Mapp v. Ohio _1961_ by changcheng2

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									                              Mapp v. Ohio (1961)
Background Summary

       Ms. Dollree Mapp and her daughter lived in Cleveland, Ohio. After receiving
information that an individual wanted in connection with a recent bombing was hiding in
Mapp's house, the Cleveland police knocked on her door and demanded entrance.
Mapp called her attorney and subsequently refused to let the police in when they failed
to produce a search warrant. After several hours of surveillance and the arrival of more
officers, the police again sought entrance to the house. Although Mapp did not allow
them to enter, they gained access by forcibly opening at least one door. Once the
police were inside the house, Mapp confronted them and demanded to see their
warrant. One of the officers held up a piece of paper claiming it was a search warrant.
Mapp grabbed the paper but an officer recovered it and handcuffed Mapp “because she
had been belligerent.” Dragging Mapp upstairs, officers proceeded to search not only
her room, but also her daughter's bedroom, the kitchen, dinette, living room, and
basement.

        In the course of the basement search, police found a trunk containing “lewd and
lascivious” books, pictures, and photographs. As a result, Mapp was arrested for
violating Ohio's criminal law prohibiting the possession of obscene materials. At trial,
the court found her guilty of the violation based on the evidence presented by the
police. When Mapp’s attorney questioned the officers about the alleged warrant and
asked for it to be produced, the police were unable or unwilling to do so. Nonetheless,
Mapp was found guilty and sentenced to 1 to 7 years in the Ohio Women’s
Reformatory.

       Upon her conviction, Mapp appealed her case to the Supreme Court of Ohio.
Her attorney argued that she should never have been brought to trial because the
material evidence resulted from an illegal, warrantless search. Because the search was
unlawful, he maintained, the evidence was illegally obtained and must also be
excluded. The Supreme Court of Ohio agreed the search was illegal but said the
evidence obtained from it was still admissible in court.

        Mapp appealed again to the Supreme Court of the United States. The case
came down to this fundamental question: may evidence obtained through a search in
violation of the Fourth Amendment be admissible in state criminal proceedings? The
Fourth Amendment states “The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” The
Fourth Amendment, however, does not define when a search or seizure is
“unreasonable” nor does it specify how evidence obtained from an “unreasonable”
search should be treated.
The Ruling

        The Supreme Court of the United States agreed to hear Mapp's case in 1960. It
handed down its 6-3 decision in 1961, ruling that people had an expectation of privacy
cy in their homes and that it was common sense that evidence illegally obtained should
not be used in a court of law.
                         Gideon v. Wainwright (1963)
Background Summary

       Between midnight and 8:00 a.m. on June 3, 1961, a burglary occurred at the Bay
Harbor Pool Room in Panama City, Florida. In the course of the burglary, a window
was smashed and the cigarette machine and jukebox were broken into. A witness
claimed to have seen Clarence Earl Gideon in the poolroom early that morning. When
Gideon was found nearby with a pint of wine and some change in his pockets, the
police arrested him. and charged him with breaking and entering.

       Gideon was a semi-literate drifter who could not afford a lawyer. When he
appeared at the Florida Circuit Court for trial, he asked the judge to appoint one for him.
Gideon argued that the Court should do so because the Sixth Amendment says that
everyone is entitled to a lawyer. The judge denied his request, claiming that the state
does not have to provide a poor person with a lawyer unless "special circumstances"
exist. Gideon was left to represent himself. He had been arrested many times before,
so he understood some of the legal procedures. However, he did a poor job of
defending himself. For instance, his choice of witnesses was unusual–he called the
police officers who arrested him to testify on his behalf. He lacked skill in questioning
witnesses, which made it difficult for him to present his case.

        Gideon was found guilty of breaking and entering and petty larceny, which is a
felony in Florida. He was sentenced to five years in a Florida state prison. While there,
he began studying law in the prison library. Gideon's study of the law reaffirmed his
belief that the Circuit Court's refusal to appoint counsel for him constituted a denial of
his rights. With that in mind, he filed a petition with the Supreme Court of Florida for
habeas corpus, which is an order to free him because he had been illegally imprisoned.
That petition was rejected, but Gideon persevered. From his prison cell, he handwrote
a petition asking the Supreme Court of United States to hear his case. The Court
allowed him to file it in forma pauperis, or free of charge. After reading the petition, they
agreed to hear his case.

       When the Supreme Court of the United States agrees to hear a case, it does so
because the case "presents questions whose resolution will have an immediate
importance far beyond the particular facts and parties involved." The justices were
interested not simply with the merits of Gideon's case, but with the larger issue of
whether poor people charged with noncapital offenses are entitled to a free lawyer in
state criminal trials. In a 1942 case, Betts v. Brady, the Court had ruled that in state
criminal trials, the state must supply an indigent defendant with a lawyer only if special
circumstances exist. These special circumstances include complex charges,
incompetence, and illiteracy on the part of the defendant. Gideon did not claim any of
these special circumstances, so for the Court to rule in his behalf, they would need to
overturn Betts v. Brady. The Supreme Court of the United States asked both sides to
present arguments on the issue of "Should Betts v. Brady be overturned"?
The Ruling

        The decision was unanimous. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court:
“The Sixth Amendment provides, ‘In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.’ We have construed
this to mean that in federal courts counsel must be provided for defendants unable to
employ counsel unless the right is competently and intelligently waived.

...

       “We accept Betts v. Brady's assumption, based as it was on our prior cases, that
a provision of the Bill of Rights, which is ‘fundamental and essential to a fair trial’ is
made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. We think the Court in
Betts was wrong, however, in concluding that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of
counsel is not one of these fundamental rights.

...

        “...there are few defendants charged with crime, few indeed, who fail to hire the
best lawyers they can get to prepare and present their defenses. That government
hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants who have the money hire lawyers to defend
are the strongest indications of the widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are
necessities, not luxuries. The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be
deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours.

...

       “The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to the Supreme Court of
Florida for further action not inconsistent with this opinion.”
                          Miranda v. Arizona (1966)
Background Summary

        A kidnapping and sexual assault occurred in Phoenix, Arizona, in March 1963.
On March 13, Ernesto Miranda, 23, was arrested in his home, taken to the police
station, identified by the victim, and taken into an interrogation room. Miranda was not
told of his rights to counsel prior to questioning. Two hours later, investigators emerged
from the room with a written confession signed by Miranda. It included a typed
disclaimer, also signed by Miranda, stating that he had “full knowledge of my legal
rights, understanding any statement I make may be used against me,” and that he had
knowingly waived those rights.

        Two weeks later at a preliminary hearing, Miranda again was denied counsel. At
his trial he did have a lawyer, whose objections to the use of Miranda's signed
confession as evidence were overruled. Miranda was convicted of kidnapping and
rape, and received a 20-year sentence.

       According to Miranda, the police clearly violated Miranda's Fifth Amendment right
to remain silent, and his Sixth Amendment right to legal counsel. Arizona ignored both
the Escobedo rule (evidence obtained from an illegally obtained confession is
inadmissible in court) and the Gideon rule (all felony defendants have the right to an
attorney) in prosecuting Miranda. His confession was illegally obtained and should be
thrown out. His conviction was faulty, and he deserved a new trial.

       The State of Arizona argued that Ernesto Miranda was no stranger to police
procedures. He negotiated with police officers with intelligence and understanding. He
signed the confession willingly. The prosecution was proper, his conviction was based
on Arizona law, and his imprisonment was just. The Supreme Court should uphold his
conviction and should not further cripple the work of police.

         The Supreme Court had to decide if a confession was admissible in a court of
law if it was obtained without warnings against self-incrimination and without legal
counsel rights guaranteed to all persons by the Fifth and Sixth amendments.

The Ruling

        By a 5-4 margin, the Court voted to overturn Miranda's conviction. Writing for
the majority, Chief Justice Warren declared that the burden is upon the state to
demonstrate that “procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against
self-incrimination” are followed. “ The current practice of 'incommunicado' [unable to
communicate with the world] interrogation is at odds with one of our Nation's most
cherished principles–that the individual may not be compelled to incriminate himself.”

       Warren spelled out the rights of the accused and the responsibilities of the
police. Police must warn a suspect “prior to any questioning that he has the right to
remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he
has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one
will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.”

        The creation of the Miranda Warning put on the shoulders of the police the
burden of informing citizens subject to questioning in a criminal investigation of their
rights to “due process.” Ernesto Miranda, retracting his confession, was tried again by
the State of Arizona, found guilty, and sent to prison. His retrial, based on a prisoner's
successful appeal, did not constitute “double jeopardy.”
                        United States v. Leon (1984)
Background Summary

        In 1981, police in Burbank, California received a tip identifying Patsy Stewart and
Armando Sanchez as drug dealers. Police began surveillance of their homes and
followed leads based on the cars that frequented the residences. The police identified
Ricardo Del Castillo and Alberto Leon as also being involved in the operation. Police
officers initiated surveillance of Leon's activities. A search warrant was issued pursuant
to that surveillance, and a large quantity of drugs were seized. Leon was charged with
violations of federal drug-trafficking laws. At trial, the court granted Leon's suppression
motion because the warrant was not issued on probable cause. Specifically, the court
found that the warrant contained allegations of an untested informant and limited
corroboration by the police. The court of appeals affirmed; they refused to accept a
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. The United State Justice Department
appealed to the Supreme Court.

       The Court had to decide if the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule should be
modified so as not to bar the use of evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable
reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate but ultimately
found to be unsupported by probable cause.

The Ruling

        The Court decided 6-3 that Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule should be
modified to permit the introduction of evidence obtained in the reasonable good-faith
belief that a search or seizure was in accord with the Fourth Amendment. The officer's
reliance on the warrant must be objectively reasonable. The exclusionary rule is not a
personal constitutional right. It is a judicially created remedy intended to safeguard
Fourth Amendment rights through its deterrent effect. Therefore, the costs and benefits
of excluding inherently trustworthy tangible evidence must be weighed, and the remedy
applied only where its costs are acceptable and its deterrent effect is well served. The
rule's chief benefit is to deter police misconduct, not to punish judicial errors. No
evidence has been shown that relaxing the rule would decrease a judge's professional
commitment to protecting Fourth Amendment rights. Courts may allow a good-faith
exception to the exclusionary rule. Good faith is an exception to the exclusionary rule.
The exclusionary rule is a judicially created rule designed to deter police misconduct.
The rule should not be applied when it does not serve its function. If a police officer in
good faith relies on a defective warrant, he is not guilty of misconduct. To suppress
evidence when a warrant is defective does nothing to deter future misconduct, because
there is nothing the officer should have done differently. The purposes of the
exclusionary rule are not achieved by suppressing evidence obtained in good faith
reliance on a defective search warrant.
                         New Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985)
Background Summary

       In 1980, a teacher at Piscataway High School in New Jersey found two girls
smoking in a restroom. At the school, smoking in the restrooms was a violation of
school rules; smoking was allowed only in the designated smoking area. The teacher
escorted the two girls to the principal’s office, where they met with an assistant vice
principal, Theodore Choplick. One of the girls was T.L.O., a freshman who was 14-
years-old. The girl who was with T.L.O. admitted that she had been smoking; T.L.O.,
however, denied the allegation, and said that she did not, in fact, smoke at all.

        Choplick took T.L.O. into his office and instructed her to turn over her purse. He
opened the purse and found a pack of cigarettes. He took the cigarettes out of the
purse and showed them to T.L.O., accusing her of having lied about smoking in the
restroom. As he removed the cigarettes, he noticed a package of cigarette rolling
papers, which he believed were an indicator of involvement with marijuana. Therefore,
he proceeded with a more thorough search of T.L.O.'s purse. This search yielded the
following items: a small amount of marijuana, a pipe, empty plastic bags, a significant
amount of money in one-dollar bills, a list of students who owed T.L.O. money, and
letters implicating T.L.O. in dealing marijuana.

       Choplick then called T.L.O.’s mother and the police. The mother came to the
school and, at the request of the police, took her daughter to the police station.
Choplick turned the evidence from the purse over to the police. At the police station,
T.L.O. admitted that she had been selling marijuana at school. As a result of T.L.O.'s
confession and the evidence from her purse, the State of New Jersey brought
delinquency charges against T.L.O. in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Middlesex County.

        T.L.O. tried to have the evidence from her purse suppressed, contending that the
search violated the Fourth Amendment. She also claimed that her confession should
be suppressed on the grounds that it was tainted by the unlawful search. The juvenile
court rejected her Fourth Amendment arguments, although it conceded that the Fourth
Amendment applies to searches by school officials. However, it held that a school
official may search a student if that official has a “reasonable suspicion that a crime has
been or is in the process of being committed, or reasonable cause to believe that the
search is necessary to maintain school discipline or enforce school policies.” This is a
lower standard than the “probable cause” standard, which is required when police
conduct a search.

       The juvenile court concluded that Choplick's search was, therefore, reasonable.
Choplick was justified in searching the purse, the Court said, because of his reasonable
suspicion that T.L.O. had violated school rules by smoking in the restroom. When he
opened the purse, evidence of marijuana use was in plain view; this justified the further
search of the purse. T.L.O. was found to be a delinquent and, in January 1982, she was
sentenced to one year of probation.

       T.L.O. appealed her conviction to the appellate division, which found no violation
of the Fourth Amendment, but returned the case to juvenile court for determination of a
possible Fifth Amendment problem with T.L.O.’s confession. T.L.O. then appealed the
appellate division’s Fourth Amendment ruling to the Supreme Court of New Jersey.

        The Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed the appellate division's ruling and
ordered the evidence found in T.L.O.'s purse suppressed. The New Jersey Court relied
on Supreme Court of the United States precedent to hold that whenever an “official”
search violates constitutional rights, the evidence may not be used in a criminal case.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court of New Jersey found that Choplick’s search was not
reasonable. Mere possession of cigarettes was not a violation of school rules;
therefore, a desire for evidence of smoking in the restroom did not justify the search. In
addition, the further search of the purse was not justified by the presence of cigarette
rolling papers.

The Ruling

       In 1983, the Supreme Court of the United States granted the State of New
Jersey’s petition for certiorari. In 1985, the Court handed down its decision. It reversed
the New Jersey Court’s decision in a 6-3 vote, contending that students have a right to
privacy at school but that right is limited by teachers’ and administrators’ need to
maintain discipline on schools grounds. Therefore, school officials need only
“reasonable cause” to search students or their possessions, not a warrant or probable
cause.

								
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