UNDERTAKING AN OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS SECURITY ASSESSMENT A Guide AIM To provide you with an understanding of the DOTARS Offshore Security Assessments Guidance material and how to use it to assist with the production of your Offshore Security Plans. Note This presentation is provided to assist organisations who may not be familiar with the requirements for providing a security assessments. It is acknowledged that a number of attendees are leaders in the field of offshore security. This presentation is aimed at assisting other industry participants who may not be as conversant of security issues or aware of the requirements. Not intended to cover all parts of the RA, rather amplify specific areas. PURPOSE OF SECURITY ASSESSMENTS • To provide a sound risk based approach to the implementation of preventive security planning to prevent unlawful interference with offshore facilities. • Ensures a systematic and analytical process is conducted with the aim of identifying outcomes focused security measures and / or procedures that reduce the vulnerabilities of assets, individuals and operations to acceptable levels. Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Act 2003 Requires Offshore Security Plan to include: A security assessment for the participants operations Set out security measures for MARSEC 1, 2 & 3 Provisions for use of Declaration of Security; Demonstrate implementation of Security Plan that contributes to maritime security outcomes Complements Federal and State OH &S legislation Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Regulations 2003 Security Assessment must include: statement outlining risk context or threat situation identification and evaluation of important assets, infrastructure and operations identification of possible risks or threats and the likelihood and consequences of occurrence Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Regulations 2003 (cont) identification of existing security measures identification of weaknesses identification, selection and prioritisation of possible risk treatments GENERAL GUIDANCE • AS/NZS 4360 Risk Assessment • HB 436:2004 Risk Management • DOTARS Offshore Security Assessments Guidance Paper http://www.dotars.gov.au/transsec/oilandgas/docs/Offshore_Security_Risk_As sessment_Guidance_Paper.doc • Use simple plain English • Protected from unauthorised access AS 4360 - 2004 REQUIREMENTS OF SECURITY ASSESSMENTS • Date assessment completed • Scope - people, assets, infrastructure, facility or facilities and operations • Summary of how the assessment was conducted • ID and evaluation of strategically important assets, infrastructure and operations Requirements for Security Assessments (cont) ID and assessment of possible security risks and likelihood and consequences of their occurrence ID of existing security measures, procedures and operations ID, selection and prioritisation of possible risk treatments Template 8.1 Offshore Industry Participants Name and Contact Details-example Offshore Industry Participants’ Name (Legal & Trading Krupp Oil and Gas Name, ABN) ABN 3760-204717-23 Physical Address 35 Walker Street, North Sydney Postal Address PO Box 2078, North Sydney 2001 Contact Details: Offshore Industry Participants’ Manager Name Mr John Smith Telephone Number: 02 9565 2095 Fax: Mobile: 02 9565 2091 Email: John.Smith@krupp.com Contact Details 24/7 Head Security Officer Name Mr Bob Brown Telephone Number: 02 9565 2345 Fax: Mobile: 02 9565 2091 Email: Bob.Brown@krupp.com Alternate Out of Hours Contact Name: Miss Jill Xandar Telephone Number: 02 8971 4356 Fax: Mobile: 02 9565 2091 Email: 0419 391 895 Jill.firstname.lastname@example.org Location and type of Offshore Facility (If a Network or 1. Latitude 35º 28’ 14’ S Longitude 145º 37’21” E Joint assessment is being undertaken then provide Type of facility Offshore Gas Production Facility details of all facilities covered by this assessment). 2. Latitude Longitude Type of facility Person (s) who conducted the Security Assessment Name: Address: Mr Nathan Pringle, Security Risk Practitioners Telephone Number: Fax: 35 Blank Street , Cremorne, NSW Mobile: 02 8765 3452 Email: 0412 347 890 email@example.com Date of completion of Security Risk Assessment 3 June 2005 Template 8.5 Assets at Risk (Asset Appreciation and Criticality Analysis)-example ASSET ASSET DETAILS ABILITY TO COST CRITICALITY CATEGORY CONTINUE to Rating (1) (without asset) Replace Facility Offshore production facility control Very difficult $ 3-5 High room- have manual controls but Million would be difficult to operate for extended periods without major increase in offshore staff numbers Pumping equipment – have Good $ 500 k-1 Medium redundancy with a duplicate system Million 6 Monopods located within a 6 nm Dependant upon $ 1-2 Medium -High radius number affected Million and whether main per pod facility was damaged. Rotary wing Helicopters to undertake staff Good $2-3 Low aviation changeovers and limited resupply of Million essential items- redundancy with company having multiple aircraft and pilots available A useful and simple rating system is Low, Medium or High with relation to the criticality of the asset in the continued productive operation of the offshore facility. TYPES OF ASSESSMENTS & PLANS Network - a security assessment covering more than one individual facility for which they are legally responsible. Covering – used for several facilities and/or offshore service providers within a single area. The Current Security Environment Sources: • DOTARS Offshore Oil and Gas Risk Context Statement - Apr 2005 http://www.dotars.gov.au/transsec/oilandgas/index.aspx. • Other Threat of Risk Assessments for Critical Infrastructure • Law enforcement and security agencies • Professional and Industry bodies • Company personnel and expert advisers Establishing the Context- External Environmental and Geographical Business and Operational Statutory and Regulatory Social and Cultural Competitive Political Financial Others you may deem appropriate Template 8.2 External Business Context- examples Environmental The facility is located 12 nm off the Victorian coast south east of the and Geographical township of Seaspray. The main facility is surrounded by 6 monopods that are within a radius of 6 nm. The area is used by commercial and recreational fisherman during the non winter months as during winter there are strong winds and 4-5 metre swells and reduced visibility ….etc. Business and Downstream Oil is one of several operators within Bass Strait and Operational produces 17.5 % of the gas suppliers for consumers in Victoria. Although not the biggest commercial operator any adverse activities in our facilities would directly result in gas shortages for domestic and commercial applications in the Melbourne CBD. Regulatory Facilities controlled under Federal and Victorian Petroleum (Undersea) Act 1998, International Ship and Port Security Code, IMO International Safety Management Code, IMO MODU Code 2001, Victorian Work cover Act 2005, MTOFSA 2003, Victorian Critical Infrastructure Legislation. Social and The facilities are predominantly operated by staff who live within the Cultural local area and Downstream Oil is the 2nd largest employed within a 50 km area. All food and minor engineering is procured locally and most major engineering is undertaken within 100km. Competitive The facility is the third largest oil and gas producer in region. Political Due to the nature of local employment in a poor economic area with high unemployment Financial Annual income from field is $2.7 billion and over $57 million paid in taxes and $300 million spent within local community. Establishing the Context - Internal The organisational culture Internal stakeholders Organisational structure Capabilities in terms of resources such as people, systems, processes and capital Goals and objectives and the strategies that are in place to achieve them. Establishing the Context – Internal (cont) Consideration of : Critical Assets and Resources Critical functions and business activities Operational capabilities Risk management capabilities Activities and Programs Existing risk controls Risk tolerance level Limitations on risk treatments Template 8.3 Internal Business Context-example Business Goals and objectives To maintain and increase production by 15% over next 5 yrs and develop new Otway fields. Consequences if goals and Lost revenue and market share with potential for objectives not realised company takeover. Critical Assets and Resources Offshore platform, computer control equipment, pumping equipment, generators and air conditioning plant, offshore fuel stocks Critical functions and business Continuous production, aircraft for crew transfer, activities supply vessel, Operational capabilities Have complex EM and firefighting capacity but very limited security resources due to limited manning Risk management capabilities (or Only OH& S capabilities and no in house security lack thereof). expertise. Use contractors and liaison with Shell. Activities and Programs Gas production with some limited explorations within 25 nm of facility. Currently undergoing mid life facility upgrade and thus significant visits by contract maintenance personnel. Risk tolerance level or position. Low risk tolerance due to crew safety, public perception and political and social overview. Internal stakeholders CEO, OH&S , Unions/SA, offshore crew, Limitations on risk treatments Limited budget available appx $1.2 million and including budget constraints. $500 k annually. The Risk Management Context The goals, objectives, strategies, scope and parameters of the activity, or part of the organisation to which the risk management process is being applied, should be established. Consideration of need to balance costs, benefits and opportunities, resources required and the records to be kept should also be specified. Defining the risk management context: • Determining resources and expertise needed • Defining the risk reporting criteria • Defining the Likelihood (Probability or Frequency) criteria • Defining the Impact (Consequence) criteria • Defining the Risk Rating criteria • Outlining the local security risk context Specific issues to consider: Roles and responsibilities of various parts of the organisation participating in the risk management process; and Relationships between the project or activity and other projects or parts of the organisation. Template 8.4. Risk Management Context-examples Define the risk management task and To undertake a risk assessment on potential security risks to the establish its goals operation of Downstream Bass Strait offshore facility and to provide detailed recommendations on effective strategies that can be implemented to reduce the identified risks. Specify the decisions to be made. Consequence and Likelihood criteria relevant to Downstream operations. Identify relevant and cost effective strategies to reduce identified risks and allocate tasking to identified personnel. Complete an implementation schedule. Define the scope, extent and the This assessment covers all operational offshore activities at the depth and breadth of the task. facility and any operations required to support he operations of the facility including crew rotations, by air, supply of food and equipment by sea and the remote on shore management of production equipment and facilities. Determine the resources and The assessment was undertaken by a selection of company expertise required. personnel, representing all areas of operation on the offshore facility, company management and union representation as well as personnel from supporting OIP’s Define the risk reporting criteria. Risk will be defined by likelihood and consequence against criticality of the asset for continued operation of the facility Define the Impact (Consequence) Refer to guidance material provided. Set own criteria if desired. criteria. Define the Likelihood (probability or Refer to guidance material provided. Set own criteria if desired. frequency) criteria. Define the Risk Rating criteria. Refer to guidance material provided. Set own criteria if desired. Outline the local security risk context The facility operates in a remote regional environment off of your operations. Southern Australia with a very low history of criminal activity, and possessing a regular and long serving workforce. There have been no known terrorist incidents on similar facilities in the SE Asia region nor are there any known terrorist support groups within the country. Consideration of risks resulting in: • Unlawful interference with offshore oil and gas operations • Death or injury • Adverse social impact • Adverse economic impact • Adverse environmental impact • Symbolic effect • Business disruption and losses • Damage to offshore oil and gas business / reputation • Significantly reducing public confidence in offshore oil and gas production and supply. Table 8. 11 Consequence Assessment Criteria - example CONSEQUENCE DEFINITION 1 Insignificant Risk impact would be negligible or no risk impact can be identified to community or business. 2 Minor Risk impact would result in few consequences, such as minor disruption to community and/or business, but of limited overall consequence. 3 Moderate Risk impact would result in some consequences, such as short-term disruption to community and/or business. 4 Major Risk impact would result in serious consequences, such as medium-term disruption to community and/or business. 5 Catastrophic Risk impact would result in disastrous consequences, such as long-term disruption to community and/or business. The worst case outcome for the community and/or business. Advanced version of consequence table p.33 Business Death or Social Environment Symbolic Effect Damage to Business Disruption injury Impact al Impact Reputation/Public Image Economic Descriptor* and Impact Continuity* * Severe Numerous Severe C omplete Significant damage to Extensive damage to business disruption to deaths ongoing destruction of or destruction of reputation (possibly irreparable and business community an ecosystem nationally important crippling to business) with potential to activities for impact (s) over a large symbol that is destroy business an extended Potentially area internationally Serious impact on organisation’s public Greater than weeks image 5 Catastrophic period – recognised $10M greater than Significant and sustained media, 1 month community and political scrutiny with possible international coverage Potential for intrusive police or other inquiry into security incident Major Some loss Major Long term Damage to an Major impact on business reputation disruption to of life C ommunity damage to important national Major set back to organisation’s public business impact (s) part of an symbol or significant image 4 Major $5M-$10M activities – Potentially ecosystem damage to or Adverse media, community and more than 1 days over a wide destruction of a state political comment, national coverage week to 1 area symbol that is well Possible intrusive questions in Month recognised Parliament, but no inquiry Some Serious Moderate Medium term Damage to a state Some impact on business reputation significant Injury or community damage to a symbol or significant Public embarrassment for senior disruption to stress impact (s) and part of an damage to a locally management and/or security business requiring source of ecosystem important symbol personnel activities – 1 hospitalisat annoyance over a wide Some adverse local media publicity 3 Moderate $1-$5M ion day up to 1 Potentially area week permanent hours injury, compensati on of injury Minimal Injury Minimal /short Short term Damage to a locally Limited damage to business reputation disruption to requiring term damage to an important symbol Stakeholder and/or shareholder business medical community environment concerns $100,000 to 2 Minor activities – 1 treatment impact (s) or with localised Limited adverse local media publicity. $1M hour to 1 Lost time annoyance impact on the day due to ecosystem injury No or very First aid Minor Very limited Very limited or no No significant damage to business limited treatment community or small scale damage to a locally reputation disruption to required impacts or damage to important symbol Resolved by day to day management business inconvenience part of an No adverse media publicity. Activities – ecosystem eg. Less than 1 Insignificant less than 1 a minor oil $100 000 hour spill Table 8.9 Likelihood Assessment Criteria -example LIKELIHOOD DEFINITION A Almost Is expected to occur in most Certain circumstances. (100/year) B Likely Will probably occur in most circumstances. (10/year) C Possible Might occur at some time. (1/year) D Unlikely Could occur at some time. (1/10 years) E Rare May occur only in exceptional circumstances. (1/100 years) The Current Security Environment Sources: • DOTARS Offshore Oil and Gas Risk Context Statement - Apr 2005 http://www.dotars.gov.au/transsec/oilandgas/index.aspx. • Other Threat of Risk Assessments for Critical Infrastructure • Law enforcement and security agencies • Professional and Industry bodies • Company personnel and expert advisers IDENTIFYING SECURITY RISKS OIP’s should consider the following terrorist related risk areas: Bomb or explosive device, including suicide bombings Hijacking and hostage siege Deliberate infringement of exclusion zones Sabotage Arson Hoax calls and scare tactics Blockage of transport routes IDENTIFYING SECURITY RISKS - cont… Tampering with supplies, essential equipment or systems Unauthorised access or use of various equipment, including cyber attack Unauthorised access to secure areas Use of industry transport to carry those intending to cause a security incident and their equipment Use of a mode of industry transport or industry facility infrastructure as a weapon or a means to cause damage or destruction Use of a ship, helicopter or aircraft to transport explosives, hazardous goods or weapons. RISK CATEGORIES AND SOURCES OF HARM Vandalism – vandals Misappropriation and sabotage - disgruntled insiders Interference - violence prone individuals or groups (politically motivated or otherwise) Crime - criminals Terrorism – terrorists Table 8.6 RISKS, HAZARDS AND ASSOCIATED RISK EVENTS- examples RISK HAZARD POSSIBLE RISK EVENTS CATEGORY (Source of Harm) Vandalism Vandals Damage to operating vessel or equipment which results in loss of production. Misappropriation Disgruntled Sabotage to offshore control equipment and Sabotage insiders which results in a system shut down (employees, and loss of production. contractors ,etc) Interference and Violence prone Hoax calls and scare tactics which damage individuals results in loss of production. (politically Tampering with supplies, essential motivated or equipment or systems resulting in otherwise) system failure or loss. Criminal activity Criminals Arson resulting in damage, injury or loss of life. Table 8.6 RISKS, HAZARDS AND ASSOCIATED RISK EVENTS- examples Cont.. RISK CATEGORY HAZARD (Source POSSIBLE RISK EVENTS of Harm) Terrorism (in its Terrorist Bomb or explosive device, including suicide many forms) bombings which result in injury, loss of life or damage to infrastructure and production. Hijacking and hostage siege resulting in lost production. Deliberate infringement of exclusion zones. Sabotage resulting in lost production or denial of services. Blockage of transport routes and denial of supplies or oil and gas supplies. Unauthorised access or use of equipment which results in interruption to production or denial of services, including cyber attacks. Unauthorised access to secure areas with the intent of destroying control equipment Use of industry transport to carry those intending to cause a security incident and their equipment; Use of a mode of industry transport or industry facility infrastructure as a weapon or a means to cause damage or destruction; and Use of a ship, helicopter or aircraft to transport explosives, hazardous goods or weapons. RISK SCENARIOS - one method • Used to determine how the various risks might be realised and unfold • Use previous security incidents (security history) • Security history must be viewed in the context • Operators must consider own unique risk scenarios • Consider possible risk scenarios to determine how the risk may be initiated and realised • It is important that significant risk causes and scenarios are identified. Table 8.7 RISK SCENARIOS- example RISK CATEGORY RISK SCENARIOS- the manner in which risks may be realised Vandalism The damage to the resupply vessel as a result of a fire being lit above the engine compartment which renders the engine unusable for a time. Misappropriation Theft of computer components and peripherals from the and Sabotage offshore facility computer system which reduces the effective control of production and safety systems. Interference and Interfering with the main controls with the intent of causing damage a major oil spill and resultant environmental damage to the nearby ecosystem to support Greenpeace calls for the closure of the offshore production in the region. Criminal activity The smuggling of illegal firearms onto an offshore facility for the purpose of hijacking a resupply helicopter and medical drugs. Terrorism The hijacking of an offshore facility to seek Australian political influence to obtain the release a suspect terrorist and Muslim cleric from jail in Indonesia Table 8.10 ESTIMATED LIKELIHOOD OF RISKS BEING REALISED- example RISK CATEGORY Rare Un Possible Likely Almost Rationale for Assessment likely Certain x Vandalism Several occurrences over past 2 years of vandalism against resupply vessel and equipment on offshore facility. Incidents have been minor with very limited loss of operational capability x Misappropriation In past 3 years 3 staff dismissed and Sabotage for theft of company equipment whilst offshore. To date no follow up incidents by dismissed personnel. x Interference and No recorded history of occurrence damage in facility. Happy and well paid workforce. x Criminal activity Several instances in past 4 years of crew and contractors attempting to smuggle contraband items onto offshore facilities. Resulted in instant dismissals and staff awareness campaigns. x Terrorism No known instances of attacks by terrorists on offshore facilities in Bass Strait. Remote location and inclement weather is likely to deter any attack in favour of more attractive targets in more accessible locations. Regular Navy patrols of area. Table 8.18.RISK TREATMENTS FOR HEIGHTENED ALERT LEVELS- example RISKS Immediate Additional Strategic or Person/s Supporting Actions on security long term Responsible Remarks advice of measures and measures and heightened procedures planning level Terrorism Advise all Increase security Prepare for OFSO, crew Require 10 MARITIME offshore watches. MARSEC 3 and chief, additional LEVEL 2 personnel. Conduct an conduct a helicopter helicopter Change Security evacuation drill. rehearsal for crew hours for Alert Status Commence in upgrade evacuation signage. water boat patrols rehearsal Advise other in conjunction with OIP’s available armed ADF personnel. Terrorism Advise all Increase security Implement OFSO, HSO MARITIME offshore watches and Company LEVEL 3 personnel. extend radar Contingency Plan Change Security range. “MAGYAR” Alert Status Evacuate all non signage. essential Advise other personnel. OIPs. Cease all non Review manning essential deliveries levels and reduce of cargo and to skeleton crew. stores. RISK SCENARIOS • Used to determine how the various risks might be realised and unfold • Use previous security incidents (security history) • Security history must be viewed in the context • Operators must consider own unique risk scenarios • Consider possible risk scenarios to determine how the risk may be initiated and realised • It is important that significant risk causes and scenarios are identified. Table 8.7 RISK SCENARIOS- example RISK CATEGORY RISK SCENARIOS- the manner in which risks may be realised Vandalism The damage to the resupply vessel as a result of a fire being lit above the engine compartment which renders the engine unusable until to extensive repairs (1-2 weeks) completed Misappropriation Theft of computer components and peripherals from the and Sabotage offshore facility computer system which reduces the effective control of production and safety systems. Interference and Interfering with the main controls with the intent of causing damage a major oil spill and resultant environmental damage to the nearby ecosystem to support Greenpeace calls for the closure of the offshore production in the region. Criminal activity The smuggling of illegal firearms onto an offshore facility for the purpose of hijacking a resupply helicopter and medical drugs. Terrorism The hijacking of an offshore facility to seek Australian political influence to obtain the release a suspect terrorist and Muslim cleric from jail in Indonesia Table 8.8 EXISTING SECURITY CONTROLS – Summary for Assets - example RISK Offshore Resupply Cargo Handling Personnel CATEGORY Facility Operations Vandalism Radar, access No passengers. All equipment locked Pre-employment controls, Maritime ID cards. down until required. checks for all security Positive ID for visitors Limited number of offshore crew and watches, 24/7 and contractors. Pre- operators. regular maintenance CCTV coverage embarkation screening Scheduled activities. staff. Maritime ID of major and on land. cards. Positive ID for critical areas All cargo screened and visitors and manifested. contractors. Pre- embarkation screening on land. Misappropriation 24/7 operations Long term crew with All offshore and Sabotage and all critical low staff change over. equipment cargo areas manned. handling equipment disabled and locked when not in use. Interference and 24/7 operations All packages sealed damage and all critical with consignment areas manned notes. Pre-departure physical checks. Criminal activity Pre- employment screening and Industry ID Card Terrorism Table 8.10 ESTIMATED LIKELIHOOD OF RISKS BEING REALISED- example RISK Rare Unlikely Possible Likely Almost Rationale for CATEGORY Certain Assessment x Vandalism Several occurrences over past 2 years of vandalism against resupply vessel and equipment on offshore facility. Incidents have been minor with very limited loss of operational capability x Misappropriati In past 3 years 3 staff dismissed on and for theft of company equipment whilst offshore. To date no Sabotage follow up incidents by dismissed personnel. x Interference No recorded history of and damage occurrence in facility. Happy and well paid workforce. x Criminal Several instances in past 4 years activity of crew and contractors attempting to smuggle contraband items onto offshore facilities. Resulted in instant dismissals and staff awareness campaigns. x Terrorism No known instances of attacks by terrorists on offshore facilities in Bass Strait. Remote location and inclement weather is likely to deter any attack in favour of more attractive targets in more accessible locations. Regular Navy patrols of area. Table 8.12 ESTIMATED CONSEQUENCE OF RISKS IF REALISED- example RISK CATEGORY Insignificant Minor Moderate Major Catastrophic Rationale for Assessment x Vandalism Good level of security on facility and no history of acts during previous 10 yrs. Very good emergency procedures and therefore any fire would be quickly contained. x Misappropriation As above and Sabotage x Interference and As above damage x Criminal activity Good level of CCTV coverage, monitoring and response to any identified activity. Good security response plans. x Terrorism Although assessed as Unlikely should such an incident occur then there could be massive ecological damage if oil was release into sea, or major shutdown and loss of production if facility inoperable for more than 7 days. Table 8.14 RISK RATING TABLE -example RISK Low Moderate High Extreme Risk Treatment Options CATEGORY x Vandalism Increase CCTV coverage of sensitive areas. Improve security fencing of landside supply facility and after hours patrolling of supply vessel mooring area. x Misappropria Amend company workplace policy. tion and Improve pre-employment checks Sabotage x Interference No deliberate treatment options and damage x Criminal Improve pre-employment checking activity with Police checks and ASIO checks. Improve vigilance and screening of crew and visitors etc at aircraft departure point. x Terrorism MOU with Police and local ADF HQ re assistance during MARSEC 3 *Note – only general information is required for risk treatment options. However, details of proposed security measures/procedures and desired outcomes should be outlined in table 8.16 Risk Treatment Implementation Schedule. Table 8. 16 RISK TREATMENT IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE - example RISKS Desired Security Estimat Estimated Person Date security Supporting Outcomes measure or ed ongoing Respons measure to be Remarks procedure to Initial Costs per ible implemented be Cost $ year $ by implemented * Vandalism No Increased 50,000 10,000 OFSO Dec 05 Awaiting Board activities CCTV funding coverage approval. Mis- Reduction appropriation In and Sabotage frequency and effect Interference No Increased 15,000 25,000 OFSO Aug 05. and damage activities Offshore Awaiting security changes to watches work practise procedures. Criminal No Pre- 23,500 7,500 HSO Sep 05. activity activities employment Awaiting security MOU with WA checks Police and ASIO re cost and procedures. Terrorism No Implement 34,000 10,000 HSO activities security plans This Implementation Schedule must be included with assessment and plan Table 8.16.RISK TREATMENTS FOR HEIGHTENED ALERT LEVELS- example RISKS Immediate Additional Strategic or Person/s Supporting Actions on security long term Responsible Remarks advice of measures and measures and heightened procedures planning level Terrorism Advise all Increase security Prepare for OFSO, crew Require 10 MARITIME offshore watches. MARSEC 3 and chief, additional LEVEL 2 personnel. Conduct an conduct a helicopter helicopter Change Security evacuation drill. rehearsal for crew hours for Alert Status Commence in upgrade evacuation signage. water boat patrols rehearsal Advise other in conjunction with OIP’s available armed ADF personnel. Terrorism Advise all Increase security Implement OFSO, HSO MARITIME offshore watches and Company LEVEL 3 personnel. extend radar Contingency Plan Change Security range. “MAGYAR” Alert Status Evacuate all non signage. essential Advise other personnel. OIPs. Cease all non Review manning essential deliveries levels and reduce of cargo and to skeleton crew. stores. SUMMARY • Please be aware of the DOTARS Offshore Security Assessments Guidance Paper. • This is the minimum requirement. If your assessment process exceeds this requirement please ensure that there is a clear explanation of the methodology, acronyms and relevant data and sources used. SUMMARY cont Ensure there is linkage with the outcomes of the Risk Assessment with the Security Plan. Complete your plan in accordance with the Guide on preparing an Offshore Security Plan for Offshore Facility Operators. Please liaise with the local DOTARS office or Veena Rampal on 02 6274 7648 QUESTIONS?
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