UNDERTAKING AN OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS - Department of Infrastructure by dfhdhdhdhjr

VIEWS: 9 PAGES: 49

									UNDERTAKING AN OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS
       SECURITY ASSESSMENT




              A Guide
AIM

To provide you with an understanding of
the DOTARS Offshore Security
Assessments Guidance material and how
to use it to assist with the production of
your Offshore Security Plans.
                        Note
   This presentation is provided to assist
    organisations who may not be familiar with the
    requirements for providing a security
    assessments.
   It is acknowledged that a number of attendees
    are leaders in the field of offshore security. This
    presentation is aimed at assisting other industry
    participants who may not be as conversant of
    security issues or aware of the requirements.

   Not intended to cover all parts of the RA, rather
    amplify specific areas.
PURPOSE OF SECURITY ASSESSMENTS

  • To provide a sound risk based approach
  to the implementation of preventive security
  planning to prevent unlawful interference
  with offshore facilities.


  • Ensures a systematic and analytical
  process is conducted with the aim of
  identifying outcomes focused security
  measures and / or procedures that reduce
  the vulnerabilities of assets, individuals and
  operations to acceptable levels.
    Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities
                Security Act 2003

Requires Offshore Security Plan to include:
   A security assessment for the participants
    operations
 Set out security measures for MARSEC 1, 2 & 3
 Provisions for use of Declaration of Security;
 Demonstrate implementation of Security Plan that
  contributes to maritime security outcomes
 Complements Federal and State OH &S
  legislation
    Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities
           Security Regulations 2003

Security Assessment must include:

      statement outlining risk context or threat
       situation

      identification and evaluation of important
       assets, infrastructure and operations

      identification of possible risks or threats
       and the likelihood and consequences of
       occurrence
    Maritime Transport and Offshore
       Facilities Security Regulations
                  2003 (cont)


   identification of existing security
    measures

   identification of weaknesses

   identification, selection and
    prioritisation of possible risk treatments
                   GENERAL GUIDANCE

• AS/NZS 4360 Risk Assessment

• HB 436:2004 Risk Management

• DOTARS Offshore Security
  Assessments Guidance Paper

http://www.dotars.gov.au/transsec/oilandgas/docs/Offshore_Security_Risk_As
sessment_Guidance_Paper.doc

• Use simple plain English

• Protected from unauthorised access
AS 4360 - 2004
            REQUIREMENTS OF SECURITY
                  ASSESSMENTS

•   Date assessment completed

•   Scope - people, assets, infrastructure, facility or
    facilities and operations

•   Summary of how the assessment was conducted

•   ID and evaluation of strategically important assets,
    infrastructure and operations
Requirements for Security Assessments
                (cont)

   ID and assessment of possible security
    risks and likelihood and consequences of
    their occurrence

   ID of existing security measures,
    procedures and operations

   ID, selection and prioritisation of possible
    risk treatments
Template 8.1 Offshore Industry Participants Name and Contact Details-example

Offshore Industry Participants’ Name (Legal & Trading     Krupp Oil and Gas
Name, ABN)                                                ABN 3760-204717-23

Physical Address                                          35 Walker Street, North Sydney

Postal Address                                            PO Box 2078, North Sydney 2001

Contact Details:
Offshore Industry Participants’ Manager Name              Mr John Smith
Telephone Number:
                                                          02 9565 2095
Fax:
Mobile:                                                   02 9565 2091
Email:                                                    John.Smith@krupp.com

Contact Details 24/7
Head Security Officer Name                                Mr Bob Brown
Telephone Number:
                                                          02 9565 2345
Fax:
Mobile:                                                   02 9565 2091
Email:                                                    Bob.Brown@krupp.com

Alternate Out of Hours Contact
Name:                                                     Miss Jill Xandar
Telephone Number:
                                                          02 8971 4356
Fax:
Mobile:                                                   02 9565 2091
Email:                                                    0419 391 895
                                                          Jill.xandar@krupp.com

Location and type of Offshore Facility (If a Network or   1. Latitude 35º 28’ 14’ S     Longitude 145º 37’21” E
Joint assessment is being undertaken then provide             Type of facility Offshore Gas Production Facility
details of all facilities covered by this assessment).    2. Latitude                           Longitude
                                                             Type of facility

Person (s) who conducted the Security Assessment
Name:
Address:                                                  Mr Nathan Pringle, Security Risk Practitioners
Telephone Number:
Fax:                                                      35 Blank Street , Cremorne, NSW
Mobile:                                                   02 8765 3452
Email:                                                    0412 347 890
                                                          npringle@srp.com.au
Date of completion of Security Risk Assessment            3 June 2005
Template 8.5 Assets at Risk (Asset Appreciation and Criticality Analysis)-example


       ASSET                       ASSET DETAILS                         ABILITY TO               COST          CRITICALITY
     CATEGORY                                                             CONTINUE                 to            Rating (1)
                                                                        (without asset)          Replace
    Facility          Offshore production facility control             Very difficult            $ 3-5         High
                      room- have manual controls but                                             Million
                      would be difficult to operate for
                      extended periods without major
                      increase in offshore staff numbers


                      Pumping equipment – have                         Good                      $ 500 k-1     Medium
                      redundancy with a duplicate system                                         Million
                      6 Monopods located within a 6 nm                 Dependant upon            $ 1-2         Medium -High
                      radius                                           number affected           Million
                                                                       and whether main          per pod
                                                                       facility was
                                                                       damaged.
    Rotary wing       Helicopters to undertake staff                   Good                      $2-3          Low
    aviation          changeovers and limited resupply of                                        Million
                      essential items- redundancy with
                      company having multiple aircraft and
                      pilots available




     A useful and simple rating system is Low, Medium or High with relation to the criticality of the asset in the continued
     productive operation of the offshore facility.
  TYPES OF ASSESSMENTS & PLANS

Network - a security assessment
       covering more than one
       individual facility for which they
       are legally responsible.

Covering – used for several facilities
        and/or offshore service
        providers within a single area.
    The Current Security Environment
Sources:
•    DOTARS Offshore Oil and Gas Risk Context
     Statement - Apr 2005
    http://www.dotars.gov.au/transsec/oilandgas/index.aspx.


•    Other Threat of Risk Assessments for Critical
     Infrastructure

•     Law enforcement and security agencies

•     Professional and Industry bodies

•     Company personnel and expert advisers
        Establishing the Context- External
   Environmental and Geographical

   Business and Operational

   Statutory and Regulatory

   Social and Cultural

   Competitive

   Political

   Financial

   Others you may deem appropriate
Template 8.2 External Business Context- examples

Environmental      The facility is located 12 nm off the Victorian coast south east of the
and Geographical   township of Seaspray. The main facility is surrounded by 6 monopods
                   that are within a radius of 6 nm. The area is used by commercial and
                   recreational fisherman during the non winter months as during winter
                   there are strong winds and 4-5 metre swells and reduced visibility
                   ….etc.
Business and       Downstream Oil is one of several operators within Bass Strait and
Operational        produces 17.5 % of the gas suppliers for consumers in Victoria.
                   Although not the biggest commercial operator any adverse activities in
                   our facilities would directly result in gas shortages for domestic and
                   commercial applications in the Melbourne CBD.
Regulatory         Facilities controlled under Federal and Victorian Petroleum (Undersea)
                   Act 1998, International Ship and Port Security Code, IMO International
                   Safety Management Code, IMO MODU Code 2001, Victorian Work cover
                   Act 2005, MTOFSA 2003, Victorian Critical Infrastructure Legislation.

Social and         The facilities are predominantly operated by staff who live within the
Cultural           local area and Downstream Oil is the 2nd largest employed within a 50
                   km area. All food and minor engineering is procured locally and most
                   major engineering is undertaken within 100km.
Competitive        The facility is the third largest oil and gas producer in region.
Political          Due to the nature of local employment in a poor economic area with
                   high unemployment
Financial          Annual income from field is $2.7 billion and over $57 million paid in
                   taxes and $300 million spent within local community.
         Establishing the Context - Internal

   The organisational culture

   Internal stakeholders

   Organisational structure

   Capabilities in terms of resources such as people,
    systems, processes and capital

   Goals and objectives and the strategies that are
    in place to achieve them.
      Establishing the Context – Internal (cont)
Consideration of :

   Critical Assets and Resources

   Critical functions and business activities

   Operational capabilities

   Risk management capabilities

   Activities and Programs

   Existing risk controls

   Risk tolerance level

   Limitations on risk treatments
Template 8.3 Internal Business Context-example

Business Goals and objectives       To maintain and increase production by 15% over
                                    next 5 yrs and develop new Otway fields.
Consequences if goals and           Lost revenue and market share with potential for
objectives not realised             company takeover.
Critical Assets and Resources       Offshore platform, computer control equipment,
                                    pumping equipment, generators and air
                                    conditioning plant, offshore fuel stocks
Critical functions and business     Continuous production, aircraft for crew transfer,
activities                          supply vessel,

Operational capabilities            Have complex EM and firefighting capacity but very
                                    limited security resources due to limited manning
Risk management capabilities (or    Only OH& S capabilities and no in house security
lack thereof).                      expertise. Use contractors and liaison with Shell.
Activities and Programs             Gas production with some limited explorations
                                    within 25 nm of facility. Currently undergoing mid
                                    life facility upgrade and thus significant visits by
                                    contract maintenance personnel.
Risk tolerance level or position.   Low risk tolerance due to crew safety, public
                                    perception and political and social overview.
Internal stakeholders               CEO, OH&S , Unions/SA, offshore crew,
Limitations on risk treatments      Limited budget available appx $1.2 million and
including budget constraints.       $500 k annually.
The Risk Management Context

The goals, objectives, strategies, scope
and parameters of the activity, or part of
the organisation to which the risk
management process is being applied,
should be established.


Consideration of need to balance costs,
benefits and opportunities, resources
required and the records to be kept
should also be specified.
Defining the risk management context:

•   Determining resources and expertise
    needed
•   Defining the risk reporting criteria
•   Defining the Likelihood (Probability or
    Frequency) criteria
•   Defining the Impact (Consequence) criteria
•   Defining the Risk Rating criteria
•   Outlining the local security risk context
Specific issues to consider:

Roles and responsibilities of various parts of
the organisation participating in the risk
management process; and


Relationships between the project or activity
and other projects or parts of the organisation.
      Template 8.4. Risk Management Context-examples
Define the risk management task and       To undertake a risk assessment on potential security risks to the
establish its goals                       operation of Downstream Bass Strait offshore facility and to
                                          provide detailed recommendations on effective strategies that can
                                          be implemented to reduce the identified risks.
Specify the decisions to be made.         Consequence and Likelihood criteria relevant to Downstream
                                          operations. Identify relevant and cost effective strategies to reduce
                                          identified risks and allocate tasking to identified personnel.
                                          Complete an implementation schedule.
Define the scope, extent and the          This assessment covers all operational offshore activities at the
depth and breadth of the task.            facility and any operations required to support he operations of the
                                          facility including crew rotations, by air, supply of food and
                                          equipment by sea and the remote on shore management of
                                          production equipment and facilities.
Determine the resources and               The assessment was undertaken by a selection of company
expertise required.                       personnel, representing all areas of operation on the offshore
                                          facility, company management and union representation as well as
                                          personnel from supporting OIP’s
Define the risk reporting criteria.       Risk will be defined by likelihood and consequence against
                                          criticality of the asset for continued operation of the facility
Define the Impact (Consequence)           Refer to guidance material provided. Set own criteria if desired.
criteria.
Define the Likelihood (probability or     Refer to guidance material provided. Set own criteria if desired.
frequency) criteria.
Define the Risk Rating criteria.          Refer to guidance material provided. Set own criteria if desired.
Outline the local security risk context   The facility operates in a remote regional environment off
of your operations.                       Southern Australia with a very low history of criminal activity, and
                                          possessing a regular and long serving workforce. There have been
                                          no known terrorist incidents on similar facilities in the SE Asia
                                          region nor are there any known terrorist support groups within the
                                          country.
             Consideration of risks resulting in:


• Unlawful interference with offshore oil and gas
     operations
•   Death or injury
•   Adverse social impact
•   Adverse economic impact
•   Adverse environmental impact
•   Symbolic effect
•   Business disruption and losses
•   Damage to offshore oil and gas business /
    reputation
•   Significantly reducing public confidence in
    offshore oil and gas production and supply.
Table 8. 11 Consequence Assessment Criteria - example
        CONSEQUENCE                         DEFINITION


   1   Insignificant        Risk impact would be negligible or no risk
                            impact can be identified to community or
                            business.
   2   Minor                Risk    impact   would   result   in    few
                            consequences, such as minor disruption
                            to community and/or business, but of limited
                            overall consequence.
   3   Moderate             Risk  impact    would  result   in  some
                            consequences,     such   as   short-term
                            disruption to community and/or business.
   4   Major                Risk impact would result in serious
                            consequences, such as medium-term
                            disruption to community and/or business.
   5   Catastrophic         Risk impact would result in disastrous
                            consequences,    such   as   long-term
                            disruption to community and/or business.
                            The worst case outcome for the
                            community and/or business.
     Advanced version of consequence table p.33
                                   Business         Death or       Social           Environment      Symbolic Effect          Damage to Business
                                   Disruption       injury         Impact           al Impact                                 Reputation/Public Image
                    Economic
    Descriptor*                    and
                    Impact
                                   Continuity*
                                   *

                                   Severe           Numerous       Severe           C omplete        Significant damage to    Extensive damage to business
                                   disruption to    deaths         ongoing          destruction of   or destruction of        reputation (possibly irreparable and
                                   business                        community        an ecosystem     nationally important     crippling to business) with potential to
                                   activities for                  impact (s)       over a large     symbol that is           destroy business
                                   an extended                     Potentially      area             internationally          Serious impact on organisation’s public
                    Greater than                                   weeks                                                      image
5   Catastrophic                   period –                                                          recognised
                    $10M
                                   greater than                                                                               Significant and sustained media,
                                   1 month                                                                                    community and political scrutiny with
                                                                                                                              possible international coverage
                                                                                                                              Potential for intrusive police or other
                                                                                                                              inquiry into security incident

                                   Major            Some loss      Major            Long term        Damage to an             Major impact on business reputation
                                   disruption to    of life        C ommunity       damage to        important national       Major set back to organisation’s public
                                   business                        impact (s)       part of an       symbol or significant    image
4   Major           $5M-$10M       activities –                    Potentially      ecosystem        damage to or             Adverse media, community and
                                   more than 1                     days             over a wide      destruction of a state   political comment, national coverage
                                   week to 1                                        area             symbol that is well      Possible intrusive questions in
                                   Month                                                             recognised               Parliament, but no inquiry

                                   Some             Serious        Moderate         Medium term      Damage to a state        Some impact on business reputation
                                   significant      Injury or      community        damage to a      symbol or significant    Public embarrassment for senior
                                   disruption to    stress         impact (s) and   part of an       damage to a locally      management and/or security
                                   business         requiring      source of        ecosystem        important symbol         personnel
                                   activities – 1   hospitalisat   annoyance        over a wide                               Some adverse local media publicity
3   Moderate        $1-$5M                          ion
                                   day up to 1                     Potentially      area
                                   week             permanent      hours
                                                    injury,
                                                    compensati
                                                    on of injury

                                   Minimal          Injury         Minimal /short   Short term       Damage to a locally      Limited damage to business reputation
                                   disruption to    requiring      term             damage to an     important symbol         Stakeholder and/or shareholder
                                   business         medical        community        environment                               concerns
                    $100,000 to
2   Minor                          activities – 1   treatment      impact (s) or    with localised                            Limited adverse local media publicity.
                    $1M
                                   hour to 1        Lost time      annoyance        impact on the
                                   day              due to                          ecosystem
                                                    injury

                                   No or very       First aid      Minor            Very limited     Very limited or no       No significant damage to business
                                   limited          treatment      community        or small scale   damage to a locally      reputation
                                   disruption to    required       impacts or       damage to        important symbol         Resolved by day to day management
                                   business                        inconvenience    part of an                                No adverse media publicity.
                                   Activities –                                     ecosystem eg.
                    Less than
1   Insignificant                  less than 1                                      a minor oil
                    $100 000
                                   hour                                             spill
Table 8.9 Likelihood Assessment Criteria -example


       LIKELIHOOD                  DEFINITION



  A   Almost            Is expected to occur in most
      Certain           circumstances. (100/year)
  B   Likely            Will probably occur in most
                        circumstances. (10/year)
  C   Possible          Might occur at some time.
                        (1/year)
  D   Unlikely          Could occur at some time. (1/10
                        years)
  E   Rare              May occur only in exceptional
                        circumstances. (1/100 years)
    The Current Security Environment
Sources:
•    DOTARS Offshore Oil and Gas Risk Context
     Statement - Apr 2005
    http://www.dotars.gov.au/transsec/oilandgas/index.aspx.


•    Other Threat of Risk Assessments for Critical
     Infrastructure

•     Law enforcement and security agencies

•     Professional and Industry bodies

•     Company personnel and expert advisers
       IDENTIFYING SECURITY RISKS

     OIP’s should consider the following
    terrorist related risk areas:

   Bomb or explosive device, including
    suicide bombings
   Hijacking and hostage siege
   Deliberate infringement of exclusion zones
   Sabotage
   Arson
   Hoax calls and scare tactics
   Blockage of transport routes
     IDENTIFYING SECURITY RISKS - cont…
   Tampering with supplies, essential equipment or
    systems
   Unauthorised access or use of various equipment,
    including cyber attack
   Unauthorised access to secure areas
   Use of industry transport to carry those intending
    to cause a security incident and their equipment
   Use of a mode of industry transport or industry
    facility infrastructure as a weapon or a means to
    cause damage or destruction
   Use of a ship, helicopter or aircraft to transport
    explosives, hazardous goods or weapons.
    RISK CATEGORIES AND SOURCES OF
                  HARM

   Vandalism – vandals

   Misappropriation and sabotage - disgruntled
    insiders

   Interference - violence prone individuals or
    groups (politically motivated or otherwise)

   Crime - criminals

   Terrorism – terrorists
Table 8.6 RISKS, HAZARDS AND ASSOCIATED RISK EVENTS- examples


      RISK             HAZARD              POSSIBLE RISK EVENTS
     CATEGORY           (Source
                        of Harm)
 Vandalism           Vandals          Damage to operating vessel or
                                      equipment which results in loss of
                                      production.
 Misappropriation    Disgruntled      Sabotage to offshore control equipment
 and Sabotage        insiders         which results in a system shut down
                     (employees,      and loss of production.
                     contractors
                     ,etc)
 Interference and    Violence prone   Hoax calls and scare tactics which
 damage              individuals      results in loss of production.
                     (politically     Tampering with supplies, essential
                     motivated or     equipment or systems resulting in
                     otherwise)       system failure or loss.
 Criminal activity   Criminals        Arson resulting in damage, injury or
                                      loss of life.
Table 8.6 RISKS, HAZARDS AND ASSOCIATED RISK EVENTS- examples
                             Cont..
RISK CATEGORY       HAZARD (Source              POSSIBLE RISK EVENTS
                        of Harm)
Terrorism (in its   Terrorist        Bomb or explosive device, including suicide
    many forms)                      bombings which result in injury, loss of life or
                                     damage to infrastructure and production.
                                     Hijacking and hostage siege resulting in lost
                                     production.
                                     Deliberate infringement of exclusion zones.
                                     Sabotage resulting in lost production or denial of
                                     services.
                                     Blockage of transport routes and denial of
                                     supplies or oil and gas supplies.
                                     Unauthorised access or use of equipment which
                                     results in interruption to production or denial of
                                     services, including cyber attacks.
                                     Unauthorised access to secure areas with the
                                     intent of destroying control equipment
                                     Use of industry transport to carry those intending
                                     to cause a security incident and their equipment;
                                     Use of a mode of industry transport or industry
                                     facility infrastructure as a weapon or a means to
                                     cause damage or destruction; and
                                     Use of a ship, helicopter or aircraft to transport
                                     explosives, hazardous goods or weapons.
RISK SCENARIOS - one method
• Used to determine how the various risks might be
  realised and unfold

• Use previous security incidents (security history)

• Security history must be viewed in the context

• Operators must consider own unique risk scenarios

• Consider possible risk scenarios to determine how
  the risk may be initiated and realised

• It is important that significant risk causes and
  scenarios are identified.
                    Table 8.7 RISK SCENARIOS- example


 RISK CATEGORY         RISK SCENARIOS- the manner in which risks may be
                                           realised
Vandalism             The damage to the resupply vessel as a result of a fire being
                      lit above the engine compartment which renders the engine
                      unusable for a time.
Misappropriation      Theft of computer components and peripherals from the
and Sabotage          offshore facility computer system which reduces the
                      effective control of production and safety systems.
Interference and      Interfering with the main controls with the intent of causing
damage                a major oil spill and resultant environmental damage to the
                      nearby ecosystem to support Greenpeace calls for the
                      closure of the offshore production in the region.
Criminal activity     The smuggling of illegal firearms onto an offshore facility for
                      the purpose of hijacking a resupply helicopter and medical
                      drugs.
Terrorism             The hijacking of an offshore facility to seek Australian
                      political influence to obtain the release a suspect terrorist
                      and Muslim cleric from jail in Indonesia
Table 8.10 ESTIMATED LIKELIHOOD OF RISKS BEING REALISED- example

 RISK CATEGORY       Rare     Un     Possible   Likely   Almost    Rationale for Assessment
                            likely                       Certain


                                       x
 Vandalism                                                         Several occurrences over past 2
                                                                   years of vandalism against
                                                                   resupply vessel and equipment on
                                                                   offshore facility. Incidents have
                                                                   been minor with very limited loss
                                                                   of operational capability


                                                 x
 Misappropriation                                                  In past 3 years 3 staff dismissed
 and Sabotage                                                      for theft of company equipment
                                                                   whilst offshore. To date no follow
                                                                   up incidents by dismissed
                                                                   personnel.


                             x
 Interference and                                                  No recorded history of occurrence
 damage                                                            in facility. Happy and well paid
                                                                   workforce.


                                                 x
 Criminal activity                                                 Several instances in past 4 years
                                                                   of crew and contractors
                                                                   attempting to smuggle
                                                                   contraband items onto offshore
                                                                   facilities. Resulted in instant
                                                                   dismissals and staff awareness
                                                                   campaigns.


                      x
 Terrorism                                                         No known instances of attacks by
                                                                   terrorists on offshore facilities in
                                                                   Bass Strait. Remote location and
                                                                   inclement weather is likely to
                                                                   deter any attack in favour of more
                                                                   attractive targets in more
                                                                   accessible locations. Regular Navy
                                                                   patrols of area.
Table 8.18.RISK TREATMENTS FOR HEIGHTENED ALERT LEVELS- example
 RISKS        Immediate             Additional          Strategic or       Person/s     Supporting
              Actions on             security            long term        Responsible    Remarks
               advice of          measures and         measures and
              heightened           procedures             planning
                 level

Terrorism   Advise all          Increase security      Prepare for        OFSO, crew    Require 10
MARITIME    offshore            watches.               MARSEC 3 and       chief,        additional
 LEVEL 2    personnel.          Conduct an             conduct a          helicopter    helicopter
            Change Security     evacuation drill.      rehearsal for      crew          hours for
            Alert Status        Commence in            upgrade                          evacuation
            signage.            water boat patrols                                      rehearsal
            Advise other        in conjunction with
            OIP’s               available armed
                                ADF personnel.


Terrorism   Advise all          Increase security      Implement          OFSO, HSO
MARITIME    offshore            watches and            Company
 LEVEL 3    personnel.          extend radar           Contingency Plan
            Change Security     range.                 “MAGYAR”
            Alert Status        Evacuate all non
            signage.            essential
            Advise other        personnel.
            OIPs.               Cease all non
            Review manning      essential deliveries
            levels and reduce   of cargo and
            to skeleton crew.   stores.
RISK SCENARIOS
• Used to determine how the various risks might be
  realised and unfold

• Use previous security incidents (security history)

• Security history must be viewed in the context

• Operators must consider own unique risk scenarios

• Consider possible risk scenarios to determine how
  the risk may be initiated and realised

• It is important that significant risk causes and
  scenarios are identified.
                    Table 8.7 RISK SCENARIOS- example


 RISK CATEGORY         RISK SCENARIOS- the manner in which risks may be
                                           realised
Vandalism             The damage to the resupply vessel as a result of a fire being
                      lit above the engine compartment which renders the engine
                      unusable until to extensive repairs (1-2 weeks) completed
Misappropriation      Theft of computer components and peripherals from the
and Sabotage          offshore facility computer system which reduces the
                      effective control of production and safety systems.
Interference and      Interfering with the main controls with the intent of causing
damage                a major oil spill and resultant environmental damage to the
                      nearby ecosystem to support Greenpeace calls for the
                      closure of the offshore production in the region.
Criminal activity     The smuggling of illegal firearms onto an offshore facility for
                      the purpose of hijacking a resupply helicopter and medical
                      drugs.
Terrorism             The hijacking of an offshore facility to seek Australian
                      political influence to obtain the release a suspect terrorist
                      and Muslim cleric from jail in Indonesia
Table 8.8 EXISTING SECURITY CONTROLS – Summary for Assets - example
     RISK              Offshore              Resupply              Cargo Handling              Personnel
   CATEGORY            Facility             Operations

 Vandalism           Radar, access      No passengers.             All equipment locked    Pre-employment
                     controls,          Maritime ID cards.         down until required.    checks for all
                     security           Positive ID for visitors   Limited number of       offshore crew and
                     watches, 24/7      and contractors. Pre-      operators.              regular maintenance
                     CCTV coverage      embarkation screening      Scheduled activities.   staff. Maritime ID
                     of major and       on land.                                           cards. Positive ID for
                     critical areas     All cargo screened and                             visitors and
                                        manifested.                                        contractors. Pre-
                                                                                           embarkation
                                                                                           screening on land.
 Misappropriation    24/7 operations    Long term crew with        All offshore
 and Sabotage        and all critical   low staff change over.     equipment cargo
                     areas manned.                                 handling equipment
                                                                   disabled and locked
                                                                   when not in use.
 Interference and    24/7 operations                               All packages sealed
 damage              and all critical                              with consignment
                     areas manned                                  notes. Pre-departure
                                                                   physical checks.

 Criminal activity   Pre-
                     employment
                     screening and
                     Industry ID
                     Card
 Terrorism
Table 8.10 ESTIMATED LIKELIHOOD OF RISKS BEING REALISED- example

    RISK         Rare   Unlikely   Possible   Likely   Almost            Rationale for
  CATEGORY                                             Certain           Assessment


                                     x
Vandalism                                                        Several occurrences over past 2
                                                                 years of vandalism against
                                                                 resupply vessel and equipment
                                                                 on offshore facility. Incidents
                                                                 have been minor with very
                                                                 limited loss of operational
                                                                 capability


                                               x
Misappropriati                                                   In past 3 years 3 staff dismissed
on and                                                           for theft of company equipment
                                                                 whilst offshore. To date no
Sabotage                                                         follow up incidents by dismissed
                                                                 personnel.


                          x
Interference                                                     No recorded history of
and damage                                                       occurrence in facility. Happy and
                                                                 well paid workforce.


                                               x
Criminal                                                         Several instances in past 4 years
activity                                                         of crew and contractors
                                                                 attempting to smuggle
                                                                 contraband items onto offshore
                                                                 facilities. Resulted in instant
                                                                 dismissals and staff awareness
                                                                 campaigns.


                  x
Terrorism                                                        No known instances of attacks
                                                                 by terrorists on offshore facilities
                                                                 in Bass Strait. Remote location
                                                                 and inclement weather is likely
                                                                 to deter any attack in favour of
                                                                 more attractive targets in more
                                                                 accessible locations. Regular
                                                                 Navy patrols of area.
Table 8.12 ESTIMATED CONSEQUENCE OF RISKS IF REALISED- example

 RISK CATEGORY       Insignificant   Minor   Moderate   Major   Catastrophic   Rationale for Assessment


                                      x
 Vandalism                                                                     Good level of security on
                                                                               facility and no history of
                                                                               acts during previous 10 yrs.
                                                                               Very good emergency
                                                                               procedures and therefore
                                                                               any fire would be quickly
                                                                               contained.


                         x
 Misappropriation                                                              As above
 and Sabotage


                         x
 Interference and                                                              As above
 damage


                                      x
 Criminal activity                                                             Good level of CCTV
                                                                               coverage, monitoring and
                                                                               response to any identified
                                                                               activity. Good security
                                                                               response plans.


                                                                    x
 Terrorism                                                                     Although assessed as
                                                                               Unlikely should such an
                                                                               incident occur then there
                                                                               could be massive ecological
                                                                               damage if oil was release
                                                                               into sea, or major shutdown
                                                                               and loss of production if
                                                                               facility inoperable for more
                                                                               than 7 days.
                    Table 8.14 RISK RATING TABLE -example


   RISK        Low    Moderate     High     Extreme         Risk Treatment Options
 CATEGORY


                          x
Vandalism                                              Increase CCTV coverage of sensitive
                                                       areas. Improve security fencing of
                                                       landside supply facility and after
                                                       hours patrolling of supply vessel
                                                       mooring area.


                          x
Misappropria                                           Amend company workplace policy.
tion and                                               Improve pre-employment checks
Sabotage


                x
Interference                                           No deliberate treatment options
and damage


                                    x
Criminal                                               Improve pre-employment checking
activity                                               with Police checks and ASIO checks.
                                                       Improve vigilance and screening of
                                                       crew and visitors etc at aircraft
                                                       departure point.


                                    x
Terrorism                                              MOU with Police and local ADF HQ re
                                                       assistance during MARSEC 3


*Note – only general information is required for risk treatment options. However, details of
proposed security measures/procedures and desired outcomes should be outlined in table
8.16 Risk Treatment Implementation Schedule.
  Table 8. 16 RISK TREATMENT IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE - example

    RISKS        Desired       Security     Estimat    Estimated    Person   Date security      Supporting
                Outcomes      measure or       ed       ongoing    Respons   measure to be       Remarks
                             procedure to    Initial   Costs per     ible    implemented
                                  be         Cost $      year $                   by
                             implemented
                                   *

Vandalism       No           Increased      50,000     10,000      OFSO      Dec 05          Awaiting Board
                activities   CCTV                                                            funding
                             coverage                                                        approval.

Mis-            Reduction
appropriation   In
and Sabotage
                frequency
                and effect
Interference    No           Increased      15,000     25,000      OFSO      Aug 05.
and damage      activities   Offshore                                        Awaiting
                             security                                        changes to
                             watches                                         work practise
                                                                             procedures.
Criminal        No           Pre-           23,500     7,500       HSO       Sep 05.
activity        activities   employment                                      Awaiting
                             security                                        MOU with WA
                             checks                                          Police and
                                                                             ASIO re cost
                                                                             and
                                                                             procedures.
Terrorism       No           Implement      34,000     10,000      HSO
                activities   security
                             plans

 This Implementation Schedule must be included with assessment and plan
Table 8.16.RISK TREATMENTS FOR HEIGHTENED ALERT LEVELS- example
 RISKS        Immediate             Additional          Strategic or       Person/s     Supporting
              Actions on             security            long term        Responsible    Remarks
               advice of          measures and         measures and
              heightened           procedures             planning
                 level

Terrorism   Advise all          Increase security      Prepare for        OFSO, crew    Require 10
MARITIME    offshore            watches.               MARSEC 3 and       chief,        additional
 LEVEL 2    personnel.          Conduct an             conduct a          helicopter    helicopter
            Change Security     evacuation drill.      rehearsal for      crew          hours for
            Alert Status        Commence in            upgrade                          evacuation
            signage.            water boat patrols                                      rehearsal
            Advise other        in conjunction with
            OIP’s               available armed
                                ADF personnel.


Terrorism   Advise all          Increase security      Implement          OFSO, HSO
MARITIME    offshore            watches and            Company
 LEVEL 3    personnel.          extend radar           Contingency Plan
            Change Security     range.                 “MAGYAR”
            Alert Status        Evacuate all non
            signage.            essential
            Advise other        personnel.
            OIPs.               Cease all non
            Review manning      essential deliveries
            levels and reduce   of cargo and
            to skeleton crew.   stores.
              SUMMARY
• Please be aware of the DOTARS
  Offshore Security Assessments
  Guidance Paper.
• This is the minimum requirement. If
  your assessment process exceeds this
  requirement please ensure that there is
  a clear explanation of the methodology,
  acronyms and relevant data and
  sources used.
               SUMMARY cont

   Ensure there is linkage with the outcomes
    of the Risk Assessment with the Security
    Plan.
   Complete your plan in accordance with the
    Guide on preparing an Offshore Security
    Plan for Offshore Facility Operators.
   Please liaise with the local DOTARS office
    or Veena Rampal on 02 6274 7648
QUESTIONS?

								
To top