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					                               Republic of the Philippines
                               REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
                                National Capital Region
                                Branch 111, Pasay City

PHILIPPINE MIGRANT RIGHTS
WATCH, INC., on its own behalf and
on behalf of its member-overseas
Filipino workers, Jesus P. Reyes and
Rodolfo B. Macorol,
                              Plaintiffs,

        - versus -                                          Civil Case No. 04-0077 CFM

OVERSEAS WORKERS WELFARE                                   For: Annulment of Sections 4, 5,
ADMINISTRATION and its Board of                                6, 7 and 8 of Article II,
Trustees composed of Hon. Patricia A.                          Sections 5(c) and (h) of
Sto. Tomas, Virgilio R. Angelo, Manuel                         Article III, Articles IV, V, VI
G. Imson, The Secretary of Foreign                             VII and VIII of OWWA Board
Affairs represented by Undersecretary                          Resolution No. 038, Series
Jose S. Brillantes, Rosalida D. Baldoz,                        of 2003, with prayer for a
The Secretary of Budget and Management                         the issuance of a writ of
represented by Assistant Secretary                             preliminary injunction.
Eduardo P. Opida, Mina C. Figueroa,
Victorino F. Balais, Caroline R. Rogge,
Gregorio S. Oca, Corazon P. Carsola and
Virginia J. Pasalo,
                                     Defendants.
x------------------------------------------------------x


                     MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION


        The PLAINTIFFS, by counsel, and unto this Honorable Court, respectfully moves

for the reconsideration of the Order dated August 31, 2004 (received by registered mail on

September 6, 2004) dismissing the instant case on the following grounds:



                                                     I.

      THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE
                 THE CONSTITUTIONALITY AND VALIDITY OF THE
                                 OWWA OMNIBUS POLICIES.



1.1     The authority and jurisdiction of this Honorable Court to decide cases involving the

        constitutionality and validity of administrative rules issued by the administrative


                                                                                              1
      agencies of government is well established in law and jurisprudence.



1.2   Section 5(a) of Article VIII of the Constitution of the Philippines states:

      “Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

                     x     x    x            x    x   x

                (2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as
                    the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and
                    orders of lower courts in:

                     (a)   All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any
                           treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential
                           decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or
                           regulation is in question.”


1.3   The above-quoted constitutional provision clearly provides for the appellate

      jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to decide cases involving the constitutionality or

      validity of laws and regulations, among others, after the same has been decided at

      the first instance by the lower courts. This implies that the issue of constitutionality

      or validity of a statute or administrative regulation, must first be ruled upon by the

      Regional Trial Court at the first instance before the Supreme Court may exercise its

      appellate jurisdiction.



1.4   The jurisdiction of this Honorable Court to hear and decide cases involving the

      constitutionality and validity of laws and administrative rules, among others, is part

      of the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court to hear and decide civil actions in

      which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation under

      Section 19 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 otherwise known as “The Judiciary

      Reorganization Act of 1980”, as amended.



1.5   In a long line of cases, the Supreme Court has affirmed the authority of the

      Regional Trial Court to heart and decide cases involving the constitutionality and

      validity of laws and administrative regulations.



                                                                                               2
1.6   In the case of J. M. Tuason & Co. v. Court of Appeals (3 SCRA 696), one of the

      issues raised was whether or not the Court of First Instance has jurisdiction to

      decide on the issue of the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 2616 which

      provided for the expropriation of the Tatalon Estate. The Supreme Court ruled in

      the affirmative. The Supreme Court held that:


              “Plainly, the Constitution contemplates that the inferior courts should have
      jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it speaks of
      appellate review of final judgments of inferior courts in cases where such
      constitutionality happens to be in issue. Construing both provisions together, it is
      readily discerned that the two-thirds vote of the Supreme Court, required by section
      10 of Article VIII, conditions only the decisions of the Supreme Court in the
      exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.”


1.7   In the case of Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court (148 SCRA 659) where the

      Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City refused to rule upon the constitutionality of

      Executive Order No. 626-A banning the transportation of carabaos from one

      province to another, the Supreme Court held that:

              “This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming
      modesty in examining constitutional questions, they are nonetheless not prevented
      from resolving the same whenever warranted, subject only to review by the highest
      tribunal. We have jurisdiction under the Constitution to ‘review, revise, reverse,
      modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may provide,’
      final judgments and orders of lower courts in, among others, all cases involving the
      constitutionality of certain measures. This simply means that the resolution of such
      cases may be made in the first instance by these lower courts.

               “And while it is true that laws are presumed to be constitutional, that
      presumption is not by any means conclusive and in fact may be rebutted. Indeed, if
      there be a clear showing of their invalidity, and of the need to declare them so, then
      ‘will be the time to make the hammer fall, and heavily,’ to recall Justice Laurel's
      trenchant warning. Stated otherwise, courts should not follow the path of least
      resistance by simply presuming the constitutionality of a law when it is questioned.
      On the contrary, they should probe the issue more deeply, to relieve the abscess,
      paraphrasing another distinguished jurist, and so heal the wound or excise the
      affliction.

              “Judicial power authorizes this; and when the exercise is demanded, there
      should be no shirking of the task for fear of retaliation, or loss of favor, or popular
      censure, or any other similar inhibition unworthy of the bench, especially this
      Court.”


1.8   In the case of Drilon v. Lim, et al., (235 SCRA 135), the Regional Trial Court of

      Manila declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code to be unconstitutional.


                                                                                                3
       Although the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the trial court, the jurisdiction

       of the Regional Trial Court to decide the constitutionality of Section 187 of the

       Local Government Code was upheld. Said the Supreme Court:


                “We stress at the outset that the lower court had jurisdiction to consider the
       constitutionality of Section 187, this authority being embraced in the general
       definition of the judicial power to determine what are the valid and binding laws by
       the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law. Specifically, BP 129 vests
       in the regional trial courts jurisdiction over all civil cases in which the subject of
       the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation, even as the accused in a criminal
       action has the right to question in his defense the constitutionality of a law he is
       charged with violating and of the proceedings taken against him, particularly as
       they contravene the Bill of Rights. Moreover, Article X, Section 5(2), of the
       Constitution vests in the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over final judgments
       and orders of lower courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of
       any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
       proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.”


1.9    This Court, in the exercise of its power of judicial review, also has the jurisdiction

       to decide on the constitutionality and validity of administrative rules and

       regulations issued by the administrative agencies of government in the exercise of

       its quasi-legislative powers. In the aforecited cases, the Supreme Court upheld the

       jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court to decide the constitutionality and validity

       of statutes. Verily, this Court can likewise rule at the first instance, on the

       constitutionality or validity of administrative rules and regulations.



1.10   In the case of Miller v. Mardo (2 SCRA 898), the Courts of First Instance of

       Baguio, Manila, Cebu and Isabela declared unconstitutional and invalid

       Reorganization Plan No. 20-A prepared by the Government Survey and

       Reorganization Commission. The Supreme Court sustained the decisions of the

       lower courts.



1.11   In the case of Dabuet, et al., v. Roche Products Labor Union, et al., (149 SCRA

       386), the Supreme Court upheld the power of courts to determine the

       constitutionality or validity of acts of administrative agencies of government

       performed in the exercise of its quasi-judicial or delegated legislative powers. The

                                                                                                4
Supreme Court held:


        “To be sure, Art. 223 of the Labor Code, while providing expressly that
decisions of the Secretary of Labor may be appealed to the Office of the President,
does not provide for review of the decisions of the Office of the President by the
Supreme Court. This does not mean, however, that the power of judicial review
does not extend to decisions of the Office of the President. In San Miguel Corp. vs.
Secretary of Labor, where the same issue was raised, the Court categorically
declared that there is an underlying power in the courts to scrutinize the acts of
agencies exercising quasi-judicial or legislative power on questions of law and
jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by the statute. The Court
therein said:

               ‘Yanglay raised a jurisdictional question which was not brought up
       by respondent public officials. He contends that this Court has no
       jurisdiction to review the decisions of the NLRC and the Secretary of Labor
       'under the principle of separation of powers' and that judicial review is not
       provided for in Presidential Decree No. 21.

               ‘That contention is a flagrant error. 'It is generally understood that as
       to administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial or legislative power
       there is an underlying power in the courts to scrutinize the acts of such
       agencies on questions of law and jurisdiction even though no right of
       review is given by statute' (73 C.J.S. 506, note 56).

               ‘The purpose of judicial review is to keep the administrative agency
       within its jurisdiction and protect substantial rights of parties affected by its
       decisions' (73 C.J.S. 504, Sec. 165). It is part of the system of checks and
       balances which restricts the separation of powers and forestalls arbitrary and
       unjust adjudications.

              ‘Judicial review is proper in case of lack of jurisdiction, grave abuse
       of discretion, error of law, fraud or collusion (Timbancaya vs. Vicente, 62
       O.G. 9424; Macatangay vs. Secretary of Public Works and
       Communications, 63 O.G, 11236; Ortua vs. Singson Encarnacion, 59 Phil.
       440).’

       “In Macailing vs. Andrada, the Court also ruled that judicial review of
administrative decisions is available even if the statute does not provide for judicial
review. The Court said:

               ‘In the matter of judicial review of administrative decisions, some
       statutes especially provide for such judicial review; others are silent. Mere
       silence, however, does not necessarily imply that judicial review is
       unavailable. Modes of judicial review vary according to the statutes; appeal,
       petition for review or a writ of certiorari. No general rule applies to all the
       various administrative agencies. Where the law stands mute, the accepted
       view is that the extraordinary remedies in the Rules of Court are still
       available.’

        “Accordingly, we restate that this Court, in the exercise of its power of
judicial review, may review decisions of the Office of the President on questions of
law and jurisdiction, when properly raised. This does not mean judicial supremacy
over the Office of the President but the performance by this Court of a duty
specifically enjoined upon it by the Constitution, as part of a system of checks and
balances.”

                                                                                       5
                                               II.


       THE CASES OF FORTICH v. CORONA (289 SCRA 624) AND PEOPLE v.
      CUARESMA (172 SCRA 415) ARE INAPPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.



2.1      In dismissing the instant case, this Honorable Court relied upon the Supreme

         Court’s decision in the cases of Fortich v. Corona (289 SCRA 624) and People v.

         Cuaresma (172 SCRA 415). Why said decisions were found to be applicable in the

         instant case was not explained in the questioned Order.



2.2      In the case of Fortich v. Corona, the issue involved was the validity of the

         Resolution dated November 7, 1997 issued by the Office of the President which

         resolution modified an earlier resolution issued also by the Office of the President

         that has already become final and executory. Said resolutions were issued by the

         Office of the President in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions in resolving

         on appeal the decision rendered by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform awarding 144

         hectares of agricultural land to farmer beneficiaries in Sumilao, Bukidnon.

         (boldface ours)



2.3      In the Fortich v. Corona case, the Supreme Court ruled upon the appropriateness of

         the petition for certiorari filed by the petitioners before the Supreme Court instead

         of a petition for review before the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the Rules of

         Court. In said case, the Supreme Court upheld the propriety of the filing of the

         petition for certiorari because the resolution being questioned was alleged to be

         “patently illegal” and constitutes an error of jurisdiction and not an error of

         judgment.



2.4      Said case finds no application to the case at bar. The Fortich v. Corona case

         involves the question of validity of a resolution issued by the Office of the

         President in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions, the proper remedy of which

                                                                                                 6
      is a petition for certiorari. The instant case however, does not involve the exercise

      of quasi-judicial functions by an administrative agency of government. Plaintiffs

      are seeking the nullification of the OWWA Omnibus Policies which were

      promulgated by the OWWA Board of Trustees in the exercise of its quasi-

      legislative functions. Hence, the special civil action of certiorari is not the

      appropriate remedy in the present case. (boldface ours)



2.5   In the same case of Fortich v. Corona, the Supreme Court cited the case of People

      v. Cuaresma in ruling that the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals and the

      Regional Trial Court have original concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of

      certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. Nowhere in said decision did the Supreme

      Court state that where the challenged act of administrative agencies is deemed

      “patently illegal” the petition should only be filed before the Supreme Court.



2.6   In fact, in the case of People v. Cuaresma, the Supreme Court admonished the

      petitioner from bringing the petition for certiorari directly to the Supreme Court

      and for failing to observe the hierarchy of courts. Said the Supreme Court:


              “Furthermore, the remedy of certiorari is limited to acts of any agency or
      officer exercising judicial functions or of any judge which are claimed to be
      ‘without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.’ It
      does not lie for the correction of errors of judgment which may be brought about
      only by appeal. Not every error in procedure, or every erroneous conclusion of law
      or of fact of serious nature, is correctible by certiorari, appeal being the appropriate
      remedy, except where the error constitutes grave abuse of discretion, i.e., ‘such
      capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
      jurisdiction.’ The error here committed by His Honor obviously does not constitute
      grave abuse of discretion. It was an error of law, involving what was then deemed
      unsettled principle whether or not the filing of a complaint in the office of the fiscal
      interrupted the period of prescription of the offense charged. It is not correctible by
      certiorari. A last word. This Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari
      (as well as prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is
      not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts (formerly
      Courts of First Instance), which may issue the writ, enforceable in any part of their
      respective regions. It is also shared by this Court, and by the Regional Trial Court,
      with the Court of Appeals (formerly, Intermediate Appellate Court), although prior
      to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 on August 14, 1981, the latter's
      competence to issue the extraordinary writs was restricted to those ‘in aid of its
      appellate jurisdiction.’ This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however; to be taken
      as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom

                                                                                              7
      of choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after
      all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals,
      and should also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for
      petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy
      most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against
      first level (‘inferior’) courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and
      those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the
      Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only
      when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set
      out in the petition. This is established policy. It is a policy that is necessary to
      prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention which are better
      devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further
      over-crowding of the Court's docket. Indeed, the removal of the restriction on the
      jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in this regard, supra — resulting from the
      deletion of the qualifying phrase, ‘in aid of its appellate jurisdiction’ — was
      evidently intended precisely to relieve this Court pro tanto of the burden of dealing
      with applications for the extraordinary writs which, but for the expansion of the
      Appellate Court corresponding jurisdiction, would have had to be filed with it.

               “The Court feels the need to reaffirm that policy at this time, and to enjoin
      strict adherence thereto in the light of what it perceives to be a growing tendency
      on the part of litigants and lawyers to have their applications for the so-called
      extraordinary writs, and sometime even their appeals, passed upon and adjudicated
      directly and immediately by the highest tribunal of the land. The proceeding at bar
      is a case in point. The application for the writ of certiorari sought against a City
      Court was brought directly to this Court although there is discernible special and
      important reason for not presenting it to the Regional Trial Court.

              “The Court therefore closes this decision with the declaration for the
      information and evidence of all concerned, that it will not only continue to enforce
      the policy, but will require a more strict observance thereof.” (underscoring ours)


                                            III.

A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 IS NOT THE
          PROPER REMEDY FOR THE PLAINTIFFS IN THIS CASE.




3.1   With all due respect to this Honorable Court, it appears that this Court is of the

      view that the plaintiffs should have instead filed a petition for certiorari before the

      Supreme Court in challenging the OWWA Omnibus Policies instead of filing the

      present action for annulment of the OWWA Omnibus Policies before the Regional

      Trial Court of Pasay City.



3.2   The Plaintiffs beg to disagree.




                                                                                                8
3.3   In the first place, a petition for certiorari under Section 1 of Rule 65 of the Rules of

      Court is a judicial remedy available when “any tribunal, board or officer exercising

      judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his

      jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of its or

      his jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy

      in the ordinary course of law.”



3.4   A petition for certiorari is not the proper judicial remedy for herein plaintiffs for the

      simple reason that the OWWA Omnibus Policies were promulgated by the OWWA

      Board of Trustees in the exercise of its quasi-legislative functions and not quasi-

      judicial functions. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is

      not proper to challenge quasi-legislative actions of administrative agencies.

      (underscoring ours)



3.5   A special civil action for prohibition is likewise not a remedy available to the

      plaintiffs because the special civil action of prohibition lies against judicial and

      ministerial functions but not against legislative functions. (Ruperto v. Torres, L-

      9785, February 25, 1957)



                                            IV.

SECTION 2 OF RULE 43 OF THE REVISED RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, AS
      WELL AS REASONS OF COMITY AND CONVENIENCE FINDS NO
                      APPLICATION TO THE CASE AT BAR.


4.1   In addition to the cases of Fortich v. Corona (289 SCRA 624) and People v.

      Cuaresma (172 SCRA 415), this Honorable Court also cited several other reasons

      for dismissing the instant case.



4.2   This Honorable Court invoked Section 2 of Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Civil



                                                                                              9
      Procedure as a ground for dismissal. Said Rule states:


            “Rule 43, Section 2. Cases not covered. - This Rule shall not apply to
      judgments or final orders issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines.”


      4.2.1   Clearly, this Honorable Court erred in invoking said provision of the Rules

              of Court.



      4.2.2   Rule 43 of the Rules of Court governs “Appeals from the Court of Tax

              Appeals and Quasi-Judicial Agencies to the Court of Appeals.”



      4.2.3   The OWWA is not a quasi-judicial agency of government. Neither is it

              included among the government agencies enumerated under Section 1 of

              Rule 43 of the Rules of Court to which said Rule applies.



      4.2.4   The OWWA Omnibus Policies were issued by the OWWA Board in the

              exercise of its quasi-legislative functions and not in the exercise of quasi-

              judicial functions.



      4.2.5   There is no “judgment or final order” to speak of in this case.



      4.2.6   The OWWA Omnibus Policies were approved by the OWWA Board of

              Trustees pursuant to its perceived legislative mandate under LOI No. 537,

              P. D. 1694, P. D. 1809 and R. A. 8042 and not under the provisions of the

              Labor Code of the Philippines.



      4.2.7   Clearly, Section 2 of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court finds no application in

              the instant case.



4.3   This Honorable Court also invoked “comity” as a ground for dismissal of the


                                                                                              10
instant case. The OWWA was likewise deemed a co-equal in rank of this Court.



4.3.1   “Comity” is not a valid ground for dismissing this case.



4.3.2   First, the jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a case is determined by

        law. Refusal to exercise jurisdiction over a case where it is clearly evident

        that jurisdiction exists is a grave abuse of discretion, at the very least. In the

        case of Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court (148 SCRA 659), the Supreme

        Court held “when the exercise is demanded, there should be no shirking of

        the task for fear of retaliation, or loss of favor, or popular censure, or any

        other similar inhibition unworthy of the bench, especially this Court.”

        (underscoring ours)



4.3.3   Second, the refusal of a trial court to exercise jurisdiction over a case on

        grounds of comity may be justified only in cases involving conflict of laws.

        No such situation exists in this case.



4.3.4   Third, under Section 4 of Rule 65 governing petitions for certiorari,

        prohibition and mandamus relating to the act of a lower court, or of a

        corporation, board, officer or person, it is required that the petition should

        be filed before the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the

        territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. OWWA has its office

        within Pasay City within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court.



4.3.5   The fact that this Court treats the OWWA as a co-equal in rank does not

        justify the refusal to exercise the power of judicial review where jurisdiction

        is clearly established. The exercise of this Court of its judicial power is a

        performance of a duty enjoined by the Constitution as part of the system of

        checks and balances in government.

                                                                                         11
4.4   This Honorable Court likewise invoked “convenience” as a ground for dismissal of

      the instant case.



      4.4.1   Convenience is not a valid ground for the court’s refusal to exercise

              jurisdiction in the instant case. Nowhere in the Rules is it stated that a case

              may be dismissed on the ground of the “convenience” of the court.



      4.4.2   Plaintiffs are enjoined by the Supreme Court to strictly follow the

              established hierarchy of courts. Plaintiffs have no choice but to file the

              instant case before this Court that has original jurisdiction over the subject

              matter of this case.



                                             V.

      THE PLAINTIFFS ARE OBLIGED TO FOLLOW THE ESTABLISHED
                                 HEIRARCHY OF COURTS



5.1   Plaintiffs are of the view that they have no other recourse than to file the instant

      action before this Honorable Court in view of the Supreme Court’s admonition to

      all party litigants and lawyers to follow the established hierarchy of courts.



5.2   Had the plaintiffs opted to file the instant case before the Supreme Court or the

      Court of Appeals, the instant case might have been dismissed for failure to follow

      the hierarchy of courts.



5.3   In the case of Miriam Defensor Santiago v. Conrado Vasquez, et al., (G. R. No.

      99289-90, January 27, 1993), the Supreme Court held:


             “One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in this case a
      propensity on the part of petitioner, and, for that matter, the same may be said of a
      number of litigants who initiate recourses before us, to disregard the hierarchy of

                                                                                               12
       courts in our judicial system by seeking relief directly from this Court despite the
       fact that the same is available in the lower courts in the exercise of their original or
       concurrent jurisdiction, or is even mandated by law to be sought therein. This
       practice must be stopped, not only because of the imposition upon the precious
       time of this Court but also because of the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or
       otherwise, in the adjudication of the case which often has to be remanded or
       referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as
       better equipped to resolve the issues since this Court is not a trier of facts. We,
       therefore, reiterate the judicial policy that this Court will not entertain direct resort
       to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or
       where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy
       within and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.”


5.4    In view of the aforequoted directive from the Supreme Court, the Plaintiffs are

       obliged under the circumstances to file the instant case before this Honorable Court

       that has original jurisdiction to try the instant case.



                                          PRAYER



       WHEREFORE, premises considered, Plaintiffs respectfully prays that the Order

dated August 31, 2004 be reversed and set aside; the Plaintiff’s application for the issuance

of a writ of preliminary injunction be resolved; and that the pre-trial of the instant case be

scheduled.



       Other reliefs, just and equitable under the premises, are likewise prayed for.



       Pasig City for Pasay City, September 15, 2004.




                                                         HENRY S. ROJAS
                                                     Counsel for the Plaintiffs
                                                 PTR NO. 0440686 1/19/04 Pasig City
                                                 IBP NO. 607207 1/15/04 Cavite
                                                 Roll of Attorneys No. 42023
                                               Unit 702 Manila Luxury Condominium
                                               Pearl Drive cor. Gold Loop, Ortigas Center
                                               Pasig City




                                                                                              13
                                                CHARMAINE M. CALALANG
                                                   Co-Counsel for the Plaintiffs
                                             PTR NO. 0022637 11/27/03 Caloocan City
                                             IBP NO. 594353 12/29/03 Caloocan City
                                             Roll of Attorneys No. 48296



                                NOTICE OF HEARING


The Clerk of Court
Pasay City RTC Branch 111

Associate Solicitor Tomas D. Tagra, Jr.
Office of the Solicitor General

       Greetings!

        Please take notice that the instant “Motion for Reconsideration” shall be submitted
for the consideration of the Honorable Court on October 1, 2004 at 8:30 a. m.



                                                            HENRY S. ROJAS


Copy furnished by registered mail due to heavy delivery schedule of messenger:

Associate Solicitor Tomas D. Tagra, Jr.
Office of the Solicitor General
134 Amorsolo St., Legaspi Village
Makati City




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