Neg Space Weaponization Derek 7-17 Mahoney

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                                                Cite Example

Macdonald, Masters in aerospace engineering and international affairs, 08
(Bruce, September, http://www.ciaonet.org.proxy1.cl.msu.edu/wps/cfr/0002787/f_0002787_1955.pdf, ―China,
Space Weapons, and U.S. Security‖, Council Special Report No. 38, CIAO, dcj)
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             Cites to find
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                                                     First Article

Space weaponization has major shortfalls- investing in weapons means country resistance

 Macdonald, BSE and masters in aerospace engineering and international affairs in Princeton, 09
(Bruce, March, http://www.cfr.org/china/space-security/p18862, ―Space Security‖, Strategic Forces Subcommittee
House Armed Services Committee, dcj)

While America has been a space-faring nation for over 50 years, the essential and growing role that space plays as a
foundational feature in our conventional military superiority, our strategic nuclear strength, and our civilian
economy is too little understood. The rivers of information and other services our space assets provide allow our
military decision-making and weapons to be far more effective than in the past, vital advantages across the spectrum
of potential conflict. It is no wonder that current U.S. space policy for the first time calls our space assets ―vital to
our national interests.‖ Yet more serious than this lack of public understanding about space is the serious shortfall in
understanding within the military space community of the larger implications of this space importance. The threats
to our space assets, and hence to our vital national interests, come in many forms, some hostile, some not. One of the
biggest threats we face is what we just don’t know: about objects in space, the intentions of those who put them
there, and the very strategic landscape of space itself – how it operates, where it poses strategic dangers, and what
we need to look out for. And this is dangerous. The Strategic Problem Our overall goal should be to shape the space
domain to the advantage of the United States, and to do so in ways that are stabilizing and enhance U.S. security.
The U.S. has an overriding interest in maintaining the safety, survival, and function of its space assets so that the
profound military, civilian, and commercial benefits they enable can continue to be available to the United States
and its allies. These vital space assets face three forms of threats, all of them worrisome and growing: 1) With the
proliferation of space and other technologies, and specifically with the anti-satellite (ASAT) capability China
demonstrated two years ago, there is a risk that China or another adversary could exploit this fast-growing U.S.
dependence on space in a war to greatly weaken U.S. military and economic power. China could do so and thus pose
a serious threat to U.S. space assets within a decade if it chose to do so. China is also pursuing other programs that
have important ASAT implications, and other nations are interested in ASAT as well. The 2008 U.S. shoot-down of
an errant satellite demonstrated the ASAT capability inherent to missile defense systems, ours and others. Last week
Russia indicated renewed interest in ASAT weapons when their deputy defense minister, General Valentin
Popovkin, stated that Russia is working on ASAT. 2) Space ―traffic‖ is heavier than it has ever been and getting
worse, both in terms of physical vehicles and communications. Yet there is no ―FAA for space‖ and even just the
monitoring, much less the management, of space objects is widely seen as far less than needed. There is a great need
for space traffic management capabilities, including enforceable rules of the road, codes of conduct, and space
situational awareness that would inform a ―space FAA‖ management capability. 3) Space debris poses an insidious
and growing threat to all space assets. Debris in space does not quickly fall to the ground, as on earth; at all but the
lowest orbits, debris can stay aloft for centuries and more. In addition to the 17,000 orbiting objects the Air Force
can track, there are hundreds of thousands of potentially lethal objects in orbit, and millions of smaller objects that
pose at least some risk. The recent collision between a U.S. Iridium satellite and an old Russian Cosmos
dramatically illustrated the problem. Our space assets are exposed and fragile. They can’t run, they can’t hide, and
today they can’t defend themselves. One small object traveling at orbital speeds can destroy them. Unless we take
proactive measures, all these threats will grow, and we must bear in mind that the U.S. depends more on space than
our potential adversaries. If we are not careful, the way we are currently thinking, planning, and investing, our space
capabilities may only be available in peacetime, or against non-peer adversaries. We could lose them just when we
need them most. At a minimum, we need far greater space situational awareness and space intelligence (SSA/SI)
capabilities than today. Responsible officials have been saying this for years, but SSA/SI has never received the
priority it deserves. If this fails to change, we can expect more frequent space collisions and growing instability in
space. I will focus on the hostile threat dimensions of our overall military space challenges, though orbital debris
and space traffic management also deserve priority attention. Current U.S. Space Policy Raises but Does Not
Answer Key Space Stability Issues In 2006, the Bush Administration issued a revised space policy that declared for
the first time that U.S. space assets are a ―vital national interest,‖ in recognition of the extraordinary and growing
U.S. military and economic dependence on them. The phrase ―vital national interest‖ carries much heavier national
security implications than has ever been attributed to space. This policy also reserves the right to deny adversaries
―the use of space capabilities hostile to U.S. national interests.‖ But attacking others’ space capabilities invites
attacks on our own, which our policy calls a ―vital national interest,‖ and on which we depend far more than anyone
else. Evolving technology guarantees both that: 1) we will depend even more on these assets in the future; and 2)
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these vital assets will likely face greater threats than today. This dimension of U.S. space policy is contradictory:
why would we want to threaten actions that would invite retaliation against ―vital national interests,‖ and where we
have more at stake than our adversaries? This contradiction was never explained. Such a policy contradiction could
make sense if: • the governing U.S. space force doctrine is deterrence -- that we would have offensive capability
strictly to deter attacks on our assets, and we would not initiate them – but there is no indication that this is the case;
or • the U.S. could maintain space dominance, which the policy tacitly implies, but such a posture would not be
sustainable; or • such attacks were limited and localized, i.e., tactical, not strategic, though there would be serious
risks of escalation. There is an inherent risk of strategic instability when relatively modest defense efforts create
disproportionate danger to an adversary, as with space offense. And there is a serious risk of crisis instability in
space when ―going first‖ pays off – destroying an adversary’s satellites before he destroys yours. We don’t know
what would happen in a crisis, but the potential for space instability seems high and likely to grow. But our policy is
silent on this. I believe the United States can and should remain pre-eminent in space, but that we are currently being
incautious in some dimensions of our military space policy due to the absence of both a clearly thought-out space
doctrine and a coherent national security space strategy. Many issues are begging to be addressed, including: • How
does deterrence function in space? Could limited counterspace attacks remain limited, or would they inevitably
escalate into all-out space conflict? • How can countries with less to lose in space than we be deterred? Are there
asymmetric means available to us for deterrence? • Is space deterrence possible without offensive space capabilities?
If so, how? If not, what kinds of capabilities are most stabilizing? What U.S. space strategy, and resulting
acquisition strategy, in that order, would promote U.S. security interests and reduce space instability over the longer
term? • How do China, Russia and others see space stability? How will this shape China’s space doctrine,
acquisition, strategies, and diplomacy? We don’t know the answers to these questions, and we are doing far too little
to answer them. The United States needs a stabilizing space protection strategy that would: • Focus on stability,
deterrence, escalation control and transparency • Incentivize nations to avoid destabilizing, irreversible actions in
space • Provide a U.S. military space architecture with ―defense in depth‖ and terrestrial, airborne, and other
backups to assure availability of key space services in the event fo space outages from whatever causes, benign or
hostile • Reduce adversary incentives and ability to target U.S. space capabilities • Maintain ―strategic ambiguity‖
over our responses to adversary actions • Encourage agreements that constrain the most destabilizing dimensions of
space competition and provide ground rules for normal space operations; and • Expand dialogue among U.S., China,
and others to promote better understanding and reduce chances for misunderstanding and miscalculation, always
dangerous in a crisis Creating a stable space domain requires the United States to respond to space threats in a
responsible manner, one that ideally does not provoke other nations to greater counter space efforts than they would
otherwise pursue. The United States must be careful to avoid creating a self-fulfilling prophecy and should refrain
from activities and public communications (such as an Air Force advertisement describing space as a future
battleground) that invite the buildup of other nations’ counterspace capabilities. The United States should proceed
cautiously with offensive counterspace initiatives. We must recognize that other nations depend less on space than
we and, therefore, the destruction of their space capabilities is of lesser relative value to us as long as this is true.
China and Space Conflict There is a sizable Chinese military (PLA) literature on space conflict, but it is unclear how
well this reflects Chinese government thinking, any more than U.S. military journals reflect official U.S. policy.
However, China’s ASAT test and this literature demonstrate a PLA awareness of the importance of offensive
counterspace (OCS) capabilities and suggest that such capabilities are part of China’s larger plans for the future. It is
also unclear whether this reflects PLA interest in OCS for warfighting or just for deterrence. Should China choose to
deploy its demonstrated ASAT system, or a more advanced versions of it, U.S. space assets and the military and
economic infrastructures they support will be in jeopardy. Furthermore, China reportedly has other offensive space
programs under development, including lasers, microwave- and cyber-weapons. We also face the twin realities that
defending space assets is more difficult than attacking them; and while advancing technology will help both defense
and offense, the offense is likely to benefit more. One thing is certain – more clarity on PLA and Chinese
government thinking on space deterrence, doctrine, space stability, and related issues – and Russian thinking, too --
are urgently needed and are important to U.S. security. It would be unwise for the United States to seek space
dominance. There are many ways to attack space assets, and it is easier and cheaper to attack than to defend them,
which would likely frustrate any sustained attempt at dominance and leave us worse off than we are now. In trying
to maintain dominance, we would be at the mercy of unpredictably advancing space technologies that could favor
China or others as well as us. In the face of likely Chinese and other resistance to such a provocative posture, we
would constantly be trying to stay ahead technologically to maintain this dominance, demanding large expenditures.
It would also be very unstable, especially if China achieved a breakthrough that threatened our dominance.
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                                               Second article
Space weapons destroy global security, sustainability, and safety

Weeden, Technical consultant with the Secure World Foundation, officer with U.S. Air Force in space
surveillance, ‘08
(Brian, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_11/Book_review#authbio, ―Space Weaponization: Aye or Nay?‖ Arms
Control Association, dcj)

The January 2007 anti-satellite test by China and the destruction of an ailing spy satellite by the United States using
similar means a year later have brought renewed attention to the issue of space security. Two new books, Harnessing
the Heavens edited by Paul Gillespie and Grant Weller and The Politics of Space Security by James Clay Moltz,
make clear that military officials, strategists, and policy intellectuals have been arguing for half a century over
whether and how space could and should be used in warfare and that the debate is far from resolved. Harnessing the
Heavens is a collection of essays presented at the U.S. Air Force Academy’s 21st Military History Symposium, held
in 2006. Many of the top scholars in the field, including Roger Launius, William Burrows, Howard McCurdy, and
David Spires, are featured on topics covering several of the important historical issues in the U.S., Soviet/Russian,
and Chinese space programs, with a focus on military aspects. What soon becomes clear is that in the past as well as
today, the military has failed to understand the unique qualities of space as a battlefield, glossing over several major
technical hurdles and assuming that tactics and strategies from other domains work equally well in space. A good
example of this, and perhaps the most fascinating essay in the compilation is by McCurdy, who recounts the history
and obsession with military lunar bases since the 1940s and the U.S. military’s argument in particular for placing
nuclear weapons on the moon. This argument saw lunar missiles as the ultimate deterrent against Soviet aggression
but also warned that if the United States dallied and allowed the Soviets to seize it first, the consequences would be
disastrous. This led to the U.S. Army’s Project Horizon, which came into conflict with the Air Force’s plans along
the same lines. Much of this lunar military mania stemmed from applying flawed analogies of ―high ground‖ on
Earth to space and thus visualizing the moon as the ultimate high ground. Although the 1967 Outer Space Treaty
banned military installations on celestial bodies, including the moon, today’s military visions of space are nearly as
flawed. Much of the military still sees space as only existing to support the war-fighter on the ground, land, and sea
and considers doing ―space for space reasons‖ a waste of money and resources. Large numbers of military leaders
are still ignorant of the fundamental physics of outer space, which leads to serious discussion of fantasy ideas such
as space planes dropping Marines into combat anywhere around the world. Similarly, as Dwayne Day recalls, the
military has long toyed with the idea of a military space plane. Day examines previously classified Air Force plans
from their inception in 1958, before NASA and Project Mercury, to when they went underground after President
Dwight Eisenhower’s mandate that NASA should assume the manned spaceflight role. The program eventually led
to two threads: plans for military space vehicles and military space stations, of which only certain aspects, Dyna-
Soar and Manned Orbiting Laboratory, have previously been known. Although the military years ago realized that
unmanned spacecraft could do a far better and cheaper job in orbit and abandoned serious plans in this arena, the
concept of a military space plane has not gone away. At least once a decade, the idea is dusted off and given new
funding and rhetoric, only to result years later in failure and wasted taxpayer funds. Everett Dolman’s essay
―Astropolitics and Astropolitik: Strategy and Space Deployment‖ lays out one of the best arguments I have seen for
the weaponization of space by the U.S. military. Whatever your ideological predilection is, this essay is perhaps the
most well written and convincingly structured of any in the collection. Dolman eloquently traces the evolution of
modern military strategy from its roots with Clausewitz to modern warfare and then applies these lessons and logic
to space. He argues that the direct consequence of these precepts is that the U.S. military must weaponize space by
placing weapons for offensive deterrence in orbit. Although it is difficult to find fault with the logic of Dolman’s
argument, three unmentioned or unresolved factors need to be seriously considered before adopting such a position,
putting aside the considerable questions of technical and economic feasibility. First, although Dolman’s conclusion
that orbital weapons could prove to be an effective deterrent is correct, he never defines what exactly would they be
deterring: ―Evil‖ behavior by rogue states? Conventional military actions by states around the world? Soft-power
expressions counter to U.S. national interests? To work effectively, there must be a clear understanding of which
actions and of which players are being deterred, otherwise the deterrence is bound to be ineffective at best and
counterproductive at worst. Is this space deterrence a replacement for or complementary to the existing nuclear
deterrent? A second factor to consider is what psychological effects such a space-to-ground offensive capability
would have on U.S. leadership and the world in general, were the United States alone to possess it. Would having
such a capability make it more or less likely that the U.S. president would use it or other military force aggressively?
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What would the psychological impact be on other world leaders knowing that they are under threat of attack from
the United States at all times, without any warning and without much of a chance to defend themselves? Would this
make unstable world leaders of rogue nations, that such a threat may be attempting to deter, more or less stable? The
final factor is perhaps the ultimate law of warfare: for every action, there is a reaction. This is the crux of the axiom
―no plan survives first contact with the enemy.‖ Plans are developed against a static set of assumptions and facts,
while an active opponent in the field is as intelligent and motivated as the attacker. As a result, occupying forces
throughout history have been surprised by the ingenuity, resourcefulness, and effectiveness of a supposedly inferior
enemy who refuses to submit. The same lessons should be applied to offensive space-to-ground weapons: They will
not create an insurmountable advantage for the U.S. military; they will only spur other states and actors to find ways
to counter such weapons or avoid their effects. That leads to the biggest issue with the pro-space weapons
movement. It is based around the ideal that a state can act unilaterally in the world and control the consequences to
its advantage. Historically, that assumption has always been a false dream over the long run, and in a globalized
world, it is quickly becoming false in the short run. Time after time in recent history, a state has acted unilaterally in
its own self interest, and in each instance, its actions have caused unforeseen or undesired consequences. The recent
Russian-Georgian conflict is a prime example. What originally looked like a clean and easy victory for Russia is
now starting to show reverberations: the crash of its stock market, more European states backing U.S. ballistic
missile defense, and most recently, the potential start of a Georgian insurgency in the contested regions. As Moltz
and others demonstrate, the essential basis of the 2006 Bush space policy is no different than that of any president
since Eisenhower. The core elements of peaceful use of outer space, separation of civil and military space, use of
space to enhance U.S. economic and military power, and the right to freedom of action in space are unchanged.
Rather, it is the tone and nuance of the policy that is different. The right to freedom of action by the United States is
coupled with a blatant warning that the United States reserves the right to deter or prevent other states from
impinging on U.S. capabilities in space. Put in the larger context of the Bush administration’s handling of world
events, this creates the impression that U.S. space policy has somehow radically swung toward weaponization. At
the end, Moltz returns to the four ideological camps of space security and presents their approach to the future of
space security. It is here that readers will find Moltz’s analysis to be absolutely correct when he states, ―Despite the
U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and the 2006 National Space Policy, no irreversible decisions have been
made regarding the deployment of space defenses. Thus, both directions for space security—unilateral and
collective—are very much in play.‖ Perhaps this is why the topic of space security has experienced its latest
resurgence. Parties on either side of the issue understand that both directions are indeed very much in play. Each
side also understands the consequences for its respective agendas and outlook on the world should the chosen
direction be against its core beliefs. Adopting a unilateral security strategy, as is the current U.S. approach, does
have its advantages, but one of the fundamental disadvantages is lack of engagement and influence in the actions of
others that one would have through a cooperative approach. A recent example that demonstrates this clearly was the
decision by European states to create their own space surveillance system. When first announced a few years ago,
the U.S. position was basically to ignore the issue. When the Europeans demonstrated that they were serious and
starting working to actually fund such a system, suddenly the U.S. position changed. The United States started
talking about space situational awareness and cooperation within the context of NATO to try to shift European
surveillance activities to that forum, where the United States is a partner and has a seat at the table and thus can exert
influence more readily. This leads to the larger fundamental truth: the rest of the world is quickly developing suites
of space capability and interest. Although most states will never individually develop equal capabilities to the United
States in terms of space power, technology is rapidly changing the game, as it has in every other field. Every state
has the same sovereign right as the United States to fully utilize space for its own socioeconomic development and
pursue its own self interests. If every state pursues the same U.S. path of unilateral action, opposition of legal
regimes prohibiting or limiting their access or use of space, and reservation of the right to deny adversaries the use
of space capabilities hostile to their national interests, then ultimately conflict in space will happen. That conflict is
likely to have lasting detrimental effects on the use of space by all states. The debate over space weaponization
should come down to three things: security, safety, and sustainability. Whatever the answer is, it should properly
address all three of those elements. Space weapons, however defined, may serve some space security needs. If that
comes at the cost of a reduction in the other two factors, clearly it is not a viable option. Likewise, certain proposals
that have been made for international regimes and bans on weapons may in theory create safety, but if they ignore
the security concerns of space-faring nations, they will ultimately be counterproductive. Only by factoring in all
three considerations and working together can the world move forward with utilization of space for the peaceful
benefit of all states.
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                                                    Third Article

Plan disrupts China-Russia-Euro Space treaty.

Tronchetti, Associate Professor at the School of Law of the Harbin Institute of Technology and Academic
Coordinator at the International Institute of Air and Space Law, ‘11
(Fabio, http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0265964611000336, ―Preventing the weaponization of
outer space: Is a Chinese–Russian–European common approach possible?‖ SciVerse, dcj)

Notwithstanding the several references to the ―peaceful uses of outer space‖ contained in the space law treaties,
outer space has increasingly been used for military purposes. While the legality of certain passive military uses of
space has received broad recognition, other military applications, such as the placement in orbit of weapons with
offensive capacity, are strongly opposed by most of the international community. Preventing the so-called
weaponization of outer space and ensuring the safety and security of outer space objects have become crucial to the
well being of states, especially taking into consideration the significant reliance of modern societies on space assets
and their applications. There are clear political, military and legal reasons behind the growing risk of the progressive
weaponization of space. First, not only are space technologies of essential importance for the proper functioning of
the economies of the majority of states, but also they have a direct and positive impact on the life of millions of
people. The need to protect these valuable space assets may induce States to take all necessary measures, including
the development and deployment of space and ground-based weapons. Second, in recent years space technologies
have become fundamental components of the military forces of the space powers and crucial tools for maintaining
their national security. The necessity to preserve and defend these space technologies, so as to maintain military
superiority over other states and to guarantee the security of one’s home land, is a factor which pushes towards a
gradual weaponization of outer space. While these two elements have the potential to place the security of the space
environment at significant risk, such a risk could be avoided if a strong international legal framework was in place.
The existing space law instruments are deemed to be inadequate to prevent the weaponization of outer space. As a
consequence, efforts aimed at updating and amending current space law, so as to make it able to better preserve the
peaceful nature of outer space, have increased. The two most notable initiatives have been taken by China and
Russia, on the one hand, and the European Union, on the other. Despite the interest generated by these two
initiatives, neither has been able to achieve global acceptance and international efforts concerning the non-
weaponization of outer space are currently at a standstill. In order to put an end to this deadlock, this paper proposes
developing a Chinese–Russian–European common approach to the non-weaponization of outer space, resulting
eventually in a common proposal. Although these states do not seem to have taken any step in this direction so far,
the paper will demonstrate the existence of several elements of a political and legal nature that could contribute to
shaping such a common approach. A Chinese–Russian–European common proposal could represent a major
breakthrough in preventing the weaponization of outer space by legal means. Taking into account that China, Russia
and the EU are three of the main outer space actors, both in terms of financial resources invested in research and
development of space technologies and of number of space missions and initiatives undertaken, a common proposal
from them would bear a special political weight which could enable said proposal to be placed at the core of the
discussions within international fora, such as the Conference on Disarmament (CD) and the Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) and to receive positive response. The importance of this proposal would
be enhanced by the fact that two of its proponents, China and Russia, have the technical ability actually to
―weaponize‖ outer space. Their willingness to avoid such a scenario, and to cooperate to this end with another main
space player like the EU, would thus increase the value and significance of such a proposal. Additionally, this
common proposal would have the potential to put pressure on and to stimulate other key space players, such as the
USA, to take a more active and positive role in the international actions aimed at preserving the peaceful character
of outer space. After analyzing some key terms and the existing legal rules regulating military activities in outer
space, the paper will focus on the 2008 Chinese–Russian Draft Treaty on the Prevention of Weaponization of Outer
Space and the 2010 EU Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, with the purpose of describing their
characteristics and the reasons of their failure. The following sections of the paper will study the possibility of
developing a Chinese–Russian–European common proposal on the prevention of weaponization of outer space and
will put forward suggestions on how this proposal should be structured and what elements it should include.
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                                                 Fourth Article
No treaty means Russia wants ASAT’s
Russian Military News Agency, Russia’s only news agency related to national security and defense, ‘9
(http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/lnacui2api/results/docview/docview.do?start=18&sort=BOOLEAN
&format=GNBFI&risb=21_T12358309708, ―MP says Russia has every reason to develop anti-satellite weapons‖,
dcj)

Moscow, 11 March: The development of anti-satellite weapons in Russia is quite justified, to protect its national
security, Andrey Kokoshin, State Duma deputy and former secretary of the Russian Security Council, has said.
"Russia definitely has every reason to work on such means, and, if need be, to demonstrate that it can appropriately
protect its national security in outer space," Kokoshin told Interfax on Tuesday [10 March]. The US has been
actively promoting the idea of deploying offensive weapons in outer space for the last several years, Kokoshin said.
"The consideration and implementation of such research and development projects has been stepped up, especially
after the US unilaterally withdrew from the Soviet-US Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972," he said. Although that
treaty dealt with limitations on missile defence systems, it was also a very important obstacle in the way of the
development of anti-satellite weapons, Kokoshin said. "As a matter of fact, missile interception weapons, say, those
deployed in space, or even ground-, sea-, or air-based weapons, can also be used as anti-satellite weapons.
Moreover, it is much easier to intercept a satellite moving along a well-known orbit in a predictable direction than to
intercept a ballistic warhead or a missile in the boost phase," he said. The ABM Treaty imposed quite significant
limitations, in particular, on missile defence systems deployed in space, Kokoshin said. The limitation of the number
of missile defence positioning areas was also an important limitation on the parties' anti-satellite potentials, he said.
The range of resources to develop anti-satellite weapons is very broad today, and it is much broader than in the
1980s, when this issue was actively debated but both parties showed restraint, Kokoshin said. "Although a lot was
done towards deploying weapons in space and developing ground-to-space and air-to-space anti-satellite weapons,
there was no such development then," he said. Russia and the US still have the chance to agree on preventing arms
race in space, but as long as they have not reached such agreements, Russia certainly has every reason to work on
anti-satellite weapons, he said.
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                                                      Fifth Article
Iran’s investment in ASAT’s leads to global war

Russian Military News Agency, Russia’s only news agency related to national security and defense, ‘8
(http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/lnacui2api/results/docview/docview.do?start=22&sort=BOOLEAN
&format=GNBFI&risb=21_T12358309708, ―Russian expert concerned about Iranian satellite launch‖, dcj)

Moscow, 18 August: The launch of Iran's first satellite may lead to the militarization of space , an expert in Russia's missile and
space sector, who did not want to give his name, told Interfax on Sunday [17 August]. "Iran has become the first country of the
Muslim world that launched satellite in space and thus joined the club of space powers. The USA's concerns about
the peaceful character of the [Iranian] nuclear programme together with the development of the Iranian space
programme may unleash a new space [arms] race and the militarization of space ", the Russian expert thinks. In this
connection, he expressed an opinion that "the future of the Iranian space programme should cause concerns of both its
neighbours in the region and the entire world". According to the expert, Tehran has not signed the agreement on banning
weapons testing and the introduction of weapons in space, therefore its space activities in the future may pose a
potential threat to Russia as well.
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             Sixth Article

				
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