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Page 1 422 U.S. 806, *; 95 S. Ct. 2525, **; 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, ***; 1975 U.S. LEXIS 83 LEXSEE 422 US 806 FARETTA v. CALIFORNIA No. 73-5772 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 422 U.S. 806; 95 S. Ct. 2525; 45 L. Ed. 2d 562; 1975 U.S. LEXIS 83 Argued November 19, 1974 June 30, 1975 PRIOR HISTORY: On certiorari, the United States Supreme CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF AP- Court vacated the judgment and remanded the PEAL OF CALIFORNIA, SECOND APPEL- case. In an opinion by Stewart, J., expressing LATE DISTRICT the view of six members of the court, it was held that (1) a defendant in a state criminal trial has a constitutional right to proceed without SUMMARY: counsel when he voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so, and (2) under the circumstances The accused, charged with grand theft in an of the present case, the accused was deprived of information filed in the Superior Court of Los his constitutional right to conduct his own de- Angeles County, California, requested, well fense. before the date of trial, that he be permitted to represent himself. Although preliminarily ac- Burger, Ch. J., joined by Blackmun and cepting the accused's waiver of assistance of Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting, expressed the view counsel, the Superior Court Judge to whom the that there is no basis under the United States case was assigned, after questioning the ac- Constitution for holding that an accused has a cused concerning the hearsay rule and the state right to self-representation. law governing the challenge of potential jurors, Blackmun, J., joined by Burger, Ch. J., and ruled that the accused had not made an intelli- Rehnquist, J., dissenting, expressed the view gent and knowing waiver of his right to assis- that (1) the holding that the Sixth Amendment tance of counsel, ruled that the accused had no guarantees a defendant the right to proceed constitutional right to conduct his own defense, without counsel is not supported by the lan- and appointed a public defender to represent guage of the Sixth Amendment or by the histor- the accused. Following the accused's convic- ical evidence relied upon by the majority, and tion, the California Court of Appeal for the (2) a right to self-representation frequently will Second Appellate District affirmed the trial cause procedural confusion without advancing judge's ruling that the accused had no constitu- any significant strategic interest of the defen- tional right to represent himself, and according- dant. ly, affirmed his conviction. The California Su- preme Court denied review. LAWYERS' EDITION HEADNOTES: Page 2 422 U.S. 806, *; 95 S. Ct. 2525, **; 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, ***; 1975 U.S. LEXIS 83 [***LEdHN1] Since the Sixth Amendment rights providing LAW § 46.3 that an accused shall be informed of the nature right to counsel -- and cause of the accusation, shall be confronted Headnote: with the witnesses against him, shall have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the his favor, and shall have the assistance of coun- United States Constitution guarantee that a per- sel for his defense, are basic to our adversary son brought to trial in any state or federal court system of criminal justice, they are part of the must be afforded the right to the assistance of due process of law that is guaranteed by the counsel before he can be validly convicted and Fourteenth Amendment to defendants in the punished by imprisonment. criminal courts of the states. [***LEdHN2] [***LEdHN5] LAW § 46 LAW § 46 defendant's right to self-representation -- WITNESSES § 4 Headnote:[2A][2B][2C] rights necessary for fair administration of jus- tice -- A defendant in a state criminal trial has a con- Headnote: stitutional right to proceed without counsel when he voluntarily and intelligently elects to The rights, under the Sixth Amendment, to no- do so, and such right of self-representation is tice, confrontation, and compulsory process, supported by the structure of the Sixth when taken together, guarantee that a criminal Amendment, which necessarily implies a right charge may be answered in a manner funda- of self-representation, and by the English and mental to the fair consideration of American colonial jurisprudence from which the Sixth justice--through the calling and interrogation of Amendment emerged. favorable witnesses, the cross-examination of adverse witnesses, and the orderly introduction [***LEdHN3] of evidence. LAW § 46 Sixth Amendment -- rights necessary to make [***LEdHN6] defense -- LAW § 46 Headnote: Sixth Amendment -- accused's right to make defense -- The Sixth Amendment includes a compact Headnote: statement of the rights necessary to a full de- fense; it constitutionalizes the right in an adver- The Sixth Amendment does not provide merely sary criminal trial to make a defense. that a defense shall be made for the accused, but rather it grants to the accused personally the [***LEdHN4] right to make his defense; it is the accused, not LAW § 46 counsel, who must be informed of the nature LAW § 37 and cause of the accusation, who must be con- WITNESSES § 4 fronted with witnesses against him, and who Sixth Amendment rights -- applicability to must be accorded compulsory process for ob- states -- taining witnesses in his favor. Headnote: Page 3 422 U.S. 806, *; 95 S. Ct. 2525, **; 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, ***; 1975 U.S. LEXIS 83 [***LEdHN7] trial strategy can only be justified by the defen- LAW § 839.5 dant's consent, at the outset, to accept counsel LAW § 49 as his representative. due process of law -- rights of accused -- Headnote:[7A][7B] [***LEdHN11] WITNESSES § 88 It is essential to due process of law in a fair ad- accused's privilege not to testify -- versary process that an accused have the right Headnote:[11A][11B] (1) to be present at all stages of the trial where his absence might frustrate the fairness of the Every criminal defendant is privileged to testify proceedings, (2) to testify on his own behalf, in his own defense, or to refuse to do so. and (3) to be convicted only if his guilt is prov- en beyond a reasonable doubt. [***LEdHN12] LAW § 46.3 [***LEdHN8] counsel -- defendant's right to decide whether LAW § 46 to use -- right of self-representation -- basis -- Headnote: Headnote:[8A][8B] Since the right to defend is personal and since The accused's right of self-representation does the defendant, and not his lawyer or the state, not arise mechanically from his power to waive will bear the personal consequences of a con- the right to the assistance of counsel, but rather, viction, it is the defendant who must be free the right must be independently found in the personally to decide whether in his particular structure and history of the text of the United case counsel is to his advantage. States Constitution. [***LEdHN13] [***LEdHN9] LAW § 46 LAW § 46.3 defendant's misconduct -- termination of right right to counsel -- unwilling defendant -- to self-representation -- Headnote: Headnote:[13A][13B] The language and spirit of the Sixth Amend- A trial judge may terminate self-representation ment contemplate that counsel, like the other by a defendant who deliberately engages in se- defense tools guaranteed by the Amendment, rious and obstructionist misconduct. shall be an aid to a willing defendant--not an organ of the state interposed between an unwil- [***LEdHN14] ling defendant and his right to defend himself LAW § 46 personally. self-representation by defendant -- standby counsel -- [***LEdHN10] Headnote:[14A][14B] ATTORNEYS § 19 trial strategy -- initial consent by defendant -- A state may, even over an objection by the ac- Headnote: cused, appoint a standby counsel to aid the ac- cused if and when the accused requests help, The allocation of power to counsel to make and to be available to represent the accused in binding decisions in regard to many aspects of Page 4 422 U.S. 806, *; 95 S. Ct. 2525, **; 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, ***; 1975 U.S. LEXIS 83 the event that termination of the defendant's accused of his constitutional right to conduct self-representation is necessary. his own defense under circumstances where (1) weeks before trial, the accused clearly and une- [***LEdHN15] quivocally declared to the trial judge that he LAW § 46 wanted to represent himself and did not want self-representation by defendant -- courtroom counsel, (2) the record affirmatively showed dignity -- rules of law -- that the accused was literate, competent, and Headnote:[15A][15B] understanding, and that he was voluntarily ex- ercising his informed free will, and (3) the trial The right of self-representation is neither a li- judge warned the accused that the judge cense to abuse the dignity of the courtroom, nor thought it was a mistake not to accept the assis- is it a license not to comply with relevant rules tance of counsel, and that the accused would be of procedural and substantive law. required to follow all the ground rules of trial procedure. [***LEdHN16] ERROR § 1354 [***LEdHN19] self-representation by defendant -- denial of LAW § 46 effective assistance of counsel -- technical legal knowledge -- knowing exercise Headnote:[16A][16B] of right to self-representation -- Headnote: Whatever else may or may not be open to him on appeal, a defendant who elects to represent An accused's technical legal knowledge, as himself cannot thereafter complain that the such, is not relevant to an assessment of his quality of his own defense amounted to a denial knowing exercise of the right to represent him- of effective assistance of counsel. self. [***LEdHN17] SYLLABUS: LAW § 46 The Sixth Amendment as made applicable self-representation by accused -- intelligent to the States by the Fourteenth guarantees that a relinquishment of benefits of counsel -- defendant in a state criminal trial has an inde- Headnote: pendent constitutional right of self- representation and that he may proceed to de- Since an accused who manages his own de- fend himself without counsel when he volunta- fense relinquishes many of the traditional bene- rily and intelligently elects to do so; and in this fits associated with the right to counsel, an ac- case the state courts erred in forcing petitioner cused, in order to represent himself, must kno- against his will to accept a state-appointed pub- wingly and intelligently forego those relin- lic defender and in denying his request to con- quished benefits. duct his own defense. Pp. 812-836. Vacated and remanded. [***LEdHN18] LAW § 46 STEWART, J., delivered the opinion of the deprivation of right to self-representation -- Court, in which DOUGLAS, BRENNAN, Headnote:[18A][18B] WHITE, MARSHALL, and POWELL, JJ., joined. BURGER, C. J., filed a dissenting opi- Forcing an accused, against his will, to accept a nion, in which BLACKMUN and REHN- state-appointed public defender deprives the QUIST, JJ., joined, post, p. 836. BLACK- Page 5 422 U.S. 806, *; 95 S. Ct. 2525, **; 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, ***; 1975 U.S. LEXIS 83 MUN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which the right to the assistance of counsel before he BURGER, C. J., and REHNQUIST, J., joined, can be validly convicted and punished by im- post, p. 846. prisonment. This clear constitutional rule has emerged from a series of cases decided here COUNSEL: over the last 50 years. n1 The question before us now is whether a defendant in a state crimi- Jerome B. Falk, Jr., by appointment of the nal trial has a constitutional right to proceed Court, 417 U.S. 906, argued the cause for peti- without counsel when he voluntarily and intel- tioner. With him on the briefs was Roger S. ligently elects to do so. Stated another way, the Hanson. question is whether a State may constitutionally Howard J. Schwab, Deputy Attorney hale a person into its criminal courts and there General of California, argued the cause for res- force a lawyer upon him, even when he insists pondent. With him on the brief were Evelle J. that he wants to conduct his own defense. It is Younger, Attorney General, Jack R. Winkler, not an easy question, but we have concluded Chief Assistant Attorney General, S. Clark that a State may not constitutionally do so. Moore, Assistant Attorney General, and Rus- sell Iungerich and Donald J. Oeser, Deputy n1 See e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 Attorneys General. * U.S. 45; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458; Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455; * John E. Thorne, pro se, filed a brief as Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335; amicus curiae. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25. JUDGES: I Burger, Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, White, Anthony Faretta was charged with grand Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist theft in an information filed in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Cal. At the ar- OPINIONBY: raignment, the Superior Court Judge assigned STEWART to preside at the trial appointed the public de- fender to represent Faretta. Well before the date OPINION: of trial, however, Faretta requested that he be [*807] [***566] [**2527] MR. JUS- permitted to represent himself. Questioning by TICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the the judge revealed that Faretta had once Court. represented himself in a criminal prosecution, that he had a high school education, and that he [***LEdHR1]  [***LEdHR2A] [2A]The did not want to be represented by the public Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of our Con- defender because he believed that that office stitution guarantee that a person brought to trial was "very loaded down with... a heavy case in any state or federal court must be afforded load." The judge Page 6 422 U.S. 806, *; 95 S. Ct. 2525, **; 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, ***; 1975 U.S. LEXIS 83 respect you. We are going to [*808] responded that he believed Faretta give you every chance, but was "making a mistake" and emphasized that in you are going to play with further proceedings Faretta would receive no the same ground rules that special favors. n2 Nevertheless, after establish- anybody plays. And you ing that Faretta wanted to represent himself and don't know those ground did not want a [**2528] lawyer, the judge, in rules. You wouldn't know a "preliminary ruling," accepted Faretta's waiv- those ground rules any more er of the assistance of counsel. The judge indi- than any other lawyer will cated, however, that he might reverse this rul- know those ground rules un- ing if it later appeared that Faretta was unable til he gets out and tries a lot adequately to represent himself. of cases. And you haven't done it." n2 The judge informed Faretta: "You are going to follow the procedure. You are going Several [***567] weeks thereafter, but to have to ask the questions still prior to trial, the judge sua sponte held a right. If there is an objection hearing to inquire into Faretta's ability to con- to the form of the question duct his own defense, and questioned him spe- and it is properly taken, it is cifically about both the hearsay rule and the going to be sustained. We state law governing the challenge of potential are going to treat you like a jurors. n3 After [**2529] consideration gentleman. We are going to Page 7 422 U.S. 806, *; 95 S. Ct. 2525, **; 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, ***; 1975 U.S. LEXIS 83 ta had not made an intelligent and knowing [*809] of Faretta's answers, and observa- [***568] waiver of his right to the assistance tion of his demeanor, the judge ruled that Faret- Page 8 422 U.S. 806, *; 95 S. Ct. 2525, **; 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, ***; 1975 U.S. LEXIS 83 defender to represent Faretta. Faretta's subse- [*810] of counsel, and also ruled that Fa- quent request for leave to act as cocounsel was retta had no constitutional right to conduct his rejected, as were his efforts to make certain own defense. n4 The judge, accordingly, re- motions on his own behalf. n5 Throughout versed his earlier ruling permitting self- representation and again appointed the public Page 9 422 U.S. 806, *; 95 S. Ct. 2525, **; 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, ***; 1975 U.S. LEXIS 83 "THE COURT: Let's see [*811] the subsequent trial, the judge re- how you have been doing on quired that Faretta's defense be conducted only your research. through the appointed lawyer from the public defender's office. At the conclusion of the trial, "How many exceptions the jury found Faretta guilty as charged, and the are there to the hearsay rule? judge sentenced him to prison. "THE DEFENDANT: Well, the hearsay rule would, I guess, be called the n3 The colloquy was as follows: best evidence rule, your "THE COURT: In the Honor. And there are several Faretta matter, I brought you exceptions in case law, but back down here to do some in actual statutory law, I reconsideration as to wheth- don't feel there is none. er or not you should contin- "THE COURT: What are ue to represent yourself. the challenges to the jury for "How have you been get- cause? ting along on your research? "THE DEFENDANT: "THE DEFENDANT: Well, there is twelve pe- Not bad, your Honor. remptory challenges. "Last night I put in the "THE COURT: And mail a 995 motion and it how many for cause? should be with the Clerk "THE DEFENDANT: within the next day or two. Well, as many as the Court "THE COURT: Have deems valid. you been preparing yourself "THE COURT: And for the intricacies of the trial what are they? What are the of the matter? grounds for challenging a ju- "THE DEFENDANT: ror for cause? Well, your Honor, I was hoping that the case could "THE DEFENDANT: Well, numerous grounds to possibly be disposed of on challenge a witness -- I the 995. mean, a juror, your Honor, "Mrs. Ayers informed one being the juror is per- me yesterday that it was the haps suffered, was a victim Court's policy to hear the of the same type of offense, pretrial motions at the time might be prejudiced toward of trial. If possible, your the defendant. Any substan- Honor, I would like a date tial ground that might make set as soon as the Court the juror prejudice[d] toward deems adequate after they the defendant. receive the motion, some- "THE COURT: Any- time before trial. thing else? Page 10 422 U.S. 806, *; 95 S. Ct. 2525, **; 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, ***; 1975 U.S. LEXIS 83 "THE DEFENDANT: "THE COURT: What Well, a relative perhaps of codes? the victim. "THE DEFENDANT: I "THE COURT: Have have done extensive research you taken a look at that code in the Penal Code, your section to see what it is? Honor, and the Civil Code. "THE DEFENDANT: "THE COURT: If you Challenge a juror? have done extensive research into it, then tell me about it. "THE COURT: Yes. "THE DEFENDANT: "THE DEFENDANT: On empaneling a jury, your Yes, your Honor. I have Honor? done -- "THE COURT: Yes. "THE COURT: What is the code section? "THE DEFENDANT: Well, the District Attorney "THE DEFENDANT: and the defendant, defense On voir diring a jury, your counsel, has both the right to Honor? 12 peremptory challenges of "THE COURT: Yes. a jury. These 12 challenges "THE DEFENDANT: I are undisputable. Any reason am not aware of the section that the defense or prosecu- right offhand. tion should feel that a juror would be inadequate to try "THE COURT: What the case or to rule on a case, code is it in? they may then discharge that "THE DEFENDANT: juror. Well, the research I have "But if there is a valid done on challenging would challenge due to grounds of be in Witkins Jurisprudence. prejudice or some other "THE COURT: Have grounds, that these aren't you looked at any of the considered in the 12 peremp- codes to see where these var- tory challenges. There are ious things are taken up? numerous and the defendant, the defense and the prosecu- "THE DEFENDANT: tion both have the right to No, your Honor, I haven't. make any inquiry to the jury "THE COURT: Have as to their feelings toward you looked in any of the the case." California Codes with refer- ence to trial procedure? "THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. n4 The judge concluded: Page 11 422 U.S. 806, *; 95 S. Ct. 2525, **; 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, ***; 1975 U.S. LEXIS 83 "[T]aking into considera- tion the recent case of n5 Faretta also urged without success People versus Sharp, where that he was entitled to counsel of his the defendant apparently choice, and three times moved for the does not have a constitution- appointment of a lawyer other than the al right to represent himself, public defender. These motions, too, the Court finds that the ends were denied. of justice and requirements of due process require that the prior order permitting the The California Court of Appeal, relying defendant to represent him- upon a then-recent California Supreme Court self in pro per should be and decision that had expressly decided the issue, is hereby revoked. That pri- n6 affirmed the trial judge's ruling that Faretta vilege is terminated." had no federal or state constitutional right Page 12 422 U.S. 806, *; 95 S. Ct. 2525, **; 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, ***; 1975 U.S. LEXIS 83 terms a right "to appear and defend in [*812] to represent himself. n7 According- person and with counsel." § 686 (2). ly, the appellate court affirmed Faretta's convic- However, this language tracks the old tion. A petition for rehearing was denied with- language of Art. 1, § 13, of the Califor- out opinion, and the California Supreme Court nia Constitution; and in construing the denied review. n8 We [***569] granted constitutional language in Sharp to ex- [**2530] certiorari. 415 U.S. 975. clude any right of self-representation un- der former Art. 1, § 13, of the State Con- n6 People v. Sharp, 7 Cal. 3d 448, stitution, the California Supreme Court 499 P. 2d 489. also stated that § 686 (2) does not pro- vide any right of self-representation. When Sharp was tried the California Constitution expressly provided that the accused in a criminal prosecution had the right "to appear and defend, in person n7 The Court of Appeal also held that and with counsel." Cal. Const., Art. 1, § the trial court had not "abused its discre- 13. In an earlier decision the California tion in concluding that Faretta had not Supreme Court had held that this lan- made a knowing and intelligent waiver of guage meant that the accused had the his right to be represented by counsel," right to appear by himself or with coun- since "Faretta did not appear aware of the sel. People v. Mattson, 51 Cal. 2d 777, possible consequences of waiving the 336 P. 2d 937. This view was rejected in opportunity for skilled and experienced Sharp, the California Supreme Court representation at trial." there holding that the defendant in a n8 The California courts' conclusion criminal prosecution has no right under that Faretta had no constitutional right to the State or the Federal Constitution to represent himself was made in the con- represent himself at trial. See generally text of the following not unusual rules of Y. Kamisar, W. LaFave & J. Israel, California criminal procedure: An indi- Modern Criminal Procedure 57-60 (4th gent criminal defendant has no right to ed. 1974); Note, 10 Calif. Western L. appointed counsel of his choice. See Rev. 196 (1973); Note, 24 Hastings L.J. Drumgo v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 431 (1973); Comment, 64 J. Crim. L. 240 930, 506 P. 2d 1007; People v. Miller, 7 (1973). Cal. 3d 562, 574, 498 P. 2d 1089, 1097 Although immaterial to the court's People v. Massie, 66 Cal. 2d 899, 910, decision, shortly before Sharp was de- 428 P. 2d 869, 876-877; People v. Tay- cided on appeal the California Constitu- lor, 259 Cal. App. 2d 448, 450-451, 66 tion had been amended to delete the right Cal. Rptr. 514, 515-517. The appointed of self-representation from Art. 1, § 13, counsel manages the lawsuit and has the and to empower the legislature expressly final say in all but a few matters of trial "to require the defendant in a felony case strategy. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 2 to have the assistance of counsel." The Cal. 3d 894, 905, 471 P. 2d 1008, 1015; new statutes on their face require counsel People v. Foster, 67 Cal. 2d 604, 606- only in capital cases. See Cal. Penal 607, 432 P. 2d 976, 977-978; People v. Code § § 686(2), 686.1, 859, 987 (1970 Monk, 56 Cal. 2d 288, 299, 363 P. 2d and Supp. 1975). In other than capital 865, 870-871; see generally Rhay v. cases the accused retains by statutory Browder, 342 F. 2d 345, 349 (CA9). A Page 13 422 U.S. 806, *; 95 S. Ct. 2525, **; 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, ***; 1975 U.S. LEXIS 83 California conviction will not be reversed 452 P. 2d 329, 334; People v. Reeves, on grounds of ineffective assistance of 64 Cal. 2d 766, 774, 415 P. 2d 35, 39. counsel except in the extreme case where the quality of representation was so poor II as to render the trial a "farce or a sham." People v. Ibarra, 60 Cal. 2d 460, 386 P. In the federal courts, the right of self- 2d 487; see People v. Miller, Id., at 573, representation has been protected by statute 498 P. 2d, at 1096-1097; People v. since the beginnings of our Nation. Section 35 Floyd, 1 Cal. 3d 694, 709, 464 P. 2d 64, of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 92, 73; People v. Hill, 70 Cal. 2d 678, 689, enacted by the First Congress and signed by President Washington one day before the Sixth Amendment Page 14 422 U.S. 806, *; 95 S. Ct. 2525, **; 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, ***; 1975 U.S. LEXIS 83 With few exceptions, each of the several [*813] was proposed, provided that "in all States also accords a defendant the right to the courts of the United States, the parties may represent himself in any criminal case. n9 The plead and manage their own causes personally Constitutions of 36 States explicitly confer that or by the assistance of... counsel...." The right right. n10 Moreover, many state courts have is currently codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1654. Page 15 422 U.S. 806, *; 95 S. Ct. 2525, **; 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, ***; 1975 U.S. LEXIS 83 1, § 13; Ohio Const., Art. 1, § 10; Okla. [*814] expressed the view that the right is Const., Art. 2, § 20; Ore. Const., Art. 1, also supported by the Constitution of the Unit- § 11; Pa. Const., Art. 1, § 9; S.D. ed States. n11 Const., Art. 6, § 7; Tenn. Const., art. 1, § 9; Utah Const., Art. 1, § 12; Vt. Const., n9 See, e.g., Mackreth v. Wilson, 31 c. 1, Art. 10; Wis. Const., Art. 1, § 7; see Ala. App. 191, 15 So. 2d 112; Cappetta La. Const., Art. 1, § 9. v. State, 204 So. 2d 913 (Fla. Dist. Ct. Others grant the right to defend in App.); Lockard v. State, 92 Idaho 813, person or by counsel: Kan. Const. Bill 451 P. 2d 1014; People v. Nelson, 47 of Rights, § 10; Mass. Const., pt. 1, Art. Ill. 2d 570, 268 N.E. 2d 2; Blanton v. 12; Neb. const., Art. 1, § 11; Wash. State, 229 Ind. 701, 98 N.E. 2d 186; Const., Art. 1, § 22. Westberry v. State, 254 A. 2d 44 (Me.); Allen v. Commonwealth, 324 Mass. Still others provide the accused the right to defend either by himself, by 558, 87 N.E. 2d 192; People v. Haddad, counsel, or both: Ala. Const., Art. 1, § 6; 306 Mich. 556, 11 N.W. 2d 240; State v. Fla. Const., Art. 1, § 16; Me. Const., McGhee, 184 Neb. 352, 167 N.W. 2d Art. 1, § 6; Miss. Const., Art. 3, § 26; 765; Zasada v. State, 19 N.J. Super. S.C. Const., Art. 1, § 14; Tex. Const., 589, 89 A. 2d 45; People v. McLaughlin, Art. 1, § 10. 291 N. Y. 480, 53 N.E. 2d 356; State v. Pritchard, 227 N.C. 168, 41 S.E. 2d 287; State v. Hollman, 232 S.C. 489, 102 S.E. 2d 873; State v. Thomlinson, n11 See, e.g., Lockard v. State, su- 78 S.D. 235, 100 N.W. 2d 121; State v. pra; People v. Nelson, supra; Blanton Penderville, 2 Utah 2d 281, 272 P. 2d v. State, supra; Zasada v. State, supra; 195; State v. Woodall, 5 Wash. App. People v. McLaughlin, supra; State v. 901, 491 P. 2d 680. See generally An- Mems, 281 N.C. 658, 190 S.E. 2d 164; not., 77 A.L.R. 2d 1233 (1961); 5 R. An- State v. Verna, 9 Ore. App. 620, 498 P. derson, Wharton's Criminal Law and 2d 793. Procedure § 2016 (1957). This [***570] Court has more than once indicated the same view. In Adams v. United n10 Some States grant the accused States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279, the the right to be heard, or to defend, in per- Court recognized that the Sixth Amendment son and by counsel: Ariz. Const., Art. 2, right to the assistance of counsel implicitly em- § 24; Ark. Const., Art. 2, § 10; Colo. bodies a "correlative right to dispense with a Const., Art. 2, § 16; Conn. Const., Art. lawyer's help." The [**2531] defendant in that 1, § 8; Del. Const., Art. 1, § 7; Idaho case, indicted for federal mail fraud violations, Const., Art. 1, § 13; Ill. Const., Art. 1, § insisted on conducting his own defense without 8; Ind. Const., Art. 1, § 13; Ky. Const. benefit of counsel. He also requested a bench Bill of Rights, § 11; Mo. Const., Art. 1, trial and signed a waiver of his right to trial by § 18 (a); Mont. Const., Art. 3, § 16; jury. The prosecution consented to the waiver Nev. Const., Art. 1, § 8; N.H. Const., pt. of a jury, and the waiver was accepted by the 1, Art. 15; N.M. Const., Art. 2, § 14; N. court. The defendant was convicted, but the Y. Const., Art. 1, § 6; N.D. Const., Art. Court of Appeals reversed the conviction on the Page 16 422 U.S. 806, *; 95 S. Ct. 2525, **; 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, ***; 1975 U.S. LEXIS 83 ground that a person accused of a felony could so likewise may he competently and intelligent- not competently waive his right to trial by jury ly waive his Constitutional right to assistance except upon the advice of a lawyer. This Court of counsel." Id., at 275. reversed and reinstated the conviction, holding The Adams case does not, of course, neces- that "an accused, in the exercise of a free and sarily resolve the issue before us. It held only intelligent choice, and with the considered ap- that "the Constitution proval of the court, may waive trial by jury, and Page 17 422 U.S. 806, *; 95 S. Ct. 2525, **; 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, ***; 1975 U.S. LEXIS 83 of his free choice the right to dis- [*815] does not force a lawyer upon a de- pense with some of these safe- fendant." Id., at 279. n12 Whether the Consti- guards... is to imprison a man in tution forbids a State from forcing a lawyer his privileges and call it the Con- upon a defendant is a different question. But stitution." Id., at 279-280 (empha- the Court in Adams did recognize, albeit in sis added). dictum, an affirmative right of self- representation: "The right to assistance of counsel and the correlative right to n12 The holding of Adams was reaf- dispense with a lawyer's help are firmed in a different context in Carter v. not legal formalisms. They rest on Illinois, 329 U.S. 173, 174-175, where considerations that go to the sub- the Court again adverted to the right of stance of an accused's position be- self-representation: fore the law... "Neither the historic conception of Due Process nor the vitality it derives "... What were contrived as from progressive standards protections for the accused should of justice denies a person the not be turned into fetters... To deny right to defend himself or to an accused a choice of procedure confess guilt. Under appro- in circumstances in which he, priate circumstances the though a layman, is as capable as Constitution requires that any lawyer of making an intelli- counsel be tendered; it does gent choice, is to impair the worth not require that under all cir- of great Constitutional safeguards cumstances counsel be by treating them as empty verbal- forced upon a defendant." isms. (Emphasis added.) See also Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155, 161. "... When the administration of the criminal law... is hedged about as it is by the Constitutional safe- In other settings as well, the Court has indi- guards for the protection of an ac- cated that cused, to deny him in the exercise Page 18 422 U.S. 806, *; 95 S. Ct. 2525, **; 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, ***; 1975 U.S. LEXIS 83 The United States Courts of Appeals have [*816] a defendant has a [***571] con- repeatedly held that the right of self- stitutionally protected right to represent himself representation is protected by the Bill of in a criminal trial. For example, in Snyder v. Rights. In United States v. Plattner, 330 F. 2d Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, the Court held 271, the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir- that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth cuit emphasized that the Sixth Amendment Amendment gives the accused a right to be grants the accused the rights of confrontation, present at all stages of the proceedings where of compulsory process for witnesses in his fa- fundamental fairness might be thwarted by his vor, and of assistance of counsel as minimum absence. This right to "presence" was based procedural requirements in federal criminal upon the premise that the "defense may be prosecutions. The right to the assistance of made easier if the accused is permitted to be counsel, the court concluded, was intended to present at the examination of jurors or the supplement the other rights of the defendant, summing up of counsel, for it will be in his power, if present, to give advice or suggestion and not to impair "the absolute and primary right to conduct one's own defense in propria or even to supersede his lawyers altogether and persona." Id., at 274. The court found support conduct the trial himself." Id., at 106 (emphasis for its decision in the language of the 1789 fed- added). And in Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. eral statute; in the statutes and rules governing 266, the Court, in holding that a convicted per- criminal procedure, see 28 U.S.C. § 1654, and son had no absolute right to argue his own ap- Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 44; in the many state peal, said this holding was in "sharp contrast" constitutions that expressly guarantee self- to his "recognized privilege [**2532] of con- representation; ducting his own defense at the trial." Id., at 285. Page 19 422 U.S. 806, *; 95 S. Ct. 2525, **; 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, ***; 1975 U.S. LEXIS 83 ity opinion stating right is no more than statuto- [*817] and in this Court's recognition of ry in nature). the right in Adams and Price. On these grounds, the Court of Appeals held that implicit This Court's past recognition of the right of in the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of due self-representation, the federal-court authority process of law, and implicit also in the Sixth holding the right to be of constitutional dimen- Amendment's guarantee of a right to the assis- sion, and the state constitutions pointing to the tance of counsel, is "the right of the accused right's fundamental nature form a consensus not personally to manage and conduct his own de- easily ignored. "[T]he mere fact that a path is a fense in a criminal case." 330 F. 2d, at 274. See [***572] beaten one," Mr. Justice Jackson also United States ex rel. Maldonado v. Den- once observed, "is a persuasive reason for fol- no, 348 F. 2d 12, 15 (CA2); MacKenna v. El- lowing it." n13 We confront here a nearly uni- lis, 263 F. 2d 35, 41 (CA5); United States v. versal conviction, on the part of our people as Sternman, 415 F. 2d 1165, 1169-1170 (CA6); well as our courts, that forcing a lawyer upon Lowe v. United States, 418 F. 2d 100, 103 an unwilling defendant is contrary to his basic (CA7); United States v. Warner, 428 F. 2d right to defend himself if he truly wants to do 730, 733 (CA8); Haslam v. United States, 431 so. F. 2d 362, 365 (CA9); compare United States v. Dougherty, 154 U.S. App. D.C. 76, 86, 473 F. 2d 1113, 1123 (intimating right is constitu- n13 Jackson, Full Faith and Credit -- tional but finding it unnecessary to reach issue) The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, with Brown v. United States, 105 U.S. App. 45 Col. L. Rev. 1, 26 (1945). D.C. 77, 79-80, 264 F. 2d 363, 365-366 (plural- Page 20 422 U.S. 806, *; 95 S. Ct. 2525, **; 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, ***; 1975 U.S. LEXIS 83 Because these rights are basic to our adversary [*818] III system of criminal justice, they are part of the "due process of law" that is guaranteed by the [***LEdHR2B] [2B]This consensus is sound- Fourteenth Amendment to defendants in the ly premised. The right of self-representation criminal courts of the States. n14 The rights to finds support in the structure of the Sixth notice, [**2533] confrontation, and compul- Amendment, as well as in the English and co- sory process, when taken together, guarantee lonial jurisprudence from which the Amend- that a criminal charge may be answered in a ment emerged. manner now considered fundamental to the fair A administration of American justice -- through the calling and interrogation of favorable wit- [***LEdHR3]  [***LEdHR4]  nesses, the cross-examination of adverse wit- [***LEdHR5] The Sixth Amendment in- nesses, and the orderly introduction of evi- cludes a compact statement of the rights neces- dence. In short, the Amendment constitutiona- sary to a full defense: lizes the right in an adversary criminal trial to "In all criminal prosecutions, make a defense as we know it. See California the accused shall enjoy the right... v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 176 (Harlan, J., con- to be informed of the nature and curring). cause of the accusation; to be con- fronted with the witnesses against n14 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. him; to have compulsory process 335, and Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 for obtaining witnesses in his fa- U.S. 25 (right to counsel); Pointer v. vor, and to have the Assistance of Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (right of confronta- Counsel for his defence." tion); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (right to compulsory process). See also In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273. Page 21 422 U.S. 806, *; 95 S. Ct. 2525, **; 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, ***; 1975 U.S. LEXIS 83 and cause of the accusation," who must be [*819] "confronted with the witnesses against him," and who must be accorded "compulsory [***LEdHR2C] [2C] [***LEdHR6]  process for obtaining witnesses in his favor." [***LEdHR7A] [7A] [***LEdHR8A] Although not stated in the Amendment in so [8A]The Sixth Amendment does not provide many words, the right to self-representation -- merely that a defense shall be made for the ac- to make one's own defense personally -- is thus cused; it grants to the accused personally the necessarily implied by the structure of the right to make his defense. It is the accused, not Amendment. n15 The right to defend counsel, who must be "informed of the nature Page 22 422 U.S. 806, *; 95 S. Ct. 2525, **; 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, ***; 1975 U.S. LEXIS 83 [*820] [***573] is given directly to the ac- 26. Instead, the Court could locate only cused; for it is he who suffers the consequences "isolated instances" of a right to trial by if the defense fails. judge, and concluded that these were "clear departures from the common law." [***LEdHR8B] [8B] [***LEdHR7B] [7B] Ibid. We follow the approach of Singer n15 This Court has often recognized here. Our concern is with an independent the constitutional stature of rights that, right of self-representation. We do not though not literally expressed in the doc- suggest that this right arises mechanically ument, are essential to due process of law from a defendant's power to waive the in a fair adversary process. It is now ac- right to the assistance of counsel. See su- cepted, for example, that an accused has pra, at 814-815. On the contrary, the a right to be present at all stages of the right must be independently found in the trial where his absence might frustrate structure and history of the constitutional the fairness of the proceedings, Snyder text. v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97; to testify on his own behalf, see Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225; Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 612; cf. Fer- [***LEdHR9]  [***LEdHR10] The guson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570; and to counsel provision supplements this design. It be convicted only if his guilt is proved speaks of the "assistance" of counsel, and an beyond a reasonable doubt, In re Win- assistant, however expert, is still an assistant. ship, 397 U.S. 358; Mullaney v. Wilbur, The language and spirit of the Sixth Amend- 421 U.S. 684. ment contemplate that counsel, like the other The inference of rights is not, of defense tools guaranteed by the Amendment, course, a mechanical exercise. In Singer shall be an aid to a willing defendant -- not an v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, the Court organ of the State interposed between an unwil- held that an accused has no right to a ling defendant and his right to defend himself bench trial, despite his capacity to waive personally. To thrust counsel upon the accused, his right to a jury trial. In so holding, the against his considered wish, thus violates the Court stated that "[the] ability to waive a logic of the Amendment. In such a case, coun- constitutional right does not ordinarily sel is not an [**2534] assistant, but a master; carry with it the right to insist upon the n16 and the right to make a defense is stripped opposite of that right." Id., at 34-35. But of the personal character upon which the that statement was made only after the Amendment insists. It is true that when a de- Court had concluded that the Constitu- fendant chooses to have a lawyer manage and tion does not affirmatively protect any present his case, law and tradition may allocate right to be tried by a judge. Recognizing to the counsel the power to make binding deci- that an implied right must arise indepen- sions of trial strategy in many areas. Cf. Henry dently from the design and history of the v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 451; Brookhart constitutional text, the Court searched v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 7-8; Fay v. Noia, 372 for, but could not find, any "indication U.S. 391, 439. This allocation can only be justi- that the colonists considered the ability to fied, however, by the defendant's consent, at waive a jury trial to be of equal impor- the tance to the right to demand one." Id., at Page 23 422 U.S. 806, *; 95 S. Ct. 2525, **; 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, ***; 1975 U.S. LEXIS 83 [*821] outset, to accept counsel as his repre- B sentative. An unwanted counsel "represents" The Sixth Amendment, when naturally the defendant only through a tenuous and unac- read, thus implies a right of self-representation. ceptable legal fiction. Unless the accused has This reading is reinforced by the Amendment's acquiesced in such representation, the defense roots in English legal history. presented is not the defense guaranteed [***574] him by the Constitution, for, in a In the long history of British criminal juri- very real sense, it is not his defense. sprudence, there was only one tribunal that ever adopted a practice of forcing counsel upon an unwilling defendant in a criminal proceeding. n16 Such a result would sever the The tribunal was the Star Chamber. That cu- concept of counsel from its historic roots. rious institution, which flourished in the late The first lawyers were personal friends 16th and early 17th centuries, was of mixed of the litigant, brought into court by him executive and judicial character, and characte- so that he might "take 'counsel' with ristically departed from common-law traditions. them" before pleading. 1 F. Pollock & F. For those reasons, and because it specialized in Maitland, The History of English Law trying "political" offenses, the Star Chamber 211 (2d ed. 1909). Similarly, the first "at- has for centuries symbolized disregard of basic torneys" were personal agents, often individual rights. n17 The Star Chamber not lacking any professional training, who merely allowed but required defendants to have were appointed by those litigants who counsel. The defendant's answer to an indict- had secured royal permission to carry on ment was not accepted unless it was signed by their affairs through a representative, ra- counsel. When counsel refused to sign the an- ther than personally. Id., at 212-213. swer, for whatever reason, the defendant was Page 24 422 U.S. 806, *; 95 S. Ct. 2525, **; 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, ***; 1975 U.S. LEXIS 83 to justice in using rules of practice in such a [*822] considered to have confessed. n18 manner as [***575] Stephen commented on this proce- dure: "There is something specially repugnant Page 25 422 U.S. 806, *; 95 S. Ct. 2525, **; 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, ***; 1975 U.S. LEXIS 83 the following account of a criminal libel [*823] to debar a prisoner from defending trial in the Star Chamber: [**2535] himself, especially when the pro- fessed object of the rules so used is to provide "In 1632 William Prynne was in- for his defence." 1 J. Stephen, A History of the formed against for his book called Hi- Criminal Law of England 341-342 (1883). The strio Mastix. Prynne's answer was, Star Chamber was swept away in 1641 by the amongst other things, that his book had revolutionary fervor of the Long Parliament. been licensed, and one of the counsel, The notion of obligatory counsel disappeared Mr. Holbourn, apologized, not without with it. good cause, for his style... His trial was, like the other Star Chamber proceedings, perfectly decent and quiet, but the sen- n17 "The court of star chamber was tence can be described only as monstr- an efficient, somewhat arbitrary arm of ous. He was sentenced to be disbarred royal power. It was at the height of its ca- and deprived of his university degrees; to reer in the days of the Tudor and Stuart stand twice in the pillory, and to have kings. Star chamber stood for swiftness one ear cut off each time; to be fined # and power; it was not a competitor of the 5,000; and to be perpetually imprisoned, common law so much as a limitation on without books, pen, ink, or paper... it - a reminder that high state policy "Five years after this, in 1637, could not safely be entrusted to a system Prynne, Bastwick, and Burton, were tried so chancy as English law...." L. Fried- for libel, and were all sentenced to the man, A History of American Law 23 same punishment as Prynne had received (1973). See generally 5 W. Holdsworth, in 1632, Prynne being branded on the A History of English Law 155-214 cheeks instead of losing his ears. (1927). "The procedure in this case appears n18 "The proceedings before the Star to me to have been as harsh as the sen- Chamber began by a Bill 'engrossed in tence was severe, though I do not think it parchment and filed with the clerk of the has been so much noticed... Star Cham- court.' It must, like the other pleadings, ber defendants were not only allowed be signed by counsel... However, counsel counsel, but were required to get their were obliged to be careful what they answers signed by counsel. The effect of signed. If they put their hands to merely this rule, and probably its object was, that frivolous pleas, or otherwise misbehaved no defence could be put before the Court themselves in the conduct of their cases, which counsel would not take the re- they were liable to rebuke, suspension, a sponsibility of signing -- a responsibility fine, or imprisonment." Holdsworth, su- which, at that time, was extremely se- pra, n. 17, at 178-179. Counsel, there- rious. If counsel would not sign the de- fore, had to be cautious that any plead- fendant's answer he was taken to have ings they signed would not unduly offend confessed the information. Prynne's an- the Crown. See 1 J. Stephen, A History swer was of such a character that one of of the Criminal Law of England 340-341 the counsel assigned to him refused to (1883). sign it at all, and the other did not sign it This presented not merely a hypothet- till after the proper time. Bastwick could ical risk for the accused. Stephen gives get no one to sign his answer. Burton's answer was signed by counsel, but was Page 26 422 U.S. 806, *; 95 S. Ct. 2525, **; 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, ***; 1975 U.S. LEXIS 83 set aside as impertinent. Upon the whole, By the common law of that time, it was not the case was taken to be admitted by all representation by counsel but self- the three, and judgment was passed on representation that was the practice in prosecu- them accordingly...." Stephen, supra, at tions for serious crime. At one time, every liti- 340-341. gant was required to "appear before the court in his own person and conduct his own cause in That Prynne's defense was foreclosed his own words." n19 While a right to counsel by the refusal of assigned counsel to en- developed early in civil cases and in cases of dorse his answer is all the more shocking misdemeanor, a prohibition against the assis- when it is realized that Prynne was him- tance of counsel continued for centuries in self a lawyer. I. Brant, The Bill of Rights prosecutions for felony or treason. n20 Thus, in 106 (1965). On the operation of the Star the 16th and 17th centuries the accused felon or Chamber generally, see Barnes, Star traitor stood alone, with neither counsel nor the Chamber Mythology, 5 Am. J. Legal Hist. 1-11 (1961), and Barnes, Due benefit of other rights - to notice, confrontation, and compulsory process - that we now asso- Process and Slow Process in the Late ciate with a genuinely fair adversary proceed- Elizabethan-Early Stuart Star Chamber, 6 ing. The trial was merely a "long argument be- Am. J. Legal Hist. 221-249, 315-346 tween the prisoner and the (1962). Page 27 422 U.S. 806, *; 95 S. Ct. 2525, **; 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, ***; 1975 U.S. LEXIS 83 the very essence of the trial, [*824] counsel for the Crown.', n21 As and his answers regulated harsh as this now seems, at least "the prisoner the production of the evi- was allowed to make what statements he dence... As the argument liked... Obviously this public oral trial pre- proceeded the counsel [for sented [**2536] many more opportunities to a the Crown] would frequently prisoner than the secret enquiry based on writ- allege matters which the ten depositions, which, on the continent, had prisoner denied and called taken the place of a trial...." n22 upon them to prove. The proof was usually given by n19 Pollock & Maitland, supra, n. reading depositions, confes- 16, at 211. sions of accomplices, letters, and the like... When the mat- ter had been fully inquired into... the presiding judge n20 Ibid. See also Stephen, supra, n. 'repeated' or summed up to 18, at 341. the jury the matters alleged against the prisoner, and the n21 Id ., at 326. answers given by him; and The trial would begin with accusa- the jury gave their verdict." tions by counsel for the Crown. The pris- Id., at 325-326. oner usually asked, and was granted, the privilege of answering separately each n22 Holdsworth, supra, n. 17, at matter alleged against him: 195-196. "[T]he trial became a se- ries of excited altercations With the Treason Act of 1695, there began between the prisoner and the a long and important era of reform in English different counsel opposed to criminal procedure. The 1695 statute granted to him. Every statement of the accused traitor the rights to a copy of the counsel operated as a ques- indictment, to have his witnesses testify under tion to the prisoner,... the oath, and "to [***576] make... full Defence, prisoner either admitting or by Counsel learned in the Law." n23 It also denying or explaining what provided for court appointment of counsel, but was alleged against him. The only if the accused so desired. n24 result was that... the exami- nation of the prisoner... was Page 28 422 U.S. 806, *; 95 S. Ct. 2525, **; 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, ***; 1975 U.S. LEXIS 83 substantially eroded in the courts, n26 was fi- [*825] Thus, as new rights developed, the nally eliminated by statute in 1836. n27 In accused retained his established right "to make more recent years, Parliament has provided for what statements he liked." n25 The right to court appointment of counsel in serious crimi- counsel was viewed as guaranteeing a choice nal cases, but only at the accused's request. n28 between representation by counsel and the tra- At no point in this process of reform in England ditional practice of self-representation. The ban was counsel ever forced upon the on counsel in felony cases, which had been Page 29 422 U.S. 806, *; 95 S. Ct. 2525, **; 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, ***; 1975 U.S. LEXIS 83 fense, but could also examine defense [*826] defendant. The common-law rule, witnesses and cross-examine those of the succinctly stated in R. v. Woodward,  Crown. 18 How. St. Tr. 1117. Later in K.B. 118, 119,  1 All E.R. 159, 160, has that century judges often allowed counsel evidently always been that "no person charged for the accused "to instruct him what with a criminal offence can have counsel forced questions to ask, or even to ask questions upon him against his will." n29 See 3 Hals- for him, with respect to matters of fact... bury's [**2537] Laws of England p1141, pp. [or] law." 4 W. Blackstone, Commenta- 624-625 (4th ed. 1973); R. v. Maybury, 11 ries *355-356. L.T.R. (n.s.) 566 (Q.B. 1865). n27 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 114, § 1. The statute provided in pertinent part that the n23 7 Will. 3, c. 3, § 1. The right to accused "shall be admitted, after the call witnesses under oath was extended Close of the Case for the Prosecution, to to felony cases by statute in 1701. 1 make full Answer and Defence thereto Anne, Stat. 2, c. 9, § 3. by Counsel learned in the Law, or by At- n24 The statute provided, in pertinent torney in Courts where Attornies practise part, that the accused "shall be received as Counsel." and admitted to make his and their full n28 See, e.g., Poor Prisoners' De- Defence, by Counsel learned in the Law, fence Act, 1903, 3 Edw. 7, c. 38, § 1; and to make any Proof that he or they can Poor Prisoners' Defense Act, 1930, 20 & produce by lawful Witness or Witnesses, 21 Geo. 5, c. 32; Legal Aid and Advice who shall then be upon Oath, for his and Act, 1949, 12 & 13 Geo. 6, c. 51. their just Defence in that Behalf; and in n29 Counsel had been appointed for case any Person or Persons so accused or the defendant Woodward but withdrew indicted shall desire Counsel, the Court shortly before trial. When the trial court before whom such Person or Persons appointed a substitute counsel, the de- shall be tried, or some Judge of that fendant objected: "I would rather not Court, shall and is hereby authorized and have legal aid. I would rather conduct the required immediately, upon his or their case myself." The trial court insisted, Request, to assign to such Person and however, that the defendant proceed to Persons such and so many Counsel, not trial with counsel, and a conviction re- exceeding Two, as the Person or Persons sulted. On appeal, the Crown did not shall desire, to whom such Counsel shall even attempt to deny a basic right of self- have free Access at all seasonable Hours; representation, but argued only that the any Law or Usage to the contrary not- right had been waived when the accused withstanding." accepted the first counsel. The Court of Appeal rejected this argument: "The prisoner right at the beginning [of the tri- n25 Holdsworth, supra, n. 17, at al] said that he wished to defend him- 195. self... and he was refused what we think was his right to make his own case to the n26 In Mary Blandy's 1752 murder jury instead of having it made for him by trial, for example, the court declared that counsel." This, the court held, was an counsel for the defendant could not only "injustice to the prisoner," and "although speak on points of law raised by the de- there was a good deal of evidence against Page 30 422 U.S. 806, *; 95 S. Ct. 2525, **; 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, ***; 1975 U.S. LEXIS 83 the prisoner," the court quashed the con- tional distrust of lawyers. When the Colonies viction. were first settled, "the lawyer was synonymous with the cringing Attorneys-General and Solici- tors-General of the Crown and the arbitrary C Justices of the King's Court, all bent on the In the American Colonies the insistence conviction of those who opposed the King's [***577] upon a right of self-representation prerogatives, and twisting the law to secure was, if anything, more fervent than in England. convictions." n30 This prejudice gained The colonists brought with them an apprec- strength in the Colonies where "distrust iation of the virtues of self-reliance and a tradi- Page 31 422 U.S. 806, *; 95 S. Ct. 2525, **; 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, ***; 1975 U.S. LEXIS 83 "Every man that findeth himselfe un- [*827] of lawyers became an institution." fit to plead his owne cause in any Court n31 Several Colonies prohibited pleading for shall have Libertie to imploy any man hire in the 17th century. n32 The prejudice per- against whom the Court doth not except, sisted into the 18th century as "the lower to helpe him, Provided he give him noe classes came to identify lawyers with the upper fee or reward for his paines...." class." n33 The years of Revolution and Confe- deration saw an upsurge of antilawyer senti- Pleading for hire was also prohibited ment, a "sudden revival, after the War of the in 17th century Virginia, Connecticut, Revolution, of the old dislike and distrust of and the Carolinas. Friedman, supra, n. lawyers as a class." n34 In the heat of these 17, at 81. sentiments the Constitution was forged. n33 Id., at 82. n34 Warren, supra, n. 30, at 212. n30 C. Warren, A History of the American Bar 7 (1911). This is not to say that the Colonies were slow to recognize the value of counsel in crim- inal cases. Colonial judges soon departed from ancient English practice and allowed accused n31 D. Boorstin, The Americans; The felons the aid of counsel for their defense. n35 Colonial Experience 197 (1958). At the same time, however, the basic right of n32 For example, the Massachusetts Body of Liberties (1641) in Art. 26 pro- vided: Page 32 422 U.S. 806, *; 95 S. Ct. 2525, **; 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, ***; 1975 U.S. LEXIS 83 fluenced by the illiberal principles which [*828] self-representation was never ques- they had imbibed in their native country, tioned. We have found no instance where a co- denied counsel to prisoners to plead for lonial court required a defendant in a criminal them to any thing but points of law. It is case to accept as his representative an un- manifest that there is as much necessity wanted lawyer. Indeed, even where counsel for counsel to investigate matters of fact, was permitted, the general practice continued as points of law, if truth is to be discov- to be self-representation. n36 ered." 2 Z. Swift, A System of the Laws of the State of Connecticut 398-399 n35 For example, Zephaniah Swift, in (1796). one of the first American colonial treatis- Similarly, colonial Virginia at first es on law, made clear that a right to based its court proceedings on English counsel was recognized in Connecticut. judicial customs, but "[b]y the middle of He wrote: the eighteenth century the defendant was "We have never admitted that cruel permitted advice of counsel if he could and illiberal principle of the common law afford such services." H. Rankin, Crimi- of England, that when a man is on trial nal Trial Proceedings in the General for his life, he shall be refused counsel, Court of Colonial Virginia 67, 89 (1965). and denied those means of defence, which are allowed, when the most trifling pittance of property is in question. The n36 See, e.g., Id ., at 89-90. flimsy pretence, that the court are to be counsel for the prisoner will only heigh- ten our indignation at the practice: for it The [***578] right of self-representation is apparent to the least consideration, that was guaranteed in many colonial charters and a court can never furnish a person ac- declarations of rights. These early [**2538] cused of a crime with the advice, and as- documents establish that the "right to counsel" sistance necessary to make his defence... meant to the colonists a right to choose be- tween pleading through a lawyer and "Our ancestors, when they first representing oneself. n37 After the enacted their laws respecting crimes, in- Page 33 422 U.S. 806, *; 95 S. Ct. 2525, **; 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, ***; 1975 U.S. LEXIS 83 the new state constitutions in wholesale fa- [*829] Declaration of Independence, the shion. n38 The right to counsel was clearly right of self-representation, along with other thought to rights basic to the making of a defense, entered Page 34 422 U.S. 806, *; 95 S. Ct. 2525, **; 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, ***; 1975 U.S. LEXIS 83 was "unacquainted with the formality of [*830] supplement the primary right of the the law," but requested that he be given a accused to defend himself, n39 utilizing his fair hearing and the "liberty of making personal [**2539] rights to notice, confronta- my defence." The request was granted, tion, and [***579] compulsory process. And Penn represented himself, and although when the Colonies or newly independent States the judges jailed him for contempt, the provided by statute rather than by constitution jury acquitted him of the charge. "The for court appointment of counsel in criminal People's Ancient and Just Liberties As- cases, they also meticulously preserved the serted, in the Trial of William Penn and right of the accused to defend himself personal- William Mead, 1670," reproduced in 1 ly. n40 Schwartz 144, 147. See The Trial of Wil- liam Penn, 6 How. St. Tr. 951 (1670), n37 See, e.g., the Massachusetts cited in Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, Body of Liberties, Art. 26 (1641), supra, 353 (opinion of DOUGLAS, J.). n. 32. Similarly, the Concessions and Agreements of West New Jersey, in n38 Article IX of the Pennsylvania 1677, provided, for all cases, civil and Declaration of Rights in 1776 guaranteed criminal, "that no person or persons shall "[t]hat in all prosecutions for criminal of- be compelled to fee any attorney or fences, a man hath a right to be heard by councillor to plead his cause, but that all himself and his council...." The Vermont persons have free liberty to plead his own Declaration of Rights (Art. X) in 1777 cause, if he please." protected the right of self-representation The Pennsylvania Frame of Govern- with virtually identical language. The ment of 1682, perhaps "the most influen- Georgia Constitution (Art. LVIII) in tial of the Colonial documents protecting 1777 declared that its provisions barring individual rights," 1 B. Schwartz, The the unauthorized practice of law were Bill of Rights: A Documentary History "not intended to exclude any person from 130 (1971) (hereinafter Schwartz), pro- that inherent privilege of every freeman, vided: the liberty to plead his own cause." In 1780 the Massachusetts Declaration of "That, in all courts all persons of all Rights, Art. XII, provided that the ac- persuasions may freely appear in their cused had a right to be heard "by himself, own way, and according to their own or his counsel at his election." The New manner, and there personally plead their Hampshire Bill of Rights (Art. XV) in own cause themselves; or, if unable, by 1783 affirmed the right of the accused their friends...." "to be fully heard in his defence by him- That provision was no doubt inspired self, and counsel." In 1792 the Delaware by William Penn's belief that an accused Constitution (Art. I, § 7) preserved the should go free if he could personally per- right in language modeled after Art. IX suade a jury that it would be unjust to of the Pennsylvania Declaration of convict him. In England, 12 years earlier, Rights. Similarly, in 1798 Georgia in- Penn, after preaching a sermon in the cluded in its Constitution (Art. III, § 8) a street, had been indicted and tried for dis- provision that protected the right of the turbing the peace. Penn conceded that he accused to defend "by himself or coun- Page 35 422 U.S. 806, *; 95 S. Ct. 2525, **; 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, ***; 1975 U.S. LEXIS 83 sel, or both." Other state constitutions did "Either party... has a natural right to not express in literal terms a right of self- plead his own cause; this right is consis- representation, but those documents tent with safety, therefore it is retained; granted all defense rights to the accused but the parties may not be able,... there- personally and phrased the right of coun- fore the civil right of pleading by proxy, sel in such fashion as to imply the exis- that is, by a council, is an appendage to tence of the antecedent liberty. See Del. the natural right [of self- Declaration of Rights, § 14 (1776) (right representation]...." Thomas Paine on a "to be allowed counsel"); Md. Declara- Bill of Rights, 1777, reprinted in 1 tion of Rights, Art. XIX (1776) (right "to Schwartz 316. be allowed counsel"); N.J. Const., Art. n40 Statutes providing for appoint- XVI (1776) (criminals to have "same ment of counsel on request of the ac- privileges of... counsel, as their prosecu- cused were enacted by Delaware in 1719, tors"); N. Y. Const., Art. XXXIV (1777) 1 Laws of the State of Delaware, 1700- ("shall be allowed counsel"). 1797, p. 66 (Adams 1797); by Pennsyl- vania in 1718, 3 Stats. at Large of Penn- sylvania 199 (Busch 1896); and by South Carolina in 1731, Laws of the Province n39 The Founders believed that self- of South Carolina 518-519 (Trott 1736). representation was a basic right of a free Appointment was also the practice in people. Underlying this belief was not Connecticut in the latter part of the 18th only the antilawyer sentiment of the po- century; appointment apparently was pulace, but also the "natural law" think- sometimes made even when the accused ing that characterized the Revolution's failed to request counsel, if he appeared spokesmen. See P. Kauper, The Higher in need of a lawyer, but there is no indi- Law and the Rights of Man in a Revolu- cation appointment was ever made over tionary Society, a lecture in the American the objection of the accused. See Swift, Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Re- supra, n. 35, at 392. Free-choice ap- search series on the American Revolu- pointment remained the rule as the new tion, Nov. 7, 1973, extracted in 18 U. of Republic emerged. See the 1791 statute Mich. Law School Law Quadrangle of New Hampshire, Laws of New Hamp- Notes, No. 2, p. 9 (1974). For example, Thomas Paine, arguing in support of the shire 247 (Melcher 1792), and the 1795 statute of New Jersey, § 2, Acts of the 1776 Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights, Nineteenth General Assembly of the said: State of New Jersey 1012. Page 36 422 U.S. 806, *; 95 S. Ct. 2525, **; 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, ***; 1975 U.S. LEXIS 83 See 28 U.S.C. § 1654. At the time James [*831] The recognition of the right of self- Madison drafted the Sixth Amendment, some representation was not limited to the state law- state constitutions guaranteed an accused the makers. As we have noted, § 35 of the Judi- right to be heard "by himself" and by counsel; ciary Act of 1789, signed one day before the others provided that an accused was to be "al- Sixth Amendment was proposed, guaranteed in lowed" counsel. n41 The various state propos- the federal courts the right of all parties to als for the Bill of Rights had similar variations "plead and manage their own causes personally in terminology. n42 or by the assistance of... counsel." 1 Stat. 92. Page 37 422 U.S. 806, *; 95 S. Ct. 2525, **; 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, ***; 1975 U.S. LEXIS 83 have the Assistance of Counsel for his [*832] In each case, however, the counsel defence" - varied in phrasing from each provision was embedded in a package of de- of the proposals. "The available debates fense rights granted personally to the accused. on the various proposals throw no light There is no indication that the differences in on the significance or the interpretation phrasing about "counsel" reflected any differ- which Congress attributed to the right to ences of principle about self-representation. No counsel." W. Beaney, The Right to State or Colony had ever forced counsel upon Counsel in American Courts 23 (1955). an accused; no spokesman had ever suggested that such a practice would be tolerable, much less advisable. If anyone [***580] had In sum, there is no evidence that the colon- thought that the Sixth Amendment, as drafted, ists and the Framers ever doubted the right of failed to protect the long-respected right of self- self-representation, or imagined that this right representation, there would undoubtedly have might be considered inferior to the right of as- been some debate or comment on the issue. But sistance of counsel. To the contrary, the colon- there was none. ists and the Framers, as well as their English ancestors, always conceived of the right to counsel as an "assistance" for the accused, to be n41 See counsel provisions in n. 38, used at his option, in defending himself. The supra. Framers selected in the Sixth Amendment a n42 In ratifying the Constitution, form of [**2540] words that necessarily im- three States urged that a right-to-counsel plies the right of self-representation. That con- provision be added by way of amend- clusion is supported by centuries of consistent ment. Virginia and North Carolina pro- history. posed virtually identical packages of a IV defendant's rights, each including the There can be no blinking the fact that the provision that an accused be "allowed" right of an accused to conduct his own defense counsel. 2 Schwartz 841, 967. The pack- seems to cut against the grain of this Court's age proposed by New York provided that decisions holding that the Constitution requires the accused "ought to... have... the assis- that no accused can be convicted and impri- tance of Council for his defense." Id., at soned unless he has been accorded the right to 913. The idea of proposing amendments the assistance of counsel. See Powell v. Ala- upon ratification had begun with the bama, 287 U.S. 45; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 Pennsylvania dissenters from ratification, U.S. 458; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. whose proposed package of a defendant's 335; Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25. For rights provided for the accused's "right... it is surely true that the basic thesis of those to be heard by himself and his counsel." decisions is that the help of a lawyer is essential Id., at 664-665. It can be seen that Madi- to assure son's precise formulation - "the right... to Page 38 422 U.S. 806, *; 95 S. Ct. 2525, **; 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, ***; 1975 U.S. LEXIS 83 he faces the danger of conviction because [*833] the defendant a fair trial. n43 And a he does not know how to establish his strong argument can surely be made that the innocence. If that be true of men of intel- whole thrust of those decisions must inevitably ligence, how much more true is it of the lead to the conclusion that a State may constitu- ignorant and illiterate, or those of feeble tionally impose a lawyer upon even an unwil- intellect. If in any case, civil or criminal, ling defendant. a state or federal court were arbitrarily to refuse to hear a party by counsel, em- n43 As stated by Mr. Justice Suther- ployed by and appearing for him, it rea- land in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45: sonably may not be doubted that such a refusal would be a denial of a hearing, "Even the intelligent and educated and, therefore, of due process in the con- layman has small and sometimes no skill stitutional sense." Id., at 69. in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of de- termining for himself whether the in- dictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without [***LEdHR11A] [11A]But it is one thing to the aid of counsel he may be put on trial hold that every defendant, rich or poor, has the without a proper charge, and convicted right to the assistance of counsel, and quite upon incompetent evidence, or evidence another to say that a State may compel a defen- irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inad- dant to accept a lawyer he does not want. The missible. He lacks both the skill and value of state-appointed counsel was not unap- knowledge adequately to prepare his de- preciated by the Founders, n44 yet the notion of fense, even though he have a perfect one. compulsory counsel was utterly foreign to He requires the guiding hand of counsel them. And whatever else may be [***581] at every step in the proceedings against said of those who wrote the Bill of Rights, him. Without it, though he be not guilty, surely there can be no Page 39 422 U.S. 806, *; 95 S. Ct. 2525, **; 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, ***; 1975 U.S. LEXIS 83 [*834] doubt that they understood the ines- consequences of a conviction. It is the defen- timable worth of free choice. n45 dant, therefore, who must be free personally to decide whether in his particular case counsel is [***LEdHR11B] [11B] to his advantage. And although he may conduct his own defense ultimately to his own detri- ment, his choice must be honored out of "that n44 See n. 38, supra, for colonial respect for the individual which is the lifeblood appointment statutes that predate the of the law." Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, Sixth Amendment. Federal law provided 350-351 (BRENNAN, J., concurring). n46 for appointment of counsel in capital cases at the request of the accused as ear- [***LEdHR13B] [13B] [***LEdHR14B] ly as 1790, 1 Stat. 118. [14B] [***LEdHR15B] [15B] n45 See, e.g., U.S. Const., Amdt. 1. [***LEdHR16B] [16B] Freedom of choice is not a stranger to the constitutional design of procedural pro- n46 We are told that many criminal tections for a defendant in a criminal defendants representing themselves may proceeding. For example, "[e]very crimi- use the courtroom for deliberate disrup- nal defendant is privileged to testify in tion of their trials. But the right of self- his own defense, or to refuse to do so." representation has been recognized from Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225. our beginnings by federal law and by See Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, most of the States, and no such result has 612; Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. thereby occurred. Moreover, the trial 570. Cf. Brown v. United States, 356 judge may terminate self-representation U.S. 148. by a defendant who deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist misconduct. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337. Of course, a State may -- even over objec- [***LEdHR12]  [***LEdHR13A] [13A] tion by the accused -- appoint a "standby [***LEdHR14A] [14A] [***LEdHR15A] counsel" to aid the accused if and when [15A] [***LEdHR16A] [16A]It is undeniable the accused requests help, and to be that in most criminal prosecutions defendants available to represent the accused in the could better defend with counsel's guidance event that termination of the defendant's than by their own unskilled efforts. But where self-representation is necessary. See the defendant will not voluntarily accept repre- United States v. Dougherty, 154 U.S. sentation by counsel, the potential advantage of App. D.C. 76, 87-89, 473 F. 2d 1113, a lawyer's training and experience can be rea- 1124-1126. The right of self- lized, if at all, only imperfectly. To force a representation is not a license to abuse lawyer on a defendant can only lead him to be- the dignity of the courtroom. Neither is it lieve that the law contrives against him. More- a license not to comply with relevant over, it is not inconceivable that in some rare rules of procedural and substantive law. instances, the defendant might in fact present Thus, whatever else may or may not be his case more effectively by conducting his open to him on appeal, a defendant who own defense. Personal liberties are not rooted elects to represent himself cannot the- in the law of averages. The right to defend reafter complain that the quality of his [**2541] is personal. The defendant, and not own defense amounted to a denial of "ef- his lawyer or the State, will bear the personal fective assistance of counsel." Page 40 422 U.S. 806, *; 95 S. Ct. 2525, **; 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, ***; 1975 U.S. LEXIS 83 Page 41 422 U.S. 806, *; 95 S. Ct. 2525, **; 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, ***; 1975 U.S. LEXIS 83 es of self-representation, so that the record will [*835] V establish that "he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open." Adams v. [***LEdHR17] When an accused manag- United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S., at es his own defense, he relinquishes, as a purely 279. factual matter, many of the traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel. For this [***LEdHR18A] [18A] [***LEdHR19]  reason, in order to represent himself, the ac- Here, weeks before trial, Faretta clearly and cused must "knowingly and intelligently" forgo unequivocally declared to the trial judge that he those relinquished benefits. Johnson v. Zerbst, wanted to represent himself and did not want 304 U.S., at 464-465. Cf. Von Moltke v. Gil- counsel. The record affirmatively shows that lies, 332 U.S. 708, 723-724 (plurality opinion Faretta was literate, competent, and understand- of Black, J.). Although a defendant need not ing, and that he was voluntarily exercising his himself have the skill and experience of a law- yer in order competently and intelligently to informed free will. The trial judge had warned Faretta that he thought it was a mistake not to [***582] choose self-representation, he should accept be made aware of the dangers and disadvantag- Page 42 422 U.S. 806, *; 95 S. Ct. 2525, **; 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, ***; 1975 U.S. LEXIS 83 [*836] the assistance of counsel, and that Fa- is remanded for further proceedings not incon- retta would be required to follow all the sistent with this opinion. "ground rules" of trial procedure. n47 We need It is so ordered. make no assessment of how well or poorly Fa- retta had mastered the intricacies of the hearsay DISSENTBY: rule and the California code provisions that go- vern challenges of potential jurors on voir dire. BURGER; BLACKMUN n48 For his technical legal knowledge, as such, was not relevant to an assessment of his know- DISSENT: ing exercise of the right to defend himself. [**2542] MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURG- ER, with whom MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN n47 See n. 2, supra. and MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST join, dissent- ing. n48 See n. 3, supra. This case, like Herring v. New York, post, p. 853, announced today, is another example of the judicial tendency to constitutionalize what is thought "good." That effort fails on its own [***LEdHR18B] [18B]In forcing Faretta, terms here, because there is nothing desirable under these circumstances, to accept against his or useful in permitting every accused person, will a state-appointed public defender, the Cali- even the most uneducated and inexperienced, to fornia courts deprived him of his constitutional insist upon conducting his own defense to crim- right to conduct his own defense. Accordingly, inal charges. n1 Moreover, there is no constitu- the judgment before us is vacated, and the case tional basis for Page 43 422 U.S. 806, *; 95 S. Ct. 2525, **; 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, ***; 1975 U.S. LEXIS 83 I [*837] the Court's holding, and it can only add to the problems of an already malfunction- [***583] The most striking feature of the ing criminal justice system. I therefore dissent. Court's opinion is that it devotes so little dis- cussion to the matter which it concedes is the core of the decision, that is, discerning an inde- n1 Absent a statute giving a right to pendent basis in the Constitution for the sup- self-representation, I believe that trial posed right to represent oneself in a criminal courts should have discretion under the trial. n2 See ante, at 818-821, and n. 15. Its Constitution to insist upon representation ultimate assertion that such a right is tucked by counsel if the interests of justice so between the lines of the Sixth Amendment is require. However, I would note that the contradicted by the Amendment's language and record does not support the Court's cha- its consistent judicial interpretation. racterization of this case as one in which that occurred. Although he requested, and initially was granted, permission to n2 The Court deliberately, and in my proceed pro se, petitioner has expressed view properly, declines to characterize no dissatisfaction with the lawyer who this case as one in which the defendant represented him and has not alleged that was denied a fair trial. See Herring v. his defense was impaired or that his law- New York, post, at 871 (REHNQUIST, yer refused to honor his suggestions re- J., dissenting). garding how the trial should be con- ducted. In other words, to use the Court's As the Court seems to recognize, ante, at phrase, petitioner has never contended 820, the conclusion that the rights guaranteed that "his defense" was not fully pre- by the Sixth Amendment are "personal" to an sented. Instances of overbearing or inef- accused reflects nothing more than the obvious fective counsel can be dealt with without fact that it is he who is on trial and therefore contriving broad constitutional rules of has need of a defense. n3 But neither that near- dubious validity. ly Page 44 422 U.S. 806, *; 95 S. Ct. 2525, **; 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, ***; 1975 U.S. LEXIS 83 witnesses against him, to offer tes- [*838] trivial proposition nor the lan- timony, and to be represented by guage of the Amendment, which speaks in un- counsel." Id., at 273. iformly mandatory terms, leads to the further conclusion that the right to counsel is merely supplementary and may be dispensed with at the whim of the accused. Rather, this Court's See also Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, decisions have consistently included the right 27-33 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 to counsel as an integral part of the bundle U.S. 335, 344 (1963). making up the larger "right to a defense as we know it." For example, in In re Oliver, 333 The reason for this hardly requires explana- U.S. 257 (1948), the Court reversed a summary tion. The fact of the matter is that in all but an contempt conviction at the hands of a "one-man extraordinarily small number of cases an ac- grand jury," and had this to say: cused will lose whatever defense he may have if he undertakes to conduct the trial himself. "We... hold that failure to af- The Court's opinion in Powell v. Alabama, ford the petitioner a reasonable op- 287 U.S. 45 (1932), puts the point eloquently: portunity to defend himself against the charge of false and evasive [***584] "Even the intelligent swearing was a denial of due and educated layman has small and process of law. A person's right to sometimes no skill in the science reasonable notice of a charge of law. If charged with crime, he is against him, and an opportunity to incapable, generally, of determin- be heard in his defense - a right to ing for himself whether the indict- his day in court - are basic in our ment is good or bad. He is unfami- system of jurisprudence; and these liar with the rules of evidence. Left rights include, as a minimum, a without the aid of counsel he may right [**2543] to examine the Page 45 422 U.S. 806, *; 95 S. Ct. 2525, **; 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, ***; 1975 U.S. LEXIS 83 do not vary depending upon whether the [*839] be put on trial without accused would have preferred to a proper charge, and convicted represent himself. upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks Obviously, these considerations do not vary both the skill and knowledge ade- depending upon whether the accused actively quately to prepare his defense, desires to be represented by counsel or wishes even though he have a perfect one. to proceed pro se. Nor is it accurate to suggest, He requires the guiding hand of as the Court seems to later in its opinion, that counsel at every step in the pro- the quality of his representation at trial is a mat- ceedings against him. Without it, ter with which only the accused is legitimately though he be not guilty, he faces concerned. See ante, at 834. Although we have the danger of conviction because adopted an adversary system of criminal jus- he does not know how to establish tice, see Gideon v. Wainwright, supra, the his innocence. If that be true of prosecution is more than an ordinary litigant, men of intelligence, how much and the trial judge is not simply an automaton more true is it of the ignorant and who insures that technical rules are adhered to. illiterate, or those of feeble intel- Both are charged with the duty of insuring that lect." Id., at 69. justice, in the broadest sense of that term, is achieved in every criminal trial. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, and n. 2 (1963); Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). That goal is ill-served, and the integrity n3 The Court's attempt to derive sup- of and public confidence in the system are un- port for its position from the fact that the dermined, when an easy conviction is obtained Sixth Amendment speaks in terms of the due to the defendant's ill-advised decision to "Assistance of Counsel" requires little waive counsel. The damage thus inflicted is not comment. It is most curious to suggest mitigated by the lame explanation that the de- that an accused who exercises his right to fendant simply availed himself of the "free- "assistance" has thereby impliedly con- dom" "to go to jail under his own banner...." sented to subject himself to a "master." United States ex rel. Maldonado Ante, at 820. And counsel's responsibili- ty to his client and role in the litigation Page 46 422 U.S. 806, *; 95 S. Ct. 2525, **; 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, ***; 1975 U.S. LEXIS 83 [***585] II [*840] v. Denno, 348 F. 2d 12, 15 (CA2 1965). The system of criminal justice should The Court's attempt to support its result by not be available as an instrument of self- collecting dicta from prior decisions is no more destruction. persuasive than its analysis of the Sixth Amendment. Considered in context, the cases In short, both the "spirit and the logic" of upon which the Court relies to "beat its path" the Sixth Amendment are that every person ac- either lead it nowhere or point in precisely the cused of crime shall receive the fullest possible opposite direction. defense; in the vast majority of cases this command can be honored only by means of the In Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, expressly guaranteed right to counsel, and the 317 U.S. 269 (1942), and Carter v. Illinois, trial judge is in the best position to determine 329 U.S. 173 (1946), the defendants had com- whether the accused is capable of conducting petently waived counsel but later sought to re- his defense. True freedom of choice and socie- nounce actions taken by them while proceeding ty's interest in seeing that justice is achieved pro se. In both cases this Court upheld the can be vindicated only if the trial court retains convictions, holding that neither an uncoun- discretion to reject any attempted waiver of seled waiver of jury trial nor an uncounseled counsel and insist that the accused be tried ac- guilty plea is inherently defective under the cording to the Constitution. This discretion is Constitution. The language which the Court so as critical an element of basic fairness as a trial carefully excises from those opinions relates, judge's discretion to decline to accept a plea of not to an affirmative right of self- [**2544] guilty. See Santobello v. New York, representation, but to 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971). Page 47 422 U.S. 806, *; 95 S. Ct. 2525, **; 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, ***; 1975 U.S. LEXIS 83 statement impossible to square with the Court's [*841] the consequences of waiver. n4 In present holding that an accused is absolutely Adams, for example, Mr. Justice Frankfurter entitled to dispense with a lawyer's help under was careful to point out that his reference to a all conditions. Thus, although Adams and defendant's "correlative right to dispense with a Carter support the Court's conclusion that a lawyer's help" meant only that "[h]e may waive defendant who represents himself may not the- his Constitutional right to assistance of coun- reafter disaffirm his deliberate trial decisions, sel...," 317 U.S., at 279. See United States v. see ante, at 834-835, n. 46, they provide it no Warner, 428 F. 2d 730, 733 (CA8 1970). But, comfort regarding the primary issue in this as the Court recognizes, the power to waive a case. n5 constitutional right does not carry with it the right to insist upon its opposite. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 34-35 (1965). n5 No more relevant is Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934). The reference in that case to an accused's n4 Indeed, the portion of the Court's "power... to supersede his lawyers" simp- quotation which warns against turning ly helped explain why his defense might constitutional protections into "fetters" "be made easier" if he were "permitted to refers to the right to trial by jury, not the be present at the examination of jurors or right to counsel. See Adams v. United the summing up of counsel...." Id., at States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 106. Mr. Justice Cardozo's opinion for 279 (1942). This Court has, of course, the Court made plain that this right was squarely held that there is no constitu- rooted in considerations of fundamental tional right to dispense with a jury. Sing- fairness, and was to be distinguished er v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965). from those conferred by the Confronta- tion Clause. See id., at 107. The Court's Similarly, in Carter the Court's opinion ob- present reliance on the Snyder dicta is served that the Constitution "does not require therefore misplaced. See n. 2, supra. that under all circumstances counsel be forced upon a defendant," citing Adams. 329 U.S., at 174-175 (emphasis added). I, for one, find this Page 48 422 U.S. 806, *; 95 S. Ct. 2525, **; 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, ***; 1975 U.S. LEXIS 83 cessary withdrawal or limitation of [*842] Far more nearly in point is Price many privileges and rights, a re- v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266 [***586] (1948), traction justified by the considera- where this Court held that, although the courts tions underlying our penal system. of appeals possess the power to command that Among those so limited is the oth- a prisoner be produced to argue his own appeal, erwise unqualified right given by § the exercise of that power is a matter of sound 272 of the Judicial Code, 28 judicial discretion. An examination of the U.S.C. § 394 [now § 1654], to whole of the Court's reasoning on this point is parties in all the courts of the Unit- instructive: ed States to 'plead and manage "The discretionary nature of their own causes personally.'" Id., the power in question grows out of at 285-286 (citations omitted). the fact that a prisoner has no abso- lute right to argue his own appeal or even to be present at the pro- It barely requires emphasis that this passage ceedings in an appellate court. The contrasts the "constitutional prerogative" to be absence of that [**2545] right is present at trial with the "recognized privilege" in sharp contrast to his constitu- of self-representation, and strongly implies that tional prerogative of being present the latter arises only from the federal statute. It in person at each significant stage is difficult to imagine a position less consistent of a felony prosecution, and to his with Price v. Johnston than that taken by the recognized privilege of conducting Court today. his own defense at the trial. Lawful incarceration brings about the ne- Page 49 422 U.S. 806, *; 95 S. Ct. 2525, **; 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, ***; 1975 U.S. LEXIS 83 the Sixth Amendment, it is a perversion of the [*843] The Court of Appeals cases relied provision to which we gave full meaning in upon by the Court are likewise dubious authori- Gideon v. Wainwright and Argersinger v. ty for its views. Only one of those cases, United Hamlin. States v. Plattner, 330 F. 2d 271 (CA2 1964), even attempted a reasoned analysis of the issue, III and the decision in that case was largely based Like MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, I hesi- upon the misreading of Adams and Price tate to participate in the Court's attempt to use which the Court perpetuates in its opinion to- history to take it where legal analysis cannot. day. See 330 F.2d at 275. In every other case Piecing together shreds of English legal history cited ante, at 817, the Courts of Appeals as- and early state constitutional and statutory pro- sumed that the right of self-representation was visions, without a full elaboration of the con- constitutionally based but found that the right text in which they occurred or any evidence had not been violated and affirmed the convic- that they were relied upon by the drafters of our tion under review. It is highly questionable Federal Constitution, creates more questions whether such holdings would even establish the than it answers [***587] and hardly provides law of the Circuits from which they came. the firm foundation upon which the creation of In short, what the Court represents as a new constitutional rights should rest. We are well-traveled road is in reality a constitutional well reminded that this Court once employed trail which it is blazing for the first time today, an exhaustive analysis of English and colonial one that has not even been hinted at in our pre- practices regarding the vious decisions. Far from an interpretation of Page 50 422 U.S. 806, *; 95 S. Ct. 2525, **; 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, ***; 1975 U.S. LEXIS 83 under discussion since the 1787 Constitutional [*844] right to counsel to justify the con- Convention. And it would be [**2546] most clusion that it was fundamental to a fair trial remarkable to suggest, had the right to conduct and, less than 10 years later, used essentially one's own defense been considered so critical the same material to conclude that it was not. as to require constitutional protection, that it Compare Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S., at 60- would have been left to implication. Rather, 65, with Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 465- under traditional canons of construction, inclu- 471 (1942). sion of the right in the Judiciary Act and its As if to illustrate this point, the single his- omission from the constitutional amendment torical fact cited by the Court which would ap- drafted at the same time by many of the same pear truly relevant to ascertaining the meaning men, supports the conclusion that the omission of the Sixth Amendment proves too much. As was intentional. the Court points out, ante, at 831, § 35 of the There is no way to reconcile the idea that Judiciary Act of 1789 provided a statutory right the Sixth Amendment impliedly guaranteed the to self-representation in federal criminal trials. right of an accused to conduct his own defense The text of the Sixth Amendment, which ex- with the contemporaneous action of the Con- pressly provides only for a right to counsel, was gress in passing a statute explicitly giving that proposed the day after the Judiciary Act was right. If the Sixth Amendment created a right to signed. It can hardly be suggested that the self-representation it was unnecessary for Con- Members of the Congress of 1789, then few in gress to enact any statute on the subject at all. number, were unfamiliar with the Amendment's carefully structured language, which had been Page 51 422 U.S. 806, *; 95 S. Ct. 2525, **; 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, ***; 1975 U.S. LEXIS 83 tion, their potential effect upon the resources of [*845] In this case, therefore, history our criminal justice system will be considered. ought to lead judges to conclude that the Con- However, such considerations are conspicuous- stitution leaves to the judgment of legislatures, ly absent from the Court's opinion in this case. and the flexible process of statutory amend- ment, the question whether criminal defendants It hardly needs repeating that [***588] should be permitted to conduct their trials pro courts at all levels are already handicapped by se. See Betts v. Brady, supra. And the fact that the unsupplied demand for competent advo- we have not hinted at a contrary view for 185 cates, with the result that it often takes far years is surely entitled to some weight in the longer to complete a given case than expe- scales. n6 Cf. Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., rienced counsel would require. If we were to 260 U.S. 22, 31 (1922). assume that there will be widespread exercise of the newly discovered constitutional right to self-representation, it would almost certainly n6 The fact that Congress has re- follow that there will be added congestion in tained a statutory right to self- the courts and that the quality of justice will representation suggests that it has also suffer. Moreover, the Court blandly assumes assumed that the Sixth Amendment does that once an accused has elected to defend him- not guarantee such a right. See 28 U.S.C. self he will be bound by his choice and not be § 1654. heard to complain of it later. Ante, at 834-835, n. 46. This assumption ignores the role of ap- IV pellate review, for the reported cases are replete with instances of a convicted defendant being Society has the right to expect that, when relieved of a courts find new rights implied in the Constitu- Page 52 422 U.S. 806, *; 95 S. Ct. 2525, **; 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, ***; 1975 U.S. LEXIS 83 MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom [*846] deliberate decision even when THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE made with the advice of counsel. See Silber v. REHNQUIST join, dissenting. United States, 370 U.S. 717 (1962). It is totally unrealistic, therefore, to suggest that an accused Today the Court holds that the Sixth will always be held to the consequences of a Amendment guarantees to every defendant in a decision to conduct his own defense. Unless, as state criminal trial the right to proceed without may be the case, most persons accused of crime counsel whenever he [**2547] elects to do so. have more wit than to insist upon the dubious I find no textual support for this conclusion in benefit that the Court confers today, we can the language of the Sixth Amendment. I find expect that many expensive and good-faith the historical evidence relied upon by the Court prosecutions will be nullified on appeal for rea- to be unpersuasive, especially in light of the sons that trial courts are now deprived of the recent history of criminal procedure. Finally, I power to prevent. n7 fear that the right to self-representation consti- tutionalized today frequently will cause proce- dural confusion without advancing any signifi- n7 Some of the damage we can antic- cant strategic interest of the defendant. I there- ipate from a defendant's ill-advised insis- fore dissent. tence on conducting his own defense I may be mitigated by appointing a quali- fied lawyer to sit in the case as the tradi- The starting point, of course, is the lan- tional "friend of the court." The Court guage of the Sixth Amendment: does not foreclose this option. See ante, "In all criminal prosecutions, at 834-835, n. 46. the accused shall Page 53 422 U.S. 806, *; 95 S. Ct. 2525, **; 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, ***; 1975 U.S. LEXIS 83 recognizes, however, ante, at 819-820, n. 15, [*847] enjoy the right to a that it has squarely rejected any mechanical in- speedy and public trial, by an im- terpretation of the Bill of Rights. Mr. Chief Jus- partial jury of the State and district tice Warren, speaking for a unanimous Court in wherein the crime shall have been Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 34-35 committed, which district shall (1965), stated: "The ability to waive a constitu- have been previously ascertained tional right does not ordinarily carry with it the by law, and to be informed of the right to insist upon the opposite of that right." nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses Where then in the Sixth Amendment does against him; to have compulsory one find this right to self-representation? Ac- process for obtaining witnesses in cording to the Court, it is "necessarily implied his favor, and to have the Assis- by the structure of the Amendment." Ante, at tance of Counsel for his defence." 819. The Court's chain of inferences is delicate and deserves scrutiny. The Court starts with the proposition that the Sixth Amendment is "a It is self-evident that the Amendment compact statement of the rights necessary to a [***589] makes no direct reference to self- full defense." Ante, at 818. From this proposi- representation. Indeed, the Court concedes that tion the Court concludes that the Sixth the right to self-representation is "not stated in Amendment "constitutionalizes the right in an the Amendment in so many words." Ante, at adversary criminal trial to make a defense as 819. we know it." Ibid. Up to this point, at least as a It could be argued that the right to assis- general proposition, the Court's reasoning is tance of counsel necessarily carries with it the unexceptionable. right to waive assistance of counsel. The Court Page 54 422 U.S. 806, *; 95 S. Ct. 2525, **; 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, ***; 1975 U.S. LEXIS 83 The Court suggests that thrusting counsel [*848] The Court, however, then con- upon the accused against his considered wish cludes that because the specific rights in the violates the logic of the Sixth Amendment be- Sixth Amendment are personal to the accused, cause counsel is to be an assistant, not a master. the accused must have a right to exercise those The Court seeks to support its conclusion by rights personally. Stated somewhat more suc- historical analogy to the notorious procedures cinctly, the Court reasons that because the ac- of the Star Chamber. The potential for exagge- cused has a personal right to "a defense as we rated analogy, however, is markedly dimi- know it," he necessarily has a right to make that nished when one recalls that petitioner is seek- defense personally. I disagree. Although I be- ing an absolute right to [**2548] self- lieve the specific guarantees of the Sixth representation. This is not a case where defense Amendment are personal to the accused, I do counsel, against the wishes of the defendant or not agree that the Sixth Amendment guarantees with inadequate consultation, has adopted a tri- any particular procedural method of asserting those rights. If an accused has enjoyed a speedy al strategy that significantly affects one of the accused's constitutional rights. For such over- trial by an impartial jury in which he was in- bearing conduct by counsel, there is a remedy. formed of the nature of the accusation, con- Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 (1966); Fay v. fronted with the witnesses against him, af- Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 439 (1963). [***590] forded the power of compulsory process, and Nor is this a case where distrust, animosity, or represented effectively by competent counsel, I other personal differences between the accused do not see that the Sixth Amendment requires and his would-be counsel have rendered effec- more. tive representation unlikely or impossible. Page 55 422 U.S. 806, *; 95 S. Ct. 2525, **; 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, ***; 1975 U.S. LEXIS 83 The Court seems to suggest that so long as [*849] See Brown v. Craven, 424 F.2d the accused is willing to pay the consequences 1166, 1169-1170 (CA9 1970). See also Anders of his folly, there is no reason for not allowing v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Nor is this a defendant the right to self-representation. even a case where a defendant has been forced, Ante, at 834. See also United States ex rel. against his wishes to expend his personal re- Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F. 2d 12, 15 (CA2 sources to pay for counsel for his defense. See 1965) ("[E]ven in cases where the accused is generally Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40 harming himself by insisting on conducting his (1974); James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 own defense, respect for individual autonomy (1972). Instead, the Court holds that any defen- requires that he be allowed to go to jail under dant in any criminal proceeding may insist on his own banner if he so desires..."). That view representing himself regardless of how com- ignores the established principle that the inter- plex the trial is likely to be and regardless of est of the State in a criminal prosecution "is not how frivolous the defendant's motivations may be. I cannot agree that there is anything in the that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done." Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, Due Process Clause or the Sixth Amendment 88 (1935). See also Singer v. United States, that requires the States to subordinate the so- 380 U.S., at 37. For my part, I do not believe lemn business of conducting a criminal prose- that any amount of pro se pleading can cure cution to the whimsical -- albeit voluntary -- the injury to society of an unjust result, but I do caprice of every accused who wishes to use his believe that a just result should prove to be an trial as a vehicle for personal or political self- effective balm for almost any frustrated pro se gratification. defendant. Page 56 422 U.S. 806, *; 95 S. Ct. 2525, **; 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, ***; 1975 U.S. LEXIS 83 assistance of counsel but remained conspi- [*850] II cuously silent on [***591] any right of self- The Court argues that its conclusion is sup- representation. The Court believes that this si- ported by the historical evidence on self- lence of the Sixth Amendment as to the latter representation. It is true that self-representation right is evidence of the Framers' belief that the was common, if not required, in 18th century right was so obvious and fundamental that it English and American prosecutions. The Court did not need to be included "in so many words" points with special emphasis to the guarantees in order to be [**2549] protected by the of self-representation in colonial charters, early Amendment. I believe it is at least equally state constitutions, and § 35 of the first Judi- plausible to conclude that the Amendment's ciary Act as evidence contemporaneous with silence as to the right of self-representation in- the Bill of Rights of widespread recognition of dicates that the Framers simply did not have the a right to self-representation. subject in mind when they drafted the lan- I do not participate in the Court's reliance guage. on the historical evidence. To begin with, the The paucity of historical support for the historical evidence seems to me to be inconclu- Court's position becomes far more profound sive in revealing the original understanding of when one examines it against the background the language of the Sixth Amendment. At the of two developments in the more recent history time the Amendment was first proposed, both of criminal procedure. First, until the middle of the right to self-representation and the right to the 19th century, the defendant in a criminal assistance of counsel in federal prosecutions proceeding in this country was almost always were guaranteed by statute. The Sixth Amend- disqualified ment expressly constitutionalized the right to Page 57 422 U.S. 806, *; 95 S. Ct. 2525, **; 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, ***; 1975 U.S. LEXIS 83 abama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), to Argersinger v. [*851] from testifying as a witness be- Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), need not be re- cause of his "interest" in the outcome. See gen- counted here. For our purposes, it is sufficient erally Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 to recall that from start to finish the develop- (1961). Thus, the ability to defend "in person" ment of the right to counsel has been based on was frequently the defendant's only chance to the premise that representation by counsel is present his side of the case to the judge or jury. essential to ensure a fair trial. The Court con- See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 50 Tenn. 232 cedes this and acknowledges that "a strong ar- (1871). Such Draconian rules of evidence, of gument can surely be made that the whole course, are now a relic of the past because vir- thrust of those decisions must inevitably lead to tually every State has passed a statute abrogat- the conclusion that a State may constitutionally ing the common-law rule of disqualification. impose a lawyer upon even an unwilling defen- See Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S., at 575- dant." Ante, at 833. Nevertheless, the Court 577, 596. With the abolition of the common- law disqualification, the right to appear "in per- concludes that self-representation must be al- lowed despite the obvious dangers of unjust son" as well as by counsel lost most, if not all, convictions in order to protect the individual of its original importance. See Grano, The defendant's right of free choice. As I have al- Right to Counsel: Collateral Issues Affecting ready indicated, I cannot agree to such a drastic Due Process, 54 Minn. L. Rev. 1175, 1192- curtailment of the interest of the State in seeing 1194 (1970). that justice is done in a real and objective The second historical development is this sense. Court's elaboration of the right to counsel. The road the Court has traveled from Powell v. Al- Page 58 422 U.S. 806, *; 95 S. Ct. 2525, **; 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, ***; 1975 U.S. LEXIS 83 tows a constitutional right on one to make a [*852] III fool of himself. In conclusion, I note briefly the procedural problems that, I suspect, today's decision will REFERENCES: Return To Full Text Opinion visit upon trial courts in the future. Although the Court indicates that a pro se defendant necessarily waives any claim he might other- 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law 310 wise make of ineffective assistance of counsel, ante, at 834-835, n. 46, the opinion leaves USCS, Constitution, 6th and 14th Amendments open a host of other procedural questions. Must every defendant [***592] be advised of his US L Ed Digest, Criminal Law 46, 46.3 right to proceed pro se? If so, when must that notice be given? Since the right to assistance of ALR Digests, Criminal Law 110, 111 counsel and the right to self-representation are mutually exclusive, how is the waiver of each L Ed Index to Annos, Criminal Law right to be measured? If a defendant has elected to exercise his right to proceed pro se, does he ALR Quick Index, Assistance of Counsel; still have a constitutional right to assistance of Criminal Law standby counsel? How soon in the criminal proceeding must a defendant decide between Federal Quick Index, Assistance of Counsel; proceeding by counsel or pro se? Must he be Criminal Law allowed to switch in midtrial? May a violation of the right to self-representation ever be harm- Annotation References: less error? Must the trial court treat the pro se Accused's right, under Federal Constitution, defendant differently than it would professional to be present at his trial. 25 L Ed 2d 931. counsel? I assume that many of these questions will be answered with finality in due course. Federal constitutional right to confront wit- Many of them, however, such as the standards nesses. 23 L Ed 2d 853. of waiver and the treatment of the pro se de- What provisions of the Federal Constitu- fendant, will haunt the trial of every defendant tion's Bill of Rights are applicable to the states. who elects to exercise his right to self- 18 L Ed 2d 1388; 23 L Ed 2d 985. representation. The procedural [**2550] prob- lems spawned by an absolute right to self- Accused's right to counsel under the Feder- representation will far outweigh whatever tac- al Constitution . 93 L Ed 137; 2 L Ed 2d 1644; tical advantage the defendant may feel he has 9 L Ed 2d 1260; 18 L Ed 2d 1420. gained by electing to represent himself. Right of defendant in criminal case to con- If there is any truth to the old proverb that duct defense in person, or to participate with "one who is his own lawyer has a fool for a counsel. 77 ALR2d 1233. client," the Court by its opinion today now bes- 118V7K ********** Print Completed ********** Time of Request: August 28, 2006 09:24 AM EDT Print Number: 1822:115421226 Number of Lines: 1289 Number of Pages: Send To: LAWRENCE, 118V7K LAWRENCE LAW LIBRARY 2 APPLETON ST LAWRENCE, MA 01840-1573
"LEXSEE 422 US 806"