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ALTERNATIVE RULINGS ON THE PETITIONER'S EXCEPTIONS

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ALTERNATIVE RULINGS ON THE PETITIONER'S EXCEPTIONS Powered By Docstoc
					                                                                            DEP09-0203
                              STATE OF FLORIDA
                   DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION


THOMAS M. PARHAM,                                 )
                                                  )
          Petitioner,                             )
                                                  )
vs.                                               )     OGC CASE NO.  08-0521
                                                  )     DOAH CASE NO. 08-2636
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL                       )
PROTECTION,                                       )
                                                  )
          Respondent.                             )
                                                  )


                                       FINAL ORDER

          On December 9, 2008, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) with the Division of

Administrative Hearings (“DOAH”) submitted a Recommended Order (“RO”) to the

Department of Environmental Protection (“DEP” or “Department”) in the above

referenced proceeding. A copy of the RO is attached hereto as Exhibit A. The RO

indicates that copies were served to Petitioner, Thomas M. Parham, (“Parham”), who

appeared pro se; and counsel for the Department. Petitioner Parham filed Exceptions

on December 29, 2008, after the time period allowed by law. On January 5, 2009, the

Department filed a response to Parham’s Exceptions, including a request that the

untimely Exceptions not be considered. This matter is now before me for final agency

action.

                                      BACKGROUND

          Petitioner Parham purchased property located at 5401 Pickettville Road,

Jacksonville, Florida (“the Property”), in a tax sale on November 21, 2007. His intention
was to use the Property to park and store trucks and heavy equipment. At the time of

purchase, there were no signs posted on the Property indicating that it was hazardous

or toxic or otherwise compromised environmentally. At the time, there was no statute or

rule requiring the Property to be posted to give the public notice of any of those

conditions. Parham was not able to inspect the property. However, he knew that there

was fill material on the Property and he did no due diligence to determine what kind of

fill was on the Property. After purchasing the Property, Parham saw that part of it had a

significant amount of a black material. Instead of determining what it was, Parham

covered it with 124 truckloads of fill dirt.

       Someone saw the activity on the Property and contacted the DEP. DEP

inspected and issued an Order requiring Parham to install monitoring wells and

implement a monitoring program to determine whether the Property was causing

pollution and contamination offsite. The Department issued the Order on April 28, 2008.

The Petitioner filed a challenge and the matter was referred to DOAH. The ALJ

conducted the final hearing on September 25, 2008. After various post hearing

submissions the ALJ entered a RO on December 9, 2008.

                               THE RECOMMENDED ORDER

       In the RO the ALJ stated that there were two issues in the case. The first issue

was whether the Petitioner is maintaining an unpermitted stationary installation that is

reasonably expected to be a source of air or water pollution. The second issue was

whether installations on the Petitioner’s property are discharging into groundwater such

that he’s required to obtain a groundwater monitoring permit and conduct groundwater

monitoring as ordered by the Department’s April 28, 2008, Order.



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       The ALJ found that the Petitioner Parham has bought and sold property in tax

sales for a living for the past 11 years. He owns 115 different properties, and has been

involved in 795 property transactions. Once, he accidentally bought a contaminated

property, which the City of Jacksonville bought back from him after the contamination

was discovered. (RO ¶ 4). The ALJ determined that based on his experience, Parham

knew or should have known to conduct due diligence on the Property before buying it.

(RO ¶ 4). The ALJ found that Parham knew that there was fill material on the Property

and he did no due diligence to determine what kind of fill was on the Property. (RO ¶ 3).

After purchasing the Property, Parham saw that part of it had a significant amount of a

black material. Instead of determining what it was, Parham covered it with 124

truckloads of fill dirt. (RO ¶ 5).

       The ALJ found that “the black material” was sandblasting grit used by

Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. (“Jacksonville Shipyards”), in its shipyard operations to

sandblast old paint coatings and rust from ships before re-painting. The used grit was

trucked to and deposited on the Property on a daily basis when it was owned by

Jacksonville Shipyards in the 1970's and early 1980's. (RO ¶ 7). The ALJ noted that

used grit would be contaminated with metals and volatile organic compounds (VOCs).

(RO ¶ 7). The ALJ further found that prior to Jacksonville Shipyards' purchase of the

Property in 1972, it was used as a sand mine. In the process, two large pits, each 20 to

25 feet deep, were excavated on the Property. Later, waste was dumped into the pits,

including concrete, asphalt, metal pipes, wire, and wooden demolition material. When

Jacksonville Shipyards purchased the Property in 1972, sandblasting grit was added to




                                             3
the waste placed into the pits. Initially, these activities were not regulated, and the pits

were not lined before being used for waste disposal. (RO ¶ 8).

       The ALJ found that by July 1980, leachate generated when waste material came

in contact with water was running off the Property towards Six Mile Creek, which flows

east to where it is joined by Little Six Mile Creek, from which the combined flow towards

the east becomes the headwater of the tidal Ribault River. In addition, leachate was

entering the groundwater on the Property, which also flowed generally to the north

towards Six Mile Creek. (RO ¶ 9). The ALJ noted that when DEP's predecessor, the

Department of Environmental Regulation (“DER”) began to regulate landfills, it required

Jacksonville Shipyards to submit a groundwater monitoring plan, which DER approved.

Monitoring wells were installed, and the groundwater on the Property was sampled once

in 1984 and showed groundwater contamination. DER groundwater standards and

criteria for arsenic, barium, chromium, lead, chlorides, copper, iron, manganese, total

dissolved solids (TDS), and zinc were exceeded. DER attempted to negotiate a

consent order with Jacksonville Shipyards to address the contamination, but those

efforts failed, and then Jacksonville Shipyards and related business entities went into

bankruptcy. (RO ¶ 10).

       The ALJ found that site investigations were conducted at the Property in 1984,

1998 (by DEP), and 2004 (by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency). The reports

from these site investigations indicate that the waste-filled pits on the Property are

discharging to groundwater. There is no liner beneath the waste that has been placed

in the pits. Rain and runoff on the Property percolates through the waste and leaches




                                              4
contaminants out of the waste; and the leachate enters the groundwater on the

Property. (RO ¶¶ 10, 13, 14-15, 17).

       The Petitioner Parham contended that contamination found on the Property was

from the 53-acre Pickettville Landfill across the street, which was operated by the City of

Jacksonville. However, the ALJ found that the evidence showed that little or none of the

contamination on the Property is attributable to the Pickettville Landfill. He determined

that groundwater flow from the Pickettville Landfill is away from the Property, and would

not account for lead contamination found in the surface and subsurface soils of the

Property. (RO ¶ 18). Parham also questioned the estimate in the three contamination

reports on the Property that 200,000 cubic yards of sandblasting grit were dumped on

the property. But the ALJ found credible DEP’s testimony estimating that two-acres of

20-25 foot deep pits would hold that quantity of sandblasting grit. The ALJ further

found that even if the actual quantity dumped on the Property was less, the evidence

was that the sandblasting grit was the likely source of the metal contamination found in

the soils and groundwater on and under the Property. (RO ¶ 19). Parham suggested

that waste oil and other waste in the Pickettville Landfill could be the source of PAH or

PCB contamination on the Property. However, the ALJ found that groundwater flow

from the Pickettville Landfill is likely away from the Property, and those contaminants

move very slowly and do not move large distances, making it very unlikely that the

contamination on the Property came from the Pickettville Landfill. (RO ¶ 20).

       The ALJ found that the waste-filled pits on the Property were operated as a “solid

waste management facility” and a “solid waste disposal facility,” as defined in Florida

Administrative Code Rule 62-701.200. (RO¶ 27). The ALJ also found that these waste



                                            5
disposal areas on the Property are a facility and an installation, as defined in Section

403.031(4), Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code (“F.A.C.”) Rule 62-

520.200(4). (RO ¶¶ 25, 26, 27). The ALJ concluded that the evidence showed that, as

of 2004, the waste disposal areas on the Property were discharging to the groundwater,

the groundwater was contaminated with chromium, iron and lead in excess of the

Department’s groundwater standards, and this constitutes pollution under F.A.C. Rule

62-520.300(6). (RO ¶¶ 32 and 38). The ALJ determined that since there is no liner to

protect the groundwater, the waste disposal areas on the Property are reasonably

expected to discharge pollution to groundwater today because rainfall and/or surface

water continue to come into contact with the waste, generating leachate. (RO ¶ 32, 38,

39). The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner is required to establish a groundwater

monitoring program under F.A.C. Rule 62-520.600(1) and comply with the minimum

criteria in F.A.C. Rule 62-520.400. (RO ¶¶ 34, 36).

       The ALJ recommended that the Department enter a final order requiring Parham

to apply for monitoring plan approval on Form 62-520.900(1) within 90 days of entry of

the final order; implement the approved monitoring program within 90 days after

Department approval; and install monitoring wells in accordance with the approved

monitoring program and F.A.C. rule 62-520.600(6).

                               STANDARDS OF REVIEW

       Section 120.57(1)(l), Florida Statutes, prescribes that an agency reviewing a

recommended order may not reject or modify the findings of fact of an ALJ, “unless the

agency first determines from a review of the entire record, and states with particularity in

the order, that the findings of fact were not based on competent substantial evidence.”



                                             6
§ 120.57(1)(l), Fla. Stat. (2008); Wills v. Fla. Elections Comm’n, 955 So.2d 61 (Fla. 1st

DCA 2007). The term “competent substantial evidence” does not relate to the quality,

character, convincing power, probative value or weight of the evidence. Rather,

“competent substantial evidence” refers to the existence of some evidence (quantity) as

to each essential element and as to its admissibility under legal rules of evidence. See

e.g., Scholastic Book Fairs, Inc. v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 671 So.2d 287,

289 n.3 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996).

       A reviewing agency may not reweigh the evidence presented at a DOAH final

hearing, attempt to resolve conflicts therein, or judge the credibility of witnesses. See

e.g., Rogers v. Dep’t of Health, 920 So.2d 27, 30 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005); Belleau v. Dep’t

of Envtl. Prot., 695 So.2d 1305, 1307 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); Dunham v. Highlands

County Sch. Bd., 652 So.2d 894 (Fla. 2d. DCA 1995). These evidentiary-related

matters are within the province of the ALJ, as the “fact-finder” in these administrative

proceedings. See e.g., Tedder v. Fla. Parole Comm’n, 842 So.2d 1022, 1025 (Fla. 1st

DCA 2003); Heifetz v. Dep’t of Bus. Regulation, 475 So.2d 1277, 1281 (Fla. 1st DCA

1985). Also, the ALJ’s decision to accept the testimony of one expert witness over that

of another expert is an evidentiary ruling that cannot be altered by a reviewing agency,

absent a complete lack of any competent substantial evidence of record supporting this

decision. See e.g., Collier Med. Ctr. v. State, Dep’t of HRS, 462 So.2d 83, 85 (Fla. 1st

DCA 1985); Fla. Chapter of Sierra Club v. Orlando Utils. Comm’n, 436 So.2d 383, 389

(Fla. 5th DCA 1983). An agency has no authority to make independent or supplemental

findings of fact. See, e.g., North Port, Fla. v. Consol. Minerals, 645 So. 2d 485, 487

(Fla. 2d DCA 1994).



                                             7
       Section 120.57(1)(l), Florida Statutes, authorizes an agency to reject or modify

an ALJ’s conclusions of law and interpretations of administrative rules “over which it has

substantive jurisdiction.” An agency’s review of legal conclusions in a recommended

order is restricted to those that concern matters within the agency’s field of expertise.

See, e.g., G.E.L. Corp. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 875 So. 2d 1257, 1264 (Fla. 5th DCA

2004). An agency has the primary responsibility of interpreting statutes and rules

within its regulatory jurisdiction and expertise. See, e.g., Pub. Employees Relations

Comm’n v. Dade County Police Benevolent Ass’n, 467 So.2d 987, 989 (Fla. 1985); Fla.

Public Employee Council, 79 v. Daniels, 646 So.2d 813, 816 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).

Considerable deference should be accorded to these agency interpretations of statutes

and rules within their regulatory jurisdiction, and such agency interpretations should not

be overturned unless “clearly erroneous.” See, e.g., Falk v. Beard, 614 So.2d 1086,

1089 (Fla. 1993); Dep’t of Envtl. Regulation v. Goldring, 477 So.2d 532, 534 (Fla. 1985).

Furthermore, agency interpretations of statutes and rules within their regulatory

jurisdiction do not have to be the only reasonable interpretations. It is enough if such

agency interpretations are “permissible” ones. See, e.g., Suddath Van Lines, Inc. v.

Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 668 So.2d 209, 212 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).

       However, agencies do not have jurisdiction to modify or reject rulings on the

admissibility of evidence. Evidentiary rulings of the ALJ that deal with “factual issues

susceptible to ordinary methods of proof that are not infused with [agency] policy

considerations,” are not matters over which the agency has “substantive jurisdiction.”

See Martuccio v. Dep’t of Prof’l Regulation, 622 So.2d 607, 609 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993);

Heifetz v. Dep’t of Bus. Regulation, 475 So.2d 1277, 1281 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); Fla.



                                             8
Power & Light Co. v. Fla. Siting Bd., 693 So.2d 1025, 1028 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997).

Evidentiary rulings are matters within the ALJ’s sound “prerogative . . . as the finder of

fact” and may not be reversed on agency review. See Martuccio, 622 So.2d at 609.

Agencies do not have the authority to modify or reject conclusions of law that apply

general legal concepts typically resolved by judicial or quasi-judicial officers. See, e.g.,

Deep Lagoon Boat Club, Ltd. v. Sheridan, 784 So. 2d 1140, 1142 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).

       Finally, in reviewing a recommended order and any written exceptions, the

agency’s final order “shall include an explicit ruling on each exception.” See §

120.57(1)(k), Fla. Stat. (2008). However, the agency need not rule on an exception that

“does not clearly identify the disputed portion of the recommended order by page

number or paragraph, that does not identify the legal basis for the exception, or that

does not include appropriate and specific citations to the record.” Id.

                               RULINGS ON EXCEPTIONS

       The case law of Florida holds that parties to formal administrative proceedings

must alert reviewing agencies to any perceived defects in DOAH hearing procedures or

in the findings of fact of ALJs by filing exceptions to DOAH recommended orders. See,

e.g., Comm'n on Ethics v. Barker, 677 So.2d 254, 256 (Fla. 1996); Henderson v. Dep't

of Health, Bd. of Nursing, 954 So.2d 77 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007); Fla. Dep’t of Corrs. v.

Bradley, 510 So.2d 1122, 1124 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). Having filed no exceptions to

certain findings of fact the party “has thereby expressed its agreement with, or at least

waived any objection to, those findings of fact.” Envtl. Coalition of Fla., Inc. v. Broward

County, 586 So.2d 1212, 1213 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); see also Colonnade Medical Ctr.,




                                              9
Inc. v. State of Fla., Agency for Health Care Admin., 847 So.2d 540, 542 (Fla. 4th DCA

2003).

         Under Section 120.57(1)(k), Florida Statutes, the parties have 15 days after the

ALJ issues the RO to submit written exceptions to the agency. Therefore exceptions to

the RO were due on Wednesday, December 24, 2008 (Christmas Eve). The

Petitioner’s Exceptions were post marked on December 22, 2008, but were not received

by the agency until Monday, December 29, 2008. In its response to the Petitioner’s

Exceptions the Department requested that they be considered untimely.

         As noted above, the ALJ’s RO was entered in this case on December 9, 2008.

Under F.A.C. Rules 28-106.104(1) and 28-106.217(1), exceptions to a DOAH

recommended order must be filed with the agency clerk within fifteen (15) days of the

entry of the recommended order. Nevertheless, Parham’s Exceptions were not filed

with the Department clerk until December 29, 2008, twenty (20) days after the ALJ’s RO

was entered in this case. Parham has thus waived his right to submit Exceptions,

unless a basis exists for excusing the late filing on grounds of excusable neglect or

other sufficient legal cause. See, e.g., Hamilton County Bd. of County Comm’ns v.

State of Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 587 So. 2d 1378, 1390 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). The only

purported “excuse” evident on the face of the filings is that Parham apparently placed

his Exceptions in the U.S. mail in Jacksonville, Florida, on December 22, 2008.

Nevertheless, it is the date of receipt by the Department Clerk that constitutes the “filing”

date of the Petitioner’s Exceptions to the Recommended Order under Florida’s Uniform

Rules of Procedure, not the date the Exceptions were placed in the U.S. mail by

Petitioner. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 28-106.104(1) and 28-106.217(3). Rule 28-



                                             10
106.217(3) expressly provides that “no additional time shall be added to the time for

filing exceptions or response to exceptions when service is made by mail.”

       I conclude that the mere act of placing Exceptions to Recommended Order in the

U.S. mail for regular delivery from a location outside of Leon County two days before

the filing deadline imposed by F.A.C. Rules 28-106.104(1) and 28-106.217, does not

demonstrate a showing of good cause for excusing the belated filing of these

Exceptions. See Adams v. Resort Village Util., Inc., 24 F.A.L.R. 3148 (Fla. DEP April

11, 2002). Thus the Petitioner’s Exceptions to RO are stricken as untimely filed.

           ALTERNATIVE RULINGS ON THE PETITIONER’S EXCEPTIONS

       In the interests of administrative and judicial economy, the Petitioner’s

Exceptions to RO are considered on their merits. Alternative rulings on the merits of

Petitioner’s Exceptions will facilitate a full disposition of this case in the event this Final

Order is appealed and the appellate court were to determine that the Exceptions should

not have been stricken as untimely filed.

Exception No. 1

       The Petitioner’s exception contains several statements, but does not clearly

identify any disputed portion of the RO by page number or paragraph, does not identify

the legal basis for the exception, and does not include specific citations to the record.

See § 120.57(1)(k), Fla. Stat. (2008). Therefore, I need not rule on this exception. The

exception is denied.

Exception No. 2

       The Petitioner’s exception contains several statements, but does not clearly

identify any disputed portion of the RO by page number or paragraph, does not identify



                                               11
the legal basis for the exception, and does not include specific citations to the record.

See § 120.57(1)(k), Fla. Stat. (2008). Therefore, I need not rule on this exception. The

exception is denied.

Exception No. 3(a)

       The Petitioner’s exception contains several statements, but does not clearly

identify any disputed portion of the RO by page number or paragraph, does not identify

the legal basis for the exception, and does not include specific citations to the record.

See § 120.57(1)(k), Fla. Stat. (2008). The Petitioner does argue that erroneous

evidence regarding “chain of ownership” was presented to the ALJ. The Department

points out in its response that competent substantial evidence in the record supports the

ALJ’s finding of fact that Parham owns the Property. (RO ¶ 1; Respondent Ex. 1). Any

evidentiary rulings of the ALJ regarding this evidence are not within my substantive

jurisdiction. See Martuccio v. Dep’t of Prof’l Regulation, 622 So.2d 607, 609 (Fla. 1st

DCA 1993). This exception is denied.

Exception No. 3(b)

       The Petitioner’s exception contains arguments related to the relative location for

groundwater purposes of the Property and the Pickettville Landfill. However, the

exception does not clearly identify any disputed portion of the RO by page number or

paragraph, does not identify the legal basis for the exception, and does not include

specific citations to the record. See § 120.57(1)(k), Fla. Stat. (2008). The Petitioner

argues that the Pickettville Landfill Superfund site is not down gradient of his property.

In Findings of Fact 13, 18, and 20, the ALJ’s conclusion to the contrary is supported by

competent substantial record evidence. (T. pp. 44-51, 125-127). In addition, the



                                            12
Department’s response indicates that the “Superfund file,” referenced by the Petitioner

was not admitted into evidence at the hearing.

       Therefore, this exception is denied.

Exception No. 4(c)

        The Petitioner’s exception does not clearly identify any disputed portion of the

RO by page number or paragraph, but seems to dispute the ALJ’s recommendation that

he is required to apply for ground water monitoring plan approval from the Department

(ground water permit). See RO p. 18. The Petitioner does not identify the legal basis for

the exception, and does not include specific citations to the record. See § 120.57(1)(k),

Fla. Stat. (2008). The ALJ’s recommendation is based on applicable rule requirements

contained in rule chapter 62-520, F.A.C. Thus, this exception is denied.

                                      CONCLUSION

       The case law of Florida holds that parties to formal administrative proceedings

must alert reviewing agencies to any perceived defects in DOAH hearing procedures or

in the findings of fact of ALJs by filing exceptions to DOAH recommended orders. See,

e.g., Comm'n on Ethics v. Barker, 677 So.2d 254, 256 (Fla. 1996); Henderson v. Dep't

of Health, Bd. of Nursing, 954 So.2d 77 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007); Fla. Dep’t of Corrs. v.

Bradley, 510 So.2d 1122, 1124 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). Having filed no specific

exceptions to certain findings of fact the Petitioner Parham “has thereby expressed [his]

agreement with, or at least waived any objection to, those findings of fact.” Envtl.

Coalition of Fla., Inc. v. Broward County, 586 So.2d 1212, 1213 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991);

see also Colonnade Medical Ctr., Inc. v. State of Fla., Agency for Health Care Admin.,

847 So.2d 540, 542 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003).



                                              13
       In addition, when a party files an exception that “does not clearly identify the

disputed portion of the recommended order by page number or paragraph, that does

not identify the legal basis for the exception, or that does not include appropriate and

specific citations to the record;” the reviewing agency need not rule on the exception.

See § 120.57(1)(k), Fla. Stat. (2008).

       Having considered the applicable law and standards of review in light of the

findings and conclusions set forth in the RO, and being otherwise duly advised, it is

ORDERED that:

       A.     The Recommended Order (Exhibit A) is adopted in its entirety and

incorporated herein by reference.

       B.     Within 90 days of the date of this Final Order, Petitioner Thomas Parham

shall submit a complete application for monitoring plan approval for the Property on

Form 62-520.900(1) to the Department’s Northeast District Office, 7825 Baymeadows

Way, Suite B200, Jacksonville, Florida 32256-7590;

       C.     Petitioner Thomas Parham shall implement the approved monitoring

program within 90 days after Department approval; and

       D.     Petitioner Thomas Parham shall install monitoring wells at the Property in

accordance with the approved monitoring program and F.A.C. Rule 62-520.600(6).

       Any party to this proceeding has the right to seek judicial review of the Final

Order pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida Statutes, by the filing of a Notice of Appeal

pursuant to Rules 9.110 and 9.190, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, with the clerk

of the Department in the Office of General Counsel, 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard,

M.S. 35, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000; and by filing a copy of the Notice of Appeal



                                            14
accompanied by the applicable filing fees with the appropriate District Court of Appeal.

The Notice of Appeal must be filed within 30 days from the date this Final Order is filed

with the clerk of the Department.

        DONE AND ORDERED this              day of March, 2009, in Tallahassee, Florida.



                                                   STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT
                                                   OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION




                                                   MICHAEL W. SOLE
                                                   Secretary

                                                   Marjory Stoneman Douglas Building
                                                   3900 Commonwealth Boulevard
                                                   Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000




FILED ON THIS DATE PURSUANT TO § 120.52,
FLORIDA STATUTES, WITH THE DESIGNATED
DEPARTMENT CLERK, RECEIPT OF WHICH IS
HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGED.



        CLERK                     DATE




                                              15
                             CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

       I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing Final Order has been sent by

United States Postal Service to:

Thomas M. Parham
7225 Arlet Drive
Jacksonville, FL 32211

Claudia Llado, Clerk and
J. Lawrence Johnston, Administrative Law Judge
Division of Administrative Hearings
The DeSoto Building
1230 Apalachee Parkway
Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550

and by hand delivery to:

Karen Bishop, Esquire
Department of Environmental Protection
3900 Commonwealth Blvd., M.S. 35
Tallahassee, FL 32399-3000


this       day of March, 2009.

                                              STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT
                                              OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION




                                              FRANCINE M. FFOLKES
                                              Administrative Law Counsel

                                              3900 Commonwealth Blvd., M.S. 35
                                              Tallahassee, FL 32399-3000
                                              Telephone 850/245-2242



              Please see PDF version for Exhibit.



                                         16

				
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