Dictatorship and
emigration
Presentation at EITM 2007
David Hugh-Jones
PhD candidate, University of Essex
Context
“The division of Europe into a number of
independent states… is productive of the
most beneficial consequences to the liberty
of mankind.”
-- Gibbon
Economic interdependence has increased
dramatically
Exit is cheap
How does this affect governments?
Questions
How does the possibility of “exit”
affect characteristics and survival of
dictatorial regimes?
Singapore vs Zimbabwe
When do dictators expel citizens?
When do they prevent them leaving?
Mariel boatlift vs Berlin wall
Ideas
The dictator balances 3 effects of
emigration
1. Economic: alters tax base
2. Political: alters probability of successful
democratic revolution
3. Political-economic: alters incentives for
revolution
If economy is highly interdependent then
controlling emigration of skilled may
increase wages of unskilled
A framework
The dictator maximizes
R(t)S(t)
Where R is revenue, S is probability of
staying in power
Solves
R’S=-S’R
A framework
R’S=-S’R
Write
R(t) = π(t)tY(t)
where
π is post-migration population
Y is population average income
A framework
R(t) = π(t)tY(t)
So
R’ = πY + π’tY + πtY’
and the dictator’s FOC is
(πY + π’tY + πtY’)S = -S’ πtY
or
1/t + π’/ π + Y’/Y + S’/S = 0
A framework
1/t + π’/ π + Y’/Y+S’/S = 0
No migration: π’=0
Migration: π’<0 so LHS will be lower. To
increase LHS, t must change
If π(t), Y(t) and S(t) are log-concave, t
must decrease
e.g. if income, emigration and probability of
rebellion all change faster as t increases
Extension
Y’=∂Y/∂t + ∂Y/∂π × π’
P’=∂P/∂ π × π’ + ∂P/∂Y × Y’
Now let dictator affect π independently of
tax
Preventing skilled emigration may
increase Y, decrease P
Also: distributional effects
Requires more complex economy
The model
Two types of workers, Skilled and Low
skilled
Economy Y=f(S,L)
Play:
1. Dictator chooses tax rate
2. Emigration
3. Remaining population may revolt
4. Outcomes: dictator’s or democratic tax rate
The model
Two types of workers, Skilled and Low
skilled
Economy Y=f(S,L) constant wages
Play:
1. Dictator chooses tax rate
2. Emigration
3. Remaining population may revolt
4. Outcomes: dictator’s or democratic tax rate
The model
Two types of workers, Skilled and Low
skilled
Economy Y=f(S,L) constant wages
Play:
1. Dictator chooses tax rate purely extractive
2. Emigration
3. Remaining population may revolt
4. Outcomes: dictator’s or democratic tax rate
The model
Two types of workers, Skilled and Low
skilled
Economy Y=f(S,L) constant wages
Play:
1. Dictator chooses tax rate purely extractive
2. Emigration skilled only emigrate;
distribution of outside wages
3. Remaining population may revolt
4. Outcomes: dictator’s or democratic tax rate
The model
Two types of workers, Skilled and Low
skilled
Economy Y=f(S,L) constant wages
Play:
1. Dictator chooses tax rate purely extractive
2. Emigration skilled only emigrate;
distribution of outside wages
3. Remaining population may revolt simple
cost-benefit decision
4. Outcomes: dictator’s or democratic tax rate
The model
Two types of workers, Skilled and Low
skilled
Economy Y=f(S,L) constant wages
Play:
1. Dictator chooses tax rate purely extractive
2. Emigration skilled only emigrate;
distribution of outside wages
3. Remaining population may revolt simple
cost-benefit decision
4. Outcomes: dictator’s or democratic tax rate
democratic tax 0
Questions
How to model participation in revolutions?
Simplest: assume probability of success is
linear in number of participants (gets rid of
game theory)
What about the cost?
Can the dictator redistribute?
Simplicity vs. “realism”
What happens in the democracy?
Ditto
EITM
An increase in the cost of emigration
increases the dictator’s extraction rate…
Test:
Historical data from the C19 age of
migration?
Proxies for “extractive tax”?
Cost of emigration: integration with world
economy? Rich-country immigration policy?
… and (???) the probability of transitions