From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia 2000 Cochabamba protests
2000 Cochabamba protests
In a 1999 Public Expenditure Review, the World Bank
stated that "no subsidies should be given to ameliorate
the increase in water tariffs in Cochabamba".[4] The New
Yorker reported on the World Bank’s motives, "Most of
the poorest neighborhoods were not hooked up to the
network, so state subsidies to the water utility went
mainly to industries and middle-class neighborhoods;
the poor paid far more for water of dubious purity from
trucks and handcarts. In the World Bank’s view, it was a
city that was crying out for water privatization."[1]
In a 2002 publication the World Bank acknowledges
that one of its loans, the "Major Cities Water and Sewer-
age Rehabilitation Project", included a condition to pri-
Demonstrators demand removal of consortium and end of pri- vatize the La Paz and Cochabamba water utilities. The
vatization of water works privatization was required to allow a two-year extension
of the project that was due to close in 1995. The World
The Cochabamba protests of 2000 also known as the
2000, Bank project that began in 1990 had covered three cities,
"Cochabamba Water Wars", were a series of protests that leading to sharply diverging outcomes: Access increased
took place in Cochabamba, Bolivia’s third largest city, be- and service quality improved in Santa Cruz de la Sierra
tween January 1999 and April 2000 in response to multi- where a successful cooperative provided services, which
national participation in the infrastructure and manage- enjoyed, according to the World Bank, "the reputation as
ment of the city’s municipal water supply. one of the best-managed utilities in Latin America." How-
ever, results were mixed in La Paz and poor in Cochabam-
Economic background ba. In the latter access to piped water had actually de-
creased from 70% to 40%, water losses had remained high
The restoration of civilian rule to Bolivia in 1982 ended at 40% and water supply had remained unreliable at
decades of military dictatorships, but did not bring eco- about 4 hours a day despite the funds made available by
nomic stability. In 1985, with hyperinflation at an annual the World Bank to support the public utility. Interest-
rate of 25 thousand percent, few foreign investors would ingly, the World Bank did not include a conditionality
do business in the country.[1] The Bolivian government to privatize water in Santa Cruz where the local utility
turned to the World Bank as a last refuge against eco- had been able to improve services, but only in the cities
nomic meltdown. For the next 20 years, successive gov- where the utilities had failed to improve services.[5]
ernments followed the World Bank’s provisions in order The World Bank acknowledges that it provided as-
to qualify for continued loans from the organization.[1] sistance to prepare a concession contract for Cochabam-
In order to move towards independent development, Bo- ba in 1997. However, its involvement with water in
livia privatised its railways, telephone system, national Cochabamba ended in the same year. At that time the
airlines, and hydrocarbon industry. bidding process for the concession had been declared
void by the Supreme Court in response to a legal chal-
Demand of the World Bank lenge by the municipality of Cochabamba. In the same
year the World Bank project in the three cities ended.
According to The Ecologist in 2000, the World Bank de- The World Bank thus was not included any more in the
clared it would not "renew" a 25 million USD loan to Bo- subsequent phase of the privatization.[5] The new con-
livia unless it privatized its water services.[2] According cession included the Misicuni project that involved con-
to Jim Shultz, executive director of the Democracy Center struction of a new dam. The dam had been opposed by
in Cochabamba, the World Bank believed that "poor gov- the World Bank as being unnecessarily expensive com-
ernments are often too plagued by local corruption and pared to a cheaper alternative. The alternative, the Co-
too ill equipped to run public water systems efficient- rani project, would have supplied water to Cochambam-
ly. ...[and that the use of private corporations] opens the ba from an existing dam. The high expected cost of the
door to needed investment and skilled management,"[3] Misicuni project was later used as a justification for the
1
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia 2000 Cochabamba protests
immediate 38% tariff increase imposed at the beginning resources that had previously been independent of regu-
of the concession. Had the advice of the World Bank been lation.[7] The law was seen as "enabling the sale of water
followed, the construction of the dam would not have resources that had never really been a part of SEMAPA
been part of the concession, the tariff increase would in the first place."[7] Many became worried that indepen-
have been unnecessary and Aguas del Tunari would have dent communal water systems which had yet to be con-
had to face competition in its drive to win the Cochabam- nected with SEMAPA would be "summarily appropriated
ba concession.[5] Such competition would have made it by the new concession."[7] By Law 2029, if Aguas del Tu-
much more difficult to obtain some of the abusive condi- nari had wanted to, not only could it have installed me-
tions that were ultimately included in the concession. ters and begin charging at independently built commu-
The Misicuni project was later pursued by Evo Mo- nal water systems, but it could have also charged resi-
rales when he became President of Bolivia. It was justi- dents for the installation of those meters.[1] The broad
fied through its benefits for hydropower generation and nature of Law 2029 led many to claim that the govern-
irrigation in addition to potable water supply for ment would require a license be obtained for people to
Cochabamba.[6] In 2010 the dam was under construction. collect rainwater from their roofs.[2] The first to raise
concerns over the scope of the law was the new Fed-
Aguas del Tunari consortium eración Departamental Cochabambina de Regantes (FEDECOR)
and its leader Omar Fernandez.[7] FEDECOR was made up
Prior to privatization the water works of Cochabamba of local professionals, including engineers and environ-
were controlled by the state agency SEMAPA. After pres- mentalists.[1] They were joined by a federation of peasant
sure from the World Bank, the Bolivian government put farmers who relied on irrigation, and a confederation of
SEMAPA up for auction for privatization but not capi- factory workers’ unions led by Oscar Olivera.[1] Togeth-
talization. Only one party was willing to bid on the pro- er these groups formed Coördinator for the Defense of Water
ject.[7] This was Aguas del Tunari, a consortium led by In- and Life, or La Coordinadora which became the core of the
ternational Water Limited (England), the utility firm Edi- opposition to the policy.[1][7]
son (Italy), Bechtel Enterprise Holdings (USA), the engi-
neering and construction firm Abengoa (Spain) and two
companies from Bolivia, ICE Ingenieros and the cement
Rate hike
maker SOBOCE.[8] The water network that they envi- As a condition of the contract Aguas del Tunari had agreed
sioned was projected to provide drinking water to all of to pay the $30 million in debt accumulated by SEMAPA.
the people of Cochabamba. This was set to double the ex- They also agreed to finance an expansion of the water
isting coverage area and also introduce electrical produc- system, and begin a much needed maintenance program
tion to more of the region.[8] on the existing deteriorating water system.[1] Dider
Without regard for its weak bargaining position, the Quint, a managing director for the consortium, said "We
Bolivian government under President Hugo Banzer were confident that we could implement this program
agreed to the terms of its sole bidder Aguas del Tunari and in a shorter period of time than the one required by the
signed a $2.5 billion, 40-year concession "to provide wa- contract. [To accomplish this] We had to reflect in the
ter and sanitation services to the residents of Cochabam- tariff increase all the increases that had never been im-
ba, as well as generate electricity and irrigation for agri- plemented before."[1]
culture."[1][7] Within the terms of the contract the con- On top of this, in order to secure the contract Aguas
sortium was guaranteed a minimum 15% annual return del Tunari had to promise the Bolivian government to
on its investment, which was to be annually adjusted to fund the completion of the stalled Misicuni dam pro-
the United States’ consumer price index.[1] The imple- ject.[1] The dam was purportedly designed to pipe water
mentation of Aguas del Tunari’s program was set to corre- through the mountains, but the World Bank had deemed
late with a government plan to present a $63 million rur- it uneconomic. While the consortium had no interest in
al development package to peasants with funds for crop building the dam, it was a condition of their contract,
diversification, and extending electric and telephone ser- as it was backed by an influential member of Banzer’s
vices to remote areas.[9] megacoalition, the mayor of Cochabamba, Manfred Reyes
Villa.[1] An attempt to privatize the water system had
Law 2029 been made without the condition of building the dam in
1997, but Reyes Villa had used his influence to squash
To ensure the legality of the privatization the Bolivian the deal.[1] Critics of Reyes Villa held that the dam was a
government passed law 2029, which verified the contract "vanity project" which would profit "some of his main fi-
with Aguas del Tunari. To many the law appeared to give nancial backers".[1]
a monopoly to Aguas del Tunari over all water resources. The officials in Bolivia for Aguas del Tunari were most-
Many feared that this included water used for irrigation ly engineers lacking marketing training.[1] They were al-
by peasant farmers(campesinos), and community-based so foreigners unaware of the intricacies of Bolivian soci-
2
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia 2000 Cochabamba protests
ety and economics.[1] Upon taking control the company Throughout March 2000 the Bolivian hierarchy of the
raised water rates an average of 35% to about $20 a Roman Catholic Church tried to mediate between the
month. While this seemed minuscule in the developed government and the demonstrators. In the meantime,
nations that the Aguas del Tunari staff had come from, the Coordinadora made their own referendum and de-
many of their new clients only earned about $100 a clared that out of fifty thousand votes, 96% demanded
month and $20 was more than they spent on food.[2] In the contract with Aguas del Tunari be cancelled.[1] The
complete ignorance of the reality of his situation, a man- government’s reply was that "There is nothing to negoti-
ager for the consortium, Geoffrey Thorpe simply said "if ate."[1]
people didn’t pay their water bills their water would be In April 2000, demonstrators again took over
turned off."[1] The poor were joined in their protest by Cochabamba’s central plaza. When the leaders of the Co-
January 2000, when middle-class homeowners and large ordinadora (including Óscar Olivera) went to a meeting
business owners stripped of their subsidies saw their own with the governor at his office they were arrested.
water bills increase.[1] As anger over the rates mounted, Though they were released the following day, some, fear-
Reyes Villa was quick to distance himself from Aguas del ing further government action, fled into hiding. More
Tunari.[1] demonstration leaders were arrested, with some being
transferred to a jungle prison in San Joaquin, a remote
Protests and state of emer- town in the Amazon rainforest on the border with
Brazil.[1][11] The demonstrations spread quickly to other
gency areas including La Paz, Oruro, and Potosí as well as rural
areas. The protesters also expanded their demands call-
Demonstrations erupted when Aguas del Tunari imposed
ing on the government to resolve unemployment and
a large rate increase, reportedly to finance the Misicuni
other economic problems.[8] Soon demonstrators had
Dam project, a week after taking control of the
most of the major highways in Bolivia barricaded.[1] The
Cochabamba water supply system. In a country where
protest even inspired officers in four La Paz police units
the minimum wage was less than US$70 per month, many
to refuse to leave their barracks or obey superiors until a
dwellers were hit with monthly water bills of $20 or
wage dispute was settled.[11]
more.
Starting in early January 2000 massive protests in
State of emergency
Cochabamba began with Oscar Olivera among the most
outspoken leaders against the rate hikes and subsequent The Bolivian Constitution allows the President (with the
water cut-offs.[8][10] The demonstrators consisted of re- support of his Cabinet) to declare a 90-day state of siege
gantes (peasant irrigators) who entered the city either in one or more districts of the nation as an emergency
under village banners, or carrying the wiphala; they were measure to maintain public order in "cases of serious
joined by jubilados (retired unionized factory workers) danger resulting from an internal civil distur-
under the direction of Olivera [1] and cholitas.[1] Young bance".[12][13] Any extension beyond 90 days must be ap-
men began to try to take over the plaza and a barricade proved of by the Congress.[13] Anyone arrested at this
across incoming roadways was set up.[1] Soon they were time must be released after 90 days unless criminal
joined by pieceworkers, sweatshop employees, and street charges are brought against them before a court.[12] With
vendors (a large segment of the economy since the clo- the roads cut off and fearing a repeat of past uprisings,
sure of the state-owned tin mines).[1] Anarchists from the President Banzer on April 8, 2000 declared a "state of
middle-classes came from the University of Cochabam- siege".[1] Banzer said, "We see it as our obligation, in the
ba to denounce the World Bank and International Mone- common best interest, to decree a state of emergency to
tary Fund and neoliberalism.[1] The strongest supporters protect law and order."[1][10] Information Minister Ron-
of the demonstration were drawn from the city’s growing ald McLean described the rationale for the decree, saying
population of homeless street children.[1] "We find ourselves with a country with access roads to
Protesters were able to halt Cochabamba’s economy the cities blocked, with food shortages, passengers
by holding a general strike that shut down the city for stranded and chaos beginning to take hold in other
four straight days.[10] A ministerial delegation went to cities."[11] The decree suspended "some constitutional
Cochabamba and agreed to roll back the water rates; still guarantees, allowing police to detain protest leaders
the demonstration continued.[1] On February 4, 2000, without a warrant, restrict travel and political activity
thousands marching in protest were met by troops and and establish a curfew."[8] Meetings of over four people
law enforcement from Oruro and La Paz.[1][10] Two days were outlawed, and the freedom of the press was cur-
of clashes occurred with the police using teargas.[10] Al- tailed with radio stations being taken over by the mil-
most 200 demonstrators were arrested; 70 protesters and itary and some newspaper reporters being arrested.[10]
51 policemen were injured.[1] The police moved in to enforce the policy with nighttime
raids and mass arrests.[2][8] At one point 20 labor union
3
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia 2000 Cochabamba protests
and civic leaders were arrested.[8] The police’s tear gas saying "We are protesting because of higher gasoline and
and rubber bullets were met by the protesters’ rocks and transportation prices and a law that will charge us for the
Molotov cocktails.[11] Continuing violent clashes be- use of water."[8]
tween the demonstrators and law enforcement led to
internal exile, 40 injuries, and five deaths.[2][8] Interna-
tional Human Rights Organizations decried the "state of
Protesters’ demands expand
siege" declaration.[12][14] This was the seventh time since Teachers of state schools in rural areas went on strike
Bolivia returned to democracy in 1982 that the "state of calling for salary increases (at the time they made $1,000
siege" decree had been employed.[11] a year). In the capital city of La Paz students began to
On April 9, 2000, near the city of Achacachi, soldiers fight running battles with police. Demonstrators put up
met resistance to removing a roadblock and opened fire, roadblocks of stones, bricks and barrels near Achacachi
killing two people (including a teen-age boy) and wound- and Batallas, and violence broke out there as well (one
ing several others. Angry residents overpowered soldiers army officer and two farmers were killed and dozens in-
and used their weapons against military leaders. They jured). Soldiers and police soon cleared most of the road-
wounded Battalion commander Armando Carrasco Nava blocks that had cut off highways in five of the country’s
and army captain Omar Jesus Tellez Arancibia. The nine provinces.[8]
demonstrators then found Tellez in hospital, dragged
him from his bed, beat him to death and dismembered his
body.[15]
Resolution
Also on 9 April 2000, 800 striking police officers fired After a televised recording of a Bolivian Army captain,
tear gas at soldiers (to which the soldiers then fired their Robinson Iriarte de la Fuente, firing a rifle into a crowd of
weapons in the air).[15] In response the government gave demonstrators wounding many and hitting high school
a 50% pay raise to the La Paz police to end the strike. This student Víctor Hugo Daza in the face, killing him, intense
brought their monthly income up from the equivalent of anger erupted.[1] The police told the executives of the
$80 to $120.[15] The police then returned to enforcement consortium that their safety could no longer be guaran-
procedures against those still demonstrating.[15] A group teed. The executives then fled from Cochabamba to San-
of soldiers soon demanded their own raise, declaring that ta Cruz.[1] After coming out of four days of hiding, Os-
there was racial discrimination in the pay scale. Police in car Olivera signed a concord with the government guar-
Santa Cruz, the nation’s second largest city, also went on anteeing the removal of Aguas del Tunari and turning
strike demanding a raise.[15] Cochabamba’s water works over to La Coordinadora. De-
tained demonstrators were to be released and Law 2029
repealed.[4] The Banzer government then told Aguas del
Government view of the Tunari that by leaving Cochabamba they had "aban-
demonstrators doned" the concession and declared the $200 million
contract revoked. The company, insisting that it had not
The coca growers of Bolivia led by then-Congressman left voluntarily but been forced out, filed a $40 million
Evo Morales (later elected President of Bolivia in Decem- lawsuit in the International Centre for Settlement of In-
ber 2005) had joined the demonstrators and were de- vestment Disputes, an appellate body of the World Bank,
manding an end to the US-sponsored program of eradi- against the Bolivian government, "claiming compensa-
cation of their crops (while coca can be heavily refined tion for lost profits under a bilateral investment
and made into cocaine it is used legally by many in Bo- treaty."[2] On the day following Víctor Hugo Daza’s fu-
livia for teas and for chewing). Seeing the involvement neral, Óscar Olivera climbed to his union office’s balcony
of the coca growers, the Bolivian government claimed and proclaimed victory to the exhausted crowd.[1] The
that the demonstrators were actually agents or pawns of demonstrators declared that they would not relent until
drug traffickers.[1] Ronald MacLean Abaroa, the Minister Law 2029 was changed. To get a quorum to amend the law
of Information, told reporters the demonstrations were the government even rented planes to fly legislators back
the work of drug traffickers trying to stop the govern- to the capital. In a special session on 11 April 2000 the law
ment program to eradicate coca fields and replace them was changed.[15]
with cotton, pineapples, and bananas. He said that "Th-
ese protests [were] a conspiracy financed by cocaine traf-
ficking looking for pretexts to carry out subversive activ- Aftermath
ities. It is impossible for so many farmers to spontaneous-
ly move on their own."[8] MacLean said President Hugo World Bank and continuing protests
Banzer was worried because "political groups and traf- On 12 April 2000 when asked about the outcome in Bo-
fickers are instigating farmers to confront the army."[8] livia, World Bank President James Wolfensohn main-
Felix Santos, a leader of the farmers rejected such claims, tained that free or subsidized delivery of a public service
4
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia 2000 Cochabamba protests
like water leads to abuse of the resource; he said, "The as 2005, half of the 600,000 people of Cochabamba re-
biggest problem with water is the waste of water through mained without water and those with it only received in-
lack of charging."[4] termittent service (some as little as three hours a day).
In Washington, D.C. at the 16 April 2000 IMF and Oscar Olivera the leading figure in the protests admitted,
World Bank meetings, protesters attempted to blockade "I would have to say we were not ready to build new
the streets to stop the meeting. They cited the Water alternatives."[18] SEMAPA managers say they are still
Wars in Bolivia as an example of corporate greed and a forced to deal with graft and inefficiencies, but that its
reason to resist globalization. Oscar Olivera attended the biggest problem is a lack of money (it can not raise rates
protests, saying, "The people have recaptured their dig- and no international company will give them a loan).[18]
nity, their capacity to organize themselves - and most Luis Camargo, SEMAPA’s operations manager in an in-
important of all, the people are no longer scared." [4] terview with the New York Times said they were forced
On 23 April 2002 Oscar Olivera led 125 protesters to to continue using a water-filtration system that is split
the San Francisco headquarters of Bechtel, the only between "an obsolete series of 80-year-old tanks and a
member of Aguas del Tunari located in the Americas. Oliv- 29-year-old section that uses gravity to move mountain
era said "With the $25 million they are seeking, 125,000 water from one tank to another."[18] He stated that the
people could have access to water." Bechtel officials system was built for a far smaller city and worried about
agreed to meet him.[4] shrinking aquifers. A system to bring water down from
The victory gained the cocalero and campesino groups the mountains would cost $300 million and SEMAPA’s
international support from anti-globalisation groups.[2] budget is only about $5 million a year.[18] The New Yorker
Oscar Olivera and Omar Fernandez have become sought reports "in Cochabamba, those who are not on the net-
after speakers at venues discussing how to resist re- work and who have no well, pay ten times as much for
source privatization and venues critical of the World their water as the relatively wealthy residents who are
Bank. His actions in the Water Wars raised the profile of hooked up", and with no new capital the situation can
Congressman Evo Morales and he became President of not be improved.[1] A local resident complained that
Bolivia in 2005. Omar Fernandez joined Morales’ socialist water-truck operators "drill polluted water and sell it.
party Movimiento al Socialismo and became a Bolivian sen- They [also] waste a lot of water."[1] According to author
ator.[16] Frederik Segerfeldt, "the poor of Cochabamba are still
The Cochabamba protests of 2000 are chronicled by paying 10 times as much for their water as the rich, con-
Olivera in his book Cochabamba! Water Rebellion in Bo- nected households and continue to indirectly subsidize
livia. water consumption of more well-to-do sectors of the
community. Water nowadays is available only four hours
Legal settlement a day and no new households have been connected to
On 19 January 2006 a settlement was reached between the supply network."[19] Franz Taquichiri, a veteran of
the Government of Bolivia (then under the Presidency of the Water War and an SEMAPA director elected by the
Eduardo Rodriguez Veltze) and Aguas del Tunari, it was community, said "I don’t think you’ll find people in
agreed that "the concession was terminated only because Cochabamba who will say they’re happy with service.
of the civil unrest and the state of emergency in No one will be happy unless they get service 24 hours a
Cochabamba and not because of any act done or not done day."[18] Another Cochabamba resident and activist dur-
by the international shareholders of Aguas del Tunari". ing the unrest summed up her opinion of the situation by
With this statement both parties agreed to drop any fi- saying, "afterwards, what had we gained? We were still
nancial claims against the other.[17] hungry and poor."[20]
Iriarte case Aguas de Illimani
When no sitting judge would hear the case against Cap- Similar protests took place in La Paz over Aguas de Il-
tain Robinson Iriarte, it was transferred to a military tri- limani, a subsidiary of the French multinational Suez.
bunal (that had final jurisdiction over which cases it Aguas de Illimani’s contract with the state was broken
hears). In March 2002, Captain Iriarte was acquitted by after allegations were made by the Bolivian government
the tribunal of any responsibility for the death of Víctor that it did not respect all of the clauses of the contract.
Hugo Daza. After Iriarte’s acquittal, he was promoted to According to the Bolivian ambassador Pablo Solón
the rank of major.[1][4] Romero, the International Finance Corporation (IFC),
part of the World Bank Group, was a share-holder of
Continued lack of water in Cochabamba Aguas de Illimani. The ambassador pointed out that since
In the end water prices in Cochabamba returned to their the case was brought before the ICSID, which is an arm
pre-2000 levels with a group of community leaders run- of the World Bank, a conflict of interest arose in this af-
ning the restored state utility company SEMAPA. As late fair.[21]
5
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia 2000 Cochabamba protests
Film documentaries [7] ^ June C. Nash (2002). Social Movements: An
Anthropological Reader. United Kingdom: Blackwell
• The Corporation Publishing.
• Blue Gold: World Water Wars by Sam Bozzo [8] ^ "Protests rock Bolivia; officials blame drug
• Thirst (film) traffickers". CNN. 2000-04-10.
• The Big Sellout by Florian Opitz http://archives.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/americas/
• "| Tambien la lluvia (film)" 04/10/bolivia.protests/index.html. Retrieved
February 13, 2007.
In popular culture [9] "Bolivian tension mounts as roadblock deadline
looms". CNN. 2000-10-03. http://archives.cnn.com/
The water supply issue in Bolivia was the main theme of 2000/WORLD/americas/10/03/
the James Bond movie Quantum of Solace.[22] The movie’s bolivia.protests.reut/index.html. Retrieved
story was based on the Cochabamba Water Revolt.[23] February 14, 2007.
Even the Rain (Spanish: También la lluvia) is a 2010 [10] ^ Shultz, Jim (2000-09-22). "Bolivia’s Water War
Spanish drama film directed by Icíar Bollaín about film- Victory". Earth Island Journal.
maker Sebastian (Gael García Bernal) who travels to Bo- http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/
livia to shoot a film about the Spanish conquest of Amer- South_America/Bolivia_WaterWarVictory.html.
ica. He and his crew arrive in 2000 during the tense time Retrieved February 14, 2007.
of the Cochabamba water crisis. [11] ^ "Bolivian president declares state of siege".
Associated Press. 2000-04-09.
See also http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/
mi_qn4196/is_20000409/ai_n10596553. Retrieved
• ICSID (International Centre for Settlement of February 16, 2007.
Investment Disputes) [12] ^ "Bolivia: The state of siege is no excuse for
• Bolivian Gas War human rights violations". Amnesty International.
• Bolivian presidential election, 2005 14 April 2000. Archived from the original on
• Water supply and sanitation in Bolivia November 19, 2006. http://web.archive.org/web/
20061119071845/http://web.amnesty.org/library/
Index/ENGAMR180022000?open&of=ENG-394.
References Retrieved February 16, 2007.
[13] ^ "The Senate Of Bolivia". Sénats d’Europe, Sénats
[1] ^ William Finnegan (2002-04-08). "Leasing The du Monde. http://www.senat.fr/senatsdumonde/
Rain". The New Yorker. Archived from the original english/bolivie.html. Retrieved February 16, 2007.
on September 29, 2007. http://web.archive.org/ [14] "Bolivia - ICJ Urges Respect for Human Rights in
web/20070929151555/ Bolivian State of Siege". The International
http://www.waterobservatory.org/ Commission of Jurists. 2000-04-18.
library.cfm?refID=33711. Retrieved February 15, http://www.icj.org/
2007. news.php3?id_article=2511&lang=en. Retrieved at
[2] ^ Benjamin Blackwell (2002-11-11). "From Coca To February 16, 2007
Congress". The Ecologist. http://www.zmag.org/ [15] ^ "Bolivians Protest Under State Of Siege".
content/showarticle.cfm?ItemID=2612. Retrieved http://www.nadir.org/nadir/initiativ/agp/free/
February 13, 2007. imf/bolivia/txt/2000/0417battles_back.txt.
[3] Jim Shultz (28 January 2005). "The Politics of Water Retrieved February 17, 2007.
in Bolivia". The Nation. http://www.thenation.com/ [16] "Rights to Water (Latin America)". Archived from
doc/20050214/shultz. Retrieved February 13, 2007. the original on December 9, 2006.
[4] ^ "Timeline:Cochabamba Water Revolt". PBS. June, http://web.archive.org/web/20061209021305/
2002. http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/ http://www.idrc.ca/en/
bolivia/timeline.html. Retrieved February 15, ev-93819-201-1-DO_TOPIC.html. Retrieved
2007. February 15, 2007.
[5] ^ World Bank:Bolivia Water Management: A Tale of [17] "Cochabamba Water Dispute Settled". 2006-01-19.
Three Cities, Operations Evaluation Department Archived from the original on October 15, 2008.
Précis, Spring 2002, Number 222, retrieved on http://web.archive.org/web/20081015081750/
December 31, 2010 http://www.bechtel.com/newsarticles/487.asp.
[6] Business News Americas:Bolivia, Cochabamba: [18] ^ Juan Forero (2005-12-14). "Bolivia regrets IMF
work on Misicuni dam and water supply services experiment". The New York Times.
set to start, 23 January 2009
6
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia 2000 Cochabamba protests
http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/12/14/ • "Bechtel battles against dirt-poor Bolivia: Nation
business/water.php. Retrieved February 14, 2007. severed water deal after hefty rate increases led to
[19] Frederik Segerfeldt, Water for Sale protests"
[20] Arthur Petersen, Juan Pablo Pardo-Guerra (2005). • "Cochabamba’s Water Rebellion -- and Beyond"
2005 Isyp Yearbook on Science and World Affairs: February 11, 2001 San Francisco Chronicle
International Student/Young Pugwash Yearbook 2005. • The Cochabamba Water Wars: Marcela Olivera
Amsterdam, Netherlands: Transaction Publishers. Reflects on the Tenth Anniversary
[21] Mark Weisbrot, Le CIRDI en ligne de mire : la • "Multinational Company Thwarted by Local Bolivian
Bolivie, le Venezuela et le Nicaragua claquent la Community" July 21, 2000 BBC News
porte, RISAL, 10 July 2007 (French) • "Protests in Bolivia" April 11, 2000 NPR’s Morning
[22] Quantum of Solace, Thebestpageintheuniverse.net Edition
[23] Timeline: Cochabamba Water Revolt, PBS.org • "Violence Erupts in Bolivia" April 8, 2000 BBC News
• Olivera, Oscar, "The voice of the People can dilute
External links corporate power" Wednesday July 19, 2006 The
Guardian
• PBS program NOW on the Water Wars • Rocio Bustamante Zenteno, Researcher, Centro
• Bechtel’s version of events Andino para la Gestion y Uso del Agua (Centro
• Jim Shultz’s version of events AGUA), Universidad Mayor de San Simon,
• Shultz’s blog during the events Cochabamba: The ‘Water War’ to resist privatisation
• "Leasing the Rain" June 2002 Co-Production of NOW of water in Cochabamba, 2002
with Bill Moyers and Frontline/World. • Dignity and Defiance: Stories from Bolivia’s
Challenge to Globalization - video report on
Democracy Now!
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Categories:
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• 2000 in Bolivia
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• Bechtel
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• Protests in Bolivia
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• Cochabamba
• Water supply and sanitation in Bolivia
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