December 5_ 2006
Document Sample


CORPORATIONS
Finance
December 5, 2006
CORPORATIONS
Issues In Finance
• Shares
• Entitles shareholders to receive dividends
• Entitles shareholders to vote for directors
• Debt
• Entitles creditors to receive interest payments
• Entitles creditors to receive collateral in default
CORPORATIONS
Issues In Finance
Competing
Shareholders
CORPORATIONS
Issues In Finance
• Shares
• Property rights – Coasean Contract – Why?
• Eliminates the prisoner dilemna in unenforceable
investment:
» If shareholders do not receive dividends, they have
the right to vote out the directors
CORPORATIONS
Issues In Finance
• Rights
• Property rights – Coasean Contract – Why?
• Where do these rights originate?
• Do these rights vary from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction?
CORPORATIONS
Issues In Finance
• Answer – Look at what happens in each country
» If a country has no publicly traded corporate shares -
what does this mean?
» If a country has a small stock market, but big banks,
what does this mean?
» Why is the price differential between the voting share
class and non-voting share class small in some
countries and large in other countries
CORPORATIONS
Issues In Finance
• The Laporta paper examined legal rules
covering protection of corporate
shareholders and creditors, the origin of
these rules, and the quality of their
enforcement in 49 countries.
CORPORATIONS
Issues In Finance
• The Laporta paper recognized two broad
legal families of rules:
• Common law (United States (Delaware), Canada
(Ontario), Britain, India, ...)
» Stronger enforcement of shareholder and debtor
rights
• Civil law (France, Germany, Sweden, ...)
» Weaker enforcement of shareholder and debtor
rights
CORPORATIONS
Issues In Finance
• What laws contribute to investor and
creditor protection:
• Company law
• Insider trading law
• Bankruptcy law
• Chapter 11 laws
CORPORATIONS
Issues In Finance
• What happens in countries with weaker
enforcement of shareholder and debtor
rights?
• What would Jensen and Meckling expect
to happen?
• Pooling or concentration of public and private
shares occurs.
• Why? Monitoring or agency costs are higher
because of weak external property rights.
• Pooling reduces the per capita agency costs
CORPORATIONS
Issues In Finance
• Who benefits most by contractual opting
out?
• Insiders
• Directors
• Lawyers
• Who loses most by contractual opting out?
• Outside shareholders
• Minority shareholders
CORPORATIONS
Issues In Finance
• In common law jurisdictions, when contractual
opting out is prevented
• The rule “One Share – One Vote” applies
• Outsider and minority shareholders have stronger rights
• In common law jurisdictions, when contractual
opting out occurs
• The rule “One Share – Many Votes” may apply as a matter of
contract
• The rights of minority and outside shareholders are
weakened
CORPORATIONS
Issues In Finance
• In common law jurisdictions, when
contractual opting out occurs, it may be
limited by statute
• The derivative law suit allows minority
shareholders to challenge the directors’ decisions
directly
• Another “oppression remedy” allows minority
shareholders to be bought out at a fair price
CORPORATIONS
Issues In Finance
• LaPorta’s results demonstrated that
common-law countries generally have the
strongest, and French-civil-law countries
the weakest, legal protections of investors,
with German- and Scandinavian-civil-law
countries located in the middle. Why?
CORPORATIONS
Issues In Finance
• LaPorta also found that concentration of
ownership of shares in the largest public
companies is negatively related to investor
protections. Why?
CORPORATIONS
Issues In Finance
• LaPorta’s result was consistent with the
hypothesis that small, diversified
shareholders are unlikely to be important
in countries that fail to protect their rights.
CORPORATIONS
Issues In Finance
Competing
Creditors
CORPORATIONS
Issues In Finance
• Imperfect Information
$C1 •Decreasing Marginal Costs Due to Precaution
•Increasing Marginal Costs Due To Production
Strict Liability Rule –
MC1
Contracted Liability
Rule – MC1
Expected Liability –
MC1
a1
Banks
Secured Creditors Debentures
Bonds
Preferred Creditors
Revenue Canada, Judgments
Unsecured Creditors
Employees, Suppliers
Shareholders
CORPORATIONS
Issues In Finance
• Debt
• Property rights – Coasean Contract – Why?
• Eliminates the prisoner dilemna in unenforceable
debt:
» If creditors do not receive interest payments, they
have the right to seize collateral
CORPORATIONS
Issues In Finance
• Limited Liability
$C1 • New Expectation Damages Rule Subject To The Limited Liability Rule
Limited Liability Rule
a1
CORPORATIONS
Issues In Finance
• The right to seize collateral underlies two
procedures
• Liquidation
• Corporate Reorganization
CORPORATIONS
Issues In Finance
• All of this relates to a fundamental
question in economics
• Do legal rules matter?
• Recall Pigou:
» No legal rules do not really matter – that is why he
recommended taxation or subsidy based policies
CORPORATIONS
Issues In Finance
• If legal rules do not matter, then do
contracts matter?
CORPORATIONS
Issues In Finance
• What would Neary and Winter expect to
happen?
• Not that much difference among jurisdictions.
Why? Problems of verifiability are global
• Long-Term Contracts do matter
• Similarly, Easterbrook and Fischel
• Not that much difference among jurisdictions.
Why? Corporations opt out of legal rules by way of
contracts among the various hierarchies
• Contracts matter
CORPORATIONS
Issues In Finance
• What can make contracts less important
because they are less effective?
• High transaction costs
• What happens if agency costs are even
higher relative to high transaction costs?
• Contracts will matter more
CORPORATIONS
Issues In Finance
• LaPorta’s study concluded
• Legal rules do matter
» In common law countries both shareholders and
creditors receive stronger protection
• Law enforcement is strongest in common law
countries, especially if they have good accounting
standards.
• Countries do develop substitute mechanisms
when the law provides poor investor protection.
• Ownership concentration does occur in countries
with poor investor protection
» Average – The three (3) largest shareholders own
50% of the shares
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