engage at the levels of high-profile diplomacy and law to
   reformulate U.S. democracy promotion policy, they should not neglect the less visible, quieter side
   of the democracy support endeavor. This is the domain of democracy assistance, the aid programs that
   the U.S. government funds to stimulate, facilitate, and help consolidate attempted or ongoing
   democratic transitions around the world.




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                      Democracy Promotion – Includes Military


Military intervention is a form of democracy promotion
Lappin, University of Leuven (Belgium) Centre for Peace Research and Strategic Studies
PhD candidate, 10
[Richard, participant in democracy assistance missions with the UN, EU, OSCE, and Carter Center, University of
Belgrade political sciences visiting scholar, Central European Journal of International & Security Studies, Volume 4
Issue 1, “What we talk about when we talk about democracy assistance: the problem of definition in post-conflict
approaches to democratization” http://www.cejiss.org/issue/2010-volume-4-issue-1/lappin, p.185-6, accessed 5-16-
11, TP]

   Additionally, there has been a notable increase of literature concerning the value of military
   intervention to promote democracy, and although some authors are in support of this (Peceny 1999), the
   majority remain sceptical about the long-term benefits (Bueno de Mesquita and Downs 2006). Moreover,
   the Westphalian principle of non-interference has been subject to reinterpretation, with rights to
   democracy and peace now frequently trumping state sovereignty (Buxton 2006). For example, the
   OSCE declare that ‘participating states emphasise that issues relating to human rights, fundamental
   freedoms, democracy, and the rule of law are of international concern … and do not belong exclusively to
   the internal affairs of the state concerned’ (CSCE 1991). All of these factors have provided a platform
   for deliberate external efforts to foster democratisation to be pursued more vigorously.




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        Democracy Promotion – Includes Development Programs


Democracy promotion includes development and poverty reduction programs – Millenium
Challenge Account proves
Dobriansky, the Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs, (2005)
[Paula J, 6-20-05, “Strategies on Democracy Promotion”, Remarks to the Hudson Institute,
http://www.dwiprayogo.appspot.com/2001-2009.state.gov/g/rls/rm/2005/48394.htm, accessed 6-2-11]

   Economic, financial and technical assistance to foreign governments and non-governmental organizations is
   crucial to support democracy. This can range from funds to hold elections, to foreign aid conditioned on good
   governance to the denial of financial assistance to those unwilling to reform. Likewise, it is not just our
   democracy assistance that is supporting this goal. For example, the Millennium Challenge Account, a
   poverty reduction tool, is an example of how assistance tied to good governance can reinforce the
   values and objectives of our democracy promotion strategy. The Middle Eastern Partnership Initiative,
   which was founded to support economic, political, and educational reform efforts in the Middle East, is
   making significant progress in furthering democracy.




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                   USAID Democracy & Governance Programs
USAID Democracy and Governance assistance includes programs that promote
     -executive branch capacity
     -oversight
     -budget related planning and revenue raising
     -delivery of basic services
     -human rights
     -judicial reform
     -legal access for minorities and disadvantaged
     -civil society
USAID Homepage ‘11
http://www.usaid.gov/locations/middle_east/sectors/dg/

   Democracy and Governance Overview Countries in the Middle East and North Africa range from liberalizing
   polities to formal but weak democracies. Challenges include corruption, poor governance, weak democratic
   institutions, and lack of political space. In some cases, extremism threatens regional stability. USAID
   democracy and governance programs forge partnerships that help Arab governments, civil
   societies, and citizens combat corruption, bolster democratic institutions, mitigate the appeal
   of extremism, and contribute to long-term development. Programs Building Democratic,
   Accountable, and Effective Government Across the region, citizens seek more representative, accountable,
   and effective government. USAID strengthens government transparency, increases executive
   branch capacity, enhances legislative institutions, and improves local governance. In Yemen,
   USAID provides training and technical assistance to support reform-minded
   parliamentarians and committees in exercising oversight. In Lebanon and Iraq, USAID
   supports the ability of local governments to represent constituent interests, plan and budget,
   raise revenues, and deliver basic services. Promoting the Rule of Law and Justice In most countries in
   the region, there is a need to improve judicial institutions and due process. USAID programs advance
   the rule of law by supporting legal reform, promoting human rights and judicial
   independence, and improving administration of justice. Programs assist the efforts of governments
   that demonstrate a commitment to judicial reform and civil societies that increase demand for legal and
   judicial reform. In Egypt, a USAID program resulted in the swearing in of 30 women judges—
   previously, there was only one. In Egypt and Jordan, USAID projects support improvements
   in criminal courts, legal education, and access to justice for women and disadvantaged
   groups. Expanding Political Competition Citizens and civil societies across the region are seeking to
   actively and openly participate in decision making that affects their lives. Restrictions on the formation of
   democratic political parties and civil society organizations contribute to poor policymaking and lack of
   accountability. USAID programs help expand political competition by supporting democratic
   political parties, transparent electoral administration, and independent media and civil
   society. In Morocco, USAID supports projects to develop partnerships between citizens,
   nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and local governments to deliver development
   projects and services to communities. In Lebanon, USAID funds civil society organizations
   that speak out in favor of transparency, accountability, and good governance.




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            Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
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    Democracy and Governance Promotion Programs – Free Press,
     Rule of Law, Government Services, Civic Culture, Elections,
                          Corruption


Democracy and governance promotion programs focus on bolstering free press, rule of law,
government service delivery, civic culture, voter turnout, fair elections, and reducing
corruption
Moehler, Prof. Comm. U. Penn., ‘10
(Devra C. The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science, March, 2010, 628 Annals 30
“Introduction: Democracy, Governance, and Randomized Development Assistance”)

      Since the 1980s, democracy and governance (DG) promotion programs have proliferated at an ever-increasing
    rate. Governments, international financial institutions, multilateral bodies, and international and domestic
    nongovernmental organizations provide assistance targeted at inducing democratic transitions in authoritarian
    polities; consolidating democracy where it exists; and increasing government effectiveness, transparency, and
    responsiveness to citizens across all regime types. Donors currently support explicit efforts to expand press
    freedom, establish rule of law, enhance government service delivery, strengthen civic culture, increase voter
    turnout, ensure free and fair elections, reduce corruption, and improve upon a myriad of other DG goals
    (Gershman and Allen 2006).




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  Democracy Programs – Governing Justly & Democratically/Four
                         Categories


Democracy programs are funded primarily in State Department/Foreign Ops budget, and
fulfill the “Governing Justly and Democratically” strategic objective – including rule of law
and human rights, good governance, political competition and consensus-building, and civil
society
Epstein, et al., Congressional Research Service Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade
Division foreign policy specialists, 7
[Susan B. Epstein, Nina M. Serafino, and Francis T. Miko, 12-26-7, CRS Report for Congress: Democracy
Promotion: Cornerstone of U.S. Foreign Policy?, p. 18-19, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34296.pdf,
accessed 5-27-11]

   U.S. government funding for democracy programs is primarily within the State Department/Foreign
   Operations budget. Referred to as the Governing Justly and Democratically strategic objective, this
   funding is allocated by account and by region. (See Table 1 below.) Governing Justly and
   Democratically includes four elements:
        Rule of Law and Human Rights. Funding under this heading supports constitutions, laws and legal
            systems, justice systems, judicial independence, and human rights.
        Good Governance. Funding under this supports legislative functions and processes, public sector
            executive functions, security sector governance, anti-corruption reforms, local governance, and
            decentralization.
        Political Competition and Consensus-Building. This category supports elections and political
            processes, political parties, and consensus-building processes.
        Civil Society. Funding focuses on media freedom, freedom of information, and civic participation.
   In addition to funds for Governing Justly and Democratically, the Department of State budget
   contains funds that are transferred to the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and The Asia
   Foundation. NED’s FY2008 total request is $80 million, of which about $70 million will go for
   democracy program support. The Asia Foundation’s FY2008 total budget request is $10 million, of which
   about $8.8 million will support democracy promotion. Therefore, the total estimated funding request for
   democracy promotion activities in FY2008 is over $1.5 billion.




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 Democracy Programs – Includes Democratic Capacity-Building for
             Parties, Governments, NGOs, Citizens


Democracy programs – technical programs for capacity-building of parties, governments,
NGOs, and/or citizens to support democratic practices and accountability
Epstein, et al., Congressional Research Service Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade
Division foreign policy specialists, 7
[Susan B. Epstein, Nina M. Serafino, and Francis T. Miko, 12-26-7, CRS Report for Congress: Democracy
Promotion: Cornerstone of U.S. Foreign Policy?, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34296.pdf, accessed 5-27-
11]

   Congress has demonstrated its concern for the lack of a consistent definition for democracy. The
   Senate Foreign Operations Appropriation Committee Report for FY2006 (S.Rept. 109-96/H.R. 3057)
   stated, “The Committee remains concerned that the State Department and USAID do not share a
   common definition of a democracy program. For the purposes of this Act, ‘a democracy program’
   means technical assistance and other support to strengthen the capacity of democratic political parties,
   governments, non-governmental institutions, and/or citizens, in order to support the development of
   democratic states, institutions and practices that are responsive and accountable to citizens.”14 The
   following year, the Senate Appropriations Committee Report for FY2007 (S.Rept. 109-277/H.R. 5522)
   asserted, “to ensure a common understanding of democracy programs among United States
   Government agencies, the Committee defines in the act ‘the promotion of democracy’ to include
   programs that support good governance, human rights, independent media, and the rule of law, and
   otherwise strengthen the capacity of democratic political parties, NGOs, and citizens to support the
   development of democratic states, institutions and practices that are responsible and accountable to
   citizens.”15

   [posted by tcram, 5-5-11, http://www.cedadebate.org/forum/index.php?topic=2380.msg4748#msg4748]




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                       ***Theory Arguments




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                Democracy Assistance – Theory – Precision Good


Democracy assistance is a distinct term of art – clarity and precision are key to topic
education and optimal implementation
Lappin, University of Leuven (Belgium) Centre for Peace Research and Strategic Studies
PhD candidate, 10
[Richard, participant in democracy assistance missions with the UN, EU, OSCE, and Carter Center, University of
Belgrade political sciences visiting scholar, Central European Journal of International & Security Studies, Volume 4
Issue 1, “What we talk about when we talk about democracy assistance: the problem of definition in post-conflict
approaches to democratization” http://www.cejiss.org/issue/2010-volume-4-issue-1/lappin, p.183-4, accessed 5-16-
11, TP]

   Yet despite its growing recognition, the term has rarely been clearly or comprehensively defined.
   Typically the term is used with the assumption that the reader will automatically understand the meaning;
   however, such casual usage can cause confusion and lead to serious misconceptions about what the
   actual practice involves. This article seeks to bring greater clarity to our understanding of post-conflict
   democracy assistance in the following four sections. The first section begins by tracing the emergence of
   democracy assistance as a distinct foreign policy instrument, the reasons why its popularity grew after the
   Cold War and how it has become an embedded feature of post-conflict peacebuilding. Second, the article
   highlights the unique characteristics of post- conflict democracy assistance as a distinct foreign policy
   tool and distinguishes it from other approaches linked to democratization. Third, the core problems
   that have developed as a direct result of definitional uncertainty over what democracy assistance entails are
   outlined. Finally, the article concludes by positing that the current ambiguity that surrounds the discourse
   on democracy assistance threatens not only the credibility of the approach, but that it also reflects a
   lack of thinking on the part of the international community as to what type of democratic end states
   are envisioned and what the appropriate means are to best achieve those ends.


Definitional clarity is key to research and better scholarly data.
Lappin, University of Leuven (Belgium) Centre for Peace Research and Strategic Studies
PhD candidate, 10
[Richard, participant in democracy assistance missions with the UN, EU, OSCE, and Carter Center, University of
Belgrade political sciences visiting scholar, Central European Journal of International & Security Studies, Volume 4
Issue 1, “What we talk about when we talk about democracy assistance: the problem of definition in post-conflict
approaches to democratization” http://www.cejiss.org/issue/2010-volume-4-issue-1/lappin, p.189, accessed 5-16-11,
TP]

   Establishing the definitional clarity of democracy assistance is an important step towards
   understanding how three core problems have developed as a direct result of definitional uncertainties
   in democracy promotion terminology. The resultant problems concern, imprecise democracy
   assistance data, a neglect of the inherent limitations of democracy assistance, and the fostering of
   negative perceptions of democracy assistance.


A lack of precision undermines the ability to rigorously test whether or not democracy
assistance is a good idea – it destroys the educational value of the topic.
Lappin, University of Leuven (Belgium) Centre for Peace Research and Strategic Studies
PhD candidate, 10
[Richard, participant in democracy assistance missions with the UN, EU, OSCE, and Carter Center, University of
Belgrade political sciences visiting scholar, Central European Journal of International & Security Studies, Volume 4
Issue 1, “What we talk about when we talk about democracy assistance: the problem of definition in post-conflict



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approaches to democratization” http://www.cejiss.org/issue/2010-volume-4-issue-1/lappin, p.189, accessed 5-16-11,
TP]

   This article has examined the emergence of democracy assistance as a distinct foreign policy tool in post-
   conflict peacebuilding. Moreover, it has shown how definitional confusion between democracy assistance
   and other democracy- oriented concepts, presents grave problems that threaten to undermine the
   practice of post-conflict democracy assistance. A lack of clarity, consistency, and consensus, as to what
   democracy assistance entails has diminished our ability to evaluate democracy assistance effectively
   (due to imprecise data), has created unrealistic expectations of what democracy can achieve in post- conflict
   environments (due to a neglect of internal factors of democratisation and broader foreign policy objectives),
   and has resulted in a general negative perception of democracy assistance (due to the misappropriation of the
   term to include elements such as military force or economic sanctions). The political consequences of the
   lack of definitional clarity are therefore considerable. Indeed, not only does it possess the potential to
   severely undermine the successes and credibility of post-conflict democracy-assistance, but it also
   reflects a fundamental deficit in our thinking about what type of democracy we are assisting and how
   we should assist it. If the international community can not articulate the democratic end goals it envisions,
   the likelihood of formulating effective democratic means will remain improbable.




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                  Democracy Assistance – Theory – Limits Good


Limits good – key to prevent broadening the topic to include democracy promotion,
development and political aid – eliminates the educational value of the topic.
Lappin, University of Leuven (Belgium) Centre for Peace Research and Strategic Studies
PhD candidate, 10
[Richard, participant in democracy assistance missions with the UN, EU, OSCE, and Carter Center, University of
Belgrade political sciences visiting scholar, Central European Journal of International & Security Studies, Volume 4
Issue 1, “What we talk about when we talk about democracy assistance: the problem of definition in post-conflict
approaches to democratization” http://www.cejiss.org/issue/2010-volume-4-issue-1/lappin, p.183-4, accessed 5-16-
11, TP]

   By the end of the 1990s, the term ‘democracy assistance’ had acquired increased and extensive usage in
   academic literature and become a natural part of the rhetoric of the development programmes and foreign
   policies of Western countries. Yet, despite this growing recognition, the term has rarely been clearly or
   comprehensively defined. Typically, the term is used with the assumption that the reader will automatically
   understand the meaning; however, such casual usage can cause confusion, especially as other terms can
   be used to describe similar phenomena, such as the often used umbrella term of ‘democracy
   promotion,’ as well as a host of other variants including ‘development aid,’ ‘political aid,’ ‘democracy
   support,’ ‘democracy aid,’ and ‘support for democratic development’ (Burnell 2000c: 3). As such, it is
   critically important that researchers are cognizant of the breadth of meaning attached to democracy
   assistance by different people and practice precision in their own usage and definition of the term.
   Indeed, if we are unable to achieve accuracy in our terminology, the utility of the approach, both in
   theory and in practice, will ultimately be undermined.




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            ***Democracy Assistance Definitions – Defenses




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     Democracy Assistance – AT – Your Authors Assume European
                       Democracy Assistance


Distinctions in approaches are minimal – the approaches are diversified and overlapping.
Toornstra, European Parliament Office for Promotion of Parliamentary Democracy
Director, 10
[Dick, “Getting Acquainted: Setting the Stage for Democracy Assistance”
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdf/oppd/Page_8/getting_acquainted_web.pdf, p.14, accessed 5-17-11, TP]

   Attempts to identify distinctive European and American approaches to democracy assistance have
   frequently labelled the political approach American and the developmental approach European.
   Authors have correctly warned of simplifications, as on both continents a multiplicity of actors with
   different strategic preferences operates, which makes it impossible to speak of a ‘single’ European or
   American way. 32 Nevertheless, it seems fair to say that overall the vast majority of European actors voice
   a preference for the developmental approach, even if there are examples of political aid, including from the
   EU itself. Although in the US an equally high or even higher amount of funding is used for
   developmental democracy assistance as for political democracy assistance, there is a stronger interest
   and willingness to pursue the political approach. 33 Carothers states that the division is not a ‘rift’ but
   rather a diversification of approaches to be appreciated in an ever more challenging international
   context for democracy assistance. 34 At the same time, awareness of the two basic approaches and
   differences in preferred strategies provide important grounds for learning from other actors and
   coordinating activities more effectively.




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                       ***Status of Assistance




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                     Status of Democracy Assistance – Amounts


US spends $1 billion on democracy assistance, not counting Iraq and Afghanistan
The National Committee on American Foreign, Saltzman Institute of War and Peace at
Columbia, The Atlantic Council-‘8
ENHANCING DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE
http://www.acus.org/files/publication_pdfs/65/Enhancing%20Democracy%20Assistance.pdf

   In 2007, the US Government (USG) will spend about $1 billion on democracy assistance in 50 countries
   (excluding Iraq and Afghanistan). Using these funds effectively requires a flexible approach that incorporates
   a range of delivery systems suited to the type of regime, the type of assistance, and the geographic location of
   the beneficiary country. Working through NGOs helps avoid the stigma that typically accompanies direct
   efforts by the USG, so in addition to project financing, this report proposes that the US Congress fully and
   more flexibly support the National Endowment for Democracy and political party institutes to insure their
   rapid response to democratization opportunities. Relevant government agencies and NGOs should work
   together to develop the broad outlines for democracy assistance in particular countries, and enhance
   communication and cooperation in Washington. On the country level, implementers of democracy assistance
   would benefit from structured opportunities for sharing information and collaboration.


US Democracy Assistance is over $1 billion a year, including Iraq and Afghanistan. Over
$8 billion from 1990 to 2005. USAID has been in 120 countries and territories.
Natl. Research Council Report, '08
(Improving Democracy Assistance: Building Knowledge Through Evaluations and Research (2008) IMPROVING
DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE, Building Knowledge Through Evaluations and Research, Committee on Evaluation
of USAID Democracy Assistance Programs, Development, Security, and Cooperation Policy and Global Affairs,
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES,
http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12164&page=23, acsd 5/25/11)

    Since 1990, USAID has supported democracy programs in approximately 120 countries and territories with
    budgets ranging from tens of thousands to hundreds of millions of dollars. The most comprehensive analysis of
    USAID DG spending estimates total expenditures between 1990 and 2005 at $8.47 billion in constant 2000 U.S.
    dollars (Azpuru et al. 2008). Total annual USAID DG expenditures currently run over $1 billion; for fiscal year
    (FY) 2008 the request for DG, including both USAID and some much smaller amounts for the State
    Department, was $1.45 billion, with $374 million allocated to Iraq and Afghanistan (Congressional Budget
    Justification [CBJ] 2008).1




Current USAID funding for DG (Democracy and Governance) is relatively small.
National Research Council Report, '08
(Improving Democracy Assistance: Building Knowledge Through Evaluations and Research (2008) IMPROVING
DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE, Building Knowledge Through Evaluations and Research, Committee on Evaluation
of USAID Democracy Assistance Programs, Development, Security, and Cooperation Policy and Global Affairs,
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES,
http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12164&page=23, acsd 5/25/11)

    Yet the funding of DG efforts, given their high priority for U.S. foreign policy and frequent mandate to help
    transform political systems into democracies, is relatively modest. In many countries, projects that are not
    strictly DG but that respond to related national needs may find a home under the DG umbrella, so the amount of
    effort actually focused on democracy building is smaller than may at first appear. 2 Moreover, DG funds


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   comprise only a small portion of what the United States spends on its international engagements. The total
   FY2008 budget request for foreign assistance, which includes DG programs, was $20.3 billion (CBJ 2008:1).




                       Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
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                        Status of Democracy Assistance – Rising

The practice of fiscal discipline seems flexible in the context of democracy assistance, as the
administration has pledged to make room for more assistance by “reprogramming” funds
to countries of interest. Democracy assistance for FY2012 has shown a substantial increase
from previous years.
Trister ‘11
[Sarah, Congressional liaison for Freedom House, an NGO dedicated to international research on democracy and
human rights, “Investing in Freedom: Analyzing the FY 2012 International Affairs Budget Request,” May,
http://freedomhouse.org/uploads/special_report/100.pdf]

    With democratic transitions in progress in Egypt and Tunisia, ongoing violence and protests in Syria, Bahrain,
    and Yemen, and full-out war in Libya, the Middle East and North Africa has become one of the highest
    priorities in terms of assistance for Congress and the Administration. Since the revolutions, the State
    Department has announced it would immediately make $150 million in aid available for support to Egypt and
    an additional $20 million available in support for Tunisia for FY 2011 by reprogramming funds that have
    already allocated. 10 Additionally, the United States has announced billions more in loans and other economic
    support to Egypt as it attempts to build its economy after 30 years of stagnation. Moving toward democracy in
    Egypt and Tunisia will be a lengthy and complicated process. The United States has an opportunity to make an
    important impact by supporting improvements in electoral processes, robust civil society participation in
    elections and constitutional debates, institutional reforms, and efforts to address human rights abuses, as well as
    by promoting gender equality and religious freedom, so that members of these societies are able to thrive in a
    free and open environment. In terms of the FY 2012 request for the Near East, Freedom House is pleased to see
    that the request for the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) has received a 68% increase over FY 2010
    amounts. MEPI has been an invaluable instrument for providing democracy and human rights assistance since
    its inception in 2002. Funds provided through MEPI are especially vital now, as they have the flexibility
    required to respond to the constantly changing environment in the region. The ongoing protests and
    crackdowns in the Middle East have drawn attention to the disproportionate amount of assistance that the
    United States is giving to Middle Eastern governments to support military capabilities compared with the
    amounts given for democracy and human rights. In the Middle East region as a whole, democracy and human
    rights funding makes up about 6 percent of United States foreign assistance. In contrast, Foreign Military
    Financing (FMF) makes up more than 71% of foreign assistance.




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                    Status of Democracy Assistance – Declining

Democracy assistance funding is under attack
McManus, Los Angeles Times, February 27, 2011,
[Doyle, p. A28, ―Helping the Arabs help themselves; The U.S. must find a way, and funding, to promote
democracy.]

   Once elections are held and new governments installed, there will still be work to do to make
   sure the fledgling democracies succeed. One crucial aspect will be economic aid to help
   improve the lives of millions of people who live in poverty even as their elites -- and
   neighboring countries such as Saudi Arabia -- live in opulence. Why is this important?
   Democracies that fail to deliver material progress don't always stay democratic. And that's
   where Congress comes in. The spending bill for the rest of this year that the Republican-led
   House passed last week cuts foreign economic aid by about 17% worldwide; it would cut the
   National Endowment for Democracy, the organization that funds those nimble democracy
   institutes, by 6%. And House Republicans have made it clear that they plan further cuts next
   year; some firebrands have even proposed eliminating foreign aid entirely, or eliminating it
   for every country except Israel. In the short run, the Senate -- and common sense -- is likely
   to save U.S. democracy promotion from being gutted. "We're the flavor of the month," an
   executive at one of the institutes (not Wollack's) told me wryly. "Everybody's offering us
   money." But over the long run, if foreign aid is slashed overall, even the little democracy-
   promotion agencies will feel the squeeze.




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            Status of Democracy Assistance – Poorly Coordinated


Unlike other developed nations like Canada, the United States utilizes a large number of
organizations to administer democracy assistance, resulting in confusing coordination and
mandate issues
Schulz ’08
[Keith, legislative adviser at the Office of Democracy and Governance at the U.S. Agency for International
Development, “How the United States Supports Democratic Development Overseas,”
http://www.revparl.ca/31/1/31n1_08e_Schulz.pdf]

    I n Canada, the majority of democracy promotion funds are currently channeled through the Canadian
    International Development Agency (CIDA). 1 By contrast, a large number of different departments and
    agencies within the United States government, and n o n - g o v e r n m e n t a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s o u t s i d e
    o f t h e government, contribute to U.S. democracy promotion efforts. This creates a complex, and sometimes
    confusing a n d o v e r l a p p i n g m a n d a t e , a m o n g t h e d i f f e r e n t departments, agencies and
    organizations involved. This was not always the case. United States support for democratic development began
    in earnest more than three decades ago, first in certain countries in Latin America and then to support
    democratic transitions in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union following the collapse of communism.
    These early efforts were modest in scope and objectives. U.S. Government democracy assistance funding in
    1990 was little more than $100 million. Today it is well over $ 1 billion per year with a large percentage of that
    funding now going to democracy assistance efforts in the Middle East and Asia.



US agencies are not well-coordinated on democracy assistance. Where there could be
cooperation, there is duplicative effort.
G.A.O., Sept. ‘09
(“DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE: U.S. Agencies Take Steps to Coordinate International Programs but Lack
Information on Some U.S.-funded Activities,” acsd 5/22/11, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09993.pdf)

    USAID and State DRL coordinate to help ensure complementary assistance but are often not aware of NED
    grants. To prevent duplicative programs, State DRL obtains feedback from USAID missions and embassies on
    project proposals before awarding democracy assistance grants. State DRL officials generally do not participate
    in USAID missions’ planning efforts; some State and USAID officials told GAO that geographic distances
    between State DRL’s centrally managed program and USAID’s country mission-based programs would make
    such participation difficult. Several USAID and State DRL officials responsible for planning and managing
    democracy assistance told GAO that they lacked information on NED’s current projects, which they believed
    would help inform their own programming decisions. Although NED is not required to report on all of its
    democracy assistance efforts to State and there currently is no mechanism for regular information sharing, NED
    told GAO that it has shared information with State and USAID and would routinely provide them with
    information on current projects if asked.


State Department attempting to coordinate agencies involved in democracy assistance
(NED, State DRL, and USAID)
G.A.O., Sept. ‘09
(“DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE: U.S. Agencies Take Steps to Coordinate International Programs but Lack
Information on Some U.S.-funded Activities,” acsd 5/22/11, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09993.pdf)

                          Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
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   Partly to lessen the risk of duplicative programs, State recently initiated efforts to reform and consolidate State
   and USAID foreign assistance processes. GAO reviewed (1) democracy assistance funding provided by
   USAID, State DRL, and NED in fiscal year 2008; (2) USAID, State DRL, and NED efforts to coordinate their
   democracy assistance; and (3) USAID efforts to assess results and evaluate the impact of its democracy
   assistance. GAO recommends that, to enhance coordination of U.S.-funded democracy assistance, the Secretary
   of State and the USAID Administrator work jointly with NED to establish a mechanism to routinely collect
   information about NED’s current projects in countries where NED and State or USAID provide democracy
   assistance. These entities concurred with our recommendation.




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                    Status of Democracy Assistance – Recipients

US AID administers most US democracy assistance. In 2008, the majority of that aid went
TO Iraq, China, Cuba, Iran, and North Korea.
G.A.O., Sept. ‘09
 (“DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE: U.S. Agencies Take Steps to Coordinate International Programs but Lack
Information on Some U.S.-funded Activities,” acsd 5/22/11, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09993.pdf)

    Although complete data on USAID funding per country were not available, USAID mission data, compiled by
    State and USAID at GAO’s request, show that in a sample of 10 countries, most democracy funds are
    programmed by USAID. In the 10 countries, annual funding per project averaged more than $2 million for
    USAID, $350,000 for State DRL, and $100,000 for NED. In fiscal year 2008, more than half of State funding
    for democracy assistance went to Iraq, followed by China, Cuba, Iran, and North Korea, and NED funding for
    democracy programs was highest for China, Iraq, Russia, Burma, and Pakistan.


Iraq and Afghanistan have received massive amounts of democracy assistance, almost 25%
of the total in 2005. Their allocations have been so heavy that assistance to other countries
has suffered.
Azpuru, Finkel, Perez-Linan, and Seligson, Vandy, Pitt, Pitt, Vandy, ’08
(“What has the United States Been Doing?” Journal of Democracy Volume 19, Number 2, April 2008 pp. 150-159)

    The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have produced the sharpest change in democracy spending since 1990. There
    was a dramatic increase in democracy aid to the Middle East and the Mediterranean in 2003, which can be
    explained entirely by the infusion of funds into postinvasion Iraq (which represented 85 percent of the
    democracy budget for the Middle East in 2003, 86 percent in 2004, and 80 percent in 2005). Likewise,
    democracy funding to Asia, which includes Afghanistan, increased dramatically after 2001. Together, funds
    allocated to Iraq and Afghanistan alone represented 23 percent of the total democracy budget for all regions in
    2003, 43 percent in 2004, and 26 percent in 2005. The heavy allocation of funds to these two countries has
    meant a shift of resources away from other areas of the world. 7 7. See Table B (U.S. Democracy Assistance by
    Region, 1990–2005) and Table C (Recipients of USAID Democracy Assistance, 1990–2005) at
    www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/gratis/AzpuruGraphics-19-2.pdf


From 2006-08, US AID implemented democracy assistance in over 90 countries. State DRL
(Dept. of State’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor) and the private
National Endowment for Democracy (NED) all give democracy assistance.
G.A.O., Sept. ‘09
(“DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE: U.S. Agencies Take Steps to Coordinate International Programs but Lack
Information on Some U.S.-funded Activities,” acsd 5/22/11, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09993.pdf)

    In fiscal years 2006- 2008, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), which has primary
    responsibility for promoting democracy abroad, implemented democracy assistance projects in about 90
    countries. The Department of State’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (State DRL) and the
    private, nonprofit National Endowment for Democracy (NED) also fund democracy programs in many of these
    countries.




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                   Status of Democracy Assistance – Middle East


Democracy assistance in the Middle East goes to Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco,
the Palestinian Territories, and Yemen
Huber, Hebrew University of Jerusalem Department of International Relations, 8
[Daniela, Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 13, No. 1, 43–62, March 2008, “Democracy Assistance in the Middle East
and North Africa: A Comparison of US and EU Policies”, p. 51,
http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/69109__790479070.pdf, accessed 6-3-11]

   Recipient Countries
   USAID claims to give assistance according to strategic importance, commitment to democratic process and
   likely effectiveness (USAID, 2005: 7). Similarly, HRDF supports regions and countries that are ‘geo-
   strategically critical to the U.S.’ (US Department of State, 2005). Recipient countries of USAID DG
   assistance in MENA at the moment are: Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, the Palestinian
   Territories and Yemen. Leading USAID DG per capita recipients were Iraq, Jordan, and the Palestinian
   Territories.
   Figure 2 shows that DA of USAID focuses on countries in conflict that are additionally of geo-strategic
   importance for the US (Iraq, Palestinian Territories) or on frontrunners in respect to liberalization
   such as Jordan. MEPI also includes countries of the Gulf such as Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and Saudi
   Arabia and thus important strategic partners. Not included in any DA are Libya and Syria – so-called
   ‘rogue states’ in the period under study. Crucial criteria thus indeed seem to be strategic importance and – to
   some extent – the level of democratic development.


Democracy assistance is the Middle East goes through one of 3 programs – DG, HRDF, and
MEPI
Huber, Hebrew University of Jerusalem Department of International Relations, 8
[Daniela, Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 13, No. 1, 43–62, March 2008, “Democracy Assistance in the Middle East
and North Africa: A Comparison of US and EU Policies”, p. 48,
http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/69109__790479070.pdf, accessed 6-3-11]

   US Democracy Assistance Policies
   The US promotes democracy in the Middle East through USAID DG, HRDF and MEPI. In 1994 under
   the Clinton administration, the Democracy and Governance Unit of USAID was established. Democracy
   and governance assistance represents 5.8 per cent of total USAID assistance, with a rising tendency
   (Finkel et al., 2006: 31). Democracy assistance through the USAID DG in the MENA area covered
   US$1.94 million in 1990, started to grow under Clinton in 1994 at the time of the Oslo peace process, fell
   again with the Bush administration and is rising considerably since 11 September 2001 and the second
   IraqWar. In 2003 it constituted US$188.93million (and US$830 million for all regions respectively) (Finkel
   et al., 2006: 26, 31).
   The HRDF was launched in 1998 and is supervised by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and
   Labour of the State Department. Funding rose from US$8 million in 1998/99 to US$48 million in
   2005/06 (US Department of State, 2004a, 2005).
   MEPI is a presidential initiative which was established in 2002 as part of President George W. Bush’s
   ‘Forward Strategy for Freedom’ to bolster democracy and reform in the Middle East and to fight
   terrorism. It is based at the State Department. Its structure was strongly influenced by the results of the
   Arab Human Development Report 2002 of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and also
   mirrors the EU’s regional initiative EMP.5 It consists of four pillars: political, economic, education and
   women’s empowerment. The budget in the years 2002–2005 amounted to US$293 million (US


                         Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
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   Department of State, 2006a). The administration usually requests more, which is not approved by
   Congress with the argument that the programme is not detailed enough and overlaps with USAID
   programmes.

   [Note – DG = Democracy and Governance Unit of USAID (USAID DG), HRDF = Human Rights and
   Democracy Initiative (HRDF), MEPI = Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI)..]


Democracy assistance in the Middle East operates through multiple implementing
partners, including NED, the ABA, think tanks and universities
Huber, Hebrew University of Jerusalem Department of International Relations, 8
[Daniela, Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 13, No. 1, 43–62, March 2008, “Democracy Assistance in the Middle East
and North Africa: A Comparison of US and EU Policies”, p. 50-1,
http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/69109__790479070.pdf, accessed 6-3-11]

   Method
   Funding is channelled through US organizations in the above-mentioned external project method (Carothers,
   2003: 257). US agencies either directly design projects or determine subject areas for local proposals.
   There are also grassroots programmes through the embassies and the NED to allow responsiveness to
   the region’s needs. The typical implementing partners include the NED, the two party institutes IRI
   and NDI, the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE), the American Center for
   International Labour Solidarity (ACILS), American Bar Association/Central and Eastern European
   Law Initiative (ABA/CEELI), research and policy institutes like Freedom House, universities, the
   Catholic Relief Service and also for-profit development consulting groups (USAID, 2006g).
   There are hardly any platforms for inter-regional US–MENA dialogue from USAID DG except for
   some visitors’ programmes for municipal and governmental officials who travel to the US. HRDF does
   not provide platforms for dialogue and only has a few very weakly institutionalized regional forums
   like a forum of Muslim political leaders with commitment to democracy or a network of democrats.
   MEPI – the US partnership initiative – does not have an institutionalized platform for governmental
   meetings, or for political or civil society dialogue, except for the US–Middle East University Partnership.
   There are some weakly institutionalized regional projects such as the Arab Judicial Forum or the Femmes du
   Monde Arabe et d’Ame´rique Re´unies pour Entreprendre.8


Current budget allows appropriated funds to support democratic transitions in MENA,
and shifts funds toward democracy assistance to Egypt, but omits democracy assistance to
Tunisia
Project on Middle East Democracy Wire, 4-12-11
[4-12-11, Project on Middle East Democracy Wire, “New FY2011 Budget Bill Released “,
http://pomed.org/blog/2011/04/new-fy2011-budget-bill-released.html/, accessed 6-3-11]

   On Tuesday, Congress released H.R.1473, the FY2011 bill which will fund the federal government
   through September 30th. The bill, which is $78.5 billion less than the President’s FY2011 request, includes
   $39.9 billion in cuts from FY2010 levels. House Appropriations Chairman Hal Rogers (R-KY) lauded the
   bill stating, “Never before has any Congress made dramatic cuts such as those that are in this final
   legislation.” Senate Appropriations Chairman Daniel Inouye (D-HI) stated: “The final compromise
   legislation negotiated with the House of Representatives contains significant spending reductions, but
   protects the vital economic and security interests of the United States.”
   Under the bill, the funding level for the State Department and Foreign Operations totals $48.3 billion,
   a $504 million reduction from FY2010 levels and $8.4 billion less than the President’s FY2011 request.
   However, it represents an increase over the proposed cuts in H.R.1, which sought to reduce the State and
   Foreign Operations budget by $3.8 billion. The bill freezes most of the spending near FY2010 levels. It also
   makes available up to $250 million for democracy and development assistance in Egypt and asks that
   Secretary of State Hillary Clinton submit a spending plan with a “comprehensive strategy” to promote
   these two goals. The bill requires a report by Clinton on the progress of Egypt’s political transition
   and preparations for free and fair elections, but notably shifts this a requirement from Egypt’s foreign

                        Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
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   military financing, as proposed in the Senate’s version of the FY11 bill in March, to its economic
   assistance. Also compared to the March Senate version, the bill omits $5 million in democracy
   assistance to Tunisia and also prohibits appropriating foreign military funding to Yemen in addition
   to Bahrain, unless waived by the Administration. It also notes that funds appropriated under the State
   and Foreign Operations heading may be made available to support other democratic transitions in the
   Middle East and North Africa.


Large percentage of democracy assistance goes to the Middle East
Schulz ’08
[Keith, legislative adviser at the Office of Democracy and Governance at the U.S. Agency for International
Development, “How the United States Supports Democratic Development Overseas,”
http://www.revparl.ca/31/1/31n1_08e_Schulz.pdf]

    I n Canada, the majority of democracy promotion funds are currently channeled through the Canadian
    International Development Agency (CIDA). 1 By contrast, a large number of different departments and
    agencies within the United States government, and n o n - g o v e r n m e n t a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s o u t s i d e
    o f t h e government, contribute to U.S. democracy promotion efforts. This creates a complex, and sometimes
    confusing a n d o v e r l a p p i n g m a n d a t e , a m o n g t h e d i f f e r e n t departments, agencies and
    organizations involved. This was not always the case. United States support for democratic development began
    in earnest more than three decades ago, first in certain countries in Latin America and then to support
    democratic transitions in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union following the collapse of communism.
    These early efforts were modest in scope and objectives. U.S. Government democracy assistance funding in
    1990 was little more than $100 million. Today it is well over $ 1 billion per year with a large percentage of that
    funding now going to democracy assistance efforts in the Middle East and Asia.


Most democracy assistance in the Middle East goes to Governance.
Azpuru, Finkel, Perez-Linan, and Seligson, Vandy, Pitt, Pitt, Vandy, ’08
(“What has the United States Been Doing?” Journal of Democracy Volume 19, Number 2, April 2008 pp. 150-159)

    The distribution of aid by subsector has varied across regions of the world. In most, civil society—and not the
    electoral process—has come in for the lion's share of aid. In Eastern Europe and Eurasia, for example, civil
    society assistance has comprised almost half the total democracy aid over the years. In the Middle East, on the
    other hand, the majority of DG assistance has gone to governance programs. In Latin America, meanwhile, the
    rule of law has been the dominant subsector. By contrast, the rule of law has been the lowest-funded sector in
    the former communist countries of Europe. Electoral assistance is relatively low everywhere, but especially in
    the Middle East, Eastern Europe, and Eurasia.


Democracy assistance is administered to MENA countries mainly through USAID DG,
State Department’s HRDF, and MEPI
Huber, Hebrew University of Jerusalem Department of International Relations, 8
[Daniela, Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 13, No. 1, 43–62, March 2008, “Democracy Assistance in the Middle East
and North Africa: A Comparison of US and EU Policies”, p. 44
http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/69109__790479070.pdf, accessed 6-3-11]

   Since the end of the Cold War MENA has been of increased political relevance for Western
   democracies and their democracy assistance efforts in this region are growing as a result. The US
   supports democratization in the MENA countries mainly through the Democracy and Governance
   Unit of USAID (USAID DG), the State Department’s Human Rights and Democracy Initiative (HRDF)
   and its Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI). In the case of the EU there are numerous initiatives of
   the individual member states. As the common programmes through the European Commission represent the
   lowest common denominator, those programmes will be analyzed as representative for the EU. If, however,
   the practice of the single member states deviates obviously from the common policy, this will be mentioned
   separately. The European Commission promotes democracy through the European Instrument for Democracy

                          Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
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   and Human Rights (EIDHR), the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and the European Neighbourhood
   Policy (ENP).



                        Status of Democracy Assistance – Egypt


Current budget shifts funds toward democracy assistance to Egypt and conditions
economic assistance on democratic progress
Project on Middle East Democracy Wire, 4-12-11
[4-12-11, Project on Middle East Democracy Wire, “New FY2011 Budget Bill Released “,
http://pomed.org/blog/2011/04/new-fy2011-budget-bill-released.html/, accessed 6-3-11]

   On Tuesday, Congress released H.R.1473, the FY2011 bill which will fund the federal government
   through September 30th. The bill, which is $78.5 billion less than the President’s FY2011 request, includes
   $39.9 billion in cuts from FY2010 levels. House Appropriations Chairman Hal Rogers (R-KY) lauded the
   bill stating, “Never before has any Congress made dramatic cuts such as those that are in this final
   legislation.” Senate Appropriations Chairman Daniel Inouye (D-HI) stated: “The final compromise
   legislation negotiated with the House of Representatives contains significant spending reductions, but
   protects the vital economic and security interests of the United States.”
   Under the bill, the funding level for the State Department and Foreign Operations totals $48.3 billion,
   a $504 million reduction from FY2010 levels and $8.4 billion less than the President’s FY2011 request.
   However, it represents an increase over the proposed cuts in H.R.1, which sought to reduce the State and
   Foreign Operations budget by $3.8 billion. The bill freezes most of the spending near FY2010 levels. It also
   makes available up to $250 million for democracy and development assistance in Egypt and asks that
   Secretary of State Hillary Clinton submit a spending plan with a “comprehensive strategy” to promote
   these two goals. The bill requires a report by Clinton on the progress of Egypt’s political transition
   and preparations for free and fair elections, but notably shifts this a requirement from Egypt’s foreign
   military financing, as proposed in the Senate’s version of the FY11 bill in March, to its economic
   assistance. Also compared to the March Senate version, the bill omits $5 million in democracy assistance to
   Tunisia and also prohibits appropriating foreign military funding to Yemen in addition to Bahrain, unless
   waived by the Administration. It also notes that funds appropriated under the State and Foreign Operations
   heading may be made available to support other democratic transitions in the Middle East and North Africa.


USAID has allocated much of the recent aid to Egypt via consensual funding initiatives that
are indirectly controlled by recipient governments. This change was made early in the
Obama administration and has sparked an outcry amongst Egyptian NGOs.
Kausch ’10
[Kristina, researcher at FRIDE, Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior, European
think-tank, “Assessing Democracy Assistance: Egypt,” http://www.fride.org/publication/781/egypt]

    The United States are providing democracy assistance in Egypt through three main channels: USAID, the
    Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), and the State Department’s Bureau for Human Rights, Democracy
    and Labor (DRL). USAID is the most significant foreign donor in Egypt in terms of funding, with 4 per cent of
    total bilateral ODA being assigned to democracy and governance projects. USAID’s budget earmarked for
    Democracy and Governance fell from an annual average of USD 51 million in 2006–2008 to USD 20 million in
    2009 (later increased to 25 million for both 2010 and 2011). According to USAID officials, this reduction is
    proportional to the overall gradual reduction of US ODA to Egypt. Cuts in direct civil society funding, however,
    are especially severe (73 per cent compared to 2008). USAID democracy assistance is provided both under a
    bilateral agreement with the Government of Egypt as well as directly to civil society organisations. In addition,
    MEPI and DRL have been directly or indirectly funding civil society programmes in Egypt with a budget of
    around USD 1.3 million and USD 2 million, respectively (financial year 2009). USAID has been providing
    direct funding to Egyptian NGOs since 2005. Since 2009, however, USAID’s approach stands out for funding

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    only associations registered under the restrictive Egyptian Associations Law (‘Law 84’), thereby giving the
    government an indirect control mechanism over its NGO funding. This self-constraining policy was introduced
    at the beginning of the Obama administration, and has been sharply criticised by Egyptian NGOs, many of
    which are registered under other legal forms. The decision led prominent exiled democracy activist Saad Eddin
    Ibrahim to publicly comment that Obama was letting Egyptian civil society down and giving up on democracy.
    In response, the US Ambassador in Cairo issued a statement giving the figures of how many dollars the US had
    given to Egyptian civil society over the past few years. MEPI and DRL funding, however, supports programmes
    from various types of local and international civil society organisations, including those not registered under
    Law 84. Total US annual bilateral assistance going to Egypt amounts to USD 1.56 billion, 1.3 billion (84 per
    cent) of which is military and security aid. Finally, the US government is considering its Egyptian counterpart’s
    request to pay US aid to Egypt into an endowment directly administered by the Egyptian government. The
    creation of such a ‘Mubarak endowment’ would remove direct US Congress oversight over the use of US
    economic aid to Egypt.


Cuts contemplated for Egypt in democracy assistance before the success of the movement.
Shadi Hamid, ’10
(Issue #15, Winter 2010, “The Cairo Conundrum” http://www.democracyjournal.org/15/6726.php?page=5, acsd
5/23/11)

    More striking, however, are the drastic cuts in democracy assistance to Egypt contained in the Obama
    Administration’s 2010 budget request. The decrease of 60 percent (from $54 million to $20 million) from
    Bush’s final request is especially jarring in a year when democracy aid shot up for countries like Morocco and
    Yemen. As it turns out, Egypt, with a population of more than 80 million, received less democracy assistance
    than either the West Bank and Gaza or Lebanon, each with about 4 million people. According to the Project on
    Middle East Democracy’s annual budget analysis, only about 1 percent of total bilateral assistance to Egypt was
    earmarked for democracy and governance, and a sizable portion of even that 1 percent went to either
    GONGOs–government organized non-governmental organizations–or the Egyptian government itself. Under
    the Obama Administration’s direction, the 2009 omnibus appropriations act included specific language limiting
    the amount of economic assistance that could be used for democracy and governance, the first time that such
    language has ever been used in legislation.




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                      Status of Democracy Assistance – Yemen


US democracy assistance to Yemen focuses on institution-building and civil society
Burke, FRIDE Researcher, 6-14-10
[Edward, 6-14-10, “Assessing Democracy Assistance: Yemen”, p. 3-4, http://www.fride.org/publication/776/yemen,
accessed 6-5-11, AFB]

   US democracy assistance
   Reflecting international optimism, USAID introduced a new ‘Special Objective’ in 2004, amending their
   Yemen Strategy from 2003–2006 to provide a programme entitled ‘Expanded Democracy and
   Governance in Yemen’. In 2006 USAID provided over USD 3.5 million for democracy promotion in
   Yemen in addition to other capacity building initiatives; a significant increase from the USD 8.1
   million spent by the US from 1990– 2005.11 Meanwhile the State Department’s Middle East
   Partnership Initiative (MEPI) made Yemen a priority, greatly stimulating the growth of civil society
   through the granting of flexible small funds of less than USD 100.000, which over 200 NGOs have
   received in recent years. The US government also funded technical missions to review prospects for
   legislative reform, including several projects undertaken by the Washington DC-based International Center
   for Non-Profit Law (ICNL).
   Overall US aid to Yemen was remarkably limited during the Bush administration, lagging behind the
   development assistance provided by European donors. US support for governance and development
   assistance were gravely affected by deepening concerns that the government was unwilling to tackle
   corruption. Relations reached a nadir in 2007 when an al-Qaeda operative convicted of the USS Cole
   bombing was released by Yemen despite US protests. In a remarkable piece of bungled timing, the Yemeni
   government announced his release hours before the US Ambassador to Sana’a was due to unveil a large aid
   package for Yemen under the Millennium Challenge Account, to which Yemen’s candidacy was once again
   suspended.12
   However, given the hreat of a resurgent al-Qaeda in Yemen, the US government has recently begun to
   prioritise its relations with Yemen, labelling its new strategy as one of ‘stabilisation’ and in late 2009
   announced two ‘flagship’ programmes, the Community Livelihood Project and the Responsive
   Governance Project which have been allocated USD $121 million from 2010 to 2013 and will be
   implemented by USAID. It is envisaged that both of these programmes will not only involve capacity
   building at the national and local levels but will also be underpinned by a democratisation approach
   that will aim to improve oversight of development by Yemen’s democratic institutions and civil society.
   USAID has also been allocated funding of just over USD $1.2 million over two years to undertake ‘conflict
   mitigation’ projects to address mounting protests and violence directed against the Yemeni government. Such
   an approach goes some way towards addressing local concerns that the US government is committed to
   strengthening Yemen’s security forces without consideration of the consequences for democratic reform. The
   US will also continue to provide core support to NDI activities in Yemen.
   Among NGOs, the US is regarded as the most flexible external donor, unafraid of working with or
   funding NGOs that have frequently incurred the wrath of the government through their persistence in
   arguing against government policies. Contrary to their European counterparts, the US MEPI
   programme established good working relations with Islamist civil society networks, including those
   firmly opposed to broader US foreign policy in the region. Generally, despite widespread criticism of
   other aspects of US foreign policy in the region, US democracy assistance has won the respect of most
   political parties and NGOs in Yemen. The US has also been praised for taking a more unequivocal
   stance on human rights violations against political and civil society activists in Yemen than European
   donors.

   [Note – NDI = US-based National Democratic Institute]



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Yemen receives democracy assistance through international organization channelsUS
democracy assistance to Yemen focuses on institution-building and civil society
Burke, FRIDE Researcher, 6-14-10
[Edward, 6-14-10, “Assessing Democracy Assistance: Yemen”, p. 6-7, http://www.fride.org/publication/776/yemen,
accessed 6-5-11, AFB]

   International democracy institutes
   There are a limited number of international NGOs working on democracy promotion which maintain
   a presence in Yemen. Following the 2003 elections, the US-based National Democratic Institute (NDI)
   expanded its parliamentary training programme, training local journalists as well as introducing a
   controversial new programme aimed at reducing conflict among Yemen’s tribes and integrating them
   into the democratic process. Although NDI has previously played a mediatory role between the
   government and the opposition parties, an uncompromising commitment to democratic standards has
   seen NDI occasionally fall foul of the government. The government has also registered its unease with
   NDI’s tribal conflict resolution programme accusing it of meddling in local politics. NDI country directors
   have enjoyed mixed relations with the government, with the latter regularly seeking to limit NDI’s
   engagement in areas it deems inappropriate.
   IFES has been in Yemen since 1999 and played a crucial role in providing training that facilitated its
   2003 and 2006 elections. More recently however, the increasing alignment of the Supreme Council for
   Elections and Referendums (SCER) with the government has called into question the viability of its work
   without a consensus between the political parties on mechanisms to hold future elections. IFES projects
   have been funded by the US government and other OECD DAC countries, but these may have to be
   scaled down in 2010 due to the prospect of a major reduction in donor support. IFES has also received
   some funding from UNDEF which supports its Youth Civic Awareness Project. IFES currently sees its role
   as providing training to a cadre of officials who will have the skills to run fair elections once the political will
   to do so is there. Its Director describes their work as ‘tinkering with nuts and bolts […] If there is a screw
   loose, then the reform process cannot move forward when the time is right’, although he acknowledges that
   Yemen is the most complex country he has ever worked in. In 2009 and 2010 IFES activities were greatly
   hampered however by a reduction in funding which meant it had to considerably scale down its presence in
   Yemen. In addition to NDI and IFES; the International Republican Institute has included Yemen in
   occasional regional conferences and training seminars but lacks country-specific programmes and a
   representative office. Meanwhile, the Washington DC-based Center for International Private
   Enterprise (CIPE) offers frequent advice and training on corporate governance and the role of
   business within a democratic society.
   Beyond conventional European and North American democracy donors, only the newly formed Jordan-based
   Foundation for the Future and limited assistance from the government of Indonesia to the Supreme National
   Authority for Combating Corruption (SNACC) can be said to have played a significant role in promoting
   democracy in Yemen. The Qatar-based Arab Foundation for Democracy has yet to make Yemen a priority.
   Some Yemeni activists feel that the failure to do so is a result of a long-standing Gulf hostility towards
   Yemen’s democratic movement, lest it act as a template for reform in the region.
   Save the Children is one of the few international NGOs working to alleviate the fall-out from the conflict in
   Saada Province, in the north of the country. However it is also playing a minor but respected role in working
   on civil society and youth empowerment projects. Article 19, an international NGO dedicated to
   supporting press freedom, is supported by the National Endowment for Democracy provides small
   grants and training opportunities for Yemeni journalists and civil society activists. The National
   Endowment for Democracy is generally perceived as a generous and consistent donor of small grants
   to Yemeni NGOs engaged in democracy promotion. The Foundation for the Future, a creation of the
   Forum for the Future – an initiative for Middle East reform that has dissipated in momentum in
   recent years – has also begun to provide small grants to Yemeni NGOs including Islamist organisations
   and those politically opposed to the government.

   [Note – NDI = US-based National Democratic Institute, IFES = International Foundation for Electoral
   Assistance]




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US democracy assistance to Yemen helps support projects like The Democracy School, the
Human Rights Information and Training Centre, and the Social and Democratic Forum
Burke, FRIDE Researcher, 6-14-10
[Edward, 6-14-10, “Assessing Democracy Assistance: Yemen”, p. 7-8, http://www.fride.org/publication/776/yemen,
accessed 6-5-11, AFB]

   The Democracy School led by Jamal Abdullah al-Shami in Sana’a is focused on youth civic education,
   working in all governorates and linked to NDI and IFES. The Democracy School also acts as a forum
   for discussing the political reform agenda and monitoring elections. The School receives support from
   the EIDHR, Denmark, MEPI and FES. The UK has ceased its support in recent years. The Human Rights
   Information and Training Centre (HRITC), based in the city of Taiz, is one of Yemen’s most active
   NGOs, receiving support from MEPI, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA),
   Foundation for the Future, and the Dutch government. The UK has recently ceased its support to HRITC.
   The Social and Democratic Forum (SDF) was established in 2005 and works on human rights, anti-
   corruption and gender issues. SDF also acts as the local representative of Transparency International.
   It relies upon funding from MEPI, FES, NED and the Arab Youth Network for Human Rights. SDF is
   a relatively small organisation with young leadership and lacks the funds to develop beyond the free time
   its volunteers can put in.

   [Note – NDI = US-based National Democratic Institute, IFES = International Foundation for Electoral
   Assistance, MEPI = State Department’s Middle East Partnership Initiative, NED = US-based National
   Endowment for Democracy]



US democracy assistance has included support for HOOD, a Yemeni NGO
Burke, FRIDE Researcher, 6-14-10
[Edward, 6-14-10, “Assessing Democracy Assistance: Yemen”, p. 8, http://www.fride.org/publication/776/yemen,
accessed 6-5-11, AFB]

   The human rights network HOOD is one of Yemen’s most vocal, and by many accounts, its most
   effective NGOs, despite having a staff of just seven and a team of volunteer lawyers. Its director describes its
   mission as one of being ‘transparent, strong and direct. We are not here to make people happy.’ However, a
   dispute with the Yemeni government over registering as a legal entity meant that HOOD’s legality was in
   question for many years before being finally being resolved in 2009. Many European embassies and UN
   agencies have been concerned that HOOD was perceived as overtly aligned with the opposition parties and
   questions over its legal status meant that they refused to fund it. Hence HOOD received funding from only
   one European country, Denmark, working with the Danish Human Rights Institute. Despite its strong
   criticism of US policies on human rights, HOOD has a surprisingly good working relationship with
   MEPI officers for the region, and received a small grant to improve its website, as well as other small
   grants from the human rights organisations Article 19 and FrontLine.

   [MEPI = State Department’s Middle East Partnership Initiative]


US democracy assistance has included support for Center of Training and Protection of
Journalists’ Freedom
Burke, FRIDE Researcher, 6-14-10
[Edward, 6-14-10, “Assessing Democracy Assistance: Yemen”, p. 8, http://www.fride.org/publication/776/yemen,
accessed 6-5-11, AFB]

   The Yemen Journalist Syndicate is regarded with some scepticism by many within the trade for its alleged
   silence in the face of abuses against journalists from newspapers such as al-Ayyam, al-Shura and al-Wasat
   which have all been closed or had journalists arrested in recent years.18 Consequently some journalists
   have established their own NGOs, such as the Center of Training and Protection of Journalists’


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   Freedom which has received support from NDI and USAID as well as working with FES and
   Transparency International. They have also relied upon the Arab Network for Human Rights Information to
   publicise abuses against journalists.

   [Note – NDI = US-based National Democratic Institute]


NDI & IFES play significant roles in Yemeni democratic transition
Burke, FRIDE Researcher, 6-14-10
[Edward, 6-14-10, “Assessing Democracy Assistance: Yemen”, p. 11, http://www.fride.org/publication/776/yemen,
accessed 6-5-11, AFB]

   NDI has played a very prominent role in Yemen, not least due to its highly volatile relationship with
   the Yemeni government. Many civil society activists were concerned that NDI was playing an overtly
   political role and ‘what Yemen did not need was another political party’. NDI is more of an implementor
   than a donor. However when NDI did make grants or establish partnerships, some NGO activists
   complained that the process was not transparent enough, that the same activists were always rewarded.
   Opinions were divided as to whether NDI’s bold tribal mediation project in Marib and other governorates
   was positive or negative: some regarded it as a helpful interlocutor in easing the worst of Yemen’s regional
   tensions, while others thought that NDI was acting more like a powerbroker than a mediator. Most activists
   however agreed that NDI was easily the most vocal international democracy institute in applying
   pressure on the government to live up to its reform commitments and that its absence from Yemen
   would be a considerable blow to prospects for further reform. Many interviewees felt that IFES had an
   important enabling presence for the prospect of future reforms, and that its departure would be a
   powerful sign that the reform process had effectively died. IFES has been criticised however by other
   interviewees for maintaining contacts wtih the Supreme Council for Elections and Referendums, despite the
   fact that it is clearly perceived as being dominated by government supporters and has lost even more
   legitimacy since the aborted elections of 2008.

   [Note – NDI = US-based National Democratic Institute, IFES = International Foundation for Electoral
   Assistance]




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                      Status of Democracy Assistance – Jordan


US cut democracy assistance to Jordan in FY2011
Echagüe & Michou, FRIDE Researchers, 5-27-11
[Ana & Hélène (Junior Researcher), 5-27-11, “Assessing Democracy Assistance: Jordan”, p. 4,
http://www.fride.org/publication/910/jordan accessed 6-5-11, AFB]

   US aid levels started to increase after 1994, when the peace treaty with Israel was finally ratified (in 1980,
   the United States had ended its economic package to Jordan after King Hussein refused to sign a peace
   treaty). After 1994 the United States also declared Jordan a major non-NATO strategic ally and wrote off its
   debt. In less than a decade, Jordan became the fourth largest recipient of US economic and military
   assistance. The administration’s allocation of USD 682.7 million in total assistance to Jordan in its
   FY11 request represents a slight (1.5 per cent) decrease from the total amount of USD 693 million spent in
   FY10. The breakdown of funds also remains relatively constant, with USD 322.4 million for military
   and security assistance and USD 360 million for civilian economic assistance. Of the latter, roughly
   half is for direct budget support. Within civilian aid the amount requested for democracy and
   governance programming – ‘Governing Justly and Democratically’ (GJD) – is reduced by USD 5.7
   million (26 per cent) from USD 22 million in FY10 to only USD 16.3 million for FY11. This includes a
   USD 2 million cut from the Political Competition and Consensus Building heading; a USD 2 million
   cut from Civil Society; and a USD 1.7 million cut from the Rule of Law and Human Rights programme
   area. The requests for democracy, rule of law and governance projects thus represent 2 per cent of the
   total aid programme. Within the Military and Security Assistance request, USD 83 million have been
   shifted to the counter-terrorism programme area, representing an 81 per cent increase in counter-terrorism
   funding to USD 186.3 million. This is the highest figure for US assistance for antiterrorism given to any
   country in the world.7


Bilateral democracy assistance is channeled through USAID to a variety of programs
Echagüe & Michou, FRIDE Researchers, 5-27-11
[Ana & Hélène (Junior Researcher), 5-27-11, “Assessing Democracy Assistance: Jordan”, p. 4,
http://www.fride.org/publication/910/jordan accessed 6-5-11, AFB]

   Bilateral assistance is distributed through the United States Agency for International Development
   (USAID). GJD programming in Jordan includes support for the government of Jordan’s programme
   to enhance the ‘authority, independence, and accountability’ of the judiciary, as well as
   decentralisation programming that aims to strengthen local governance and improve public
   participation. For example, the MASAQ project provided USD 15 million in technical assistance to the
   Ministry of Justice. In addition, USAID programmes focus on formal processes such as elections and
   transparent parliamentary proceedings. For example, the Parliamentary Strengthening Project destined
   USD 8.7 million to provide technical assistance to parliamentary committees, automate the parliamentary
   voting system, and build a legislative research office in the Parliament. Smaller projects, of around USD 2.5
   million each, focus on human rights, freedom of information, gender equality and civil society capacity
   building. USAID partners are usually US implementing institutions such as the National Democratic
   Institute (NDI), the International Republican Institute (IRI) and Freedom House, which then work
   with local implementers. The main partner in the civil society capacity programme is the Academy for
   Educational Development (AED). The programme works on capacity-building of NGOs, advocacy
   campaigns, access for those with disabilities to voting booths and encouraging NGO lobbying, and tries
   to focus the strategy of civil society organisations so that they can ‘graduate’ to receiving funds from
   the AED. USAID does not directly fund local NGOs in part because these organisations do not have


                         Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
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   sufficient absorption capacity given the scale of USAID grants. The system stretches back to Washington
   where implementers bid for grants worth millions.
   The National Democratic Institute (NDI) has a budget of USD 1 million most years with USD 2 million
   during election years. The focus of its work is on strengthening Parliament (it works mainly with the
   Lower House), election monitoring, supporting women candidates, funding research on social and
   political issues and raising awareness among women and youth. It distributes grants of between USD
   75,000 and USD 100,000 for projects of between six and nine months. Tangible achievements highlighted
   by NDI since the 2007 elections include setting up an election committee, campaigning for equal TV/radio
   air time for candidates, increased voter registration, reports by al-Hayat and the National Centre for Human
   Rights (NCHR), and persuading the Jordanian regime to host both domestic and international observers.
   NDI’s assistance project to Jordanian political parties, which was supported by USAID, concluded in
   late 2009 and the Institute chose to focus on other pressing programme priority areas, especially in
   light of limited resources. Nevertheless, NDI continues to informally engage political parties in its
   programmes.


MEPI does civil society projects in Jordan
Echagüe & Michou, FRIDE Researchers, 5-27-11
[Ana & Hélène (Junior Researcher), 5-27-11, “Assessing Democracy Assistance: Jordan”, p. 5,
http://www.fride.org/publication/910/jordan accessed 6-5-11, AFB]

   The Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) has a budget of USD 40 million for a total of 50 projects in
   Jordan. MEPI programmes are generally shorter-term and more focused on addressing specific
   reform challenges than those of USAID. Rather than working with government ministries, MEPI
   provides direct funding through its small grants programme for independent civil society
   organisations and to support political competition. It has a strong emphasis on encouraging political
   engagement among youth and women as well as on media and entrepreneurship.8 It also carries out
   work of a less political nature such as educational workshops for youth, projects for training teachers
   or citizenship and public service-related projects. It distributes grants of between USD 25,000 and USD
   75,000, based on issues determined by the MEPI committee, for projects of between six and 12 months. It
   disseminates information regarding grants through an ‘alumni network’ of those who previously attended
   workshops, inquired about local grants, etc. Projects then require the approval of the Ministry of Social
   Development. Unlike most international donors it accepts funding proposals and concept papers in Arabic
   and strives to work with organisations that might not be funded otherwise. It is willing to work with new
   NGOs that do not have a proven record and tries to cover all geographic areas, even if this means having to
   work with government-linked organisations such as the Hashemite Foundation because they have a broader
   geographical reach. It is smaller and more flexible so as to reach as broad a group as possible.


NED provides grants for civil society projects in Jordan
Echagüe & Michou, FRIDE Researchers, 5-27-11
[Ana & Hélène (Junior Researcher), 5-27-11, “Assessing Democracy Assistance: Jordan”, p. 5,
http://www.fride.org/publication/910/jordan accessed 6-5-11, AFB]

   The National Endowment for Democracy (NED) was created by Congress to strengthen democratic
   institutions around the world through nongovernmental efforts. Its priorities are opening political space in
   authoritarian countries; aiding democrats and democratic processes in semi-authoritarian countries; helping
   new democracies succeed; building democracy after conflict; and aiding democracy in the Muslim world. In
   2009 it spent a little over USD 1 million in Jordan, disbursing grants of between USD 25,000 and USD
   500,000 to various projects concerned with civic participation, trade unions, public-private policy dialogue,
   media networks and youth and women’s awareness.


IFES, USAID, and NDI assist Jordan with regard to election transparency and monitoring
Echagüe & Michou, FRIDE Researchers, 5-27-11


                         Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
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[Ana & Hélène (Junior Researcher), 5-27-11, “Assessing Democracy Assistance: Jordan”, p. 14,
http://www.fride.org/publication/910/jordan accessed 6-5-11, AFB]

   The main international actor with regard to election monitoring, election awareness campaigns and
   electoral transparency is the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES). It works with the
   Ministry of Interior (‘the guys who basically run the elections’, according to one local source), in seeking
   to expose Jordan to international election standards. Although the results of November 2010’s
   elections were predictably disappointing, IFES officials point to small but concrete changes which they
   have achieved: come results, the ballot paper is shown and not just the name read out; copies of
   objection forms are to remain on record; candidates sign copies of official results forms.45 Since the
   protests in January and February of this year, and since the appointment of a new government, public opinion
   has remained cautious regarding anticipated political reforms in Jordan. Hints of redrawing electoral district
   boundaries and potentially introducing partial proportional representation will all be believed once they can
   be seen.
   USAID also works with the Ministry of Interior regarding the administration of elections including
   registration, ballot boxes, names of candidates on websites and fortnightly reports from NCHR. Aside
   from contributing to the observation of elections at the international and local levels through NGOs
   such as the NCHR and al-Hayat, NDI supports female candidates in their campaigns, platforms,
   outreach, etc. The Konrad Adenauer Foundation cooperated with al-Quds Centre to raise awareness of the
   new Election Law, despite disappointment in the law itself. Many NGOs started awareness campaigns prior
   to the elections but have been criticised for starting their election awareness programmes so late rather than
   right after the dissolution of parliament in November 2009: ‘Changing mindsets is not a matter of months.’46
   Foreign donors have been criticised for throwing too much money at the Ministry of Political Development
   for this purpose. Critics believe the Ministry would have made more of a grassroots effort if it had had fewer
   funds. Instead ‘it hired a cartoonist, paid him a large sum from this money, and proceeded to make yet
   another “awareness campaign”.’47

   [Note – NDI = US-based National Democratic Institute, IFES = International Foundation for Electoral
   Assistance]



NDI assists the Jordanian National Centre for Human Rights
Echagüe & Michou, FRIDE Researchers, 5-27-11
[Ana & Hélène (Junior Researcher), 5-27-11, “Assessing Democracy Assistance: Jordan”, p. 16,
http://www.fride.org/publication/910/jordan accessed 6-5-11, AFB]

   The National Centre for Human Rights receives a third of its funding from government and two thirds
   from donors (including NDI and the Australian Embassy). It is treated as a government institution
   rather than as an independent NGO in terms of oversight of its finances. NCHR has a liaison officer
   with each of the government ministries. But NCHR is an example of an organisation which despite its
   government links, has proved that it is willing to put forth credible reports and tackle sensitive issues.
   For example, after the 2007 elections, while the US Embassy issued a press release stating that
   elections went smoothly, NCHR issued a report accusing government of gerrymandering, cheating, etc.
   In anticipation of the elections in 2010, it also issued a set of recommendations for revising the elections law
   that included increasing the number of quota seats for women and creating a mixed electoral system that
   would allocate a portion of ‘national’ atlarge seats by proportional representation. Most provocatively, the
   report levelled an explicit critique at the unequal distribution of seats across the population, drawing attention
   to the taboo but widely recognised fact that Jordan’s majority Palestinian population is effectively
   disenfranchised through the law.51 Some donors believe that there is no alternative organisation which can
   produce such credible reporting but which also has the ear of, or influence on the Prime Minister.




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                     Status of Democracy Assistance – Morocco

US provides democracy assistance to Morocco
Khakee, international consultant and The Policy Practice associate, 6-14-10
[Anna, The Policy Practice, a development consultancy. 6-14-10, “Assessing Democracy Assistance: Morocco”, p.
3, http://www.fride.org/publication/780/morocco, accessed 6-5-11]

   Morocco receives democracy assistance from the European Union and, to a lesser extent, from individual
   European states. The United States and Canada also provide Morocco with democracy support as do
   Western NGOs. Democracy assistance covers a large number of issue areas, with a particular
   emphasis (in terms of funds committed) on judicial and administrative reform and decentralisation.11
   NGO development, the strengthening of political parties and parliament and electoral support are also
   important focus areas. In addition to democracy assistance, respect for democratic principles form part of the
   main agreements and initiatives between Morocco on the one hand and Western states on the other, such as
   those under the Euro- Mediterranean Partnership and the European Neighbourhood Policy. This section
   provides a brief overview of international democracy promotion in Morocco.


US democracy assistance to Morocco focuses on democratic governance
Khakee, international consultant and The Policy Practice associate, 6-14-10
[Anna, The Policy Practice, a development consultancy. 6-14-10, “Assessing Democracy Assistance: Morocco”, p.
4-5, http://www.fride.org/publication/780/morocco, accessed 6-5-11]

   Morocco has traditionally been rather peripheral to United States interests, but after 9/11 this
   changed. Today, the US is the largest bilateral donor of democracy assistance in Morocco: democratic
   governance is one of four priority assistance goals of the US government in the country.17 Funding
   comes mainly through USAID, the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), the Bureau of Democracy,
   Human Rights and Labour (DRL), and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). Important
   agencies responsible for programmes in Morocco with mainly USAID and NED funding include the
   National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI, present in Morocco since 1998) and the
   International Republican Institute (IRI).18
   USAID has recently worked on technical assistance and training for the Moroccan parliament, with
   the aim of strengthening the parliament’s capacity to oversee public finances, review legislation and
   policy and engage in a dialogue with citizens. In view of the 2007 elections, USAID funded NDI and IRI
   to work with Moroccan political parties, including the moderate Islamist party PJD, to improve their
   capacity to develop political platforms and to effectively communicate them to voters. NDI also assisted
   Moroccan civil society to encourage voter participation in the elections, and has conducted a large
   number of focus groups (a particular type of polling technique) to gauge Moroccan public opinion.19 USAID
   has also been active on local governance, aiming to increase citizen participation at the local level and
   enhancing local governments’ transparency, performance, and accountability.
   The main US post-9/11 initiative in the MENA region is the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI),
   offering support for political, economic and educational reforms. MEPI’s presence is largest in
   Morocco,20 where programming has included – apart from a range of region-wide activities notably
   on the media – parliamentary reforms, support to political parties, and strengthening of local
   government.21
   The Human Rights and Democracy Fund (HRDF) of the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and
   Labor (DRL) funds some MENA-wide projects (on general democracy issues, media, women etc.)
   which have included Morocco. It has also funded judicial reform projects in Morocco.
   Apart from funding a number of NDI and IRI programmes, NED has also funded Moroccan NGOs
   directly, focussing on issues such as judicial reform, local democracy, youth participation in politics,
   civil society strengthening, and human rights.
   In the context of the troubled US-sponsored Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative
   (BMENA), the itinerant Forum for the Future was held in Morocco in 2004 and then again in
   November 2009. The BMENA Foundation for the Future, intended to provide assistance to civil society


                         Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
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   organisations that work to foster democracy and freedom, started its grant-giving activities in 2007. So far,
   however, it has only funded a handful of projects in Morocco.22
   Some American initiatives have been very high profile, including US work with the Moroccan
   parliament and political parties, opinion polls which IRI undertook prior to the 2007 elections (polling
   had not until then been part of the political landscape in Morocco and the polls predicted that PJD had a
   following of approximately half the electorate, upsetting the traditional Moroccan political landscape), and
   official support for Al Adl wal- Ihsan spokes-person Nadia Yassine when she was detained in 2005.


NDI provides assistance with Moroccan elections
Khakee, international consultant and The Policy Practice associate, 6-14-10
[Anna, The Policy Practice, a development consultancy. 6-14-10, “Assessing Democracy Assistance: Morocco”, p.
6-7, http://www.fride.org/publication/780/morocco, accessed 6-5-11]

   In view of the 2007 elections, the Moroccan authorities invited an international observation mission headed
   by the NDI to the country. It consisted of a 50-strong delegation, preceded by a pre-election assessment team.
   The delegates visited polling stations in selected locations.37 Domestic and international observers concurred
   that the 2007 elections were the most transparent and fair in the history of Morocco, as ‘overall, the voting
   went smoothly and was characterised by a spirit of transparency and professionalism’. However the mission
   stressed that ‘The low voter turnout [...] and significant number of protest votes suggest that Moroccan
   authorities will need to undertake further political reforms in order to encourage widespread engagement in
   the political process. Those reforms should aim to enhance the power of elected representatives while also
   increasing the transparency of the system and accountability to the electorate’.38 During the 2009 municipal
   elections, only Moroccan observers, relying mainly on their own funds, were present.39

   [Note – NDI = US-based National Democratic Institute]


NDI and IRI are primary international actors in election assistance to Morocco
Khakee, international consultant and The Policy Practice associate, 6-14-10
[Anna, The Policy Practice, a development consultancy. 6-14-10, “Assessing Democracy Assistance: Morocco”, p.
16, http://www.fride.org/publication/780/morocco, accessed 6-5-11]

   Electoral support has come in several forms in Morocco: the international observation mission of the 2007
   parliamentary elections, support for national observers, encouragement to participate in elections, training for
   candidates (in particular female candidates), and campaign training including helping set up national
   campaign strategies and teams. Separate, but nevertheless related, is the continuous work with political
   parties, including training, party building, and focus groups to bridge the gap between the parties and the
   electorates. Although several international actors have been involved in this area, the main actors have been
   US organisations such as NDI and IRI. The IRI resident representative noted that there is ‘so much work
   around elections, I’m a fan of that kind of work’.




                         Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
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                         Status of Democracy Assistance – Iran


When evaluating Iran in the country inclusion process, it should be noted that recent policy
regarding democracy assistance to Iran has not included earmarks, which allows the U.S.
flexibility when allocating funds.
McInerney ’10
[Stephen, Director of Advocacy for the Project on Middle East Democracy, “The Federal Budget and
Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2011,” http://pomed.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2010/04/fy11-budget-
analysis-final.pdf]

    The decision by the Obama administration not to specifically allocate or earmark any funding
    for Iran has a few potential advantages. First, it allows the administration flexibility to react to
    changes on the ground in Iran. If programs are deemed ineffective or counterproductive, those
    funds can easily be reprogrammed to support democracy in other countries of the region. In
    addition, it allows the administration to fund programming, such as conferences that educate
    and train NGO employees, that includes participants from numerous countries, not only Iran.
    Some argue that the presence of participants from countries that are U.S. allies may ease suspicions that such
    programs are veiled attempts at regime change. On the other hand, several Republican members of
    Congress have expressed concern that the lack of an earmark for democracy and governance
    specifically in Iran may signal a lack of support. The Senate version of the FY10 appropriations
    bill for State and Foreign Operations included an earmark requiring all $40 million under the
    NERD designation to be spent on Iran democracy programs, but the final omnibus version
    passed in December included no such provision. It appears that the Democrat-controlled
    Congress will most likely grant the President’s full request of $40 million for FY11. An earmark
    requiring the funds to be spent in Iran is unlikely to pass in the final version of the FY11 bill.
    Funds may once again be earmarked by Congress for Internet freedom, but the administration is likely to spend
    a significant portion of NERD program funds on this objective, whether required by Congress or not.




                         Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
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                  ***Neg Counterplan Ground




            Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
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                              Counterplan – Agent (General)


All flavors of agent counterplans
Committee on Evaluation of USAID Democracy Assistance Programs, National Research
Council-‘8
Improving Democracy Assistance: Building Knowledge Through Evaluations and Research
http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/22159/12164_EXS.pdf

  Over the past 25 years, the United States has made support for the spread of democracy to other nations an
  increasingly important element of its national security policy. Many other multilateral agencies, countries,
  and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) also are involved in providing democracy assistance. These
  efforts have created a growing demand to find the most effective means to assist in building and
  strengthening democratic governance under varied conditions.




                        Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
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                    Counterplan – International Actor – Europe


The EU is more credible and more experienced at providing democracy assistance
The National Committee on American Foreign, Saltzman Institute of War and Peace at
Columbia, The Atlantic Council-‘8
ENHANCING DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE
http://www.acus.org/files/publication_pdfs/65/Enhancing%20Democracy%20Assistance.pdf

   By offering incentives to semi-democratic regimes to become more democratic, the
   EU has been a magnet for reform since the end of the Cold War, as well as a
   generous sponsor of democracy assistance. Working with Europe not only would magnify US
   capabilities and effectiveness. Its focus on using soft power could help overcome the barriers
   resulting from America’s reduced credibility. In the context of EU enlargement, its Stabilization and
   Association Agreements (SAA) provide a democratization track for countries that aspire to membership. EU
   financial assistance tends to use a “whole of country” approach and includes state-building activities that are
   well-suited to weak and post-conflict states. The Council of Europe sets human rights standards
   and evaluates the performance of its members. The Organization for Security and
   Cooperation in Europe is extensively involved in electoral assistance. NATO’s Membership
   Action Plans (MAP) and Partnership for Peace (PfP) provide benchmarks and incentives for political,
   economic and security reforms to potential members. Other regional bodies, such as the Organization of
   American States, monitor and evaluate the progress of members and engage in democracy assistance.




                         Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
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                                       Counterplan – NGOs


NGOs are a more appropriate mechanism for short-term democracy promotion efforts
McManus, Los Angeles Times, February 27, 2011,
[Doyle, p. A28, ―Helping the Arabs help themselves; The U.S. must find a way, and funding, to
promote democracy]

   The State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development, the foreign aid
   agency, are already designing a proposal for a package of "transition assistance" to newly
   democratic countries in the area. But that's likely to be a slow process. Tunisia, for example,
   overthrew its dictatorship more than a month ago, but it has yet to receive any new help from
   USAID. More promising vehicles, in the short term, are the nimbler nongovernment
   organizations like Wollack's, which can launch small projects quickly. His National
   Democratic Institute, sponsored by the Democratic Party and funded by a combination of
   U.S. government and private donations, has sent an expert to Yemen to serve as an unofficial
   conduit between the government and opposition leaders. The International Republican Institute, the
   GOP counterpart, has already launched a public opinion poll in Egypt to show budding politicians what their
   potential voters think


NGOs more efficient at distributing aid
The National Committee on American Foreign, Saltzman Institute of War and Peace at
Columbia, The Atlantic Council-‘8
ENHANCING DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE
http://www.acus.org/files/publication_pdfs/65/Enhancing%20Democracy%20Assistance.pdf

   Even when most of their funding comes from the US Government, NGOs are formally
   independent and can act more efficiently than government bureaucracies involved
   in grant-making and assistance. These include NDI and IRI, the Center for International Private
   Enterprise (CIPE), IFES, the American Center for International Labor Solidarity, Freedom House, the United
   States Institute for Peace, the Eurasia Foundation, and the Asia Foundation. Other NGO activities can be
   undertaken by more than 70 foundations with headquarters in the United States (e.g. the Open Society
   Institute, the Ford Foundation, and the Rockefeller Brothers Fund ). For- profit consulting groups play
   a prominent role in post-conflict settings where they receive more than half of the contracts
   issued by USAID’s Office of Transitional Initiatives (i.e. SWIFT-II contractors including ARD,
   Casals, Chemonics, Creative Associates, DAI and PADCO). OTI small grants to local partners and
   cooperative agreements with NGOs for specialized tasks maximizes their ability to work in
   the most flexible and responsive fashion.




                        Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011
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                                        Counterplan – Study


Study CP
Committee on Evaluation of USAID Democracy Assistance Programs, National Research
Council-‘8
Improving Democracy Assistance: Building Knowledge Through Evaluations and Research             http://iis-
db.stanford.edu/pubs/22159/12164_EXS.pdf

   Despite these substantial expenditures, our understanding of the actual impacts of USAID
   DG assistance on progress toward democracy remains limited—and is the subject of much current
   debate in the policy and scholarly communities. Admittedly, the realities of democracy programming are
   complicated, given the emphasis on timely responses in politically sensitive environments and flexibility in
   implementation to account for fluid political circumstances. These realities pose particular challenges for the
   evaluation of democracy assistance programs. Nonetheless, USAID seeks to find ways to attempt to
   determine which programs, in which countries, are having the greatest impact in supporting
   democratic institutions and behaviors and how those effects unfold. To do otherwise would
   risk making poor use of scarce funds and to remain uncertain about the effectiveness of an
   important national policy. Yet USAID’s current evaluation practices do not provide
   compelling evidence of the impacts of DG programs. While gathering valuable information
   for project tracking and management, these evaluations usually do not collect data that are
   critical to making the most accurate and credible determination of project impacts—such as
   obtaining baseline measures of targeted outcomes before a project is begun or tracking
   changes in appropriately selected (or assigned) comparison groups to serve as a control or
   reference group.




                         Topic Committee Democracy Assistance Working Group - 2011

				
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