Criminal Law Cases

Themes - We want the police to stop crime - Liberty v. Security? UNITED STATES (Pl.) v. WATSON (def.) 423 U.S. 411, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976) Justice White FACTS: Khoury, the ―reliable‖ informant, told a federal postal worker that Watson had provided him with a stolen card and promised more at another meeting a few days later. At that meeting, Khoury signaled the inspector when it was identified that Watson had the cards and the inspector arrested Watson without a warrant. PROCEDURE: The Court of appeals held the arrest unconstitutional because the inspector had failed to secure an arrest warrant although he concededly had time to do so. On appeal to Supreme Court. ISSUE: Is the acquisition of an arrest warrant mandated when there is ample time to acquire one? HOLDING: Decision reversed. The arrest was constitutional. An arrest may be made through probable cause and without an arrest warrant even if there was enough time to acquire one. ANALYSIS: - Under the 4th Amendment it is not unreasonable for postal inspectors to arrest without a warrant but with probable cause - There is nothing in the Court’s prior cases indicating a warrant is required to make a valid arrest for a felony - Section 30:61 – It is ok for warrantless arrests with probable cause (Congress) - Gerstein: Intolerable handicap for legitimate law enforcement AND the court has never invalidated an arrest solely because of a failure to secure a warrant - Common law rule: Police officer can make an arrest without a warrant for crime committed in his presence - It is a judicial preference, but should not be a constitutional rule DECENTORS: - Decision reduces power of the 4th Amendment - There were 2 crimes…exigent circumstances on 2nd offense - The precedent is spurious…and longstanding government practice should not immunize it from scrutiny - Common law balanced need for arrests in exigent circumstances when encountered and provide for magistrate oversight to protect against mistaken insults - Privacy better protected with a warrant requirement - ―Arrest warrant rule‖ I DON’T THINK THAT THE REVERSAL OF THE APPEALS COURT DECISION WOULD LEAD TO SCANT USE OF ARREST WARRANTS AND RAMPANT DISREGARD OF PRIVACY RIGHTS. POLICE OFFICERS STILL MUST JUSTIFY THEIR PROBABLE CAUSE IN COURT. THIS PROTECTS THE PRIVACY OF THE PUBLIC. WARRANTS WILL STILL BE ACQUIRED FOR THEIR PROTECTION. IN THIS CASE OF PROBABLE CAUSE AND EXIGENCY, SEEKING A WARRANT WOULD ALLOW THE SUSPECT TO FLEE. Exclusionary Rule: Violations of the 4th amendment. Incriminating evidence garnered from unreasonable searches and seizures must be excluded in the prosecution of the case. WOLF (pl.) v. COLORADO (def.) 338 U.S. 25, 69 S.Ct. 1359, 93 L.Ed. 1782 (1949) Justice Frankfurter FACTS: Unknown PROCEDURE: Unknown ISSUE: Does a conviction by a state court for a state offense deny the due process of law required by the 14th amendment (civil rights), solely because evidence that was admitted at the trial was obtained under circumstances which would have rendered it inadmissible in a prosecution for violation of a federal law in a court of the US because there deemed to be an infraction of the 4th Amendment? (Does the basic right to protection against arbitrary intrusion by the police demand the exclusion of logically related evidence?) HOLDING: In a prosecution in a state court for a state crime the 14th amendment does not forbid the admission of evidence attained by unreasonable search and seizure. ANALYSIS: Weeks v. US – In a federal prosecution, evidence secured through illegal search and seizure barred (Matter of judicial interpretation) 30 states reject Weeks doctrine. The exclusion of evidence only serve those who, upon their person or property, something incriminating has been found Exclusion may be effective in deterring unreasonable searches, but other methods may be equally as effective 4th Amendment: security of one’s privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police. How do we enforce these rights? You can sue the cops, civil remedies, demand for law changes if it doesn’t work (another remedy) Dissenters - Murphy, Rutledge, Douglas - Self-scrutiny is an ideal, but expecting a DA to prosecute his office for well-meaning violations of the search and seizure clause is tougher - If seized evidence is used at trial, it justifies the unlawful search - The amendment has no effective sanction is there is no exclusionary rule - Douglas MAPP (pl.) v. OHIO (def.) 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961). (Selective Incorporation Doctrine) Justice Clark - Someone bombed Don King’s house. He ran a lottery. Dabbled in bookmaking. Alex Burns did this. FACTS: On May 23, 1957, three Cleveland police officers arrived at appellant’s residence pursuant to info that ―a person was hiding out in the home that was wanted for questioning in connection with a recent bombing and that there was evidence inside.‖ Dolly Mapp refused entry without a search warrant. Three hours later, officers forcibly entered the residence. The officer held up a piece of paper when asked for the warrant and the woman took the paper. After a struggle for the paper, the officer handcuffed the woman. The basement contained a trunk with evidence that led to her conviction. Lewd photos, books. Sent to prison on a statute that banned lewd material. PROCEDURE: Upholding of Wolf ruling in case on appeal from the Ohio Supreme Court ISSUE: Is evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution admissible in a state court? Does the exclusionary rule apply to the states via the 14th Amendment? HOLDING: Reserved and remanded. No, evidence obtained from illegal search and seizures are not admissible in state court. Exclusionary rule applies to the states ANALYSIS: Pro: - Because other remedies have failed to secure compliance with the constitutional provisions, more than half the states that passed Wolf have adhered to Weeks Elkins ―Silver Platter Doctrine‖ – Evidence of a federal crime seized by state authorities could be handed to the federal authorities to use freely Rea – The state prosecution cannot use Evidence from a state crime that was seized by federal authorities. In California, police discipline note working. 4th Amendment right to privacy enforceable through 14th (due process clause), enforceable by same exclusion used by federal government Purpose of exclusionary rule is to deter by removing incentive to disregard it Cardozo, ―the criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered‖ Law set him free The process has been successful for federal courts 4th on unreasonable searches with 5th against self-incrimination, requires rule Dissenting: (Harlan, Frankfurter, Whittaker) - States should be Constitutionally free to follow or disregard the rule as they see fit - Flexible contours of the due process clause - Coerced confession analogy o The way evidence was obtained and not simply its relevance is important o How forcibly? KATZ v. UNITED STATES 389 U.S. 347, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). (Protected areas and interests) Justice Stewart FACTS: Katz convicted of transmitting wagering information by telephone from LA to Miami and Boston in violation of a federal statute. Government was permitted at trail to introduce evidence of Katz’s end of the telephone conversation, overheard by FBI agents, who had attached an electronic listening and recording device to the outside of a public phone booth. PROCEDURE: Petition of certiorari to the Supreme Court - Convicted in trial court - Upheld by Court of Appeals; no physical entrance to telephone booth ISSUE: Does placing a listening device in the top of a phone booth to listen to calls constitute a violation of the 4th Amendment? Is physical penetration of a necessary before a search and seizure can violate the 4th Amendment? Does the 4th Amendment protect surveillance without trespassing and without seizure? HOLDING: Judgment reversed. Government’s actions violated the privacy Katz was justifiably relied while using the booth, and this constituted a search and seizure within the 4th Amendment. Reversed Olmstead (PUBLIC PLACE (reasonable expectation of privacy)) ANALYSIS: - The 4th Amendment protects people, not places. Public exposure is not subject to 4th Amendment protection, but what he seeks to preserve as private may be. Protection against ears. - One who occupies the booth, shuts the door, and pays the toll assumes privacy - Olmstead: Surveillance without trespassing and without seizure fell outside the Constitution. o Departed form this view o Amendment cannot turn upon presence or absence of physical intrusion - Does it apply to Constitutional standards? o They took great precautions, however, magistrate approval would approve the limited search that took place. o It substitutes the less reliable procedure of after-the-event justification o Leaves it up to police discretion. - You have to want to keep it private. (Keeping your voice down in the phone booth) Dissent (Black): - Framers of Constitution did not put in a provision for eavesdropping - Few things happen to an individual that do not affect his privacy - 4th Amendment is a vehicle for holding all laws violative of the Constitution which offend the court’s broadest concept of privacy It doesn’t have to be a physical intrusion. CALIFORNIA v. GREENWOOD 486 U.S. 35, 108 S.Ct. 1625, 100 L.Ed.2d 30 (1988). Justice White FACTS: Investigator Stacner received information that Greenwood may be involved with narcotics trafficking. Stracner asked the trash collector to put Greenwood’s trash aside for police investigation. Items related to narcotics use were found; she received a search warrant and arrested Greenwood after discovering large quantities of cocaine and hashish. After more reports of late-night visitors to Greenwood’s home, investigator Hahaeuser repeated Stracner’s process to arrest Greenwood. PROCEDURE: CA Supreme Court denied State petition for review of the Court of Appeal’s decision. Supreme Court grants certiorari - Superior Court dismissed charges under People (warrantless trash search violates 4th Amendment, no probable cause without search) - Court of Appeal affirmed ISSUE: Did the respondents expose their trash to the public sufficiently to relinquish 4th Amendment proection? Is there a reasonable expectation of privacy? Court decides no HOLDING: Judgment reversed. Trash is public domain. No warrant required. ANALYSIS: White: - Warrantless search and seizure would violate 4th Amendment if respondents manifested an expectation of privacy in their garbage that society thought reasonable - The trash was place on the street in an opaque bag, which the collector would deposit with others at the dump. - A expectation of privacy does not give rise to 4th Amendment protection unless the expectation is reasonable - Bag deposited in an area suitable for public inspection, and for the purpose that strangers take it. - Katz: That which is knowingly exposed to the public is not subject to 4th Amendment protection. Objective reasonability. - Anyone can start picking through trash. Putting it out for purpose of transferring it out. - Smith: The phone number that you dial is logged somewhere. Is there a reasonable expectation of privacy in phone numbers you dial? NO - Giving to 3rd person, it is out in public for others to rifle through. Dissents (Brennan, Marshall) - If a package is closed against inspection the 4th Amendment protects its contents wherever it may be, and the police must obtain a warrant - Opaque, sealed bags - A search can expose private details, ―sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life‖ - If trash spills out or is on the curb open, in plain view of police - Katz: What a person seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected. - County commended him to leave trash on curb and denied him to dispose of it any other way - Here, a letter could lose 4th Amendment protection for the purpose of entrusting it to the postal carrier. Read P.88 footnote B - If the government violated anyone’s justified expectation of privacy, it constitutes a 4th Amendment search. However, through Katz, the interpretation has been applied only in situations of one’s own property FLORIDA v. RILEY 488 U.S. 445, 109 S.Ct. 693, 102L.Ed.2d 835 (1989). Justice White FACTS: - California v. Ciraolo: Police inspected the backyard of a house while flying at 1,000 feet. Officers found marijuana growing with the naked eye, a search warrant was obtained on these merits, and the defendants were arrested. The CA State Supreme Court recognized that the expectation of privacy of a fence was not reasonable that society was prepared to honor. Public airway travel is now routine. PROCEDURE: The court answered that a warrant was needed for the search and the Supreme Court granted the state’s petition for certiorari. ISSUE: Whether surveillance of the interior of a partially covered greenhouse in a residential backyard from a helicopter 400 feet in the air constitutes a search for which a warrant is required. HOLDING: Reversed. The 4th Amendment simply does not require police traveling in public airways at this altitude to obtain a warrant in order to observe what is visible to the naked eye. Have a PLURALITY ANALYSIS: Does society have different standards with respect to different locations? (Rural vs. urban landscape) White o Helicopter was NOT violating the law o Nothing to suggest that helicopters flying at 400 feet are sufficiently rare for the respondent to expect that his greenhouse would be private o No undue noise, dust, or threat of injury O’Connor o There is considerable use of public airspace at 400 feet and above, and Riley introduced no evidence to the contrary (Reasonable expectation of privacy) o Police helicopters circling a home may be in violation Brennan w/Marshall and Stevens (Dissenting) o Denying essence of Katz, claim that expectation of privacy defeated if a member of society could position themselves in a way without breaking the law o Surveillance from a public road different than from a helicopter o Riley’s expectation of backyard privacy was reasonable o Flights hovering 400 feet are a rarity o Burden of proof rests with state, coercive power of the state should not be brought to bear in these cases. (Police had ways of getting into the airspace and knowing more than the public) - - UNITED STATES v. KARO (pp.98) 468 U.S. 705, 104 S.Ct. 3296, 82 L.Ed.2d 530 (1984). Justice White FACTS: Agent Rottinger of the DEA learned that Kano ordered 50 gallons of ether from informant Muehlenweg. Ether had been used to extract cocaine from clothing shipped into the United States. The government obtained a court order and placed a beeper in one of the cans of ether. The vehicles containing the ether cans arrived at the Taos residence and, according to the beepers, stayed there for 2 days. The agents obtained a search warrant, found the cocaine, and arrested the respondents. PROCEDURE: - District court granted pretrial motion to suppress evidence on the grounds of an invalid beeper installation - United States appealed but did not challenge warrant invalidation - Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that a warrant was required to install the beeper and to monitor it in private dwellings - Petition for certiorari to Supreme Court ISSUE: Was there reasonable expectation of privacy in Kano? Yes What is society willing to accept? 1. Whether installation of a beeper in a container of chemicals with consent of the original owner constitutes a 4th Amendment search and seizure when the container is delivered to a buyer having no knowledge of the beeper 2. Whether monitoring of the beeper falls within the ambit of the 4th Amendment when it reveals information that could not have been obtained through visual surveillance. HOLDING: The transfer of the container did not constitute a seizure. A warrant must be obtained to monitor a beeper that falls within private residences. Striking the monitoring, the evidence in the house should not have been suppressed. No expectation of privacy for trash ANALYSIS: - Not like Riley, that was naked eye sight, this is not. - The actual placement of the beeper did not violate the 4th Amendment. Muehlenweg’s consent was sufficient - The transfer of the can did not violate privacy interest or constitute a seizure. (No possessory interest affected in a meaningful way) - United States v. Knotts: Court held that, since the movements of the can and transfer to the cabin could be seen by the naked eye, no 4th Amendment violation was committed. - Without a warrant, the government obtains info it could not have obtained from outside the house - Indiscriminate monitoring of property withdraw from public view is a privacy interests issue - Requisite justification that a crime is going to be committed is not enough Stevens Dissenting (Brennan and Marshall Join) - Attachment of the beeper constituted a seizure - Beeper also revealed when the can had been moved. Contents in a can are not open to public view, but the beeper gives the information. KYLLO v. UNITED STATES 533 U.S. 27, 121 S.Ct. 2038, 150 L.Ed.2d.94 (2001). Justice Scalia FACTS: Agent Elliott suspected that marijuana was being grown at Kyllo’s home. Elliott used an Agema Thermavision 210 Thermal Scanner to detect that heat emanating from the petition’s garage was consistent with the high intensity lamps needed to grow marijuana plants. Based on tips from electric bills, informants, and thermal imaging, he obtained a warrant and arrested Kyllo. PROCEDURE: - Petitioner was indicted on one count of marijuana manufacture. - Petition unsuccessfully moved to suppress evidence seized and entered a guilty plea - Court of Appeals affirmed - Petition for certiorari to the supreme Court ISSUE: Did the use of the thermal image scanner to obtain a warrant constitute an unlawful search in violation of the 4th Amendment? What limits are there upon the power of technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy? HOLDING: Court of Appeals decision reversed. The Thermovision Imager search was deemed unlawful. Does not turn on intrusion or no intrusion. Does it violate reasonable expectation of privacy? Yes, being in the home is PRIVACY Does the nature of the location targeted by the police matter? If you are increasing sensory perception, like Katz ANALYSIS: - The Katz Test – Expectation of privacy that society deems reasonable - Cannot withdraw minimum expectation of privacy in the interior of homes - Sense-enhancing technology, at least not in public use, that provides information as to the interior of a person’s home is unlawful search - Government claims that the heat was only external. However, a microphone picks up sound waves that were rejected in Katz - Government claims that the search did not, ―detect private activities in private areas.‖ However, 4th Amendment protection not tied to quality or quantity of info gleaned. Stevens dissents with Rehnquist, O’Connor, and Kennedy - Simply off-the-wall surveillance that is exposed to public - No details regarding interior of home revealed - U.S. v. Place: A dog sniffing the presence of narcotics, like sense-enhancing technology, is not a search - If equipment did provide functional access, the rule should apply - Must give legislators the opportunity to grapple with emerging issues rather than shackle them with constitutional restraints. Technique Phone Tap Trash Grab Chopper 1 choppers Beeper Hot stuff Case Katz Greenwood Riley Kano Kyllo Reasonable ex. of privacy? Why? Yes Private convo No 3rd Party Transfer No Public Use of Airspace (Many have No Naked Eye Yes Private Spaces Yes Enhanced observation (rare tech) No, if everyone had a machine Probable Cause - Warrant clause of the 4th Amendment provides that, ―no warrants should be issued but upon probable cause. An arrest or search is unreasonable unless based upon probable cause. When police arrest or search without a warrant, they make the decision for themselves; when the search or arrest is with a warrant, the magistrate makes the judgment. But the decision is not final. - There can be enough to get a search warrant and not for an arrest and the other way around. - Search – Show by substantial evidence that the items you are trying to seize is seizable, connected to criminal activity, and it will be found in the place to be searched. Don’t have to demonstrate whose it is - Arrest – Probable cause that a crime has been committed and the person who you want to arrest has committed it. Can exist without evidence of contraband at any premises under a person’s control. - Probable cause needed for both search and arrest warrants - The Supreme Court prefers warrants SPINELLI v. UNITED STATES 393 U.S. 410, 89 S. Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969) Justice Harlan FACTS: The FBI tracked Spinelli’s movements for 5 days. Four of the five days Spinelli was seen crossing one of two bridges from Illinois to St. Louis. On four of five days, his car was seen in the parking lot for residents of an apartment complex. On one day, he entered the apartment. His apartment contained two telephone lines. The application for affidavit stated that Spinelli is known to agents as a bookmaker, gambler, and associate of gamblers. An informant stated that Spinelli was operating a handbook and running a gambling operation from the two numbers that matched those in the apartment. PROCEDURE: Spinelli was convicted of intention to conduct gambling activities proscribed by Missouri law. At every stage, petitioner challenged constitutionality of the search warrant that the FBI conducted and found materials for his conviction. GRANTED CERTIORARI because the principles of Aguilar should be clarified. ISSUE: Is an informant’s tip – even when confirmed to minor extent – sufficient to provide a basis for the finding of probable cause? HOLDING: No finding of probable cause. Court of Appeals judgment reversed. ANALYSIS: - Aguilar test for determining probable cause for a warrant o ―Underlying circumstances‖ allowing the magistrate to judge validity (Basis of knowledge) o Support for the claim that informant was ―credible‖ or his information ―reliable‖ (veracity) - In the present case, the informant’s information that Spinelli was running a gambling operation and that the telephone numbers assigned were the exact numbers of the apartment Spinelli entered. Without this info, probable cause could not have been established in the first place. - Spinelli’s movements form Illinois to St. Louis, parking at an apartment house, his phone listing, and his known reputation for gambling operations are not sufficient on face value. - Has to be evidence of a crime. - The informer’s report must be measured against Aguilar standards - Considering the weight of the informer’s tip: (Reliable tip) o Affiant did not offer the court reason for support that the tip was reliable o The tip does not contain underlying circumstances from which informer concluded a gambling ring o He did not explain why the sources were reliable o The tip did not describe the criminal activity in such detail that goes beyond casual rumors - Draper: Benchmark for detail provided by informant (Reliable informant) o The tip-provider described in minute details the clothes the person would be wearing, when he would be traveling, and how much drugs he would have on him. Sufficient evidence to make reliable inference o Not applicable here: informant could have hear the numbers at a local bar White concurring - After the phone numbers linking Spinelli to the tip to the apartment, the Draper principle should apply because a reliable inference could have been made. - 2 different numbers used in an apartment away from home indicates bookmaking. - Voted with the court because he didn’t want to produce a divided court 3-3 (one of the judges didn’t participate) ILLINOIS v. GATES (pp.118) 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) Justice Rehnquist FACTS: The Bloomingdale, IL police receive an anonymous letter informing them the location and nature of The Gates’ drug dealings. Sue drives car to Florida where she leaves it to be loaded with drugs. Lance flies down and drives it back. The informant makes note of the next drug run. Detective Mader took the case and found out the following: L. Gates made a reservation to fly to Florida on May 5. The DEA agent on Mader’s flight saw him and followed him to a Holiday Inn. Lance went into a room reserved by Susan, emerged the next day with an unidentified woman and Mercury Hornet owned by Gates. They were driving towards Illinois. Mader signed an affidavit setting forth the facts with a copy of the anonymous letter. The judge issued a search warrant for the Gates’ residence and automobile. Everything happened as the letter predicted, and the Bloomingdale police were waiting for them when they arrived home. Recovered were 350 lbs of marijuana in the car, and contraband and marijuana in the house. PROCEDURE: The Illinois Circuit Court ordered suppression of the items, on the ground that the affidavit failed to support necessary determination of probable cause that Gates’ auto and home had the contraband in question. Decision affirmed by Illinois Appellate and Supreme Court. They stated that the anonymous letter, standing alone, was not enough to determine probable cause. ISSUE: Did the judge have a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause to search the Gates’ home and car existed. HOLDING: Illinois Supreme Court decision reversed. Abandon 2-pronged test, reaffirm totality of circumstances ANALYSIS: - Letter gives no basis for writer’s predictions regarding the Gates’ criminal activities. Needed something more - Illinois put the two pronged test in Spinelli to work o Veracity prong not fulfilled – No way of knowing anonymous writer was credible o Basis of knowledge prong not fulfilled - These 2 prongs should be taken together to illuminate common sense and practicality - Probable Cause o Dealing with probabilities, not technical analysis…It is a fluid concept o Rigid rules are ill suited to an area of such diversity. One rule will not cover every situation - TOTALITY OF CIRCUMSTANCES ANALYSIS o A deficiency in one prong may be compensated by the other o If an informant has been reliable in the past, poor basis of knowledge can be compensated for  Jones: Probable cause to search petitioners’ apartment because of tip from reliable informant  Rugendorf: Multiple informants told police stolen furs were in house  Ker: Had previously sold marijuana to police officer; police observed Ker even though nothing appeared to change hands; car chase ensued…probable cause o Affidavits are normally drafted by non-lawyers in haste of investigation o Many warrants are issued by common-sense judgments of laymen o If rules continue to be so technical, police officers will engaged in more warrantless searches and hope for an exception to the search warrant rule o Spinelli denies ―to provide for the security of the individual and his property‖ o As a result of the test, anonymous tips are rarely investigated o Nathanson: Conclusory statements alone are not sufficient. We need basis for determining existence of probable cause o Draper: Tip on nabbing heroin dealer. Police corroboration of tip provided for reasonable grounds when the suspect was located o The facts alone suggest that Gates was involved with drug trafficking. The timing of the exchange in Florida was suspicious o Police corroboration verifies the anonymous tip White Concurring: - The warrant should be upheld through the Aguilar-Spinelli framework - Lower court’s characterization of Gates’ activity as totally innocent is dubious - Did the actions observed by the police (corroboration) give rise to inference that the informant is credible and that he reliably obtained his information? Yes - Does not join court’s holding to remove probable cause two-pronged test - Need prerequisites for warrants, like credible information Brennan Dissenting: - Ill-advised rejection of the two-pronged test - Spinelli stands for the proposition that corroboration of tip details may satisfy veracity, but not basis of knowledge. Detail in informant’s tip may be sufficient to satisfy basis of knowledge prong. - Cannot rely on non-technical nature of probable cause - Standards help structure probable cause inquiries to help non-lawyer judges in determining probable cause Stevens dissenting: - Discrepancy in informant predictions and Gates’ actions. Sue did not fly back form Florida. They were actually together, and therefore the prediction that one spouse was always home to guard the contraband was false - The discrepancy made the Gates’ conduct less unusual - Cannot accept conclusion that probable cause justified a search of the home before their arrival in Bloomingdale. Informant’s note was faulty in one significant respect. Standard of review - Deferential Review – de novo (look at an issue as if it is the first time). However, on issues that apply to the law, appellate courts give deference. A finding of probable cause will be confirmed as long as the lower court has the substantial basis for determining probable cause existed. The reviewing court just needs to say that enough is there for the lower judge to find probable cause Is there fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime would be found in a particular place? (Probable Cause under Gates) Probable Cause – The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, commonsense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him… - MARYLAND v. PRINGLE 540 U.S. 366, 124 S.Ct. 795, 157 L.Ed.2d 769 (2003). Justice Rehnquist FACTS: Police officer stopped a Maxima with Partlow (driver), Pringle (Front-seat Passenger), and Smith (Back-seat passenger) riding in it for speeding. Partlow opened the glove compartment to get the driver’s license and the officer saw a large amount of rolled-up money. After the boys checked out with the computer system, the officer told Partlow to get out of the car. Partlow consented to a search of the vehicle. The search yielded $763 from the glove compartment and five baggies of cocaine from behind the backseat arm-rest. The men offered no information as to the ownership of the drugs, and all three were arrested. Later, Pringle gave an oral confession acknowledging possession of the cocaine. He maintained that the others did not know of the cocaine. PROCEDURE: - Trial court denied Pringle’s motion to suppress confession as the fruit of an illegal arrest (Probable cause) - Jury convicted Pringle of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. - Court of Appeals reversed, holding insufficient facts showing Pringle’s control over the drugs. The mere finding of cocaine in the back seat was insufficient to establish probable cause to arrest for possession by the front-seat passenger ISSUE: Whether the officer had probable cause to believe Pringle committed the crime HOLDING: Affirmed Appeals Court. Officer had probable cause to believe Pringle had committed possession of a controlled substance. NEED TO CONSIDER EVERYTHING TOGETHER. ANALYSIS: - Totality of circumstances basis o Probable cause based on reasonable ground for belief of guilt. (Was a crime and specific person had committed it). Belief must be particularized. - $763 in cash in front of Pringle. Cocaine was accessible to all 3 men. - Maryland Supreme Court thinks money along is innocuous - Reasonable inference that any or all three men had knowledge of the cocaine (Sole or joint probable cause) ―Common enterprise‖ - Pringle countered with Ybarra and Di Re: o Ybarra  Officers got a warrant to search a tavern and found cocaine on Ybarra  Court held that police could not do broad searches, must be individualized  In the present case, it was a small car and it was reasonable to confer a common enterprise among the men o Di Re  Counterfeit gasoline ration coupons handoff in a car  Di Re was in front passenger seat, and nothing could be connected to him. Lack of probable cause  Any inference that everyone at a crime scene is a party disappears after someone is singled out. In this case, no one was singled out. - What level of suspicion? Bright line issues RICHARDS v. WISCONSIN (pp.141) 520 U.S. 385, 117 S.Ct. 1416, 137 L.Ed.2d 615 (1997). Justice Stevens FACTS: Police in Madison obtained a warrant to search Richards’ hotel room for drugs. The warrant was the culmination of evidence that Richards was dealing. The ―no-knock‖ entry provision was taken off the warrant. The police knocked on the door, Richards opened it to find maintenance man and police officers, Richards shut the door quickly. After waiting 2-3 seconds, the officers kicked down the door while identifying themselves, caught Richards trying to escape, and recovered cocaine. Was the entry made in a constitutional way? PROCEDURE: - Richards attempted to suppress the evidence because of officer failure to knock and enter - Trial court denied the motion (strange behavior implied destroying evidence or escape) - Richards appealed to Wisconsin Supreme Court - Wisc. S.Ct. concluded that exigent circumstances justifying a no-knock entry are always present in drug felony cases (high risk of serious injury and potential for drug disposal) - Wisc. S.Ct. created a blanket exception because of the drug culture (Always have exigent circumstances) ISSUE: Whether threats of physical violence and opportunity to dispose of drugs justify eliminating case-bycase evaluation of the manner in which a search is executed. HOLDING: The officer’s no-knock enter did not violate the 4th Amendment. Circumstances in this case warranted the result. However, they reversed the ruling on the blanket exception. ANALYSIS: - In Wilson, knock-and-announce requirement could be waived in circumstances of a threat of violence or disposing the drugs, but creating exceptions to the rule based on culture are problematic: o Considerable overgeneralization - Police could be entering a place containing people not connected to the case, or there may be no place to dispose of the drugs o Creates an exception that can be applied by others – Bank robbers. Know and announce would become meaningless - Need the neutral scrutiny of the court - Officers must have reasonable suspicion (Lower quantum of proof than probable cause) of physical threat or drug disposal to drop the rule - In this case, it was reasonable that Richards knew they were officers, and it was reasonable to break in because the drugs could have been disposed of. - Exigencies kill the rule - Court didn’t go for a bright line rule here: Bright line rules can sweep too broadly. Court is balancing. Here disadvantages outweigh the advantages of a bright line rule because the officer can be more in control of this situation. Privacy interest (Court really cares about a person’s home) Was it bad that they did no-knock entry against warrant prohibition. They needed to evaluate everything based on what they knew and what happened at the time of entry. - Search incident to an arrest (Exception to warrant requirement)(Subjective fear) U.S. v. ROBINSON (pp. 150) 414 U.S. 218, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973). Justice Rehnquist FACTS: Officer Jenks had reason to believe the operator was driving after the revocation of his driver’s permit. The statute for the offence in D.C. is a mandatory minimum jail term, fine, or both. Jenks signaled to the auto to stop. All three respondents emerged form the car, and the driver was told he was under arrest for operating after revocations and obtaining a permit by misrepresentation. While searching the respondent, Jenks found a crumpled cigarette package, testifying that at that point he didn’t know what it was. He opened it to find 14 capsules of heroin. The heroin was deemed admissible in a trial that resulted in his conviction. PROCEDURE: - Robinson convicted in U.S. District Court for possession and facilitation of concealment of heroin. - Court of Appeals en banc (On the bench, court as a whole) reversed judgment, holding that the heroin was obtained in a manner that violated the 4th Amendment. ISSUE: Whether law enforcement has the general authority to search incident to a lawful arrest. HOLDING: Reversed Court of Appeals. Officers have general authority to search everybody ANALYSIS: - A search incident to a lawful arrest is an exception to 4th Amendment warrant requirement o A search may be made of the person of the arrestee by virtue of lawful arrest o Search may be made of the area within the control of the arrestee - Persuasive authorities on this subject are sparse, but tend to support broad statement of the authority to search incident to arrest - Disagree with court of Appeals support of case-by-case litigation to determine whether authority exists o An officers determination to search is an ad hoc judgment. . o Authority to search a person incident to a lawful arrest does not depend on what a court would later decide as the probability of risk of concealed weapons, depends on probable cause. - The intrusion being lawful. A search incident to an arrest requires no further justification - Therefore, the search of respondent’s person by Jenks was permissible under 4th Amendment. - No subjective fear on the part of the officer - No reasonable expectation of privacy of your body after you are arrested once probable cause is attained. Marshall dissents with Douglas and Brennan – Balance privacy interest and law enforcement needs - Powers granted in this case are subject to police abuse - An officer lacking a warrant will conduct a traffic arrest then search the person. o Need to determine whether or not the full arrest was effected for legitimate reasons - 3 phases o Patdown of coat pocket  Police right to conduct limited frisks for weapons o The removal of unknown object from coat  Is it reasonable to make a fuller search than is permitted by Terry?  Jenks didn’t think the object in the pocket was a weapon o Opening of the cigarette wrappers - No reason to think the defendant was dangerous - An in-custody arrest gives more face time, greater need for search…Pursuant to Terry, less need for search - If an officer has questions about something, they should be taken to the precinct station. (Probable cause all you need for search incident to an arrest. Even without subjective fear) WHREN v. U.S. 517 U.S. 806, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). Justice Scalia FACTS: Plainclothes D.C. officers were patrolling a high drug area, in an unmarked car. They became suspicious of a dark Pathfinder with temporary license plates and youthful occupants driving; the driver looking down into his lap as the car waited for twenty seconds at an intersection. The police car made a u-turn and the car sped off. They caught them in traffic; an officer walked up to the car and saw two large bags of crack cocaine. The two men were arrested and more drugs were found in the car. PROCEDURE: - Petitioners charged with violating drug laws - At a pre-trial suppression hearing, they challenged the legality of the stop and resulting seizure. Arguing that the stop had not been justified by probable cause to believe petitioners were engaging in illegal drug activity and that officer’s ground for approaching vehicle for traffic violation was pre-textual. - District court denied suppression motion - Petitioners convicted - Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding that regardless of whether the officer subjectively believes that occupants may be engaging in illegal activity, the stop was permissible as long as another officer would reasonably done the same ISSUE: Whether the officers have probable cause to believe the petitioners had violated traffic code. HOLDING: Yes ANALYSIS: - Temporary detention of individuals constitutes a seizure - The decision to stop an automobile is reasonable when the police have probable cause to believe a traffic violation has occurred. - Petitioner arguments o Probable cause is not enough. Total compliance with the rules is not possible, and an officer can pull someone over for anything. Traffic stop as a means of investigating other violations. - Court has never held that an officers motive invalidates objectively justifiable behavior under the 4th Amendment - Like Robinson: We would not have rendered a traffic violation arrest invalid because it was mere pretext for a narcotics search - Subjective intent does not make otherwise lawful conduct illegal. - Petitioner standard o Whether the officer’s conduct deviated materially from usual police practices, so that a reasonable officer in the same circumstances would not have made the stop for the reasons given o However, its whole purpose is to prevent the police from doing under the guise of enforcing traffic code what they would like to do for different reasons. - Intent of officer is better than trying to guess what the entire law enforcement establishment would deem reasonable - Their claim hinges on a D.C. law allowing plainclothes officers to enforce traffic violations only if there is an immediate danger to the safety of others. - Petitioners argue that balancing in a 4th Amendment inquiry requires weighing governmental and individual interests implicated in a traffic stop. - The foremost method of enforcing traffic regulations is acting upon observed violations, which afford the quantum of individualized suspicion necessary to ensure police discretion is sufficiently constrained. - The making of a traffic stop out of uniform does not qualify as an extreme practice, and so is governed by the usual rule that probable cause outbalances private interests No realistic alternative to the rule that probable cause justifies a search and seizure. You cannot, on the basis of race, discriminate (Seizure incident to arrest possible, even if non-jailable) ATWATER v. CITY OF LAGO VISTA 532 U.S. 318, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001). Justice Souter FACTS: In Texas, all driver’s and child passengers must be secured with seatbelts. Violation is a misdemeanor fine punishable by $25-$50. Atwater was driving her two children in a car without seat belts, the children being in the front seat. Officer Turek pulled her over, got out of the car, yelled that she was going to jail. Atwater could not present driver’s license and registration because they were with her lost purse. A friend picked up the children while Atwater was handcuffed and taken to the police station. After one hour of being in a jail cell, she was taken before a magistrate and released on $310 bond. PROCEDURE: - Atwater was charged with driving without fastening her seatbelt, failing to secure her children in seatbelts, driving without a license, and failing to provide proof of insurance. She pleaded no contest to seatbelt offenses and paid a $50 fine. All other charges were dropped - Atwater filed suit in Texas state court - Moved to Federal Court; city’s motion for summary judgment approved. - A panel of Court of Appeals reversed - Court of Appeals sitting en banc vacated panel decision and affirmed district court ruling ISSUE: Whether the 4th Amendment, either by incorporating common-law restrictions on misdemeanor arrests or otherwise, limits police officers’ authority to arrest without warrant for minor criminal offenses HOLDING: Affirm court of appeals ruling. The standard of probable cause applies to all arrests without the need to balance interests and circumstances involved in particular situations. If an officer has probable cause even for minor criminal offenses, he may arrest that person. ANALYSIS: - Atwaters’ Claims o Peace officer’s authority to make a warrantless arrest is restricted by common law (exception in breach of peace tending towards violence)  Two centuries of uninterrupted state and federal practice permitting warrantless arrests for misdemeanors not amounting to breach of peace. o Asking to mint a new constitutional law that courts must strike a balance between individual and societal interests by subjecting contemporary circumstances to standards of reasonableness o Modern arrest rule forbidding custodial arrest, even with probable cause, when there is no jail time for the offense  A 4th Amendment balance is not well served by standards requiring case-by-case determinations of government need  An officer on the street may not be able to tell the distinction between jailable and fineonly charges  Penalties for identical conduct may vary on facts. (repeat offender?) o Need reliably administrable rules o If line was drawn at non-jailable traffic offenses, warrantless arrests would be authorized where necessary for enforcement of traffic laws and offender would continue to pose a danger on the road  Difficulties. Would the exception apply to speeding?  Very little in the way of administering the plan o Tie breaker: If in doubt, do not arrest - An officer not sure if the drugs weighed enough for jail time would not arrest even though it may not be true The general process of a hearing before magistrate within 48 hours is sufficient to prompt release Easier to enforce offense limitation by statute Country does not face an epidemic of unnecessary minor-offense arrests  O’Connor dissents - Custodial arrest exacts toll on individual liberty and privacy - The fact of the arrest is permanent record - If the state has decided that a fine is an appropriate punishment, there is limited interest in taking that person into custody - A citation or summons would serve just as effectively. - Arrests for fine-only misdemeanors work against reasonable seizures - Officer should be able to cite unique facts for an arrest - Potential for abuse of rule When do police have probable cause? Is PC enough? - Arrest? - Ignore knock and announce? - Search incident to arrest? - More on this soon Notice bright line divide. Section 6: Warrantless Seizure and Search of Premises - (Ability to get into a house, Searching premises) PAYTON v. NEW YORK 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). Justice Stevens FACTS: New York detectives had assembled evidence to establish probable cause to believe Peyton had murdered a man two days earlier. Six officers went to his apartment to arrest him without a warrant. There was no response to their knocks. 30 minutes later they broke in. Peyton wasn’t there but a gun shell they saw in his apartment was used in the trial. Riddick was arrested for commission of two armed robberies. The victims at the scene identified him. A detective and three officers came to his house at noon to arrest him without a warrant. Riddick’s son opened the door and Riddick was arrested after getting out of bed. The police went into his drawers and found narcotics, which he was charged on. Case not about exigent circumstances PROCEDURE: - NY Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions of the men ISSUE: Absent exigent circumstances, whether or not searches and seizures inside the home without a warrant are reasonable HOLDING: REVERSED. Searches and seizures in a home without a warrant or consent are prohibited (absent exigent circumstances). Not about entering into 3rd parties’ house, probable cause yes, or about consent. Homes are special – ―The archetype of the privacy protection secured by the 4th Amendment‖ Does an arrest warrant provide less protection than a search warrant? To really satisfy 4th amendment, we’d have to prove probable cause to arrest the person and have probable cause where he is now. (Impractical) Court says that maybe there is more protection in a search warrant because you can demand a strict level of detail, but we still want the neutral magistrate between the officer and the citizen. ANALYSIS: - Prerequisites o Both cases were not exigent circumstances o Police had probable cause o Entries into homes without consent of occupant - Searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are unreasonable - Objects found by police in a public place may be seized without a warrant (Probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity) - Constitutional protection afforded the individual interest in the privacy of his own home is applicable to warrantless arrest of a person in his house - Court of Appeals noted a difference between intrusiveness of entry to search for property and entry to search for a person. However, police must check premises for safety reasons. - 4th Amendment draws a bright line at the door of the home. Absent exigent circumstances, the threshold may not be crossed without a warrant. - State suggests that only a warrant w/probable cause that a suspect will be home at a certain time would protect privacy, that would be impractical, so there should be no warrant requirement - - Arrest warrants on probable cause carries limited authority to enter a dwelling where a suspect lives when there is reason to believe suspect is home. o Steagold v. U.S. – Police entered Steagold’s home to look for Lyon’s, found drugs in view, arrested Steagold. Warrant didn’t cover that, so Drugs could not be used against Steagold. RULE: Warrant has to be for suspect’s home. Government does think they need a warrant because, needing probable cause for arrest and in house. White, chief justice, and Rehnquist Dissent - 4 Restrictions on home arrests are sufficient o Felony, knock and announce, daytime, stringent probable cause - Here, and individual can surrender at the front door and escape humiliation - Rule hampers law enforcement…Have to make subtle distinctions (What can cops do after they’ve made the arrest) CHIMEL v. CALIFORNIA 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969). Justice Stewart FACTS: Three police officers arrived at the home of the petitioner with a warrant authorizing arrest for burglary of a thrift shop. Petitioner’s wife ushered them inside until the petitioner arrive home. At that time, police asked if they could look around, petitioner objected, but they looked through the entire house without a search warrant. After completing the search, they seized coins, medals, and tokens. Search took 45 minutes. Post-arrest search of premises ―on the basis of lawful arrest‖ Is this fair game? PROCEDURE: - State trial on two charges of burglary, objects taken from the house used as evidence over objection - Convicted, and judgments affirmed ISSUE: Whether the warrantless search of the petitioner’s entire house can be constitutionally justified as incident to an arrest. HOLDING: REVERSED. Warrantless ―broad‖ search not justified as incident to an arrest. Cannot search whole house, just evidence in immediate area. How do you define immediate area of control? From where could I get a weapon that would be dangerous to the police officer. ANALYSIS: - Rabinowitz o At arrest, officers searched the area for 1 ½ hours and seized stamps with forged overprints that were admitted into evidence and used against him at trial. o The test was not whether it is reasonable to procure a search without a warrant, but whether the search was reasonable o Extends to area in possession or control of arrested person o NOT RELIABLE AUTHORITY ANYMORE o Not overruled though - Reasonable to search the person and seize weapons or evidence ―under immediate control‖, but there is not justification for searching rooms other than that in which the incident occurs or searching concealed areas in the arresting room. - 4th Amendment protection is evaporated when it becomes reasonable to search an entire man’s house when he is arrested in it. - Rabinowitz rationale would apply here…Search everything - If he was arrested at work instead of his home, the home would not be searched without a warrant. - SCOPE was unreasonable - Court: we need some restrictions. Just because we have an arrest warrant doesn’t mean we can search your house. - 14th Amendment is there. Harlan concurring - Noting difficulties in administering the law. State officials face different problems White and Black dissent - When there is probable cause to search and it is impractical to get a warrant, a warrantless search may be reasonable - Must a police officer leave the scene of an arrest in order to get a search warrant when they have probable cause and there is a chance the evidence may be destroyed? - The fact of arrest provides exigent circumstances justifying police action No bright line rule here, but case law creates bright lines resulting from this. Interpreting Chimel over the years. What is in control and why? For safety? There are situations in which defendants are handcuffed Horton v. California PG 217 Author: Libby STATEMENT OF THE CASE: The D Argued that the officer's discovery of the seized items not listed in the search warrant was not inadvertent, and that the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Coolidge v. New Hampshire required their suppression under the Fourth Amendment. PROCEDURE BELOW: The California state court refused to suppress the items found in the accused's home, and the accused was convicted after a jury trial. Affirming the conviction, the California Court of Appeal rejected the accused's argument. The California Supreme Court denied the accused's petition for review, the U.S. Supreme court granted certiorari. STATEMENT OF FACTS:A police officer investigating an armed robbery determined that there was probable cause to search the accused's home for the property stolen in the robbery and for the weapons used by the robbers. The warrant authorizing the search of the accused's home, however, authorized a search for only the stolen property. The officer searched the accused's home pursuant to the warrant but found no stolen property. In the course of the search, the officer discovered the robbery weapons in plain view and seized the weapons and several other items. The officer testified that while he was searching for the stolen property, he also was interested in finding other evidence connecting the accused to the crime. LEGAL ISSUES: If the discovery of an item in Plain view not named in the warrant is not inadvertent, may these items be seized where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them. HOLDING: There is no requirement that the officer discover evidence in plain view inadvertently. The plain view doctrine could apply even if an officer expected in advance to find the object in plain view. The United States Supreme Court eliminated the requirement that discovery of evidence be "inadvertent". REASONING: Yes. The inadvertence requirement is unsound on two grounds. First, the standard is impermissibly subjective, based solely on the state of mind of the officer. The officer’s state of mind is irrelevant , b/c the question under the 4th is whether the search or the seizure is objectively reasonable. Second, rejecting the inadvertence requirement would not allow the officer to look in any more places or with any more intensity than he would otherwise be able to look. In fact, the officer would want to include all seizable materials to expand his search area. Plain view doctrine is justified when there is a (1) lawful arrival at the place from which the object can be plainly seen, (2) lawful access to the object seized, and (3) an object whose incriminating nature is immediately apparent. (Not binding, plurality). Bright line rule. Easy to follow - A search deals more with privacy, a seizure deprives the person dominion over his property DISSENTING: (Marshall, J.) The inadvertent discovery requirement is essential if we are to take seriously the 4th Amendment’s protection of possessory interests as well as privacy interests. CRITICAL SUMMARY: If the officer knew there was a possibility of finding the guns involved why didn’t he include it in the warrant. Sloppy work and the evidence should have been excluded. The officers can name a few small hard to find items and thereby gain access to the whole house. ―A search compromises the individual interest in privacy.‖ If in plain view, no privacy invasion, but seizure would invade possessory interest. - There are already limitations on where the police can search. Court’s concern about bright line rules and objective conduct. Court balancing. - - Plain view o Police must be there legally to see it Warrant or other justification o Even with a warrant, where are they looking? o Is the incriminating nature immediately apparent? Incriminating character must be immediately apparent o Do the police have PC? (Hicks) o Police must be legally able to seize it Arizona v. Hicks 480 U.S. 321 (1987) Docket Number: 85-1027 Abstract Argued: Decided: Subjects: December 8, 1986 March 3, 1987 Criminal Procedure: Search and Seizure Facts of the Case A bullet was fired through the floor of Hicks's apartment which injured a man in the apartment below. To investigate the shooting, police officers entered Hicks's apartment and found three weapons along with a stocking mask. During the search, which was done without a warrant, an officer noticed some expensive stereo equipment which he suspected had been stolen. The officer moved some of the components, recorded their serial numbers, and seized them upon learning from police headquarters that his suspicions were correct. Question Presented Was the search of the stereo equipment (a search beyond the exigencies of the original entry) reasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments? Conclusion No. The Court found that the search and seizure of the stereo equipment violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Citing the Court's holding in Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971), Justice Scalia upheld the "plain view" doctrine which allows police officers under some circumstances to seize evidence in plain view without a warrant. However, critical to this doctrine, argued Scalia, is the requirement that warrantless seizures which rely on no "special operational necessities" be done with probable cause. Since the officer who seized the stereo equipment had only a "reasonable suspicion" and not a "probable cause" to believe that the equipment was stolen, the officer's actions were not reconcilable with the Constitution. Arizona v. Hicks: officer moved stereo component to read serial # 1. plain view doctrine: doesn’t allow for any further intrusion, if during the course of search, police discover prop. not covered by warrant, they may seize prop. w/o getting new warrant must have some prior justification under 4th A. i. seizing what is in plain view is extension of whatever prior justification for officer’s access to object may be 2. the numbers were not in plain view, hence it was a search w/o warrant ct. says no middle ground, no sliding scale even though it was a minor intrusion was the search reasonable under 4th A? search would be valid if plain view doctrine would have sustained seizure of equipment he did not have pc to believe stereo stolen only reasonable suspicion—NOT ENOUGH There is nothing that prevents states than going beyond the minimum bounds of high court decisions. What is a plain view search, and what must an officer do to be able to seize inadvertently. Police must be there legally to see it - o Warrant or other justification o Even with a warrant, where are they looking? Incriminating character must be immediately apparent o Do police have PC? See hicks o Police must be legally able to seize it - CALIFORNIA v. CARNEY Supreme Court, 1985 Justice Burger FACTS: DEA agent watched Carney and a youth enter a dodge mini motor home parked in a lot. They closed the windows and shades. There was uncorroborated info that someone else was using the motor home for exchanging marijuana and sex. When the youth left the motor home he was stopped by the agents, they identified themselves, and the youth disclosed that he had received marijuana for sex contacts. Youth was made to return to the home and knock on the door. Carney stepped out. Without a warrant, they observed marijuana and a scale. After taking him into custody, they searched the motor home and found more marijuana. PROCEDURE: - Carney charged with possession of marijuana for sale. - At a preliminary hearing, he moved to suppress the evidence - Magistrate denied the motion - Overturned by the state supreme court, holding search unreasonable because of no warrant ISSUE: Is probable cause sufficient to search inside motor vehicles? Was the search reasonable? HOLDING: Yes, supreme court judgment reversed ANALYSIS: - Carroll: ―automobile exception‖ – Privacy interests in an auto protected, but ready mobility of vehicle justifies lesser protection - Vehicle can be quickly moved out - Mobility AND expectation of privacy in auth less than in a home - Passenger compartment open to plain view - Less privacy because of compelling need for governmental regulation - Maryland v. Dyson: auto exception to warrant requirement doesn’t require exigency - Although the vehicle possessed attributes of a home, the vehicle was clearly a Carroll vehicle - A motor home lends itself to drug trafficking - Goals: law enforcement agents are not hamstrung in their efforts to detect criminal activity and legitimate privacy interests are being protected - DON’T NEED A WARRANT Stevens dissenting - Home parked in an off-street lot near San Diego, a warrant should have been issued. No indication of immediate departure. No exigency. - If inherent mobility does not justify searches of containers, the same should apply here - Motor home designed to accommodate everyday living, curtains, walls inhibit viewing - Searches of places that serve a wide range of human functions are different from autos that serve as transportation primarily - Auto exception is ok, but you need to limit the exception. You cannot place cars with motor homes - A car is a car is a car Thornton v. United States 541 U.S. 615 (2004) Facts of the Case Marcus Thornton was stopped after getting out of his vehicle by a police officer who had noticed that the license plate on Thornton's car belonged to another car. During his conversation with Thornton, the officer asked if he could search him. During the search he found two bags of drugs. The officer arrested Thornton, then searched his vehicle (which Thornton had already exited by the time the police officer spoke with him, though the officer had seen him exit it). In the vehicle the officer found a gun. Thornton was convicted of drug and firearms offenses. On appeal, he moved to have the gun dismissed as evidence because, he claimed, it had been found as the result of an unconstitutional search. He argued that the officer had contacted him after he had left the vehicle and that the search therefore did not fall within the "search incident to arrest" exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement (the exception allows police to search the person being arrested and the area "within his immediate control"). A Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals panel rejected his argument, holding that requiring officers to signal their intent to arrest a person before he exited his vehicle would be dangerous because it would give him a chance to get any weapons in the vehicle or to use the vehicle to get away or run over the officers. Question Presented Under the "search incident to arrest" exception to the Fourth Amendment, may police search the vehicle of a person they have arrested if they did not make contact with him until after he left the vehicle? Conclusion Yes. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court ruled that forcing officers to decide whether a suspect had noticed them before exiting the car (with the understanding that only if he had could the car be searched) would be too subjective and leave officers uncertain of whether they could perform searches. Further, it found that weapons or contraband inside a vehicle could still be easily accessed by someone who had just exited it, providing the same reason for searching the vehicle that was present in cases where suspects were arrested while still inside it (that is, the possibility that illegal material would be destroyed or officers attacked with concealed weapons). Chief Justice Rehnquist, in the majority opinion, wrote, "Once an officer determines there is probable cause to make an arrest, it is reasonable to allow officers to ensure their safety and to preserve evidence by searching the entire passenger compartment." Danger to police officer flows from the arrest, stress, and uncertainty ―contact initiation rule‖ would diminish officer safety Belton: Officer ordered occupants out of the vehicle, unlike here when he just got out Can search the passenger side of a car if you make an arrest No basis to conclude that the area of an arrestee’s immediate control is determined by whether the arrestee exited the vehicle Once probable cause is found, officer can search the entire compartment ―recent occupant rule‖ Scalia concurring The arrestee was handcuffed at the car…No threat of officer danger No chance of prisoner escape, the bright line rule does not justify the small minority of people who are searched unreasonably Return to the broader search allow before Chimel Limit these searches to where it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest may be found in the vehicle Stevens dissenting o Officer’s safety no longer in jeopardy o Uncovering evidence must give way to citizen privacy o Broadening of automobile exception o Chimel can cover a recent occupant of a car Can bright line rule be a sword as well as a shield – Rule protects the cops, but a defendant can flip that around and claim they are on the other side. Defendant says recent occupant rule isn’t going to be a good bright line rule. REVIEW What areas are protected? What constitutes PC to get a warrant to search/seize? What can police do without a warrant? Thought about search of arrestees Thought about homes Thought about Post-arrest search of premises Thought about plain view KNOWLES v. IOWA S.Ct. 1998 Justice Rehnquist FACTS: An Iowa Police officer stopped Knowles for speeding, issued a citation for driving 43 in a 25. Under Iowa law, he could have arrested him. The officer conducted a full search of the car and found a bag of marijuana and a pot pipe under the driver’s seat. Knowles was arrested and charged with a violation of state laws dealing with controlled substances PROCEDURE: - Before trial, Knowles moved to suppress evidence, arguing that the search could not be sustain under ―search incident to arrest‖ because he wasn’t arrested - At hearing on motion to suppress, officer conceded that he didn’t have consent or probable cause to search, but relied on Iowa law. - Iowa Code Ann. § 321.485(1) authorizes citation in lieu of arrest. The issue of citation in lieu of arrest does not affect the officer’s ability to conduct an otherwise lawful search. - Iowa Supreme Court took that as giving officers authority to search incident to citation - Trial court denied motion to suppress and found Knowles guilty - Supreme Court of Iowa upheld search incident to citation where the officer had probable cause to make an arrest but instead issued a citation. ISSUE: Whether a search incident to citation is a valid exception to the 4th Amendment HOLDING: No, Reversing the lower court ruling ANALYSIS: - Robinson rationales for search incident to arrest: o Need to disarm suspect to take him into custody o Preserve evidence for use at trial - Neither are sufficient to justify search here o Threat to officer safety is significantly less when issuing a citation  A routine stop is a brief encounter ―Terry Stop‖ o There is a small chance of danger, but in those cases you may order the driver out of the vehicle, perform a patdown, a Terry patdown of a compartment on reasonable suspicion it may contain a weapon, o Once Knowles was stopped for speeding, all evidence was had been obtained. o As for destruction of evidence, an officer may arrest pursuant to unsatisfactory ID. - We cannot extend the bright-line rule to a situation where there is no concern for the officer and there is no concern for loss of evidence. - No probable cause here - Searching passenger compartment is incident to custodial arrest WYOMING v. HOUGHTON S.Ct. 1999 Justice Scalia FACTS: Wyoming officer pulled over a speeding car with a faulty brake light. Three passengers were in the front seat of the car. While questioning Young, the driver, he noticed a syringe in his pocket. Young admitted that the syringe was used for drugs. Respondent lied about her identity to a backup officer. The officer searched the car for contraband on Young’s admission. He found the respondent’s purse in the back seat that contained a black container and brown pouch, which the respondent denied was hers. The brown pouch contained 60ccs of meth and paraphernalia. The black container, which the respondent described as hers, contained 10ccs. There were needle tracks on the respondent’s arms and she was arrested. PROCEDURE: - Wyoming charged respondent with felony possession of methamphetamine - Trial court denied her motion to suppress evidence from her purse o Officer had probable cause to search for contraband, and any containers holding contraband - Wyoming Supreme Court by divided vote reversed the conviction saying: o The officer should have known that the purse didn’t belong to the driver, and there was no probable cause to search the passenger’s personal effects and no reason to believe contraband was placed in the purse ISSUE: Do police officers with probable cause to search a car have to right to inspect passengers’ belongings found in the car that are capable of concealing the object of the search? HOLDING: Yes, ruling reversed ANALYSIS: - Carroll: The officer had probable cause to believe drugs were in the car - Framers would find this reasonable, they enacted legislation to allow searches of any ship without a warrant if there was probable cause to believe something on there was subject to duty o Contraband good concealed and illegally transported may be search without a warrant where probable cause exists - Ross: upheld reasonable warrantless search of a paper bag and leather pouch in the trunk of defendant’s car with probable cause to believe it contained drugs o If probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justified the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search o The permissible scope of the search is in places where there is probable cause to believe it is located (Zurcher) - It is reasonable for officers to search containers or packages without showing individualized probable cause - Passengers possess a reduced expectation of privacy with regard to the property transported on public roads o Exposure to traffic accidents that could expose their identity - Di Re: No searching the body of a passenger o Tramatic consequences won’t happen in search of personal property in car - Effective law enforcement would be impaired when there is reason to believe evidence of criminal wrongdoing is in the car - Passengers are often engaged in common enterprise with driver for concealing contraband - If a ―passenger’s property‖ exception were to become known, passengers would claim everything as their own…Bog down litigation - REASONABLENESS…PRACTICAL REALITIES Breyer concurs - Pointing out that the rule only applies to searches of containers in cars - The purse was found at a distance from her. Purses are special containers. Like a man’s billfold, if on the person it could be considered ―outer clothing‖ Stevens Dissents - Di Re: The information prompting the search implicated the driver, not the passenger - A search of a purse is just as much an invasion of privacy as Di Re (Searching in a residence). - At the very least the Wyoming troop should have had probable cause to think the contraband was in the purse - Law enforcement concerns do not outweigh privacy concerns - A person should not lose immunity from search just by being in the car. The majority opinion allows searches of passenger belongings based on driver’s misconduct Where are we? - Arrestee searches - Homes - Post-arrest search of premises - Plain view - Cars COLORADO v. BERTINE S.Ct. 1987 Justice Rehnquist FACTS: An officer arrested Bertine for driving van under influence of alcohol. After Bertine was taken into custody and before the vehicle was taken to the impound lot, an officer inventoried the van’s contents and found controlled substances, paraphernalia, and money. PROCEDURE: - State court granted Bertine’s motion to suppress the evidence found during the search - Court held that the search violated the Colorado constitution - Supreme Court affirmed, but premised its ruling on the federal constitution ISSUE: Does looking into containers in an inventory search violate the 4th Amendment? HOLDING: No. Judgment reversed ANALYSIS: - Probable cause approach is not helpful when analysis center on administrative functions - An inventory search may be reasonable even though it is not conducted with a warrant with probable cause - Opperman: Inventory procedures served to protect owner’s property and to guard police from danger. Strong governmental interests and diminished expectation of privacy - Lafayette: Officer search the contents of a shoulder bag in possession of an individual taken into custody - Police are responsible for the property taken into their possession. Need to protect themselves against false claims of theft. - Supreme Court of Colorado held that the search was unreasonable because the van was towed to a lighted, safe facility and that Bertine could have been offered to make other arrangements for his property. - Could have locked it in a parking lot - Lafayette: It is unreasonable to make officers make distinctions of searchable or sealed when inventorying. - Bertine argues that the police had discretion in how to dispose of his car, however nothing prohibits police discretion as long as it is not based on suspicion of criminal activity - Incentive to impound the car to do an inventory search Blackmun concurs - Importance of inventories conducted to standardized procedures Marshall dissents - No standardized criteria limit officer discretion - 3 options for disposing the vehicle o Allow a third party to take custody o Take the car to a public parking facility and lock it o Impound the vehicle and search the contents  Only option to have the ability to search the vehicle - Little guidance as to which areas to search and what items to inventory - Danger of abuse of discretion - Court ignores expectation of privacy in his backpack (repository for personal effects) Inventory searches - Closed containers? Police searching Are they following established procedures? o What should a police manual look like under these circumstances  Too standardless…too unstructured Lesser intrusions - The police do not have probable cause - Yet they are concerned about a current offense and their safety - Explicit balancing of the need to search against the invasion which the search entails TERRY v. OHIO S.Ct. 1968. Justice Warren FACTS: Detective became suspicious of two men on a street corner at 2:30p.m. One of the men walked up to and peered into a store, walked on, started back, and peered into the store again, then conferred with his companion. This happened about 12 times. They talked to a third man and followed up on the street 10 minutes after departure. The officer thought they were casing a ―stick-up‖ and might be armed. He confronted the men, asked for their names, spun around Terry and patted him down, finding a gun. A frisk of the second man resulted in discovery of a pistol, and the third man had nothing on him. PROCEDURE: - Terry was charged with carrying a concealed weapon, and moved to suppress the weapon as evidence - Motion denied by trial court judge, who upheld stop-and-frisk theory - Ohio court of appeals affirmed - State Supreme Court dismissed appeal ISSUE: Whether in all circumstances of this on-the-street encounter, Terry’s right to personal security was violated by unreasonable search and seizure. (Whether it is unreasonable for a policeman to seize a person and subject him to a limited search for weapons unless there is probable cause for an arrest) HOLDING: No, affirmed prior holdings. It was reasonable. ANALYSIS: - Distinctions should be made between a stop and an arrest, between a frisk and a search - Police should be allowed to stop a person briefly upon suspicion of criminal activity. Upon suspicion the suspect is armed, they made do a frisk. If this gives him probable cause to believe suspect as committed a crime, there can be an arrest and search of the person - The stop and frisk is a minor inconvenience - Others say there cannot be a variety of police activity that doesn’t depend on the voluntary cooperation of the citizen yet stops short of arrest based on probable cause for arrest - Issue is the admissibility of evidence uncovered by the search and seizure - Street encounters between police and citizens are rich in diversity. Some encounters are unrelated to a desire to prosecute for a crime - Exclusionary rule is powerless to deter invasions of constitutionally guaranteed rights where the officer has no interest in prosecuting. - Whenever an officer restrains the freedom of a citizen to walk away, he has seized that person. It is a serious intrusion on the sanctity of a person and shouldn’t be taken lightly - Swift action predicated upon on-the-spot observations aren’t subject to warrant procedure - Only test for determining reasonableness: balancing the need to search against invasion of privacy. To justify, officer must present relevant facts and rational inferences - Effective crime prevention and detection o Officer observed the men go through a series of acts, each innocent in itself, but taken together warranted for further investigation - - - - - Justification for invasion of Terry’s personal security by searching him for weapons? More immediate officer safety interest. Need for law enforcement to protect themselves Petitioner says that it is unreasonable for policeman to take steps to search before he has probable cause to arrest o Fails to account for limited scope of searches o In absence of probable cause, exigencies justify initiation An arrest is wholly different from a limited search for weapons A protective search for weapons is not justified by need to prevent destruction of evidence. Sole justification is for protection of officers, an intrusion reasonably designed to discover weapons. Officer did not conduct a general exploratory search for whatever criminal activity he could find. Where an officer observes conduct in which he has a reasonable belief of criminal activity; where he identifies himself; where nothing dispels his fear of safety; he is entitled to a limited search of outer clothing of such persons to discover weapons that may be used to assault him. Michigan v. Long: Extended self-protective search principle of Terry to a vehicle. Two deputies investigated a car that swerved into a ditch. They saw a hunting knife on the floorboard and promptly search the car and found marijuana. The search of the passenger compartment of an auto if the officer has reasonable belief based on facts that the suspect may gain immediate control of weapons Hiibel v. 6th Judicial District: Victim didn’t comply with a lawful Terry stop and was convicted. Request for ID is reasonable in a Terry stop. Petitioner’s refusal to disclose his name wasn’t based on fear of self-incrimination Can’t do this if you suspect someone was involved with a past crime. Officer safety and security is the main priority, not crime investigation Harlan concurring - If frisk is justified to protect an officer in an encounter with a citizen, then the officer must have constitutional grounds to make a forcible stop. A policeman must first have a right not to avoid him but to be in his presence - Right to frisk depends upon reasonableness of a forcible stop to investigate a suspected crime. Where the stop is reasonable, the frisk must be immediate White Concurring - Absent special circumstances, the person approached may not be detained and may refuse to speak to the officer and go on his way. - In proper circumstances, the person may be briefly detained against his well to receive the questions. Refusal to answer furnishes no basis for arrest, but for continued observation. Douglas dissents - Police here have a greater authority to authorize a search and seizure than do the courts - Infringement of personal liberty only reasonable when police have probable cause. FLORIDA v. J.L. S.Ct. 2000. Justice Ginsburg FACTS: An anonymous caller reported that a young black male standing at a particular bus stop wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a gun. No audio recording of tip, nothing known about informant. Officers responded but had no reason to suspect any illegal conduct. Officers didn’t see a firearm and J.L. wasn’t showing threatening conduct, but an officer frisked him, seized a gun. J.L. was 15. PROCEDURE: - J.L. was charged with carrying a concealed firearm without a license and possessing a firearm while under 18. - J.L. moved to suppress gun as fruit of unlawful search and seizure - Trial court granted motion - Intermediate appellate court reversed - Supreme Court quashed the decision ISSUE: Whether an anonymous tip that a person carrying a gun is, without more, sufficient to justify an officer stop and frisk. HOLDING: No. REVERSED AND REMANDED. An anonymous tip lacking reliability does not justify stop and frisk ANALYSIS: - Officer suspicion of gun concealment was on anonymous call, not officer observation - An anonymous tip seldom forms an informant’s basis of knowledge - Alabama v. White: Anonymous tip asserting a women was carrying cocaine, predicting that she would leave a building at a specific time, get into a car with description, and drive to a named hotel. Terry stop only justified when police suspicion determined it was reasonable. o Borderline – having knowledge of one’s affairs does not necessarily imply that a person knows that another is carrying hidden contraband. - Anonymous call left no predictive information and left police without a means for testing credibility - Reasonableness of suspicion measured by what officers knew before conducting their search - Accurate description of location of location and appearance makes someone reliable in one sense, but it doesn’t show that the tipster knows of hidden criminal activity - Automatic firearm exception to reliability analysis would rove too far o Would enable people seeking to harass another to set in motion an intrusive search of a person simply by placing an anonymous phone call falsely reporting target’s unlawful carriage of a gun - Officials in airports and schools, in places where reasonable expectation of privacy is diminished, can conduct protective searches in situations where it wouldn’t have been justified elsewhere. - This ruling does not diminish Terry rule to frisk a person who has been legitimately stopped. - There has to be some kind of predictive component that has to be corroborated. Caller has knowledge of the illegal activity. Kennedy concurs - A tip might be anonymous but have supporting reliability or a narrowing of the class of informants for the tip to provide a basis for police action - Experience with the same caller cures anonymity reliability concerns - If the caller places anonymity at risk, court can consider this a factor when weighing reliability - Unlawful to make false reports to the police, and the ability of the police to track down a caller affects reliability ILLINOIS v. WARDLOW S.Ct. 2000. Justice Rehnquist FACTS: Wardlow fled upon seeing two officers patrolling an area known for heavy narcotics. The officers caught up, did a protective pat-down search for weapons. They discovered a gun and arrested Wardlow. The officers were in uniform, and they expected to find a crowd of people and customers in the area. They observed Wardlow with an opaque bag in hand. During the pat down, Officer Nolan squeezed the bag and felt the shape of a gun. He opened the bag to find the gun and 5 live rounds. ISSUE: Did the officers’ stop violate the 4th amendment? (What is reasonable suspicion) HOLDING: No. Affirmed ANALYSIS: - An individual’s presence in an area of expected criminal activity is not enough to support reasonable suspicion alone. - ―High crime area‖ is a contextual consideration - The flight from the police was unprovoked. Nervous behavior is a pertinent fact, suggestive of wrongdoing - Nolan was justified of suspecting criminal behavior. He was being evasive, hiding something - Florida v. Royer: When an officer without reasonable suspicion approaches a citizen, they have the right to ignore and go about their business. o However, unprovoked flight is the opposite of ―going about one’s business‖ - Respondent argues that the flight is not necessarily indicative of criminal activity. o That is true, but does not establish 4th amendment violation Stevens concurs and dissents - Illinois wants a bright line rule authorizing detention of anyone who flees an officer, respondent wants ruling that fleeing alone doesn’t justify detention o Unwise to endorse either rule. Factors like time of day, number of people in area, character of neighborhood, speed and direction of flight, all matter. o Totality of the circumstances must dictate the result…This is too close to a bright line rule o Wardlow could be running from someone else, or running away because he didn’t want to be near the police, fear of police - Did Nolan have reasonable suspicion to stop the respondent? Insufficient evidence. Presence in a ―high crime area‖ alone is not sufficient to justify reasonable suspicion. MINNESOTA v. DICKERSON S.Ct. 1993. Justice White FACTS: Two officers were patrolling in a marked car. They noticed a man walking out of a building identified as a ―crack house.‖ (They responded to complaints of drug sales before) Upon spotting the police car, Dickerson halted and started walking the other way and turned down an alley. Based on evasiveness and where he was coming from the officer made a stop and frisk. There were no weapons, but there was a small lump in the nylon jacket. The officers slid his fingers into the jacket and felt crack cocaine and cellophane. He reached in, grabbed the cocaine, and arrested Dickerson. PROCEDURE: - Respondent moved to suppress the cocaine o First trial court concluded that the officers were justified under Terry  Stop – might be engaged in criminal activity  Frisk  Plain-view doctrine – warrantless seizure of contraband in plain view during a lawful search (Plain view rules apply) o Respondent found guilty at trial o On appeal, MN. Court of appeals reversed.  Stop and protective pat down was lawful because of reasonable belief,  Overstepping Terry bounds by seizing the cocaine…Rejected ―plain feel doctrine‖ o MN Supreme Court Affirmed.  Sense of touch is less reliable and immediate as well as far more intrusive ISSUE: Whether the 4th Amendment permits the seizure of contraband detected through a police officer’s sense of touch during a protective pat down search HOLDING: Affirmed. Rejection of ―plain feel doctrine‖ ANALYSIS: - Purpose of limited search is not to find evidence of crime, but to protect the officer from harm - If protective search goes beyond what is allowed in Terry, it is invalid - Officers may seize contraband in a Terry search, but search must be limited to areas where weapons may be hidden. Clearly you cannot ignore contraband - If contraband is left in plain view, then there is no invasion of privacy and no search. If a pat down leads to touching of something that is immediately apparent to be contraband, there was no invasion beyond pat down - MN Supreme Court rejection of plain feel doctrine: o Touch is less immediate and less reliable o Touch is far more intrusive into privacy - Officers need probable cause to believe item is contraband before seizing it ensures against speculation - Officer determined it was cocaine after squeezing it, even though the officer knew the pocket had no weapons – Overstepping bounds - Hicks: SIMILAR TO the moving of the stereo equipment to get at the serial numbers – no probable cause - Was immediately apparent that it wasn’t a weapon Scalia concurs - The frisk may not have complied with 4th amendment search - No precedent for physical search of person temporarily detained for questioning - If the detention doesn’t amount to arrest, no need to search Rehnquist concurs and dissents - Would like to vacate the judgment of S.Ct. of MN and remand. - They applied different 4th Amendment analysis than done here Royer & Drayton - Lots of issues o When is a citizen-police interaction consensual? o When is there a seizure? o When have the police exceeded the bounds of Terry? o When in there reasonable suspicion to support a Terry stop? FLORIDA v. ROYER S.Ct. 1983 (PLURALITY) Justice White FACTS: Royer purchased a 1-way ticket from Miami to New York under an assumed name and checked two suitcases with assumed name, respondent was approached by two detectives who believed he fit the drug courier profile. Upon request, but not oral consent, he gave them his ID and ticket. The detectives asked about the name discrepancy and he said a friend made the reservation under the assumed name. They told Royer they were narcotics agents, had reason to suspect him, and asked him to accompany them to a small room in the airport. Without consent, his luggage was retrieved. He didn’t respond to requests for consent to search the luggage, but produced a key, marijuana was found. PROCEDURE: - Denial of pre-trial motion to suppress evidence obtained in suitcase search - Royer convicted of marijuana possession - Florida District Court of Appeals reversed (involuntary confinement without probable cause exceeding limited detention in Terry, no consent) ISSUE: Whether Royer was illegally detained when he consented to the search of his luggage HOLDING: Yes, Affirmed ANALYSIS: - Preliminary observations: o Without warrant to search Royer’s luggage and in the place of probable cause and exigent circumstances, the validity of the search depended on Royer’s consent o Need articulable suspicion to seize under Terry. But it doesn’t authorize a full search. o No detention, no seizure? 4th Amendment right cannot be violated. - Validity of search rests on purported consent (Without warrant and in absence of probable cause and exigent circumstances) - He may not be detained without reasonable grounds - If there is no detention – no seizure – no constitutional rights have been infringed - Detentions may be investigative yet violate the 4th Amendment without probable cause - Dunaway: Police may not seek to verify suspicions by means approaching arrest conditions - Davis: Detention for fingerprinting may constitute a much less serious intrusion upon personal security. (Reasonable suspicion justifies investigative interrogation) - The investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than the purpose of the stop. Should be least intrusive method available at the time o Sharpe: The fact that the protection of the public might be accomplished by less intrusive means does not render the search unreasonable - They did have authority for a Terry seizure…Reasonable and articulable suspicion. ID was false, drug courier profile (Which is very vague, using totality of circumstances) - If illegal detention, statements voluntarily given are inadmissible. Legal detentions must be short - Not consensual – retaining his ID and ticket, in a police room, did not indicate he was free to depart. - The consensual inquiry turned into an investigative procedure…Royer would not have been free to leave the room had he asked to do so Statements or giving key after illegal detention, anything the seized person says or does is irrelevant Would have been better to deal with the bags with narcotic-sniffing dogs to minimize intrusion No litmus paper test, no bright line rule for when the police exceed bounds of and Terry stop. No probable cause at the time Brennan concurring - Scope of the Terry stop should be limited so it doesn’t eat the 4th Amendment probable cause for search and seizure rule - Thought that the initial stop of Royer was legal. Asking for his ticket and ID was the seizure point Blackmun dissents - Police were minimally intrusive - Society’s interest in overcoming drug trafficking should not be subject to probable cause - Approach in major airport and taken to a private room to prevent humiliation Rehnquist dissents - Royer consented, and the facts presented did not constitute seizure. If the room has been large and had three chairs, would it be reasonable? - Concerned about the reasonableness of the intrusion. UNITED STATES v. DRAYTON S.Ct. 2002. Justice Kennedy FACTS: Drayton and Brown were traveling from Ft. Lauderdale to Detroit by bus and were making a stop in Tallahassee. As passengers re-boarded, the driver checked tickets and left to complete paperwork. The driver allowed 3 officers to board the bus in a drug interdiction effort. On officer knelt at the driver’s seat while the other two questioned people on the bus. He asked them where they were going and matched luggage. To allow for departure, he left the alley open. He did not inform passengers of their right not to cooperate. The officer approached Brown and Drayton, identified himself, and asked if they had bags on the bus. The bag contained no contraband. In the officer’s experience drug traffickers used baggy clothing to transport drugs. Brown consented to a search of his person. In patting his thigh areas, he felt large packages like drugs. They were arrested after the discovery of cocaine in their boxers. PROCEDURE: - Respondents were charged with conspiring to distribute cocaine, and possession with intent to distribute - Motion to suppress denied - Reversed on appeal ISSUE: Whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officer’s requests or terminate the offer in a bus. (Was there a seizure?) HOLDING: Yes, The drugs will be admitted as evidence, there isn’t a seizure here ANALYSIS: - Bostick: 2 officers asked for consent to search luggage, passenger aboard bus agreed, cocaine found, evidence suppressed o Florida adopted a per se rule that act of questioning aboard a bus constricts movement and is a seizure…This court rejects that decision o Whether a reasonable person would feel free to deny the officer’s request - No individualized suspicion - Totality of circumstances needed here - Officer did not remove the gun from pouch or threaten. - 11th Circuit: Pre se rule that evidence obtained during suspicion-less drug interdictions aboard buses must be suppressed unless passengers were notified of their right not to cooperate (Rejected) - Officers gave no reason to believe respondents were required to answer questions - Quiet voice, left the aisle free, didn’t brandish weapon - Delgado: INS agents wearing badges and questioning workers in a factory didn’t constitute seizure - Would reasonable person feel free to decline officer’s request? Yes - Debate: Who has a more realistic understanding of the facts? Court or dissenters. - Hodari: The idea of saying halt is not a seizure because you have not submitted to authority. Crashing into someone is not a seizure because it is not intentional. Souter dissents - 3 officers, one at the front, threatening presence, overbearing a person’s right to act freely. - Driver with tickets entitling passengers to travel left - Questioning in cramped quarters...accosting - Hard to imagine the men would have believed that he stood to lose nothing by refusing cooperation, no probable cause, no warrant… Can Terry apply to luggage? What kind of balancing? What happens in this case? Why? UNITED STATES v. PLACE S.Ct. 1983. Justice O’Connor FACTS: Place waited in line at Miami Airport to buy a one-way ticket to New York’s La Guardia. Place proceeded to the gate for flight the agents approached him and asked for his ticket and ID. Place consented to a search of his luggage, but the agents decided not to because his flight was about to leave. Investigation found that the luggage tags showed discrepancies and the phone number Place gave the airline was a different address. Two agents waited for Place to arrive and approached him in the terminal, identified themselves, and told him of their suspicion of him carrying narcotics. The agents requested and received his ID, they ran a check to find no offenses on record. Place refused to have them search his luggage, the officers told him they were going to take the luggage to get a federal warrant to search. They took the bag to Kennedy for the drug-sniffing dogs. Took 90-minutes to do the sniff. Narcotics smelling dogs reacted to the scent of narcotics, the agents retained the luggage until Monday morning, got the warrant, and found the cocaine inside. PROCEDURE: - Place indicted for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. - Place moved to suppress in district court claiming warrantless seizure - District court denied motion, he appealed - U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals reversed ISSUE: Reasonableness under 4th Amendment warrantless seizures of personal luggage from custody of the owner on a basis less than probable cause, for the purpose of limited investigation, short of opening the luggage, that would confirm suspicion. Does a Terry stop apply to luggage? HOLDING: No, affirmed. Search not possible ANALYSIS: - Applying principles of Terry, reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts - No discussion of warrant requirement - Where the authority possess specific acts warranting reasonable belief that luggage contains narcotics, government interest to seize luggage is substantial (Effective crime prevention) - An intrusion on possessory interests can vary in nature and extent (Reasonable and articulable suspicion) o Some brief detentions may be so minimally intrusive that government interests prevail - Person whose luggage is detained is allowed to go about his business o However, it may disrupt his plans - Never have adopted a seizure of person for the prolonged 90-minute period here. - Agents failed to notify the respondent where they were taking his luggage, and the length of time he would be dispossessed. - Compare this with Kyllo. The dog’s heightened olfactory senses are naturally occurring, unlike Kyllo, where there is all this technology. Also, the pervasiveness of dogs Brennan concurs - As soon as the luggage was seized, independent of personal seizure, the Terry stop construct was breached. Seizing personal property independent of seizure of a person. Luggage isn’t acting suspiciously. Blackmun Concurs - Emerging tendency to convert Terry decision into a general statement that the 4th Amendment requires only that any seizure be reasonable. Warrant requirement missing. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF POTTAWATOMIE v. EARLS S.Ct. 2002. Justice Thomas FACTS: Student Activities Drug Testing Policy implemented by Pottawatomie requires all students who participate in competitive extracurricular activities to submit to drug testing. All middle and high school students apply. The policy has only been applied to competitive extra-curriculars. Under the policy, students must submit to testing before participating and at random during the year upon reasonable suspicion. Urinalysis designed to test for illegal drugs and not prescription medications or medical conditions. PROCEDURE: - The Earls and James’ brought an action against the school district o They alleged that the policy violates the 4th Amendment and requested injunctive and declarative relief. They also argued that the school district failed to identify a special need for testing the students - U.S. District Court rejected the claim that the policy was unconstitutional and granted summary judgment to the school district - Court of Appeals reversed ISSUE: Is the drug testing policy reasonable? HOLDING: Yes, Court of Appeals ruling reversed ―Special needs‖ search – not a law enforcement search. Administrative type. Highlight privacy concerns of 4th Amendment and government’s health and safety interests. ANALYSIS: - Searches by public school officials, like urine samples, implicate 4th Amendment interests - Section 1983 – Civil right provision saying that you can sue is someone is violating your constitutional rights - Government seeks to prevent the development of hazardous conditions - Respondents argue that drug testing must be based on individualized suspicion o 4th Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of individualized suspicion o Government’s need to discover latent or hidden conditions is compelling enough to justify intrusion of privacy entailed by conducting searches without individualized suspicion. - In public schools, the reasonableness inquiry cannot disregard the school’s responsibility to the children - 1. Nature of the privacy interest o Vernonia: Upheld suspicionless drug testing of school athletes o Privacy interest is limited because the state is responsible for health, safety, and discipline of the students. Schoolchildren submit to physical exams and vaccinations. o Off-campus travel and communal undress further diminishes expectation of privacy. o LIMITED EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY - 2. Character of the intrusion o Degree of intrusion with urine sample depends on the manner in which the production of the sample was monitored o Faculty monitor waits outside and listens for the normal noises to protect against tampering o Test results kept in confidential files and not turned over to law enforcement. Failed test limits activity participation o INTRUSION NEGLIGENT - 3. Immediacy of government’s concerns and efficacy of the policy o Drug abuse problem among nation’s youth - o Specific evidence of drug use and Tecumseh schools o Need to prevent and deter the substantial harm of childhood drug abuse provides necessary immediacy for the policy Programs of individualized suspicion can unfairly target members of unpopular groups Ginsburg dissents - Vernonia re-interpretation: Emphasized that drug use increased the risk of sports-related injury and Vernona athletes were leaders of the drug culture. In Potta, drug problem was not major - If a student has a reasonable subjective expectation of privacy in personal items brought to school, that would extend to the composition of her urine - Voluntary participation in athletics are regulated because of a physical risk of injury which school has a duty to mitigate - Interscholastic sports requires health and safety regulation, academic team does not - 1. Invasion of privacy issue o School district mishandled the confidential info o Also, it was given to all sponsors whether or not they had a need to know - 2. Nature and immediacy of government’s concerns o Vernonia: Athletes were in rebellion fuelled by drugs. o Tecumseh: Responded to a Federal Government Report…Not major in their schools o 10th circuit: Without a demonstrated drug abuse problem among the tested group, efficacy is greatly diminished - Students who participate in extra-cirriculars are less likely to use drugs. Students may forgo activities to avoid detection of their drug use. Steering the high-risk kids away Consent searches - Frequent, popular, controversial - Indispensable law enforcement tool or example of state coercion? - The courts like them. The natural consequence of what we have seen up to this point. NO constitutional significance - You cannot be illegally detained and give valid consent - If you are not improperly seized, the only question is whether the search is voluntary - Many people who consent do so our of fear of reprisal SCHNECKLOTH v. BUSTAMONTE S.Ct. 1973. Justice Stewart FACTS: Officer stopped an auto after observing dead headlight and license plate light. Six men were in the vehicle. The driver couldn’t produce ID, and only Alcala produced a license. The officer asked if he could search the car, and Alcala replied, ―Sure, go ahead.‖ He opened the truck and glove compartment for the officer. He found three checks that had been stolen from a car wash in the left rear seat. Admitted as evidence in Bustamonte’s trial. Defendant didn’t give consent to search the car. PROCEDURE: - Bustamonte was convicted, and CA Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. - Respondent sough a writ of habeas corpus in a federal court…Denied - On appeal, Court of Appeals 9th circuit set aside District Court’s order (Right to decline) ISSUE: When the subject of a search is not in custody and the state attempts to justify a search on the basis of his consent, do the 4th and 14th Amendments require that it demonstrate that the consent was in fact voluntarily given, and not the result of coercion or duress? What does the government have to prove to establish valid consent? HOLDING: Yes, If not in custody, consent must be voluntarily given, not under duress or coerced. You don’t have to be told that you have the right to refuse. ANALYSIS: - Totality of the circumstances argument - Right to decline is subjective - While knowledge of right to refuse is 1 factor, the government need not establish the knowledge as the only basis for effective consent - Two competing concerns o Legitimate need for searches o Assuring absence of coercion - A search pursuant to consent may result in considerably less inconvenience for the subject of search - Account must be taken of subtly coercive police questions and vulnerability of the subject - 9th circuit found that the state must affirmatively prove the subject of the search knew he had a right to refuse to consent…This would create a doubt whether these searches would occur anymore - Consent searches normally occur under unstructured circumstances, a far cry from the atmosphere of trial where a defendant is informed of his rights - Johnson: to establish a waiver the state must demonstrate an intentional relinquishment of known right - However, 4th Amendment protections are different o Protection of security of privacy from police o Much more protocol when court asks for consent - o Difference between truth-seeking function and non-truth-seeking function o 4th Amendment has nothing to do about truth, it protects the security of privacy from the police. There is nothing constitutionally suspect in a person voluntarily allowing a search A policeman could reasonably make a detailed examination as demanded by Johnson VOLUNTARILY GIVEN, NOT COERCED OR UNDER DURESS Marshall dissents - We permit our citizens to choose whether or not they wish to exercise their constitutional rights - Consent cannot be a meaningful choice unless he knew that he could in fact exclude the police - Lack of knowledge invalidates consent - Not impractical to tell the subject he has a right to refuse consent Consent searches are granted in overwhelming proportions - Troubling What happens if I say no? Will I get hassled even more? 9th circuit said that, ―under many circumstances, a reasonable person may read the officers ―may I‖ as a demand. (Competing visions of reality) Why might you want a consent search? Concerned with voluntariness and the legitimate need for consent searches Drayton: was that consent voluntarily given? o Officers sought permission to search, as opposed to issuing an order. o Difference in language important to the court o 9th circuit though a ―may I‖ could be coercive. (Not free to refuse) o Empirical research – Fear emerges as a primary motivation to consent (Fear of reprisal). Those subjects who knew they could refuse did not give faith that the law would be followed To get the warrant, investigators will set up surveillance. Court doesn’t want to burden law enforcement Merely a change in expectation You can provide more protection, but not less Consent searches can be far broader of what officer could have obtained with a warrant. Courts may interpret consent as looking wherever you want (Blanket consent searches) You can revoke consent when you want. It is yours to give and take away as you please o What can the cops conclude from the facts that you revoke your consent? Policy - GEORGIA v. RANDOLPH S.Ct. 2006. Justice Souter FACTS: Rudolph complained about her husband’s drug use, and told the officers that there was drug evidence in the house. Scott denied entry into the house, but Janet consented to the search. She led the officers to the bedroom where the sergeant noticed a drinking straw with a powdery substance on it. He left the house to get an evidence bag and call the DA’s office. They told him wait stop searching and apply for a warrant. After getting the search warrant, they returned to the house and seized more evidence of drug use. PROCEDURE: - Scott was indicted on evidence of cocaine possession - He moved to suppress the evidence as products of warrantless search unauthorized by his wife’s consent over his refusal - Trial court denied the motion - Court of Appeals of Georgia reversed, holding that an individual who chooses to live with another assumes the risk of the inability to control access to the premises in his absence ISSUE: Whether one occupant may give law enforcement effective consent to search shared premises, as against a co-tenant who is present and states a refusal to permit the search. HOLDING: Reversed. Janet did not have common authority to grant the search. ANALYSIS: - Validity of searches with voluntary consent of an individual possessing authority - Matlock: Co-occupant consent rule. The consent of one who possesses common authority over premises or effects is valid as against the absent, nonconsenting person with whom that authority is shared. - 3rd party consent rests on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes - They understand that any one of them may admit visitors. Shared tenancy is an assumption of risk - If a co-tenant said, ―stay out‖, no reasonable person would go inside - No understanding of superior or inferior if the people don’t fall under a hierarchy - Loose ends: o Matlock explanation for constitutional sufficiency of a co-tenant’s consent to enter and search. Turns on whether social understanding gives a tenant authority to overrule another. o If the co-tenant is not at the door at the time of asking consent to search, they lose out o There are times when the authority leads to different desires o If you find out enough from a consenting party, you can go get a warrant Breyer Concurring - Possible abuse victims will not be able to be protected Roberts dissents - Court observes that, ―no sensible person would go in under those circumstances.‖ However, the possible scenarios are limitless - What the majority’s rule protects is the good luck of the co-owner who happens to be present at the door when the police arrive - We should not embrace a rule that draws a fine line - A person hiding drugs could refuse entry and inflict retribution on the consenting co-tenant and destroy the drugs - This rule forbids the police from entering to assist a victim of domestic abuse Thomas dissents - Coolidge: No 4th amendment search occurs where the spouse of an accused voluntarily leads police to potential evidence of wrongdoing by the accused. Coolidge controls this case Limitations on protections - Things that the court has done to limit protections of the 4th Amendment: substantively or procedurally - Whether or onto you are able to object because your interests have been affected - Limiting the use of the exclusionary rule MINNESOTA v. CARTER S.Ct. 1998 Justice Rehnquist FACTS: Respondents and lessee were bagging cocaine. An officer who was looking through the blinds observed them. He went there to investigate a tip fro a confidential informant. The informant said he walked by the window and saw people putting white powder into bags. The officer saw the bagging for several minutes, notified headquarters that prepared affidavits for a search warrant. The two men left in a Cadillac and the police stopped the car. Carter and Johns had a black zippered pouch and a loaded handgun. The men were arrested and there was more cocaine found in the car the next day. A search of the house revealed residue on the table. The men had come to the house for the sole purpose of bagging the cocaine. They had never been to the apartment before and were only there for 2.5 hours. PROCEDURE: - Carter and Johns charged with conspiracy to commit controlled substance abuse - They moved to suppress all evidence and incriminating statements made…Arguing that the initial observations was an unreasonable search - MN trial court held the officer did not conduct a search under the 4th Amendment. Men convicted - MN Court of Appeals held that the men didn’t have standing to object, because his claim that he was a social guest is inconsistent with actual happenings - MN Supreme Court Reversed, respondents had standing because they had a legitimate expectation of privacy ISSUE: Was the viewing through the blinds a search, which violated the 4th Amendment? HOLDING: Reversed. Any search that may have occurred did not violate the 4th Amendment context ANALYSIS: - Rakas: Auto passengers could not assert 4th Amendment protection against seizure of incriminating evidence. - In order to claim 4th Amendment protection, a defendant must demonstrate that he personally had an expectation of privacy in the place searched, and that the expectation is reasonable. - 4th Amendment only protects people in their houses. Olson: We may have expectation of privacy in someone else’s house – overnight guest - Respondents here were not overnight guests, but in the house for a business transaction. Expectation fo privacy in commercial areas less than home Scalia concurs - ―Their‖ houses ambiguous. - Many state constitutions speak of their houses - Their houses extends beyond fee simple ownership to legal title, renting, and leasing - House shall not be made a sanctuary for a stranger Kennedy concurs - Respondents established nothing more than a fleeting and insubstantial connection with the home, which was used as a convenient processing station - Like Rakas, no meaningful connection established with home Breyer concurring - Second question, whether observation from outside the cartilage constituted a search violating 4th Amendment rights o Families frequently used the grassy area outside the window to play, members of the public stored bikes in plain view of the window - One who lives in a basement apartment that fronts a street understands the need of care - He went to look to verify the tipster’s credibility. Ginsburg Dissents - Decision undermines security of short-term guests and security of resident - People have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their homes because they can exclude others - If police have no PC, they have everything to gain by searching a house because they know at least one of the guests doesn’t have standing. - One need not remain overnight to establish privacy in another’s home - Host intended to share her privacy with respondents, and entered into 4th amendment protection - Katz connection: I do not believe we have a greater expectation of privacy when making a call in a phone booth than when we enter a person’s premises to engage in a common endeavor U.S. v. Leon STATEMENT OF THE CASE: The D held that there was no good faith exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. PROCEDURE BELOW: Petitioner appealed the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS: Police officers initiated surveillance of Leon's (D) activities. A search warrant was issued pursuant to that surveillance. A large quantity of drugs was seized. D was charged with violations of federal drug-trafficking laws. At trial, the court granted D's suppression motion because the warrant was not issued on probable cause. Specifically, the court found that the warrant contained allegations of an untested informant and limited corroboration by the police. The court of appeals affirmed; they refused to accept a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. LEGAL ISSUE: Should the 4th Amendment's exclusionary rule be modified so as not to bar the use of evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate but ultimately found to be unsupported by probable cause? (Technically defective warrant) HOLDING: The 4th Amendment's exclusionary rule should be modified to permit the introduction of evidence obtained in the reasonable good-faith belief that a search or seizure was in accord with the 4th Amendment. REASONING: (White, Justice) Yes. The 4th Amendment's exclusionary rule should be modified to permit the introduction of evidence obtained in the reasonable good-faith belief that a search or seizure was in accord with the 4th Amendment. The officer's reliance on the warrant must be objectively reasonable. The exclusionary rule is not a personal constitutional right. It is a judicially created remedy intended to safeguard 4th Amendment rights through its deterrent effect. Therefore, the costs and benefits of excluding inherently trustworthy tangible evidence must be weighed, and the remedy applied only where its costs are acceptable and its deterrent effect is well served. The rule's chief benefit is to deter police misconduct, not to punish judicial errors. No evidence has been shown that relaxing the rule would decrease a judge's professional commitment to protecting 4th Amendment rights. Courts may allow a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Good faith is an exception to the exclusionary rule. The exclusionary rule is a judicially created rule designed to deter police misconduct. The rule should not be applied when it does not serve its function. If a police officer in good faith relies on a defective warrant, he is not guilty of misconduct. To suppress evidence when a warrant is defective does nothing to deter future misconduct, because there is nothing the officer should have done differently. The purposes of the exclusionary rule are not achieved by suppressing evidence obtained in good faith reliance on a defective search warrant. Reversed. Concurring: (Blackmun, Justice) The exclusionary rule is not constitutionally compelled and there is no way to avoid the majority decision because the rule has not appreciable effect when officers act in objectively reasonable reliance upon search warrants. Dissent: (Brennan, Justice) The courts use of costs and benefits analysis has a narcotic effect of creating the illusion of technical precision and ineluctability. The majority has not given honest assessment to the merits of the exclusionary rule. If this good faith exception weakens police compliance with the 4th Amendment, then this exception will be reconsidered in the future. This makes the magistrate’s role far less significant. CRITICAL SUMMARY: The exclusionary rule is a judge made rule created to deter police misconduct; it is intended to deter 4th Amendment misconduct by the government as a whole, not just excesses by the police. Neither the history nor the language of the 4th Amendment suggests that it was intended to restrict the police but allow other agents of the same government to take advantage of unlawfully seized evidence. When does a judge made rule come under the penumbra of rights inherent in the constitution? This rule should be part of the inherent rights in the constitution. Good faith is the current standard for applying the exclusionary rule. Exceptions: 4 circumstances when the evidence will be excluded notwithstanding the fact that the officer acted in good faith. 1) If the magistrate issued a warrant by relying on affidavit supplied by affiant who knew that statements were false or recklessly disregarded the truth. Generally speaking that magistrate must assume officer is saying the truth because he is under oath. In this situation we have bad faith and needs to be deterred. 2) If issuing magistrate abandoned neutral and detached role by blindly rubber-stamping behavior of police. Reasonable officer must realize that this behavior is unethical. 3) If warrant is completely lacking in any indicia of probable cause than there is no good faith on part of police officer. 4) If police officer relies on warrant that is facially deficient. If it looks like a preconstitution general warrant lacking all particularities. Concerned about societal costs of exclusionary rule Too high a price If the police reasonably rely on the warrant. Under what Reserve the exclusionary rule in cases where you need to deter police conduct This will lead to judge-shopping. Certain jurisdictions have a judge on duty If there is a longer-term investigation, you can judge-shop Is there so little probable cause that you can’t rely on the warrant HUDSON v. MICHIGAN S.Ct. 2006. Justice Scalia FACTS: Police executing a warrant authorizing search for drugs and firearms at Hudson’s home announcing their presence, but waited only a short time, perhaps three to five seconds, before entering. PROCEDURE: - Hudson moved to suppress the drugs and weapon found, arguing a violation of 4th Amendment rights - Trial court granted his motion, but the appellate court reversed on the ground that suppression is inappropriate when entry is made pursuant to warrant but without proper knock and announce ISSUE: Whether the exclusionary rule is appropriate for violation of the knock-and-announce requirement. HOLDING: Affirmed. The exclusionary rule is not appropriate for violation of the knock-and-announce requirement ANALYSIS: - Wilson rule is not easily applied: many situations where it is not necessary to knock and announce (Threat of physical violence, evidence destroying, knocking would be futile) - Banks: proper measure not how long it would take the resident to reach the door but how long to dispose of the evidence. Officers are uncertain how long to wait. (EASILY OVERCOME REQUIREMENT) - But-for causality is only a necessary condition for suppression - Segura: Never held that evidence is fruit of the poisonous tree simply because it would not have come to light except for the illegal actions of the police - Interest in protecting human life because unannounced entry can provoke self-defense violence, protection of property, and elements of privacy and dignity destroyed by sudden entrance o It assures one the opportunity to collect themselves before opening the door - The costs are considerable o Imposing a massive remedy for knock-and-announce violations would generate a flood of alleged failures to observe the rule o Tough to determine what constituted a reasonable wait o Officers would refrain from timely entry after the knock and announce - Massive deterrence is not required, they can get in with reasonable suspicion of evidence destroying anyways - Hudson complains that damages in civil-rights grievances will be too small. But Congress authorizes attorneys fees in these cases - Civil-rights violations are deterred by more police training and emphasis on discipline (enhance accountability - A violation of knock and announce is not sufficiently related to the later discovery of evidence to justify suppression Breyer Dissents - Exclusionary rule should apply - In assessing reasonableness, court must look at knock and announce compliance - This deters unlawful police behavior - What reason is there to believe the inadequacies in Mapp can deter police behavior here? - The cases reporting knock-and-announce violations are legion (Widespread pattern) (No deterrence here) - Majority argues that police are better trained now, but this argues that Wolf, not Mapp, is the law - Majority assumes that civil liability is an effective deterrent - - - - Court declines to apply exclusionary rule where: o There is specific reason to believe that application would not result in appreciable deterrence o Admissibility in non-criminal trials was at issue Not followed because: o The officers violating the rule are not acting reasonably o The case doesn’t involve governmental employees other than officers o ―Lack of discretion‖ explanation is missing In many states, the ―no knock‖ warrants are less costly than determining exigency Discovery of evidence at the Hudson’s was a foreseeable consequence of the unlawful entry Inevitable discovery doctrine o Does not treat as critical what hypothetically would have happened had the police acted lawfully in the first place. o Must show that the same evidence inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means Without unlawful entry they would not have been in the house to find the evidence The question is not what police might have done if they had behaved lawfully, it’s what did they do. (In response to officer safety policy argument) If probable cause justified a search for guns, why would it not have also justified a no-knock warrant thereby diminishing any danger to the officers? Kennedy concurrence - Knock and announce is part of our constitutional heritage - Continued operation of exclusionary rule is not in doubt. Liberty v. security What’s the law? Policy implications? What are the goals rooted in the constitution What interpretive tool are they using? Analogizing from pervious cases? ―In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right…to have the assistance of council for his defense.‖ BETTS v. BRADY S.Ct. 1942 Justice Roberts FACTS: Petitioner, an indigent, was indicted for robbery. His request for council was denied because local practice permitted appointment only in rape and murder prosecutions. PROCEDURE: - Petitioner pled not guilty and elected to trial without jury. At trial he didn’t take the stand, was convicted, and sentenced to eight years imprisonment - Petitioner says rule to be deduced from former decisions is that, in every case, whatever the circumstances, one charged with crime, who is unable to obtain council, must be furnished council by the state ISSUE: Whether the constraint laid by the amendment upon national courts expresses a rule so fundamental and essential to a fair trial, and so, to due process of law, that it is made obligatory upon the states by the 14th Amendment. HOLDING: No, judgment affirmed. ANALYSIS: - The due process clause of the 14th Amendment does not incorporate the guarantees in the 6th Amendment although the denial by a state of the rights embodied in the 1st eight Amendments may deprive a litigant of due process of law in violations of the 14th Amendment. (Fundamental fairness to not bring it to the states) - Powell v. Alabama: (Trial for a capital offense without effective appointment of council and without opportunity to consult casually appointed council. Occurred in a state where law required appointment of council for indigent) o In a capital case, where defendant is unable to employ council, and is incapable adequately of making his own defense because of ignorance or illiteracy, it is the duty of the court, to assign council. o 6th Amendment requires appointment of council for all federal cases where a defendant cannot procure an attorney o Johnson v. Zerbst – Federal felonies… - The matter is generally deemed a matter of legislative policy - Every court has the power to appoint council as required in the interest of fairness - We cannot say that the 14th Amendment embodies and inexorable command that no trial can be fairly conducted and justice accorded a defendant who is not represented by council - Look for special circumstances and determine whether the deprivation of council impacted the case in a fundamental way Black dissents - - Narrower question: whether in view of the nature of the offense and circumstances of his trial and conviction, this petitioner was denied the procedural protection, which is his right under the federal constitution. YES Powell: Unfair practices, which subject innocent men to increased dangers of conviction because of poverty Denial of council made is inaccurate to conclude the defendant’s case was adequately presented GIDEON v. WAINWRIGHT S.Ct. 1963 Justice Black FACTS: Petitioner was charged in a Florida state court with having broken and entered a poolroom with intent to commit misdemeanor. Offense is a felony in FL. Appearing in court without funds or a lawyer, petitioner asked and was denied council. PROCEDURE: Gideon conducted his defense as well as could be expected from a layman. He made an opening statement, cross-examined witnesses, presented witnesses, declined to testify himself, and made an argument claiming innocence. Jury returned a guilty verdict and Petitioner was sentenced to 5 years in prison ISSUE: Did the state court's failure to appoint counsel for Gideon violate his right to a fair trial and due process of law as protected by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments? HOLDING: Reversed. Gideon’s constitutional rights were violated…Require council in the state courts ANALYSIS: - Betts: Bill of Rights give rights fundamental and essential to a fair trial by 14th Amendment - A number of states had taken care of this on their own - Betts was wrong in concluding 6th Amendment guarantee of council was not one of those rights - In our adversarial system, any person taken to court, who is too poor to afford a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless council is provided for him. This seems to be an obvious truth. - Great emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals, which every defendant stands equal before the law. This ideal cannot be realized if a poor man charged with a crime has to face his accusers without council. - 22 states, as friends of the court, want Betts overruled. Clark concurs - The Constitution makes no distinction between capital and non-capital cases Harlan Concurs - Betts should get a more respectful burial - Betts did no more than to admit possible special circumstances in non-capital cases too, while showing the circumstances are a denial of due process. Imposing these requirements to the states would be an abrupt break with the immediate past - The mere existence of a serious criminal charge is in itself a special circumstance. - Special circumstances rule is formally abandoned in capital and non-capital cases, at least to offenses which carry the possibility of a substantial prison sentence WATTS v. INDIANA S.Ct. 1949. Justice Frankfurter FACTS: Petitioner was arrested and held as the suspected perpetrator of an alleged criminal assault. Later in the day in the same vicinity as the first occurrence, a woman was found dead under conditions suggesting murder in the course of an attempted assault. Suspicion turned towards petitioner and the police interrogated him non-stop for a week until he made incriminating statements. Indiana law required prompt preliminary hearing before a magistrate, but petitioner was not given a hearing nor the aid of council. They disregarded his need for sleep and food. PROCEDURE: - Supreme Court of Indiana rejected petitioner’s claim that confessions elicited from him were procured under circumstances rendering their admission as evidence against him a denial of due process ISSUE: Were the confessions elicited from him procured under circumstances rendering their admission as evidence against him a denial of due process? HOLDING: Reversed. The Due Process Clause bars police procedure that violates the basic notions of our accusatorial mode of prosecuting crime and vitiates a conviction based on the fruits of such procedure. ANALYSIS: - If force has been applied, this court does not leave to local determination whether or not the confession was voluntary. There is torture of mind as well as body; the will is as much affected by fear as by force - A confession by which life becomes forfeit must be the expression of free choice. If it is the product of sustained pressure by police if does not issue from free choice - To turn detention into wrenching evidence offends the procedural standards of due process Douglas concurring - Detention without arraignment is a time-honored method of keeping an accused under the control of the police. We should condemn the procedure by outlawing any confession obtained during the unlawful detention. - Peril to individual freedom - If the state may arrest on suspicion and interrogate without council, there is no denying the fact that it largely negates the benefits of the right to council - Once a confession is obtained it supplied a way of verifying its trustworthiness. - If interrogation is permitted, there are decent options for prolonging it – confronting accused of falsities - The right to question must be protected…Otherwise the police will be rendered helpless (The process…Powell…Betts…Watts…Gideon…) what other role does a lawyer have to play? The value of council Involuntary versus voluntary confessions Start with totality of the circumstances test: - How long was the questioning? - Where was the questioning? - Told of right to counsel? Crooker: If you want a lawyer anytime you are arrested, you should Spano: Confession after a nasty interrogation. Used the same traditional criteria. The need to use another ground. By 1959, the views of the concurring justices in Spano ruled the court. Court showed restraint in developing the doctrine. The concurring justices said the right to counsel should be upheld on these grounds. MASSIAH v. UNITED STATES S.Ct. 1964 Justice Stewart FACTS: Massiah was indicted for conspiracy to possess narcotics aboard a U.S. vessel. Massiah retained a lawyer, pled not guilty, and was released on bail. Colson, a co-defendant who was also released on bail, invited Massiah to discuss the pending case in his car, which was wired by the police. Massiah made damaging statements. PROCEDURE: - Massiah was convicted of several narcotics offenses - Affirmed by U.S. Court of Appeals, 2nd circuit ISSUE: When the police have arrested and released on bail one member of a criminal ring and another member, a confederate, is cooperating with the police, can the confederate be allowed to continue his association with the ring or should it be withdrawn as to avoid challenge to trial evidence on the ground that it was obtained after arrest or indictment? HOLDING: REVERSED. The petitioner was denied the basic protections of the guarantee when trial evidence was used of his own incriminating words, which was elicited after indictment and without council. Defendant’s own incriminating statements can ANALYSIS: - Spano v. NY: Court reversed a state criminal conviction because a confession was wrongly admitted into evidence against defendant at trial o A Constitution which guarantees a defendant the aid of council could vouchsafe no less to an indicted defendant under interrogation by the police in a completely extrajudicial proceeding. - Here we deal with the 6th Amendment through a federal case - Massiah was more seriously imposed upon because he did not know that he was under interrogation by a government agent White dissents - Without evidence, the quest for truth may be impeded - I am unable to see how this case presents an unconstitutional interference with Massiah’s right to counsel. Massiah was not prevented from consulting with counsel as often as he wished. - The court’s new exclusionary principle goes beyond self-incrimination - He was free on bail and not questioned in an atmosphere of coercion - Absence of council only one factor by which voluntariness is to be judged ESCOBEDO v. ILLINOIS S.Ct. 1964 Justice Goldberg FACTS: Petitioner’s brother-in-law was fatally shot. Petitioner was taken into custody for questioning, made no statement, and was released on a writ of habeus corpus. DiGerlando stated that petitioner was fired the shots. Petitioner was arrested and taken in for questioning. Petitioner asked for advice of his lawyer. The two were not permitted to talk to each other. Police arranged a meeting between petitioner and DiGerlando where the petitioner told DiGerlando that he didn’t shoot him, but DiGerlando did. This admitted knowledge of the crime. PROCEDURE: - Petitioner was convicted of murder - Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed ISSUE: Whether the refusal by the police to honor petitioner’s request to consult with his lawyer during the course of an investigation constitutes a denial of assistance of counsel in violation of the 6th Amendment, rendering inadmissible any incriminating evidence elicited by the police during the interrogation HOLDING: REVERSED. Where the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime by focusing on a particular suspect, police carry out interrogations to solicit a confession. He was denied counsel; the police did not warn him of his right to remain silent. Anti-confession…and relying on 6th Amendment Differences in the nature of an investigation. Doesn’t set totality of circumstances here…a bright line break. If the right to counsel is not respected, the confession cannot be admitted. Protect 5th Amendment right against self-incrimination. Role of the lawyer in a more bright line way. ANALYSIS: - Direct relationship between importance of the stage to the police and in their quest for confession and the criticalness of that stage to the need for counsel - When the process shifts from investigatory to accusatory, our adversary system begins to operate and the accused must be able to consult a lawyer Harlan Dissents - This ruling fetters perfectly legitimate methods of criminal law enforcement Stewart dissents - The institution of formal proceedings begins at the point a criminal investigation has ended and adversary proceedings have commenced. HERE the Constitution guarantees are attached to criminal trial - By abandoning the voluntary-involuntary test for admissibility of confessions, court seems to be driven by notion that it is uncivilized law enforcement to use the accused’s own admissions against him in trial. - Escobedo knew full well that he didn’t have to answer and knew full well that his lawyer had advised him not to answer. Provided procedural safeguards What is the constitutional footing for those safeguards? MIRANDA v. ARIZONA S.Ct. 1966. Justice Warren FACTS: In each case the defendant was questioned by police officers, detectives, or a prosecuting attorney in a room that was cut off from the world. In none of the cases was the defendant given a full and effective warning of his rights at the outset of the interrogation process. The questioning elicited oral admissions. All resulted in self-incriminating statements without full warnings on Constitutional rights. Miranda v. Arizona – Police arrested defendant and took him to a special interrogation room where they questioned the defendant. Miranda was under custodial interrogation. You have bee formally arrested or functionally arrested. Freedom is curtailed to a degree. Objective standard. Vignera v. NY – Defendant made oral admissions to the police after interrogation in the afternoon and signed an inculpatory statement in the evening Westover v. U.S. – Defendant was handed to FBI by local authorities after they had interrogated him for a lengthy period. The FBI elicited confession after 2 hours. CA v. Stewart – Local police held the defendant for 5 days of questioning on nine different occasions ISSUE: The admissibility of statements obtained from an individual who is subjected to custodial police interrogation and the necessity for procedures which assure the individual is accorded his privilege under the 5th Amendment to not incriminate himself. Methods of police interrogation - Concedes to silence  Silence in incrimination. Deflect need for attorney – Emphasize need for truth. (Wouldn’t work here in Escobedo) - Reverse lineup. Witnesses pointing you out. - Defendant was fingered for other crimes - Good cop – bad cop - Mutt and Jeff - Deflect need for attorney emphasis - Society is at fault, you are the victim - Assume guilty and get corroborated details HOLDING: REVESED in all, except affirm in CA v. Stewart. - No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, and that the accused shall have the assistance of counsel – rights put into jeopardy through official overbearing. - The prosecution may not use statements stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against 5th Amendment self-incrimination - Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. - If an individual wishes not to be interrogated, the police must comply ANALYSIS: - - The police are designed to put the subject in a psychological state where his story is but an elaboration of what the police purport to know already – that he is guilty. The interrogators are sometimes instructed to induce a confession out of trickery Even without employing brutality, the very fact of custodial interrogation exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on the weakness of individuals. o Potential for compulsion is forcefully apparent o Like physical coercion o Destructive of human dignity. o Will subject to that of the examiner Unless adequate protective devices are employed to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement obtained from the defendant can truly be the product of his free choice In Escobedo, the denial of request for attorney undermined his privilege to remain silent if he choses or not to speak without intimidation. Re-examination of Escobedo, and we affirm. Focus on 6th Amendment in this case. 1. Right to remain silent a. The warning exists to simply make them aware of it b. A warning is a clearcut fact, and is indispensable to overcome its pressures and to insure that the individual knows he is free to exercise the privilege at that point in time 2. Anything said can and will be used against you a. Needed in order to make him aware not only of the privilege, but also of the consequences of foregoing it b. Makes the individual more acutely aware that he is faced with a phase of the adversary system 3. Right to counsel a. Assistance of counsel can mitigate the dangers of untrustworthiness b. Can help guarantee the accused gives a fully accurate statement to the police and that it is rightly reported c. Failure to ask for a lawyer doesn’t constitute a waiver d. The financial ability of the defendant has no relationship to the scope of the rights involved here e. Authorities have the obligation not to take advantage of indigence in the administration of justice 4. If he is indigent a lawyer will be appointed for him a. Without this warning, the Miranda rights may be misconstrued in a way that they may think they can consult with a lawyer if they have funds for one Interrogation must cease if individual wishes to remain silent. If evidence secured without presence of attorney, government has burden to prove that the waiver was of free-will Adversary system begins upon interrogation Not all confessions are inadmissible o But unless warnings and waiver are demonstrated, no evidence obtained in interrogation can be used against him The person with no offense will be better able to clear himself of the allegations - Clark dissents - The cited ―police manuals‖ were not official. Examples of police brutality are rare exceptions - We must follow the due process clause of the 14th Amendment that protect people in police custody Harlan dissents - This discourages all confessions - Due Process Clause is an adequate tool for coping with coerced confessions - 5th Amendment has never been thought to forbid all pressure to incriminate oneself - Lawyer, in fulfilling his responsibilities, may be an obstacle to truth-finding - - The new code would markedly decrease the number of confessions In Miranda, signed a statement admitting his own crime within 2 hours and without any force – without giving nay warnings at all o Now held inadmissible Johnson: Appointed counsel must be given to indigent in federal criminal cases Mapp: exclusionary rule on states (many had adopted) Gideon: Extended Johnson to the states These new restrictions have been opposed by 22 states White dissents - The court has not examined a single transcript of any police interrogation - While admissions may be involuntary, they were not compelled. - 5th Amendment deals with compelling the accused self. Confessions and incriminating evidence are not forbidden, only compelled ones are banned - Court has a deep seeded distrust of confessions - There is nothing wrong with police asking a suspect whom they have reasonable cause to believe a man has killed his wife, especially when he has been advised that he may remain completely silent - If someone questioned is not guilty, this process will only end in red tape - The new court rule will operate indiscriminately in all criminal cases regardless of severity of the crime or circumstances involved. - 5th Amendment – Protections against self-incrimination 6th Amendment – Right to counsel Miranda basics - Why does the court care? Voluntariness, coercion and custodial interrogation setting - So what does the court do? They created the Miranda warnings that can only be waived once understood, effectuating knowing waiver - How does the court do it? Requiring these warnings - When does the court require these warnings? Custodial interrogation and subject to questioning - Objective intent based on reasonable person in a suspect’s position. Not subjective standard of police - Useful for anything that would incriminate. Something that the police might want to use. Even an innocuous statement. Inculpatory or exculpatory doesn’t matter… - Failure to give Miranda warnings is an irrefutable presumption Can Congress Overrule Miranda? Title II of the Crime Control Act of 1968. o § 3501 – Admissibility of confessions  Turned the clock back to voluntariness espoused by the Miranda dissents The case for § 3501 o Michigan v. Tucker – allowed the testimony of a prosecution witness whose identity had been discovered by questioning defendant in violation of Miranda. o Tucker: The Miranda safeguards were not meant to create a constitutional straightjacket. The are a reinforcement against self-incrimination. o New York v. Quarles and Oregon v. Elstad – Underscoring a distinction between incriminating statements actually coerced or compelled and those obtained merely in violation of Miranda procedural safeguards or prophylactic rules o Davis v. United States – Criticized the Justice Depts. Repeated refusal to invoke § 3501 DICKERSON v. UNITED STATES S.Ct. 2000 Justice Rehnquist Checks and balances between the court system and Congress. Congress does not get to interpret the constitution. FACTS: Congress enacted U.S.C. § 3501, which laid down the rule that admissibility of a suspect’s statements should turn only on whether or not they were voluntarily made. ISSUE: Whether Congress has constitutional authority to supercede Miranda. Whether Miranda announced a Constitutional rule or exercised its authority to regulate evidence in the absence of congressional discretion. HOLDING: Congress may not overrule Miranda, and we decline to overrule Miranda ourselves. Miranda governs the admissibility of statements made during custodial interrogation in both state and federal courts. ANALYSIS: - Coercion inherent in custodial interrogation blurs the line between voluntary statements and heightens the risk that an individual will not be accorded his privilege under the 4th Amendment - The court needs to independently evaluate Miranda and §3501. emicus curiea, friend of the court. - The Court of Appeals intended to overrule Miranda because §3501 designates voluntariness as the touchstone of §3501, has no warning requirement, and lists non-exclusive factors - - - - Congress retains the ultimate authority to modify or set aside any judicially created rules of evidence and procedure that are not required by the Constitution. o But Congress may not legislatively supercede our decisions applying the constitution The court in Miranda granted cert. to give concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow Stare decisis is important for legitimacy as well as finality. Reluctant on a whim to turn over something, especially because it has been working. Unwarned confessions in Miranda were obtained from defendant under circumstances that did not meet constitutional standards for protection of the privilege. §3501 cannot sustain if Miranda is the law Miranda has become embedded in routine police practice to the point where warnings have become part of our popular culture Totality-of-the-circumstances test in §3501 is more difficult for officers to conform to Miranda was a state case. The Supreme Court ONLY gets involved in state courts if there is a violation of Constitutional law. Somewhere someone thought that the Miranda rules applied to the states, claiming constitutional transgressions. Rehnquist – As an institutional matter, he is loathe to give ground to Congress when he doesn’t have to. Sure he really doesn’t like Miranda, but 30 years of precedent is too hard to overturn. Scalia dissents - New Constitutional rule - Statutes of Congress can be disregarded, not only when what they prescribe violates the Constitution, but when they violate the decision of the court that ―announced a constitutional rule‖ o Imposing prophylactic restrictions upon Congress and the state - No basis in reasoning for concluding that a response to the very first question asked by a suspect who knows all their rights is anything other than a volitional act - There is a difference between compelling a suspect to incriminate himself and preventing him from doing so foolishly on his own accord - Court offends separation of the powers - The court misdescribes the post-Miranda cases as dicta - It is not immediately apparent that the judicial burden is eased by the bright-line rule here - Little harm in admitting a mistake in taking away from the people the ability to decide for themselves what protections are afforded in the criminal justice process Applying and Explaining Miranda Harris v. New York – Statements preceded by defective warnings could nevertheless be used to impeach the defendant’s credibility if he takes the stand in his own defense Oregon v. Hass – Resulting incriminating statements could be used for impeachment o When a suspect asserts his rights, the police have little to lose by continuing with the questioning Michigan v. Mosley – Under certain circumstances, if they cease questioning on the spot, the police may try again and succeed at a later interrogation Berkemer v. McCarty – Roadside questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to a traffic stop is quite different from stationhouse investigation and is not a custodial interrogation California v. Beheler – If the suspect goes to the stationhouse on his own voluntary will accompanying the police, even police station questioning may not be a custodial interrogation What constitutes custodial interrogation? Yarborough v. Alvarado S.Ct. 2004 Justice Kennedy FACTS: Alvarado was 17 when the crime occurred. He helped Sotto try to steal a truck, which led to a shooting of the truck’s owner. Comstock asked Alvarado’s parents to bring him to the police station. The parents waited in the lobby while he was taken to a small room. The questioning lasted 2 hours with no Miranda warnings. Alvarado denied involvement, but later admitted it PROCEDURE: - Alvarado was charged with murder and attempted robbery - CA trial court rejected his motion to exclude the evidence from Comstock because he had not been ―in custody‖ - District Court of Appeals affirmed - U.S. Court of Appeals reversed, holding that state courts had erred in failing to take into account defendant’s youth and inexperience with the law enforcement process in a reasonable person standard - Habeas Corpus (When convicted, they violated constitutional rights) - (Tightened up collateral review – the state court must have imposed a reasonable application) ISSUE: Was this a custodial interrogation? HOLDING: REVERSED. The state’s application of the law was reasonable. A fair-minded jurist could disagree over whether Alvarado was in custody. NO CUSTODY. The CA courts did not make an unreasonable conclusion ANALYSIS: - unreasonable application of clearly established law - Against custody o No requirement to appear at a particular time o No threats or suggestions that he would be placed under arrest o Focus on Soto’s crimes o Alvarado asked twice if he wanted a break - For custody o Interview lasted 2 hours o Brought to the station by legal guardians o Extent of his control over his presence unclear - Relief can be granted only if state court’s decision is objectively unreasonable. Relief cannot be granted - Counsel for defendant did not press importance of age or experience - In most cases, officers won’t know the suspect’s history or his exact age O’Connor concurs - It was no big deal in this case…Alvarado was so close to 18. The issue of ae is still open if the cops can more easily figure it out. Breyer dissents - Alvarado was clearly in custody - Reasonable person context - Would a reasonable person have felt that he was entitled to leave in this circumstance? NO - Small interrogation room, police made it clear that they had evidence against him, officer suggested he was lying - Majorities’ evidence against custody: o Police didn’t transport him to the station  Involvement of his parents suggests involuntary o Parents remained in lobby, showing that it was a quick interview  Interview was not brief o Alvarado went home  Issue is freedom to leave during interrogation o Comstock focused on soto’s crimes  Indication that defendant participated o No pressure with threat of arrest  No the issue here o Ask if he wanted to take a break  Control over defendant’s movements - Defendant’s age is relevant. He is not well versed in police practices o Kid is 17 ½. What constitutes interrogation within the meaning of Miranda? RHODE ISLAND v. INNIS S.Ct. 1980 Justice Stewart FACTS: Patrolman arrested respondent suspected of robbing and shooting a cabbie. He was given rights twice and he asked for a lawyer. He was taken in a police car with a mesh screen, an officer accompanying him in back. Two officers briefly discussed how sad it was that handicapped children might find the gun and kill themselves. The respondent interrupted and showed the police where the gun was. PROCEDURE: - Respondent was convicted of murder. - Trial judge admitted the shotgun and testimony related to discovery. - On appeal, RI Supreme Court concluded that the police had interrogated respondent without valid waiver to right of counsel. ―Subtle coercion equivalent to a Miranda interrogation ISSUE: Whether he was interrogated in violation of Miranda HOLDING: The Respondent was not interrogated within the meaning of Miranda ANALYSIS: - Concern in Miranda was the interrogation environment subjugating the individual to the will of the examiner o Must reflect a measure of compulsion - Miranda safeguards for interrogation come into play with: o Express questioning (Are you guilty?) o Loophole - Any words or actions on the part of the police that they should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect - No express questioning and officers weren’t aware of respondent’s susceptibility in concern for handicapped children - We don’t care what people think; we care what people do. What they could have reasonably expected the questioning to do Burger concurs - Under the court’s test, an officer must evaluate susceptibility of the accused in a short time Marshall dissents - The notion that such an appeal could not be expected to have any effect unless the suspect were known to have a special interest in handicapped children is ludicrous o This is a classic interrogation technique - Court’s test creates an incentive for police to ignore a suspect’s invocation of his rights in order to make continued attempts to extract info from him. ILLINOIS v. PERKINS S.Ct. 1990 Justice Kennedy FACTS: Carlton, and inmate of Perkins, told police that Perkins implicated himself in the Stephenson murder. The police placed Charlston and Parisi, and undercover officer in the same cell with Perkins, incarcerated for a different crime. After some talk about planning an escape, Parisi asked Perkins if he had ever done anybody. Perkins replied that he had, and described the Stephenson murder. PROCEDURE: - Trial court suppressed the statements made to Parisi in jail. - Appellate court affirmed, reading Miranda to prohibit all undercover contacts with incarcerated suspects ISSUE: Is there a due process violation here? Is Miranda applicable. QUESTION OF CUSTODY HOLDING: REVERSED. Miranda warnings are not required when the suspect is unaware that he is speaking to a law enforcement officer and gives a voluntary statement ANALYSIS: - Essential Miranda ingredients of police-dominated atmosphere and compulsion are not present here. Coercion is determined from suspect’s perspective - When suspect has no reason to think that the listeners have official power over him, it should not be assumed that his words are motivated by the reactions of the listeners - No charges have been filed against subject of investigation, 6th amendment not applicable - For Miranda purposes, he wasn’t in custody. He didn’t know that the guy was working for the cops - No police-dominated environment. No technical custody Brennan concurs - Deception and manipulation raise a claim that there was a violation of the due process clause - ―Jailhouse bravado‖ to exploit vulnerability Marshall Dissents - Perkins received no Miranda warnings - Because he was interrogated by the police, he was in custody - ―Any‖ police tactics to compel a suspect to make incriminating statements - Psychological pressures increase anxiety, making him seek the relief by talking with others - Constant threat of physical danger makes him demonstrate his toughness If he has been indicted for the Stevenson murder, 6th Amendment would have stopped them from interrogating the suspect MINNICK v. MISSISSIPPI S.Ct. 1990 Justice Kennedy FACTS: Minnick and Dykes escaped from jail and broke into a trailer to search for weapons, killing two people. They first went to Mexico, then Minnick went to CA alone. 4 months later he was arrested by San Diego police. The next day, he was interviewed by 2 FBI agents, they gave him his Miranda rights, he claims he understood them, but didn’t sign the waiver. He answered questions, saying the Dykes forced him to kill the second victim, and hesitated to disclose further until he spoke with a lawyer. The FBI interview ended, and an attorney met with Minnick. Monday, Denham, a MS police chief came to interview Minnick. He was told by his jailers that he couldn’t refuse. Denham advised the petitioner of his rights, Minnick declined to sign a waiver, and proceeded to give incriminating statements PROCEDURE: - Minnick tried for murder in MS - He moved to suppress the evidence given to all FBI officers - Trial court denied motion with respect to Denham - Petitioner convicted and sentences to death - State Supreme Court affirmed HOLDING: When counsel is requested, interrogation must cease, and officials may not reinitiate interrogation without counsel present, whether or not accused has consulted with his attorney. ANALYSIS: - Edwards is designed to prevent police from badgering defendant into waiving previously asserted Miranda rights. Once you initiate request for counsel, all interrogations must stop. o No coercive pressures o Provides clear guidelines - Cases following interpreted the decision to mean that the authorities may not initiate questioning of the accused in counsel’s absence - A single atty. Consultation doesn’t remove Edwards…Coercion may increase as detention is prolonged - Without this rule, it will undermine Miranda…Go back in and try to coerce. - Bradbury: When the suspect initiated further communication with the police, it is ok even if the lawyer has left. - You need an unambiguous declaration that I want to talk to a lawyer (To stop). To reinitiate, squishy standard. Does not require the defendant to declare the reinitiating. Scalia dissents - Presumption that a suspect can never waive the right to counsel, even after multiple Miranda warnings - After suspect has requested and spoken with an attorney, he knows he has an advocate and the police will honor that. + a heightened awareness of the right to remain silent - We have gone far beyond the concern for suspects who do not know their right to remain silent, or who have been coerced to abandon it. - Providing him with an attorney at every stage where he may be persuaded to incriminate himself will even the odds - Corrosive of the justice system to regard a confession as a mistake NEW YORK v. QUARLES S.Ct. 1984 Justice Rehnquist FACTS: At 12:30am, police apprehended Quarles at rear of a supermarket. He matched the description of a man who had just raped a woman. A woman told police he had entered the supermarket and was carrying a gun. Seeing the officers enter, he ran towards the rear. Kraft frisked him and discovered an empty holster, then handcuffed him. Then he asked him where the gun was, and he responded, ―the gun is over there.‖ At the time, respondent was surrounded by 4 officers who put down their guns because the situation was under control. Kraft found the gun in an empty carton. Quarles was then put under arrest and informed of his Miranda rights. He then stated that he owned the revolver PROCEDURE: - Prosecuted for criminal possession of a weapon - NY Courts suppressed the statement ―the gun is over there‖ as well as the incriminating statements after. ISSUE: Should the statements be suppressed because of failure to give Miranda warnings before asking questions? HOLDING: Under these circumstances, the overriding considerations for public safety justify officer’s failure to provide Miranda warnings before asking questions ANALYSIS: - ―Public safety exception‖ to Miranda requirements that Miranda warnings be given before a suspect’s answers may be admitted into evidence. Availability of exception doesn’t depend on officer’s motivations - Officer was confronted with immediate necessity of ascertaining the whereabouts of the gun. So long as the gun was concealed, it posed public safety danger. An accomplice may use it, or an employee might find it. - Spontaneity, exigency, ticking bomb - The cost would have been more than the failure to obtain evidence useful in conviction - Need for answers > need for prophylactic rule - Prophylactic rules…Not rights protected by the constitution. O’Connor goes both ways - Public safety exception blurs the lines established making Miranda tougher to understand. - Will benefit court in some places because exigencies are excusable - Will hurt officers and their excluded evidence because it wasn’t exigent circumstances Marshall dissents - Public was not at risk here - Quarles had been reduced to a position of powerlessness - Was not believed to have had an accomplice - When the questioning began, the officers felt safe enough to put away their guns - Kraft knew the gun was in the vicinity - Miranda is not a decision about public safety 5th – Self-incrimination 6th – Right to counsel What is Miranda’s foundation – Constitution requires Miranda, or is it a prophylactic rule? What about the fruit? What are the votes? - Thomas cannot command the court What is the actual holding? What about the incentives? U.S. v. PATANE S.Ct. 2004 Justice Thomas FACTS: Patane was arrested outside his home and handcuffed. A federal agent was told that the defendant possessed a Glock pistol. He began giving him warnings, but the suspect told him he knew his rights. Agent asked about the Glock, defendant told him that it was in his bedroom on a shelf. PROCEDURE: - Defendant indicted for being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm in violation of federal law - 10th circuit held that the pistol itself and statement disclosing location, were inadmissible ISSUE: Whether the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine covers evidence seized in violation of Miranda HOLDING: REVERSED. The pistol and statement were admissible. No fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine applies to the 5th Amendment CURTAILMENT OF MIRANDA – Court has not explored all of its possibilities. What about third parties? (Who else knew you were trying to kill Dean Sergeant) ANY kind of derivative evidence is fair game. ANALYSIS: - Miranda rule is not implicated in admission of physical fruit of a voluntary statement o No justification for extending Miranda to this situation - The self-incrimination clause contains its own exclusionary rule – no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself - A mere failure to give Miranda warnings does not violate a suspect’s constitutional rights or the Miranda Rule o Violations occur when admitting unwarned statements into evidence - No reason to apply fruit of poisonous tree doctrine here o Provide no risk that the defendant’s incriminating statements will be used against him at trial Kennedy concurs - Elstad and Quarles – Evidence following an unwarned interrogation was held admissible Souter dissents - Majority adds an inducement for interrogators to ignore the rule in Miranda. Functionally, his words are being used against him. - Privilege against self-incrimination extends to the exclusion of derivative evidence - Incentive for police officer is to ignore Miranda and get a gun. Breyer dissents - Courts would exclude physical evidence derived from unwarned questioning unless failure to provide Miranda warnings was in good faith (not here) Court the votes – Plurality What about Elstad? What is the actual holding? O’Connor Dissent MISSOURI v. SEIBERT S.Ct. 2004 Justice Souter FACTS: Officer Hanrahan arranged for another officer to arrest Seibert, a murder suspect, instructing the officer not to give her Miranda rights. Seibert was left alone in the interrogation room for 20 minutes, then Hanrahan came in and got her to give an incriminating statement. She was given a 20-minutes break, he comes back in, gives her Miranda warnings, and got Seibert to acknowledge the incriminating statement. The statement was largely a repeat of information prior obtained. PROCEDURE: - Trial court excluded only the statement obtained during the first questioning session - Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statement made after defendant had been given Miranda warnings and waived her rights had to be suppressed too ISSUE: Is the repeated statement admissible here? Could the interrogated reasonably choose to stop talking even if he had talked earlier? HOLDING: No, A statement repeated after warning in such circumstances is inadmissible (Conscious plan inadmissible. Forgetting to let them know inadvertently is ok). What would the reasonable defendant do in this instance? Miranda ineffective once you get the confession Narrow approach to Miranda. ANALYSIS: - The two-step questioning technique is a challenge to Miranda o Strategy of withholding Miranda warnings until after interrogating and getting a confession o Used in national police training handbooks - It is likely if an officer succeeds in getting incriminating statements before the warning, the warnings will be ineffective in preparing the subject for further interrogation - Likely interrogated person’s reaction would be bewilderment and perplexity - Elstad: Police initial failure to warn was an oversight that may have resulted in confusion as to whether the exchange was a custodial interrogation (Evaluating voluntariness) - Relevant facts: Completeness and detail of initial round of questions, the overlapping content of the two statements, the timing and setting, the continuity of police personnel. - The question was systematic and managed with psychological skill - The police did not advise her that her previous statements would not be used (Curative measures) Breyer concurs - Simple rule: Courts should exclude the fruits of the initial unwarned questioning unless the failure to warn was in good faith Kennedy concurs - It undermines and obscures Miranda’s meaning - Officer here relied on the pre-warning statement to obtain the post-warning statement used against her at trial - Plurality test cuts too broadly – Specific to the 2-step questioning strategy. (Excluded unless curative measures or a significant period of time taken before post-warning questions are asked Intent of the police officer important O’Connor dissents - Thought’s kept inside an officer’s head cannot affect that experience - The officer’s intent could not have influenced the voluntariness of her confession - Here the officer admitted the 2-step was intentional. It will be more difficult at times when officers say it was unintentional - We refuse to recognize the psychological impact of a suspect’s conviction that he has ―let the cat out of the bag‖ MORAN v. BURBINE S.Ct. 1986 You have a right to attorney but… What is out waiver standard in this context? On what Amendment does Stevens rely in dissent Justice O’Connor FACTS: After given Miranda rights and after executing waivers, respondent confessed to the murder of a young woman. He never requested an attorney, but his sister appointed one to represent him. Not to his knowledge anyways. The attorney phoned the station and received assurances that respondent wouldn’t be questioned until the next day. The interrogation that yielded the confession took place later that night. Several months after death of a woman by a metal pipe, officers arrested respondent in connection with a local burglary. Before arrest, Detective Ferrarri of the Cranston Police force learned from a confidential informant that the person who killed the women lived at the respondent’s address. Miranda rights given, no waivers signed, officer got some implicating info from the burglary accomplices. Respondent’s sister phoned public defender’s office to get a lawyer for her brother’s burglary charge. Munson, the lawyer, phoned the Cranston Police, telling them that she would act as Burbine’s counsel if questioning took place. She received assurances that he wouldn’t be questioned through the night. Interrogation that night produced a written statement confessing to the murder PROCEDURE: - Respondent moved to suppress the statements - Court denied the motion, finding the respondent received Miranda warnings and voluntarily waived right to counsel and self-incrimination o Also, no collusion or police conspiracy o The constitutional right to request the presence of an attorney belongs solely to the defendant - Jury found respondent guilty of murder and he appealed to the Supreme Court of RI - S.Ct. of RI said that an attorney would not have significantly added much info necessary to make an informed decision, nor did the police have to honor Munson’s request. - Federal habeus corpus, U.S. Court of Appeals for the first circuit: police conduct tainted valid waiver of 5th amendment privilege against self-incrimination and right to counsel o Blameworthy action by police o Respondent’s ignorance of phone call ISSUE: Whether a pre-arraignment confession preceding an otherwise valid waiver must be suppressed either because the police misinformed an inquiring attorney about their plans concerning a suspect or because they failed to inform the suspect of the attorney’s efforts to reach him. Violate 5th, 6th, 14th Amendments? HOLDING: Reverse. Confession and waiver was valid. ANALYSIS: - Waiver must be: o Voluntary: free from coercion and intimidation o Made with full awareness both of the nature of the abandoned right and to consequences of the decision to abandon it - Events unknown to suspect can have no bearing on his capacity to relinquish a constitutional right - Additional information would have been useful, but the police do not have to monitor the flow of info to a suspect - Questioning the police ―recklessness and irresponsibility‖ (Police state of mind irrelevant) - 5th Amendment: violated if they fail to tell suspect if an attorney was trying to reach him…Purpose is to dissipate the compulsion threat - 2 concerns of custodial interrogations: o Need for police questioning as a tool for effective enforcement of criminal laws (admission of guilt is essential to those enforcing laws o Interrogation process is inherently coercive, and there’s a risk that police will overstep their bounds th - 6 Amendment: doesn’t apply here because the statements took place before initiation of adversarial judicial proceedings. Non-interference in attorney dealings begins once a relationship is formed. - 14th Amendment due process doesn’t apply here because it doesn’t shock the court’s conscience. Stevens dissents - Police interference with attorney-client communications is a problem - Waiver of constitutional rights violated when he didn’t get info of attorney - No constitutional distinction between a deceptive misstatement and concealment by police - Deliberate deception of Munson tantamount to deception of her client - Here, police could refuse to let attorneys see their clients With respect to 6th Amendment issues, you need commencement for formal judicial proceedings must have been initiated. The Miranda concepts of custody don’t matter here if you look at it as a 6th Amendment violation. Self-incriminating statements 5th Amendment Analysis – Custodial Interrogation (Arrest or its functional equivalent) (Actions police should know will illicit an incriminating response) BREWER v. WILLIAMS S.Ct. 1977. Justice Stewart FACTS: Man kidnapped and killed a girl at the YMCA. Williams, formal mental patient and religious man, turns himself in. He’s got lawyers everywhere. Williams is arraigned. He goes in the car from Davenport to Des Moines. Agreement for no interrogation. Kelly is not allowed to ride with them. Cop gave a Christian Burial Speech. Showed the cops where the body is. PROCEDURE: - Trial judge admitted all evidence from statements given in a car ride. They ruled that Williams waived his rights - Federal District Court said statements were involuntary. Williams had been denied 6th Amendment right against self-incrimination - Court of Appeals affirmed HOLDING: Affirmed. Williams deprived of right to counsel. Violation of 6th and 14th Amendments ANALYSIS: - Convo took place after initiation of judicial proceedings - Designed to illicit incriminating information. No different than Massiah - Williams was entitled to counsel under 6th Amendment - No knowing, intelligent, voluntary waiver – There was no waiver. o He kept saying I’ll talk to you after I see my lawyer o Repeatedly asserted his right to counsel - Waiver requires not merely comprehension, but relinquishment Burger dissents - Don’t punish the public for an officer’s wrongdoing, punish the officer - He had 5 warnings of his right to counsel. Williams was not threatened or coerced and acted voluntarily - Williams was prompted by a statement, not a question White Dissents - Individual validly waived his rights. - He was advised of his right by 3 state officials. Exercise of his own free will - He spontaneously changed his mind about the timing of his disclosures KULHMANN v. WILSON 477 U.S. 436, 106 S.Ct. 2616, 91 L.Ed.2d (1986). Justice Powell FACTS: Respondent and two confederates robbed a garage and killed the night dispatcher. Respondent turned himself in and admitted that eh had witnessed the murder, but said he fled because he didn’t want to be blamed for the crimes. Jailbird Lee was in the same cell and was told to ―keep an ear open‖. Wilson told his story to Lee, he said it didn’t sound too good. Wilson’s brother comes and he changes his story. He was placed near Kuhlmann but didn’t deliberately illicit incriminating statements. PROCEDURE: - Trial court denied Wilson’s motion to suppress the incriminating statements o His statements were spontaneous and unsolicited. - Supreme Court says the lower court recast those findings o No 6th Amendment incrimination ISSUE: HOLDING: REVERSED. The statements are allowed. ANALYSIS: - Distinguishing Henry: The informant had stimulated convos with defendant, Lee didn’t do that here. - To be a 6th Amendment violation, the informant has to take some action beyond merely listening that was designed deliberately to illicit incriminating remarks - Lee was passive enough for the majority of the Supreme Court Brennan Dissents - Lee stimulated conversation concerning respondent’s role in the murder o ―Didn’t sound so good‖ - If the person is a listening post, it is a problem…If a person is asking questions and stimulating conversation, that’s a problem. Where do you draw the line? ―Didn’t look so good‖ is ok, but more than that the government has a problem. Depends whether you are talking to a government agent or not - At the time of the event, are you an agent of the state? Highlights of the Semester Search question, interrogation question Think about what’s happening in the context of what we’ve been talking about Take time to organize thoughts 2 ½ hours. Hope that the exam takes only 2 hours Exclusionary Rule – incorporation o Mapp – must use exclusionary rule…Ways out of it (Leon – Reliance on warrant unless cops lie) Protected areas – What would 4th amendment protect and why? o Katz, Trash grab, helicopter, beeper, Probable cause o Spinelli  Gates (Totality) Search warrants o Knock and announce o WARRANTLESS SEARCHES HUGE o Motor home? Car? o What about your motivation? As long as there was a violation Strike a balance between liberty and security (worried about officer safety and want officers to be able to administer effectively, check on government power, o Bright line rules o Terry stop world…no probable cause but worries about crime and officer safety…Reasonable and articulable suspicion…Pat downs to look for weapons…plain feel is ok, but you cannot further manipulate object when you know it isn’t a weapon Consent o Different standard: Not Johnson v. Zerbst…It’s a lower, government friendly consent standard. o 3rd Party consent - - Interrogations – Not on the Street - Miranda – 5th Amendment approach o What is custody, what is interrogation? o What is the foundation for Miranda?  Dickerson – Constitutionally based  Recent cases continue to jumble it - Massiah - 6th Amendment interrogations Court is trying to be faithful to the text while striking a pragmatic balance between interests in government in enforcing the law and interests of the individual in their liberty A WAY OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION THAT OFFERS LESSONS THAT CAN TRANSFER TO OTHER SUBSTANTIVE AREAS OF THE LAW