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					     Histoire du libéralisme en Europe

          Giampaolo Azzoni (Université de Pavie)
                  giampaolo.azzoni@unipv.it / cfs.unipv.it


“Liberté et loi dans la pensée de Bruno Leoni (1913-1967)”

                 Jeudi 6 mars 2003, 17h00 - 19h00
Ancona, 26 aprile 1913
Alpignano (Torino), 21 novembre 1967
”The Lectures comprising this volume were
delivered by Professor Bruno Leoni at Fifth
Institute of Freedom and Competitive
Enterprise [Claremont Men’s College,
Claremont, California] June 15 to June 18,
1958.”
L’amitié avec von Hayek

             Chicago, 1953: la naissance de l’amitié.

             Claremont (California), juin 1958: Fifth
             Institute of Freedom and Competitive
             Enterprise.

             Kassel, 1960: Bruno Leoni est élu
             secrétaire de la Mont Pelerin Society.

             Taiwan, 1965: mission d’étude de Leoni
             et von Hayek.

             Vichy, 1967: Bruno Leoni est élu
             président de la Mont Pelerin Society.
1ère phase (1938-1942): la science du droit




2ème phase (1946-1953): histoire
et méthodologie de la science
3ème phase (1954-1969): la maturité
de la pensée
       Le concept de liberté en Bruno Leoni

«Liberté» en Leoni est absence de contrainte, freedom from constraint
(liberté négative)

Pour Leoni il ne faut pas confondre liberté comme «absence de
contrainte» et liberté du besoin, freedom from want (liberté positive)




 “freedom from constraint”                 “freedom from want”
      Deux concepts de «certitude du droit»

L’importance de la certitude du droit pour l’économie

“According to Professor Hayek, the certainty of the Law is probably the
most important requirement for the economic activities of society and has
contributed much to the greater prosperity of the Western world as
compared with the Orient, where the certainty of the law was not so early
achieved. But he does analyze what the term “certainty” properly means
when referred to the law.”


Pour Leoni, il y a deux concepts de «certitude du droit»
      Deux concepts de «certitude du droit»

“short-run certainty of the law”   “long-run certainty of the law”


                                    “the possibility open to individuals
                                      of making long-run plans on the
                                          basis of a series of rules
 “the precision of written text
                                              spontaneously
  emanating from legislators”       adopted by people and eventually
                                      ascertained by judges through
                                         centuries and generations”
        Deux concepts de «certitude du droit»

“short-run certainty of the law”:           “long-run certainty of the law”:
  certitude de l’“État de droit”             certitude de la “Rule of Law”


La “short-run certainty” n’est pas véritable certitude:

“While legislation is almost always certain, that is, precise and
recognizable, as long as it is “in force”, people can never be certain that
the legislation in force today will be in force tomorrow or even tomorrow
morning”

“there is nothing to prevent a law, certain in the above-mentioned sense,
from being unpredictably changed by another law no less “certain” than
the previous one.”
    Législation et science: deux phénomènes
         contradictoires de la modernité

       Les deux phénomènes plus importantes de la modernité
“ … the increasing significance of legislation in almost all the legal
systems of the world is probably the most striking feature of our era,
besides technological and scientific progress.”


              Mais avec des logiques tout à fait différentes
“the development of science and technology, on the one hand, and that of
legislation, on the other, are based respectively on two completely
different and even contradictory ideas.”
    Législation et science: deux phénomènes
         contradictoires de la modernité

 science and technology:                       legislation: “authority”,
  “individual initiative and                   “contingent majorities”,
     individual freedom”                           “representation”

Le développement de la science est la preuve de la faillite des
décisions à la majorité ou sous contrainte
“No truly scientific result has ever reached through group decisions and
majority rule.”
 “[...] the history of modern science [...] constitutes the most convincing
evidence of the failure of decision groups and group decisions based on
some coercive procedure and more generally of the failure of constrained
exercised over individuals as a pretended means of promoting scientific
progress and of achieving scientific results.”
                La critique de l’idéologie de la
                   représentation politique
“The mythology of our age is not religious, but political, and its chief myths seem to be
“representation” of the people, on the hand, and the charismatic pretension of political
leaders to be in possession of the truth”

“representation, like legislation, is something altogether extraneous to the procedures
adopted for scientific and technological progress.”

la représentation politique n’est pas une véritable représentation (au sens
du droit privé):
“in order to restore to the word “representation” its original, reasonable meaning, there
should be a drastic reduction either in the number of those “represented” or in the number
of matters in regard to which they are allegedly represented, or in both”

Il y a une véritable démocratie seulement dans les cas où il a la règle de
l’unanimité ou dans les “Landsgemeinden” de la Suisse
“no group decision, if it not unanimous, is the expression of a will common to all the people
who participate in that decision”
         Représentation vs. volonté commune
                                     “common will”
                                                        “the will that emerges
                                                      from the collaboration of
     “a majority of the purported
                                                      all the people concerned,
  “representatives of the people””
                                                       without any recourse to
                                                          group decisions and
                                                            decision groups”




“This will is “common” in the sense that all those individuals who participate in
manifesting and exercising it in a community are free to do so, while all those who
eventually do not agree are equally free to do so in their turn without being forced
by other people to accept their decision.”
        Représentation vs. volonté commune




“This common will creates and keeps alive words in the ordinary language as well
as agreements and engagements among various parties without any need of
coercion in relations among individuals; exalts popular artists, writers, actors, or
wrestlers; and creates and keeps alive fashions, rules of courtesy, moral rules,
and so on.”
       L’illusion de la législation et sa faillite
                   épistémologique

 La critique menée par Ludwig von Mises à l’économie centralisée
       n’est qu’un cas particulier d’une critique plus générale
“The fact that the central authorities in a totalitarian economy lack any
knowledge of market prices in making their economic plans is only a
corollary of the fact that central authorities always lack a sufficient
knowledge of the infinite number of elements and factors that contribute
to the social intercourse of individuals at any time and at any level.”

 “[...] its conclusions may be considered only as a special case of a more
general realization that no legislator would be able to establish by
himself, without some kind of continuous collaboration on the part of all
the people concerned, the rules governing the actual behaviour of
everybody in the endless relationships that each has with everybody”
            Découverte vs. création du droit

“Both the Romans and the English shared the idea that the law is
something to be discovered more than to be enacted and that nobody is
so powerful in his society as to be in position to identify his own will with
the law of the land.”

“The German word Rechtsfindung, i. e. the operation of finding the law,
seems to render well the central idea of the Juristenrecht and of the
Continental European jurist’s activity as a whole.”
       Législation imposée vs. droit pratiqué


“Legislation may have and actually has in many cases today a negative
effect on the very efficacy of rules and on the homogeneity of the feelings
and convictions already prevailing in a given society. For legislation may
also deliberately or accidentally disrupt homogeneity by destroying
established rules and by nullifying existing conventions and agreements
that have hitherto been voluntarily accepted and kept.”
           Le modèle du droit privé romain
Le droit privé romain avait un concept de certitude comme “long-
run certainty”
“The Romans accepted and applied a concept of the certainty of the law
that could be described as meaning that the law was never to be
subjected to sudden and unpredictable changes.”

Le droit privé romain n’était pas un droit produit par la législation
“Private Roman law, which the Romans called jus civile, was kept
practically beyond the reach of legislators during most of the long history
of the Roman Republic end the Empire”

Le droit privé romain était plutôt découvert que produit
“private Roman Law was something to be described or to be discovered,
not something to be enacted – a world of things that were there, forming
part of the common heritage of all Roman citizens.”
      Le droit (publique et privé) selon Caton

“Is [Cato] dicere solebat ob hanc causam praestare nostrae civitatis
statum ceteris civitatibus, quod in illis singuli fuissent fere quorum suam
quisque rem publicam constituisset legibus atque institutis suis, ut
Cretum Minos, Lacedaemoniorum Lycurgus, Atheniensium, quae
persaepe commutata esset, tum Theseus, tum Draco, tum Solo, tum
Clisthenes, tum multi alii, postremo exsanguem iam et iacentem doctus
vir Phalereus sustentasset Demetrius, nostra autem res publica non
unius esset ingenio, sed multorum, nec una hominis vita, sed aliquot
constituta saeculis et aetatibus. Nam neque ullum ingenium tantum
extitisse dicebat, ut, quem res nulla fugeret quisquam aliquando fuisset,
neque cuncta ingenia conlata in unum tantum posse uno tempore
providere, ut omnia complecterentur sine rerum usu ac vetustate.”

Cicero, De Republica, 2, 1, 2.
      Le droit (publique et privé) selon Caton

“Egli [Catone] soleva dire che la nostra costituzione politica era superiore
a quella degli altri stati, perché le leggi e le istituzioni non erano state
opera di singoli uomini, come di Minosse a Creta, di Licurgo a Sparta, e
di Teseo, di Dracone, di Solone, di Clistene e di molti altri in Atene, che
mutò spesso la sua forma politica, finché ormai indebolita e prostrata, fu
risollevata dall’abilità di Demetrio Falero. La nostra costituzione, invece,
non è sorta per opera di un solo uomo e di una sola generazione, ma nel
corso di parecchie età e per virtù di molti uomini. Diceva infatti Catone
che non vi fu mai ingegno tanto alto a cui nulla potesse sfuggire, e che
neppure tanti ingegni riuniti insieme, senza l’esperienza che deriva dal
trascorrere del tempo, potrebbero in un solo momento storico prevedere
tutto e a tutto provvedere”. (Tr. it. di Anna Resta Barrile)

Cicerone, Lo Stato, 2, 1, 2.
       Le droit (publique et privé) selon Caton
“La constitution de notre cité, aimait-il [Caton] à dire, est supérieure à celle des
autres cités, pour la raison suivante: là, ce furent en général des individus qui
constituèrent leurs États respectifs par leurs lois et leur organisation; par exemple
pour la Crète, Minos, pour Lacédémone, Lycurgus, pour Athènes, qui changea si
souvent de Régime, ce furent d’abord Thésée, puis Dracon, Solon, Chlisthène,
puis beaucoup d’autres, et enfin le savant Démétrius de Phalère qui, lorsqu’elle
était déjà exsangue et terrassée, réussit à la ranimer. Notre État, au contraire, n’a
pas été constitués par l’intelligence d’un seul homme, mais par celle d’un grand
nombre; et non au cours d’une seule vie d’homme, mais par des générations,
pendant plusieurs siècles. Il n’a jamais existé, disait-il, un génie assez grand pour
ne rien laisser échapper de tous les faits, et tous les génies réunis pour n’en faire
qu’un seraient incapables, à un moment donné de prendre de sages mesures, en
embrassant toute la réalité, s’ils manquaient de l’expérience que donne une
longue durée.” (tr. fr. par Esther Bréguet)

Cicerone, La République, 2, 1, 2.
“Famous scholars have noted the lack of individuality of the Roman
jurists. Savigny called them “fungible personalities”. This lack of
individuality was a natural counterpart of their individualistic view of the
private laws they were studying. Private law was conceived of by them as
a common inheritance of each and all of the Roman citizens. Therefore,
nobody felt entitled to change it at his own will. When changes occurred,
they were recognized by the jurists as having already happened in their
environment rather than being introduced by the jurists themselves.”
                           Qui fait le droit

“arbitrary will of particular men”             “common citizens”



    “legislative assemblies”              “ordinary men in the street”




 “the process of law-making is, or was, essentially a private affair
concerning millions of people throughout dozen of generations and
               stretching across several centuries”.


                    “the impersonal law of the land”
                    Le droit spontané

“spontaneous application of nonlegislated rules of behaviour”

 On a un ordre spontané dans les cas de:
“ordinary language”
“rules of courtesy”
“moral rules”
“customs”
“common law”
“free market”
“agreements and engagements among various parties without any need
of coercion”
“fashions”
“popular artists, writers, actors, or wrestlers”
L’école italienne du droit spontané / muet


                Roberto Ago
                Bruno Leoni
                Gino Gorla
               Rodolfo Sacco
    Le droit comme équilibre dynamique des
            prétensions individuelles

     Le droit n’est pas norme ou obligation (Hand Kelsen), mais
                   prétension individuelle (“claim”)

                           Prétensions juridiques
“quelle [...] pretese che hanno un’elevata probabilità di essere soddisfatte
 dalle persone corrispondenti in una data società ed in un dato periodo,
  essendo variabili le ragioni per cui esse possono essere soddisfatte in
 ogni singolo caso, basate alternativamente o congiuntamente su norme
                             morali o tecniche.”

                     Prétensions non-juridiques
 quelle pretese “con scarsa o nessuna probabilità di essere soddisfatte
 dalle persone corrispondenti in circostanze normali (come quella di un
     rapinatore che agisce in pieno giorno in una strada affollata)”.
  Une perspective de politique de droit contre
                la législation

           “socialism and legislation are inevitably connected”

       Il y a le risque de “perpetual unrest and general oppression”

 “legislation in matters of private law is fundamentally incompatible with
                             individual freedom”

           la réduction de l’espace des décisions d’autorité
    “I am convinced that the more we manage to reduce the large area
 occupied at present by group decisions in politics and in the law, with all
 their paraphernalia of elections, legislation, and so on, the more we shall
  succeed in establishing a state of affairs similar to that which prevails in
the domain of language, of common law, of the free market, of fashion, of
    customs, etc., where all individual choices adjust themselves to one
            another and no individual choice is ever overruled.”

				
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