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Exerpts from State Department Report on terrorist incidents against the Unites States

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									                    PAPERLESS ARCHIVES RELEASE

                     OSAMA BIN LADEN - AL QAEDA
                         GOVERNMENT FILES

Abridged Version

From Paperless Archives http://www.paperlesssarchives.com
Complete version available at Paperless Archives
The complete set includes 5,000 pages of U.S. government documents covering the activities of Osama bin
Laden's al Qaeda (Arabic for "the Base") network. Osama bin Laden (Osama bin Ladin) and al Qaeda
(al Qaida) have been accused of several acts and conspiracies against the United States, including the
September 11th, 2001, attack on New York's World Trade Center Twin Towers and the Pentagon building.

Material covers Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda network's alleged involvement in the bombings of the U.S.
military's Khobar Towers barracks in Saudi Arabia, the United States' embassies in Kenya and Tanzania,
and the attack on the USS Cole.

Highlights of the material include:

Testimony of former Osama bin Laden associate Jamal Ahmed Al-Fadl. Al-Fadl broke from al Qaeda after
stealing $110,000 of the group's funds. Al-Fadl testified that in 1996 he warned U.S. officials that its embassies
may come under attack from al Qaeda. Al-Fadl, who once ran al Qaeda's payroll, gave account of Osama bin
Laden extensive network of companies involved in import-export, currency trading, construction, and farming.
Al-Fadl also spoke of his role in the seeking of uranium.

U.S. Navy's Judge Advocate General (JAG) report on the USS Cole attack. The report shows the investigation
of the incident found shared responsibility for the failure to anticipate and protect the USS Cole from a terrorist
attack on October 12, 1999, which killed 17 sailors and injured 42 others. The report notes, among other
things, that because no one on board spoke Arabic, the Cole crew "had no means of making meaningful
queries" during its refueling stop in Yemen.

A CIA document outlining Osama bin Laden's activities against the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan and
his later dealings with al Qaeda.

A report from the Defense Department on failures by command to safeguard the Khobar Towers against attack.

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Materials cover Presidencies, Historical Figures, Historical Events, Celebrities, Organized Crime, Politics, Military
Operations, Famous Crimes, Intelligence Gathering, Espionage, Civil Rights, Serial Killers, World War I, World
War II, Korean War, Vietnam War, and more.

Source material from Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security
Agency (NSA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Secret Service, National Security Council, Department of
Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Justice, National Archive Records and Administration, Presidential

Paperless Archives www.paperlessarchives.com
Excerpts From State Department report on Terrorist incidents against the United States
                            Sub-Saharan Africa
                             April 12, 1998—Belet Karim, Somalia:
                                  An American employee of the United Nations
                             World Food Program was abducted. He was
                             released unharmed 3 hours later. No motive is
                             known for his abduction.

                             August 7, 1998—Nairobi, Kenya
                                   At approximately 10:36 a.m., a truck bomb
                             containing two terrorists approached the rear
                             entrance to the U.S. Embassy. It is believed that
                             the terrorists’ goal was to drive the truck bomb into
                             the underground parking garage of the U.S.
                             Embassy and detonate the device. When the
                             terrorists approached the rear entrance to the
                             Embassy, they were challenged by local unharmed
                             Embassy guards who refused to let the truck enter
                             the underground parking garage. In an effort to
                             scare off the guards, the passenger in the truck got
                             out and threw flash/bang grenades at the guards
                             while the driver fired on the guards with a handgun.
                             None of the guards were harmed.
                                 When the driver realized that they could not
          Usama Bin Ladin    penetrate the duel security perimeter protecting the
                             underground basement entrance, he detonated the
                             truck bomb. The passenger who was outside the
                             truck at the time of the explosion was injured, but
                             was able to flee the scene. The explosion killed
                             291 people and injured nearly 5,000. Among the
                             dead were 12 Americans and 32 Foreign Service
                             nationals (FSNs) employed by the U.S. Embassy.
                             Six Americans and 13 FSNs were injured. The
                             majority of the deaths were caused by the collapse
                             of the Ufundi Building located 2–3 meters from the
                             blast site.

                                                   U.S. EMBASSY

                                 UFUNDI BUILDING

A truck bomb attack against the U.S. Embassy
completely destroys the Ufundi Building located
adjacent to the Embassy. Most of the deaths were
caused by the collapse of the Ufundi Building.





                Nairobi, Kenya
                August 7, 1998

                          Parking area in rear of the Embassy where the truck
                          bomb detonated.

                                                   Order Code RL31119

                CRS Report for Congress
                                    Received through the CRS Web

                Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and
                              State Sponsors, 2001

                                              September 10, 2001

                                                Kenneth Katzman
                              Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
                     Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
               Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and
                       State Sponsors, 2001

      Signs continue to point to a decline in state sponsorship of terrorism, as well as
a rise in the scope of threat posed by the independent network of exiled Saudi
dissident Usama bin Ladin. During the 1980s and the early 1990s, Iran and terrorist
groups it sponsors were responsible for the most politically significant acts of Middle
Eastern terrorism. Although Iran continues to actively sponsor terrorist groups, since
1997 some major factions within Iran have sought to change Iran’s image to that of
a more constructive force in the region. Pressured by international sanctions and
isolation, Sudan and Libya appear to have sharply reduced their support for
international terrorist groups, and Sudan has told the United States it wants to work
to achieve removal from the “terrorism list.”

      Usama bin Ladin’s network, which is independently financed and enjoys safe
haven in Afghanistan, poses an increasingly significant threat to U.S. interests in the
Near East and perhaps elsewhere. The primary goals of bin Ladin and his cohort are
to oust pro-U.S. regimes in the Middle East and gain removal of U.S. troops from the
region. Based on U.S. allegations of past plotting by the bin Ladin network, suggest
that the network wants to strike within the United States itself.

     The Arab-Israeli peace process is a longstanding major U.S. foreign policy
interest, and the Administration and Congress are concerned about any terrorist
groups or state sponsors that oppose the Arab-Israeli peace process. Possibly
because of a breakdown in the Palestinian-Israeli peace process in September 2000,
Palestinian Islamic organizations such as Hamas have stepped up operations against
Israelis, after a few years of diminished terrorist activity. Some observers blame
Palestinian Authority President Yasir Arafat, accusing his regime of ending efforts to
constrain these and other groups. Others assert that Israel’s actions against the
Palestinians have been provocative and have contributed to increased Palestinian
support for violence against Israel.

     There is no consensus on the strategies for countering terrorism in the Near East.
The United States, in many cases, differs with its allies on how to deal with state
sponsors of terrorism; most allied governments believe that engaging these countries
diplomatically might sometimes be more effective than trying to isolate or punish
them. The United States is more inclined than its European allies to employ
sanctions, military action, and legal pressure to compel state sponsors and groups to
abandon terrorism. In a few cases since 1998, the United States has pursued an
engagement strategy by easing sanctions or conducting dialogue with those state
sponsors willing to distance themselves from international terrorism. The United
States also believes that greater counterterrorism cooperation with allies and other
countries, including Russia, is yielding benefits in reducing the threat from terrorism.

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Radical Islamic Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
    Hizballah (Party of God) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
          Hizballah’s Persian Gulf Connections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
          Specially Designated Terrorists (SDTs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
          Blocked Assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
    Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
          Blocked Assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
          SDTs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
    The Islamic Group and Al-Jihad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
          SDTs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
    Al-Qaida (Usama bin Ladin Network) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
          SDTs/August 20, 1998 Executive Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
          Blocked Assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
    The Armed Islamic Group(GIA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
    Harakat ul-Mujahidin/Islamist Groups in Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
          Other Islamist Groups in Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
    Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
    Abu Sayyaf Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
    Islamic Army of Aden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Radical Jewish Groups: Kach and Kahane Chai . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
          Blocked Assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Leftwing and Nationalist Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .                18
     Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .                       18
     Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine — General Command
          (PFLP-GC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .            19
          SDTs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .       20
     Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .                            20
          SDTs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .       20
     Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) . . . . . . . . . . . . .                               20
     Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .                  21
          SDTs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .       22
     Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .                    22
          SDTs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .       22

Other Non-Islamist Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .                 23
    Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .                     23
    Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C) . . . . . . . . . . . .                                   23
    The People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .                                 24

Middle Eastern Terrorism List Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .                      25
    Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   25
    Syria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .    26
    Libya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .    27
      Sudan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
      Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Countering Near Eastern Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .                31
    Military Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .       31
    Unilateral Economic Sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .                32
    Multilateral Sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .           34
    Counterterrorism Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .                 34
    Selective Engagement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .             35
    Legal Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .       36
    The Domestic Front . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .           36

List of Tables
Table 1. Near Eastern Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Table 2. Blocked Assets of Middle East Terrorism List States . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
           Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and
                   State Sponsors, 2001

     Please Note: This report was completely immediately prior to the terrorist
attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. It is
offered as essential background for policymakers.

      This report is an annual analysis of Near Eastern terrorist groups and countries
on the U.S. “terrorism list,” a list of countries that the Secretary of Commerce and
Secretary of State have determined provide repeated support for international
terrorism.2 Five out of the seven states currently on the terrorism list are located in
the Near East region — Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Sudan. (The other two are Cuba
and North Korea, which will not be covered in this report). The composition of the
list has not changed since Sudan was added in 1993. The groups analyzed in this
report include, but are not limited to, those designated as “Foreign Terrorist
Organizations” (FTO’s), pursuant to the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-132). The last section of the report discusses significant
themes in U.S. unilateral and multilateral efforts to combat terrorism in or from the
region. The State Department’s annual report on international terrorism, entitled
Patterns of Global Terrorism: 20003 is a significant source for this report; other
sources include press reports and conversations with U.S. counter-terrorism officials,
experts, investigative journalists, and foreign diplomats.

      Near Eastern terrorist groups and their state sponsors have been the focus of
U.S. counter-terrorism policies for several decades. Since the 1970s, many of the
most high-profile acts of terrorism against American citizens and targets have been
conducted by these groups, sometimes with the encouragement or at the instigation
of their state sponsors. Few recent terrorist attacks – either in or outside the Near
East region – compare in scale to the August 7, 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies
in Kenya and Tanzania, which killed 224 persons, including 12 Americans. The
October 12, 2000 bombing of the U.S. destroyer Cole in the harbor of Aden, Yemen,
killed 17 U.S. Navy personnel, nearly sank the ship, and caused at least a temporary
halt in growing U.S. military relations with Yemen. According to Patterns of Global
Terrorism: 2000 (available on the U.S. Department of State's web site at
[http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2000/]; hereafter cited as Patterns 2000),

    This report was prepared with the assistance of Patricia Niehoff.
 The determinations are made in accordance with Section 6(j) of the Export Administration
Act of 1979 50 U.S.C. 2405(j).
    State Department Publication 10822, released April 2001.

worldwide terrorism-related casualties increased to 405 in 2000 from 233 in 1999, but
the number of attacks increased only slightly, from 392 in 1999 to 423 in 2000. Of
these 2000 totals, only 16 of the 423 attacks and 19 of the 405 casualties occurred in
the Middle East, although Patterns covered only three months of the Palestinian
uprising that began in late September 2000. Since 2001 began, there have been
dozens of terrorism-related Israeli casualties resulting from Palestinian suicide bomb
attacks. Thirty-one of attacks and 12 of the deaths during 2000 occurred in Eurasia
(Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Russia).

     The terrorist groups analyzed often differ in their motivations, objectives,
ideologies, and levels of activity. The Islamist groups remain generally the most
active, stating as their main objective the overthrow of secular, pro-Western
governments, the derailment of the Arab-Israeli peace process, the expulsion of U.S.
forces from the region, or the end of what they consider unjust occupation of Muslim
lands. Some groups, such as the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), fight for cultural
and political rights or the formation of separate ethnically-based states. Table 1
below shows the 19 Near Eastern groups currently designated by the State
Department as FTO’s. The designations were mostly made when the FTO list was
inaugurated in October 1997 and revised in October 1999. A revised list is due out
in October 2001. A group can be added to the list at any time; Al-Qaida (the bin
Ladin network) was added on August 21, 1998 and the Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan was designated on September 25, 2000.

     Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, the designation of
a group as an FTO blocks its assets in the United States and makes it a criminal
offense for U.S. persons to provide it with material support or resources, such as
financial contributions. Executive order 12947 of January 23, 1995, also bars U.S.
dealings (contributions to or financial transactions) with any individuals named as
“Specially Designated Terrorists (SDTs).” An SDT, according to the Executive
order, is a person found to pose a significant risk of disrupting the Middle East peace
process, or to have materially supported acts of violence toward that end.

     In contrast to Patterns 2000, this report analyzes the following:

   ! The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which has not been the subject
     of a separate section in Patterns since Patterns 1995, is analyzed in this report
     because of the debate over whether or not PLO leader Yasir Arafat is taking
     sufficient steps to prevent terrorism by other groups in areas under the control
     of the Palestinian Authority. Since late 2000, there has been discussion about
     the degree to which certain PLO factions are involved in violence against Israel
     and whether or not they should be named as FTO’s.

   ! When the FTO list was reviewed and re-issued in October 1999, the
     Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) was dropped, largely
     because it has reconciled with Arafat. The group’s past involvement in
     terrorism, and the recent revival of its operations against Israel, are discussed
     in this report.

   ! This report, in contrast to last year’s, contains a section on the Abu Sayyaf
     Group operating in the Philippines, as well as analysis of several Pakistani

       Islamist groups that are fighting Indian control of part of Kashmir Province.
       These groups are discussed in this report, even though they operate outside the
       Near East region, because of their alleged connections to the bin Ladin
       network and the Taliban of Afghanistan.

Table 1. Near Eastern Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs)

            Group                          Description
                                                                     Activity Level
Abu Nidal Organization          Palestinian, nationalist            Very Low
Abu Sayyaf Group                Filipino, Islamist                  Moderate
Armed Islamic Group             Algerian, Islamist                  Moderate
Hamas                           Palestinian, Islamist               Very High
Harakat ul-Mujahidin            Kashmir, Islamist                   High
Hizballah                       Lebanese, Shiite Islamist           High
Islamic Group                   Egyptian, Islamist                  Moderate
Islamic Movement of             Uzbek, Islamist                     Moderate
Al-Jihad                        Egyptian, Islamist                  Moderate
Kach                            Jewish extremist                    Low
Kahane Chai                     Jewish extremist                    Low
Kurdistan Workers’ Party        Kurdish, anti-Turkey                Low

Palestinian Islamic Jihad       Palestinian, Islamist               Very High
Palestine Liberation Front      Palestinian, nationalist            Very Low
Popular Front for the           Palestinian, Marxist                Low
Liberation of Palestine
Popular Front for the           Palestinian, nationalist            Moderate
Liberation of Palestine -
General Command
People’s Mojahedin              Iranian, leftwing anti-regime       Moderate
Organization of Iran
Al-Qaida (Bin Ladin             Multinational Islamist,             Extremely High
Network)                        Afghanistan-based

Revolutionary People’s          Turkish, leftwing anti-government   Low
Liberation Party/Front

                         Radical Islamic Groups
     Since the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran, and particularly since the seizure of the
U.S. Embassy in Tehran in November of that year, radical Islam has attracted
widespread press attention as the driving ideology of the most active Middle Eastern
terrorist groups and state sponsors. Of the 19 FTOs listed above, ten are Islamic

Hizballah (Party of God)4
      Lebanon-based Hizballah appears to be groping for direction following Israel’s
May 2000 withdrawal from Lebanon. Having accomplished its main goal of ousting
Israel from southern Lebanon, some in the organization want it to change from a
guerrilla and terrorist organization into a mainstream political movement, focusing
mainly on its work in parliament (it holds 8 out of 128 total seats) and its charity and
reconstruction works with Lebanon’s Shiite community. Hardliners in Hizballah want
it to battle Israeli forces over the border and in the disputed Shib’a farms area.5 Other
hardliners in the organization believe that the Israeli withdrawal validated its guerrilla
strategy and are helping Palestinian groups apply similar tactics against Israeli forces
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

     Although initially encouraged by Hizballah’s relative restraint following the
Israeli withdrawal, Israel and the United States remain wary of Hizballah. Hizballah’s
15 year military campaign against Israeli and Israeli surrogate forces in southern
Lebanon – activity that is not technically considered terrorism by the U.S. State
Department – often included rocket attacks on Israeli civilians. Even though the
United Nations has certified that Israel’s withdrawal is complete, Hizballah has
asserted that Israel still occupies some Lebanese territory (the Shib’a farms) and, on
that basis, has conducted a few military attacks on Israel since the withdrawal. In
October 2000, Hizballah captured three Israeli soldiers in the Shib’a farms area and
kidnapped an Israeli noncombatant whom it had lured to Lebanon. Hizballah has
indicated a willingness to return these captives in exchange for several Lebanese
prisoners captured or kidnaped by Israel since the late 1980s.

     Founded in 1982 by Lebanese Shiite clerics inspired by the Islamic revolutionary
ideology of Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini, Hizballah’s original goal was to establish an
Islamic republic in Lebanon. During the 1980s, Hizballah was a principal sponsor of
anti-Western, and particularly anti-U.S., terrorism. It is known or suspected to have
been involved in suicide truck bombings of the U.S. Embassy (April 1983), the U.S.
Marine barracks (October 1983, killing 220 Marine, 18 Navy and 3 Army personnel),
and the U.S. Embassy annex (September 1984), all in Beirut. It also hijacked TWA
Flight 847 in 1985, killing a Navy diver, Robert Stethem, who was on board, and its

 For other names under which Hizballah or the other groups discussed in this paper operate,
see U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control. “Terrorism: What
You Need to Know About U.S. Sanctions.”
For a further discussion of this dispute, see CRS Report RL31078, The Shib’a Farms
Dispute and Its Implications. August 7, 2001, by Alfred Prados.

factions were responsible for the detention of most, if not all, U.S. and Western
hostages held in Lebanon during the 1980s and early 1990s. Eighteen Americans
were held hostage in Lebanon during that period, three of whom were killed.

      In the early 1990s, Hizballah also demonstrated an ability to conduct terrorism
far from the Middle East. In May 1999, Argentina’s Supreme Court, after an official
investigation, formally blamed Hizballah for the March 17, 1992 bombing of Israel’s
embassy in Buenos Aires and issued an arrest warrant for Hizballah terrorist leader
Imad Mughniyah. Hizballah did not claim responsibility for the attack outright, but
it released a surveillance tape of the embassy, implying responsibility. In May 1998,
FBI Director Louis Freeh told Argentina the FBI believes that Hizballah, working
with Iranian diplomats, was also responsible for the July 18, 1994 bombing of the
Argentine-Jewish Mutual Association (AMIA) building in Buenos Aires that left 86
dead.6 In July 1999, Argentine investigators brought charges against 20 suspected
Argentine collaborators in the AMIA bombings, and the trial is set to begin in
September 2001.

      Hizballah has continued to conduct surveillance of the U.S. Embassy in Lebanon
and its personnel, according to recent Patterns reports, but no major terrorist attacks
have been attributed to it since 1994. However, according to numerous press reports
and Hizballah leaders’ own statements, the organization is helping Palestinian groups
fight against Israel in the latest Palestinian uprising, which began in September 2000.
In late August 2001, Jordanian officials discovered a cache of rockets at a Hizballah-
owned location in Jordan, igniting fears that Hizballah might fire rockets on Israel
from there or might provide the weapons to Palestinian militants there or in the West

     Hizballah’s Persian Gulf Connections. Hizballah maintains connections
with similar groups in the Persian Gulf. Saudi and Bahraini investigations of anti-
regime unrest have revealed the existence of local chapters of Hizballah composed of
Shiite Muslims, many of whom have studied in Iran’s theological seminaries and
received terrorist training there and in Lebanon. Saudi and U.S. officials believe that
Saudi Shiite Muslims with connections to Lebanese Hizballah were responsible for
the June 25, 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers housing complex for U.S. military
personnel, near Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. This allegation was reaffirmed in the June
2001 U.S. indictments of 14 Khobar suspects. According to Patterns 1998, in
November 1998 Bahraini authorities uncovered an alleged bomb plot that they blamed
on persons linked to Bahraini and Lebanese Hizballah.

      Patterns 1999 reiterates that Hizballah receives “substantial” amounts of financial
assistance, weapons, and political and organizational support from both Syria and
Iran, although it does not mention specific figures. Then Secretary of State
Christopher said on May 21, 1996 that Iran gave Hizballah about $100 million per
year, a figure that U.S. officials have not since deviated from. About 150 of Iran’s
Revolutionary Guards remain in Lebanon to coordinate Iran’s aid to Hizballah. Syria
permits Iran to supply weapons to Hizballah through the international airport in

 FBI Ties Iran to Argentine Bombing in ‘94. Washington Post, August 8, 1998.
 Slavin, Barbara. Rockets Found in Jordan Worry U.S. USA Today, August 31, 2001.

Damascus, although a recent Turkish shutdown of the air corridor connecting Iran
and Syria has made Iranian deliveries more difficult.

      Specially Designated Terrorists (SDTs).8 Hizballah members named as
SDTs include: (1) Secretary General Hasan Nasrallah, who is about 43 and has led
Hizballah since 1993; (2) Imad Mughniyah, the 39 year old Hizballah intelligence
officer and alleged holder of some Western hostages in the 1980s; (3) Shaykh
Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, the 64-year-old senior Shiite cleric and leading
spiritual figure of Hizballah; and (4) Subhi Tufayli, the 54 year old former Hizballah
Secretary General who leads a radical breakaway faction of Hizballah.

      Blocked Assets. According to the Treasury Department’s “Terrorist Assets
Report” for 2000, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms has seized $283,000
in assets belonging to 18 persons arrested in North Carolina in July 2000 on suspicion
of smuggling goods to generate funds for Hizballah.

Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)
      Prior to the September 2000 outbreak of the Palestinian uprising, it appeared
that the bulk of the leadership of the Sunni Muslim Palestinian group Hamas (Islamic
Resistance Movement) was accommodating Yasir Arafat’s leadership of the
Palestinian Authority (PA). Hamas leaders also appeared resigned to an eventual final
peace agreement between Israel and the PA, although they continued to criticize
Arafat as too eager to compromise with Israel. Since the uprising began, Hamas and
its smaller ally, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), have escalated terrorist attacks against
Israelis. Hamas claimed responsibility for the June 1, 2001 suicide bombing of the
“Dolphinarium” discotheque in Tel Aviv, which killed 21, and for an August 9, 2001
suicide bombing at a pizza restaurant in Jerusalem that killed 18, including one
American. PIJ has conducted several recent suicide bombings, many of which killed
only the bomber(s). Many experts believe that the renewed terrorist activity is at least
partly attributable to a breakdown in security cooperation between Israel and the
Palestinian Authority – cooperation that was widely credited with keeping terrorist
attacks to a minimum in the preceding few years. The renewed terrorist threat has led
Israel to adopt a policy – criticized by the United States and many other countries –
of assassinating Hamas and PIJ activists to preempt their suspected attacks.

     Hamas was formed by Muslim Brotherhood activists during the early stages of
the earlier Palestinian uprising (intifada) in 1987. Its spiritual leader, Shaykh Ahmad
Yassin, who is paralyzed, was released from prison by Israel in October 1997. He
seems to serve as a bridge between Hamas’ two main components — the extremists
who orchestrate terrorist attacks (primarily through a clandestine wing, the Izz ad-
Din al-Qassam Brigades), and the more moderate elements affiliated with Hamas’
social services, charity, and educational institutions. PIJ was, in part, inspired by the
Iranian revolution of 1979 even though PIJ is a Sunni Muslim, not a Shiite Muslim
organization. PIJ remains almost purely a guerrilla organization, with no overt
component. It is led by Ramadan Abdullah Shallah, a Gaza-born, 43 year old

The list of SDTs is contained in the Office of Foreign Assets Control factsheet “Terrorism:
What You Need to Know About U.S. Sanctions.”

academic who previously was an adjunct professor at the University of South Florida.
He was chosen leader in 1995 after his predecessor, Fathi al-Shiqaqi was assassinated,
allegedly by Israeli agents. Recent Patterns reports characterizes Hamas’ strength as
“an unknown number of hardcore members [and] tens of thousands of supporters and
sympathizers,” and PIJ’s strength as “unknown.”

     Hamas receives funding from Iran, from wealthy private benefactors in the
Persian Gulf monarchies, and Palestinian expatriates, according to Patterns 2000,
which adds that the group conducts fundraising and propaganda activities in Western
Europe and North America. Many individual donors appear to believe their
contributions go to charitable activities for poor Palestinians served by Hamas’ social
services network, and are not being used for terrorism. PIJ is politically closer to Iran
than is Hamas, and apparently derives most of its funding from state sponsors,
especially Iran. PIJ receives some logistical support from Syria, according to Patterns

      Hamas and PIJ have not targeted the United States or Americans directly,
although Americans have died in attacks by these groups, along with Israelis and often
the bombers themselves. Five out of the 65 killed in a series of four Hamas/PIJ
bombings in Israel during February - March 1996 were American citizens. These
bombings had the apparent effect of shifting public opinion toward Benjamin
Netanyahu in Israeli national elections on May 29, 1996, possibly proving decisive in
his election victory as Prime Minister over then Labor Party leader Shimon Peres.
Neither group conducted major attacks in the run-up to the May 1999 Israeli
elections, although they did carry out attacks in an attempt to derail the negotiation
and implementation of the October 23, 1998 Israeli-Palestinian Wye River
Memorandum. In total, the two groups have conducted about 80 suicide bombings
or attempted suicide bombings, killing more than 450 Israelis, since the signing of the
Israeli-PLO Declaration of Principles in 1993.9

     Blocked Assets. The United States has blocked the assets of some alleged
Hamas/PIJ leaders, using the authority of President Clinton’s January 23, 1995
Executive order on Middle East terrorism. As of the end of 2000, a total of about
$17,000 in PIJ assets in the United States were blocked, consisting of a bank account
belonging to PIJ leader Shallah.10

     SDTs. Several Hamas and PIJ activists have been named as SDTs. They
include: (1) Hamas founder Shaykh Ahmad Yassin; (2) PIJ leader Ramadan Abdullah
Shallah; (3) PIJ ideologist Abd al-Aziz Awda; (4) Hamas political leader Musa Abu
Marzuq, who was barred from returning to Jordan when that country shut Hamas’s
offices in Amman in August 1999; and (5) alleged U.S. fundraiser for Hamas,
Mohammad Salah.

Pipes, Daniel and Steven Emerson. Rolling Back the Forces of Terror. Wall Street Journal,
August 13, 2001.
 These figures are contained in the 2000 Annual Report to Congress on Assets in the United
States Belonging to Terrorist Countries or International Terrorist Organizations. Office of
Foreign Assets Control, U.S. Department of Treasury. January 2001.

The Islamic Group and Al-Jihad
      Egyptian security authorities continue to gain the upper hand in their battle
against the opposition Islamic Group and its ally, Al-Jihad,11 groups that, over the
past several decades, periodically have gone underground and then resurfaced. There
have been no large scale terrorist attacks by these groups since the Islamic Group’s
November 17, 1997 attack on tourists near Luxor, and no attacks inside Egypt at all
since August 1998. The gunmen in the Luxor attack killed 58 tourists and wounded
26 others, and then committed suicide or were killed by Egyptian security forces.
Sensing that they are on the defensive and that terrorism has made them unpopular,
in late 1997 leaders of both groups, including their common spiritual leader, the 63
year old blind cleric Shaykh Umar Abd al-Rahman, declared a ceasefire with the
Egyptian government. Muhammad Hamza, who is in operational control of the
Islamic Group in Egypt while Abd al-Rahman remains incarcerated in the United
States, has abided by the truce.

      Despite the decline of the groups’ activities within Egypt, factions of the groups
that are in exile have gravitated to the network of Usama bin Ladin. Several SDTs
from the Islamic Group and Al-Jihad now serve in bin Ladin’s inner circle as his top
lieutenants, including Ayman al-Zawahiri, Rifai Taha Musa, and Abu Hafs Masri
(Mohammad Atef). These leaders forswear any truce with the Egyptian government
and also seek, in concert with bin Ladin, to attack U.S. interests directly.

     Abd al-Rahman was not convicted specifically for the February 1993 bombing
of the World Trade Center in New York, but he was convicted for related
unsuccessful plots in the New York area, and those convicted in the Trade Center
bombing were allegedly associated with him. There has been much speculation about
the relationship, if any, between Abd al-Rahman and bin Ladin. Both recruited
fighters for the Afghan conflict against the Soviet Union through centers in the United
States and elsewhere, but it is not clear that the two men had any direct contact with
each other in Afghanistan. The two also had close connections to the Islamic
government of Sudan, although Abd al-Rahman left Sudan in 1990, before bin Ladin
relocated there. Abd al-Rahman’s two sons reportedly have been in or around
Afghanistan since the war ended in 1989. Before the February 1993 World Trade
Center bombing, some of Abd al-Rahman’s aides reportedly had personal contact with
bin Ladin associates in the United States.12 Although their recruiting presence has
raised questions as to whether or not the United States gave bin Ladin or Abd al-
Rahman assistance during the Afghan war, the Central Intelligence Agency has told
CRS that it found no evidence that the Agency provided any direct assistance to either
of them. The U.S. assistance program for the anti-Soviet groups in Afghanistan
focused primarily on indigenous Afghan mujahedin and not Arab volunteers such as
those sponsored by bin Ladin or Abd al-Rahman.

    The Islamic Group and Al-Jihad formed in the early 1970s as offshoots of the
Muslim Brotherhood, which opted to work within the political system after being

  A faction of the Jihad operates under the name “Vanguards of Conquest.”
 U.S. Sees Links in Brooklyn To World Terrorist Network. New York Times, October 22,

crushed by former President Gamal Abd al-Nasser. Both seek to replace Egypt’s pro-
Western, secular government with an Islamic state. Al-Jihad was responsible for the
assassination of President Anwar Sadat in October 1981. The Islamic Group has been
responsible for several attacks on high-ranking Egyptian officials, including the killing
of the People’s Assembly Speaker in October 1990 and the wounding of the Minister
of Information in April 1993. The Islamic Group also has a nonviolent arm which
recruits and builds support openly in poor neighborhoods in Cairo, Alexandria and
throughout southern Egypt, and runs social service programs. Al-Jihad has operated
only clandestinely, focusing almost exclusively on assassinations.

     SDTs. The following Egyptian Islamist figures have been named as SDTs: (1)
Shaykh Umar Abd al-Rahman, who was acquitted in 1984 of inciting Egyptian
President Anwar Sadat’s assassination, is in a medical detention facility in Missouri
following his October 1995 conviction for planning terrorist conspiracies in the New
York area; (2) Ayman al-Zawahiri, about 50, who is a top lieutenant of bin Ladin (see
below) and was convicted in Egypt for the Sadat assassination;13 (3) Rifa’i Taha
Musa, about 47, another top aide to bin Ladin; (4) Abbud al-Zumar, leader of the
remnants of the original Jihad who is serving a 40 year sentence in Egypt; (5) Talat
Qasim, about 44, a propaganda leader of the Islamic Group; and (6) Muhammad
Shawqi Islambouli, about 46, the brother of the lead gunman in the Sadat
assassination. Islambouli, a military leader of the Islamic Group, also is believed to
be associated with bin Ladin in Afghanistan.

Al-Qaida (Usama bin Ladin Network)
      Over the past six years, Al-Qaida (Arabic for “the base”), the network of Usama
bin Ladin, has evolved from a regional threat to U.S. troops in the Persian Gulf to a
global threat to U.S. citizens and national security interests. In building this network,
bin Ladin has assembled a coalition of disparate radical Islamic groups of varying
nationalities to work toward common goals – the expulsion of non-Muslim control
or influence from Muslim-inhabited lands. The network’s ideology, laid out in several
pronouncements signed by bin Ladin and his allies, has led bin Ladin to support
Islamic fighters or terrorists against Serb forces in Bosnia; against Soviet forces in
Afghanistan and now Russian forces in Chechnya; against Indian control over part of
Kashmir; against secular or pro-Western governments in Egypt, Algeria, Saudi
Arabia, and Uzbekistan; and against U.S. troops and citizens in the Persian Gulf,
Somalia, Yemen, Jordan, and against the U.S. mainland itself.

      The backbone of the Saudi dissident’s network is the ideological and personal
bond among the Arab volunteers who were recruited by bin Ladin for the fight against
the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (1979-1989). Financially, it draws on the
personal fortune of bin Ladin, estimated at about $300 million, but also reportedly
including funding from many other sources. Al-Qaida now encompasses members
and factions of several major Islamic militant organizations, including Egypt’s Islamic
Group and Al-Jihad, Algeria’s Armed Islamic Group, Pakistan’s Harakat ul-
Mujahidin, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and opposition groups in Saudi
Arabia. The network reportedly also has links to the Abu Sayyaf Islamic separatist

  Egypt’s Most Wanted. The Estimate, December 19, 1997. P.8.

group in the Philippines. Although there are few evident links to Hamas, bin Ladin
was a follower of Dr. Abdullah al-Azzam, a Palestinian of Jordanian origin who was
influential in the founding of both Hamas and al-Qaida. Reflecting its low level of
early activity, al-Qaida was not discussed in U.S. government reports until Patterns
1993. That report, which did not mention a formal group name, said that several
thousand non-Afghan Muslims fought in the war against the Soviets and the Afghan
Communist government during 1979 to 1992.14 Although the Taliban movement of
Afghanistan, which controls about 90% of that country, gives bin Ladin and his
subordinates safehaven, bin Ladin does not appear to be acting on behalf of the
Taliban, or vice versa.

    Bin Ladin’s network has been connected to a number of acts of terrorism. Bin
Ladin himself has been indicted by a U.S. court for involvement in several of them.
They include the following:

     ! Bin Ladin has claimed responsibility for the December 1992 attempted
       bombings against 100 U.S. servicemen in Yemen — there to support U.N.
       relief operations in Somalia (Operation Restore Hope). No one was killed.

     ! In press interviews, bin Ladin has openly boasted that he provided weapons to
       anti-U.S. militias in Somalia during Operation Restore Hope and that his
       loyalists fought against U.S. forces there. His involvement with the Somali
       militias appears to have strengthened his view that terrorism and low-
       technology combat can succeed in causing the United States to withdraw from
       military involvement abroad.

     ! The four Saudi nationals who confessed to the November 13, 1995 bombing
       of a U.S. military training facility in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, admitted on Saudi
       television to being inspired by bin Ladin and other Islamic radicals. Three of
       the confessors were veterans of conflicts in Afghanistan, Bosnia, and

     ! According to Patterns 1997, members of bin Ladin’s organization might have
       aided the Islamic Group assassination attempt against Egyptian President
       Mubarak in Ethiopia in June 1995.

     ! There is no direct evidence that bin Ladin was involved in the February 1993
       bombing of the World Trade Center. However, Patterns 1999 says that bin
       Ladin’s network was responsible for plots in Asia believed orchestrated by
       Ramzi Ahmad Yusuf, who was captured in Pakistan, brought to the United
       States, and convicted in November 1997 of masterminding the Trade Center
       bombing. The plots in Asia, all of which failed, were: to assassinate the Pope
       during his late 1994 visit to the Philippines and President Clinton during his
       visit there in early 1995; to bomb the U.S. and Israeli embassies in Manila in
       late 1994; and to bomb U.S. trans-Pacific flights.

  Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1993. Released April 1994. p.4.

   ! The August 7, 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, which
     killed 224 persons, including 12 American citizens, occurred just after a six
     month period in which bin Ladin had issued repeated and open threats,
     including a February 1998 pronouncement calling for the killing of U.S.
     civilians and servicemen worldwide. On August 20, 1998, the United States
     launched cruise missiles on bin Ladin’s training camps in eastern Afghanistan,
     based on U.S. evidence of his network’s involvement in the bombings. The
     United States also struck a pharmaceutical plant in Sudan that the
     Administration alleged was linked to bin Ladin and was producing chemical
     weapons agents. U.S. officials add that the bombings were intended to disrupt
     planning for a new attack. For their alleged role in the bombings, 17 alleged
     members of al-Qaida have been indicted by a U.S. court, including bin Ladin.
     Four of the six in U.S. custody have been tried and convicted; three are in
     custody in Britain.

   ! In December 1999, U.S. and Jordanian law enforcement authorities uncovered
     and thwarted two alleged plots – one in the United States and one in Jordan
     – to attack U.S. citizens celebrating the new millennium. The United States
     plot, allegedly to bomb Los Angeles international airport, was orchestrated by
     a pro-bin Ladin cell of Algerian Armed Islamic Group members coming from
     Canada. In June 2000, Jordan tried 28 who allegedly were planning to attack
     tourists during millennium festivities in that country, but 15 of those charged
     are still at large. Also in June 2000, Lebanon placed 29 alleged followers of
     bin Ladin on trial for planning terrorist attacks in Jordan. The presence of bin
     Ladin cells in Jordan and Lebanon – coupled with Israeli arrests of alleged bin
     Ladin operatives in the West Bank and Gaza Strip – suggests that Al-Qaida
     might plan acts of terrorism in connection with the Palestinian uprising.

   ! Patterns 2000 says that “supporters” of bin Ladin are suspected in the October
     12, 2000 bombing of the destroyer U.S.S. Cole in the harbor of the port of
     Aden, Yemen. The blast, which severely damaged the ship, killed 17 and
     injured 39 Navy personnel.

     Since the August 1998 U.S. retaliatory strikes on the Afghan camps and the
Sudan pharmaceutical plant, the Taliban leadership has tried to dissociate itself from
bin Ladin by asserting that he is no longer its guest. However, Taliban officials have
rebuffed repeated U.S. requests to extradite him, claiming that the United States has
not provided the Taliban with convincing evidence that bin Ladin might have been
involved in anti-U.S. terrorism. Adding to the U.S. concerns, several hundred U.S.
shoulder-held anti-aircraft weapons (“Stingers”) are still at large in Afghanistan, and,
because of bin Ladin’s financial resources, it is highly likely he has acquired some of
them. U.S. officials say bin Ladin’s fighters have experimented with chemical
weapons and might be trying to purchase nuclear or other weapons of mass

destruction materials.15 From those comments, it is reasonable to assume that bin
Ladin’s organization has at least a rudimentary chemical weapons capability.16

     SDTs/August 20, 1998 Executive Order. President Clinton’s August 20,
1998 Executive Order 13099 amended an earlier January 23, 1995 Executive order
(12947) by naming al-Qaida and its aliases (the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against
Jews and Crusaders, the Islamic Army for the Liberation of the Holy Places, the
Islamic Salvation Foundation, and the Group for the Preservation of the Holy Sites),
as an FTO. The effect of the order was to ban U.S. financial transactions with bin
Ladin’s organization and to allow U.S. law enforcement to freeze any bin Ladin assets
in the United States that can be identified. The order also named bin Ladin as an
SDT, along with Rifai Taha Musa, of the Egyptian Islamic Group (see that section
above) and another associate, Abu Hafs al-Masri (Mohammad Atef). Atef and Al-
Jihad guerrilla leader Ayman al-Zawahiri (see above) were indicted along with bin
Ladin on November 4, 1998 for the Kenya/Tanzania bombings; both are viewed as
potential successors to bin Ladin.17 A $5 million reward is offered for the capture of
Atef, who, according to the U.S. indictment against him, was sent by bin Ladin to
Somalia in 1992 to determine how to combat U.S. troops sent there for Operation
Restore Hope. Zawahiri, a medical doctor, met bin Ladin in the late 1980s in
Afghanistan and is considered his closest adviser on policy and strategy.

     Blocked Assets. No assets have been firmly linked to bin Ladin, in the United
States or elsewhere, and hence none are frozen at this time, according to the Treasury
Department’s report on terrorist assets for 2000. U.S. officials say they are
encouraging other governments to help dismantle bin Ladin’s financial empire and
they have persuaded Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to end the handling
of some of bin Ladin’s money by a few of their banks.18 About $254 million in assets
of the Taliban movement are blocked under Executive order 13129, issued in July
1999 on the grounds that the Taliban continued to harbor bin Ladin.

 Weiser, Benjamin. U.S. Says Bin Laden Aide Tried to Get Nuclear Material. New York
Times, September 26, 1998; West, Julian. Atomic Haul Raises Fears of Bin Laden Terror
Bomb. London Sunday Telegraph, April 23, 2000.
 For further information on the Taliban’s relationship with bin Ladin, see CRS Report
RL30588, Afghanistan: Current Issues and U.S. Policy Concerns. June 22, 2000, by
Kenneth Katzman.
 Loeb, Vernon. As U.S. Targets Bin Laden, 2 Top Aides Also Draw Scrutiny. Washington
Post, July 3, 2000.
 Risen, James and Benjamin Weiser. U.S. Officials Say Aid for Terrorists Came Through
Two Persian Gulf Nations. New York Times, July 8, 1999.

                                   Usama bin Ladin
  Usama bin Ladin, born July 30, 1957 as the seventeenth of twenty sons of a (now
deceased) Saudi construction magnate of Yemeni origin, gained prominence during the
Afghan war against the Soviet Union. In 1989, after the Afghan war ended, he returned
to Saudi Arabia to work in his family’s business, the Bin Ladin Construction group,
although his radical Islamic contacts caused him to run afoul of Saudi authorities.

  In 1991, bin Ladin relocated to Sudan with the approval of Sudan’s National Islamic
Front (NIF) leader Hasan al-Turabi. There, in concert with NIF leaders, he built a network
of businesses, including an Islamic bank, an import-export firm, and firms that exported
agricultural products. An engineer by training, bin Ladin also used his family connections
in the construction business to help Sudan build roads and airport facilities. The businesses
in Sudan, some of which apparently are still operating, enabled him to offer safehaven and
employment in Sudan to al-Qaida members, promoting their involvement in radical Islamic
movements in their countries of origin (especially Egypt) as well as anti-U.S. terrorism.
He reportedly has some business interests in Yemen as well and is believed to have
investments in European and Asian firms. Bin Ladin has said publicly that, while he was
in Sudan, there were a few assassination attempts against him.

  In the early 1990s, he founded a London-based group, the Advisory and Reform
Committee, that distributed literature against the Saudi regime. As a result of bin Ladin’s
opposition to the ruling Al Saud family, Saudi Arabia revoked his citizenship in 1994 and
his family disavowed him, although some of his brothers reportedly have maintained
contact with him. He has no formal role in the operations of the Bin Ladin Construction
group, which continues to receive contracts from the Saudi government and from other
Arab countries. In May 1996, following strong U.S. and Egyptian pressure, Sudan
expelled him, and he returned to Afghanistan, under protection of the dominant Taliban
movement. On June 7, 1999, bin Ladin was placed on the FBI’s “Ten Most Wanted List,”
and a $5 million reward is offered for his capture.

     Bin Ladin is estimated to have about $300 million in personal financial assets with
which he funds his network of as many as 3,000 Islamic militants. Al-Qaida cells have
been identified or suspected in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Saudi Arabia, Qatar,
Yemen, Jordan, Egypt, Libya, Lebanon, Algeria, Tunisia, Mauritania, Sudan, Azerbaijan,
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Chechnya, , Somalia, Eritrea, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Ethiopia,
other parts of Africa, Malaysia, the Philippines, Uruguay, Ecuador, Bosnia, Kosovo,
Albania, the United Kingdom, Canada, and allegedly inside the United States itself.

Sources: State Department Factsheet: Usama bin Ladin: Islamic Extremist Financier. August
1996; ABC News Nightline, June 10, 1998; Defense Department factsheet, August 20, 1998;
conversations with U.S. counter-terrorism officials.

The Armed Islamic Group(GIA)
      The Armed Islamic Group (GIA, after its initials in French) is experiencing
pressure in Algeria similar to that faced by Egyptian Islamist groups in Egypt.
According to Patterns 2000, a GIA splinter group, the Salafi Group for Call and
Combat, is now the more active armed group inside Algeria, although it is considered
somewhat less violent in its tactics than is the GIA. Led by Antar Zouabri, the GIA
is highly fragmented,19 in part because it does not have an authoritative religious
figure who can hold its various factions together and arbitrate disputes. Some GIA
members in exile appear to have gravitated to bin Ladin’s network, according to
information coming out of the thwarted December 1999 plot to detonate a bomb in
the United States.20 As noted above, it now appears that the target of the plot was
Los Angeles international airport.

      Founded by Algerian Islamists who fought in Afghanistan, the GIA formed as
a breakaway faction of the then legal Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) political party in
1992, after the regime canceled the second round of parliamentary elections on fears
of an FIS victory. According to Patterns 2000, the GIA has killed over 100
expatriates in Algeria (mostly Europeans) since 1992, but, in a possible indication of
regime counterterrorism success, no foreigners have been killed in Algeria since 1997.
Over the past six years, the GIA has conducted a campaign of civilian massacres,
sometimes wiping out entire villages in their areas of operations, in an effort to
intimidate rival groups and to demonstrate that the government lacks control over the
country. The GIA conducted its most lethal terrorist attack on December 31, 1997,
when it killed 400 Algerian civilians in a town 150 miles southwest of Algiers,
according to Patterns 1997. It should be noted that there are allegations that elements
of the regime’s security forces and other opposition groups have also conducted
civilian massacres. Among its acts outside Algeria, the GIA hijacked an Air France
flight to Algiers in December 1994, and the group is suspected of bombing the Paris
subway system on December 3, 1996, killing four. Patterns 2000 repeats previous
descriptions of the GIA’s strength as probably between several hundred to several
thousand. The organization receives financial and logistical aid from Algerian
expatriates, many of whom reside in Western Europe and in Canada.

Harakat ul-Mujahidin/Islamist Groups in Pakistan
      The Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM) is a Pakistan-based Islamic militant group that
seeks to end Indian control of Muslim-inhabited parts of the divided region of
Kashmir. It is composed of militant Islamist Pakistanis and Kashmiris, as well as Arab
veterans of the Afghan war against the Soviet Union who view the Kashmir struggle
as a “jihad” (Islamic crusade). The HUM was included in the original October 1997
FTO designations when its name was Harakat al-Ansar. It subsequently changed its

 For more information, see CRS Report 98-219. Algeria: Developments and Dilemmas, by
Carol Migdalovitz, updated August 18, 1998.
 Evidence Is Seen Linking Bin Laden to Algerian Group. New York Times, January 27,
2000; Burns, John and Craig Pyes. Radical Islamic Network May Have Come to U.S. New
York Times, December 31, 1999.

name to Harakat ul-Mujahidin, possibly in an attempt to avoid the U.S. sanctions that
accompanied its designation as an FTO. Under its new name, the group was
redesignated as an FTO in October 1999. An offshoot of the HUM kidnapped and
reportedly later killed five Western tourists in Kashmir in 1995. The HUM is believed
responsible for the December 1999 hijacking of an Indian airliner because the
hijackers demanded the release of an HUM leader, Masood Azhar, in exchange for
the release of the jet and its passengers (one of whom was killed by the hijackers).

      The group appears to be allied with or part of bin Ladin’s militant Islamic
network, although its goal is the expulsion of Indian troops that occupy parts of
Kashmir – it does not appear to be part of bin Ladin’s more far-reaching struggle
against the United States. A senior leader of the HUM, Fazlur Rehman Khalil, signed
bin Ladin’s February 1998 pronouncement calling for terrorist attacks on American
troops and civilians and, according to Patterns 1999, some HUM fighters were killed
in the August 20, 1998 U.S. retaliatory strikes on bin Ladin’s training camps in
Afghanistan. Khalil stepped down in February 2000 as leader of the HUM in favor
of his second-in-command, Faruq Kashmiri. Kashmiri is not viewed as closely linked
to bin Ladin as is Khalil, and the move could suggest that the HUM wants to distance
itself from bin Ladin. Khalil remains as Secretary General of the organization.

     Other Islamist Groups in Pakistan. The HUM fights alongside other
Pakistani Islamist groups that have not been named as FTOs. They include the

   ! Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM, Army of Mohammed). This is a more radical
     splinter group of the HUM formed by Masood Azhar (see above) in February
     2000. The group is analyzed in a section of Patterns 2000 but it is not named
     as an FTO. The group, which attracted a large percentage (up to 75%) of
     HUM fighters who defected to it when it was formed, is politically aligned with
     bin Ladin, the Taliban, and the pro-Taliban Islamic Scholars Society (Jamiat-i
     Ulema-i Islam) party of Pakistan. It probably receives some funds from bin
     Ladin, according to Patterns 2000.

   ! Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (Army of the Righteous) is analyzed separately in Patterns
     2000 as “one of the three largest and best trained groups fighting in Kashmir
     against India.” Led by Professor Hafiz Mohammed Saeed and operating
     through a missionary organization known as the MDI (Center for Islamic Call
     and Guidance), its fighters are Pakistanis from religious schools throughout
     Pakistan, as well as Arab volunteers for the Kashmir “jihad.”

   ! A few other Kashmir-related groups are mentioned in press reports or in
     Patterns 2000, but they are not analyzed separately in the report or discussed
     in depth. One is the Harakat-ul Jihad Islami (Islamic Jihad Movement), many
     of whose fighters defected to the Jaish-e-Mohammed when it was formed.
     Another group, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, has called for attacks on the United States
     and declared itself an ally of bin Ladin. The Hizb-ul Mujahedin (Mujahedin
     Party) is an older, more established, and somewhat more moderate group with
     few apparent links to bin Ladin or to Arab volunteers for the Kashmir struggle.

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)
     The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) was named as an FTO on
September 25, 2000 after kidnaping four U.S. citizens who were mountain climbing
in Kyrgyzstan in August 2000. The IMU’s primary objective is to replace the secular,
authoritarian government of Uzbekistan’s President Islam Karimov with an Islamic
regime, and it is believed responsible for setting off five bombs in Tashkent,
Uzbekistan on February 16, 1999. One of the bombs exploded in a government
building just minutes before Karimov was to attend a meeting there. The government
of Uzbekistan blamed the plot on two IMU leaders, Tahir Yuldashev and Juma
Namangani, both of whom are reported to enjoy safehaven in Taliban-controlled

     Among its insurgency operations, in August 1999, Namangani led about 800
IMU guerrillas in an unsuccessful attempt to establish a base in Kyrgyzstan from
which to launch cross-border attacks into Uzbekistan. In the course of their
operations, the IMU guerrillas kidnaped four Japanese geologists and eight Kyrgyz
soldiers. In early August 2000, about 100 guerrillas presumably linked to the IMU
seized several villages just inside Uzbekistan, on the Uzbekistan-Tajikistan border.
At the same time, a related group of guerrillas battled security forces in neighboring
Kyrgyzstan. Some press reports indicate that bin Ladin contributes funds to the
IMU,22 although Patterns 2000 says only that the IMU receives “support from other
Islamic extremist movements in Central Asia.”

Abu Sayyaf Group
     The Abu Sayyaf Group, which is a designated FTO, is an Islamic separatist
organization operating in the southern Philippines. Although it is not known to
operate in the Near East region, Abu Sayyaf is discussed in this report because of its
alleged ties to Islamic extremists based in Afghanistan, possibly including bin Ladin.
The group, led by Khadafi Janjalani, raises funds for operations and recruitment by
kidnaping foreign hostages. As of late August 2001, it was holding about 20
hostages, including two American citizens, in the southern Philippines. It has also
expanded its kidnapings into Malaysia and is suspected of shipping weapons to
Muslim extremists in Indonesia.23

Islamic Army of Aden
     The Islamic Army of Aden, also called the Aden-Abyan Islamic Army, is a
Yemen-based radical Islamic organization. It has not been designated by the State
Department as an FTO and it is not analyzed separately in Patterns 2000, although it
is mentioned in that report’s discussion of terrorism in Yemen. Little is known about

     Kyrgyz Lawmaker to Extend Stay in Kabul to Push Talks. Reuters, September 29, 1999.
 Kinzer, Stephen. Islamic Militants With Japanese Hostages Hold Kyrgyz at Bay. New York
Times, October 18, 1999.
 Malaysia Probes Abu Sayyaf Link in Gun Racket - Reports. Dow Jones Newswire, August
21, 2001.

the group, but it advocates the imposition of Islamic law in Yemen and the lifting of
international sanctions against Iraq, and opposes the use of Yemeni ports and bases
by U.S. or other Western countries. Some of the group’s members are suspected of
having links to bin Ladin, and the group was one of three to claim responsibility for
the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole on October 12, 2000. However, some experts, note
that the Islamic Army of Aden is not, as a whole, closely linked to bin Ladin and is
therefore not the likely perpetrator of that attack.

      The group first achieved notoriety in December 1998, when it kidnaped sixteen
tourists, including two Americans. Three British and one Australian tourist were
killed in the course of a rescue attempt by Yemeni security forces; the rest were
saved. The group’s leader at the time, Zein al-Abidine al-Midhar (Abu Hassan),
admitted to the kidnaping and was executed by the Yemeni government in October
1999. No new leader has been publicly identified.

      Yemen’s President Ali Abdullah al-Salih has publicly vowed to eradicate
terrorism from Yemen and there is no evidence that the government, as a matter of
policy, supports radical Islamist groups or alleged bin Ladin sympathizers living in
Yemen. However, there are areas of Yemen under tenuous government control and
experts believe that the Yemeni government has, to some extent, tolerated the
presence of Islamic extremists in Yemen. Some government workers are believed to
have personal ties to individual Islamists there. Yemen has interrogated many people
and made a number of arrests in the Cole attack, but some U.S. law enforcement
officials are unsatisfied with its cooperation in that investigation. The former South
Yemen (People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, PDRY) was on the U.S. terrorism
list during 1979-1990 for supporting leftwing Arab terrorist groups, but was removed
from the list when South Yemen merged with the more conservative North Yemen
in 1990 to form the Republic of Yemen.

     Radical Jewish Groups: Kach and Kahane Chai
     Some radical Jewish groups are as opposed to the Arab-Israeli peace process as
are radical Islamic groups. The Jewish groups, which derive their support primarily
from Jewish settlers in the occupied territories, have been willing to engage in
terrorism to try to derail the process. The incidents involving these Jewish groups
have declined in recent years, although settlers possibly linked to Kach and Kahane
Chai have attacked Palestinians throughout the latest Palestinian uprising that began
in September 2000.

      Kach was founded by Rabbi Meir Kahane, who was assassinated in the United
States in 1990.24 Kahane Chai (Kahane Lives) was founded by Kahane’s son,
Binyamin, following his father’s assassination. Binyamin Kahane and his wife were
killed on December 31, 2000 by a Palestinian group calling itself the “Martyr’s of Al-
Aqsa.” The two Jewish movements seek to expel all Arabs from Israel and expand

  El Sayyid Nosair, a radical Islamist associated with Shaykh Abd al-Rahman and others
involved in the World Trade Center bombing, was convicted of weapons possession for the
attack on Kahane, but not the murder itself.

Israel’s boundaries to include the occupied territories and parts of Jordan. They also
want strict implementation of Jewish law in Israel. To try to accomplish these goals,
the two groups have organized protests against the Israeli government, and threatened
Palestinians in Hebron and elsewhere in the West Bank.

     On March 13, 1994, the Israeli Cabinet declared both to be terrorist
organizations under a 1948 Terrorism Law. The declaration came after the groups
publicly stated their support for a February 25, 1994 attack on a Hebron mosque by
a radical Jewish settler, Baruch Goldstein, who was a Kach affiliate and an immigrant
from the United States. The attack killed 29 worshipers and wounded about 150.
Patterns 2000 says that the numerical strength of Kach and Kahane Chai is unknown
and repeats previous assertions that both receive support from sympathizers in the
United States and Europe. Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was killed by Israeli
extremist Yigal Amir in November 1995, shortly after signing the Oslo II interim
agreement with the Palestinians. Neither Amir nor his two accomplices were known
to be formal members of Kach or Kahane Chai, although Amir appears to espouse
ideologies similar to those of the two groups.

    Blocked Assets. According to the Terrorist Assets Report for 2000, about
$200 belonging to Kahane Chai has been blocked since 1995.

                Leftwing and Nationalist Groups
     Some Middle Eastern terrorist groups are guided by Arab nationalism or leftwing
ideologies rather than Islamic fundamentalism. With the collapse of the Soviet Union
and the loss of much of their backing from state sponsors, the leftwing and nationalist
groups became progressively less active since the late 1980s and were largely eclipsed
by militant Islamic groups. However, some of the leftwing nationalist groups have
reactivated their terrorist and commando operations during the Palestinian uprising.

Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
      The PLO formally renounced the use of terrorism in 1988, and it reaffirmed that
commitment as part of its September 1993 mutual recognition agreement with Israel.
The PLO has not been named an FTO by the State Department and Patterns 1995
was the last Patterns report to contain a formal section analyzing the PLO. The PLO
is analyzed in this CRS report because of the debate in Congress and among observers
over whether or not the PLO, as the power behind the Palestinian Authority (PA), is
taking sufficient steps to prevent Hamas, PIJ, and others from conducting terrorist
attacks against Israelis. This debate has intensified since the Palestinian uprising
began in September 2000 – the uprising has been accompanied by a significant
increase in the frequency of Hamas and PIJ terrorist attacks.

     Patterns 2000 generally credits the PA with working with Israel to disrupt
Hamas and PIJ attacks against Israel in the first half of 2000, but the report notes
Israel’s dissatisfaction with PA anti-terrorism cooperation after the uprising began.
Patterns 2000, and an Administration report to Congress on PLO compliance with its
commitments (covering June - December 2000) cite Israeli allegations that factions

of the PLO encouraged or participated in violence against Israel. The factions
mentioned include the Fatah movement, a wing of Fatah called the “Tanzim”
(Organization) and a PLO security apparatus called Force 17. The PLO compliance
report added that Israeli officials are divided on the degree to which senior PLO and
PA officials were willing or able to halt violence by these factions. Neither report
clearly states whether or not the U.S. government concurs with the Israeli allegations,
although U.S. officials acknowledge that the inclusion of the Israeli views in these
reports suggests a degree of U.S. concurrence. On the basis of these allegations,
some Members of Congress maintain that some or all of Fatah, the Tanzim, and
Force 17 should be designated as FTO’s.

     Although some Israelis no longer view Arafat as a partner for peace, others note
than many Palestinians have looked to Arafat and the PLO for leadership for more
than three decades and that there is no viable alternative to him. Yasir Arafat, who
was born August 1, 1929, used the backing of his Fatah guerrilla organization to
become chairman of the PLO in 1969. After the PLO and other Palestinian guerrillas
were forced out of Jordan in 1970 and 1971, cross border attacks on Israel became
more difficult, and some constituent groups under the PLO umbrella resorted to
international terrorism. In the wake of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, international efforts
to promote Arab-Israeli peace caused Arafat to limit terrorist attacks largely to targets
within Israel, Lebanon, and the occupied territories.

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine — General
Command (PFLP-GC)
      Ahmad Jibril, a former captain in the Syrian army, formed the PFLP-GC in
October 1968 as a breakaway faction of the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (PFLP, see below), which he considered too willing to compromise with
Israel. He also believed that a conventional military arm was needed to complement
terrorist operations, and the group operates a small tank force at its bases in Lebanon,
according to observers. During Israel’s occupation of a strip of southern Lebanon,
which ended in May 2000, Jibril’s several hundred guerrillas fought against Israeli
forces alongside Hizballah. Recent Patterns reports have not attributed any significant
terrorist attacks to the PFLP-GC in the past few years. In May 2001, Jibril claimed
responsibility for shipping a boatload of weapons to the Palestinians in the occupied
territories, although the shipment was intercepted by Israel’s navy.

     Probably because of Jibril’s service in the Syrian military, Syria has always been
the chief backer of the PFLP-GC, giving it logistical and military support. In the late
1980s, the PFLP-GC also built a close relationship with Iran, and it receives Iranian
financial assistance. There have been persistent reports that Iran approached the
PFLP-GC to bomb a U.S. passenger jet in retaliation for the July 3, 1988 U.S. Navy’s
downing of an Iranian passenger airplane (Iran Air flight 655). The PFLP-GC
allegedly pursued such an operation and abandoned it or, according to other
speculation, handed off the operation to Libya in what became a successful effort to
bomb Pan Am flight 103 in December 1988.25 Patterns 2000 drops assertions in

  Closing In on the Pan Am Bombers. U.S. News and World Report, May 22, 1989. p.23.

previous Patterns reports that Libya, formerly a major financier of the group, retains
ties to the PFLP-GC.

     SDTs. Jibril, who is about 63, and his deputy, Talal Muhammad Naji (about
70), have been named as SDTs.

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
     The PFLP’s opposition to Arafat and to eventual peace with Israel appears to
be weakening. The PFLP opposed the Palestinians’ decision to join the Madrid peace
process and suspended its participation in the PLO after the September 1993 Israel-
PLO Declaration of Principles. In August 1999, in apparent recognition of Arafat’s
growing control over Palestinian territory, the PFLP held reconciliation talks with
him. Arafat reportedly invited the PFLP to send a delegate to the U.S.-brokered
summit talks with Israel at Camp David in July 2000, but the PFLP refused. Its
terrorist wing had been almost completely inactive in the four years prior to the latest
Palestinian uprising, but since then has conducted five car bombings and a few other
attacks on Israelis, according to Israeli officials. Patterns 2000 repeats previous
estimates of the PFLP’s strength as about 800, and says that the group receives
logistical assistance and safehaven from Syria. The PFLP is headquartered in
Damascus and it reportedly has training facilities in Syrian-controlled areas of

     The PFLP was founded in December 1967, following the Arab defeat in the Six
Day War with Israel in June of that year, by Marxist-Leninist ideologue and medical
doctor George Habash, a Christian. The PFLP was active in international terrorism
during the late 1960s and the 1970s; on September 6, 1970, PFLP guerrillas
simultaneously hijacked three airliners and, after evacuating the passengers, blew up
the aircraft.

     SDTs. George Habash is the only PFLP leader named as an SDT. Habash, who
is about 75 years old, suffered a stroke in 1992 and was replaced as PFLP Secretary-
General in July 2000 by his longtime deputy Abu Ali Mustafa, also known as Mustafa
al-Zubari. In October 1999, in the wake of the PFLP’s reconciliation talks with
Arafat, Israel allowed Mustafa to return to Palestinian-controlled territory from exile.
Mustafa, who was about 63, was killed on August 27, 2001 by an Israeli missile strike
on his West Bank office. After the Israeli attack, the United States reiterated its
opposition to Israel’s policy of targeted killings as an excessive use of force and
unhelpful to efforts to quiet the ongoing violence.

Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)26
       The DFLP, still led by its 67-year-old founder Nayif Hawatmeh, abandoned its
call for the destruction of Israel in the 1980s. However, it sought stringent conditions
for Palestinian participation in the October 1991 Madrid peace conference and
opposed the September 1993 Israel-PLO mutual recognition accords. Although it still

  The DFLP has splintered into factions, but the one headed by Nayif Hawatmeh dominates
the organization and is the one discussed in this paper.

opposes the interim agreements reached between Israel and the Palestinians since
1993, the DFLP began reconciling with Arafat in August 1999 and stated that it might
recognize Israel if there were a permanent Israeli-Palestinian peace. In response to
the DFLP’s apparent moderation, the State Department removed the group from the
list of FTOs when that list was revised in October 1999. Also that month, Israel
permitted Hawatmeh to relocate to the Palestinian-controlled areas, although he
apparently has not moved there permanently. Patterns 1999 is the first Patterns report
to exclude the group from its analysis of terrorist organizations. In July 2000, the
DFLP was part of the Palestinian delegation to the U.S.-brokered Israeli-Palestinian
final status summit negotiations at Camp David. However, since the Palestinian
uprising began in September 2000, the group has claimed responsibility for a few
attacks on Israeli military patrols and settlers in the occupied territories, and has
openly encouraged the Palestinian uprising. Two commandos from the group
attacked a heavily fortified Israeli military position in the Gaza Strip on August 25,
2001, and killed three Israeli soldiers; the two guerrillas were killed in the exchange
of fire.

      The DFLP formed in 1969 as an offshoot of the PFLP. The DFLP’s most noted
terrorist attack was the May 1974 takeover of a school in Maalot, in northern Israel,
in which 27 schoolchildren were killed and 134 people wounded. It thereafter
confined itself largely to small-scale border raids into Israel and infrequent attacks on
Israeli soldiers, officials, and civilians in Israel and the occupied territories. Recent
Patterns reports estimate the total strength (for all major factions) of the DFLP is
about 500. The DFLP may still receive some financial assistance from Syria, where
it has its headquarters.

Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)
      The PLF, founded in 1976 as a splinter faction of the PFLP-GC, has greatly
declined as a terrorist threat. The group’s last major attack was a failed raid on the
Israeli resort town of Eilat in May 1992. The leader of the most prominent PLF
faction, Abu Abbas (real name, Muhammad Zaydun), has always enjoyed close
personal ties to Arafat. Abbas at first opposed Arafat’s decision to seek peace with
Israel, but, since the mid-1990s, he has accommodated to that decision. In April
1996, Abu Abbas voted to amend the PLO Charter to eliminate clauses calling for
Israel’s destruction. In April 1998, Israel allowed Abu Abbas to relocate to the Gaza
Strip from Iraq, where he had settled after his expulsion from Damascus in 1985.

     During its period of terrorist activity, the PLF conducted several high-profile
attacks. Its most well-known operation was the October 1985 hijacking of the Italian
cruise ship Achille Lauro, in which the group murdered disabled U.S. citizen Leon
Klinghoffer and held the other passengers hostage for two days. Abu Abbas and his
team surrendered to Egyptian forces in exchange for a promise of safe passage. They
were apprehended at a NATO airbase in Italy after U.S. aircraft forced down the
Egyptian airliner flying them to safehaven. Abu Abbas, who was not on board the
Achille Lauro during the hijacking, was released by the Italian government but later
sentenced in absentia. A warrant for his arrest is outstanding in Italy but the Justice
Department dropped a U.S. warrant in 1996 for lack of evidence. The four other

hijackers were convicted and sentenced in Italy.27 (On April 30, 1996, the Senate
voted 99-0 on a resolution (S.Res. 253) seeking Abu Abbas’ detention and
extradition to the United States.) On May 30, 1990, the PLF unsuccessfully
attempted a seaborne landing, from Libya, on a Tel Aviv beach. Arafat refused to
condemn the raid and, as a consequence, the United States broke off its dialogue with
the PLO, which had begun in 1988. The dialogue resumed in September 1993,
following the mutual Israeli-PLO recognition agreement.

    SDTs. Abu Abbas, who was born in 1948, has been named an SDT. He
underwent guerrilla training in the Soviet Union.28

Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)
     The international terrorist threat posed by the Abu Nidal Organization has
receded because of Abu Nidal’s reported health problems (leukemia and a heart
condition), internal splits, friction with state sponsors, and clashes with Arafat
loyalists. It still has a few hundred members and a presence in Palestinian refugee
camps in Lebanon, but it has not attacked Western targets since the late 1980s.
During the 1970s and 1980s, the ANO carried out over 90 terrorist attacks in 20
countries, killing about 300 people. One of its most well-known operations was a
December 27, 1985 attack at airports in Rome and Vienna, in which 18 died and 111
were injured. One month earlier, ANO members hijacked Egypt Air 648, resulting
in the deaths of 60 people. On September 6, 1986, ANO gunmen killed 22 at a
synagogue (Neve Shalom) in Istanbul. The group is suspected of assassinating top
Arafat aides in Tunis in 1991 and a Jordanian diplomat in Lebanon in January 1994.

      Also known as the Fatah Revolutionary Council, the ANO was created in 1974
when Abu Nidal (real name, Sabri al-Banna), then Arafat’s representative in Iraq,
broke with the PLO over Arafat’s willingness to compromise with Israel. U.S.
engagement with Iraq in the early stages of the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war contributed to
Iraq’s expulsion of Abu Nidal to Syria in November 1983, but Syria expelled the
group four years later to reduce scrutiny on the country as a sponsor of terrorism.
Abu Nidal left his next home, Libya, in April 1998, after a schism between pro and
anti-Arafat members of Abu Nidal’s group. He relocated to Cairo, where he stayed
until December 1998, when more infighting caused his presence in Egypt to become
public, and therefore a foreign policy problem for Egypt. He has been in Iraq since,
but there is no hard evidence that Abu Nidal is reviving his international terrorist
network on his own or on Baghdad’s behalf. 29

      SDTs. Abu Nidal, who was born in 1937 in Jaffa (part of what is now Israel),
is the only ANO member named an SDT. He faces no legal charges in the United
States, according to an ABC News report of August 25, 1998, but he is wanted in
Britain and Italy. His aide, Nimer Halima, was arrested in Austria in January 2000.

  Of the four, one is still in jail, two were paroled in 1991, and one, Yusuf al-Mulqi, escaped
in 1996 while on prison leave.
  Holmes, Paul. Achille Lauro Mastermind Looks Back at 50. Reuters, June 24, 1998.

               Other Non-Islamist Organizations
     Three groups designated as FTOs primarily are attempting to influence the
domestic political structures or the foreign policies of their countries of origin. Two
of them operate against the government of Turkey and the other against the
government of Iran.

Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)30
      The PKK appears to be in transition from a guerrilla and terrorist organization
to a political movement. It was founded in 1974 by political science student Abdullah
Ocalan, with the goal of establishing a Marxist Kurdish state in southeastern Turkey,
where there is a predominantly Kurdish population. It claims to have changed its
goals somewhat to focus on greater cultural and political rights within Turkey. The
PKK generally targeted government forces and civilians in eastern Turkey, but it has
operated elsewhere in the country and attacked Turkish diplomatic and commercial
facilities in several Western European cities in 1993 and 1995. The United States
sides with Turkey in viewing the PKK as a terrorist organization, but wants to see a
peaceful resolution of the conflict, and encourages Turkey to provide greater cultural
and linguistic rights to the Kurds.

     The PKK’s transition accelerated in October 1998 when Turkish military and
diplomatic pressure forced Syria to expel PKK leader Ocalan and the PKK. Ocalan,
who is about 52, sought refuge in several countries, but Turkey captured him in
Kenya in early 1999 and tried him. On June 29, 1999, a Turkish court sentenced him
to death for treason and the murder of about 30,000 Turks since 1984, although the
implementation of the sentence has been suspended pending appeals to the European
Court of Human Rights. In August 1999, he called on his supporters to cease armed
operations against the Turkish government, a decision affirmed at a PKK congress in
January 2000. PKK violence against the Turkish government has since subsided, but
not ended, and many of the PKK’s estimated 5,000 fighters remain encamped and
active across the border in Iran and Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq.

Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C)
      The DHKP/C is becoming more active after a long period of virtual dormancy.
This Marxist organization, still commonly referred to by its former name, Dev Sol,
was formed in 1978 to oppose Turkey’s pro-Western tilt and its membership in the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Since the late 1980s, the DHKP/C
(which corresponds to its acronym in Turkish) has concentrated attacks on Turkish
military and security officials, but it has since 1990 attacked foreign interests,
according to Patterns 2000. The group assassinated two U.S. military contractors in
Turkey to protest the Gulf War against Iraq and it rocketed the U.S. consulate in
Istanbul in 1992. An attempt by the group to fire an anti-tank weapon at the

 For more information on the PKK, see CRS Report 94-267, Turkey’s Kurdish Imbroglio
and U.S. Policy, by Carol Migdalovitz,, Mar. 18, 1994. The PKK is distinct from Iranian
and Iraqi Kurdish organizations that the State Department does not consider terrorist and
which, in the case of Iraqi Kurds, benefit from U.S. support.

consulate in June 1999 was thwarted by Turkish authorities. Also foiled was a
planned attack by the group in August 2000 on Incirlik air base, which hosts U.S.
aircraft patrolling a “no fly zone” over northern Iraq. The group attacked an Istanbul
police station, killing one police officer, in January 2001.

The People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI)
      The People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI), the dominant
organization within a broader National Council of Resistance (NCR), has leftwing
roots but it is not composed of an ethnic minority. It was formed in the 1960's as an
opponent of the Shah’s authoritarian and pro-Western rule and allied with the clerics
who overthrew the Shah. In 1981, the PMOI turned against the Islamic revolutionary
regime of Ayatollah Khomeini when Iran’s clerics excluded the PMOI and other
groups from major roles in the new government, but the PMOI was defeated and its
leaders fled Iran. The group claims that it has abandoned its leftwing past and that it
is committed to free markets and democracy. However, the State Department noted
in a 1994 congressionally-mandated report that there is no record of an internal debate
over the change in ideology, and there is reason to doubt the organization’s sincerity.
The group publicly supports the Arab-Israeli peace process and the rights of Iran’s

      The State Department’s longstanding mistrust of the group is based not only on
the group’s leftist past, but on its killing of several U.S. military officers and civilians
during the struggle against the Shah, its support for the takeover of the U.S. Embassy
in Tehran in 1979, its authoritarian internal structure, and its use of Iraq as base for
its several thousand member military wing. The State Department named the PMOI
an FTO in October 1997 on the grounds that it kills civilians in the course of its anti-
regime operations inside Iran. In one of its most high-profile attacks, the group
claimed responsibility for the April 10, 1999 assassination in Tehran of a senior
Iranian military officer. However, the group does not appear to purposely target
civilians. In the October 1999 revision of the FTO list, the NCR was named as an
alias of the PMOI, meaning that FTO-related sanctions now apply to the NCR as well.
The NCR’s offices in the United States have not been closed by U.S. law enforcement
authorities, but seven of its members were arrested in California in March 2001 for
soliciting donations for the group, a violation of FTO sanctions regulations. Other
supporters of the group often operate under the names of local Iranian expatriate
organizations. Some Members of Congress have questioned the State Department’s
designation of the group as an FTO, and stated that the group merits U.S. support as
an alternative to the current regime in Tehran.

     The PMOI is led by Masud and Maryam Rajavi. Masud, the PMOI Secretary
General, leads the PMOI’s military forces based in Iraq. His wife Maryam, who is
now with him in Iraq after being asked to leave France in 1997, is the organization’s
choice to become interim president of Iran if it were to take power.

         Middle Eastern Terrorism List Countries
       Signs of success in the long-running U.S. campaign to reduce state sponsorship
of international terrorism continue to mount. In the case of several of the five Middle
Eastern countries on the terrorism list — Iraq, Iran, Syria, Sudan, and Libya31 — U.S.
and international pressure, coupled with internal developments in some of these states,
appears to have reduced their support for international terrorism. However, many
experts believe that a decision whether or not to remove a country from the terrorism
list is based on factors in addition to terrorism support alone, including congressional
sentiment and public perception of the country in question. Of the Middle Eastern
countries on the list, Sudan appears to be the closest to achieving removal; the State
Department openly acknowledges working with Sudan to help it meet the remaining
requirements for removing it from the list.

      Under Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act, removal from the list
requires 45 day advance notification to the House International Relations Committee,
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and the Senate and House Banking
Committees, that the country has ceased support for international terrorism and
pledges to continue doing so. Also under that provision, a major change of
government in the listed country can serve as grounds for immediate removal from the

      Patterns 2000, as has been the case for the past six years, again characterizes
Iran as “the most active” state sponsor of international terrorism. However, the
report, as did Patterns 1999, attributes Iran’s terrorism support to specific institutions
– the Revolutionary Guard and the Ministry of Intelligence and Security – rather
rather than the Iranian government as a whole. This characterization suggests that
the State Department believes President Mohammad Khatemi and his allies genuinely
wish to overcome Iran’s reputation as a “terrorist state” in order to further ease Iran’s
isolation. Suggesting that Khatemi is attempting maintain a position within a
leadership foreign policy consensus, that includes extremists, Patterns 2000 cites
statements by him as well as by hardline leaders calling for the destruction of Israel.
In another apparent signal to Iran, Patterns 2000, for the third year in a row, cites
PMOI attacks on Iranian officials as justification for Iran’s claim that it is a victim of

     Although no major international terrorist attacks have been linked to Iran since
Khatemi took office in August 1997, the United States has not publicly noted any
diminution of Iranian material support for terrorist groups opposed to the Arab-
Israeli peace process, such as those discussed earlier in this paper. Patterns 2000

 Along with Cuba and North Korea, these countries have been designated by the Secretary
of State, under Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App.
2405(j)) as having repeatedly provided state support for international terrorism.
 For further information, see CRS Issue Brief IB93033, Iran: Current Developments and
U.S. Policy. Updated regularly, by Kenneth Katzman.

notes that Iran has encouraged Hizballah and Palestinian terrorist groups to escalate
attacks on Israel in the context of the Palestinian uprising. Iran also has been accused
by regional governments of sponsoring assassinations of anti-Shiite Muslim clerics in
Tajikistan and Pakistan, and of supporting Shiite Muslim Islamic opposition
movements in the Persian Gulf states and Iraq. On the other hand, U.S. officials
acknowledge that Iran has improved relations with its Gulf neighbors dramatically in
recent years, and that its support for Gulf opposition movements has diminished
sharply. Iran also has largely ceased attacks on dissidents abroad that were so
prominent among Khatami’s predecessors.

      In handing down indictments of 14 people in June 2001, the Department of
Justice stated its belief that Iran was involved in the June 1996 Khobar Towers
bombing in Saudi Arabia, which killed 19 U.S. airmen. No Iranians were among
those indicted, but the indictments detail the role of Iranian security personnel in
inspiring and supervising the plot, which was carried out by members of Saudi
Hizballah. Eleven of the 14 are in custody in Saudi Arabia, and Saudi Arabia says
they will be tried there and not extradited to the United States.33 Many experts
believe that the Saudi and U.S. governments have sought to avoid firmly pressing the
Khobar case against Iran – legally or diplomatically – in order not to undermine
Khatemi (who was elected after the bombing) or reduce the chance to improved
relations with Iran.

      Patterns 2000 is more critical of Syria than was Patterns 1999, which came
close to promising that Syria will be removed from the terrorism list if it signed a
peace agreement with Israel. This could signal that U.S. hopes have receded that
President Bashar al-Assad would be more flexible on foreign policy than his father,
the late Hafez al- Assad, who Bashar succeeded in June 2000 upon his death. Far
from praising Syria for restraining terrorist groups as was the case in some past
Patterns report, Patterns 2000 says that Syria allowed Hamas to open a new office in
Damascus in March 2000. The report adds that Syria did not act to stop Hizballah
or Palestinian terrorist groups, operating in Syria or areas under Syrian control or
influence, from launching ant-Israel attacks. Syria continued to allow Iran to resupply
Hizballah through the Damascus airport, and has allowed visiting Iranian officials to
meet with anti-peace process terrorist organizations based in Syria. It also publicly
opposed suggestions that Hizballah be disarmed by U.N. peacekeepers after the militia
seized positions in southern Lebanon vacated by Israel during its May 2000

     Patterns 2000 does state that Syria is generally upholding its pledge to Turkey
not to support the PKK. Some believe that Syria’s position on the PKK is the result
of Syria’s fear of Turkey’s potential threat to use armed force against Syria, and not
a unilateral Syrian desire to sever relations with the PKK. An alternate interpretation

 MacFarquhar, Neil. Saudis Say They, Not U.S., Will Try 11 in ‘96 Bombing. New York
Times, July 2, 2001.
  For further information, see CRS Issue Brief IB92075, Syria: U.S. Relations and Bilateral
Issues. Updated regularly, by Alfred Prados.

is that Syria wants to sustain the recent improvement in its bilateral relationship with
Turkey. Also, Patterns 2000 states that Syria appears to have maintained its long-
standing ban on attacks launched from Syrian territory or against Western targets.

      Despite its position on the terrorism list, the United States maintains relatively
normal relations with Syria. The two countries exchange ambassadors and most
forms of U.S. trade with and U.S. investment in Syria are permitted. Exports of items
that can have military applications are subject to strict licensing requirements.

     The Pan Am 103 bombing issue has been at the center of U.S. policy toward
Libya for more than a decade, and will likely prevent any major rapprochement as
long as Muammar Qadhafi remains in power. The Pan Am attack, on December 21,
1988, killed 259 people aboard plus 11 on the ground, and the families of the victims
are vocal advocates of a hardline U.S. stance on Libya. Three U.N. Security Council
resolutions — 731 (January 21, 1992); 748 (March 31, 1992); and 883 (November
11, 1993) — called on Libya to turn over the two Libyan intelligence agents (Abd al-
Basit Ali al-Megrahi and Al Amin Khalifah Fhimah) suspected in the bombing, and to
help resolve the related case of the 1989 bombing of French airline UTA’s Flight 772.
The U.N. resolutions prohibited air travel to or from Libya and all arms transfers to
that country (Resolution 748); and froze Libyan assets and prohibited the sale to
Libya of petroleum-related equipment (Resolution 883). In accordance with U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1192 (August 27, 1998), the sanctions were suspended,
but not terminated, immediately upon the April 5, 1999 handover of the two to the
Netherlands. There, their trial under Scottish law began on May 3, 2000 and ended
on January 31, 2001 with the conviction of al-Megrahi and the acquittal of Fhimah.

      The handover of the Pan Am suspects, along with Libya’s growing distance
from radical Palestinian groups, reportedly prompted the Clinton Administration to
review whether to remove Libya from the terrorism list. 36 In 1998, prior to the
handover, Libya had expelled Abu Nidal, it was reducing its contacts with other
radical Palestinian organizations, and it expressed support for Yasir Arafat. In an
effort to reward Libya’s positive steps, in 1999 a U.S. official met with a Libyan
diplomat for the first time since 1981, and the U.S. trade ban was modified to permit
exports of food and medicine. In March 2000, a group of U.S. security officials
visited Libya briefly to assess whether or not to lift the U.S. restriction on the use of
U.S. passports for travel to Libya. No decision was announced.

     The January 31, 2001 conviction of al-Megrahi brought some closure to the Pan
Am case but also reinforced the perception among the Pan Am victims’ families and
others that Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi knew about, if not orchestrated, the
bombing. Immediately upon the conviction, President Bush stated that the United
States would maintains unilateral sanctions on Libya and opposes permanently lifting
U.N. sanctions until Libya: (1) accepts responsibility for the act; (2) compensates the

 For further information on Libya and its involvement in terrorism, see CRS Issue Brief
IB93109, Libya, by Clyde Mark, (updated regularly).
     Slavin, Barbara. Libya May Be Taken Off Terrorist List. USA Today, July 8, 1999.

families of the victims; (3) renounces support for terrorism; and (4) discloses all it
knows about the plot. Since the conviction, no U.S. official has suggested that Libya
would receive consideration for removal from the terrorism list in the near future.
Patterns 2000 was more critical of Libya than was Patterns 1999, stating that it is
unclear whether or not Libya’s distancing itself from its “terrorist past” signifies a true
change in policy.

      Libya has tried to appear cooperative in resolving other past acts of terrorism.
In March 1999, a French court convicted six Libyans, in absentia, for the 1989
bombing of a French airliner, UTA Flight 772, over Niger. One of them is Libyan
leader Muammar Qadhafi’s brother-in-law, intelligence agent Muhammad Sanusi.
Although it never acknowledged responsibility or turned over the indicted suspects,
in July 1999 Libya compensated the families of the 171 victims of the bombing, who
included seven U.S. citizens. In July 1999, Britain restored diplomatic relations with
Libya after it agreed to cooperate with the investigation of the 1984 fatal shooting of
a British policewoman, Yvonne Fletcher, outside Libya’s embassy in London. It is
alleged that a Libyan diplomat shot her while firing on Libyan dissidents
demonstrating outside the embassy.

      In what some construe as part of the effort to improve its international image,
Libya also has tried to mediate an end to conflicts between Eritrea and Ethiopia, and
within Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. However, some believe
Libya is trying to extend its influence in Africa rather than broker peace, and some in
Congress and the Administration assert that Libya continues to arm rebel groups in
Africa, such as the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone.37

     Sudan appears closest of any of the Near Eastern countries on the terrorism list
to being removed, despite congressional and outside criticism over its prosecution of
the war against Christian and other rebels in its south. The State Department says it
is engaged in discussions with Sudan with the objective of getting Sudan “completely
out of the terrorism business and off the terrorism list.”39 Since shortly after being
placed on the terrorism list, Sudan has signaled a willingness to assuage international
concerns about its support for terrorism. In August 1994, Sudan turned over the
terrorist Carlos (Ilyich Ramirez Sanchez) to France. In December 1999, Sudan’s
President Umar Hassan al-Bashir, a military leader, politically sidelined Sudan’s
leading Islamist figure, Hassan al-Turabi. In February 2001, Turabi was arrested, and
has remained under house arrest since May 2001. Turabi was the primary proponent
of Sudan’s ties to region-wide Islamic movements, including Al Qaida, the Abu Nidal
Organization, Hamas, PIJ, Egypt’s Islamic Group and Al Jihad, Hizballah, and

 Libya Must Fulfill All Requirements to Have Sanctions Lifted. USIS Washington File, July
22, 1999.
 For further information see CRS Issue Brief IB98043, Sudan: Humanitarian Crisis, Peace
Talks, Terrorism, and U.S. Policy. Updated regularly, by Theodros S. Dagne.
     Patterns 2000, p. 31.

Islamist rebel movements in East Africa. According to Patterns 2000, by the end of
2000 Sudan had signed all 12 international conventions on combating terrorism.

      The key outstanding terrorism issue is Sudan’s compliance with three Security
Council resolutions adopted in 1996: (1044 of January 31; 1054, of April 26; and
1070 of August 16). The resolutions demanded that Sudan extradite the three Islamic
Group suspects in the June 1995 assassination attempt against President Mubarak in
Ethiopia, restricted the number of Sudanese diplomats abroad, and authorized a
suspension of international flights by Sudanese aircraft, although the last measure was
never put into effect. According to the Washington Post of August 21, 2001, the
Bush Administration has concluded that Sudan has ended its support for the terrorists
involved in the bomb plot. Some Administration officials want the United States to
agree to a lifting of the U.N. sanctions if and when Sudan seeks such a move, possibly
as early as late September 2001. Others believe that the U.N. sanctions should remain
as a signal, in part, of U.S. displeasure with Sudan’s overall poor human rights record
and its war against southern Sudanese rebels.

     The United States has tried to promote further progress on terrorism by slowly
increasing engagement with Sudan. The United States closed its embassy in
Khartoum in February 1996, although diplomatic relations were not broken. U.S.
diplomats posted to Sudan have since worked out of the U.S. Embassy in Kenya, but
have made consular visits to the embassy in Khartoum. Several times since mid-2000,
U.S. counterterrorism experts have visited Sudan to discuss U.S. terrorism concerns
and monitor Sudan’s behavior on the issue.

      There is lingering resentment among some Sudanese against the United States
because of the August 20, 1998 cruise missile strike on the al-Shifa pharmaceutical
plant in Khartoum, conducted in conjunction with the strike on bin Ladin’s bases in
Afghanistan. The United States destroyed the plant on the grounds that it was
allegedly contributing to chemical weapons manufacture for bin Ladin. Although the
Clinton Administration asserted that the al-Shifa strike was justified, several outside
critics maintained that the plant was a genuine pharmaceutical factory with no
connection to bin Ladin or to the production of chemical weapons. The plant owner’s
$24 million in U.S.-based assets were unfrozen by the Administration in 1999, a move
widely interpreted as a tacit U.S. admission that the strike was in error.

      U.S.-Iraq differences over Iraq’s regional ambitions and its record of compliance
with post-Gulf war ceasefire requirements will probably keep Iraq on the terrorism
list as long as Saddam Husayn remains in power. Observers are virtually unanimous
in assessing Iraq’s record of compliance with its postwar obligations as poor, and its
human rights record as abysmal. However, international pressure on Iraq on these
broader issues appears to have constrained Iraq’s ability to use terrorism. Patterns
2000, as have the past few Patterns reports, notes that Iraq continues to plan and
sponsor international terrorism, although Iraq’s activities are directed mostly against

 For further information, see CRS Issue Brief IB92117, Iraqi Compliance With Ceasefire
Agreements. Updated regularly, by Kenneth Katzman.

anti-regime opposition, symbols of Iraq’s past defeats, or bodies that represent or
implement international sanctions against Iraq. In October 1998, Iraqi agents
allegedly planned to attack the Prague-based Radio Free Iraq service of Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty, although no attack occurred. Iraq organized a failed
assassination plot against former President Bush during his April 1993 visit to Kuwait,
which triggered a U.S. retaliatory missile strike on Iraqi intelligence headquarters.
Since 1991, it has sporadically attacked international relief workers in Kurdish-
controlled northern Iraq.

     Iraq, which historically has had close ties to Yasir Arafat, has given some
support to anti-peace process Palestinian groups, and hosts the Abu Nidal
Organization, Abu Abbas’ Palestine Liberation Front, and other minor groups. As a
lever in its relations with Iran, Iraq continues to host and provide some older surplus
weaponry to the PMOI’s army, the National Liberation Army (NLA), which has bases
near the border with Iran. However, Iraq apparently has reduced support for the
group as Iraq’s relations with Tehran have improved over the past two years.

     Table 2. Blocked Assets of Middle East Terrorism List States
                                          (As of End 2000)

                     Country                                    Assets in U.S.
                                                  $23.2 million, consisting of blocked
                                                  diplomatic property and related accounts.
                                                  (A reported additional $400 million in
              (added to terrorism list
                                                  assets remain in a Defense Dept. account
                January 19, 1984)
                                                  pending resolution of U.S.-Iran military
                                                  sales cases)41
                                                  $2.356 billion, primarily blocked bank
                                                  deposits. Includes $596 million blocked in
     (on list at inception, December 29, 1979.
                                                  U.S. banks’ foreign branches, and $173
       Removed March 1982, restored to list
                                                  million in Iraqi assets loaned to a U.N.
                 September 13, 1990)
                                                  escrow account.
              (on list since inception)           No blocked assets.
             (added August 12, 1993)              $33.3 million in blocked bank deposits.
                       LIBYA                      $1.073 billion, primarily blocked bank
              (on list since inception)           deposits.

Principal Source: 2000 Annual Report to Congress on Assets in the United States Belonging to
Terrorist Countries or International Terrorist Organizations. Office of Foreign Assets Control,
Department of the Treasury. January 2001.

 Pincus, Walter. Bill Would Use Frozen Assets to Compensate Terrorism Victims.
Washington Post, July 30, 2000.

              Countering Near Eastern Terrorism
      There is no universally agreed strategy for countering the terrorism threats
discussed above, partly because the challenge is so complex and the potential anti-
terrorism methods so diverse. However, a central tenet of U.S. policy is not to
capitulate to the demands of terrorists. Observers also tend to agree that the success
of almost any strategy depends on bilateral, multilateral, or international cooperation
with U.S. efforts. Not all options focus on pressuring states or groups; some believe
that engagement with state sponsors and U.S. efforts to address terrorists’ grievances
are more effective over the long term. The United States has claimed some successes
for its policy of pressuring state sponsors, but there are signs that the United States
is now incorporating a greater degree of engagement into its policy framework. At
the same time, the United States has not dropped the longstanding stated U.S. policy
of refusing to make concessions to terrorists or of pursuing terrorism cases, politically
or legally, as long as is needed to obtain a resolution.

      An exhaustive discussion of U.S. efforts to counter terrorism emanating from
the region is beyond the scope of this paper, but the following sections highlight key
themes in U.S. efforts to reduce this threat.42

Military Force
      The United States has used military force against terrorism in selected cases.
U.S. allies in Europe have sometimes been the victims of Near Eastern terrorism, but
they generally view military retaliation as a last resort, believing that it could inspire
a cycle of attack and reaction that might be difficult to control. On some occasions,
however, allies have provided logistic and diplomatic support for unilateral U.S.
retaliatory attacks. U.S. military actions against terrorists have almost always
received strong congressional support.

      Major U.S. attacks have been conducted in retaliation for terrorist acts
sponsored by Libya and Iraq, as well as those allegedly sponsored by the bin Ladin
network. On April 15, 1986, the United States sent about 100 U.S. aircraft to bomb
military installations in Libya. The attack was in retaliation for the April 2, 1986
bombing of a Berlin nightclub in which 2 U.S. military personnel were killed, and in
which Libya was implicated. On June 26, 1993, the United States fired cruise missiles
at the headquarters in Baghdad of the Iraqi Intelligence Service, which allegedly
sponsored a failed assassination plot against former President George Bush during his
April 14-16, 1993 visit to Kuwait. (Other U.S. retaliation against Iraq since 1991 has
been triggered by Iraqi violations of ceasefire terms not related to terrorism.) The
August 20, 1998 cruise missile strikes against the bin Ladin network in Afghanistan
represented a U.S. strike against a group, not a state sponsor. The related strike on
a pharmaceutical plant in Sudan could have been intended as a signal to Sudan to
sever any remaining ties to bin Ladin.

  An extended discussion of these issues is provided by CRS Issue Brief IB95112. Terrorism,
the Future, and U.S. Foreign Policy. Updated regularly, by Raphael Perl.

      The effectiveness of U.S. military action against terrorist groups or state
sponsors is difficult to judge. Libya did not immediately try to retaliate after the 1986
U.S. strike, but many believe that it did eventually strike back by orchestrating the Pan
Am 103 bombing. Since the 1993 U.S. strike, Iraq has avoided terrorist attacks
against high profile U.S. targets, but it has continued to challenge the United States
on numerous issues related to its August 1990 invasion of Kuwait. The 1998
airstrikes against bin Ladin did not prompt the Taliban leadership to extradite or expel
him from Afghanistan, nor did the strikes deter bin Ladin’s network from engaging
in further terrorist activities.

Unilateral Economic Sanctions
     The United States has been willing to apply economic sanctions unilaterally.
Under a number of different laws,43 the placement of a country on the terrorism list
triggers a wide range of U.S. economic sanctions, including:

     ! a ban on direct U.S. foreign aid, including Export-Import Bank guarantees.

     ! a ban on sales of items on the U.S. Munitions Control List.

     ! a requirement that the United States vote against lending to that country by
       international institutions.

     ! strict licensing requirements for sales to that country, which generally prohibit
       exports of items that can have military applications, such as advanced sensing,
       computation, or transportation equipment.

     A U.S. trade ban has been imposed on every Middle Eastern terrorism list state,
except Syria, under separate Executive orders. Placement on the terrorism list does
not automatically trigger a total ban on U.S. trade with or investment by the United
States. In addition, foreign aid appropriations bills since the late 1980s have barred
direct and indirect assistance to terrorism list and other selected countries, and
mandated cuts in U.S. contributions to international programs that work in those
countries. As shown in Table 2 above, the United States also tries to maintain some
leverage over terrorism list states and groups by blocking some of their assets in the
United States.

      Some sanctions are aimed at countries that help or arm terrorism list countries.
Sections 325 and 326 of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (P.L.
104-132) amended the Foreign Assistance Act by requiring the President to withhold
U.S. foreign assistance to any government that provides assistance or lethal military
aid to any terrorism list country. In April 1999, three Russian entities were sanctioned

  The list of sanctions are under the following authorities: Section 6(j) of the Export
Administration Act, as amended [P.L. 96-72; 50 U.S.C. app. 2405 (j)]; Section 40 of the
Arms Export Control Act, as amended [P.L. 90-629; 22 U.S.C. 2780]; and Section 620A of
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended [P.L. 87-195; 22 U.S.C. 2371]; and Section
1621 of the International Financial Institutions Act [22 U.S.C. 262c].

under this provision for providing anti-tank weaponry to Syria; sanctions on the
Russian government were waived.

      The 1996 Anti-Terrorism act also gave the Administration another option
besides placing a country on the terrorism list. Section 303 of that Act created a new
list of states that are deemed “not cooperating with U.S. anti-terrorism efforts,” and
provided that states on that list be barred from sales of U.S. Munitions List items.
Under that provision, and every year since 1997, Afghanistan – along with the seven
terrorism list countries – has been designated as not cooperating. No U.S. allies have
been designated as “not cooperating,” although the provision was enacted following
an April 1995 incident in which Saudi Arabia did not attempt to detain Hizballah
terrorist Imad Mughniyah when a plane, on which he was believed to be a passenger,
was scheduled to land in Saudi Arabia.44 Possibly in an attempt to avoid similar
incidents, on June 21, 1995, President Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive
39 (PDD-39), enabling U.S. law enforcement authorities to capture suspected
terrorists by force from foreign countries that refuse to cooperate in their

     The Clinton Administration rejected several outside recommendations – most
recently those issued in June 2000 by the congressionally-mandated National
Commission on Terrorism – to place Afghanistan on the terrorism list. The Clinton
Administration said that placing Afghanistan on the list would imply that the United
States recognizes the Taliban movement as the legitimate government of Afghanistan.
However, President Clinton, on July 4, 1999, issued Executive order 13129 imposing
sanctions on the Taliban that are similar to those imposed on terrorism list countries
and on foreign terrorist organizations. The order imposed a ban on U.S. trade with
areas of Afghanistan under Taliban control, froze Taliban assets in the United States,
and prohibited contributions to Taliban by U.S. persons. The President justified the
move by citing the Taliban’s continued harboring of bin Ladin.

     Also in its June 2000 report, the National Commission on Terrorism
recommended naming Greece and Pakistan as not fully cooperating with U.S. anti-
terrorism efforts. The Clinton Administration rejected those recommendations as
well. In Patterns 2000, the State Department implied that Pakistan and Lebanon were
potential candidates for the terrorism list, or possibly the “not cooperating” list, for
supporting or tolerating operations by terrorist groups.46 On the other hand, Patterns
2000 did credit both Pakistan and Lebanon with anti-terrorism cooperation in selected
cases. Most experts believe the United States does not want to alienate those
countries by placing them on the terrorism list, although designating them as “not
cooperating” might have less of an effect on U.S. relations with them.47

     Hizballah Denies Mughniyah on Board Plane. FBIS-NES-95-079. Apr. 25, 1995. p.44.
     Policy on Terror Suspects Overseas. Washington Post, February 5, 1997.
  Patterns 2000, p. 32.
   Pakistan is widely credited with helping the United States capture Ramzi Ahmad Yusuf
(February 1995), CIA shooter Mir Aimal Kansi (June 1997), and some suspects in the
Kenya/Tanzania embassy bombings.

      Analysts doubt that unilateral U.S. economic sanctions, by themselves, can force
major changes in the behavior of state sponsors of terrorism. Major U.S. allies did
not join the U.S. trade ban imposed on Iran in May 1995 and the move did not, in
itself, measurably alter Iran’s support for terrorist groups. On the other hand,
virtually all Middle Eastern terrorism list states have publicly protested their inclusion
on the list and other U.S. sanctions, suggesting that these sanctions are having an
effect politically and/or economically. U.S. officials assert that U.S. sanctions, even
if unilateral, have made some terrorism state sponsors “think twice” about promoting

      To demonstrate that improvements in behavior can be rewarded, in April 1999
the Clinton Administration announced that it would permit, on a case-by-case basis,
commercial sales of U.S. food and medical products to Libya, Sudan, and Iran. The
move relaxed the bans on U.S. trade with the three countries. As noted previously,
all three have recently shown some signs of wanting to improve their international

Multilateral Sanctions
      In concert with U.S. unilateral actions, the United States has sought to apply
multilateral sanctions against Middle Eastern terrorism. As noted above, the United
States led efforts to impose international sanctions on Libya and Sudan for their
support of terrorism, and both those states have sought to improve their international
standings since international sanctions were imposed. The United States and Russia
jointly worked successfully to persuade the United Nations Security Council to adopt
sanctions on the Taliban because of its refusal to extradite bin Ladin. U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1267, adopted October 15, 1999, banned flights outside
Afghanistan by its national airline, Ariana, and directed U.N. member states to freeze
Taliban assets. The United States and Russia teamed up again to push another
resolution (U.N. Security Council Resolution 1333, adopted December 19, 2000)
that, among other measures, imposed an international arms embargo on the Taliban
only, not on opposition factions.48 These measures are beginning to be implemented
and have not, to date, caused the Taliban to waiver in its refusal to hand over bin
Ladin. Pakistan has said it will comply with the resolutions, possibly resulting in
Pakistan’s reducing its patronage of the Taliban movement.

Counterterrorism Cooperation
     Successive administrations have identified counterterrorism cooperation with
friendly countries as a key element of U.S. policy. In one important regional example,
the United States has sought to contain Hizballah by providing military and law
enforcement assistance to the government of Lebanon. In the past few years, the
United States has sold Lebanon non-lethal defense articles such as armored personnel
carriers. In 1994, on a one-time basis, the United States provided non-lethal aid,
including excess trucks and equipment, to Palestinian Authority security forces in an
effort to strengthen them against Hamas and PIJ, although some in Israel now fear

 Miller, Judith. Russians Join U.S. To Seek New Sanctions on Taliban. New York Times,
August 4, 2000.

that the PA or PLO factions might use some of this equipment against Israel. Several
Middle Eastern countries, including Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia,
Tunisia, and Turkey, receive anti-terrorism assistance through the Anti-Terrorism
Assistance Program run by the State Department Bureau of Diplomatic Security, in
which the United States provides training in airport security, explosives detection, and
crisis management.

     In cooperating against the bin Ladin network, the United States has expanded
and formalized a counterterrorism dialogue with Russia and begun bilateral dialogues
on the issue with the Central Asian states. Every year since 1999, the State
Department has hosted a multilateral conference of senior counterterrorism officials
from the Middle East, Central Asia, and Asia, focusing on combating the terrorism
threat from Afghanistan. These conferences and meetings have often resulted in
agreements to exchange information, to conduct joint efforts to counter terrorist
fundraising, and to develop improved export controls on explosives and conventions
against nuclear terrorism.49 The United States has provided some detection
equipment to the Central Asian states to help them prevent the smuggling of nuclear
and other material to terrorist groups such as the bin Ladin network or terrorism list
countries. The measure yielded some results in April 2000, when Uzbek border
authorities used this equipment to detect and seize ten containers with radioactive
material bound for Pakistan.50 During a trip to the region a few weeks after this
incident, then Secretary of State Albright pledged $3 million each to Uzbekistan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan to help their border police combat drug smuggling and
terrorism. In June 2001, the U.S. National Academy of Sciences began a program
of cooperation with the Russian Academy of Sciences to combat the use of high
technology for terrorism.

     The United States has worked with the European Union (EU) to exert influence
on Iran to end its sponsorship of terrorism. In exchange for relaxing enforcement of
U.S. sanctions under the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (P.L. 104-172) , which would have
sanctioned EU firms that invest in Iran’s energy industry, in mid 1998 the United
States extracted a pledge from the EU to increase cooperation with the United States
against Iranian terrorism. In May 1998, the EU countries agreed on a “code of
conduct” to curb arms sales to states, such as Iran, that might use the arms to support
terrorism. However, the code is not legally binding on the EU member
governments.51 In January 2000, the United States signed a new International
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Financing, which creates an international
legal framework to investigate those involved in terrorist financing.

Selective Engagement
    As noted in the discussions of terrorism list countries, the Administration has
shown increasing willingness to engage state sponsors, once these countries have
demonstrated some willingness to curb support for terrorism. U.S. officials justify

  Patterns 1998. p. V.
  Bryen, Stephen. “The New Islamic Bomb.” Washington Times, April 10, 2000.
  “Plan Still Lets Rogue States Buy Arms.” Associated Press, May 26, 1998.

engagement with the argument that doing so creates incentives for terrorism list
countries to continue to reduce their support for international terrorism. On the other
hand, critics believe that terrorism list countries are likely to view a U.S. policy of
engagement as a sign that supporting terrorism will not adversely affect relations with
the United States.

      Of the Middle Eastern terrorism list countries, the United States engages in
bilateral dialogue with all except Iran and Iraq. The United States has called for a
dialogue with Iran, but Iran has thus far refused on the grounds that the United States
has not dismantled what Iran calls “hostile” policies toward that country – a
formulation widely interpreted to refer to U.S. sanctions. Iraq has asked for direct
talks with the United States, but the United States has rejected the suggestion on the
grounds that Iraq is too far from compliance with Gulf war-related requirements to
make official talks useful.

Legal Action
      Legal action against terrorist groups and state sponsors is becoming an
increasingly large component of U.S. counterterrorism strategy. In the case of the
bombing of Pan Am 103, the Bush Administration chose international legal action –
a trial of the two Libyan suspects – over military retaliation. A similar choice has
apparently been made in the Khobar Towers bombing case, although that legal effort
consists of U.S. indictments of suspects and not a U.N.-centered legal effort.

     Congress has attempted to give victims of international terrorism a legal option
against state sponsors. The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(Section 221) created an exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunity for Certain
Cases (28 U.S.C., Section 1605), allowing victims of terrorism to sue terrorism list
countries for acts of terrorism by them or groups they support. Since this provision
was enacted, a number of cases have been brought in U.S. courts, and several
multimillion dollar awards have been made to former hostages and the families of
victims of groups proven in court to have been sponsored by Iran. In 2000, the
Clinton Administration accepted compromise legislation to use general revenues to
pay compensatory damage awards to these successful claimants, with the stipulation
that the President try to recoup expended funds from Iran as part of an overall
reconciliation in relations and settlement of assets disputes. The provision, called the
“Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act,” was incorporated into the Victims of
Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-386). The Clinton
Administration had opposed directly tapping frozen Iranian assets in the United States
– such as selling Iran’s former embassy in Washington – on the grounds that doing so
could violate diplomatic sovereignty or provoke attacks on U.S. property or citizens

The Domestic Front
     The February 1993 World Trade Center bombing exposed the vulnerability of
the United States homeland to Middle Eastern-inspired terrorism as did no other
previous event. The bombing sparked stepped up law enforcement investigation into
the activities of Islamic networks in the United States and alleged fundraising in the

United States for Middle East terrorism. In January 1995, President Clinton targeted
terrorism fundraising in his Executive order 12947 (see above). Congress included
many of the measures in that Executive order in the Anti-Terrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996. The additional law enforcement powers and efforts in
recent years might have accounted for the foiling of the alleged plot by bin Ladin
supporters to detonate a bomb at Los Angeles airport on the eve of the millennium.

      Some observers allege that Middle Eastern groups have extensive fundraising
and political networks in the United States, working from seemingly innocent
religious and research institutions and investment companies.52 PIJ leader Shallah,
before being tapped to lead PIJ, taught at the University of South Florida in the early
1990s and ran an affiliated Islamic studies institute called the World and Islam Studies
Enterprise (WISE). In May 2000, the parents of an Israeli-American teenager killed
in a 1996 Hamas attack in Israel filed suit against several Islamic charity groups in the
United States alleging that they raised money for Hamas.53 Groups named in the suit
included the Quranic Literary Institute, the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and
Development, the Islamic Association for Palestine, and the United Association for
Studies and Research. Representatives of these groups have consistently denied any
involvement with fundraising for terrorism or involvement in Hamas/PIJ activities.54

      Others have challenged this view, saying that most American Muslims who
support such groups oppose the use of violence, and donate money to organizations
that they believe use the funds solely for humanitarian purposes. Some U.S. domestic
counterterrorism efforts, particularly those dealing with immigration and investigative
powers, have drawn substantial criticism from U.S. civil liberties groups, which have
expressed concern about excessive intrusions by law enforcement authorities. These
groups also have said that the prohibition on donations to groups allegedly involved
in terrorism infringes free speech. Some Arab-American and American Muslim
organizations have complained that U.S. residents and citizens of Arab descent are
being unfairly branded as suspected terrorists, and point to erroneous initial
accusations by some terrorism experts that Islamic extremists perpetrated the
Oklahoma City bombing in April 1995.

 Emerson, Steven. Islamic Terror: From Midwest to Mideast. Wall Street Journal, August
28, 1995.
 Miller, Judith. Suit Accuses Islamic Charities of Fund-Raising for Terrorism. New York
Times, May 13, 2000.
Sworn Complaint against Ali Abdelseoud Mohamed.
Trial testimony of FBI agent John Anticev.

Anticev questioned Mohamed Sadeek Odeh, while Odeh was held in a Kenyan jail.
Anticev took the stand to describe his interrogation of Odeh in a Kenyan jail and
recount Odeh's confession. One especially riveting part of the confession, Anticev
said, was Odeh's description of the urgent activity as the al Qaeda members were
ordered to prepare to leave Kenya and the day-to-day comings and goings Odeh
saw between August 1 and August 6 as the members took care of business and fled
                             Anticev - direct



 3   Q.   Good morning, Agent Anticev.

 4   A.   Good morning.

 5   Q.   When we broke yesterday, you described what Odeh told you

 6   about his understanding of the bayat he gave.   Did Odeh tell

 7   you when it was he made a pledge of bayat?

 8   A.   I believe it was in March of '92.

 9   Q.   Did he indicate where he did that?

10   A.   I believe in Peshawar.

11   Q.   In Peshawar, Pakistan?

12   A.   Yes.

13   Q.   Did Odeh indicate what he did after he made the pledge of

14   bayat?

15   A.   After he took the pledge to Al Qaeda, he went back to the

16   Jihad Wal camp for just a couple days to get reassigned, and

17   then from there he went back to the Farouq camp.   Because he

18   had medical training he went back there to be a medic for a

19   couple of months.

20   Q.   Do you recall approximately what months it was that he

21   would have begun serving as a medic in the Farouq camp?

22   A.   April, May '92.

23   Q.   Did he indicate what he did after he served as a medic at

24   the Farouq camp?

25   A.   After the Farouq camp, he went on to another training

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 1   camp, called the Sadeek camp, where he took a course in

 2   explosives.

 3   Q.   Did he indicate what he learned during the course in

 4   explosives?

 5   A.   He learned the more complicated aspects of explosives.    He

 6   had a trainer there, Abu Ubaidah, that taught him mathematical

 7   formulas, the type of explosives to use, how much explosives

 8   would be needed to do a certain job.    And I believe he was

 9   also at the camp with another instructor, was somebody named

10   Abdel Rahman, and another student with him was Ahmed the

11   Egyptian.

12   Q.   Did he indicate the Abu Ubaidah who was his trainer, was

13   that the same person who was Abu Ubaidah al Banshiri, or a

14   different Abu Ubaidah?

15   A.   It's a different Abu Ubaidah.

16   Q.   Did he indicate what he did after he took this course in

17   explosives at the Sadeek camp?

18   A.   Yes.   I believe the course lasted 45 days, and then after

19   that he went to get some medical treatment for problems he was

20   having.

21   Q.   Did he indicate where he went to get the medical

22   treatment?

23   A.   He did.   I forget where he went, but I think he recovered

24   in Peshawar.

25   Q.   Did he indicate what he did after he recovered from the

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 1   medical treatment?

 2   A.   After he recovered from the medical treatment he went back

 3   to the Bait al Ansar, that house of support where he

 4   originally came to when he came to Peshawar, to look for his

 5   passport that he had left there and some personal items, and

 6   that house of support was closed because the war in

 7   Afghanistan was winding down, and he had to go search for his

 8   documents so he wound up going to a different house of

 9   support.

10   Q.   Did he tell you what happened when he went to the other

11   house looking for his documents?

12   A.   Yes.   The other house, I think, was called Bait al

13   Umameen.    When he went there, he was found by one of his

14   instructors, Abu Thomama.    And then Abu Thomama told him that

15   he had to go see an important Al Qaeda leader named Adel.

16   Q.   Did he go see this person?   Did Odeh tell you that he went

17   to see this person that Abu Ubaidah told him to go see?

18   A.   Yes.

19   Q.   Do you know what Adel's full name was?

20   A.   Saif al Adel.

21   Q.   What happened when he went to see Saif al Adel?

22   A.   Saif al Adel told him that the war in Afghanistan was

23   winding down and that they were going to move the jihad to

24   other parts of the world, and he wanted him to go to Somalia

25   via Kenya.

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 1   Q.   Did Odeh indicate what he did after this conversation?

 2   Let me strike that.

 3               Did Saif al Adel tell Odeh where those instructions

 4   were coming from?

 5   A.   Yes, he told him they were coming from Usama Bin Laden.

 6   Q.   Did Odeh tell you what he did after he received those

 7   instructions?

 8   A.   Yes.    Later on he went by plane from Pakistan to Nairobi.

 9   Q.   Did he tell you approximately what month and what year it

10   was that he went from Pakistan to Nairobi?

11   A.   March of '93.

12   Q.   Did he indicate how long he stayed in Nairobi?

13   A.   He said he stayed in Nairobi for two weeks, and when he

14   got there the first night he stayed at the Ambassador Hotel,

15   and then he spent the next two weeks -- the rest of the two

16   weeks with another Al Qaeda member.

17   Q.   Do you remember the name of the Al Qaeda member that he

18   spent the two weeks with?

19   A.   It escapes me now but I believe he was from Oman.

20   Q.   What did Odeh tell you he did after those two weeks in

21   Nairobi?

22   A.   He tried -- so he was ordered to go to Somalia, so he had

23   to try to get to Somalia, but he didn't have the proper

24   documents to get to Somalia.     So he was able to find his way

25   on to a small airplane that's used in that region to

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 1   smuggle -- it's a mild narcotic that the local people chew

 2   called khat, or khat, and he was able to hitch a ride on that

 3   plane to the Kenyan/Somali border, but he remained on the

 4   Kenyan side of the border.

 5   Q.    Did Odeh tell you what happened when he got to that part

 6   of Kenya near the Somali border?

 7   A.    He was told to wait for somebody to come and pick him up

 8   there.

 9   Q.    Did he indicate whether somebody ever came and picked him

10   up?

11   A.    Yes, he was picked up and brought across the border into

12   the Somalia to the town of Belahawa.

13   Q.    Did Odeh indicate what he did in Somalia?

14   A.    His job in Somalia was to train one of the tribes that was

15   in Somalia.    It was one of 17 tribes, and they picked one

16   particular tribe at that time called the Um Rehan tribe, to

17   give training and other additional support such as food and

18   medical treatments.

19   Q.    For the Um Rehan tribe, did Odeh indicate what type of

20   training he provided to them?

21   A.    He provided them training in small arms and medical

22   treatments.

23   Q.    Did Odeh indicate why it was that that tribe, the Um Rehan

24   tribe, was picked to receive this training?

25   A.    That was picked by Bin Laden's group because it had the

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 1   closest philosophical ties to Al Qaeda.

 2   Q.   Did Odeh indicate whether the Um Rehan tribe had links to

 3   any other group?

 4   A.   Yes, it had links to another group called Ittihad

 5   Islamiya, which I think is Islamic Unity, translation.

 6   Q.   Did Odeh indicate how long he spent in that area training

 7   people with the Um Rehan tribe?

 8   A.   Approximately seven months.

 9   Q.   Did he tell you how far the area he was located in was

10   from the area of Somalia, the city in Somalia called

11   Mogadishu?

12   A.   He said it was 600 kilometers.

13   Q.   Did Odeh indicate what it was his understanding was of the

14   attitude of the tribes toward United Nations presence in

15   Somalia?

16   A.   Yes.   He said that the tribes were very upset that the UN

17   was in that area.    They felt that they were controlling the

18   area.   They were afraid that if they accepted aid from the

19   United Nations, that they would have to give up their arms in

20   exchange for this aid.

21   Q.   Did Odeh indicate what the position of Al Qaeda was

22   regarding United Nations and United States troops being in

23   Somalia?

24   A.   The position of Al Qaeda regarding unarmed civilian aid

25   workers just providing aid, that it was OK, but as far as

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 1   armed US troops being in Somalia, Al Qaeda thought that this

 2   was not good, that it was wrong, and they considered it

 3   colonization.

 4   Q.   Did Odeh indicate whether or not Al Qaeda would support

 5   attacks on civilian workers from the UN in Somalia?

 6   A.   He stated that they wouldn't support attacks on civilian

 7   workers but would support attacks on soldiers.

 8   Q.   During the time that he was in that area, did Odeh

 9   indicate whether or not he received any training himself?

10   A.   Yes.   While they were there, him and the other trainers

11   brushed up on their own skills in fighting.

12   Q.   Did Odeh discuss a person by the name of Abu Hafs?

13   A.   Yes.

14   Q.   What did Odeh tell you about Abu Hafs?

15   A.   He said while he was there an individual, Abu Hafs, who he

16   describes as a major leader in Al Qaeda, who served with Bin

17   Laden from the very beginning and has been with him since the

18   early times in Afghanistan, was coming down from Mogadishu,

19   and he had four other trainers with him.

20   Q.   Did Odeh indicate what nationality Abu Hafs was?

21   A.   Egyptian.

22   Q.   Did Odeh say whether or not he ever knew Abu Hafs or had

23   seen him before he saw him in Somalia?

24   A.   Yes, he had seen him in Afghanistan.

25   Q.   Do you recall the names of any of the trainers that Odeh

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 1   told you were with Abu Hafs in Somalia?

 2   A.   Yes.   One person was named Khalid.    He is also known as

 3   Abu Jihad and also known as Mustafa.    And the second person

 4   was a person named Shuaib, who was also known as Abu Islam and

 5   also known as Ahmed the Egyptian.    I think the third person

 6   was Irkima, and the fourth person was another person, I

 7   believe from either Oman or Morocco.

 8   Q.   Did Odeh indicate to you what his understanding was of why

 9   Abu Hafs was in Somalia, what he was doing there or where he

10   was coming from?

11   A.   Abu Hafs was sent to Somalia by Usama Bin Laden to not

12   only assist the situation but to make contact with some of the

13   tribal chiefs in Mogadishu and around Somalia also.

14   Q.   Did Odeh indicate what was going on in Mogadishu at that

15   time?

16   A.   Yes.   They were, that person Aideed's tribe, and another

17   tribe were not only fighting amongst each other, they were

18   fighting against the UN and the US troops there were there.

19   Q.   Did Odeh indicate who it was that Abu Hafs met with?

20   A.   Yes.   He met with a person named either Ahmed or Mohamed

21   Sahal.

22   Q.   Did he indicate whether or not he met anyone from Aideed's

23   tribe?

24   A.   Yes, he did.

25   Q.   Do you know if he met with Aideed or someone in his tribe?

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 1   A.   It's not exactly clear, the way it was explained.

 2   Q.   Did Odeh indicate what the outcome was of the meeting that

 3   Abu Hafs had with these people in Mogadishu?

 4   A.   Yes, Abu Hafs said that he was going to support them in

 5   their fight against US troops and he said they will support

 6   them militarily and to kick out the United States by military

 7   force.

 8   Q.   Did Odeh indicate to you how it was that Abu Hafs got to

 9   Mogadishu, how he traveled there?

10   A.   He went to Mogadishu disguised as a businessman.      I don't

11   know the motive of how he got there.

12   Q.   Did he tell you when it was that he saw Abu Hafs, what

13   month, do you recall, and what year, that he saw Abu Hafs on

14   his way back to Mogadishu?

15   A.   I believe it was November of '93.

16   Q.   Did he indicate whether or not Abu Hafs met with anybody

17   else while he was in Somalia, any other leaders?

18   A.   Sorry?

19   Q.   Whether Abu Hafs met with any other Somali leaders while

20   he was in Somalia at that time?

21   A.   I believe a person named Ali Mani.

22   Q.   What happened to the four trainers that came with Abu

23   Hafs?

24   A.   They went to the Ogden region, to work with the Ogden

25   tribe in Somalia.

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 1   Q.   Did Odeh indicate why the four trainers who were with Abu

 2   Hafs went to the Ogaden region?

 3   A.   They went there to train other Somalis.

 4   Q.   Did he indicate who it was that the Somalis being trained

 5   were led by, who their leader was?

 6   A.   Sheik Hassan.

 7   Q.   Did Odeh indicate who Sheik Hassan was?

 8   A.   He was a leader of that Somali tribe.

 9   Q.   Did Odeh indicate what he did when these four trainers

10   went to Ogden to train these Somali people?

11   A.   He also partook in the training.    He was one of the

12   trainers that went there.

13   Q.   Do you happen to recall the name of the place he said that

14   he and the four trainers went to in Somalia or the Ogden

15   region to train?     If you don't know --

16   A.   I do know it, but I just can't recall it right now.

17   Q.   Did Odeh indicate whether there came a time when he left

18   Somalia and moved to Kenya?

19   A.   Yes.

20   Q.   Do you recall approximately when that was?

21   A.   I believe it was in August of '94.

22   Q.   Did he indicate whether he left Somalia and went to Kenya

23   alone or with someone else?

24   A.   He left Somalia with that person Ahmed the Egyptian who I

25   described before as Abu Islam and Shuaib.

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 1   Q.   Did he indicate where he went in Kenya?

 2   A.   They went to the coastal city of Mombasa.

 3   Q.   Did he indicate what he did, what he and Ahmed the

 4   Egyptian or Shuaib did when they got to Mombasa?

 5   A.   They rented a house.

 6   Q.   What happened after that?

 7   A.   He talked about him and Ahmed wanted to get married and

 8   settle over there, and said that Ahmed wound up getting

 9   married two months later.

10   Q.   Did Odeh indicate whether he got married?

11   A.   He did, but after that.

12   Q.   Did he indicate how he met his wife?

13   A.   Yes.   He was introduced to his wife through his friend

14   Mustafa.

15   Q.   Is that the same Mustafa you mentioned --

16   A.   Yes, Khalid.

17   Q.   Did Odeh tell you Mustafa's last name?

18   A.   Fadhl, I believe.

19   Q.   What did Odeh tell you about Mustafa Fadhl, what

20   nationality he was and whether or not he was a member of Al

21   Qaeda?

22   A.   He was a member of Al Qaeda.   He took bayat long before

23   him.   He first met Mustafa, I think, in the Jihad Wal camp

24   back in '92 while he was getting his second phase of training.

25   Q.   Did he indicate what country Mustafa was from, what his

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 1   nationality was?

 2   A.   I think he's Egyptian.

 3   Q.   Did Odeh indicate whether Mustafa ever worked anyplace

 4   outside of Kenya, the Kenya, Tanzania area, following 1994?

 5   A.   Yes.    He worked in a business, an import export business

 6   with another person, Fahad.

 7   Q.   Where was that import expert business located?

 8   A.   He spent a lot of time in Dar es Salaam.

 9   Q.   Did Odeh ever indicate whether Mustafa Fadhl ever worked

10   in the Sudan?

11   A.   Yes, he did.

12   Q.   Did he indicate what type of work he did in the Sudan?

13   A.   He worked with Usama Bin Laden's group in Khartoum.

14   Q.   Did Odeh indicate who attended his wedding?

15   A.   Yes.

16               THE COURT:   Whose wedding?

17               MR. FITZGERALD:   I am sorry, Odeh's wedding.

18   A.   Mustafa, Ahmed, another person named Harun.

19   Q.   What did Odeh tell you about this person named Harun, who

20   he was and where he was from?

21   A.   He said that Harun was also an Al Qaeda member.      He was

22   also in the camps in Afghanistan.      He knew him from Somalia.

23   Q.   Did he indicate where he was born or grew up?

24   A.   All right.    He is Comoros Islands, from Comoros.

25   Q.   You told us a few moments ago about how Odeh described to

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 1   you seeing Abu Hafs in Somalia.   Did Odeh indicate whether or

 2   not he ever saw Abu Hafs in Kenya?

 3   A.   Yes.

 4   Q.   What did he tell you about that?

 5   A.   After arriving in Kenya, Abu Hafs came to see him later

 6   on, couple of months later in Mombasa, October or November of

 7   that year, and he told Odeh that he was going to set him up in

 8   a fishing business, and he gave him a fiberglass boat, and he

 9   said that he was going to have two employees who were also Al

10   Qaeda members, and that he could take a small salary for

11   himself just for his own expenses and living, and the other

12   two people would get salaries, and the rest of the profits

13   would remain for Al Qaeda.

14   Q.   During your interviews of Odeh, did he ever talk to you

15   about a person by the name of Saleh?

16   A.   Yes.

17   Q.   What did Odeh tell you about Saleh?

18   A.   Saleh is the leader of the Al Qaeda cell of people in

19   Kenya, and that he has a lot of contact with Usama Bin Laden

20   and the hierarchy in Afghanistan.

21   Q.   Did he indicate to you what nationality Saleh was?

22   A.   That he was Egyptian.

23   Q.   Did he indicate any other names that Saleh was known by?

24   A.   He was also known as Abu Miriam and Abdellah Ahmed

25   Abdellah, and Abu Mohamed.

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 1   Q.   Let's go through those more slowly.    Abu Miriam, did he

 2   indicate any reason why Saleh would be known as Abu Miriam?

 3   A.   Because -- that means father of.    Abu means father of

 4   somebody.   So he has a daughter, oldest daughter named Miriam.

 5   Q.   You mentioned Abdellah Ahmed Abdellah.    Do you know if

 6   that was his real name or not?

 7   A.   I believe that was his real name.

 8   Q.   You mentioned an Abu Mohamed.   Did Odeh tell you anything

 9   else about Saleh, what he did prior to becoming involved in

10   jihad?

11   A.   Saleh, he believes that Saleh, or he said that Saleh was a

12   member of another, what is considered a terrorist group called

13   Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and he also stated that Saleh was very

14   athletic, and he had also been a soccer player and actually

15   obtained some fame in Egypt as a soccer player.

16   Q.   Did Odeh tell you whether or not Saleh had ever been to

17   Somalia?

18   A.   Yes.

19   Q.   Did he indicate where in Somalia Saleh had gone to and

20   when?

21   A.   Well, he said he was in Somalia and he was in Mogadishu.

22   Q.   Did he indicate the year, the Odeh indicate to you the

23   year that Saleh was in Mogadishu?

24   A.   Yes, in '93.

25   Q.   During your interviews, did Odeh talk about a person by

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 1   the name of Abdul Rahman or Abdel al Mahajur?

 2   A.   Yes, he did.

 3   Q.   What did he tell you about him?

 4   A.   Abdul Rahman, he first met Abdul Rahman in that Sadeek

 5   camp that I mentioned before.    He was one of the trainers in

 6   explosives at the advanced explosive course in Sadeek camp.

 7   Q.   Did Odeh indicate whether or not Abdul Rahman was a member

 8   of Al Qaeda?

 9   A.   Yes.

10   Q.   Did he indicate his national origin?

11   A.   I believe he is also Egyptian.

12   Q.   Did Odeh indicate whether or not he ever saw Abdul Rahman

13   in Somalia?

14   A.   Yes.

15   Q.   What did he say about that?   Did he see him or not, in

16   Somalia?

17   A.   He told me in the interview that Abdul Rahman was in

18   Somalia.    I can't recall if he actually saw him there.

19   Q.   You mentioned a person named Ahmed the Egyptian, or

20   Shuaib, or Abu Islam.    What did Odeh tell you about his

21   background during the course of the interviews?

22   A.   He met Ahmed the Egyptian also at the Jihad Wal camp in

23   '92, and he was in Somalia with them.    He was one of those

24   four trainers that was in the company of Abu Hafs coming back,

25   you know, when they were in Somalia, and Ahmed the Egyptian

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 1   left Somalia with Odeh.

 2   Q.   Did he indicate to you whether he was a member of Al

 3   Qaeda?

 4   A.   Yes, he is.

 5   Q.   Did he indicate whether or not Ahmed the Egyptian or

 6   Shuaib ever worked in the Sudan?

 7   A.   Yes, he did.   After he got married to, I believe his

 8   wife's name was Meena, they moved back to Khartoum, Sudan.

 9   That was where Bin Laden's headquarters was at the time.      And

10   he went to work for Bin Laden over there.

11   Q.   Did Odeh indicate to you what type of work Shuaib or Ahmed

12   the Egyptian did for Bin Laden in the Sudan?

13   A.   Right, he worked in the agricultural part of Bin Laden's

14   business, buying and selling agricultural products, and he

15   also did some financial work for Bin Laden.

16   Q.   Did Odeh indicate whether or not Ahmed the Egyptian or

17   Shuaib ever returned to Kenya after working in the Sudan?

18   A.   Yes, he did.

19   Q.   Did he indicate when he returned and the town where he

20   lived?

21   A.   He didn't stay in Sudan all that long.   I don't know

22   exactly he returned, but I know he settled in a town of

23   Malindi.

24   Q.   Did Odeh talk to you during the course of the interviews

25   about a person named Fahad?

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 1   A.   Yes, he talked about Fahad.

 2   Q.   Just give us a general description of what Odeh told you

 3   about the background of Fahad?

 4   A.   He said that Fahad was a young guy who was born in Kenya.

 5   I believe, I think he might be of Yemeni descent.    I'm not

 6   quite sure.    But he described him as a young guy who was

 7   searching for jihad, who was really wanting to get involved

 8   with the jihad.

 9   Q.   Did Odeh indicate to you how it was that he met or who it

10   was that put him in contact with this person named Fahad?

11   A.   I believe he met him through Mustafa, because Mustafa was

12   in that business with him.

13   Q.   Is that the person you said before was Mustafa Fadhl?

14   A.   Yes.

15   Q.   Did he indicate whether or not Fahad ever received any

16   training?

17   A.   Yes.   He wanted training so badly that he even paid his

18   own way.    He went and took a very advanced explosive course in

19   Afghanistan that he had to pay $6,000 out of his own funds to

20   go to.

21   Q.   Did he indicate how long that class was that Fahad took

22   for $6,000?

23   A.   Yes, it was 60 days.   And Odeh also said that Fahad had

24   even more knowledge of explosives than he did.

25   Q.   Than Odeh did?

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 1   A.   Than Odeh did.

 2   Q.   Did Odeh indicate whether or not he liked spending time

 3   with Fahad?

 4   A.   The gist of what he said about Fahad is that he really

 5   didn't trust him all that much.     He thought that Fahad knew

 6   too many things about that little cell.      He complained that

 7   Fahad knew all the guys in that cell, all their nicknames, and

 8   he didn't think that was a good idea, that he would know so

 9   much about everybody.

10   Q.   Did Odeh indicate whether or not there came a time when

11   Fahad brought him any material?

12   A.   Yes.    At a time Fahad brought him a block of TNT and an

13   electrical detonator, blasting cap.

14   Q.   Do you recall if Odeh told you the year it was that Fahad

15   brought him the TNT and the detonator?

16   A.   I would like to say '97 but I am not quite sure.

17   Q.   Let me see if I can refresh your recollection.     I show the

18   witness what has been premarked as Government's Exhibit 6 in

19   the 3500 material -- why don't we move it along and come back

20   to the date later.

21               What did Odeh indicate to you the block of material

22   looked like?

23   A.   He described the block that Fahad showed him as pale

24   green.

25   Q.   What did Odeh indicate to you he thought of the TNT

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 1   because of its color?

 2   A.   He said it wasn't the best.    He said the best TNT was

 3   yellow.

 4   Q.   What did Odeh indicate to you would happen -- I am sorry.

 5              Did Odeh indicate where it was that Fahad got the TNT

 6   and the detonator?

 7   A.   He said that he got that in Tanzania, that there was lots

 8   of explosives there and readily available.

 9   Q.   What if anything did Odeh tell you about what would happen

10   to the information that Fahad could get TNT from Tanzania?

11   A.   Odeh stated that if Fahad had developed a source of

12   explosives that was easy to get, that that should be reported

13   back to the hierarchy at Al Qaeda.

14   Q.   Did he indicate whether or not Fahad ever traveled to

15   Afghanistan?

16   A.   Yes, he spent a year in Afghanistan.

17   Q.   Let me just approach you with page 19 of Government's

18   Exhibit 6.     I will ask you if reading that document refreshes

19   your recollection as to the time Odeh indicated that Fahad

20   showed him the TNT?

21   A.   On this document it says that --

22   Q.   Don't tell us what the document says.    I am asking you --

23   A.   No, two and a half years ago from '98.

24   Q.   So it would be 1996, not 1997?

25   A.   Right.

                   SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS (212) 805-0300
                               Anticev - direct

 1   Q.   During the discussion with Mr. Odeh, did he ever indicate

 2   to you whether he ever went by the American Embassy in

 3   Nairobi, ever stopped there?

 4   A.   Odeh?

 5   Q.   Yes.

 6   A.   Yes, he did.

 7   Q.   Did Odeh tell you the circumstances under which he went by

 8   the American Embassy, and, if you recall, what year that was?

 9   A.   The circumstances that he stopped at the embassy was, he

10   was trying to renew his Jordanian passport, and he was looking

11   for another embassy, and he said he wandered into the U.S.

12   Embassy, and that was probably '96, I believe.

13   Q.   Are you certain of that year?

14   A.   No, I am not certain.

15   Q.   We will come back to the year in a moment.    Did he

16   indicate whether or not he asked anyone in the embassy

17   anything when he visited?     Did he indicate how he found the

18   other embassy he was looking for?

19   A.   Yes.    He asked the people, he asked the guard at the U.S.

20   Embassy where that other embassy was.

21   Q.   During the time that you interviewed Odeh, did he talk to

22   you about a person named Abu Ubaidah al Banshiri?

23   A.   Yes.

24   Q.   Did he indicate what happened to Abu Ubaidah al Banshiri?

25   A.   Abu Ubaidah al Banshiri, he said that he drowned in a

                   SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS (212) 805-0300
                                Anticev - direct

 1   ferry boat accident.

 2   Q.   Just so we can clear up the date before we move on, I show

 3   you that same exhibit, page 12 --

 4               MR. FITZGERALD:   Your Honor, we have a stipulation

 5   with Mr. Ricco that the date Mr. Odeh said he asked directions

 6   at the embassy was 1994, just so the record is clear.

 7               THE COURT:   1994?

 8               MR. FITZGERALD:   1994.

 9   Q.   During your interview of Mr. Odeh, did he indicate what if

10   anything was done after people in Al Qaeda learned that Abu

11   Ubaidah had drowned in the ferry accident?

12   A.   Yes.    He said that they were very concerned about that,

13   and they wanted to confirm the fact that he had died, and they

14   sent an individual named Harun to go and confirm that he in

15   fact did die.

16   Q.   Did Odeh indicate whether or not while Abu Ubaidah Al

17   Banshiri was alive, whether Odeh ever saw Abu Ubaidah in

18   Kenya?

19   A.   Yes, he indicated that Abu Ubaidah came to visit him in

20   Mombasa two times.

21   Q.   During your interviews with Mr. Odeh, did he talk about a

22   person by the name of Abu Fadhl, or Abu Fadhl al Makkee?

23   A.   Yes.

24   Q.   Did he indicate who Abu Fadhl was?

25   A.   He indicated that he was also a high-ranking Al Qaeda

                   SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS (212) 805-0300
                             Anticev - direct

 1   member who they thought had been compromised that was talking

 2   to the Saudi authorities.

 3   Q.   Did Odeh indicate what it was he thought Abu Fadhl was

 4   talking to the Saudi authorities about?

 5   A.   I don't believe he said what they were talking about but

 6   it caused Al Qaeda to change its operations.

 7   Q.   Did Odeh indicate what it was that Al Qaeda wished to do

 8   in response to the fact that Abu Fadhl was talking to the

 9   Saudi authorities?

10   A.   They wanted to figure out a way to assassinate him.

11   Q.   Did Odeh talk to you at all about an entity known as the

12   Mercy International Relief Agency?

13   A.   Yes.

14   Q.   What did he tell you about the Mercy International Relief

15   Agency?

16   A.   That was also -- it was run by a guy in Nairobi named

17   Tawhili, and that organization had ties to Al Qaeda, and Harun

18   and Abu Ubaidah al Banshiri were close to that organization.

19   Q.   Did Odeh indicate to you what the word Tawhili meant?

20   A.   The tall.

21   Q.   During the course of your interviews, did Odeh talk about

22   an organization known as Help Africa People?

23   A.   Yes.

24   Q.   Did he indicate to you whether or not he received anything

25   from Help Africa People?

                 SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS (212) 805-0300
                              Anticev - direct

 1   A.   He said he received an identity card from that

 2   organization.

 3   Q.   During the course of the interviews, did Odeh describe to

 4   you whether or not Harun from the Comoros was a member of Al

 5   Qaeda?

 6   A.   Yes.

 7   Q.   Did he describe to you what Harun's appearance was, what

 8   he looked like?

 9   A.   He described him as small and thin, with shiny brown skin,

10   a small nose, and just said he looked Somali, he looks like a

11   Somali.

12   Q.   Did Odeh describe to you any particular tasks that Harun

13   performed for Al Qaeda?

14   A.   Yes.   Harun, he said that Harun was a good typist, and,

15   you know, he spent a lot of time at MIRA, the organization we

16   just talked about, and he would type reports for the hierarchy

17   in Al Qaeda.

18   Q.   And when you said MIRA, MIRA, are you referring to the

19   Mercy International Relief?

20   A.   Yes, Mercy International Relief.

21   Q.   Did Odeh indicate to you what was contained in those

22   reports that he typed for the hierarchy?

23   A.   In those reports they were using certain code words to

24   conceal what their true intentions were.

25   Q.   Did Odeh describe to you what some of the code words were

                 SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS (212) 805-0300
                               Anticev - direct

 1   and what they meant?

 2   A.   Yes, he gave me a list of about four.      For example, the

 3   word working means jihad.     Tools mean weapons.    Potatoes mean

 4   hand grenades.     Papers mean bad documents.    And the word goods

 5   mean fake documents of a particular country, and he gave me an

 6   example of how were the goods from Yemen, which would mean we

 7   need fake documents for Yemen.

 8   Q.   Did he describe what he meant by fake documents, what kind

 9   of documents?

10   A.   Travel documents, things of that nature.

11   Q.   Did Odeh indicate to you what it was that Harun would do

12   with these reports once they were typed?

13   A.   Once they were typed, Harun would fax it to Pakistan, and

14   since there was no electronic communications with the

15   leadership in Afghanistan, it would go by courier to the Al

16   Qaeda leadership.

17   Q.   Did Odeh indicate to you who, what Al Qaeda leaders were

18   receiving the reports from Harun?

19   A.   I am sorry.

20   Q.   Did he indicate who the Al Qaeda leaders were that were

21   receiving these reports from Harun?

22   A.   Yes.   It was Abu Hafs and Fadhl and a third person, I

23   can't remember.

24   Q.   Did Odeh indicate whether or not Harun had any training in

25   explosives?

                  SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS (212) 805-0300
                              Anticev - direct

 1   A.   Yes, he did.

 2   Q.   Did he indicate whether or not Harun was capable, his

 3   explosives experience made him capable of blowing up an

 4   embassy?

 5   A.   Yes.   Odeh said that if that bomb was built by them it was

 6   most likely built by Harun and Abdul Rahman.

 7   Q.   Did Odeh indicate whether or not Harun had better

 8   explosives appearance than Odeh had -- explosives training, I

 9   am sorry.    If you recall.

10   A.   I know Harun, I believe, went to the Sadeek camp too.

11   So --

12   Q.   Don't --

13   A.   I don't know.

14   Q.   During your interviews, did Odeh talk about a person by

15   the name of Abu Osama?

16   A.   Yes.

17   Q.   What did he tell you about Abu Osama?

18   A.   He described him as an Egyptian who is from America, and

19   that he went to Afghanistan to teach students in tactics of

20   avoiding capture and countering interrogation.

21   Q.   Did Odeh tell you whether or not he knew of a person

22   referred to by the name Taysir el Masry?

23   A.   Yes.   He said that Taysir el Masry was another name for

24   Abu Hafs.

25   Q.   Did Odeh talk to you about a person by the name of

                  SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS (212) 805-0300
                               Anticev - direct

 1   Azmarai?

 2   A.   Yes.   He stated that the word Azmarai in the Afghani

 3   language means lion --

 4   Q.   Like Lion King, lion.

 5   A.   -- and that he had his own cell and that he was in US

 6   custody and that he would take revenge for him being in US

 7   custody.

 8   Q.   When you say he, who are you referring to?

 9   A.   When I say he, I mean Usama Bin Laden.

10   Q.   Directing your attention to March of 1997, did Odeh

11   indicate what it was that he was doing in March of 1997?

12   A.   In March of '97, Odeh, along with Mustafa and Ahmed the

13   Egyptian, were sent back by orders of Bin Laden back to

14   Somalia to, as he says, assess the situation.

15   Q.   During the time that you interviewed Mr. Odeh, did he

16   indicate whether he was paid as a member of Al Qaeda?

17   A.   Yes.

18   Q.   Did he indicate when was the last time he received his Al

19   Qaeda payment of salary?

20   A.   He stated that the way they got paid was on a yearly

21   basis, and he was paid in -- he was paid up until after August

22   of '98.     He was paid the year before, but that covered the

23   whole year.

24   Q.   So he was paid sometime in late '97?

25   A.   Yes, late '97, and he was good till late '98.

                  SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS (212) 805-0300
                               Anticev - direct

 1   Q.   Did Odeh indicate how long he spent when he went to

 2   Somalia with Ahmed the Egyptian and Mustafa?

 3   A.   I believe he went there for approximately seven months.

 4   Q.   Did he indicate what he did after that?   Let me ask you

 5   this:   Did he ever return to Kenya from Somalia?

 6   A.   Yes, he came back.

 7   Q.   Did he indicate where he went to, what town?

 8   A.   He located to the town of Witu.

 9   Q.   Did he indicate what he was doing in Witu?

10   A.   Yes.   He had set up a furniture business with his

11   brother-in-law Omar.

12   Q.   Did he indicate whether or not -- what year was this that

13   he moved to Witu and set up the furniture business?

14   A.   I would say late '97, early '98.

15   Q.   Did Odeh indicate to you whether or not he ever saw the

16   person named Saleh in 1998?

17   A.   Yes.

18   Q.   Can you tell us as you recall what Odeh told you about the

19   occasions when he met Saleh?

20   A.   In March of '98, he went to Mombasa to do some furniture

21   business with Omar, and he met Saleh in Mombasa, and Saleh

22   told him that they were going to have a meeting that night

23   that he had to come to in the town of Malindi, and at that

24   meeting there would be the other sell people there.    It was

25   Saleh, Odeh, Ahmed the Egyptian, and Harun, and Mustafa was

                  SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS (212) 805-0300
                              Anticev - direct

 1   not there.    He was traveling in Tanzania, I believe he was in

 2   Dar, Dar es Salaam.

 3   Q.   What happened at the meeting?

 4   A.   In that meeting Saleh indicated that he had just returned

 5   from Afghanistan and that he had received word from Bin Laden

 6   that he was going to start to get the people, the Al Qaeda

 7   people out of Kenya.

 8              (Continued on next page)


















                  SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS (212) 805-0300
Trial Testimony of former bin Laden Associate Jamal Ahmed Al-Fadl. He describes
his first meeting with Osama bin Laden during Afghanistan Jihad and bin Laden's
plans after defeat of the Russians.
                               al-Fadl - direct

 1   Q.   And if we could just spell that for the record:       A-B-U,

 2   H-A-J-E-R, A-L, separate word I-R-A-Q-I.

 3               Is it fair to say that the name "al Iraqi" means the

 4   person is from Iraq?

 5   A.   From Iraq, and I met Abdallah.

 6   Q.   And Abdallah, A-B-D-A-L-L-A-H, is the person Abdallah,

 7   what country was he from?

 8   A.   Saudi Arabia.

 9   Q.   At the time did you know his real name?

10   A.   Yes.

11   Q.   What was his real name?

12   A.   Usama Muhammad al Wahad.

13   Q.   Usama, U-S-A-M-A?

14   A.   Yes.

15   Q.   Muhammad, M-U-H-A-M-M-A-D?

16   A.   Correct.

17   Q.   Al W-A-H-A-D, yes?

18   A.   Yes.

19   Q.   Bin Laden, B-I-N and L-A-D-E-N?

20   A.   Correct.

21   Q.   Can you tell us what happened, the circumstance under

22   which you met Abu Hajer al Iraqi and Usama Bin Laden at this

23   guesthouse?

24   A.   I met them during the prayer, after prayer and usually

25   they talk with new people and they tell them about jihad and

                   SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS (212) 805-0300
                                  al-Fadl - direct

 1   what's going on with that.

 2   Q.   Why don't you tell us what, as best you can recall, what

 3   Abu Hajer al Iraqi and Usama Bin Laden told you about jihad

 4   during this meeting after the prayer.

 5               MR. SCHMIDT:     Objection, your Honor, asking two --

 6               THE COURT:     Yes, identify who those people were.


 8   Q.   If you can identify what you recall that Usama Bin Laden

 9   told you about jihad after the prayer during that meeting.

10   A.   He talk about the Soviet Union army come to Afghanistan

11   and kill people and we have to help them, we have to make

12   jihad out of them and you have to be patient, you have to

13   follow the rule of the emir.

14   Q.   And do you recall anything in particular that Abu Hajer al

15   Iraqi said that day during the meeting after the prayer?

16   A.   He say similar what Bin Laden talk about, but he make

17   lecture for all new people about Jihad Fardh al Ein.

18   Q.   You mentioned a term Jihad Fardh al Ein, and why don't we

19   spell:     F-A-R-D-H, separate word A-L, separate word E-I-N.

20               And why don't you explain as best you can to the jury

21   what the concept of Jihad Fardh al Ein is.

22   A.   Jihad --

23               MR. SCHMIDT:     Objection, your Honor, as to what he

24   says it is or what he believes it is.

25               THE COURT:     What he understood it to be, this

                   SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS (212) 805-0300
                              al-Fadl - direct

 1   witness's understanding of that term.


 3   Q.   Can you explain your understanding of what Jihad Fardh al

 4   Ein is?

 5   A.   Jihad Fardh al Ein mean when the enemy come to Muslim war

 6   or Muslim country and the people live in that country, they

 7   cannot push the enemy back and they ask for other brother or

 8   other Muslim to come and join them.     That means any Muslim in

 9   the war, he should go over there and push the enemy out of the

10   country.

11   Q.   And during the time when there's a Jihad Fardh al Ein, if

12   a person is busy in personal matters with their family, with

13   school, are they allowed not to go to the Jihad Fardh al Ein?

14   A.   If it's Jihad Fardh al Ein means your family, your kids,

15   your money, your business, you have to forget everything, just

16   focus on jihad.

17   Q.   And is there a time of Jihad where it's optional if you

18   actually go to do the fighting?    Do you have a choice other

19   than jihad, something different than Jihad Fardh al Ein, where

20   a person has the option not to go and fight but instead to

21   take care of their other business?

22   A.   Yeah, we have another kind, it's called Jihad Fardh al

23   Khafiya.

24   Q.   I'll try and display that spelling on the screen.

25              If you could look at the screen in a moment and tell

                  SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS (212) 805-0300
                                  al-Fadl - direct

 1   me if the words displayed are Jihad Fardh al Khafiya?

 2   A.   Yes.

 3   Q.   During this meeting with Usama Bin Laden and Abu Hajer al

 4   Iraqi at this meeting, did you learn of Usama Bin Laden being

 5   referred to by any other name besides Abu Abdallah?

 6   A.   Yeah, he got another nickname, it's called Al Qaqa.

 7   Q.   Al Qaqa?

 8   A.   Yes.

 9   Q.   During that meeting what name were you referred to by?

10   A.   Abu Bakr Sudani.

11   Q.   During the time that you were in Afghanistan, did you meet

12   a lot of people by their Abu names?

13   A.   Yes.

14   Q.   Did you always know what their true name was?

15   A.   No.

16   Q.   Are there people to this day that you know by an Abu name

17   for whom you do not know their true name?

18               MR. SCHMIDT:     Objection, your Honor.   Objection as to

19   the form of the question.

20               THE COURT:     Overruled.


22   Q.   Are there people whom you met in Afghanistan and learned

23   their Abu name but for whom you do not know their real name?

24   A.   I don't know their real name only if I work with them

25   together.

                   SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS (212) 805-0300
                               al-Fadl - direct

 1   Q.   What did you do after this meeting at the Areen guesthouse

 2   in Afghanistan?

 3   A.   I help in that, in Areen for a few days, and after that we

 4   go to Jaji in front line.

 5   Q.   When you went to Jaji, the front line, did you help out

 6   fighting in and around the front in Afghanistan?

 7   A.   Yes, I went with Izzeldine al Saudi group.

 8   Q.   For how long did you spend with the Izzeldine al Saudi

 9   group?

10   A.   Around two weeks.

11   Q.   How much time in total do you recall spending at the front

12   at or about that time?

13   A.   Around two months.

14   Q.   After that two months in the area of the front, where did

15   you go then?

16   A.   After that, me and other brother, we went back to

17   Peshawar.

18   Q.   When you got back to Peshawar, where did you go in

19   particular?

20   A.   We went to Bait al Ansar.

21   Q.   Can you explain to the jury what Bait al Ansar?

22   A.   Bait al Ansar, for people when they came back from inside

23   the fight, they go over there and they got dressed.        If

24   someone he got hit, he go to clinic, if someone he wants to

25   check, he go to clinic.     Someone he wants to buy something

                   SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS (212) 805-0300
                               al-Fadl - direct

 1   from the market, he go before they give you another order.

 2   Q.   So is it basically a place to rest up after the front?

 3   A.   Yes.

 4   Q.   And did there come a time when you left the Bait al Ansar

 5   guesthouse?

 6   A.   Yes.

 7   Q.   And where did you go next?

 8   A.   I went to near Kabul in Afghanistan.    Some area, it's

 9   called Chakary.

10   Q.   Is Kabul a big city in Afghanistan?

11   A.   It's the capitol city.

12   Q.   And you went to an area nearby.    Can you tell us the name

13   of that place?

14   A.   Chakary.

15   Q.   Where did you go after that?    Did you ever go back to

16   another camp?

17   A.   Yes.   When we finished in Chakary our time, we went back

18   to the guesthouse in Peshawar, and after that they tell us to

19   go to the camp in Afghanistan.

20   Q.   How did you get from the camp in Peshawar, Pakistan to a

21   camp in Afghanistan?

22   A.   I went to the guesthouse Bait al Ansar, and after that we

23   went to Miram Shah City.

24   Q.   Can you tell the jury where Miram Shah City is?

25   A.   It's the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

                   SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS (212) 805-0300
                              al-Fadl - direct

 1   Q.   It's the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan?

 2   A.   Yes, it's a little town.

 3   Q.   Can you tell us how you get from Peshawar to Miram Shah

 4   and how long it takes?

 5   A.   It takes around seven hours' drive.

 6   Q.   And how long did you spend at the Miram Shah City?

 7   A.   We spend one night, and the next day we went to the camp.

 8   Q.   Can you tell us where the camp was located that you went

 9   to that day?

10   A.   It's in Khost, Khost area.

11   Q.   K-H-O-S-T?

12   A.   Yes.

13   Q.   Can you tell us where the Khost area is in relation to

14   where the first camp you went to, Khalid Ibn Walid, is; how

15   far apart?

16   A.   It's around 12 or 14 hours' drive.

17   Q.   Can you tell us the name of the camp you first went to in

18   the Khost area?

19   A.   It's called Farook camp.

20   Q.   Can you tell us what you did at the Farook camp?

21   A.   I got trained over there with other people and under

22   somebody and it's our Islamic religion and about jihad.

23   Q.   And can you tell us how long the training you received at

24   the Farook camp in Islamic religion was?

25   A.   Take two weeks.

                  SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS (212) 805-0300
                                al-Fadl - direct

 1   Q.   And at the end of that two weeks of training, where did

 2   you go?

 3   A.   We went back to Miram Shah.

 4   Q.   Then where did you go?

 5   A.   After that we got a little rest in the guesthouse in Miram

 6   Shah, and after that we went to Abu Bakr al Sadeek camp.

 7   Q.   Okay.     And we'll put that on the screen.

 8                Can you tell us in what area the Abu Bakr al Sadeek

 9   camp is located?

10   A.   It's in Khost and it's not far from the Farook camp.

11   Q.   And can you tell us what type of training you received at

12   the Abu Kakr al Sadeek camp?

13   A.   I received the first training under somebody, his name

14   Issawi abu Hassan.

15   Q.   Can you tell us the type of training you received at the

16   Abu Bakr al Sadeek camp?

17   A.   The type of training, how to run the camp and how to run

18   the training where the people train, how to run them and give

19   them order and make book for them.

20   Q.   So at a camp you were trained at how to run camps?

21   A.   Yes.

22   Q.   And can you tell us how long you spent at the Abu Bakr al

23   Sadeek camp receiving that form of training?

24   A.   For that training it take two weeks.

25   Q.   And did you go to any other camps in the Khost area to

                    SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS (212) 805-0300
                               al-Fadl - direct

 1   receive any other type of training?

 2   A.   We went to Jihad Wal camp.

 3   Q.   Can you tell us what type of training you received at the

 4   Jihad Wal camp?

 5   A.   We got training under somebody, his name Abu Feda el

 6   Masry, and that time it's how to use a small gun.

 7   Q.   Let me stop you there.    When you hear the words "el

 8   Masry," what does that tell you about the people with that

 9   name?

10   A.   He's from Egypt.

11   Q.   So Egyptian people are given the title "el Masry"?

12   A.   Yes.

13   Q.   Besides the type of training you received in small

14   weapons, what other type of training did you receive at the

15   Jihad Wal camp?

16   A.   We got general training about how to use explosive and how

17   to study them.

18   Q.   Can you tell briefly to the jury what specifically you

19   were told and taught about explosives at that camp?

20   A.   We got training under Abu Jaffar and he teach us how to

21   load the different styles of explosives.

22   Q.   You mentioned Abu Jaffar.    Can you tell us what Abu Jaffar

23   taught you?

24   A.   He teach us about what kind of explosive, like TNT and C4

25   and how to use them, how to save them and how to make trick

                   SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS (212) 805-0300
                               al-Fadl - direct

 1   with them.

 2   Q.   Can you use the interpreter to your left and give her the

 3   Arabic word you mean for "trick"?

 4              THE INTERPRETER:   To trick.

 5   Q.   Can you give us an example what you mean by a trick with

 6   explosives?

 7   A.   Trick, if you want to kill somebody, if you want to stop

 8   somebody and you want to explode him and you know his car is

 9   going to be 2:00, he going to go somewhere, you need to put

10   explosives in that road and time it and when he come, it's

11   going to explosive.

12   Q.   Did you receive any other type of training in explosives

13   when you were at the Abu Bakr al Sadeek camp?

14   A.   No.

15   Q.   Beside the training you mentioned named Abu Jaffar, was

16   there any other training you recall who were training people

17   in explosives at the Jihad Wal camp?

18   A.   They got another training for more specific about

19   explosives.

20   Q.   Can you explain what that type of training was?

21   A.   That for people, they going to use them for specific

22   operation, so they give them more details about the

23   explosives.

24   Q.   Do you know who taught that class?

25   A.   Whose run?

                   SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS (212) 805-0300
                                   al-Fadl - direct

 1   Q.     Who trained that class?

 2   A.     Abu Jaffar, Salem elal Masry, Haydar Dosari.

 3   Q.     Abu Jaffar you mentioned before.      You mentioned Salem al

 4   Masry and you mentioned Haydar Dosari.           Besides those three

 5   persons, do you remember anyone else who was teaching

 6   explosives at that camp?

 7   A.     No.

 8   Q.     Now, when you were at the Khost camps, did you ever meet a

 9   person by the name of Abu Kheir?

10   A.     Yes, Abu Kheir el Masry.

11   Q.     Is he an Egyptian person?

12   A.     Yes.

13   Q.     Can you tell us what you recall about Abu Kheir at that

14   camp?

15   A.     I got trained with him, the first training for jihad,

16   about teaching about jihad and Islamic law.

17                 MR. COHN:    I'm sorry, I missed the last word.

18                 THE COURT:    Jihad and Islamic law.


20   Q.     And during your time at the Jihad Wal camp, did you ever

21   meet or hear of a person named Abu Mohamed el Masry?

22   A.     Yes.

23   Q.     Can you tell us, tell the jury who Abu Mohamed el Masry

24   was?

25   A.     He one of the people trained in the same camp with Abu

                     SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS (212) 805-0300
                               al-Fadl - direct

 1   Jaffar and Salem el Masry and Haydor Dosari.

 2   Q.   Was he a person giving the training or receiving the

 3   training?

 4   A.   No, he give the training.

 5   Q.   And do you know what his specialty was?

 6   A.   He's very good with explosives.

 7   Q.   Now, during the time that you were in Afghanistan and

 8   Pakistan, did you learn of a person by the name of Abdallah

 9   Azzam?

10   A.   Yes.

11   Q.   Can you tell us who Abdallah Azzam is?

12   A.   During that time Abdallah Azzam, he's emir of Mektab al

13   Khidemat.

14   Q.   We'll display that on the screen.

15               Can you tell us what Mektab al Khidemat is?

16   A.   Mektab al Khidemat is office run by Dr. Abdallah Azzam and

17   Abu Abdallah, Usama Bin Laden, and it helps the new people

18   when they came to Afghanistan help the Afghani people against

19   Russia.     This office help them for training and gives them

20   some money and some support.

21   Q.   And what relationship, if any, was there between the

22   Mektab al Khidemat in Pakistan and the Farouq Mosque in

23   Brooklyn?

24   A.   The office in Farouq Mosque, it's branch of Mektab al

25   Khidemat.

                   SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS (212) 805-0300
                                  al-Fadl - direct

 1   Q.   Did there come a time that Abdallah Azzam and Usama Bin

 2   Laden remained part of the Mektab al Khidemat organization, or

 3   did that ever change?

 4   A.   Yes.    In beginning, they worked together because Abdallah

 5   Azzam, he runs office, and Bin Laden, he gives them the money

 6   for that, for running the Mektab al Khidemat.         But later on

 7   they split.

 8   Q.   I'm sorry, later on they what?

 9   A.   When he go separate.

10   Q.   Tell us again who split.       Who split?

11   A.   Abdallah Azzam and Bin Laden.        In the beginning they

12   worked, they run Khidemat service office together, but later

13   on they split.

14   Q.   Can you tell us when they split what Abdallah Azzam did

15   and what Usama Bin Laden did?

16               MR. SCHMIDT:     Objection, your Honor, foundation.

17               THE COURT:     Do you know?   First establish whether he

18   knows.

19               MR. SCHMIDT:     Foundation of his knowledge.


21   Q.   Did you have discussions in Afghanistan and Pakistan with

22   regard to what was happening with Mektab al Khidemat?

23   A.   When the Russians decide to leave Afghanistan, Bin Laden,

24   he decide to make his own group.

25               MR. SCHMIDT:     Objection, your Honor.   We don't know

                   SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS (212) 805-0300
                                  al-Fadl - direct

 1   the basis of this information.

 2               THE COURT:   Sustained.    Establish the basis of his

 3   knowledge.     Foundation.


 5   Q.   If you could focus on my question.         I'm not going to ask

 6   you what someone said.        I want to know what it is, if yes or

 7   no, you heard anything.

 8               Were you present for any conversations where Usama

 9   Bin Laden stated what he was going to do after the Russians

10   left Afghanistan?

11   A.   Yes.

12   Q.   Can you tell us what Usama Bin Laden said he was going to

13   do after the Russians left Afghanistan?

14   A.   He thinking about making group.

15   Q.   Can you explain to us anything else you recall about what

16   he wanted this group to do?

17   A.   To be ready for another step because in Afghanistan

18   everything is over.

19   Q.   And did he explain at that time what that other step was?

20   A.   They say we have to make Khalifa.

21   Q.   Can you explain to the jury what a khalifa is?

22   A.   Khalifa mean we need one Muslim leader for the whole

23   Muslim in the war.

24   Q.   Continue with what else you recall Usama Bin Laden stated

25   he wished to do after the Russians left Afghanistan.

                   SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS (212) 805-0300
Trial Testimony of former bin Laden Associate Jamal Ahmed Al-Fadl, he describes
a salary dispute within al Qaeda.

 1   A.   Yes.

 2   Q.   And why would you also get money from Sheikh Sayyid?

 3   A.   Because the al Qaeda tried to help the members for extra.

 4   Q.   Now, can you tell us more specifically what you would do

 5   when you helped Sheikh Sayyid with the payroll?     What files

 6   were you given access to?

 7   A.   Some members, they came and I just checked their file and

 8   I sign, and I give it to Sheikh Sayyid and he gives them the

 9   money.

10   Q.   Did there come a time -- let me back up.    When you were a

11   member of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, did the members of al Qaeda

12   in Afghanistan all receive the same amount of money or did the

13   salaries vary?

14   A.   No, there's a difference.    Some people, they got more.

15   Some people, they got a little.

16   Q.   And that was in Afghanistan?

17   A.   Yes.

18   Q.   When you got to the Sudan, were the salaries of al Qaeda

19   members the same for everyone or did they vary?

20   A.   No, it's different.

21   Q.   And did you ever have a conversation with anyone about the

22   different salaries for al Qaeda members in the Sudan?

23   A.   Yes, we have discussion why is difference, why not all the

24   same.

25   Q.   Did you ever have a conversation with Usama Bin Laden

                 SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS (212) 805-0300

 1   about the difference in the salaries for different members of

 2   al Qaeda?

 3   A.   Yes.

 4   Q.   And did you talk to them about one person's salary in

 5   particular?

 6   A.   Yes.

 7   Q.   Can you tell the jury about your conversation with Mr. Bin

 8   Laden?

 9   A.   What I tell him, some people complain because some people,

10   they got high salary, some people, they got a little and they

11   want to know if we all al Qaeda membership, why somebody got

12   more than others.

13   Q.   How much money were you making at the time that you had

14   this conversation?

15   A.   I made from the al Qaeda membership 300 and from Khalid

16   Ali Waleed around $200.

17   Q.   And did you know of anyone who was making more money per

18   month?

19   A.   Yes.   I know few people they make more money than me.

20   Q.   Who were they?

21   A.   Abu Hajer al Iraqi and Abu Fadhl al Makkee and Abu

22   Abdullah Lubnani and other people.

23   Q.   Why don't we stop there.     First, just focusing on the word

24   "Lubnani," does that mean the person is from a particular

25   place?

                   SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS (212) 805-0300

 1   A.   Yes, he's Lebanon.

 2   Q.   Can you tell us how much was Abu Hajer al Iraqi making at

 3   the time?

 4   A.   It's around $1500.

 5   Q.   And how much money was Abu Fadhl al Makkee making at the

 6   time?

 7   A.   I don't remember now, but I believe more than Abu Hajer.

 8   Q.   How about Abu Abdullah Lubnani?

 9   A.   $800.

10   Q.   Can you tell us what you said to Usama Bin Laden about

11   those salaries compared to yours?

12   A.   I tell him the people complain about that and myself, too,

13   I complain about that.

14                MR. SCHMIDT:   I'm sorry, I did not --

15   A.   I tell him the people complain about that, some members,

16   they complain about that, and me, too, I say why not the

17   members together that same salary.

18   Q.   Now, Abu Abdallah Lubnani, do you know his true name?

19   A.   Yes.

20   Q.   What's that?

21   A.   Wadih El Hage.

22   Q.   What did Usama Bin Laden say to you when you complained

23   about the salaries of Abu Fadhl al Makkee, Abu Hajer and Abu

24   Abdallah Lubnani?

25   A.   He say some people, they traveling a lot and they do more

                    SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS (212) 805-0300

 1   work and also they got chance to work in the country.      Some

 2   people, they got citizenship from another country and they go

 3   back over there for regular life, they can make more money

 4   than in group.     And he says that's why he try to make them

 5   happy and give them more money.

 6   Q.   Did there come a time when you trained someone else to

 7   help Sheikh Sayyid with the payroll?

 8   A.   Yes.

 9   Q.   Can you tell us when this was and who that was?

10   A.   This is now around '93 and I remember Abu Fadhl Makkee, he

11   tell me we going to move.

12   Q.   Abu Fadhl Makkee tells you he was giving a job to Abu

13   Dijana al Yemeni?

14   A.   He told me we need for you to go somewhere and we need you

15   to give the job to Abu Dijana al Yemeni and Abdallah Lubnani.

16   Q.   So what did you do?

17   A.   And I help Abu Dijana, I tell him about the count backs

18   and our stores and the stuff we buy and when we buy, when we

19   sell it we have to exchange it to dollars, and also I help

20   Abdallah Lubnani to sell ballam oil.

21   Q.   What kind of oil, ballam oil?

22               If we could have the translator interpret the word,

23   just say it in Arabic.

24               THE INTERPRETER:   Palm oil.

25   Q.   Palm oil.    Okay.   Did you train either of those two in how

                   SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS (212) 805-0300
Trial Testimony of former bin Laden Associate Jamal Ahmed Al-Fadl, he describes
bin Laden's discussions of fatwah against the United States.

 1   '91.

 2   Q.     And how did you learn what Al Qaeda's position towards the

 3   United States was?

 4   A.     Well, I was in the guesthouse and they talk after Iraq

 5   government took Kuwait.       After few months, they say American

 6   army now, they should leave the Gulf area.

 7   Q.     Let's focus specifically.    After Iraq invaded Kuwait, who

 8   did you hear speak at a lecture about the view towards the

 9   American military in Saudi Arabia?

10   A.     Different people.    I hear from Abu Abdallah, Usama Bin

11   Laden himself, and from Abu Fadhl al Makkee, Saad al Sharif,

12   and be Baugh.

13   Q.     Abu Hajer al Iraqi, did you mention him?

14   A.     Yes.

15   Q.     Was there another person?

16   A.     Farjahm.

17   Q.     Why don't we go through that more slowly.

18                 Do you recall what it is Usama Bin Laden said about

19   the United States following the Gulf War?

20   A.     Yes, in that time they make different meeting to make

21   fatwah and the shura council, and those guys, they mentioned,

22   each one, he got his opinion.

23   Q.     Did there come a time when they came to a fatwah?

24   A.     Yes.

25   Q.     And were you present when it was announced or discussed?

                     SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS (212) 805-0300

 1   A.   Yes.

 2   Q.   Can you tell us what you were told?

 3   A.   They say the fatwah, it say we cannot let the American

 4   army stay in the Gulf area and take our oil, take our money,

 5   and we have to do something to take them out.       We have to

 6   fight them.

 7   Q.   And who do you recall saying this?

 8   A.   Could you repeat?

 9   Q.   Who actually said this after the fatwah was formed that

10   you heard?

11   A.   Bin Laden by himself and Abu Hajer al Iraqi and Saad al

12   Sharif.

13   Q.   Did you ever hear any later discussion of al Qaeda's

14   position towards the United States?       Just yes or no.

15   A.   Yes.

16   Q.   And do you recall the year you heard this or the event

17   that caused you to hear this?

18   A.   Could you repeat?

19   Q.   Do you recall when you heard the next discussion of al

20   Qaeda's position regarding the United States?

21   A.   Can she help me?

22   Q.   Do you recall the year or the event that caused you to

23   next hear al Qaeda's position towards the United States?

24               THE INTERPRETER:   I didn't get the second part, next

25   hear?

                   SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS (212) 805-0300

 1   Q.   To hear.     Do you recall the next -- during an event or the

 2   year when you next heard what al Qaeda's position towards the

 3   United States was?

 4                THE INTERPRETER:    Could you repeat it?   It's not

 5   clear.

 6                MR. FITZGERALD:    I'll try again.   It's the English

 7   problem not the Arabic problem.

 8   Q.   Did you ever hear of any other fatwahs against the United

 9   States, and if so, when?

10   A.   End of '92.

11   Q.   And can you tell us how you heard about the next fatwah?

12   A.   I was in the guesthouse and in a Thursday meeting and they

13   say it's new fatwah because we proved more about the American

14   army in Gulf area.

15   Q.   Okay.     Can you tell us first who was speaking.

16   A.   Abu Hajer al Iraqi and Saad Sharif and Abu Faraj al

17   Yemeni.

18   Q.   Tell us as best you can recall what they said about

19   America at that time.

20   A.   They say they got another proof for the fatwah and they

21   say Prophet Mohamed say don't allow true religion in our

22   islands.

23   Q.   And following that discussion, did you ever hear of a

24   further fatwah against the United States by members of al

25   Qaeda?

                    SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS (212) 805-0300

 1   A.   Yes.    After that, also, we got another fatwah because they

 2   say the American army come to the home of Africa in Somalia.

 3   Q.   Can you tell us when you learned about that fatwah?

 4   A.   Area of '93 or end of '92.

 5   Q.   Can you tell us how you learned of that fatwah?

 6   A.   Also I was in the guesthouse and Abu Ubaidah al Banshiri,

 7   he talk about that.     He says the American army in home of

 8   Africa in Somalia and now they already took off Gulf area and

 9   now they go to Somalia, and if they successful in Somalia, the

10   next thing it could be south of Sudan and that's going -- they

11   going to take the Islamic countries.

12   Q.   And the person speaking, you said, was Abu Ubaidah al

13   Banshiri?

14   A.   Yes.

15   Q.   Following that discussion, did you ever hear of a further

16   fatwah or discussion of a fatwah about the United States?

17   A.   It's another fatwah, also, it say the American army, now

18   they are in the two Muslim mosques, Mecca and Medina al

19   Munawara.

20   Q.   Are those two mosques both located on the Saudi Arabia

21   peninsula?

22   A.   Yes.

23   Q.   Did you ever hear of a discussion within al Qaeda of

24   whether or not innocent people could be killed?

25   A.   I remember in, yes, I hear that.

                   SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS (212) 805-0300

 1   Q.   When did you --

 2              MR. BAUGH:   Objection, the time.


 4   Q.   When did you hear it?

 5   A.   During the Somalia fatwah.

 6   Q.   Can you tell the jury what discussion was had about

 7   whether or not innocent civilians could be killed?

 8   A.   I remember Ibn al Tamiyeh, he said --

 9   Q.   Let's stop.    Would you just briefly explain to the jury

10   who Ibn al Tamiyeh is?

11   A.   He's a scholar for Islamic history 1700 or 1800 years ago.

12   Q.   Can you tell us now what Abu Hajer al Iraqi said about Ibn

13   al Tamiyeh?

14   A.   He said that our time now is similar like in that time,

15   and he say Ibn al Tamiyeh, when a tartar come to Arabic war,

16   Arabic countries that time, he say some Muslims, they help

17   them.   And he says Ibn al Tamiyeh, he make a fatwah.      He said

18   anybody around the tartar, he buy something from them and he

19   sell them something, you should kill him.      And also, if when

20   you attack the tartar, if anybody around them, anything, or

21   he's not military or that -- if you kill him, you don't have

22   to worry about that.     If he's a good person, he go to paradise

23   and if he's a bad person, he go to hell.

24   Q.   What did Abu Hajer say about that in the context of

25   Somalia?

                   SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS (212) 805-0300

 1   A.   He say they talk over there.      If they make attack because

 2   American people is everywhere in Somalia and Mogadishu City,

 3   and he says it is no guarantee if we fight we not going to

 4   injure innocent people.

 5   Q.   Was there any further discussion at a later time about

 6   whether it was appropriate to kill, to allow innocent

 7   civilians to be killed?

 8   A.   Also, I remember they say if you -- if the people want to

 9   make explosives for building and it's military building and

10   sometimes it could be civilian around the building and you

11   don't have any choice other than that, you should do it and

12   you don't have to worry about that.

13   Q.   Who said that?

14   A.   Abu Hajer.

15   Q.   You mentioned that there was a fatwah --

16              THE COURT:   When you are at a good stopping point...

17              MR. FITZGERALD:     I think this is it, Judge.

18              THE COURT:   This is a good stopping point, all right,

19   then we will break for lunch now and we'll resume at 2:15.

20              (Luncheon recess)






                  SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS (212) 805-0300
Testimony of pilot and former bin Laden Associate Essam Al-Ridi, describing efforts
by Al Qaeda to purchase an airplane in the United States in order to fly Stinger
missiles from Pakistan to Sudan

 2   ------------------------------x


 4              v.                            S(7)98CR1023

 5   USAMA BIN LADEN, et al.,

 6                   Defendants.

 7   ------------------------------x

                                              New York, N.Y.
 9                                            February 14, 2001
                                              10:30 a.m.


12   Before:

13                        HON. LEONARD B. SAND,

14                                            District Judge












 1                            APPEARANCES

          United States Attorney for the
 3        Southern District of New York
 4        DAVID KELLEY
 5        PAUL BUTLER
          Assistant United States Attorneys

 8        Attorneys for defendant Wadih El Hage

11        Attorneys for defendant Mohamed Sadeek Odeh

          Attorneys for defendant Mohamed Rashed Daoud Al-'Owhali
16        Attorneys for defendant Khalfan Khamis Mohamed










 1            (In open court; jury not present)

 2            THE COURT:   All right.   All be seated.   I think the

 3   jury is about to come in.

 4            (Jury present)

 5            THE COURT:   Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.

 6   You've inquired as to more precise dates for vacations as we

 7   call it, and I'll respond to that question later.     The witness

 8   al Fadl has not yet been cross-examined on behalf of the

 9   defendant El Hage, and Mr. Schmidt, who is the attorney who

10   had prepared to do that, is still out with the flu.     So what

11   we will do is we will ask the government to call its next

12   witness, and we'll proceed understanding that Mr. Al Fadl will

13   return to the stand on Tuesday for cross-examination on behalf

14   of the defendant El Hage, and, then, if it wishes, redirect

15   examination by the government.

16            So I'd ask that the government call its next witness.

17            MR. FITZGERALD:    Yes, sir.   I believe that there was

18   an agreement that your Honor would read a stipulation at the

19   start of the day.

20            THE COURT:   Ladies and gentlemen, you recall I told

21   you that a stipulation was an agreement among the parties that

22   if called a certain witness would testify in a certain fashion

23   or that certain facts were true, and this is the stipulation

24   with respect to certain facts being true.     And that's evidence

25   that is before you.   Those are undisputed facts, and you may

 1   treat that as evidence.

 2            This is a stipulation agreed by and between the

 3   United States of America and the defendants by and with the

 4   consent of their attorneys as follows.

 5            1.    On December 27, 1979 the Soviet Union invaded

 6   Afghanistan, a country with a predominantly Muslim population.

 7            2.    In response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan

 8   groups of Muslims formed an armed force that became known as

 9   the Afghan Mujahadeen.    The Afghan Mujahadeen fought the

10   invading Soviet force and the Soviet-supported Afghan

11   government.

12            3.    In 1986 during its occupation of Afghanistan, the

13   Soviet Union installed Mohammed Najibullah as president of

14   Afghanistan.

15            4.    On February 15, 1989, the last Soviet troops

16   departed from Afghanistan.

17            5.    From the time of the departure of Soviet troops

18   from Afghanistan in February 1989, through the dissolution of

19   the Soviet Union in 1991, the Soviet Union provided economic

20   and military support to the Najibullah government in

21   Afghanistan.

22            6.    From shortly after the start of the Soviet

23   invasion in Afghanistan in 1979, through September 1991, the

24   United States, through one of its intelligence agencies,

25   provided economic and military support to the Afghan

 1   mujahideen through a third country intermediary.

 2              7.   Beginning in 1987 the American military support

 3   to the Afghan mujahideen included stinger antiaircraft

 4   missiles.

 5              The parties have so stipulated, and, as I said, those

 6   are facts which are not disputed and are in evidence before

 7   you.

 8              MR. FITZGERALD:   The government now calls Essam al

 9   Ridi.


11          called as a witness by the government,

12          having been duly sworn, testified as follows:

13              THE DEPUTY CLERK:   Please be seated.   Please state

14   your full name.

15              THE WITNESS:   Essam al Ridi.



18   Q.   Can you spell your first name for the record as well.

19   A.   Certainly.   E double S A M.

20   Q.   You have a loud voice, so if you could keep your loud

21   voice and just make sure you look at the microphone because

22   it's directional.

23              Sir, could you tell the jury where you were born?

24   A.   I was born in Cairo, Egypt, 1958.

25   Q.   And for how long did you live in Egypt?

 1   A.   Five years.

 2   Q.   After those five years, where did you move?

 3   A.   I moved to Kuwait and stayed there for the next 23 years.

 4   Q.   And can you tell the jury how far you went in school in

 5   Kuwait?

 6   A.   High school.

 7   Q.   And what did you do after graduating high school in

 8   Kuwait?

 9   A.   I went to Karachi Pakistan, study engineering.

10   Q.   And can you tell the jury that you moved to Karachi

11   Pakistan to study engineering?

12   A.   Yes.

13   Q.   What year was that?

14   A.   196 -- excuse me, 1976.

15   Q.   For how long did you stay in Karachi Pakistan studying?

16   A.   Approximately three to four years.

17   Q.   Did you actually complete your studies?

18   A.   No.

19   Q.   Can you tell the jury why not?

20   A.   Actually there was a civil unrest in Pakistan due to the

21   conflict between Ali Batu and martial laws of that time, so

22   they closed the universities for a month.   I could not stay

23   any longer.

24   Q.   If you could speak a bit slower to make sure, and a little

25   bit closer to the microphone.

 1               And once the school in Karachi was closed, what did

 2   you do?

 3   A.   I resolved to come to the States and finish my aviation,

 4   which was always my desires.

 5   Q.   So what did you study in Karachi Pakistan?

 6   A.   Electronic engineering.

 7   Q.   And where did you go to in the United States?

 8   A.   I went to Texas, a school by the name of Ed Boardman

 9   Aviation School.

10   Q.   And what year was that?

11   A.   1979, the end of 1979.

12   Q.   And did you complete your studies at the Boardman aviation

13   school?

14   A.   Yes.

15   Q.   When did you do that?

16   A.   1981.

17   Q.   And what did you do after graduating?

18   A.   Went back to Kuwait.

19   Q.   And for what reason?

20   A.   Find a job.

21   Q.   Did you find one?

22   A.   No.

23   Q.   So what did you do then?

24   A.   I came back to the US and worked as a flight instructor in

25   the same school.

 1   Q.   And what year was it that you returned?

 2               MR. DRATEL:    I didn't hear the last answer.

 3               MR. FITZGERALD:    Can the court reporter read the last

 4   answer back, and I'll ask the witness if you keep your voice

 5   up and sit up about 12 inches in the chair and look at the

 6   microphone it be easier.

 7   A.   Not with my knees, no.      I'll try.

 8               THE COURT:    Maybe you can bring that microphone down.

 9   Q.   Okay.    Why don't we try it, if you could try to talk at

10   the microphone and if you keep your mouth about nine inches

11   from the microphone I think it works.

12               (Record read)

13   Q.   Did there come a time when you were in Karachi Pakistan

14   studying that you met a person by the name of Sheik Abdallah

15   Azzam?   A-B-D-A-L-L-A-H, Azzam, A-Z-Z-A-M.

16   A.   Yes.

17   Q.   And can you explain to the jury how you came to meet Sheik

18   Abdallah Azzam?

19   A.   The Egyptian embassy located in Islamabad, which is the

20   political capital of Pakistan, and Sheik Abdallah used to be

21   one of the professors at the Islamic school, Islamic

22   university I should say, in Islamabad.       It was customary of

23   him to invite as guests and give us not really a lecture, just

24   a casual thing for about maybe half and hour to forty-five

25   minutes at his house.

 1   Q.   And you mentioned the Egyptian embassy.    What country were

 2   you a citizen of when were you studying in Pakistan?

 3   A.   Country of Egypt.

 4   Q.   And when you moved to the United States did there come a

 5   time when you saw Sheik Abdallah Azzam again?

 6   A.   Yes.

 7   Q.   Can you tell us when and where that was?

 8   A.   Must have been 1982 or '83 I'm not sure, but it was the

 9   MAYA convention at the time.

10   Q.   You mentioned MAYA.   Is that M-A-Y-A?

11   A.   Yes, sir.

12   Q.   And do you know what the initials MAYA stand for?

13   A.   Muslim American Youth Association.

14   Q.   What role did you play in this convention in 1982 or 1983?

15   A.   I was helping in reorganizing part of the convention since

16   I resided in Fort Worth where the convention was held, so it

17   was very normal of me knowing the city to help in the

18   organizing part of the convention.

19   Q.   And what role did Sheik Abdallah Azzam play in that

20   convention?

21   A.   He was one of the guest speakers.

22   Q.   And do you recall what Sheik Abdallah Azzam spoke about at

23   the convention?

24   A.   Yes.   He spoke about jihad in Afghanistan.

25   Q.   So we're clear, who is the jihad in Afghanistan against at

 1   that time?

 2   A.   Of course was against the Russians.

 3   Q.   And what did Sheik Abdallah Azzam say about the jihad

 4   against the Russians?

 5   A.   He indicated to Muslims attending the convention, and of

 6   course Muslims worldwide, that it is an obligation upon

 7   Muslims to help in any way they could to help the Afghan

 8   jihad.

 9   Q.   Did Sheik Abdallah Azzam indicate what type of jihad the

10   war in Afghanistan was?

11   A.   You're referring to?

12   Q.   What type of jihad?

13   A.   It's, we have fardh al ein and fardh al khafiya.     Fardh al

14   ein means if it's an obligation upon all Muslims if the

15   immediate circuit of the immediate country that have been

16   oppressed cannot really defend itself.

17   Q.   So that was the F-A-R-D-H-A-L-E-I-N, that's the obligation

18   to fight jihad, correct?

19   A.   Yes.

20   Q.   And the other one you mentioned, fardh al khafiya.

21   F-A-R-D-H-A-L-K-H-A-F-I-Y-A, what type of jihad is that?

22   A.   That's similarly the same type of jihad except --

23               MR. WILFORD:   Your Honor, I have an objection.   Is

24   this witness' own personal opinion?

25               THE COURT:   Clarify.

 1   Q.   Yes.   If you can just tell us your personal understanding

 2   what you understand jihad fardhalkafya to mean?

 3   A.   Of course.   It means that if a group of people are helping

 4   the oppressed country and they are covering enough ground and

 5   giving enough help, then it become only obligatory on this

 6   group of people, not of the rest of the Muslims.

 7   Q.   What do you recall that Sheik Abdallah Azzam said about

 8   the jihad in Afghanistan during the time of the convention in

 9   Fort Worth, Texas?

10   A.   That it's fardh al ein.

11   Q.   Following that speech that you heard by Sheik Abdallah

12   Azzam did you do anything immediately?

13   A.   No.

14   Q.   What were you doing at the time for work, and were you

15   married?

16   A.   Yes, I was married, and I had one daughter and my wife was

17   pregnant with the second child.

18   Q.   Did there come a time when you spoke to Sheik Abdallah

19   again?

20   A.   Yes.

21   Q.   When was that?

22   A.   After he left Texas, left the convention, there were quite

23   a few phone calls between us asking certain people who would

24   be interested to help in Afghanistan.

25   Q.   And did there come a time when you left the United States?

 1   A.   Yes.

 2   Q.   And when was that?

 3   A.   The early part of 1983.

 4   Q.   What year?    Sorry.   Early part you mentioned, I didn't

 5   hear it.

 6   A.   1983.

 7   Q.   '83.    Where did you go?

 8   A.   I went to Peshawar Pakistan, Islamabad specifically.

 9   Q.   Now, during, do you know a person by the name of Wadia El

10   Hage?

11   A.   Yes.

12   Q.   Can you tell us about how long you know him?

13   A.   Must have been since 1983 onwards.

14   Q.   Do you recall where it was you first met him?

15   A.   Not really I'm not sure if I met him first in the States

16   or not during that time.

17   Q.   Met him in both places?

18   A.   Yes.

19   Q.   Now, can you tell us what happened when you got to

20   Peshawar Pakistan in 1983?

21   A.   We met Sheik Abdallah, spent the night at his house.     The

22   following morning we went to Peshawar to meet Abdul Rasool

23   Sayyaf who is at the time was the leader of the Afghanis.

24   Q.   I believe we're spelling that as A-B-D-U-L R-A-S-O-O-L

25   S-A-Y-Y-A-F.     Can you tell us did you bring your family when

 1   you moved to Pakistan?

 2   A.   Yes.

 3   Q.   And what happened when you met Sheik Abdul Rasool Sayyaf?

 4   A.   It was very important to me to make sure from my

 5   understanding Sheik Abdallah my understanding would be Islamic

 6   religion to make sure that I'm needed specifically to reside,

 7   that my help will be actually needed to the extent of residing

 8   in Peshawar, however, rather than just giving them some help

 9   from the States.   So I had the liberty to ask Sayyaf himself

10   in a meeting and ask him if my help will be very important to

11   them or needed.

12   Q.   And what were you told?

13   A.   I was told, yes, I'm needed there.

14   Q.   And did you offer any particular skill that you could give

15   them to help them in their effort?

16   A.   The only two skills that I know is flying and I know how

17   to travel around the world.

18   Q.   And what did they say?

19   A.   They said, well, there is no flying of course, but I could

20   be needed in traveling and shipping few things for them.

21   Q.   And did you do that?

22   A.   Yes.

23   Q.   And for how long did you do that while residing in

24   Pakistan?

25   A.   18 months.

 1   Q.   And where did you yourself reside in Pakistan?

 2   A.   In Peshawar.

 3   Q.   And where did your family reside?

 4   A.   At first must have been maybe six to eight months my

 5   family resided in Karachi, because there were no flat or house

 6   allocated to us, so I left my wife and kids in Karachi with my

 7   brothers, and I myself resided in Peshawar.

 8   Q.   And can you tell the jury what you did to aid the cause

 9   during those 18 months?

10   A.   As I said earlier, basically traveling and getting them

11   items that they need.

12   Q.   Can you describe what those items were?

13   A.   Well, some of which were was like scuba diving equipment,

14   range finders, night vision goggles and night vision scopes.

15   Q.   Can you briefly explain?

16   A.   Sometimes video equipment, batteries, it was so sometimes

17   and so used sometimes.

18   Q.   Can you briefly explain what a night vision goggle is?

19   A.   Yes.   It's a technology that if you, if you wore those

20   goggles you would be able to be, to see individuals and

21   vehicles at night.

22   Q.   What's a range finder?

23   A.   It's an equipment where you'll measure range with.

24   Q.   Does it tell you how far a certain object is?

25   A.   Yes.

 1   Q.   Can you tell the jury where you bought this various

 2   equipment?

 3   A.   I bought the range finders from England.    The scuba diving

 4   equipment also from England.     The night vision scopes were

 5   from the US.     Later on the night vision goggles were also from

 6   the US.

 7   Q.   Can you tell us roughly how much scuba equipment you

 8   bought?

 9   A.   Two sets.

10   Q.   And how many range finders did you buy?

11   A.   Six.

12   Q.   Do you recall how many night scopes you bought?

13   A.   Six.

14   Q.   And did you travel to any countries other than the United

15   States and to England?

16   A.   Yes.

17   Q.   What other countries did you travel to buy things?

18   A.   Japan, Kuwait, Saudi.

19   Q.   And did there come a time when you, while you were in

20   Pakistan that you met a person by the name of Usama Bin Laden?

21   A.   Yes.

22   Q.   Can you tell the jury how that came about?

23   A.   The first actual visit to Peshawar was with his other

24   brothers, and two gentlemen who supposed to be from somewhere

25   in Europe, they spoke English with an accent.     And I was

 1   invited to that meeting to interpret between English and

 2   Arabic to Sheik Sayyaf and Sheik Abdallah.

 3   Q.   And did you actually do that at the meeting?

 4   A.   Yes.

 5   Q.   And did you meet Usama Bin Laden on any other occasions

 6   while you were then living in Pakistan?

 7   A.   Yes.

 8   Q.   Approximately how many times?

 9   A.   Well, at that time he was not living in Pakistan.     He came

10   another time when we had a camp for the --

11               MR. DRATEL:   Your Honor, when the witness says "we,"

12   just if he could be more precise.

13   Q.   You said "we" had a camp.     Could you --

14   A.   Yes, I'm relating to, I'm referring to Sheik Abdallah

15   office having some activities to the Afghan I leaders, the

16   small ones like if he's a leader of twenty to fifty troops he

17   was invited to that camp to be taught in the proper way of

18   worshipping because most of them have a lot of sympathy to

19   Islam, they pray, of course they do their own duties, but not

20   necessarily to the standard of the scholars of Sheik Abdallah,

21   so he wanted to really teach them those ways and methods of

22   how to worship God, how to come closer to God, and of course

23   that will be also beneficial for them in the front.

24   Q.   And when you say Sheik Abdallah, are you referring to

25   Sheik Abdallah Azzam?

 1   A.   Yes, I am.

 2   Q.   And did Azzam Bin Laden appear at that camp?

 3   A.   Yes.

 4   Q.   Did there come a time when you yourself decided to leave

 5   Pakistan and move back to the United States?

 6   A.   Yes.

 7   Q.   Can you tell us when that was?

 8   A.   1985.

 9   Q.   And can you tell us why you decided to leave Pakistan and

10   come back to the States?

11   A.   Actually, I had some reasons related to the cause itself.

12   Other related to personal reasons.

13   Q.   Can you tell us both?

14   A.   Yes.    Reasons related to the cause were the fact that my

15   passport was about to expire.     This is the main tool for me to

16   travel.     I was almost the only one who have had a valid

17   passport.     The Egyptian passport is very difficult to come

18   about, especially if you have selective service which is the

19   military service.     My passport at the time had only about

20   three months duration and perhaps maybe one or two pages left.

21               I was traveling extensively almost every 15 days to

22   20 days.     I was so many stamps I really could not sustain a

23   new passport.     I have approached Sheik Abdallah and the people

24   in charge asking them to put somebody with me doing the same

25   job or perhaps I could show him where I go, and you know

 1   people that I know.    I was not successful.   Other reasons

 2   were --

 3   Q.   Let me stop you there for a moment.

 4   A.   Sure.

 5   Q.   You mentioned selective service.   Can you explain to the

 6   jury why the selective service issue would make it hard for

 7   you to renew your Egyptian passport?

 8   A.   If you are Egyptian citizen you have to serve in the

 9   military.    It's an obligation on you upon graduation from

10   college, which the assumption was that I was already by then

11   graduated, age 26.    27 is the final age where you have to

12   submit yourself to the military service.

13   Q.   So we're clear, had you ever served in the Egyptian

14   military?

15   A.   No.

16   Q.   If you can continue with the other reasons?

17   A.   So then the other internal reasons were things really

18   between us.    I was one of the people invited to special

19   meetings with Sheik Abdallah to organize the work of the Arabs

20   and the visitors in Peshawar, and things of, you know,

21   important nature to Afghani, how are we helping them,

22   including donations and things.

23              One of the main sticking issue was I was totally

24   opposing the fact that any rich individual who comes to

25   Afghanistan would control the decision making.     I think they

 1   have, you know, pure, I mean pure feeling to the code, but I

 2   don't think he have the experience to be involved in the

 3   day-to-day running of the business in Afghanistan.    I was very

 4   much opposed to that and I, my voice was very well heard out,

 5   but nobody really acted on it.   I have asked other scholars,

 6   I've asked other colleagues.   I think I was right and I took a

 7   stand on that.

 8   Q.   Now, at the time you came back to the States what was the

 9   status of your aviation license?

10   A.   It was expired.

11   Q.   And what were the prospects of your renewing the license

12   while in Pakistan?

13   A.   Almost impossible.

14   Q.   And why was that?

15   A.   Well, first of all, I can't fly in Pakistan.   I can't fly

16   anywhere else.   I have to come to the States since it's an FAA

17   license, and of course it's very expensive to renew.    I've

18   been offered help from Sheik Abdallah on few occasions, but it

19   was not really enough to renew the license.

20   Q.   And what was the status of your personal financial

21   situation supporting your family in Pakistan?

22   A.   I only had what I needed actually, and most of the time,

23   well, sometimes I lived with less than what I needed.

24   Q.   And when you came back to the United States where did you

25   move?

 1   A.   I moved back to Arlington, Texas.

 2   Q.   In what year was this?

 3   A.   1985.

 4   Q.   And what did you do for work when you came back to the

 5   United States?

 6   A.   Work as a flight instructor again.

 7               THE COURT:   What was that?

 8               THE WITNESS:   Flight instructor.

 9   Q.   When you were back beginning in 1985 did you ever render

10   any further assistance to the cause of the jihad in

11   Afghanistan?

12   A.   Yes.    That was one of the things that I have proposed to

13   them, I'm not needed.      We are not in line together when it

14   comes to the ideology.      It will be best that I move back and

15   I'll still provide the help that you all need.

16   Q.   Can you give us examples of what it is that you did to

17   help from the United States?

18   A.   The second set of night vision goggles were actually

19   shipped at that time I resided back in the US.

20   Q.   And how many night vision goggles were they?

21   A.   Eleven.

22   Q.   How did you ship them from the United States to

23   Afghanistan?

24   A.   Just as a passenger luggage.

25   Q.   And who was the passenger that you gave them to?

 1   A.   Wadia.

 2   Q.   Is that Wadih El Hage?

 3   A.   Yes.

 4   Q.   Is it your understanding -- what year was this?

 5   A.   Must have been 1987 or '88, I'm not sure.

 6   Q.   What was your understanding of what the night vision

 7   goggles were to be used for?

 8   A.   You mean -- well, they use is actually to use it at night

 9   because most of the mujahadeen movement is at night.

10   Q.   Was it for the jihad against the Russians?

11   A.   Yes, of course.

12   Q.   Did you ship any other equipment from the United States to

13   Pakistan or Afghanistan?

14   A.   You mean in that capacity passenger or --

15   Q.   No, in any capacity during the time from 1985 to 1990?

16   A.   Yes, I did.

17   Q.   What else did you ship?

18   A.   I shipped Barrett rifles, 50 calibers.

19   Q.   B-A-R-R-E-T-T.    How many of those did you ship?

20   A.   25.

21   Q.   And so we're clear, did Wadih El Hage have anything to do

22   with that transaction?

23   A.   No.

24   Q.   And can you tell us what a 50 caliber rifle is?

25   A.   This is supposed to be a heavy caliber, but the advantage

 1   of it is carried by individuals so it's made in such a way

 2   where you could have a heavy cannon, but mobile by an

 3   individual.    That's basically it.   And it's very compatible to

 4   the Russian caliber 12.7.

 5   Q.   And, again, was it your understanding that these weapons

 6   were to be used in the jihad against the Russians in

 7   Afghanistan?

 8   A.   Yes, of course.

 9   Q.   Now, did you ever see the rifles in Afghanistan yourself?

10   A.   Yes.

11   Q.   Can you tell us how it came to be that you saw the rifles

12   in Afghanistan?

13   A.   How what, sir?

14   Q.   How did it happen that you were in Afghanistan and you saw

15   these rifles?

16   A.   I received a fax of them having difficulty sighting the

17   scopes on the rifles, so I was asked --

18   Q.   Can you explain what "sighting the scopes" means?

19   A.   It's lining the scope with the rifle barrel so whatever

20   you see you'd have a hit.    That's as simple as I can put it.

21   Q.   So what did you do after you received the fax?

22   A.   I planned a trip and I went to Peshawar and sighted the

23   scopes for them.

24   Q.   Do you recall approximately what year this was?

25   A.   It's the year of it must have been 1989 because that's the

 1   same year where Sheik Abdallah was assassinated.

 2   Q.   Now, did there come a time when you obtained a green card

 3   in the United States?

 4   A.   Yes.

 5   Q.   Do you know what year that was?

 6   A.   '86, '87.

 7   Q.   And did you ever obtain American citizenship?

 8   A.   Yes.

 9   Q.   Do you know what year that was?

10   A.   1994.

11   Q.   And are you known --

12               MR. COHN:   That was that last answer?

13   Q.   Can you just repeat the last date?

14   A.   1994.

15               THE WITNESS:   Thank you.

16   Q.   And are you known by any name that begins with Abu?

17   A.   Yes.

18   Q.   What's the name that you're known by that begins with Abu?

19   A.   Abu Tareq.

20   Q.   T-A-R-E-Q?

21   A.   Yes, sir.

22   Q.   Did there come a time when you became involved in

23   purchasing an airplane for Usama Bin Laden?

24   A.   Yes.

25   Q.   Can you tell us what year that was that you first became

 1   involved?

 2   A.   1993.

 3   Q.   And can you tell us how it came about that you became

 4   involved in buying an airplane?

 5   A.   There was quite a few communications between me and Wadih

 6   El Hage about the interests of Usama aquiring an airplane used

 7   in Khartoum.

 8   Q.   When you had these conversations where were you?

 9   A.   In the States.

10   Q.   And where did you understand Wadih to be?

11   A.   Khartoum Sudan.

12   Q.   Do you know when it was that he moved to Khartoum Sudan?

13   A.   I can't really recall the specific year, but it must have

14   been maybe 1998.

15               MR. DRATEL:   Your Honor, the basis of his knowing.

16               MR. FITZGERALD:   I'll withdraw the question, your

17   Honor.

18   Q.   When you spoke to him about the airplane transaction where

19   did you understand him to be?

20   A.   Say again, please?

21   Q.   When you spoke to Wadih El Hage about the airplane where

22   did you understand that Wadih was?

23   A.   In Khartoum.

24   Q.   Did you ever call him directly from the States?

25   A.   Yes.

 1   Q.   And did you dial a number for the Sudan?

 2   A.   Yes.

 3   Q.   Can you tell us what Wadih El Hage told you when he first

 4   contacted you?

 5   A.   The interests of Usama Bin Laden in aquiring an airplane

 6   for Khartoum.

 7   Q.   And did you, did he tell you where Usama Bin Laden was

 8   living at the time?

 9   A.   Yes.

10   Q.   Where was he living?

11   A.   In Khartoum, Sudan.

12   Q.   And what did he tell you about the airplane that he wished

13   you to purchase for Usama Bin Laden?

14   A.   The price range within 350,000 US, and that is a range of

15   about a little bit over two thousand miles.

16   Q.   And did you have any further discussions with him about

17   the financial arrangements for purchasing this airplane?

18   A.   Yes.

19   Q.   What was that discussion?

20   A.   Once I located an airplane with that price and that range,

21   I've called Wadih and specifically told him, it's 350,000 and

22   I'll be offered 9 percent from the dealer, the owner of the

23   airplane.

24   Q.   And what did you mean, you'll be offered 9 percent?

25   A.   This is a customary commission when you buy or sell an

 1   aircraft in the US.

 2   Q.   And who would the commission go to?

 3   A.   To me.

 4   Q.   And did you have any discussions with anyone as to whether

 5   or not it was proper for you to receive a commission on this

 6   airplane transaction?

 7   A.   Yes.

 8   Q.   Who did you discuss this with?

 9   A.   I discussed it with my best friend Moataz al Hallak.

10               MR. FITZGERALD:   We'll spell that M-O-A-T-A-Z A-L

11   H-A-L-L-A-K.

12   Q.   What was your understanding of what was a proper way to

13   obtain a commission?

14   A.   I have what I say knowledge about our religion and how to

15   go about these things, but I wanted to make sure because

16   Moataz in fact is much more knowledgeable than me.      So I asked

17   him what will be the best way for me to get any commission out

18   of that sale without of course compromising our rules as

19   Muslims.     He suggested that, first of all, I have to become an

20   owner of the entity, and, thereafter, I could be, since I'm an

21   owner, I could resell it to a price that I choose to the new

22   owner.

23   Q.   And did you discuss this at all with Wadih El Hage?

24   A.   No.

25   Q.   And what did you tell Wadih El Hage about how the

 1   financial arrangements would work regarding the airplane?

 2   A.   Well, actually this part did not really go through.    They

 3   came later with a different price.     Instead of 350, anything

 4   less than 250.

 5   Q.   You say "they came."    Can you explain who?

 6   A.   I'm indicating Wadih El Hage and you know representing of

 7   course Usama in Khartoum.

 8   Q.   And what did he tell you about the changed price?

 9   A.   They wanted something within the 250,000 or less, and my

10   response was, you'll never get a used jet aircraft for that

11   price that will do the range that you want.

12   Q.   And what happened then?

13   A.   Actually, they came with that final decision, it doesn't

14   matter.     This is the budget and let's try to work with that

15   budget.

16   Q.   Was there any discussion of the reason why the range for

17   the plane had to be two thousand miles?

18   A.   Yes.

19   Q.   Can you tell us what was said?

20   A.   They have some goods of their own they want to ship from

21   Peshawar to Khartoum.

22   Q.   And first of all, who is "they"?

23   A.   Again, I'm referring to Wadih and Usama.

24   Q.   And did he tell you what the goods were that he wanted to

25   ship from Peshawar to Khartoum?

 1   A.   Yes.

 2   Q.   What were they?

 3   A.   Stinger missiles.

 4   Q.   And when he told you they wanted to ship Stinger missiles

 5   from Peshawar to Khartoum, what did you say?

 6   A.   I said it's possible as long as we have arrangements from

 7   the departing country to the arriving country.

 8   Q.   And what do you mean by that?

 9   A.   I meant the legality, because it's clearly air policy.

10   Q.   Did you discuss this with Wadih?

11   A.   Yes.

12   Q.   Tell us what you told him about the legality of shipping

13   the Stingers from Peshawar to Khartoum?

14   A.   That we have to have a legal permit to depart Peshawar

15   with that equipment on board, and the legal permit to land in

16   Khartoum, which is not a problem because they could ally

17   people in Peshawar and also in Khartoum.    However, the problem

18   with allies, once we have to divert or land for any fuel or

19   any emergency in the countries in between, then it will be

20   definitely exposed and then it will be absolutely a chaos.

21   Q.   And what, if anything, did he say in response?

22   A.   Nothing in particular.   I was just explaining to them

23   technicalities.

24   Q.   And did you have a further discussion after that

25   conversation about shipping stinger missiles?

 1   A.   I don't think so, no.

 2   Q.   Did you ever actually transport yourself stinger missiles

 3   from Peshawar to Khartoum?

 4   A.   No.

 5   Q.   Did you find a plane for the price of less than $250,000?

 6   A.   Yes.

 7   Q.   And what type of plane was it?

 8   A.   Again, with the reduction in the price and the range I had

 9   limited options, one of which was a military aircraft under

10   the designation of T389 which is the equivalent of a civilian

11   aircraft called Saber-40.

12   Q.   And did you find one?

13   A.   Yes.

14   Q.   And what was the price?

15   A.   210,000 after I finished all the modifications that I

16   needed to do.

17   Q.   What kind of modifications did you do on the plane?

18   A.   Well, the airplane were in a storage what we call boneyard

19   in Tucson, Arizona.

20   Q.   Is that boneyard?   B-O-N-E like bones, boneyard?

21   A.   Yes.

22   Q.   Can you explain what happened then?

23   A.   So we pulled the aircraft out of the storage and we had to

24   go through certain checks mechanically and officially of

25   course to certify again and make it acceptable by the FAA to

 1   fly the civilian aircraft.

 2   Q.   Did you do all those things?

 3   A.   Yes, sir.

 4   Q.   And where did the money come from to acquire the plane?

 5   A.   From Khartoum.

 6   Q.   And approximately how much money came from Khartoum if you

 7   recall?

 8   A.   About a total of 230, 230, around that figure.

 9   Q.   230 dollars or 230,000 dollars?

10   A.   Thousand dollars.

11   Q.   Did you put any of your money toward the purchase of the

12   airplane?

13   A.   Well, that initial part of the plan actually.    I put up,

14   me and Moataz and another friend a sum of $10,000 where we

15   acquire the airplane and started the process.

16   Q.   Now, once you acquired the plane did you have any

17   discussions with Wadih El Hage in the Sudan about the

18   acquisition?

19   A.   No.

20   Q.   What did you do with the plane?

21   A.   I bought it as I said, I finished the, I reconditioned --

22   well, actually I refurbished it completely, and the avionic

23   equipment, updated the version of avionics and also new paint.

24   And we took off from Dallas-Fort Worth to Khartoum.

25   Q.   Did you actually fly the plane yourself from the United

 1   States to Khartoum?

 2   A.   Yes, I did.

 3   Q.   Can you tell us the route just generally the route that

 4   you took?

 5   A.   The airplane had a range of about 1500 miles.   You cannot

 6   really cross the Atlantic with that range.    So we had to go up

 7   north almost to the Pole and cross down to mainland.    So we

 8   took the first one was Dallas-Fort Worth, Slte. St. Marie at

 9   the Canadian borders.    From there on to a place 67 lat north,

10   I think it's Furbisher Bay, Canada and then from Fervershaw

11   Bay, Canada to Iceland to Lucan, Rome, Cairo, Cairo, Khartoum.

12   Q.   How long did it take you to fly the plane from Dallas

13   through the various stops to Khartoum, Sudan?

14   A.   It should have taken two days at the most but actually we

15   had some technical problems due to the bad weather in

16   Fervershaw Bay.    It was minus 65, so we lost hydraulics and we

17   had a crack in all the window.

18   Q.   How long did it actually take you to get there?

19   A.   About a week.

20   Q.   Do you recall approximately when was that you flew the

21   plane from the United States to Sudan?

22   A.   The early part of 1993.

23   Q.   And what happened when you arrived in Khartoum with the

24   plane?

25   A.   In the sense of if you can explain the question please.
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