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					Planet Debate                                                                                                                  1
PMCs – Sherry Hall
**PMSCs Status Quo**...................................................................................................... 6
Shift to PMSCs Now........................................................................................................... 7
Factors Fueling Shift to PMSCs ......................................................................................... 8
Factors Fueling Shift to PMSCs ......................................................................................... 9
Factors Fueling Shift to PMSCs ....................................................................................... 10
Factors Fueling Shift to PMSCs ....................................................................................... 11
**PMSCs Bad** ............................................................................................................... 12
PMSCs Covert & Unaccountable ..................................................................................... 13
PMSCs Covert & Unaccountable ..................................................................................... 14
PMSCs Covert & Unaccountable ..................................................................................... 15
PMSCs Covert & Unaccountable ..................................................................................... 16
PMSCs Covert & Unaccountable ..................................................................................... 17
PMSCs Illegitimate ........................................................................................................... 18
PMSC Contractors Violate Human Rights and Laws ....................................................... 19
PMSC Contractors Violate Human Rights and Laws ....................................................... 20
PMSCs Skirt Democratic Checks ..................................................................................... 21
PMSCs Skirt Democratic Checks ..................................................................................... 22
PMSCs Skirt Democratic Checks ..................................................................................... 23
PMSCs Skirt Democratic Checks ..................................................................................... 24
PMSCs Skirt Democratic Checks ..................................................................................... 25
PMSCs Skirt Democratic Checks ..................................................................................... 26
PMSCs Skirt Democratic Checks ..................................................................................... 27
Undermining Democracy Makes PMSCs Unethical ........................................................ 28
Undermining Democracy Makes PMSCs Unethical ........................................................ 29
PMSCs Increase Terrorism ............................................................................................... 30
PMSCs Increase Terrorism ............................................................................................... 31
PMSCs Increase Terrorism ............................................................................................... 32
PMSCs Increase Terrorism ............................................................................................... 33
AT: “Can Regulate PMSCs”............................................................................................. 34
AT: “Can Regulate PMSCs” ............................................................................................. 35
AT: “Can Regulate PMSCs” ............................................................................................. 36
AT: “Can Regulate PMSCs” ............................................................................................. 37
AT: “Can Regulate PMSCs” ............................................................................................. 38
AT: “Can Regulate PMSCs” ............................................................................................. 39
AT: “Can Regulate PMSCs” ............................................................................................. 40
AT: “Can Regulate PMSCs” ............................................................................................. 41
AT: “Can Regulate PMSCs” ............................................................................................. 42
AT: “Can Regulate PMSCs” ............................................................................................. 43
AT: “Contract Law Holds PMSCs Accountable” ............................................................. 44
AT: “Are Subject to US Legal Control” ........................................................................... 45
PMSCs Like Mercenaries ................................................................................................. 46
PMSCs are Private Armies ............................................................................................... 47
PMSCs Driven by Profit Motive....................................................................................... 48
PMSCs Driven by Profit Motive....................................................................................... 49
PMSCs Driven by Profit Motive....................................................................................... 50
PMSCs Driven by Profit Motive....................................................................................... 51
Planet Debate                                                                                                           2
PMCs – Sherry Hall
PMSCs Driven by Profit Motive....................................................................................... 52
PMSCs Driven by Profit Motive....................................................................................... 53
PMSCs Driven by Profit Motive....................................................................................... 54
PMSCs Driven by Profit Motive....................................................................................... 55
PMSCs Driven by Profit Motive....................................................................................... 56
Profit Motive Makes PMSCs Immoral ............................................................................. 57
PMSCs Violate International Law .................................................................................... 58
PMSCs Violate International Law .................................................................................... 59
PMSCs Violate International Law .................................................................................... 60
PMSCs Violate International Law .................................................................................... 61
PMSCs Violate International Law .................................................................................... 62
PMSCs Violate International Law .................................................................................... 63
PMSCs Violate International Law .................................................................................... 64
PMSCs Violate International Law .................................................................................... 65
PMSCs Violate International Law .................................................................................... 66
PMSCs Undermine Just-War Doctrine ............................................................................. 67
Private Contracts for Security Less Ethical than Public ................................................... 68
Private Contracts for Security Less Ethical than Public ................................................... 69
PMSCs Allow Public to Ignore True Costs of Foreign Policy Decisions ........................ 70
PMSCs Undermine U.S. Security Goals and Policies ...................................................... 71
PMSCs Undermine U.S. Security Goals and Policies ...................................................... 72
PMSCs Undermine U.S. Security Goals and Policies ...................................................... 73
PMSCs Undermine Counterinsurgency Efforts ................................................................ 74
PMSCs Undermine Counterinsurgency Efforts ................................................................ 75
PMSCs Undermine Counterinsurgency Efforts ................................................................ 76
PMSCs Undermine Counterinsurgency Efforts ................................................................ 77
PMSCs Hurt Military Retention – Drain the Best Personnel Away ................................. 78
PMSCs Hurt Military Retention – Drain the Best Personnel Away ................................. 79
PMSCs Undermine Civil/Military Relations .................................................................... 80
PMSCs Undermine Civil/Military Relations .................................................................... 81
PMSCs Undermine Professional Military/Military Ethics ............................................... 82
PMSCs Undermine Professional Military/Military Ethics ............................................... 83
PMSCs Undermine Professional Military/Military Ethics ............................................... 84
Privatizing War Undermines Overall Security ................................................................. 85
Privatizing War Undermines Overall Security ................................................................. 86
Privatizing War Undermines Overall Security ................................................................. 87
PMSCs Increase Militarism – Invisible Form of Warfare ................................................ 88
Net Impact of PMSCs Negative ........................................................................................ 89
PMSCs Blur Lines – Not Purely Private........................................................................... 90
PMSCs Ineffective/Unreliable .......................................................................................... 91
PMSCs Ineffective/Unreliable .......................................................................................... 92
PMSCs Ineffective/Unreliable .......................................................................................... 93
PMSCs Ineffective/Unreliable .......................................................................................... 94
AT: PMSCs Do Good Things ........................................................................................... 95
AT: “PMSCs More Cost Effective” .................................................................................. 96
AT: “PMSCs More Cost Effective” .................................................................................. 97
Planet Debate                                                                                                                      3
PMCs – Sherry Hall
AT: “PMSCs More Cost Effective” .................................................................................. 98
AT: “PMSCs More Cost Effective” .................................................................................. 99
AT: “PMSCs More Cost Effective” ................................................................................ 100
AT: “PMSCs More Cost Effective” ................................................................................ 101
AT: “PMSCs Provide Critical Logistics Support”.......................................................... 102
AT: “PMSCs Provide Critical Logistics Support”.......................................................... 103
AT: “PMSCs Provide Critical Logistics Support”.......................................................... 104
AT: “PMSCs Provide Critical Logistics Support”.......................................................... 105
AT: “Can’t Afford to Pull PMSCs Out of Iraq” ............................................................. 106
AT: “Can’t Afford to Pull PMSCs Out of Iraq” ............................................................. 107
Should Ban PMSCs......................................................................................................... 108
Should Ban PMSCs......................................................................................................... 109
PMSCs Should Be Governed by Military Law............................................................... 110
*Statism Answers*.......................................................................................................... 111
Statism Challenges High Now ........................................................................................ 112
PMSCs Not Challenging Statism .................................................................................... 113
Statist Control of the Military Good/Necessary.............................................................. 114
*Genocide Response Answers* ...................................................................................... 115
Still Unethical ................................................................................................................. 116
UN Doesn’t Want to Use Contractors ............................................................................ 117
UN Doesn’t Want to Use Contractors ............................................................................ 118
UN Contractors Ineffective at Humanitarian Missions .................................................. 119
UN Contractors Ineffective at Humanitarian Missions .................................................. 120
PMSCs Undercut State’s Obligations to the UN ............................................................ 121
Unpopular With Less Powerful States ............................................................................ 122
UN Contractor Force Undermines US Military .............................................................. 123
**PMSCs Good** .......................................................................................................... 124
Long Historical Tradition of Mercenaries ...................................................................... 125
Long Historical Tradition of Mercenaries ...................................................................... 126
PMSCs Challenge Statism .............................................................................................. 127
PMSCs Challenge Statism .............................................................................................. 128
PMSCs Challenge Statism .............................................................................................. 129
Statism Root of Violence ................................................................................................ 130
Statism Root of Violence ................................................................................................ 131
“Moral” Objections to PMSCs Grounded in Statism ..................................................... 132
PMSCs Challenge “Total” and Ideological Wars ........................................................... 133
PMSCs Challenge “Total” and Ideological Wars ........................................................... 134
PMSCs Challenge Militarism ......................................................................................... 135
PMSCs Reduce Military Operational Lethality .............................................................. 136
PMSCs Promote Universalized Rights and Standards.................................................... 137
PMSCs Promote Democracies ........................................................................................ 138
PMSCs Effective at Many Tasks .................................................................................... 139
PMSCs Effective at Reconstruction................................................................................ 140
PMSCs Necessary for Success in Iraq ............................................................................ 141
PMSCs More Cost Effective ........................................................................................... 142
PMSCs Provide Critical Logistic Support for Effective Missions ................................. 143
Planet Debate                                                                                                                              4
PMCs – Sherry Hall
PMSCs Critical to Effective Military Readiness ............................................................ 144
Nations have Sovereign Right to Contractors ................................................................. 145
US PMSC Policy Modeled ............................................................................................. 146
**Should Deploy PMSCs to UN Humanitarian Missions** .......................................... 147
UN Wants to Use PMSCs ............................................................................................... 148
UN Lacks Capacity for Humanitarian Missions Now .................................................... 149
UN Lacks Capacity for Humanitarian Missions Now .................................................... 150
UN Lacks Capacity for Humanitarian Missions Now .................................................... 151
Limitations on Traditional UN Action Justify PMSCs ................................................... 152
PMSCs Good Response to Humanitarian Crises ............................................................ 153
PMSCs Good Response to Humanitarian Crises ............................................................ 154
PMSCs Good Response to Humanitarian Crises ............................................................ 155
PMSCs Good Response to Humanitarian Crises ............................................................ 156
PMSCs Good for Peacekeeping Operations ................................................................... 157
UN More Likely to Respond with a Force of Contractors than Regular Service Personnel
......................................................................................................................................... 158
UN More Likely to Respond with a Force of Contractors than Regular Service Personnel
......................................................................................................................................... 159
UN Empirically Relied on Contractors ........................................................................... 160
UN Command More Effective with Contractors ............................................................ 161
UN Command More Effective with Contractors ............................................................ 162
UN Command More Effective with Contractors ............................................................ 163
PMSCs More Efficient Use of Resources ....................................................................... 164
PMSCs Less Likely to Pull Out of UN Missions ........................................................... 165
Should Increase Role of PMSCs in UN Missions .......................................................... 166
UN Can Hold PMSCs it Contracts with Accountable .................................................... 167
UN Can Hold PMSCs it Contracts with Accountable .................................................... 168
US Action Critical to UN Employment of PMSCs ........................................................ 169
Proposal for Using Contractors ....................................................................................... 170
AT: Should Not Replace UN Forces with PMSCs ......................................................... 171
*Answers to Arguments Against PMSCs* ..................................................................... 172
AT: PMSCs Dangerous and Unaccountable ................................................................... 173
AT: PMSCs Dangerous and Unaccountable ................................................................... 174
AT: PMSCs Dangerous and Unaccountable ................................................................... 175
AT: PMSCs Dangerous and Unaccountable ................................................................... 176
AT: PMSCs Dangerous and Unaccountable ................................................................... 177
AT: PMSCs Violate International Law........................................................................... 178
AT: PMSCs are Mercenaries .......................................................................................... 179
AT: PMSCs are Mercenaries .......................................................................................... 180
AT: PMSCs are Mercenaries .......................................................................................... 181
AT: PMSCs Bad – Motivated by Profit .......................................................................... 182
AT: Mercenaries are Bad ................................................................................................ 183
AT: PMSCs Unethical .................................................................................................... 184
AT: PMSCs Unethical .................................................................................................... 185
AT: PMSCs Undermine Democracy .............................................................................. 186
AT: PMSCs Undermine Security Goals ......................................................................... 187
Planet Debate                                                                                                     5
PMCs – Sherry Hall
AT: PMSCs Undermine Security Goals ......................................................................... 188
AT: PMSCs Undermine Security Goals ......................................................................... 189
AT: PMSCs Undermine Security Goals ......................................................................... 190
Impact of PMSCs on Stability Unclear ........................................................................... 191
Planet Debate                               6
PMCs – Sherry Hall

                     **PMSCs Status Quo**
Planet Debate                                                                                                           7
PMCs – Sherry Hall

                                        Shift to PMSCs Now
TREND TOWARD PRIVATIZATION OF MILITARY SERVICE
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 40
The private sector is becoming an increasingly important partner of government . Politics is being
increasingly privatized; not only is power shared with business, the commercial ethos is challenging the traditional
professional ethos of public service. This is true of soldiers as well as doctors, civil servants and university
professors. Military power is now judged by utilitarian standards. (Coker 1999).

CHANGING STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENTS HAVE CAUSED INCREASE IN PMSCs
Simon Chesterman & Chia Lehnardt, Professor and Researcher – NYU School of Law, 2007, From
Mercenaries to Market: the rise and regulation of private military companies, eds. S. Chesterman & C.
Lehnardt, p. 1
Whether or not this extensive use of PMCs is evolutionary or remains exceptional, the growth of the industry shows no
signs of slowing down. The privatization of military functions reflects a general enthusiasm for the
outsourcing of state capacities in the industrialized world, but is also a consequence of the growing
reluctance on the part of key states to intervene in conflicts that are not of immediate strategic interest or
where domestic support for intervention is lacking. In addition, non-state actors such as transnational
corporations and humanitarian organizations operating in fragile states are increasingly targeted by non-
state violence, prompting them to turn to the commercial sector for want of other security options.
Planet Debate                                                                                                                             8
PMCs – Sherry Hall

                                  Factors Fueling Shift to PMSCs
GROWTH OF PMSCs FUELED BY ASSUMPTIONS OF LIBERAL CAPITALISM AND A
RETHINKING OF JUST WAR DOCTRINES
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 5
This book focuses on PMSCs to better understand them, but also because they serve as a prism, to separate out some background
trends and assumptions that have given these firms their staying power. If Avant is right, and “the PMSC train has left the station,” I
want to illuminate the ideas that made such a train line possible. PMSCs are more than ambiguous entities that pique
our curiosity; their prominence draws attention to larger theoretical issues at the heart of contemporary
political life. This analysis requires an understanding of the background assumptions that have allowed this new
phenomenon to flourish. Some of the assumptions, such as those of liberal capitalism, are familiar to us, and
PMSCs operate according to the assumptions of contract and profit which lie at the heart of capitalism. But
many of these conditions are truly new, having arisen during the last two decades. They include a new conception of military service
in the post-Cold War era, and a novel view of risk and its impact on business and conflict. The assumptions that have helped
PMSCs thrive at this historical moment include, too, a crisis in ethical and just-war thinking. If PMSCs are
our future, which it seems like they are, then it will be a future that is quite different from the one we have
come to know. And if they are the logical outcomes of shifts and changes that have been happening for a long time, then they have
caught us by surprise. They are either the foreshocks, or the aftershocks, of a tectonic shift in the relationship
between violence, the state, and politics.

PMSCs ON THE RISE AS PART OF THE OVERALL TREND TOWARD PRIVATIZATION AND
ENHANCED EFFICIENCY
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 50
The political rationale behind the use of these forces has been given greater legitimacy by the third “origin”
story: the increasing prominence of private organizations, or public-private partnerships in policy-making and
governance. This rise has occurred both domestically and internationally, and it is due to a number of factors. The
increasing use of private forces to take on formerly public tasks is found within the military, in domestic
politics, and in international affairs. The transformation is driven by a number of key capitalist assumptions. First of all,
private firms foster competition, which means cheaper, but also better products and services . As Doug Brooks
of IPOA, repeatedly mentions, Fed Ex can do things “better, faster, and cheaper” than the US Postal Service. Private firms may
be more autonomous, but their contractual relationships with the government can be severed quickly if
needed. And the decisions of multiple actors and organizations can be more effectively coordinated
through these networks.
Planet Debate                                                                                                                               9
PMCs – Sherry Hall

                                  Factors Fueling Shift to PMSCs
PERCEPTION OF PRIVATE FIRMS AS MORE EFFICIENT AND EFFECTIVE HAS DRIVEN
THE RISE OF PMSCs
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 50-1
Not only does the privatized, market-based approach to solving problems provide better practical solutions
to any particular need, it is also a “better” option on its own: it has an edge on the normative side of the
scale. Private firms offered professionals better salaries, more flexibility, and, in general a more interesting
(and mobile) career path than one in government, and gradually they began to attract the best talent – schools of
public policy began sending their graduates to private firms or non-governmental organizations rather than government. This shift in
the idea of public administration is part of what spawned the idea of a public-private hybrid. Sometimes these hybrids are referred to
as public-private partnerships, or mixed regimes, and recently they have come under increasing scrutiny. Jonathan Koppell is one
of the few researchers who have looked at the gradual rise and increasing autonomy of such hybrid
organizations. In his account, hybrids, though not completely new, began extending their power and autonomy in
recent decades because they seemed “more ‘business-like’ than a typical government program. They might be
cheaper, and more effective, but they also just invoked a better idea of how to do business.” (Koppell 2003).
Regardless of their true benefit – which his analysis questions –the use of hybrid organizations is only likely to
increase, perhaps only because they are perceived as beneficial.
Although domestic private security contracting firms are not officially referred to as hybrid institutions, they take on many
of the same aspects; not only do they merely do business with the government, their activities are seen as part of national
policy, and the risks of their actions and choices are ultimately backed up by public force. They gain
privately from the relationship, but are ultimately part of a public policy, and any problems (fraud, mis-use of force,
etc.) are ultimately borne out by the public. In the most direct case, the military has to step in and do the job if the contractors walk
off the job: as happened when Custer Battles walked off the job of securing the Baghdad airport. More indirectly, the liability for
contractor actions of firm fraud falls on the government or the contracting entity. And, as Koppell points out, the costs of adequately
regulating contractors have to be deducted from any beneficial aspects of the arrangements.

PMSCs DRIVEN BY INCREASED SUPPLY OF SOLDIERS LOOKING FOR WORK
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 41-2
In 2004, a year into the war in Iraq, the New York Times Magazine profiled soldiers who had returned home with
debilitating battlefield injuries. Pictured on the cover was one soldier who had been injured by a roadside bomb.
Having lost his right arm and part of his hearing, this soldier was undergoing many operations to remove shrapnel from his
face and body, and struggling, psychologically and physically, with the consequences of his experiences in
Iraq. Unable to work, he spent his time attending physical therapy and group counseling sessions and driving
around with another Iraq veteran. By the end of the article, however, he had hit upon a new plan for his future:
“returning to Iraq as a security contractor for a private company” (Corbert 2004). The soldier was responding
to the market for force.
This first origin story is offered by those who argue that there is nothing truly new about the PMSC; that a
market for force has existed whenever supply has aligned with demand. Mercenaries and contractors will
inevitably increase to meet a rising demand, if there are enough otherwise unemployed soldiers to create
the supply. For these scholars, the contemporary political economy resembles that of any other period in which
veterans needed jobs. Here three factors stand out: the large pool of ex-military men and weaponry,
providing the supply; the increase in failed or quasi-failed states, providing the demand; and a political and
economic theory in favor of privatizing formerly public functions, making the supply answerable to the
demand.
Planet Debate                                                                                                                     10
PMCs – Sherry Hall

                                 Factors Fueling Shift to PMSCs
LONG HISTORY OF OUT-OF-WORK SOLDIERS CONTRACTING OUT THEIR SERVICES
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 43
Scholars of military downsizing point to the long-established historical pattern of demobilized forces,
unneeded and often unwanted at home, migrating to other areas of the world with their expertise for sale,
not only as mercenaries, but as advisors, consultants, and trainers (Lock 1998). The Peloponnesian War that
shattered the leadership of democratic Athens in the fifth century BCE was often fought with mercenary soldiers left over
form the earlier Persian wars. At the end of the Peloponnesian War, members of the Greek armies hired
themselves out as professional trainers of area militias. The Crusades were filled with men whose fighting power was
destabilizing their home territories, and who needed some focus for their energies. In the modern era veterans of Napoleon’s
wars emigrated to the new colonies in Latin America too find work, and the American Civil War contained
fighters demobilized from (and disheartened by) the failed European socialist revolutions of 1848.
After World War I, a large group of demobilized Russian and British officers were hired by Chiang Kai-
Shek to fight the emerging Red Army under Mao Tse-Tung. Many demobilized Germans were also brought in as
advisors, arms merchants, and military trainers, opening the door to a barter relationship between China and Germany,
which in the 1920s lacked adequate cash and foreign exchange, and permitting Germany to begin rearming with Chinese raw
materials. In the United States, veterans from both the Spanish-American War and World War I found
immediate employment as strike-breakers in mining camps. Having often gambled away their money on the trip home,
many veterans were willing to work for low wages replacing anyone on strike. The public, moreover, frequently sympathized more
with out-of-work veterans than with strikers demanding higher wages. Local militias deployed against striking miners were often led
by veterans from a wide variety of domestic and colonial wars, including the campaigns against the Sioux, the Boer War, and the
Mexican Madero revolt. And, after World War II, the huge demobilization of soldiers, many of whom hailed from
colonies, contributed in no small way to the wars of independence in colonial Africa and South Asia . The notorious
mercenaries whose exploits made history in the 1960s for their commission of atrocities and their role in coups were World War II
veterans.

TREND TO PMSCs REFLECT THE CHANGING NATURE OF AND MOTIVATIONS FOR
PARTICIPATION IN WAR
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 58
In an almost complete reversal from state-based Cold War nuclear-deterrence planning, the wars of the present day pit
transnational and privatized actors from “above” against sub-state but equally globalized combatants from
“below.” Kaldor and van Creveld both describe a world in which the private contractor is the most obvious example of
anew world order, an order in which individual actors are motivated by money and resources on the one
hand, and identity on the other. The “new” wars of the last decade are wars fought neither for political
ideology, nor for state goals as we know them, and by actors who often identify themselves only
tangentially with a state. Contractors working for PMSCs are motivated by better pay, certainly, but also a desire
to do what they do best, and for a cause that is often hard to put into-state based terms.

PMSCs GROWTH IN LINE WITH EXPANDING RISK ANALYSIS
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 67
The language of risk currently shows up in a wide array of topics: liability law, criminology, financial regulation, health and
environmental policy, and counter-terrorism, to name a few. All of these topics are unified by a concern with the politics of anger,
and the cultural attitudes that underlie how risks are chosen for analysis, and how that analysis will inform decision-making. Certain
risks—especially financial markets terrorist attacks, or environmental collapse, for instance, are especially
resistant to rational risk analysis. As a result, some threats are vastly overblown and exaggerated, in order to
justify risk-reduction services with an emphasis on certain types of solutions. PMSCs are embedded in this
world in a number of ways: they assess risk, they offer solutions and services to manage and reduce risk,
and they work closely with the insurance agencies that will reward those who take on these firms for risk
reduction with “preferential terms.”
Planet Debate                                                                                                                        11
PMCs – Sherry Hall

                                  Factors Fueling Shift to PMSCs
INSURANCE INDUSTRY’S RELIANCE ON PMSCs HAVE FUELED THEIR RISE
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 68
The PMSC industry owes much of its prominence and power to its relationship to the international risk-
insurance business. Insurance companies provide security on a number of fronts : business ventures are made
financially more secure by spreading financial risk and insuring against potential loss; and business actors are made physically more
secure through the use of security training, bodyguards, and kidnap and ransom or extraction teams mandated by insurance contracts.
The insurance industry contributes to a privatized mode of governance, allowing certain actions and disallowing
others, providing physical and financial security, and backing up its preferred policies with the use of private security actors.
Although insurance firms ostensibly act within the legal framework provided by their home state, they export these frameworks
and practices to much more unstable areas. Thus, in places far from the reach of a stable state, the insurance
industry provides a de facto form of governance, extending one of the most important functions of the
modern liberal state: insuring that ventures can be undertaken without incurring prohibitive risk . Much
research has been done on the role of the insurance company as a form of private authority and policy-making in global governance.
Many private industries now rely on private security organizations in lieu of the state :
“While the state has enormous legal power to spread risk and responsibility among different sectors of society, the insurance industry
also has regulatory power…While the state has formidable military and police power, the insurance industry
mobilizes private security systems. It forces policyholders to implement security measures intended to
provide an efficient level of prevention, and thereby minimize actual harm and the future cost of harm.”
(Ericson and Doyle 2004).
The decentralization of what are traditionally state governmental functions, and the consequent shift toward
a more regulatory role for the state, has resulted in the increasing prominence of private non-state actors
addressing what used to be governmental responsibilities.

PMSCs INCREASED TO FILL POST COLD WAR VOID
Daniel Isenberg, Senior Research Associate- British American Security Information Council, 2007,
From Mercenaries to Market: the rise and regulation of private military companies, eds. S. Chesterman &
C. Lehnardt, p. 82
The standard explanation for the rise of private military companies (PMCs) is that the end of the Cold War gave states a
reason to downsize their military forces, freeing up millions of former military personnel from a wide
variety of countries, many of them Western. At the same time, the end of the Cold War lifted the lid on many long
simmering conflicts held in check by the superpowers. Since markets, like nature, abhor a vacuum, PMCs
emerged to fill the void, when conflicts emerged or wore on and no one from the West or the United
Nations rode to the rescue.

MULTIPLE FACTORS FUELED GROWTH OF PMSCs
Daniel Isenberg, Senior Research Associate- British American Security Information Council, 2007,
From Mercenaries to Market: the rise and regulation of private military companies, eds. S. Chesterman &
C. Lehnardt, p. 82
In the United States, by contrast, one can trace the push for outsourcing of military activities back to the 1966 release of the revised
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-75. Private contractors were prominent in the “nation-building”
effort in South Vietnam, and grew significantly over the decades. One Department of Defense (DOD) guide
listed several factors driving the expanding role for contractors and suggested some of the complications to
which this has given rise:
“Downsizing of the military following the Gulf War; Growing reliance on contractors to support the latest
weapons and provide lifetime support for the systems; DoD-sponsored move to outsource or privatize
functions to improve efficiency and free up funds for sustainment and modernization programs; and
increased operating tempos. Today contractor logistics support is routinely imbedded in most major systems maintenance and
support plans. Unfortunately, military operational planner have not been able to keep up with the growing involvement of
contractors.
Planet Debate                        12
PMCs – Sherry Hall

                     **PMSCs Bad**
Planet Debate                                                                                                                         13
PMCs – Sherry Hall

                                PMSCs Covert & Unaccountable
PMSCs ARE HARD TO ANALYZE AND CATEGORIZE BECAUSE OF THEIR QUASI-
ORGANIZATIONAL NATURE
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 10-1
PMSCs are what organizational theorists refer to as “informal organizations” entities whose basic structure resists
easy categorization. Such organizations can act effectively in unclear situations, are quick to adapt, and cohere through informal
trust networks. Many times, such informal organizations play a “boundary-spanning” role between two other
formal organizations—in this case the military and the bureaucracy (Scott 1981; Williams 2002).
In public policy analysis, boundary-spanning organizations are often called “hybrids” or “quasi-organizations,”
since they combine aspects of both public and private organizations. In 2007, the Congressional Research Service
issued a report on the role of these hybrids in the “quasi-government.” The report focused on public-private partnerships with non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) federally funded research organizations like the RAND Corporation, and any private business
with “the federal government as a guaranteed customer”:
“The quasi government, virtually by its name alone and the intentional blurring of the governmental and private
sectors, is not easily defined. In general, the term is used to refer to entities that have some legal relation or association,
however tenuous, to the federal government…While different categories of quasi governmental organizations can be described and
found useful as an analytical tool, such categories are artificial, with porous lines of distinction and differentiation, and tend to be
imposed upon the disparate entities after the fact. “(Kosar 2007)
One reason PMSCs are hard to pin down is that they are more than one thing at once, and any analytical
categories or typology will have “porous lines of distinction and differentiation .” In itself this may not be such a
strange thing – many organizations may blur categories – but in the case of PMSCs, the categories being blurred are ones that have
typically resisted any such combinations.

PMSCs AND THEIR EMPLOYEES ARE DIFFICULT TO IDENTIFY AND CHARACTERIZE
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 9-10
The task of characterizing PMSCs qualitatively is also difficult. During a 2002 House of Commons hearing, a Member of
Parliament commented on the difficulty of regulating these firms, noting that keeping track of the facts was “like sand
going through your fingers: companies dissolve, ownership is vague and the soldiers themselves are not
known or named …[these companies] are very protean, they are like an amoeba; they come and go” (MacShane 2002).
Years later, and despite continued study, little has changed. The corporate structure of these firms, their exact
affiliations with governments and businesses, and their legal status remain murky. On the ground, it is
difficult even to identify who they are or for whom they work. Some security contractors might be well-
trained, with recognizable uniforms. Others are outliers among an already hard-to-classify force. As one
Marine Colonel put it:
“On the other hand, there were other security contractors over there that were just cowboys. They clearly had
neither the training nor the experience. Could I identify them? No. They word a mixed bag of uniforms. Nobody wore
name tags. They didn’t have unit logos. You’d run into these people in town’ you would see them handling weapons
improperly. You would see them with really kind of a bad attitude, and there’s nothing you could about it. How
do you identify them? Well, there’s no license plate on their car.. They’re driving an SUV. Some of them weren’t even in any
uniform even within the team.” (Col. Thomas X. Hammes, in Gaviria and Smith 2005).

PMSCs UNACCOUNTABLE – THEY ARE VERY DIFFICULT TO LABEL
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 10
Among scholars, the most common complaint is that PMSCs lack accountability. First, PMSCs are literally
hard to count: it is difficult to ascertain how many there are (estimates of firms providing armed security in Iraq range
from 50 to 75, and if the definition is widened to include firms that provide “security services” but are unarmed, the number could be
as high as 280). It is hard to know how much money they government has paid for armed security contractors
(estimates range from $6 to $10 billion). And it is unclear what kinds of jobs they are doing and where. Second, it is
unclear exactly who is in charge—what the lines of authority are within companies and between firms, and
their contracting and subcontracting authorities – and so not obvious who is liable for mistakes or breaches of
contract or crimes. Third, PMSCs literally lack an “account” –a story or narrative that can make sense of
their role. The lack of an explanation of what these firms are and how they came about, contributes to the
sense that they are indeed shape-shifting, not just numerically and factually, but as organizations themselves.
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PMCs – Sherry Hall

                                PMSCs Covert & Unaccountable
LAWS THAT SUPPOSEDLY COVER PMSC CONTRACTORS NOT ENFORCED
Suzanne Simons, CNN Executive Producer, 2009, Master of War: Blackwater USA’s Erik Prince and the
Business of War, p. 148-9
But the idea of Blackwater as peacekeepers couldn’t be further from reality in the minds of some of the
committee members. They were more concerned with the controversial issue of accountability, and whether it even
existed in the private military industry. Taylor was ready for the question. He had armed himself with a list of
applicable laws.
“Our services support primarily federal entities. Private security firms, therefore, are accountable to many domestic
federal statutes, regulations, and common law, which included the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, the War
Crimes Act of 1996, the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, the Anti-Torture Statute, the Defense Trade
Controls Act, the Gun Control Act, Arms Export Control Act, Export Administration Regulations, International Traffic and Arms
Regulation, the Defense Base Act, Federal Aviation Regulations, the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations, the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, and the general order of Central Command, the Multinational Corps of Iraqi Forces, and the Combined Joint Task Force
76. “
The list sounded impressive. There was just one problem; not a single private military contractor had been
held accountable under any of those laws. What good was a law if it wasn’t ever enforced ?

BUSH ADMINISTRATION POLICIES GAVE RISE TO FEAR OF PMSCs AS ATTEMPTS TO
LESSEN DEMOCRATIC CONTROLS AND OVERSIGHT ON THE USE OF FORCE
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 14-5
Critics of PMSCs see the proliferation of firms and the increasing reliance of the military on their presence
as a sure sign that the state is losing its monopoly on legitimate violence, and that the world will soon be
awash in out-of-control mercenary bands, getting rich off of increasing instability. These pessimists see a
widespread conspiracy to undercut democratic authority of the use of force both abroad and domestically .
In the US, even before the publication of Jeremy Scahill’s book Blackwater: the Rise of the World’ Most Powerful Mercenary Army
(2007), many saw the links between the Bush Administration, companies like Halliburton, former generals,
and the iron triangle of K-Street lobbyists for the defense industry as hatching a plot to distance US use of
force from all but the most serpentine processes of oversight. Scahill also asserts that the connections between Blackwater’s
founder and CEO Erik Prince and the Catholic Church give these forces the veneer of “holy war.” Outsourcing military labor,
like outsourcing other industries, has the effect of diffusing responsibility avoiding onerous regulations, and
hiding the adverse affects of policy, such as the healthcare costs associated with long-term commitments to
domestic employees. The conspiracy account maintains that the rise of the industry has been to the consequences of a number of
under-the-radar deals between certain industries and certain governments.

PMSCs UNACCOUNTABLE – TO MILITARY COMMANDERS AND TO THE LAW
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 97-8
One of the biggest risks associated with the use of contractors and PMSCs in warfare is the lack of any
clear, effective legal tools to control their behavior . The military refers to this situation as a “classic principal-agent
problem,” where the agents of the military – its contractors – are only weakly control.
“Army personnel consider a commander’s inability to force contract performance…a serious problem.
Even if a commander could legally direct contract personnel to do something, the commander would have
no immediate recourse if they refused to comply. The commander could only take the issue to court and/or terminate the
contract for nonperformance. “ (Camm and Greenfeld 2005)
Currently the only way to punish those contactors who commit crimes or fail to perform their duties is to fire
them or release them from their contract. This is for the simple reason that contract law, as a branch of civil law, was
never meant to carry the burden of regulating the excessive use of lethal force. The next chapter addresses the
question of how to reduce the legal risk associated with “unlawful belligerents” of a whole new type.
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PMCs – Sherry Hall

                                PMSCs Covert & Unaccountable
CONTRACTORS MUCH LESS LIKELY TO BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE FOR CRIMES AND
MISTAKES THAN THE REGULAR MILITARY
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 99-100
Running a sex ring in Bosnia, torturing prisoners at Abu Ghraib in Iraq, shooting at unarmed civilians in
“questionable” uses of force, mistaken “friendly fire” incidents with other contractors and members of the
military, and general mayhem on the roads of Baghdad: PMSC members have been involved in a number
of high-profile and notorious episodes wherein their misconduct would be considered criminal under
international, domestic, or military law. And yet very few prosecutions have occurred. A 2008 study by Human
Rights First asserted that:
“To date more than 60       US military personnel have been court-martialed in the deaths of Iraqi citizens and
more are under investigation. In contrast not one private contractor implicated in similar crimes in Iraq has
been prosecuted…The Justice Department’s neglect has created a “shoot-first, ask questions later – or
never” attitude among some contractors.” (Human Rights First, 2008).
It is repeatedly claimed that PMSCs operate in a shadowy legal environment, unregulated and uncontrolled by
anything but hazy market forces and voluntary codes of conduct. The business is frequently described as operating in
the “grey area of the law,” or in the “shadows,” “beyond the law”, or simply as “unregulated.” Despite the fact that the industry has
existed for many years in some form or another, and attempts have made to classify and clarify all sorts of aspects of it, the entire
debate continues to be marked by confusion. As one critic pointed out, it is hard to believe that “we can regulate the
ingredients of an Oreo cookie, but not the forces that work alongside our military” (Callahan 2004). Despite all
the hue and cry about a “vacuum of law” or the lack of oversight, there are actually many layers of international and
domestic law that could apply to these actors. There are enough standing regulations to prompt the remark that, as one
executive noted, “we are the most regulated force on the ground that has ever been seen” (Beese, Christopher). Given this , the
suspicion often arises that this murky world was created on purpose, in order to shield contractors from the
reach of law, and enable a faster and more flexible procurement of services. Critics repeatedly allege that this
obscurity was intentionally rigged to prevent proper oversight and regulation.

BLACKWATER EMPLOYEES AND OTHER PRIVATE CONTRACTORS NOT HELD
ACCOUNTABLE FOR CRIMINAL CONDUCT IN IRAQ
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 100
After Blackwater contractors opened fire on civilians in Baghdad in September 2007, killing 17 civilians.,
Congress convened another hearing on the company, and renewed its cries for regulation . Representative Henry
Waxman, chairman of the House Committee on Government Oversight and Reform, began by listing the problems associated with the
State Department’s use of Blackwater to provide diplomatic security:
“New documents indicate that there have been a total of 195 shooting incidents involving Blackwater forces since
2005. Blackwater’s contract says the company is hired to provide defensive services, but in most of these incidents it was
Blackwater forces who fired first. We have also learned that 122 Blackwater employees, one seventh of the
company’s current work force in Iraq, have been terminated for improper conduct.” (Waxman 2007).
Representative Tom Davis followed up, noting that:
“Incidents of erratic and dangerous behavior by security personnel from all the companies involved, not just
Blackwater, are handled with little or no regard to Iraqi law. Usually, the bad actor is simply whisked out of the country,
whether the offense is a civilian casualty, negligent discharge of a weapon, alcohol or drug abuse, or destruction of property. To date,
there has not been a single successful prosecution of a security provider in Iraq for criminal misconduct .”
In his response, the CEO of Blackwater, former Navy SEAL Erik Prince, testified that, “the Blackwater team acted appropriately
while operating in a complex war zone”, and that the risks taken by the heroic men who worked for Blackwater had resulted in no
deaths of those they were hired to protect.
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PMCs – Sherry Hall

                               PMSCs Covert & Unaccountable
PMSCs IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN HAVE NOT BEEN HELD ACCOUNTABLE FOR
SERIOUS CRIMES
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 172
Since the US invasion of Iraq in March 2003 there have been persistent reports of contractors opening fire
on Iraqi civilians and attacking their property without reasonable cause . There may have been scores of
unlawful killings and other serious crimes of violence. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the figure is at least what
investigative journalist Robert Young Pelton 2006 called “a not insignificant number.” In a comparison raised by industry critic
Jeremy Scahill, from 2003 to early 2007 there had been 64 US military personnel charged with what he called
“murder-related” offenses. Over this period there has been no similar charges brought (through any means)
against armed US contractors although this has since changed. Amnesty International has compiled its own alarming list of
allegations of contractor misconduct in both Afghanistan and Iraq. In 2005 the 3rd Infantry Division was responsible for security in
and around Baghdad. Its then Deputy Commander was Brigadier Karl. R. Horst and he put the matter this way:
“These guys run loose in this country and do stupid stuff. There’s no authority over them, so you can’t
come down on them hard when the escalate force…they shoot people, and someone else has to deal with
the aftermath. It happens all over the place.”

PMCS ARE BOTH CORRUPT AND INCOMPETENT—MULTIPLE INCIDENTS PROVE
Wayne ’02, (Leslie, “America's For-Profit Secret Army,” NYT, Section 3; Column 5; Money and
Business/Financial Desk; Pg. 1, 10-13-2002)
At times, the results have been disastrous.
In Bosnia, employees of DynCorp were found to be operating a sex-slave ring of young women who were
held for prostitution after their passports were confiscated. In Croatia, local forces, trained by MPRI, used
what they learned to conduct one of the worst episodes of "ethnic cleansing," an event that left more than
100,000 homeless and hundreds dead and resulted in war-crimes indictments. No employee of either firm
has ever been charged in these incidents.
In Peru last year, a plane carrying an American missionary and her infant was accidentally shot down when a
private military contractor misidentified it as on a drug smuggling flight.

GROWING NUMBER OF PMSCs UNACCOUNTABLE
Suzanne Simons, CNN Executive Producer, 2009, Master of War: Blackwater USA’s Erik Prince and the
Business of War, p. 4
Beginning in 2003, after the invasion of Iraq, the rise of private military companies like Blackwater has been nothing
less than meteoric. Private contractors now occupy the battlespace in Iraq on a one-to-one ratio with US
troops. They are often paid a lot more money by the taxpayer, and they aren’t governed by the same rules
as US troops. The stark lack of oversight and accountability of the industry has led to numerous
congressional hearings and has put the policies of the Bush administration into question. Has the United States government
farmed out too many critical parts of its own missions? Who will police this growing shadow army?
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PMCs – Sherry Hall

                               PMSCs Covert & Unaccountable
INADEQUATE ACCOUNTABILITY DRIVES OPPOSITION TO PMSCs
Simon Chesterman & Chia Lehnardt, Professor and Researcher – NYU School of Law, 2007, From
Mercenaries to Market: the rise and regulation of private military companies, eds. S. Chesterman & C.
Lehnardt, p. 2
Acceptance of that market will largely depend on the reality and the perception of accountability
mechanisms to guard against abuse. A useful starting point in the discussion on regulation is, therefore, to focus not on the
identity of the actor but on the nature of the acts requiring regulation and accountability. Concerns relate primarily to the use
of potentially lethal force by PMC personnel, but also to the impact these actors may have on the strategic
balance of a conflict. Most of the existing regulation – notably international humanitarian law – is directed primarily towards the
standing armies of states. As private actors take on more responsibilities a central question is whether the
normative framework and accountability structures adequately address the new environment .
Most commentators agree that they do not. Instead, it is often implicitly or explicitly assumed that it is business
interests – rather than international and national law – that govern the use and conduct of PMCs. There is, in this
context, good reason to be concerned about leaving issues of peace and war, life and death, to purely market
mechanisms. It would be naïve, of course, to assume that traditional armed forces are necessarily virtuous and
private armies inherently harmful to public interests. But the fact that profit-driven interests play a role in
conflict does complicate control, transparency, and accountability issues. Periodic outrage surrounding
PMScs and the apparent impunity with which their personnel engage in misconduct supports this view,
lending credence to the perception that PMCs fall through the cracks of both national and international law.
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PMCs – Sherry Hall

                                             PMSCs Illegitimate
COMBAT PMSCs ARE ILLEGITIMATE
Sarah Percy, Research Fellow -Oxford, 2007, From Mercenaries to Market: the rise and regulation of
private military companies, eds. S. Chesterman & C. Lehnardt, p. 13-4
A final difference, not visible in Table 1.1, is worth pointing out. There are only two examples of combat PMCs, and
both are defunct; between the two of them, they only have three notable clients: the governments of
Angola, Sierra Leone, and Papua New Guinea. The lack of combat-PMC action, and the disappearance of
these PMCs, suggests that these companies were only marginally legitimate and were far from accepted
actors on the international stage. Conversely, there are dozens of non-combat PMCs working for a wide range of clients, from
state governments to NGOs to international organizations. It appears that combat and non-combat PMCs also differ in the degree to
which they are accepted by the international community.
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PMCs – Sherry Hall

           PMSC Contractors Violate Human Rights and Laws
PMC CRIMINAL ACTIVITY INEVITABLE-- ENVIRONMENTS AND MOTIVATIONS ARE
INTRINSICALLY VIOLENT
Rothe and Ross (08/01/2010).[ Dawn L. Rothe , Old Dominion University. College of Arts And Letters.
Department of Sociology and Criminal Justice. Jeffery Ian Ross, Ph.D. a professor, writer, and consultant
specializing in policing, political crime, "Private Military Contractors, Crime, and the Terrain of
Unaccountability.". Justice quarterly (0741-8825), 27 (4), p. 593. /hnasser]
While much attention has been paid to organizational context and decisionmaking processes by scholars of state-corporate crime,
there is a similarly rich criminological tradition which examines how social forces work within communities that are disorganized
to produce criminal actions and actors (Rothe & Mullins, 2009). This also seems pertinent to understanding the
criminogenic conditions associated with PMCs. After all, the influence of social disorder within
immediate environments has powerful criminogenic effects (Rothe & Mullins, 2009). European and American
criminologists have established that these disorganized environments have a pronounced tendency to produce criminal enterprises
of varying levels of organizations (Mullins & Rothe, 2008a; Rothe & Mullins, 2006, 2008). Social disorganization theory
(Bursik & Grasmick, 1993; Shaw & McKay, 1942) suggests that when communities possess a
diminished capacity to create and enact informal mechanisms of social control, crime rates increase.
Rothe and Mullins have noted that widespread social disorganization is most readily apparent in
producing militias. Abject poverty, a lack of functioning infrastructure, and social institutions severely
undercut by decolonization creates a profound vacuum of social order . These illicit organizations arise in such
contexts to structure life and provide opportunities for community members to realize meaningful social identities. We see social
disorganization as directly related to the lack of regulation or anomic conditions. In the absence of legitimate forms of social
regulation, disorganization proliferates. Military organizations, or in the case at hand PMCs, are generally
operating in such an environment. Their immediate goal accomplishment mechanisms are innately
violent and thus prone toward producing additional atrocity when unchecked and constrained . Even
corporate social disorganization can undermine or hinder the extant informal social controls within a corporation, thus allowing
high rates of criminal activity to occur. In addition, as most PMCs operate in areas of conflict or under tumultuous
conditions they are even more prone to experiencing the chaos that is a result of the disorganization and
indirectly a result of the larger anomic conditions guiding their actions . For our purposes here, we consider
the environment from which PMCs operate in as an example of criminal groups which arise out of or in
response to social disorder anomic conditions, lack of regulation. We suggest that these factors (i.e.,
anomie and social disorganization) are central to understanding PMC’s criminal propensity. Additionally,
due to the environment within which they operate they are uniquely situated, making generalizations difficult to
translate to other corporate organizations. Thus, attention must be paid theoretically to the dynamicsand processes that
are at work within and surrounding these organizations.
Planet Debate                                                                                                                          20
PMCs – Sherry Hall

           PMSC Contractors Violate Human Rights and Laws
CONTRACTORS OPERATE WITHIN THE MILITARY FRAMEWORK AND REPRESENT THE
US; THEIR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS ARE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT VIOLATIONS
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Wolf 6 [Wolf, Antenor Hallo de. Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, Volume 13, Issue 2, Summer
2006, pp. 315-356 (Article)”Modern Condottieri in Iraq: Privatizing War from the Perspective
of International and Human Rights Law” /hnasser] http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/gls/summary/v013/13.2wolf.html
On the basis of the Taguba and Fay reports it can be argued that a number of CACI and Titan contractors,
through commission or omission, directly contributed to violations of common article 3 to Geneva
Conventions (III) and (IV) and article 76 of Geneva Convention ( IV) as well as violations of articles 7
and 10 of the ICCPR and article 1 of the CAT. This leads to the following question: Is the United States
responsible for violations of international humanitarian law and human rights committed by private
parties in Iraq? According to international customary law, the state is responsible for acts of commission or omission, that
entail a breach of an international obligation of the state and which are attributable to it under international law.104 Are the
abuses possibly perpetrated by PMSC contractors attributable to the United States? The responsibility of the United States for the
conduct of its own soldiers and officers is clear. States are always responsible for their own breaches of international obligations
and for those breaches committed by an organ of the state or its agents.105 The responsibility of the United States for
the acts of CACI and Titan contractors is not so evident, however, because here we are dealing with
acts committed by private entities. The state, in principle, is not responsible for the acts of private actors.
Notwithstanding this general rule, breaches of international obligations committed by private actors
while exercising governmental authority or other public tasks which have been delegated to them by
law, or carried out under the state’s supervision or orders, are also attributable to the state .106 The
International Court of Justice (ICJ) has concluded that this is especially the case when a state has “effective
control” over the activities of these actors.107 The ICTY has also ruled that: [P]rivate individuals acting within
the framework of, or in connection with, armed forces, or in collusion with State authorities may be
regarded as de facto State organs. [note omitted] In these cases it follows that the acts of such individuals are
attributed to the State, as far as State responsibility is concerned, and may also generate individual
criminal responsibility.108 In addition, a state is also responsible if it has not taken the necessary measures
to prevent breaches of its international obligations committed by private actors. This due diligence
obligation requires that the state act diligently and promptly to prevent, investigate, and punish the
harmful conduct of private actors.109
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PMCs – Sherry Hall

                                PMSCs Skirt Democratic Checks
PMSCs ALLOW GOVERNMENT TO BECOME INVOLVED IN CONFLICTS WITHOUT
DEMOCRATIC CONSTRAINTS
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 94-5
A less desirable objective has been the “democratic deficit” arising from the shift in power from the legislature to executive
government. If an American President wishes to involve the US in an armed conflict this has become               easier
because of the availability of contract forces which lessen pressure to deal with a legislature that may be
unsympathetic. By encouraging thousands of security contractors to work in Iraq, the Republican
Administration required fewer regular troops to be diverted to the Middle East . Similarly, fewer Reservists and
National Guard have been called up. Other costs have appeared in their place. Open government, transparent process and
public accountability have assumed lesser prominence. Nor is executive government under the same pressure to form
empathetic alliances with other states. As one American officer described it, “When you can hire people to go toward,
there’s none of the grumbling and political friction.” If costs occasioned by the use of force are sharply
reduced and other factors remain unchanged, then military action seems more likely . Instead of the roughly
140,000 US troops in Iraq in 2006, an absence of contractors would have encountered at least somewhat greater
difficulty in persuading the American public and Congress to acquiesce . For any democratically elected
government seeking to launch a conflict, a military expedition is exactly the sort of matter over which the
institutions of a robust democracy should be encouraged to engage in vigorous and informed debate. This
is particularly so where the evidence supporting a case for war has been fabricated, manipulated, or
contrived to meet ends that bear a doubtful relationship to national security.

PMSCs DECREASE DEMOCRATIC CHECKS ON WAR
Sarah Percy, Research Fellow -Oxford, 2007, From Mercenaries to Market: the rise and regulation of
private military companies, eds. S. Chesterman & C. Lehnardt, p. 20-1
A second type of objection to the private military industry is that, just as mercenaries made it easier for the state to go to
war and to repress its people in the past, private military and PMCs might make it easier for modern states
to fight war and also reduce democratic control over war. This argument finds echoes in theories of the democratic
peace, which argue that public opinion can exert a strong effect on making a state more reluctant to go to war,
particularly if too many soldiers are killed or if soldiers’ lives are placed in harm’s way. As Kant argues, “if the
consent of the citizens is required in order to decide that war should be declared…nothing is more natural than that they would be very
cautious in commencing such a poor game, decreeing for themselves all the calamities of war.” One objection to the private
military industry is that it removes or lessens the restraints of public opinion, because the public will not
notice or will be less worried about the deaths of private fighters than they would be about the killing of
soldiers. The use of PMCs might lead to a reduction of democracy in states which hire these companies by
diminishing democratic oversight decisions to go to war .
Many commentators have noticed that PMCs are problematic because they might encourage covert wars, or act as
proxies in conflicts in which the state finds it politically inexpedient to get involved . Both covert wars and
the use of proxies allow states to enter into conflict without the usual range of democratic oversight. Even in
open conflicts, the use of private military personnel instead of regular soldiers not only loosens the
aforementioned constraint of public opinion but significantly reduces the number of obstacles to continuing
a prolonged conflict. The current war in Iraq demonstrates the significant political obstacles to mobilizing larger numbers of
troops. Because PMCs can perform a variety of military tasks, they can free up regular soldiers. The
obstacles to increasing the number of PSC personnel on the ground are also far less significant than those in
the way of mobilizing larger numbers of regular troops. The state might also find it easier to sustain wars that go against
public opinion because of the presence of PMCs.
Planet Debate                                                                                                                       22
PMCs – Sherry Hall

                               PMSCs Skirt Democratic Checks
BLACKWATER PERCEIVED AS A PARAMILITARY WING OF THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 100-1
The footage of Mr. Prince defending the actions of his company’s men as a “measured and appropriate” response to threats, and his
defense that his convoy-protection details and helicopter support only provided “defensive” security, contradicted many reports of
offensive actions. Media accounts of his testimony were almost uniformly negative, and no one seemed to come forward to defend
Blackwater USA, not even their contracting agency the US State Department. Their domestic deployment after Hurricane
Katrina in September 2005, their contract to do border security along the US-Mexican border, and their
repeated requests to do humanitarian rescue in Darfur, put them in the spotlight again and again. The fall
of 2007 seemed to spell “the beginning of the end,” as one contractor put it: all of the issues that had been
smoldering along had suddenly crystallized: the lawlessness with which they operated in war zones hand
the no-bid contractors with the US government which gave them business. Blackwater had become the
Sandline of the US: a large, privately financed, well-established firm whose lose ties with the US government
and the Republican Party made it look like they were the paramilitary wing of the Bush Administration .

PMSCs WERE CREATED TO EVADE THE RULES AND CODES THAT GOVERNED
MILITARY PERSONNEL
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 101
Such appearances are not coincidental. In the political origin story referred to in Chapter 2, PMSCs were created in order for
the executive branch and the Pentagon to bypass the strict rules of law and rigid practices that the military
had developed over time, codes and rules that made its actions constrained and inflexible. Grey areas of
conduct and murky legal codes would allow for more discretion, flexibility, and plausible deniability. Here,
contractors would be seen as an outgrowth of mercenaries or covert operators, rather than as the more
benign security workers. They would be part of the long tradition, documented so well by Janice Thomson, of
privateers working in vague conjunction with national goals, but encouraged to operate at a hazy distance
from those in power (Thomson 1994).
In this story, the government actively wants to avoid checks and balances on a number of fronts. The President
can avoid Congressional oversight. The Department of Defense can avoid public scrutiny. Contractors are
freed from the onerous aspects of the established law of armed combat. And “citizens” are freed from the
full implications and consequences of their foreign policy. This is game of smoke and mirrors played to
create plausible deniability. Confusing matrices of laws give this story real staying power.

PMSCs UNDERMINE DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OVER USE OF FORCE
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 135
No matter how effective they may be in current conditions, or how benignly they may present themselves, PMSCs continue to be
considered ethically shaky and morally hazardous; almost every treatment of them in the last ten years begins by pointing
this out. Singer says that they “rest on a confused and precarious moral position”. Avant ultimately argues that
increased privatization undermines democratic control over the use of forces abroad . Even journalist Robert
Young Pelton, who admits that he has “spent much of my adult life following the activities of mercenaries and soldiers-for-hire,”
begins his expose of the industry noting that the only “moral leash that operates on these people is how they view
themselves, not how the world views them” (Pelton 2006).
Planet Debate                                                                                                      23
PMCs – Sherry Hall

                            PMSCs Skirt Democratic Checks
CONTRACTORS UNDERMINE GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE- PMCS CREATE SECURITY
OUTSIDE OF DEMOCRATIC CHECKS
Salzman 8 [Zoe,New York University School of Law 2008 “Private Military Contractors And The
Taint Of A Mercenary Reputation” International Law And Politics [Vol. 40:853 /hnasser]
http://www.law.nyu.edu/ecm_dlv2/groups/public/@nyu_law_website__journals__journal_of_internatio
nal_law_and_politics/documents/documents/ecm_pro_058877.pdf
In addition to challenging the state’s monopoly on the use of force, the privatization of military force
also threatens the democratic state because it allows governments to make war while avoiding
democratic accountability.82 Democratic governments are entrusted with a monopoly on the use of
force because their power to exercise that force is limited by the rule of law and by accountability to
their citizens.83 Private contractors, however, greatly undermine democratic accountability, and in so
doing circumvent the democratic reluctance for war. By undermining the public’s control over the warmaking
powers of the state, private contractors threaten the popular sovereignty of the state.84 Thus, the problem
with private military force may not be simply a lack of state control, as discussed above, but also too
much government control, particularly executive control, at the expense of popular, democratic control.85 At an
extreme, a government, even a democratic government, might use private violence as a brutal police
force to ensure its control over the people.86 In reality, however, a democratic government’s outsourcing of
military functions undermines the democratic process much more subtly than this far-fetched scenario.
Because the executive branch is generally in charge of hiring contractors , private contractors allow the executive to
evade parliamentary or congressional checks on foreign policy.87 Indeed, [t]o the extent privatization
permits the Executive to carry out military policy unilaterally . . . it circumvents primary avenues
through which the People are informed and blocks off primary channels (namely Congress) through which
the People can register their approval or voice their misgivings.88 Privatizing military force results in a
lack of transparency and puts the military effort outside of the scope of the democratic dialogue,
“obscuring choices about military needs and human implications.”89 Notably, in the United States, private
contractors are not subject to the scrutiny of the Freedom of Information Act,90 which greatly restricts
the public’s ability to be well-informed about the government’s reliance on the private military industry.
Thus, the privatization of military force allows the executive “to operate in the shadows of public
attention” 91 and to subvert democratic political restraints.92
Planet Debate                                                                                                                          24
PMCs – Sherry Hall

                                PMSCs Skirt Democratic Checks
CONSTITUTIONALISM—PMCS ALLOW THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH TO CRIPPLE
CURRENT CONGRESSIONAL CHECKS ON MILITARY ACTION
Avant and Sigelman, Professor of Political Science at the University of California Irvine, January 2K8
(Deborah and Lee, “What Does Private Security in Iraq Mean for Democracy at Home?”
http://www.international.ucla.edu/cms/files/ PrivateSecurityandDemocracy.pdf)
Constitutionalism refers to established processes for ensuring that a range of institutional actors have
input into policy. Known and accessible political processes that disperse power in established ways help make
outcomes more predictable and reduce the potential for capricious action. 40 Privatization could affect
constitutionalism by evading established processes for making and implementing policy. If the process of
contracting avoids key veto points in the policymaking process, power may become centralized in ways
that side step normal constitutional limits. For example, the use of contractors rather than military personnel
could enable members of the executive branch to pursue policy without going through normal channels – evading
checks from Congress or even from other portions of the executive branch; or leaders in the executive branch
could encourage contracts between private security companies and foreign governments or other entities
and thereby avoid formal government involvement altogether – what has been called “foreign policy by proxy.”41
Either way, privatization opens the door to bypassing veto points and thus eroding constitutionalism . To
assess the impact of privatization on constitutionalism, we consider how contracting with PSCs or allowing PSCs to contract
directly with foreign governments or other entities has affected the relative power of the legislative and executive branches and
the associated number of veto points in the policyprocess. Even without contracting, the executive branch enjoys numerous
advantages in military policy decision making. 42 Contracting enhances these advantages. The executive branch, not Congress,
hires contractors. Although Congress approves the military budget, it does not approve – or often even know
about – individual decisions for contracts. Information about contracts is held, and oversight of
contracts is conducted, almost exclusively by the executive branch. Although the executive branch dominates
military information and oversight, Congress has several avenues of influence – over military personnel, over
funds for the military, over the structure of the service branches and the processes by which the military
does its business, and over the deployment of US troops.43 Congressional authority over personnel ranges from
limiting the size of the military to regulating and restricting how soldiers can be deployed and structuring chains of command and
approving promotions.44 Congressional appropriations also frequently carry restrictions on the use of the money that regulates
the use of military forces. Among the most important tools at Congress’ disposal is its ability to structure incentives within the
services – requirements for entry, criteria for promotion, and so on.45 Finally, as a consequence of the War Powers Resolution,
the President must consult Congress and seek its approval to deploy US military forces in conflict zones.46 This set of tools
provides Congress with numerous means of swaying military policy.47 These avenues for influence are enhanced by
congressional access to information about military units. Congress has the information to keep track of how many military units
there are, and how, where, and when they are deployed. It has devised many procedures for receiving information about the
military and it continuously uses these to direct the military on a short term as well as long-term basis. These tools, however,
are of little avail for controlling contractors. Congress retains its power of the purse in the use of
contractors, but it is more difficult to use this authority to direct the internal workings of PSCs– such as
decisions about whom to hire for particular tasks. As the recent experience in Iraq has demonstrated, copies
of contracts are hard for Congress to obtain and contracts for security services can be even routed through the federal
bureaucracy (via the Interior or Commerce Department, for instance) in ways that mask their military impact.48 All of this makes
it difficult for the legislative branch to affect either the internal processes of private firms or the terms on which the executive
branch contracts with them.49 Congress’ access to information about contractors is also highly circumscribed .
In instances of contracted foreign military training, for example, the annual consolidated report on military assistance and sales
does not identify the contractor or even whether the job is done by troops or PSCs. Thus, members of Congress who are
interested in overseeing individual firms may not even know which PSCs should be overseen or
when.50 The executive can use this advantage to evade congressional restrictions on US actions . For
instance, Congress often limits US involvement in a conflict by stipulating a ceiling on the number of US
troops. By employing contractors, the executive can increase de facto US involvement. Sometimes
Congress innovates by stipulating an upper limit on the number of contractors, but PSCs can evade this
restriction by hiring more locals or third-party nationals.51 More generally, there are many ways to
circumvent even the limited oversight and control mechanisms that Congress possesses . The availability of
private contractors concentrates power in the hands of those in charge of hiring, dispersing funds, and overseeing contractors –
generally activities undertaken in the executive branch.
Planet Debate                                                                                                                         25
PMCs – Sherry Hall

                                PMSCs Skirt Democratic Checks
PMCS BYPASS PUBLIC DISCLOSURE POLICIES AND HAVE VIRTUAL MEDIA IMMUNITY
Avant and Sigelman, Professor of Political Science at the University of California Irvine, January 2K8
(Deborah and Lee, “What Does Private Security in Iraq Mean for Democracy at Home?”
http://www.international.ucla.edu/cms/files/ PrivateSecurityandDemocracy.pdf)
Deploying PSCs should be expected to be less transparent than using troops . In the first place, there should
be fewer public demands for transparency. Perhaps more importantly, private security mobilization can avoid
the institutional mechanisms that have been developed over time to ensure transparency. These
mechanisms range from triggers adopted to alert the media to pathways through which to access
information. For example, reporters covering the Pentagon are accustomed to covering troops but may not
be attuned to deployments of contractors. Also, casualty figures routinely collected and released by the
military exclude contract personnel. Differences between the information available for tracking public
agencies and private firms are also substantial. Even in highly sensitive policy arenas like security policy, the US
has procedures such as the Freedom of Information Act that guarantee public access to information
deemed relevant to the public interest. However, because private firms are assumed to operate in a
market environment, the rules governing their information-sharing recognize the necessity for
proprietary secrecy. Another way that transparency is reduced (somewhat paradoxically) is that even when information
on private security firms is potentially available, it is more diffuse and harder to collect, aggregate, and
analyze than parallel military information. For instance, in 2004 even as analysts were decrying the lack of information
about CACI’s provision of interrogators at Abu Ghraib prison, CACI itself was advertising on its website for interrogators to
serve in Iraq. The information was not so much secret as it was hard to amass. When information is hard to gather, transparency is
reduced. To assess the impact of private security options on transparency more systematically, we first compare the processes by
which Congress, interested citizens, and foreign governments can obtain information about the activities of troops versus private
security companies. We then 21 contrast media coverage of US troops and private security companies in two similar incidents of
captivity and over time in a single conflict. Avoiding the mobilization of military machinery sidesteps many
institutionalized mechanisms that foster public awareness of foreign policy decisions and their
implementation. Compared to the fanfare that accompanies deployments of military forces abroad,
deployments of private security teams may pass virtually unnoticed. Television networks and major
newspapers assign correspondents to the Pentagon and local television stations and newspapers routinely cover
military bases within their circulation area and the families that are attached to them. Thus, coverage of military deployments is
virtually automatic. PSCs, however, attract none of this coverage on a regular basis. Although the irresistible attraction
of bad news may draw media coverage if something goes wrong, it may be harder for the media even to discover that
something has gone wrong if they are not covering these deployments in the first place . As noted above,
even casualty figures focus on troops and typically do not include contractors, thereby reducing the
transparency of the human costs of war. 61 Taken together, these considerations imply that PSCs working for the
government abroad should be less likely to generate the same degree of media coverage as troops
would. Citizens also have less access to details about the use of PSCs and the policies that surround
such use. Because PSCs are private, their assertions of control over proprietary information about the
terms of their contracts, their operations, and their policies can reduce the access of journalists, NGOs,
and other interested parties. In some cases, this proprietary privilege can be abused. For instance, in the recent furor over
the contract of a Halliburton subsidiary, Kellogg, Brown and Root, to repair oil fields in Iraq, significant portions of a Pentagon
audit sent to the international monitoring board were blacked out. By law, commercially sensitive information must be concealed
when government documents are released. Thus, the Pentagon sent the report to the firm before sending it out, and the firm
claimed that it was permissible to black out not only proprietary information but also statements “that we believe are factually
incorrect or misleading and could be used by a competitor to damage KBR’s ability to win and negotiate new work.”62 Even
when they are not abused, proprietary limits on information can reduce the transparency of government
policy. Because of these concerns, FOIA requests for contracts between the government and PSCs are often denied.63
Planet Debate                                                                                                                             26
PMCs – Sherry Hall

                                 PMSCs Skirt Democratic Checks
PMCS ALLOW THE TRUE NATURE OF WAR TO BE KEPT FROM THE PUBLIC- THIS
UNDER MINES THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS
Salzman 8 [Zoe,New York University School of Law 2008 “Private Military Contractors And The Taint
Of A Mercenary Reputation” International Law And Politics [Vol. 40:853 /hnasser]
http://www.law.nyu.edu/ecm_dlv2/groups/public/@nyu_law_website__journals__journal_of_international
_law_and_politics/documents/documents/ecm_pro_058877.pdf
At an extreme, a government, even a democratic government, might use private violence as a brutal police
force to ensure its control over the people.86 In reality, however, a democratic government’s outsourcing of
military functions undermines the democratic process much more subtly than this far-fetched scenario.
Because the executive branch is generally in charge of hiring contractors, private contractors allow the
executive to evade parliamentary or congressional checks on foreign policy.87 Indeed, [t]o the extent
privatization permits the Executive to carry out military policy unilaterally . . . it circumvents primary
avenues through which the People areinformed and blocks off primary channels (namely Congress) through
which the People can register their approval or voice their misgivings. 88 Privatizing military force
results in a lack of transparency and puts the military effort outside of the scope of the democratic
dialogue, “obscuring choices about military needs and human implications.”89 Notably, in the United States, private
contractors are not subject to the scrutiny of the Freedom of Information Act, 90 which greatly restricts the
public’s ability to be well-informed about the government’s reliance on the private military industry. Thus, the privatization
of military force allows the executive “to operate in the shadows of public attention” 91 and to subvert
democratic political restraints.92

CIRCUMVENTION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE MAKES WAR INEVITABLE
Salzman 8 [Zoe,New York University School of Law 2008 “Private Military Contractors And The Taint Of A
Mercenary Reputation” International Law And Politics [Vol. 40:853 /hnasser]
http://www.law.nyu.edu/ecm_dlv2/groups/public/@nyu_law_website__journals__journal_of_international_law_and_p
olitics/documents/documents/ecm_pro_058877.pdf
This impediment to public debate is important because, as Immanuel Kant famously reasoned, the
chances for peace are greatly increased when the people control the decision on whether or not to go to
war, since it is the people themselves who will suffer “the miseries of war.” 99 If, on the other hand, the
decision rests with the head of state, he has little incentive to refrain from war because he bears none of
its costs.100 At a fundamental level, therefore, the use of private contractors subverts Kant’s reliance on
the democratic reluctance to go to war by circumventing the public’s reluctance to sustain casualties.
101 In Iraq, for example, contractor deaths are not counted towards the official death toll,102 allowing the
government to present a far lower number of American casualties. Recent estimates suggest that the total
number of contractors killed in Iraq is 1,000, with over 10,000 wounded or injured on the job. 103 But, as
the daughter of one contractor killed in Iraq put it: “If anything happens to the military people, you hear about it right away . . . .
Flags get lowered, they get their respect. You don’t hear anything about the contractors.”104
Planet Debate                                                                                                                      27
PMCs – Sherry Hall

                                PMSCs Skirt Democratic Checks
PMCS ALLOW FOR LESS PUBLIC DEBATE AND POLITICAL BACKLASH- THIS
THREATENS DEMOCRACY
Salzman 8 [Zoe,New York University School of Law 2008 “Private Military Contractors And The Taint Of A Mercenary
Reputation” International Law And Politics [Vol. 40:853 /hnasser]
http://www.law.nyu.edu/ecm_dlv2/groups/public/@nyu_law_website__journals__journal_of_international_law_and_politics/docume
nts/documents/ecm_pro_058877.pdf
The privatization of combat duties is potentially much more problematic than the privatization of other
government functions because the privatization of the use of force inherently removes many of the
burdens of war from the citizenry, thereby reducing public debate about national involvement in the
conflict.93 Indeed, governments may turn to private military forces not because they are cheaper, but because they are less
accountable and less likely to attract political backlash.94 For example, by outsourcing military functions,
the executive branch is able to evade certain forms of democratic accountability by circumventing
congressional caps on the number of troops approved for deployment.95 Employing private contractors
also allows the executive to avoid instituting a draft, keep official casualty counts and public criticism
down, and even to avoid arms embargoes.96 The government is also able to distance itself from
mistakes by blaming them on the contractors. 97 By subverting public debate and by undermining the
separation of powers, the privatization of military force poses a direct threat to the democratic system.

PMCS HAVE NO ACCOUNTABILITY- INHERENT ASPECTS OF DEMOCRACY ARE LOST
Salzman 8 [Zoe,New York University School of Law 2008 “Private Military Contractors And The Taint Of A
Mercenary Reputation” International Law And Politics [Vol. 40:853 /hnasser]
http://www.law.nyu.edu/ecm_dlv2/groups/public/@nyu_law_website__journals__journal_of_international_law_and_p
olitics/documents/documents/ecm_pro_058877.pdf
In addition, while contractors are technically regulated to some extent by their contracts,109 there is in fact a
notable lack of means to ensure contractual compliance.110 Importantly, most militaries have no developed system
with which to monitor contractual compliance.111 In Iraq, for example, a contractor allegedly involved
in the Abu Ghraib abuse “posed a ‘different dilemma’” than the uniformed soldiers involved.112 Since the
contractor could not be prosecuted under the UCMJ, the Army was confined to reporting him to the off-site Army
officer responsible for the contract under which he had been hired.113 In fact, no contractor has ever been
prosecuted for his or her involvement in the Abu Ghraib abuse scandal, although a private contractor was
convicted for his role in the death of a detainee in Afghanistan.114 As this Section has demonstrated , when the state
privatizes its military functions, a great deal of the accountability inherent in democratic government is
lost, as “[t]here is, in the final analysis, no direct chain of command from the government to units of
[private contractors].”115 Fundamentally, corporations are not subject to the same kind of electoral
accountability as governments, because while “public accountability is shared . . . market accountability
is sold.”116 While a PMC may be accountable in the sense that it must generate a profit in order to
remain a viable corporation, a democratic government is held accountable in more complex and
effective ways.

COVERT NATURE OF PMSCs DESIGNED TO SKIRT POPULAR OPPOSITION
James DeFronzo, (Professor Emeritus, Sociology, U. Connecticut), THE IRAQ WAR: ORIGINS AND
CONSEQUENCES, 2010, 238.
Another PMF function is carrying out covert, semicovert, or other missions in which the use of uniformed
US troops might constitute a political provocation. For example, Scahill describes how the Pentagon hired the
PMF Blackwater to train an elite Azeri force to help protect American oil interests in Azerbaijan because
using US troops might cause a hostile reaction from either neighboring Russia or Iran. Still another argument for
PMFs is that through their elevated pay levels they constitute a mechanism for maintaining the skill levels of highly and expensively
trained special operations or technical military personnel who might otherwise lose their proficiencies when they leave government
military service and no longer be competent when their skills are needed. PMFs also theoretically reduce individual
nations' military budgets by allowing them to downsize their armed forces with the knowledge that they can
access a ready pool of military specialists to supplement their standing forces when temporary needs arise.
Planet Debate                                                                                                                        28
PMCs – Sherry Hall

             Undermining Democracy Makes PMSCs Unethical
PMSCs UNETHICAL BECAUSE THEY UNDERMINE CITIZEN OBLIGATIONS TO THE
STATE
Sarah Percy, Research Fellow -Oxford, 2007, From Mercenaries to Market: the rise and regulation of
private military companies, eds. S. Chesterman & C. Lehnardt, p. 18
The second ethical objection to the use of private force centers around the idea that there is something
morally important about the citizens’ military contribution to the state . The military relationship between the citizen
and the state, according to this argument, results in restraint over the use of force and the reach of the state. A citizen army
restrains the state by making it more difficult for the state to engage in war, and specifically more difficult
for the state to use the armed forces to quash rebellion among its citizens . Hiring mercenaries disrupts this
relationship, because the state will be far less restrained by public opinion in the decision to fight wars if its
soldiers are foreign, and in case of rebellion will not need to worry about sympathy preventing soldiers
from crushing citizens from the same community. Moreover, the citizen’s military duty to the state is a
moral one, and mercenaries weaken the community’s moral fiber by performing the citizen’s duty .

HIRING MERCENARIES MAKES ALL CITIZENS MORALLY WEAKER
Sarah Percy, Research Fellow -Oxford, 2007, From Mercenaries to Market: the rise and regulation of
private military companies, eds. S. Chesterman & C. Lehnardt, p. 18-9
The origin of this objection can be traced at least as far back as Machiavelli and his contemporaries. Niccolo
Machiavelli argued that the citizen owed a special, and irreplaceable, duty to the state . He writes that ‘the
republic is the common good; the citizen, directing all his actions toward that good, may be said to dedicate
his life to the republic; the patriot warrior dedicates his death.” Machiavelli’s concerns about the mercenary
use revolve around a deep-seated feeling that native sons should fight for the republic, to ensure its health and
success at war. The republic drew strength from the military service of its citizens. Hiring foreigners to fight thus
diminished the strength of the republic.
Humanists during the Italian renaissance argued that hiring mercenaries would undermine the moral safety
of the republic. The decision to hire mercenaries instead of relying on citizens would mean that:
“The citizens would be corrupted because the permitted inferiors to do for them what should be done for
the public good; the mercenaries would be agents of that corruption because they performed a public
function without regard for the public good; and any ambitious individual could set himself above the
republic and destroy it, by bringing the unthinking mercenaries to do for him what should only be done for
the republic.”
In other words, citizens would be morally weaker because of the decision to hire mercenaries, because
mercenaries could not care for the republic in the same way as citizens. The republic would also run the risk of
becoming dominated by a tyrant, because foreign mercenaries would be more willing to serve the interests of the tyrant rather than
serve the public good.

RELIANCE ON MERCENARIES DEMONSTRATES MORAL BANKRUPTCY OF THE WAR
Sarah Percy, Research Fellow -Oxford, 2007, From Mercenaries to Market: the rise and regulation of
private military companies, eds. S. Chesterman & C. Lehnardt, p. 19-20
The ideal army, recruited from and at one with the people, would prevent tyranny. Mercenaries, because
they fight only for their employers rather than for the community at large, will find it easy to subjugate
citizens. Citizen soldiers, on the other hand, with a strong conception of the public good, would be less prone to “blind
obedience” and more likely to disobey if the public good were threatened. Louis de Jaucourt, one of the
contributors to the Encyclopedie, also worried that mercenaries would lead to despotism.
Americans during the Revolution also took the position that the use of mercenaries led to tyranny. Indeed, the revolutionaries
believed that England’s use of German mercenaries known as Hessians indicated its decline into despotism,
and demonstrated the moral bankruptcy of the English cause . The Declaration of Independence highlighted King
George III’s use of mercenaries as one of the prime grievances of the newly declared republic against its monarchical progenitor:
“He is, at this time, transporting large armies of foreign Mercenaries, to compleat the works of death, desolation and tyranny, already
begun with circumstances of cruelty and perfidy scarcely paralleled in the most barbarous ages and totally unworthy the Head of a
civilized nation.”
Planet Debate                                                                                                                         29
PMCs – Sherry Hall

             Undermining Democracy Makes PMSCs Unethical
RELIANCE ON PMSCs UNDERMINE CITIZENS’ DUTY TO THE STATE
Sarah Percy, Research Fellow -Oxford, 2007, From Mercenaries to Market: the rise and regulation of
private military companies, eds. S. Chesterman & C. Lehnardt, p. 21-2
Another way of looking at the same problem is to argue that PMCs simply erode the citizen’s duty to the state, which is
important for a democracy. The fact that PMCs might not display loyalty to the community left the writers of a Green Paper,
ordered by the British government to examine PMCs, “uneasy”:
“To encourage such activity seems contrary both to our    values and to the way in which we order society. In
a democracy it seems natural that the state should be defended by its own citizens since it is their state.
And it is not an accident that the business of fighting for money often brings in unattractive characters .

MORAL OBJECTIONS APPLY TO ALL CATEGORIES OF PRIVATE FIGHTERS INCLUDING
PMSCs
Sarah Percy, Research Fellow -Oxford, 2007, From Mercenaries to Market: the rise and regulation of
private military companies, eds. S. Chesterman & C. Lehnardt, p. 22
Discussing moral objections to the use of private force reveals that while private actors that use force might do very different jobs, and
at first appear dissimilar, some moral objections apply to all types of private fighter . All the variants of private
force outlined in this chapter have the potential to upset the relationship between the state and the citizen, and
could make it easier for the state to use force become tyrannical, or sustain an unpopular war . It is important to
note here that this criticism relates to the state as much as it does to the private fighter. The state that decides to privatize
aspects of the use of force is more morally responsible for the disruption of democratic control over the use
of fore than the private actor it hires. PMCs would not exist unless there was a demand for their services,
and responsibility thus lies with the state. That said, the persistence of this objection to private force and its applicability to
all types of private force helps explain why they mercenary label has been hard for the industry to shake off. Private fighters of
all kinds are linked because they are subject to the same criticism; that they disrupt the military relationship
between the citizen and the state.
Planet Debate                                                                                                                        30
PMCs – Sherry Hall

                                      PMSCs Increase Terrorism
THE UNACCOUNTABILITY OF PRIVATE MILITARIES MAKES THEM DETRIMENTAL TO
THE WAR ON TERROR
Sampson ’04, (Anthony, “MERCENARIES ARE UNACCOUNTABLE - WHICH IS WHY
GOVERNMENTS LIKE TO EMPLOY THEM;
 PARTS OF THE WORLD ARE LOOKING LIKE 14TH-CENTURY EUROPE, WHEN KINGS,” The
Independent, First Edition; COMMENT; Pg. 39, 8-14-04)
The rise of private armies has its own obvious logic in a privatised world, where national armies are increasingly undermanned and
under growing pressure, and business corporations are setting the pace. And Jack Straw, back in 2002, officially endorsed the
"outsourcing" of some military tasks to private companies.
But the hazards are now much more apparent. Many private companies have shown themselves
unaccountable to any government, while many mercenaries include men who owe no allegiance to any
country, or to any recognised laws. Their unaccountability may be their main attraction to their clients, but it
threatens to undermine the basic discipline on which real peacekeeping depends.
When major governments surrender their monopoly of force to mercenaries, in countries where law and
order are fragile, they are introducing a new danger to the "war on terrorism". They may see themselves as
fighting "unlawful combatants" - as the Americans define the prisoners in Guantanamo Bay. But they are
recruiting their own unlawful combatants to the struggle, and threatening to extend the areas of chaos
which provide the seedbeds of terrorism.
Planet Debate                                                                                                                                         31
PMCs – Sherry Hall

                                             PMSCs Increase Terrorism
CONTRACTORS PREVENT U.S. FROM DEFEATING TERRORISTS THROUGH COIN-
CONTRACTORS LEAD TO IRAQI DISAPPROVAL, AND INCREASED COSTS
Singer 7 [ Peter, director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative at the Brookings Institution, “Security for a New Century: Study Group Report”
http://www.stimson.org/newcentury/pdf/111907PeterSinger.pdf /hnasser]
Security for a New Century was honored to host Peter Singer, director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative at the Brookings Institution and author of
                                                                                                  (PMCs) are
Corporate Warriors, for a discussion of private military contractors and their role in Iraq and future conflicts. Private military contractors
                                                                     carry out a traditionally military task,
private firms (and their employees) that meet all of the following characteristics: they
using military techniques and technology, in the context of a war, against a combatant. A bodyguard for a
celebrity, even in a war zone, is not technically a PMC. Many PMCs are military support firms, in a role parallel to supply chain
logistics. Other roles often undertaken by contractors include military consulting or training and, most
recently in the headlines, armed security. These socalled “private security” companies perform tactical
functions such as guarding facilities and bases, guarding key individuals, and convoy escort. In Iraq, the size
and scope of the PMC contingent is unprecedented. There are at least 160,000 PMCs, although that number only includes those
associated with the Department of Defense, not those contracted by other agencies such as the Department of State. Camp Doha in Kuwait, the launching
                                                                               This presence has largely been shielded
pad of the invasion of Iraq, was built, is operated, and continues to be guarded by PMCs .
from public view, however. While troop casualties are reported widely in the media, contractor casualties
rarely receive the same level of attention. Just over 1,000 PMCs have been killed, 13,000 wounded, and
approximately 20 missing in action. One of the reasons more scrutiny of the rules governing PMCs is
necessary is to protect the rights of PMC employees themselves. In Iraq, PMCs have been achieving critical
mission goals, but their effect on the overall mission has been negative, for several reasons. Like a steroid, a
ready supply of PMCs has allowed the U.S. military to lift weights it wouldn’t have been able to lift
otherwise, enabling military commitments that might not receive the same level of support if soldiers were
used instead. In effect, policymakers can avoid politically unpopular troop deployments by supplementing the
force with PMCs much less visible to the American public. The ability to avoid difficult choices and
political costs makes for bad policy decisions. Further, the “bigger is better,” Green Zone mentality with
which PMCs approach their supply chain contacts can run contrary to the best approach for the overall
mission. Contractors make more money when they provide more services, but more supply convoys serving larger stations with
more people leave a bigger footprint in the occupied area, disconnecting troops from the local population . Turning these
functions into for-profit endeavors has also cost taxpayers billions of dollars. A lack of oversight,
mechanisms to drive down costs, and competition, aided by an outdated acquisitions system and a dearth of
contract officers, has made the outsourcing process extremely inefficient. The Department of State, for its
part, has lost the ability to see itself as a client and manager with regard to PMCs, as its effort to grant
Blackwater employees immunity from prosecution demonstrates. Winning hearts and minds, moreover, is
not part of the contract. PMCs are judged by their ability to get people or supplies from point A to point B,
not how many people they steer away from the insurgency on the way. And although PMCs are not U.S.
government personnel, their involvement in episodes such as the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse and the
Blackwater shootings that killed Iraqi civilians in the fall of 2007 has soured the perception of U.S. efforts
in Iraq because many Iraqis do not distinguish between soldiers and armed contractors. Within a broader
context, where Iraq is one theater in a global war on terrorism, the perception of contractors as extensions of
the U.S. government is an impediment to U.S. efforts to win the “war of ideas” against potential terrorists
and insurgents. That PMCs seem to exist outside any legal jurisdiction compounds the problem further and
contributes to a perception of a U.S. double standard with regard to Iraqis. At an individual level, PMCs might
fall under the jurisdiction of local laws, extra-territorial application of civilian law (the Military Extra-
territorial Jurisdiction Act or MEJA), or the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). None of these have
been systematically applied. MEJA is generally not useful for prosecuting battlefield conduct because of
the need to produce the political will, evidence, and witnesses for a trial in the U.S., as well as convince a jury to favor a
foreigner over a U.S. soldier. (It does work well in cases with American victims and a clear parallel to civilian
cases.) UCMJ applies military law to civilians during times of declared war as well as, since Fall 2006,
contingency operations, but the Department of Defense has yet to provide implementation guidance.
Additionally, two days before it dissolved itself, the Coalition Provisional Authority issued Order 17, which
can be interpreted as giving foreign contractors immunity from Iraqi law. And while Iraqi licenses are required of
firms contracted by DoD, the State Department does not have the same rule, meaning State allowed Blackwater to guard its staff even
though the firm had no license in Iraq. Blackwater and similar firms appear to be above the law even as the State
Department tries to promote the rule of law in Iraq.
Planet Debate                                                                                                                        32
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                                        PMSCs Increase Terrorism
IRAQI CIVILIANS ARE THE KEY INTERNAL LINK TO SOLVING FOR TERRORISM-
WINNING HEARTS AND MINDS IS THE GREATEST TOOL FOR COUNTERING
INSURGENCY IN IRAQ
Miles 6[ Donna, writer for the American Forces Press Service “Combat Leaders Cite Relationship
Building as Key to Victory” Department of Defense
http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=1549 /hnasser]
“Winning hearts and minds” is more than a cliche; it’s the critical factor that ultimately will determine
victory or defeat in the global war on terror, Army leaders said yesterday at the Association of the U.S. Army’s annual
convention here. Commanders returned from combat in Iraq and Afghanistan reinforced the importance of building relationships
with and support from the local population. “The center of gravity is the support of the people ,” said Army Lt. Col.
Chris Cavoli, who commanded the 10th Mountain Division’s 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry, in northeastern Afghanistan. Cavoli
cited the major difference between traditional warfare and the current operations under way in the Middle East. “In a regular,
conventional war, military forces are committed to annihilating each other,” he said. But as U.S. forces
work alongside their coalition and host-nation counterparts in Iraq and Afghanistan, “everything we do
is an arrangement designed to make people closer to the government … (and) to connect the people to
the government.” Accomplishing that requires that the local people believe the coalition is acting in their best
interest and cares about them and their future, the officers agreed. That begins with creating a secure
environment, they said. Army Lt. Col. Chris Hickey, who commanded 2nd Squadron, 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, in Tal
Afar, Iraq, called security critical, not just to building support for the new national government, but for helping the coalition.
“Security has cascading effects,” he said. “When people feel safe, they give you information.” When it
comes to identifying and capturing or killing insurgents who hide among the local people, “Knowledge
is often more important than firepower,” Cavoli said. Fighting insurgents and helping a new
government get off the ground is a bit like walking a tightrope, the officers said. It requires force, but
not too much force. “It’s critical to avoid overreacting,” Cavoli said. “You have to know to use one bullet when one
bullet is needed.” Similarly, the officers said, it takes a balance between fighting the insurgency and taking on
missions that build the country and its government. Army Lt. Col. Willard Burleson, who commanded the 10th
Mountain Division’s 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry, in western Baghdad, cited the importance of infrastructure improvements that
demonstrate the coalition’s concern for the people’s well-being. These projects can be as major as long-term electricity and
sewage projects or as simple as sending U.S. troops to work alongside Iraqi soldiers to pick up trash in off the streets, he said.
“These are important parts of what we do,” Burleson said. As troops conduct these missions, they come to
recognize that victory “is not just about the attack,” he said. “It’s the effects.” Cavoli emphasized the
importance of cultural sensitivity as troops build relationships with local people. “The way we do what
we do is as important as what we do,” he said. Defeating the insurgency requires “persistent contact with the
population” and behavior that projects strength and inspires trust in the locals, he said. “Relationships matter,” agreed
Hickey. “You have to build trust. Mutual respect is a combat multiplier.” Ultimately, success in the war
on terror will boil down to how well U.S. and coalition forces build the relationships needed to weed
out terrorists and build Iraq’s and Afghanistan’s new democracies, the officers said. “Being able to treat a
populous with dignity and respect is critical to getting things done,” Burleson said.
Planet Debate                                                                                                                   33
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                                     PMSCs Increase Terrorism
LAWLESSNESS OF PMC PRESENCE IN IRAQ UNDERMINES U.S. COIN EFFORTS
Elsea, 10
[Jennifer, Legislative Attorney @ Congressional Research Service, “Private Security Contractors in Iraq
and Afghanistan: Legal Issues”, 1/7, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40991.pdf]/galperin
U.S. departments and agencies contributing to combat or stability operations overseas are relying on private
firms to perform a wider scope of security services than was previously the case. The use of private security
contractors (PSCs) to protect personnel and property in Iraq and Afghanistan has been a subject of debate in the press, in
Congress, and in the international community. While PSCs are widely viewed as being vital to U.S. efforts in the region, many
Members are concerned about transparency, accountability, and legal and symbolic issues raised by the use
of armed civilians to perform security tasks formerly performed by military personnel, as well as the
adverse impact PSCs may be having on U.S. counterinsurgency efforts. Contractors working for the U.S.
military, the State Department, or other government agencies during contingency operation in Iraq and Afghanistan are non-
combatants who have no combat immunity under international law if they engage in hostilities, and whose
conduct may be attributable to the United States. Contractors who commit crimes in Iraq or Afghanistan are
subject to U.S. prosecution under criminal statutes that apply extraterritorially or within the special maritime and
territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or by means of the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA). Section 552 of
the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for FY2007 (P.L. 109-364) makes military contractors supporting the Armed
Forces in Iraq subject to court-martial jurisdiction, although the military trial of a civilian contractor would likely be
subject to legal challenge on constitutional grounds. Despite congressional efforts to expand court-martial
jurisdiction and jurisdiction under MEJA, some contractors may remain outside the jurisdiction of U.S.
courts, civil or military, for improper conduct in Iraq or Afghanistan.
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                                    AT: “Can Regulate PMSCs”
REGULATING PMSCs VERY DIFFICULT
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 34
Looking at the organizational nature of PMSCs, it is clear that their own authority structures bear little resemblance to
the formal vertical hierarchy of the traditional military. These firms are classic “informal organizations,”
with fragmented and fluid structures of governance, and they pose a genuine problem for regulators of the
industry. Christopher Kinsey has examined multiple PMSCs in the UK and calls the typical organizational structure a “loosely
coupled organic network.” These organizations have a very different relationship to law than that of a strict
hierarchical organization:
“In the ‘quasi-government’ of these hybrid organizations management can do whatever is not forbidden to
do by law, thus providing the basis for innovation and partnerships. Accountability will be for performance; however
it may be defined and measured, rather than to strict conformance to law.” (Kosar 2007).
Andrew Bearpark, who heads the British Association of Private Security Contractors, noted that any effective self-regulatory
body needed to be local, limiting its members to only those based in the same state , “so that w can check up on
guys within three phone calls.” The effective regulations would form a “matrix” of regulatory bodies and rules, thereby almost
mimicking the horizontally integrated models of the networked and informal organizations being regulated.

DIFFICULT TO ENSURE ADEQUATE REGULATION AND OVERSIGHT OF PMSCs IN THE
TYPES OF ENVIRONMENTS THEY OPERATE
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 143
Frost’s idea of an anarchic ethic is not what Jowitt would see in a “frontier” organization. His citizens, who see themselves as
confident bearers of human and political rights, are much more stable than those whose weak ties and casual use of violence mark
Jowitt’s frontier society. His description of an anarchic ethic should not be confused with the violence of a
complete lack of rules or principles. His anarchy is multi-faceted, and polymorphous, and protean, but
ultimately all about the assertion and protection of rights on many fronts.
In fact, Frost is careful to point out that this ethical defense of PMSCs is one that requires a coherent set of
legal and ethical principles to which they can be held account by a public composed of equal “rights
bearers.” PMSCs are not ethically problematic as long as the world is not divided into zones. His is an ideal defense of
PMSCs that sees them as one type of international business among many others, with equal rights to
operate as long as they abide by the norms and practices of their home state . And he claims that all states, as
states, share normative values – or at least they should. By the end of his essay, however, Frost admits that this ideal
vision breaks down in war zones:
“The key to preventing [the ethically noxious] outcomes [of PMSCs] is regulation by public bodies. Within
stable democratic states, this kind of regulation is relatively easy. However, within some unstable and dangerous territories
beyond the borders of one’s own state, greater problems are encountered in attempting to monitor and
regulate the activities of PMSCs.” (Frost, 2008)
This admission is a telling one. Since most PMSCs do not operate in such zones, but instead in frontier settings wherein
it is harder to recognize the fundamental rights of others, then the attempt to apply a code of ethics that
reflects the more cosmopolitan world from which Frost speaks will merely paper over problems. A similar clash
of cultures occurs when human rights activists advocate regulation to those who have been unleashed to be
proxy forces on a frontier zone of sorts.
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                                      AT: “Can Regulate PMSCs”
REGULATIONS FAIL BECAUSE THEY LACK A COHERENT LEGAL INFRASTRUCTURE
FOR ENFORCEMENT
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 103-4
What unnerves us about the advent of the private military industry is the lack of coherence in the legal
regime. This stems from the nature of contracts : specifically negotiated and usually short-term and informal relationships.
There may be benefits to these contractual arrangements, even on the battlefield, but they remain a perplexing
way to construct what is essentially a new legal person. The legal world of contract law does not contain in
it a broad notion of “responsibility” or “honor, ” or even those grand-sounding but important references to “humanity” or
“civilized peoples.” And currently these ad hoc relationships do not have any coherent and mobile legal
infrastructure – lawyers, judges, courts-martial proceedings, etc. – to deal with abuse.
Laws on the books mean nothing without a legal infrastructure willing to investigate and prosecute crimes
and fraud. In this case, the problems have been magnified by the collision of the three distinct legal genealogies, with three distinct
legal personals: first, a business contractor, governed by contract regulation; second, a security guard, distinct from the military soldier
but with some of his rights and responsibilities; and third, a civilian non-governmental worker, unconnected to any US government
agency, working in conflict zones. So far, attempts to force PMSCs into any one box have been unsuccessful.

INCREASED OVERSIGHT COUNTERPRODUCTIVE AND UNDERMINES THE EFFICIENCY
ADVANTAGES OF PMSCs
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 138
In response to the argument that PMSCs are a necessary (if dirty) choice, the remedy for their potential to operate too violently must
be more effective oversight. But here another ethical problem emerges: the problem of diffused responsibility, or “many hands.’
When too many regulatory eyes are charged with the job of oversight, responsibility can be so diffused as
to be ineffective. This is most often merely a problem of organizational inefficiency, with no ethical dimension to it at all.
However, complex oversight mechanisms become an ethical problem when they result in inaction. Each
oversight organization can “pass the buck” to some other agency until the problem disappears. Agencies
can lose control of a problem when there are too many hands involved in the process.
Oversight involving too many hands can become bureaucratically cumbersome and authoritatively weak .
One of the apparent advantages of contractors is that they are nimble and cost-effective; but realistically, the
cumbersomeness and cost of their oversight ought to be factored into the calculation of their cost and
efficacy, it rarely is. The problem of many hands includes the problem of sluggishness: issues can linger in
bureaucratic or legal slow lanes while demands on the ground shift, and actions again become virtually
unregulated. Finally, the “many hands problem” is exacerbated by the “slipperiness” of the hands involved:
the classic principal-agent problem of an agent continually trying to maximize profit and for minimum
performance, or principals trying to shirk their own obligations and not pay.
The case of contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan has only underscored this accusation. The problem of many slippery hands
characterizes the problem of contracting and sub-contracting among several government agencies, in the midst of a confusing array of
entities on the round in Iraq, and hiring many types to do the work. But in order to exercise control, there has to be
someone who can command, in the world of contracting, there are too many hands involved for any
effective command.
Planet Debate                                                                                                                        36
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                                     AT: “Can Regulate PMSCs”
SWISS INITIATIVE FAILS
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 105-6
In October 2008, a document concerning PMSCs was forwarded to the UN Secretary General from the Swiss Representative
sponsored by the government of Switzerland and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The “Montreux Document”
(sometimes referred to as the “Swiss Initiative”) is the result of two years of meetings and negotiations between
state representatives from 17 countries, PMSC industry members, NGO officials, journalists and
academics. The long-awaited document reminds states of their obligations under existing international law, and lays out
“best practices’ that could help to provide a framework for licensing and regulation. The overall goal is “to
promote respect for international humanitarian law and human rights law” by those states who contract
with PMSCs for services, those states on whose territory PMSCs operate, and those “home states” wherein PMSCs are based, or
whose citizens work for them.
The document is filled with good recommendations. One example directs that those who contract with PMSCs should require that the
company “post a bond that would be forfeited in case of mis-conduct or non-compliance” with relevant international and national
laws. However, although the document makes clear that the trend toward increasing use of PMSCs is
worrisome, and pretty much unstoppable, its recommendations are soft-peddled as reminders and
suggested, couched in the language of “best practices” that evokes corporate good governance or project
management. It is suggested that sates ‘consider establishing corporate criminal responsibility for crimes
committed by the PMSC, consistent with the Contracting State’s national legal system.” For territorial states, on whose soil
PMSCs will be operating:
“The following good practices aim to provide guidance…[the state should] evaluate whether their domestic legal framework is
adequate to ensure that the conduct of PMSCs and their personnel is in conformity with relevant national law, international
humanitarian law and human rights law, or whether it needs to establish further arrangements to regulate the activities of PMSCs.”
(Swiss Government 2008).
The problem with this suggestion is that most states that need to have PMSCs on their own territory need
them precisely because they do not have a civil and legal infrastructure capable of monitoring and
regulating the activities of armed contractors on their territory.
Planet Debate                                                                                                                         37
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                                      AT: “Can Regulate PMSCs”
ETHICAL CODES OF BEHAVIOR DIFFICULT TO APPLY TO PMSCs IN WAR ZONES
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 151-2
Ethics are intimately connected – linguistically and in practice – with the idea of ethnicity, that celebration of one’s own
community. Ethics is some sort of rule abiding behavior that has as its central concern, I would argue, the
maintenance of a group standard or norm. Professional ethics and the like are primarily oriented back toward the need for
the group identity to be as unsullied as possible: there may be concern for victims of abuse, but it is not the main focus of ethics. Even
Aristotelian ethics are habits that have the primary benefit for those who practice them. The etymology of the world reveals this
orientation towards one’s self, or one’s own.
Private security contractors can be part of associations that help build up the professional contractor ethic.
They can write and maintain codes of conduct, and can self-regulate based on such codes. They can, like
other professional associations, monitor and evaluate each other for lapses of all sorts. And gradually, as is
already happening, a certain ethos will build up around the firms and the contractors, with its own customs and
allowable practices, its own excuses and allowable justifications. They can be called professionally ethical if they
abide by these rules. And this is mostly the level at which the debate is taking place. PMSCs say give us rules; monitor us
well (and we’ll monitor ourselves too); and we can be seen as legitimate professional forces in the field.
But for social and political theorists, the twentieth century has exposed moral problems that go beyond the simple
application of good ethics. The ethical uncertainty that can be found in the vague phrasings of codes of
conduct (“we will at all times abide by human rights norms”) reveals a deeper uncertainty about the moral good . Here
it is helpful to distinguish “ethics” from “morality,” a word that is often used synonymously. In contrast with
the reflexive orientation of ethics, morality is oriented toward others, usually those outside of one’s own circle. How we should
regard, or tolerate, or interact, or care for, others is the much bigger problem of moral behavior. In war zones, private
contractors must have a professional ethic as employees of a firm, and as members of an emerging
profession, but they must also, like soldiers, have an attitude toward those in and amongst whom they
operate, and against whom their aggression can be directed .
For the most part, the relationship between one person and another, where morality is concerned, involves a
real asymmetry of power. Morality is required where one person ahs the power to do something to the
other person, without any kind of immediate reciprocity. In a war zone, no one is asked to actually care
about their potential victims. In the Balkans, the ICRC tried to deter war crimes by reminding militia members of a “warrior
ethic” by putting out posters that said “warriors don’t rape women, warriors don’t kill children.” They reminded them of the group
norm to which they belonged. But they did not ask them to care for their potential victims, to behave morally, as one to another. This
is the hard part, and understanding the problems that crop up here at this level of behavior will require a detour
into moral theory in the late twentieth century.
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                                     AT: “Can Regulate PMSCs”
NATURE OF CONTRACT LAW MAKES REGULATING PMSCs DIFFICULT
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 130
Hypothetically, it should be possible to create a workable legal remedy to honor all of these commitments. In fact, however, the
specific circumstances of the private military or security contractor, working in a war zone abroad, renders
any such neat remedy impossible. The reason for this relates to the three primary questions asked above: the question of
status, and what I would term the “time/space” problem – the question of jurisdiction (what space is this?) and the question of what
kind of “time” it is – wartime or peacetime? Legal answers to these questions do not admit of hybrid or quasi-entities. In the
language of the ICRC, in a war zone you are either a combatant or a non-combatant. It is either a time of
war or a time of peace, and those who bear arms do so either lawfully or unlawfully, under the rules of war
or not all. Contract law cannot cover the lawful use of force by a private employee in an international zone.
Unlike domestic private security providers, who act within strict confines of a domestic policing order, and
can only very rarely bear arms, private military contractors serving in Iraq or Afghanistan currently have no
such overarching legal order, except the contract. This relationship to the legal structure is what makes them akin to
privateers and mercenaries of old, rather than their specific actions motivations, or profiles on the ground. And it is the inability
of the primary contracting entities – national governments – to find any workable legal status under which
contractors can operate that makes it seem as if these seemingly lawless mercenary-like forces are intended
to be that way.

DIFFERENT CONCEPTIONS OF SECURITY MAKE REGULATIONS DIFFICULT
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 134
The ethics of PMSCs are also formed by the ethics of private security guards in general. Here I employ research done on privatized
policing by Clifford Shearing and others. In a recent study done for the Department of Justice, Shearing and Balyley contrasted the
“mentality” of a private security force with that of a public police force (Shearing and Balyely 2001). In this case, Shearing’s research
demonstrates that public and private forces have different ideas of what constitutes security—and, by
extension, justice. It is necessary to understand these different mentalities before any workable normative
judgments can be made about PMSCs; and especially before any workable legal or regulatory policies can
be put in place.

CURRENT REGULATIONS FAIL BECAUSE THEY DON’T ACCOUNT FOR THE UNIQUE
IDENTITY OF PMSCs
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 155
PMSCs are relatively unregulated forces on the ground, not because there is a dearth of specific regulations
governing the work that they do, but because extant regulations are not yet calibrated to PMSCs in a way
that identifies with clear legal structures to investigate and prosecute – a specific legal person or actor, with
specific and workable rights and duties. Like terrorists, they are caught in a clash of legal cultures. The
solution is either to create a new body of law that would specifically address these actors, or else to maneuver them firmly under
existing legal personalities.
Planet Debate                                                                                                                         39
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                                      AT: “Can Regulate PMSCs”
SELF REGULATION DOOMED TO FAIL
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 159
The current status quo represents the worst-case scenario. PMSCs are flourishing on all fronts; even Blackwater,
under its strange new name, Xe, has just secured a renewed contract to guard State Department employees. Clearly confident, they
recently hosted a tour group form a conservative Catholic college at their Moyock, North Carolina facilities. We are kidding
ourselves if we believe that allowing many hands to regulate an already shady industry (one that is sometimes
justified as a necessary dirty business) will ever result in any real reforms. Hearings can take place, shock can be
expressed, calls for reform can be made, and changes will languish in order for business to continue as
usual. There may be very good reasons for the world of PMSCs to have grown and flourished in the last decade. That growth might
reasonably be allowed an experiment whose results we are not being called in to evaluate. As with other experiments with allowing
the market to compete with the state for provision of essential services without lose public regulation, there is a need for assessment
and reform. The status quo solution is tantamount to admitting that the abuses that have occurred are
acceptable prices to pay in return for private profits and the governmental abdication of public
responsibility.

LEGITIMACY OF GOVERNMENT NOT A WORKABLE LIMIT ON PMSCs
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 103
There is also a difference between state and corporate perceptions of legitimacy. Early in Colonel Spicer’s
autobiography, the reader is struck by the frequency with which he describes the importance of PMC support for
“legitimate” governments. On its face this is a proper enough intention. The difficulty lies in ascertaining the
legitimacy of a government that may exercise authority over a limited part of a populace, territory, or
borders. That government may in fact carry out few of those functions expected in the West. Moreover, it
may do so with limited tolerance of dissent, while embracing say, patrilineal tribalism. It is not surprising that legitimacy
as measured by functional or representative yardsticks is doubtful in weak states; or that claims to sovereignty are often violently
disputed from within. On the other hand, Spicer refers in passing to the dictators of Africa, Asia and the Balkans and laments that the
UN will not “take them on.” He champions a familiar view. The more skeptical reader will recall that some of the more odious
dictators of recent times were in the past valued friends of those Western states with which Spicer’s
business requires sound relations. Saddam Hussein and the USA spring to mind. In business – as elsewhere – timing is
everything.

US DOES NOT APPLY LAWS TO ITS CONTRACTORS
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 90
This shift has been supported by an American approach of deliberately limiting governance of the new corporate players in
                                                                                                           TITAN
international military affairs just as home state governments did three centuries ago. Employees of DynCorp, CACI,
and others have been implicated in torture, other forms of aggravated assault, sexual assault, bribery and
various other nefarious acts. Yet the US government has evinced remarkably limited interest in developing
effective legal means to draw those concerned and their US employers to account. Attempts to utilize
existing law during the Iraq occupation have been less than vigorous. In other words, powerful governments of both
the past and the present have found it expedient to keep some distance from the operations of companies
where these firms exercise (or misuse) coercion or violence on their behalf. Greater importance has been attached
to burden shifting than effective governance.
Planet Debate                                                                                                                     40
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                                     AT: “Can Regulate PMSCs”
MANY PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES WITH ENFORCING REGULATIONS AGAINST
CONTRACTORS
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 153
At the international level there are two problems: a dearth of customary norms regarding modern military
contractors; and treaties which tend to be of marginal relevance or which are poorly drafted, or both . For
example, the 1989 Mercenaries Convention does not even identify the modern PMSC or its personnel. Another
problem is uncertainty regarding applicable criminal justice regimes applying to PMSCs and their servants engaged in operations on a
battlefield or a peacekeeping zone. Consider the recognizable anatomy of criminal law enforcement. This
requires identification of authorities competent to supply jurisdiction and suitable laws known to be
effective. These empower investigative agencies with the authority to carry out necessary conduct exercised via sovereign, multi-
national or supranational authority. Skilled personnel are required to attend crime scenes, speak with various parties, observe and
collect forensic evidence in conformity with prescribed procedures. They may identify, detain and interview suspects in conditions
                                                                                                              is
which do not prejudice the collection and later use of evidence procured. Military investigators are trained to do this. It
difficult to see how civilians could carry out that function in a war zone, although this has been suggested .
Planet Debate                                                                                                                                                                       41
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                                                  AT: “Can Regulate PMSCs”
STATE REGULATIONS ONLY LEGITIMATIZE PMCS- THIS DECREASES STATE CONTROL
OF FORCE, AND THE LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Krahman 9 [Erik, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF) 2009 “Private Security Companies and the
State Monopoly on Violence: A Case of Norm Change?”
http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/PRIF_Prvt_Security_and_The%20State_Monopoly_on
_Violence.pdf /hnasser]
In international relations, the state monopoly on the legitimate use of force has sought to outlaw the private use of
armed force between the citizens of different countries. While its implementation was never as
successful as at the national level, it became a guiding norm in the twentieth century, shaping the UN
Charter, the international laws of conflict and the UN and African Union conventions against
mercenarism. The potential consequences of the transformation of this norm for international security
may be even more profound than at the domestic level because fewer attempts have been made to
control the private use of armed force. The Montreux Document provides an illustration of the failure of
states to respond to the transformation in the norms and practices regarding the international use of
collective force by private security contractors. By reasserting existing international law, the document neglects the fact
that these laws are based on the premise of the state monopoly on the legitimate use of violence and the
primacy of interstate wars. Both no longer describe many contemporary conflicts with the result that large sections of the global private security industry
and their operations are exempt from legislative controls at the international level. Since Western states have tightened the regulation of
private security firms working within their domestic boundaries, the consequences of the proliferation
of PSCs at the international level are likely to primarily concern so-called “areas of limited statehood”,
where such legislation is missing or not effectively enforced. Countries split by internal conflicts such as Iraq and Afghanistan, but also weak states such as Sierra Leone fall
           The consequences of the increased availability and acceptance of private armed force in
into this category.
international affairs may be positive or negative. On the positive side, PSCs operating internationally can help to re-establish peace in
countries with weak indigenous military or police forces, protect NGOs which seek to help people in conflict regions, and permit transnational corporations to invest and
operate in areas of limited statehood. In addition, PSCs are playing a growing role in security sector reform programmes, i.e. in training national military and police forces in
                                                                                                                                                  , the
order to create the foundations for a functioning state monopoly on the legitimate use of violence in these countries in the first place (Krahmann 2007). Nevertheless
benefits of using PSCs can be dubious. A clearer picture of the effects of legitimizing private armed
forces in international affairs appears to be emerging in the light of the interventions in Iraq and
Afghanistan. One danger regards the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. Although scholars agree that
PSCs are only one factor, the legitimization of private armed contractors can contribute to the small arms trade
and related transfers (Makki et al. 2001; COST 2006). In most cases PSCs bring their own weapons with them to
fulfil their contracts, in others they obtain them locally. In Afghanistan, only the government, foreign
militaries and embassies are permitted to import weapons, but the lack of public security has created a
huge demand for armed guards. According to Swisspeace (Joras/Schuster 2008: 14), this has created a major dilemma with the result that PSCs have
variously hired local staff and “turn a blind eye to the source of their weapons”, or buy arms on the black market. The organization estimates that a
private security guard in Afghanistan owns on average 3.5 weapons, suggesting that there could be
about 43,750 small arms in the possession of PSCs in the country (Joras/Schuster 2008: 15). However, there have also been
instances such as in Sierra Leone and Papua New Guinea where PSCs have acted as arms brokers. In Sierra Leone, this caused a major scandal because the exports
                                                           The consequences of the changing conception
circumvented a UN arms embargo and took place with the knowledge of the UK government.
of legitimacy with regard to the private use of collective force can also be more severe at the
international than at the domestic level. The most important consequence appears to be the challenge to
the laws of war which have largely been based on the presumption of the state monopoly on the
legitimate use of violence and attempts to outlaw mercenarism (Chesterman/Lehnardt 2007). Although international
humanitarian law includes detailed stipulations for contractors accompanying state militaries as well as
for non-state combatants, these are often inapplicable for three reasons. First, PSCs typically operate in
areas where there is no declared war, such as in Afghanistan and Iraq today. Second, many PSCs work for private
organizations, businesses or individuals and not for national armed forces. Third, PSCs do not engage, or at least claim not to engage, in offensive military action and it is
                                                   In the absence of applicable international laws, the
therefore not clear whether they are “combatants” who “take part in hostilities”.
regulation of PSCs by their home states, i.e. the states where a PSC is registered, or the states where a
PSC is operating, is particularly important. However, only the USA and South Africa have laws which control the export of private security
services abroad, and the countries where PSCs are deployed often lack the capabilities to enforce local laws on private security contractors.
Planet Debate                                                                                                                                                                 42
PMCs – Sherry Hall


                                                  AT: “Can Regulate PMSCs”
ACCOUNTABILITY ONLY LEGITIMIZES PSC USE OF FORCE- THIS UNDERMINES
INTERNATIONAL LAW FURTHER
Krahman 9 [Erik, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF) 2009 “Private Security Companies and the
State Monopoly on Violence: A Case of Norm Change?”
http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/PRIF_Prvt_Security_and_The%20State_Monopoly_on
_Violence.pdf /hnasser]
In addition to their weak legal legitimacy, the international use of private armed force can also inhibit
the political accountability of PSCs. As at the domestic level, the main cause of this problem is the primary accountability of PSCs to their clients and
shareholders and not to the people who are otherwise affected by their actions. In international affairs, the difficulties of holding private
security guards politically accountable can be exacerbated if the contracting parties are not based or
living in the country of operation. Foreign intervention forces often have status of armed forces
agreements which exempt their soldiers and private contractors from local political and legal
accountability. This creates the impression with local populations that criminals are being “whisked
away”.26 As a Kabul-based journalist reports, this “rankles an Afghan population with no means of pursuing justice”.27 In short, while PSCs have at
least legal legitimacy in Europe and North America, in international affairs their perceived legitimacy is
neither legal nor political. It is rather practical considerations that legitimize the private use of violence.
The main arguments put forward for the legitimacy of the use of armed force by PSCs in zones of
conflict or limited statehood are the failure of local governments or the international community of
states to ensure public security, forcing individuals to resort to self-defence with the assistance of armed
security guards. Finally, the private use of armed force can affect the contexts and purposes for which
violence is deployed in international affairs. In contrast to states which are only permitted to deploy military
force either against or in other states in exceptional circumstances such as self-defence, the protection
of international peace and to prevent genocide, private actors can hire and use international PSCs across
national borders without any other restrictions than the ability of the host states to regulate and control
their operations. As a consequence, NGOs and transnational corporations have become less dependent upon local governments or Western militaries for protection
in zones of conflict or areas of limited statehood. Within these regions, NGOs and transnational corporations can use
private protection to implement their own agendas or interests. In the NGO community, this has
facilitated a merging of the development and security agendas (Duffield 2001). With the support of PSCs, NGOs are able to take
more “proactive” stances towards providing aid in conflict regions. Instead of relying exclusively on local acceptance and support
for their role in areas where violence is commonplace, NGOs have moved towards deterrence and
protection by means of private security guards (Spearin 2006: 235). Nearly one third of NGOs use armed security guards today
(Buchanan/Muggah 2005: 9). The hiring of PSCs has been even more widely accepted among transnational corporations. Extractive companies in the oil
and mining sectors, in particular, rely extensively on private security to protect their installations in
countries such as Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola, Sierra Leone and Iraq. Despite
the emergence of the concept of corporate social responsibility, the contexts and purposes for which
private guards are employed in these countries have not (yet) evolved to significantly benefit the larger
community (Feil et al. 2008: 29). In some cases, PSCs and transnational corporations collaborate with and support corrupt national police forces, as in Nigeria. In
other countries, they install themselves as an independent police force competing with local agencies, like in Afghanistan where citizens feel harassed by private security
                                                                            In sum, even where the clients
guards who set up road blocks, search pedestrians and “interfere with the lives of everybody” (Joras/Schuster 2008: 27).
of PSCs seek to benefit their host country, the interests and security of the customer remain the primary
goal of private security guards.
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PMCs – Sherry Hall


                                               AT: “Can Regulate PMSCs”
CALLS FOR REGULATION ARE INADEQUATE- THE ISSUE OF LINKING PROFITS TO
WAR IS ONLY SOLVED THROUGH WITHDRAWAL
The Nation 7[ “End of the Shadow War” October 15 /hnasser ]
http://web.ebscohost.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=1&hid=6&sid=978f
a706-c457-4de6-ab67-1218b8756479%40sessionmgr14
Some members of Congress have proposed steps to rein in the cowboy contractors roaming Iraq. Senator
Barack Obama introduced legislation earlier this year that would require clear rules of en gagement for
armed contractors, expand the military code of justice to govern their actions and provide for the
Defense Department to “arrest and detain” contractors suspected of crimes and turn them over to
civilian authorities for prosecution. Such changes are essential if private contractors are to continue to play a role in US military operations overseas.
But calls for greater regulation and oversight miss the larger issue . As The Nation’s Scahill said in his testimony before the
Senate Democratic Policy Committee on September 21, “In the bigger picture, this body should seriously question whether the
linking of corporate profits to war- making is in the best interest of this nation and the world .” Some in
Congress are finally beginning to ask that question. Democratic Senators Jim Webb and Claire McCaskill have proposed legislation creating a Commission on Wartime
                                                                       “We now have more contractors on
Contracting modeled after the Truman committee, which investigated waste and fraud during World War II.
the ground in Iraq than we do American troops. This situation is unprecedented in our history and is
fraught with legal challenge,” said Webb. “Hundreds of billions of dollars have been appropriated and spent
in Iraq alone, resulting in billions of dollars in waste, fraud and abuse .” Blackwater should answer for
the crimes of its soldiers in Iraq. But it shouldn’t have soldiers in Iraq. Calls for withdrawal must
include troops like those who fired on the fleeing crowds in Nisour Square.

REGULATION CAN’T SOLVE MORAL OBJECTIONS ABOUT THE STATUS OF
CONTRTACTORS
Sarah Percy, Research Fellow -Oxford, 2007, From Mercenaries to Market: the rise and regulation of
private military companies, eds. S. Chesterman & C. Lehnardt, p. 23
All the moral objections (and, indeed, some of the practical objections not outlined here) to private force can be further
divided into objections about the status of private actors that use force and the activities of these actors.
Objections that focus on the actions of the private military industry, like the objection that a private actor
might be more likely to commit human rights abuses or lacks accountability, might be met or at least
diminished with regulation that is designed to control actions. On the other hand, objections that stem from the
status of the private military industry, based around the idea that the private use of force is morally
inappropriate, cannot be met by regulation as easily. These objections are fundamental; they are not objections to what
private fighters do, but an objection to what private fighters are: individuals or groups that exchange military services for financial
gain.
Analyzing moral objections is thus crucially important in understanding the potential for regulation of the private military industry.
Objections about activities might be met through regulation; the objection that private fighters do not kill
for an appropriate cause can be met by changes in practice; but the objection that private force undermines
the appropriate relationship between citizen and state is not so easily overcome.

MANY PROBLEMS WITH REGULATING PMSCs
Chia Lehnardt, NYU School of Law - Researcher, 2007, From Mercenaries to Market: the rise and
regulation of private military companies, eds. S. Chesterman & C. Lehnardt, p. 156
Of course, shifting conceptual boundaries will not render international law a sufficient tool to regulate the use
and conduct of PMCs. The enforcement problems of international law are well known. PMCs thrive in
weak and failing states which have little bargaining power and are unlikely to be in a position to monitor
and restrict PMC conduct, or to enforce the responsibility of another hiring state. Even where states are willing
and in principle able to monitor the activities of PMCs, the private nature of PMCs provides them with means of
protection from scrutiny not available to public actors, such as arguments of privacy and client
confidentiality. Issues of extraterritorial jurisdiction compound the problem.
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PMCs – Sherry Hall

                AT: “Contract Law Holds PMSCs Accountable”
CONTRACT LAW INADEQUATE TO REGULATE ACTIONS OF PMSCs
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 129
Here is where the interesting quandary appears. According to recent research, even though contracts are made within an
almost hyper-legal setting, legal remedies are rarely used; instead, the relationship is merely broken off . The
market takes care of faulty contracts by punishing those who consistently fall short of expectations.
“On the one hand, most political, economic, and social theory suggests that in the market economy the law of
contract comprises a fundamental mechanism of social order . Lawyers…in their emphasis on the fundamental of the
law of contract within the legal system, hold that this legal regulation provides the crucial element in sustaining the social system. On
the other hand, evidence from empirical studies of contractual behavior indicates the marginal and sometimes
socially disintegrative effects of the law of contract. Consumers who purchase defective products almost
never vindicate their legal rights in the courts.” (Collins 1999).
Applying the legal regime of contract law to constrain the behavior of private military companies, we are struck by two facts. First,
the actual regulations that apply to military contractors and firms are diffuse, and confusing. They do not
contribute to the creation of a comprehensible legal identity for any of the actors .
Planet Debate                                                                                                                    45
PMCs – Sherry Hall

                         AT: “Are Subject to US Legal Control”
PMSC POSSESSION OF PROHIBITED WEAPONS PROVES THAT THE US GOVERNMENT
CONTROL OVER THEM IS INADEQUATE
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 167
One recent problem has been the indeterminacy of weaponry employed in certain armed PMSC operations .
The matter is not one resolved through reliance on corporate adherence to states’ requirements consistent with international
agreements and norms. Company personnel working for US-based PMSCs face lethal risks in places like Iraq
and Afghanistan. They may not consider it in their interests to eschew what Steve Fainaru of The Washington Post
Foreign Service described as “prohibited” weapons. In his example, “Crescent Security” personnel at Tallil air base in Iraq were
found in possession of fragmentation grenades and anti-armor weapons. This matters because the US military has proscribed
company possession of these weapons, yet the firm’s employees saw fit to procure and possess them with the intention to use them in
the hazardous circumstances of their employment. This was the case in spite of the fact that the US government is at least as modern
as most others and its armed forces are probably no less effective in administration and enforcement where this role falls to them.
To company staff the possession of this hardware may have appeared prudent and sensible in their violent
situation. They may even have been correct. But the larger point is not that the company personnel may have
breached various contractual and legal obligations. The significance is twofold: first, the opinion of
corporate agents regarding suitable weapons differed from the view held by representatives of their
principal (that is, agencies of the US government); and second, company employees were prepared to act upon this
conviction. This is a classical variant of a principal/agent control dilemma, where the parties’ intentions
differ notwithstanding the precision with which their contract is drawn. This would not occur (or would be a
different type of problem) if company tasks had been carried out b y the US military or State Department.
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PMCs – Sherry Hall

                                       PMSCs Like Mercenaries
PMSCs SHARE MANY DANGEROUS AND NEGATIVE TRAITS WITH MERCENARIES
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 12-3
To those who express confusion about what private military and security contractors are, there is a ready answer:
they are merely modern versions of the age-old mercenary fighter, a throwback to the day of mercenaries and
pirates, private actors wielding deadly force as proxies for governments and corporations. This negative
characterization is one that PMSCs have been unable to shake.
Two related criticisms have always dogged mercenaries: lack of discipline and lack of reliability. At least
since the beginning of the modern state system, every description of them refers to their general untrustworthiness
and risk aversion. Frederick the Great, in the eighteenth century, claimed that contracted mercenary forces
possessed “neither courage, nor loyalty, nor group spirit, nor sacrifice, nor self-reliance.” Clausewitz noted that
the contracted forces he observed were “an expensive and therefore small military force. Even smaller was their fighting valued:
extremes of energy or exertion were conspicuous by their absence and fighting was generally a sham” (Clausewitz 1976).
PMSCs garner the same criticism. Any attempt to legitimize the business has been met with the suspicion
that security contractors or the firms they work for are ineffective, untrustworthy, undisciplined, disloyal,
corrupt, and generally renegade. We hear about the “cowboy” attitude of security contractors, endangering
regular military forces with their bravado, or we hear of contractors underperforming – doing an
incomplete or substandard job, and then running away with the money. There is good evidence that these claims are
often exaggerated, and historical examples of organized mercenary groups have often belied this criticism. Certainly, regular troops
also shirk and mutiny and underperform. But in comparison to regular, state-based militaries, who can be ordered
into combat under highly policed command-and-control structures security contractors most often seem
like just a trumped-up version of their mercenary cousins: as both a risk to operational control and risk-
averse. Nothing captures this tension like the ongoing debate about the use of the “M” word.

CRITICISMS OF MERCENARIES APPLICABLE TO PMSCs IN IRAQ
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 40
Yet the adventures of two generations ago would be out of place in the corporatized private military and
security companies of today. This is not to deny that one might reasonably oppose some mercenaries as a
matter of principle. Those employed several decades ago against indigenous groups by colonialists or neo-colonialists are one
example. Infamous and ultimately unsuccessful units of mixed competence notoriously fought in the Congo
and elsewhere in Africa during the 1960s. Opposing that kind of violence and those who engaged in it has seemed ethical
to anti-colonialists in particular. More recently, paramilitary PMSCs in Iraq have engaged in excessive
violence in the absence of a functional criminal justice regime. To oppose their deployment in the absence
of proper criminal restraint is another reasonable view.

PRIVATE MILITARY CORPORATIONS ARE CORPORATE ENTITIES THAT ORGANIZE
MERCENARY FORCES
Allan Gerson & Nat J. Colletta, International Relations Professors at George Washington University,
2002, Privatizing Peace; From Conflict to Security, p. 89-90
Before examining the benefits and risks of private security companies, it is important to first define and differentiate between
private military companies (PMCs) and private security companies (PSCs). This distinction is essential to
an assessment of the role of the UN and other multilateral agencies play in addressing problems which
require both political neutrality and the application of military force.
Abdel-Fatuau Musah, of the Center for Democracy and Development in London and a long-time student of private military
and security groups in Africa, defines PMCs as follows: “Private Military Companies are corporate entities comprising
military and intelligence entrepreneurs whose activities include but are not co-extensive with: organizing
mercenaries into temporary armies for combat operations in foreign conflicts on behalf of a party to the
said conflict; procuring war material and logistics; providing military training and advice and acting as
force multipliers to clients’ armies; intelligence gathering on behalf of the client state/party to conflict and
or foreign states; and guarding installations and providing VIP escort . PMCs usually pay cash to their personnel and
receive payment both in the form of cash and in kind typically in the form of mineral concessions from their clients. Gurkha Security
Guards, Sandline International, and the now defunct Executive Outcomes are examples of PMCs.”
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PMCs – Sherry Hall

                                      PMSCs are Private Armies
BLACKWATER IS A PRIVATE ARMY WITH HIGH TECH MILITARY WEAPONS AND
SUPPLIES
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 3
Eric Prince is the well-known proprietor and recently departed chief executive of ‘Blackwater’, a PMSC having a brief history of
operational effectiveness colored by multiple criminal justice issues. His past employees or contractors today face allegations of
multiple manslaughter, firearms trafficking and murder while associated with his company. US Congressional and Senate
opponents tend to portray Prince as a ruthless war profiteer. He has certainly secured rapid and spectacular
profits from the US treasury in a controversial fashion. Aside from these matters his firm is noteworthy for other
reasons. The company draws on probably unequalled industry resources in a range of logistic and
paramilitary capabilities. For example, Blackwater possesses light fixed wing transport and at least one
propeller-driven ground attack aircraft; several helicopters and a sizable anti-piracy ship; company
designed and manufactured armored personnel carriers and dirigibles – the latter created for surveillance
purposes. Equally important is access to a formidable range of military expertise which can be deployed to
carry out a range of tasks or to train others, either in the US or elsewhere .
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PMCs – Sherry Hall

                                 PMSCs Driven by Profit Motive
PMSC CULTURE FUNDAMENTALLY DISTINCT FROM THE SOLDIER – PROFIT MOTIVE
AND PUBLIC INTEREST DO NOT ALIGN
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 31-2
When industry members make this claim, they are arguing that the profession of the soldier is not dependent on
actual current attachment to a military; it is a way of live that extends beyond active service . But, while it
may be true that the public values of the professional soldier may outlast service in the military, it is not clear that
they mesh as well with the private values of a PMSC. As one retired US general put it, “The profit motive
never aligns 100 percent with the public interest.” PMSC defenders reply to this criticism by noting that
motivation should not be the deciding factor: “Who cares why the go? All that matters is what they do when they
get there.” This focus on the final outcome, however, ignores the argument that organizational culture
matters: actions are framed in different ways depending on whether you are working for a PMSC or a
military. Colonel Thomas Hammes has been one of the most outspoken critics of the idea that military culture can be easily
exported to other types of organizations: ‘
“And oftentimes the terms of the contract,           will actually be in tension with what needs to be done, because
contracting, you try to be about efficiency. Wartime is not about efficiency, it’s about effectiveness . The
American way of war is ‘We don’t care what it costs. Let’s get it done right and save lives.’ Contracting is about the most
efficient way rather than the most effective way.” (Garviria and Smith 2005)
The culture of the soldier and the culture of the business professional are often described as diametrically
opposed. To use Max Weber’s language, the “calling” of each is dramatically different. For the soldier , at least in
the version of soldiering popularized by military historians and theorists of the modern state, the call was to a way of life
marked by group norms, physical and mental discipline, sacrifice for a larger political entity (the nation-state,
or an ideology), and the subordination of individuals to group goals and identities .

SIERRA LEONE EXPERIENCE PROVES THAT PROFIT MOTIVE DISTORTS THE QUALITY
OF PROTECTION FROM THE PMSC
Sarah Percy, Research Fellow -Oxford, 2007, From Mercenaries to Market: the rise and regulation of
private military companies, eds. S. Chesterman & C. Lehnardt, p. 17
A variation on this argument is that private actors, who are interested only in profit rather than the good of the
state, will fight only in areas where there are profits, bringing security only to some states and only to some
parts of those states. In Sierra Leone, “wherever they [EO] went, civilians stopped dying. The trouble was
that they only went where the payoff was high.” David Shearer alleges that EO’s strategy in Sierra Leone was
financial; because it was partially paid in diamond concessions, Sierra Leone’s diamond areas were opened
first. According to these arguments, security in Sierra Leone was geographically specific; it was not supplied as a
public good. Because EO was not motivated by the common good, it behaved in a way that did not ensure
the common good. The power of the moral objection in this case is fascinating, because it was made even in a situation where it
could be argued that the state was no more motivated by notions of the common good than were PMCs. In Sierra Leone, where
financial and military collusion between rebels and state soldiers was so rife that soldiers became known as “sobels,” or soldier-rebels,
it seems certain that security was not provided as a public good. Moral objections can prevent clear-headed analysis of a situation.
Planet Debate                                                                                                                         49
PMCs – Sherry Hall

                                  PMSCs Driven by Profit Motive
PMSCs INCREASE LIKELIHOOD OF BRIBERY
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 111-2
Management may also behave deviously in lobbying and competition tactics. A contractor might seek to
influence the views of elites within P5 states and the rotating ten members of the Security Council. This could be
achieved through funding key political parties or patronizing their leaders and providing allies with a
revolving door of corporate sinecures. Something not wholly dissimilar has been an unremarkable convention in the West
for decades. Contractor representatives may also toil at influence peddling, wider political donations and some
judicious but effective bribery. Some of the targeted leaders may also be politically intolerant. Their electorates – if that is a
meaningful concept—may know nothing of campaign or other contributions supplied by ambitious tenderers. And in authoritarian
states, inquiries into benefits paid to cabinet members or senior civil servants seem improbable. Contractors are also likely to
have assiduously studied the legal environment in which influence buying might be a lawful if discreet
enterprise. If or when elected to the Security Council, a newly pliant government may exhibit unexpected approval
of privatization measures. Those responsible will understandably wish to maximize company chances of
securing a contract. And they will quickly realize that prerogatives held by the Security Council are
exercised through a process known for its obscurity. Profit for a PMSC investor should be relatively
generous compared to the return on other investments, as a UN enterprise will almost certainly be littered with plentiful
dangers. Nevertheless, the specter of attractive profits will also be an incentive to engage in sharp practice and
political gamesmanship.

PROFIT MOTIVE MEANS THAT THERE IS NO GUARANTEE THAT PMSCs WILL
PROMOTE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 123
While the effects of private military intervention were beneficial in Sierra Leone and Angola, the corporate interests
responsible viewed stability as valuable only in so far as involvement in violence lading to the stability
generated profit. A PMC may create socially constructive circumstances. Equally, it may not . The point is
that a PMC is not necessarily an ideological ally of democracy or any other kind of government. And if one accepts the
thesis Stevens called “the militarized commerce” of diamond mining in Angola by EO affiliate DiamondWorks, this could prove a
model for future corporate conduct in extractive industry within collapsed stats . Although EO’s military effectiveness
shortened the conflict in this state, Stevens emphasizes the militarized defense of assets, effective bribery
and exclusion of indigenes from the bulk of the benefits obtained.
This view concludes that extractive industry removes part of a nation’s capital and very probably places it in the
hands of a few foreigners identified as neo-colonialists. Control of such wealth is thought to provide an unhealthy influence
which no modern national-state should tolerate. If this analysis is accurate, the principles of political economy one might glean are at
least unsettling. PMCs in Africa might be viewed as a free market tool of an increasingly globalized economy
through which foreign shareholders rather than a distressed citizenry are likely to determine what is done
with national wealth. If it is true that the price of security has been consideration in the form of rights to exploit assets of
considerable value, one is at least bound to include the value extracted in assessing the genuine price paid for services rendered.
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PMCs – Sherry Hall

                                  PMSCs Driven by Profit Motive
FACT THAT PMSCs ARE DRIVEN BY PROFIT MOTIVE MEANS THEY ARE LESS LIKELY
TO ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY FOR MISTAKES
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 155-6
Brooks’ notion that PMSCs would take action against delinquent employees was especially doubtful. An
obvious conflict of interest arises, something which becomes more pointed should delinquents be in management rather than
uniformed ranks. The fact that Brooks thinks in this fashion hints at a broader problem. He promotes a corporatized system
of administration which has no equivalent to those necessary disciplinary instruments armies properly
carry. A chain of command, military laws, criminal investigators, military police, courts-martial and
penitentiaries are all absent. The inevitable consequence is that when challenged over allegations of misconduct
involving violence in Iraq or Afghanistan, American corporate management reacts defensively according to
principles routinely applied in US litigation. Management is not necessarily to be condemned for this, as the problem is not wholly of
their making. But in the absence of a coercive apparatus analogous to those integral to military forces,
management will serve predictable interests. In descending order these are; its own and irregularly those of
its shareholders, sometimes employees, less often contractors and rarely foreign citizens harmed by
corporate negligence or more international employee villainy.

PROFIT MOTIVE COMPLICATES INCENTIVES
Suzanne Simons, CNN Executive Producer, 2009, Master of War: Blackwater USA’s Erik Prince and the
Business of War, p. 225-6
Nobody can accuse Blackwater of actively encouraging the drug trade in Afghanistan. Yet, as any economist can recognize, the
company’s incentives were complicated: as long as the drug trade continued, and as long as the company
remained in the good graces of the Afghan and U.S. governments, it would have work. Prince’s men had been
contracted to help train narcotics officers in the NIU. Intercepting drug shipments was not a job for the faint of heart.
Drug traffickers had successfully been transporting poppy out of the country on the backs of donkeys
traveling narrow mountainous passes along the border. Other drug runners had loaded the drug into the back of pickup
trucks, often taking little effort to cover it up. Those shipments had been fairly easily detected, but stopping a drug shipment one truck
at a time wasn’t going to stop the flow of narcotics out of the country. Afghans had to be trained in more aggressive tactics, such as
how to conduct a successful raid, how to collect and interpret intelligence, and how to fight their way out of an ambush. Many parts
of Afghanistan were still under the influence of powerful drug lords who ruled their territory with an iron fist.
Being a part of the Pentagon’s Narcoterrorism Technology program would also be profitable. Five
companies stood to support the program, worth up to $15 billion. Blackwater had a K-9 unit back at Moyock that
trained dogs in explosives and drug detection, and Prince knew the dogs could do the same work in Afghanistan. He would soon send
over a dog and a handler to prove his point.

PROFIT MOTIVE ENCOURAGES LONGER CONFLICTS
Allan Gerson & Nat J. Colletta, International Relations Professors at George Washington University,
2002, Privatizing Peace; From Conflict to Security, p. 92
The biggest obstacle to the use of private security forces is the difficulty in regulating their performance,
particularly in regard to human rights violations and conflicts of interest. In effect, as war is profitable for a security
business, there is a “moral hazard” in employing forms whose profits depend upon the continuation, rather
than termination, of war.
Planet Debate                                                                                                                         51
PMCs – Sherry Hall

                                  PMSCs Driven by Profit Motive
PMC USE FORMS A NEW NEOLIBERAL MODEL OF THE SOLDIER WHOSE BEHAVIOR IS
DRIVEN SOLELY BY MARKET MECHANISMS – THIS ACTS AS A REINFORCEMENT OF
NEOLIBERAL ECONOMIC SYSTEMS WHERE ONLY CAPITAL HAS MEANING
Krahmann, 10, [Elke, Senior Lecturer in International Relations Department of Politics University of
Bristol “State, Citizens and the Privatisation of Security”, Pgs. 265-268, dgeorge]
While contemporary Neoliberal theorists have primarily based their argument on the state and the economy, the general principles of
democratic control outlined in the preceding section are also applicable to the armed forces. The primary aim of these principles is to
increase the ability of citizens to choose between competing security providers and to use market mechanisms to promote compliance
with popular policy preferences and norms. Neoliberals, such as Friedman, have traditionally seen the professional soldier as the ideal
embodiment of these principles. “Over the past decades, however, the private military contractor has increasingly
emerged as a new Neoliberal model of the soldier. According to Neoliberal thought, the democratic control
and accountability of this model rests on four characteristics: professionalism, private standard-setting,
globalization, and specialization and civilianization The professionalization of private military contractors
is an important condition for the emergence of a Neolíberal system of democratic control over the
legitimate use of violence by private security providers. The transition from freelance mercenaries to
incorporated private military companies has been the foundation for this development. 'While mercenaries
operate outside the legal framework of the market, private military companies recognize and work within
its formal and informal rules. The contemporary private military industry is a legitimate participant in the
marketplace bound by business and contractual law and the mechanisms of competition, supply and
demand. Private military companies have become subject to judicial prosecution for contractual obligations and to concerns about
business reputation and industry best practice. Both mechanisms enable governments and citizens to exert direct
control over the industry as consumers of private military services."` In addition, professionalization defines
democratic standards of behavior for the individual military' and security contractor, According to Avant, military professionalism
incorporates several cure principles: civilian control of the military, abidance by the rule of law, respect for human rights and the laws
the entry of private military companies into the public marketplace the same professional principles play an important role in the
social and democratic control of private military contractors. Private military firms have an interest in ensuring that their employees
comply with these standards to protect their reputation and profits, and to prevent costly law suits. For these reasons the
professionalization of the industry has already progressed significantly. Contemporary private military companies are incorporated
businesses with boards of directors, fixed headquarters and huge numbers of personnel. The largest and most well-known firms, such
as KBR, CSC with its subsidiary DynCorp, and Communicalions with MPRI and Titan, arc joint stock companies floated on stuck
markets. Many Enns comply with professional industry management standards such as ISO 9001 and some companies have developed
their own codes of conduct, such as Erinys, Control Risks and Triple Canopy.“ The professionalization of private military
contractors is closely linked lo private standard-setting and the self-regulation of the sector. As argued in the
preceding section, they enhance democratic control and accountability since they facilitate the self-government
of private firms and the transmission of consumer preferences regarding corporate standards and private
business behaviour through market mechanisms. In terms of the private military contractor as the new model of the
soldier, it means that individual behaviour has not only to comply with public law, but also a growing range of
subsidiary regulations and standards. Since industry self-regulation frequently lacks convincing punitive measures, the
socialization of employees becomes crucial for ensuring the effectiveness of these regulations. So far, private military businesses have
largely relied on the professional standards many of their personnel have acquired through training within national armed forces, But
some private military such as DynCorp are requiring employees ro sign :1 pledge to their firm’s code of conduct or to enroll in
training courses before certain deployments. The globalization of the market for private military contractors is
another factor in the democratic control over armed forces according to Neoliberal thought. Specifically, the
globalization of personnel recruitment and industry competition increases the choice that states and citizens
have between alternative security providers, thus exerting pressure to conform to public norms and
expectations. In a global market consumers of private military services can easily replace contractors who
do not abide by the law or professional standards with those who do. Moreover, globalization allows
companies to use local personnel and expertise and, thus, work in a more cost-efficient and effective
rnanner. Finally, global private military firms and contractors can be employed in international crisis
management," Transnational actors who lack armed forces, such as international] organizations or NGOs,
particularly benefit from a globalization of the market for private military contractors. The resulting ability
of non-state actors to address. transnational security threats where state action is slow or prevented by
intergovernmental diplomacy contributes to the provision of security at subsidiary levels and receives its
democratic legitimacy, at least partly, from the donations and personal participation of citizens who feel
directly concerned about these security issues. (CONTINUES NEXT PAGE – NO TEXT SKIPPED)
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                                 PMSCs Driven by Profit Motive
(CONTINUES PREVIOUS PAGE, NO TEXT SKIPPED)
Owing to its advantages, a global market for private military personnel and firms has indeed been emerging over
the past decades. As noted in the preceding chapters, in Iraq private military staff have come from a variety of countries, ranging
from the USA and the UK to Fiji and Ukraine. In addition to states, international organizations and NGOS have gained from thc
growing competitive global market for private military contractors. The USA, the UN, the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOVVAS), the African Union and a range of NGOs have hired private military contractors to supply :1 variety of
peacekeeping and pence support functions ranging from demining to logistics and personnel protection.’ Finally, the increasing
specialization of private military personnel and the associated civilìanization of their identity can enhance
the democratic control over private contractors. In this view, specialization facilitates the reduction of state-controlled
armed forces by separating combat from support functions and by limiting national militaries to the former, Specialization within the
private military industry also contributes to differentiating between military and civilian means for combating contemporary security
threats. The outsourcing of non-military tasks to private contractors highlights the civilian nature of a large
section of contemporary security provision and can help to ‘de-scrutinize”’ threats such as terrorism, crime
and migration and move them from State to private security provision.
The second is the civilianization and privatization of contemporary security management. While there is some
empirical evidence for such developments, there can only be established in the long term. So far, cuts in the armed forces in the UK
and the USA have been outweighed by the employment of private contractors. Moreover, efforts of the US and UK governments to
include private military personnel within the rules and regulations of their national armed forces have blurred the boundaries between
soldiers and contractors instead of civilianizing security. In conclusion, Neooliberalists suggest that a return to the
theory’s core principles can contribute to improving democratic control and accountability of contemporary
armed forces in multiple ways. Firstly, professionalization, industry self-regulation and private standard-
setting encourage the compliance of individual private military contractors with democratic norms,
expectations and processes. Neoliberal forms of self-governance thereby aim to address the weaknesses of
nation-states with regard to the transnational regulation of private military personnel. Secondly, the
globalization of the market for private contractors gives. states and citizens as customers a greater choice of
security personnel and firms. Increased global competition promotes democratic control and accountability
since consumers are less dependent 'upon individual contractors. Thirdly, the specialization of military and
security contractors helps to distinguish between combat and civilian functions and, thus, can highlight the
decreased utility of military means in combating present security threats.
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                                             PMSCs Driven by Profit Motive
THAT JUSTIFIES WAGING UNENDING WARS AGAINST ALL GROUPS THAT DON’T
CONFORM TO THOSE MARKET NORMS
Giroux, 05, Henry A. Giroux 2005 (The Terror of Neoliberalism: Rethinking the Significance of Cultural
Politics http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/25115243.pdf Henry A. Giroux holds the Global TV Network
Chair in Communications at McMaster in Hp.13-14)
Corporate power increasingly frees itself from any political limitations just as it uses its power through the educational force of the dominant culture to put into place an utterly
privatized notion of agency in which it becomes difficult for young people and adults to imagine democracy as a public good, let alone the transformative power of collective
action. Once again, democratic politics has become ineffective                              , if not banal, as civic language is impoverished and genuine spaces for democratic
learning, debate, and dialogue such as schools, newspapers, popular culture, television networks, and other public spheres are either underfunded, eliminated, privatized, or subject
                   Under the aggressive politics and culture of neoliberalism, society is increasingly mobilized for the
to corporate ownership.
production of violence against the poor, immigrants, dissenters, and others marginalized because of their age, gender,
race, ethnicity, and color. At the center of neoliberalism is a new form of politics in the United States, a politics in which
radical exclusion is the order of the day, and in which the primary questions no longer concern equality,
justice, or freedom, but are now about the survival of the slickest in a culture marked by fear, surveillance,
and economic deprivation. This is a politics that hides its own ideology by eliminating the traces of its power in a rhetoric of normalization, populism, and the
staging of public spectacles. As Susan George points out, the question that currently seems to define neoliberal "democracy" is "Who has a right to live or does not"
          Neoliberalism is not a neutral, technical, economic discourse that can be measured with the
(1999,para.34).
precision of a mathematical formula or defended through an appeal to the rules of a presumptively unassailable science that conveniently leaves its own
history behind. Nor is it a paragon of economic rationality that offers the best "route to optimum efficiency, rapid economic growth and innovation, and rising prosperity for all
                                                                                                  neoliberalism is an ideology, a politics,
who are willing to work hard and take advantage of available opportunities" (Kotz 2003, 16). On the contrary,
and at times a fanaticism that subordinates the art of democratic politics to the rapacious laws of a market
economy that expands its reach to include all aspects of social life within the dictates and values of a
market-driven society. More important, it is an economic and implicitly cultural theory-a historical and socially constructed ideology that needs to be made visible,
critically engaged, and shaken from the stranglehold of power it currently exercises over most of the commanding institutions of national and global life. As such,
neoliberalism makes it difficult for many people either to imagine a notion of individual and social agency
necessary for reclaiming a substantive democracy or to be able to theorize the economic, cultural, and
political conditions necessary for a viable global public sphere in which public institutions, spaces, and
goods become valued as part of a larger democratic struggle for a sustainable future and the downward
distribution of wealth, resources, and power. As a public pedagogy and political ideology, the neoliberalism of Friedrich Hayek (1994) and Milton
Friedman (2002) is far more ruthless than the classic liberal economic theory developed by Adam Smith and David Ricardo in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
Neoliberalism has become the current conservative revolution because it harkens back to a period in American history that supported the sovereignty of the market over the
sovereignty of the democratic state and the common good. Reproducing the future in the image of the distant past, it represents a struggle designed to roll back, if not dismantle, all
of the policies put into place over seventy years ago by the New Deal to curb corporate power and give substance to the liberal meaning of the social contract. The late Pierre
Bourdieu captures what is new about neoliberalism in his comment that neoliberalism is a new kind of conservative revolution [that] appeals to progress, reason and science
(economics in this case) to justify the restoration and so tries to write off progressive thought and action as archaic. It sets up as the norm of all practices, and therefore as ideal
                                                                                             It reifies and glorifies the reign of what
rules, the real regularities of the economic world abandoned to its own logic, the so-called laws of the market .
are called the financial markets, in other words the return to a kind of radical capitalism, with no other law than that of maximum profit, an unfettered
capitalism without any disguise, but rationalized, pushed to the limit of its efficacy by the introduction of modern forms of domination, such as 'business administration', and
                                                       Neoliberalism has indeed become a broad-based
techniques of manipulation, such as market research and advertising. (Bourdieu 1998, 35)
political and cultural movement designed to obliterate public concerns and liquidate the welfare state, and
make politics everywhere an exclusively market-driven project (Leys 2001). But neoliberalism does more than make the market "the
informing principle of politics" (Duggan 2003, 34), while allocating wealth and resources to those who are most privileged by virtue of their class, race, and power. Its supporting
political culture and pedagogical practices also put into play a social universe and cultural landscape that sustain a particularly bar baric notion of authoritarianism, set in motion
under the combined power of a religious and market fundamentalism and anti-terrorism laws that suspend civil liberties, incarcerate disposable populations, and provide the
security forces necessary for capital to destroy those spaces where democracy can be nourished. All the while, the landscape and soundscape become increasingly homogenized
through the spectacle of flags waving from every flower box, car, truck, and house, encouraged and supplemented by jingoistic bravado being broadcast by Fox Television News
                                                          neoliberalism tells a very limited story, one that is
and Clear Channel radio stations. As a cultural politics and a form of economic domination,
antithetical to nurturing democratic identities, values, public spaces, and institutions and thereby enables
fascism to grow because it has no ethical language for recognizing politics outside of the realm of the
market, for controlling market excesses, or for challenging the underlying tenets of a growing
authoritarianism bolstered by the pretense of religious piety. Neoliberal ideology, on the one hand, pushes for the
privatization of all non-commodified public spheres and the upward distribution of wealth. On the other hand, it supports policies that
increasingly militarize facets of public space in order to secure the privileges and benefits of the corporate elite and ultra-rich.
Neoliberalism does not merely produce economic inequality, iniquitous power relations, and a corrupt
political system; it also promotes rigid exclusions from national citizenship and civic participation. As Lisa
Duggan points out, "Neoliberalism cannot be abstracted from race and gender relations, or other cultural aspects of the body politic.
Its legitimating discourse, social relations, and ideology are saturated with race, with gender, with sex, with religion, with ethnicity,
and nationality" (2003, xvi). Neoliberalism comfortably aligns itself with various strands of neoconservative and
religious fundamentalisms waging imperial wars abroad as well as at home against those groups and
movements that threaten its authoritarian misreading of the meaning of freedom, security, and
productiveness.
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PMCs – Sherry Hall

                                  PMSCs Driven by Profit Motive
PMC PRESENCE IS AN EXPLICIT ENDORSEMENT OF NEOLIBERALISM – SHIFTS THE
STATE’S MONOPOLY OVER VIOLENCE TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR
Schreier and Caparini, 05,
[Fred, consultant with the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces and Swiss Ministry of Defense and Marina,
Senior Fellow at the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces and Ph.D., King’s College, University of London,
“Privatising Security: Law, Practice and Governance of Private Military and Security Companies,” p. 46, March, Geneva Centre For
The Democratic Control Of Armed Forces, GScholar,
http://se2.dcaf.ch/serviceengine/Files/DCAF/18346/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/BA695123-3145-4CAA-B29A-
A60711724C96/en/op06_privatising-security.pdf]/galperin
Perhaps the most important factor in the recent rise of the PMC and PSC industry is the normative shift
toward the marketisation of the public sphere: the privatization revolution – the ultimate representation of neo-
liberalism12 – which provides the logic, legitimacy, and models for the entrance of markets into formerly
public sector domains. Privatization has gone hand in hand with globalization. Both dynamics are supported
by the belief that comparative advantage and competition maximize efficiency and effectiveness. Privatization
has been touted as a testament to the superiority of the marketplace over government in provision of certain
services. Outsourcing expenditures topped $1 trillion worldwide by 2001, doubling in just 3 years.13 And the pressure for
outsourcing will not subside. For example, for a number of years it has been official British government policy to outsource
certain defence functions. Britain’s public-private partnership, dubbed “Private Finance Initiative”, is all about “paying privately for
the defence we cannot afford publicly”.14 Thus, transport planes, ships, trucks, training, and accommodations may all
be provided on long term leases from private firms. The equipment will be leased to other customers during
down time. Pilot training of the Royal Air Force is largely outsourced,15 and up to 80 percent of all army training now
involves civilian contractors in some way.16

PMCS ONLY SERVE FINANCIAL INTERESTS- CONTRACTORS EXACERBATE CONFLICT
FOR PROFIT
Salzman 8 [Zoe,New York University School of Law 2008 “Private Military Contractors And The Taint Of A
Mercenary Reputation” International Law And Politics [Vol. 40:853 /hnasser]
http://www.law.nyu.edu/ecm_dlv2/groups/public/@nyu_law_website__journals__journal_of_international_law_and_p
olitics/documents/documents/ecm_pro_058877.pdf
Similarly, there is often a vast difference between the public good that the state’s use of force is meant
to achieve and the private good that is the desired result for a PMC. 118 A PMC is a corporation and, like
any other corporation, it “work[s] for the shareholder . . . [ and its] job is to go out and make the most
money for those people.”119 Unlike a state, which is under pressure to resolve conflicts, there is little
incentive for private contractors to encourage the resolution of the conflicts 120 that motivated their hire
in the first place. Thus, when military force is sold as a commodity on the market, there is a risk that
private contractors, who “directly benefit from the existence of war and suffering,” 121 will aggravate a
conflict situation in order to keep their profits high.122 For example, “[t]here have. . .been allegations that
Halliburton has run additional but unnecessary supply convoys through Iraq because it gets paid by the trip”—a clear case of
a company’s incentive to turn a higher profit leading it to risk aggravating the conflict.123 In sum,
“[s]oldiers serve their country; contractors serve their managers and shareholders.” 124 Nevertheless, a
PMC does have reputational concerns that generally encourage it to perform its contract successfully,
which in many cases may help resolve the conflict.125 Even if their participation can sometimes assist in the immediate, short-
term resolution of a given conflict, however, on a broader level contractors can “worsen the conditions for long-term
stability.”126 Private contractors can be used to “help prop up rogue regimes, resist struggles for self-
determination, and contribute to the proliferation and diffusion of weaponry and soldiers around the
world—axiomatically a destabilizing and thus undesirable phenomenon.”127 In addition, private contractors sometimes
remain in a country after the conflict (and their contract) has ended. This happened in Sierra Leone, where the
government paid for the contractors’ services in mining subsidiaries, leading the PMC Executive Outcomes to retain a militarized
presence in Sierra Leone long after its contract had ended in order to protect these mining assets.128 This militarized presence
destabilized the already vulnerable country by creating a parallel force that ultimately became a challenge to the national
army.129
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PMCs – Sherry Hall

                                PMSCs Driven by Profit Motive
CREATING VIOLENCE FOR PROFIT UNDERMINES THE STABILITY OF HUMAN LIFE-
VIOLENCE IS A NATURAL EXPRESSION WHICH SHOULD NOT BE CHANNELED FOR
MONETARY PURPOSES
Sheehy, 10
[Benedict Sheehy, School of Law University of Newcastle, Jackson N. Maogoto, Dr. of Philosophy , March 7TH 2010, “THE
PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANY—UNRAVELLING THE THEORETICAL, LEGAL & REGULATORY MOSAIC”,
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1044&context=jackson_maogoto]
A safe peaceful environment and fair and effective political process are the driving and ultimate objectives
in developing/maintaining paradigms of ordering human affairs; meaning achieving this is and ought to be
the priority of all policy decisions. The issue of whether the ordering involves public or private means,
and the related issues of economic efficiency and market liberties are secondary, as the dominant values
supporting human wellbeing are at stake. Accordingly, the matter of raw economic motivation for violence is
problematic, and its related sub-issue of violence for profit is highly problematic. Humanity’s history has
demonstrated time and time again that mankind is not driven by a single over-riding concern, whether capitalism’s economic
dominance, communism’s brutal equality, or Nietzsche’s will to power. Humans are complex creatures working from
a variety of different motivations, at times congruent and at times conflicting, all needed to make human life
sustainable, worthwhile, and decent. This drive for a sustainable, worthwhile, decent life embodied in the
political processes of the Nation-State should not be adumbrated by the will of a few with economic
power who are prepared to pay others committed to the delivery of efficient violence to assist the wealthy
who achieve their own narrow goals without due regard for the rest of the population and its interests.
While Clausewitz feared that “political, social, economic, and religious motives” had become “hopelessly entangled” in modern
warfare,8 it may well be that it is and has always been that way. Nevertheless, his comment alerts us to an important reality—the
resort to violence is too important an action to be left to the boardroom. Violence is the expression of a
number of important complex human motivators and should not simply be a cheaper or easier means for the
greedy or intransigent to gain power and/or monopolize resources. As these corporations become larger—both
economically and politically—corporate managers increasingly engage in decision-making traditionally
exercised by politicians.9 While the political process has its own worries and politicians have their own agendas, it provides
at least some level of transparency and accountability above that offered by the private corporate actor. It is thus unsettling
that PMCs dedicated to profiting by violence or potential violence have amassed power such that they can affect conflict
resolution, world economic stability, and geo-strategic negotiations, more so that their power stands
unchecked.10 A further alarm needs to be raised as the PMC, classified as a non-State actor, enjoys the rights
and privileges of a private actor, including the privileges of free movement, relatively minor scrutiny of
action, the privacy accorded to citizens, and lack of accountability to the general public, yet carries out
the functions of violence traditionally accorded to the State and subject to the correlated scrutiny and
accountability.
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PMCs – Sherry Hall

                                  PMSCs Driven by Profit Motive
PMCs CAUSE WAR – PROFIT MOTIVE UNDERMINES FOREIGN DEMOCRACY AND
INCREASES AGGRESSION
Orts, 02
[Eric Orts, Professor of Legal Studies and Management, Wharton School @ UPenn, “Corporate Governance, Stakeholder
Accountability, And Sustainable Peace,” http://www.wdi.umich.edu/files/Publications/WorkingPapers/wp427.pdf]/galperin
On the purely economic dimension, private corporations may seek to make profits and enhance shareholder value by
engaging in the business of war, that is, manufacturing and selling weapons, munitions, and military services. Recent
activities in this industry give a sense of the scale of this business. On October 27, 2001, the U.S. Defense Department awarded
the largest military contract in American history to Lockheed Martin Corporation in the amount of $200 billion for the building of
a new Joint Strike Fighter supersonic stealth jet.76 Also in October 2001, the U.S. Justice Department blocked a proposed
friendly acquisition of Newport News Shipbuilding by General Dynamics valued at $2.6 billion on the grounds that the deal
would create a monopoly in the construction and sale of nuclear-powered submarines and aircraft carriers.77 The government
prefers a merger between Newport News and Northrup Grumman.78 News of the September 11 bombing of the World
Trade Center and the Pentagon sent military stocks upwards.79 Similar, though perhaps smaller, connections
between business corporations and national military budgets apply to both companies and countries
outside the United States.80 Clearly, there is much money still to be made in war, and today business
corporations act as the primary vehicle for the purpose. Special issues of law and ethics arise in military contracting.
Billion-dollar contracts must create great temptations for corporate executives or other employees to
fudge the rules on political lobbying and fair economic competition. The regulation of government procurement
contracts has therefore been traditionally very detailed.81 In the United States, a large Defense Contract Auditing Agency
oversees defense procurement.82 Companies themselves recognize the special nature of the legal and ethical
problems they face, and the defense industry in the United States has organized a voluntary Defense Industry Initiative on
Business Ethics and Conduct.83 Another important issue involves the regulation of financial contributions to political
campaigns.84 Although it is not illegal for business corporations to contribute to the political process, the question arises
whether a military contractor should, as a matter of policy, have significant influence in choosing
political leaders. At least arguably, the economic objective should not allow corporations in the business of
war to support candidates with particularly aggressive foreign policy agendas . But these issues slide into the
topic of legal and ethical constraints on the economic objective. Before considering these important areas, however, I would like
to mention one troubling trend that raises the issue of whether business corporations should sometimes be banned from engaging
in at least some kinds of military profit-making. This trend relates to the recent increase in what have been called “private military
companies” (PMCs).85 In June 1997, the Pentagon held a conference on the “privatization of security” in sub- Saharan Africa.86
Members of a new growth industry of PMCs were on display, as well as the private security representatives of some large oil
companies, such as Texaco and Exxon.87 For example, Military Professional Resources, Incorporated (MPRI) claims “the
greatest corporate assemblage of military expertise in the world,” including seventeen retired U.S. generals as well as hundreds of
former U.S. Special Forces personnel.88 Vinnell Corporation is another example. It employs approximately 1,000 former U.S.
military personnel in training 65,000 members of the Saudi National Guard, the personal security contingent protecting the Saudi
Royal family.89 Executive Outcomes (EO) is a South African company that fields thousands of combat soldiers in sub-Saharan
Africa. EO’s air capabilities include a fleet of helicopters and MIG fighter jets.90 The existence and use of PMCs raises
a central question with respect to the economic objective of corporate law. Unlike informal or ad hoc
networks of mercenary armies in the past, PMCs today have developed a “distinct corporate nature,”
including “a desire for good public relations.”91 But are corporate “soldiers of fortune” to be accepted as just another
way of doing business? At least, the issue of the intrinsic legitimacy of these kinds of businesses arises. A
primary aspect of the claim to legitimacy by political states involves the assumed monopoly on military
force that they exercise. Private military companies threaten to erode this monopoly of coercive force.
The economic objective of maximizing shareholder value does not compare favorably with theories of
political democracy as a legitimate basis for the use of military force. A good argument can made, therefore, for
an international agreement to ban PMCs, though the social forces of globalization may make such an agreement difficult to
achieve. At the same time, it is accurate to observe that the rise of PMCs responds to “the pullback of western
nations and the United Nations from peacekeeping and peace enforcing” missions, especially in poor or
developing countries.92 At least, the international community should seek to regulate the actions and behavior of PMCs, probably
through an international treaty – in other words, through the development of morally informed legal constraints.93 Already in the
United States, for example, some regulation is provided under the Arms Export Control Act and the Export Administration Act.94
The Arms Export Control Act provides conditions for the foreign sale of U.S. goods and services, and the Export Administration
Act regulates the export and sale of so-called “dual-use” material that has both civilian and military applications.95 Similar
controls are imposed in other countries.96 International regulation of private companies engaged in the actual
provision of military services as “modern mercenaries,” however, is lacking, if not entirely absent .
Planet Debate                                                                                                                    57
PMCs – Sherry Hall

                          Profit Motive Makes PMSCs Immoral
FIGHTING FOR MONEY IS IMMORAL
Sarah Percy, Research Fellow -Oxford, 2007, From Mercenaries to Market: the rise and regulation of
private military companies, eds. S. Chesterman & C. Lehnardt, p. 17-8
There is a clear line of thought that to kill without an appropriate cause is unjustified and immoral, a line of
thought that runs from the middle ages until today. Again, it is important to emphasize that even though those
objections to mercenaries might be unfair, in that it is very difficult to prove the degree to which private
actors are motivated by money, or that a financial motivation leads to bad behavior, or indeed that the state or its forces are
motivated by the common good in a way that private fighters are not, they cannot be dismissed. This is in part because of
the prevailing belief, outlined above, that killing in warfare must be justified by, to use Bogden’s words, a
sentiment to hallow the use of arms. There are social rules about when killing is justified. When
individuals kill, we require a reason, such as self-defense. When states go to war, they too have been
required to supply reasons before they fight, in order to justify the lives lost. The problem with
mercenaries is that many people simply cannot accept their justification for fighting and killing. Of course,
one of the simplest solutions to the moral problems posed by fighting for money is to avoid actually fighting. Today’s PMCs, which
avoid combat, accordingly also avoid one of the main criticisms that can be leveled at the private security industry. Even if a PMC
were directly ordered by a state government to engage in combat and fight and kill, it is likely that moral disapproval over the
financial motivation of that fighting would continue.
Planet Debate                                                                                                                       58
PMCs – Sherry Hall

                               PMSCs Violate International Law
PMSCs VIOLATE INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 107
International humanitarian law (IHL) is the body of law that contains both human rights law and the law of armed combat
(LOAC), and since its twentieth-century codification, it has consistently banned any person on the battlefield that
might appear to be anything resembling a mercenary. The evolution of this negative norm is intertwined with the history
of the LOAC, and the attempt to legitimize certain kinds of combatants – those that can be made to obey the laws – and delegitimize
any combatant that does not fall under its legal umbrella (Percy 2007).
Although contracted or mercenary forces have been used in warfare from the very beginning of recorded
history, an anti-mercenary bias began to show itself in the laws of armed combat in the early twentieth
century, first with the Hague Convention of 1907, then with the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and again in he 1977
Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions. Some portions of these latter protocols remain unratified by the United States and
some other great powers, but they have in effect achieved the status of customary international law, recognized as legitimate, if not
entirely binding. Although PMSCs present themselves as being much more than trumped up bands of
mercenaries, it is important to understand both the law and the customs behind the anti-mercenary
prohibitions in international law.

LAW OF WAR NECESSARY TO SURVIVE WARS
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 118
To the uninitiated, it often seems strange that law appears in the midst of war. Centuries of civilization have realized that
war needs rules in order to be fought and survived. Even as war is transformed, the necessity of the rule of
law remains: to add some order the battlefield; to enable the return to some sort of peace and stability; and to distinguish those who
are honored and legitimate from those who are criminals or outlaws.
“Without law to define what is and is not permitted, there can be no war. Though written international law is comparatively recent,
previous ages were no less dependent on the war convention for their ability to fight…Before there was international law there were
bilateral treaties between kings. These in turn were preceded by the law of nature, the code of chivalry, the ius gentium, Greek
religion and custom, and earlier still, the customs and usage of tribal societies.” (van Creveld 1991).
In the late-modern era in which we find ourselves, the internationally codified laws of war have achieved what I would
term “canonical” status. They are treated as almost sacred repositories of what is right and just in warfare. In
recent testimony before the Senate Armed Forces Committee, military JAGS noted that the “Geneva Conventions an the
Uniform Code of Military Justice which honors them, represent the gold standard of the law of war (Zernike
2006).
Planet Debate                                                                                                                         59
PMCs – Sherry Hall

                               PMSCs Violate International Law
PMC’S VIOLATE INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW PRINCIPLES – THEY’RE
DEFINED AS CIVILIANS BY THE U.S. AND AREN’T ALLOWED TO PARTICIPATE IN
HOSTILITIES
Cameron, 07
[Lindsey, U of Geneva, “International Humanitarian Law and the Regulation of Private Military Companies”, Feb. 8-9,
http://www.baselgovernance.org/fileadmin/docs/pdfs/Nonstate/Cameron.pdf]/galperin
One of the fundamental principles of the IHL of international armed conflicts is that one must distinguish                    between
civilians and combatants, since it is only lawful to target combatants.16 The principle of distinction is
crucial to IHL’s ability to protect civilians from the violence of armed conflict. Furthermore, only combatants may
lawfully directly participate in hostilities: this is the “combatants’ privilege”.17 The fact that combatants may lawfully
directly participate in hostilities means that they are immune to prosecution for lawful acts of war – for example , killing enemy
soldiers – but not immune from prosecution for commission of violations of IHL . If captured, combatants have
the right to be prisoners of war unless they have failed to distinguish themselves from the civilian
population while fighting.18 The flipside to this “privilege” is that combatants may be directly targeted and killed with impunity by
opposing enemy combatants. Examples abound of PMC employees directly participating in hostilities, and
lobbying by the companies indicates that some seek a more robust role in combat operations generally;19
consequently, it is imperative to determine whether they are combatants under international humanitarian law such that
they may benefit from “combatants’ privilege”. Members of the armed forces of a (state) Party to a conflict are combatants.20 As one
author notes, this “confirms that lawful combatants act in a public capacity.” 21 International humanitarian law does not set
out the steps that states must take in order to incorporate individuals into their armed forces; that is a matter of
internal law.22 However, it does set out certain minimum requirements for those forces : they must be organized
under a command responsible to a Party to the conflict and subject to an internal disciplinary system.23
Incorporation of a PMC employee into the armed forces of a Party to a conflict therefore depends on the will and
internal legal regime of the state in question. It would be entirely possible for states to incorporate PMCs into their armed forces
if they choose to do so; if they did, PMC employees would have combatant status. However, the will of an individual to be a
member of a state’s armed forces, without more, is not sufficient for that individual to be a part of the armed
forces.24 The fact that some official form of incorporation is necessary is evidenced by the fact that a specific provision in the article
of Additional Protocol I defining combatants stipulates that states that incorporate their own police forces or other
paramilitary forces into their armed forces must inform the opposing side .25 This also suggests that i nternational
h umanitarian l aw anticipates that even though it is a matter of domestic law as to how members of armed
forces are recruited and registered within a state, it should be understandable to opposing forces precisely who
constitutes those forces.
Planet Debate                                                                                                                      60
PMCs – Sherry Hall

                               PMSCs Violate International Law
PMC USE VIOLATES INTERNATIONAL LAW – THEY’RE NOT VISIBLY MARKED AS
COMBATANTS
Schreier and Caparini, 05
[Fred, consultant with the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces and Swiss Ministry of Defense and Marina,
Senior Fellow at the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces and Ph.D., King’s College, University of London,
“Privatising Security: Law, Practice and Governance of Private Military and Security Companies,” p. 46, March, Geneva Centre For
The Democratic Control Of Armed Forces, GScholar,
http://se2.dcaf.ch/serviceengine/Files/DCAF/18346/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/BA695123-3145-4CAA-B29A-
A60711724C96/en/op06_privatising-security.pdf]/galperin
It is unclear exactly what laws apply to the privatized military and security industry. One great problem is the
ambiguous legal status of PMCs and PSCs in regard to existing international treaties relevant to conflict and war.
This is partly because the whole structure of diplomacy and international recognition rests on the state as a
cornerstone and building block of international law and international relations. There is no clarity about the exact
relationship between governments and private military and security companies. In their own interests, governments
and their military institutions often publicly distance themselves from such companies. Contractors do not fall under the
narrowly defined international laws on mercenaries. Nor do most national laws – where they exist at all – clearly apply to contractors.
In Iraq for example, US law does not fully apply to PMCs and PSCs because many of the contractors are not
American. Contractors are no longer restricted to acquisition and logistics but are found nearly everywhere. And their
presence in the battlespace is a reality. But PMC employees are not “noncombatants”,172 as unarmed contractors are under
the 4th Geneva Convention173 because they carry weapons and act on behalf of the government. However, they
are also not “lawful combatants” under the 3rd Geneva Convention174 because they do not wear regular uniforms
or answer to a military command hierarchy. These armed contractors do not fit the legal definition of mercenaries because that
definition requires that they work for a foreign government in a war zone in which their own country is not part of the fight. Thus
legally, they seem to fall into the same grey area as the unlawful combatants detained as suspected terrorists at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.175 This legal murkiness creates real problems in Iraq. International humanitarian law
(IHL) requires soldiers on both sides to distinguish between combatants and noncombatants . Armed
contractors wearing quasi-military outfits and body armour blur these distinctions, making it harder for the
enemy to play by the rules of war – assuming that insurgents and terrorists wanted to in the first place. And it leaves
armed contractors open to treatment by foreign governments as unlawful combatants . Should they stray into
neighbouring countries, for example, it is possible that they would be locked up on these grounds.
Planet Debate                                                                                                                       61
PMCs – Sherry Hall

                               PMSCs Violate International Law
PMC USE DESTROYS U.S. ILAW CREDIBILITY – THEY’RE UNACCOUNTABLE
Schreier and Caparini, 05
[Fred, consultant with the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces and Swiss Ministry of Defense and Marina,
Senior Fellow at the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces and Ph.D., King’s College, University of London,
“Privatising Security: Law, Practice and Governance of Private Military and Security Companies,” p. 46, March, Geneva Centre For
The Democratic Control Of Armed Forces, GScholar,
http://se2.dcaf.ch/serviceengine/Files/DCAF/18346/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/BA695123-3145-4CAA-B29A-
A60711724C96/en/op06_privatising-security.pdf]/galperin
Contractors are not only complicating traditional norms of military command and control, they are challenging the basic
norms of accountability that are supposed to govern the government’s control of violence. Accountability is
being answerable or liable for one’s conduct or actions.207 The lack of accountability is one of the major problems
associated with the private military and security industry. Few states have statutes that even recognize that
PMCs exist. For those states in which PMCs typically operate, the legal structures and political environments are
often too weak to challenge PMC usage and practices. In particular, there is not enough oversight and control of
private military and security firms that sell services directly to foreign countries. With the exception of the
US and a few other countries, PMCs are not truly subject to governmental control or scrutiny, partly because they
are not beholden to government, and because, as with transnational companies in general, they do not confine their
activities within the borders of any single state. If a nation puts too much pressure on a firm, it can simply “shop around”
for alternative, more permissive environment in which to base itself. In fact, all the mechanisms typically used by
multinationals to avoid taxation or labour and environmental regulations are available to PMCs to avoid
oversight. Despite national legislation, state capacity and willingness to monitor and enforce anti-mercenary laws
often remain lacking, sometimes due to national interests, resource constraints, or conflicting priorities. It is the duty of
government to maintain disciplined armed forces. National armed forces are accountable domestically through the
political process. Soldiers who commit war crimes, together with their military commanders and political superiors who bear
responsibility, can be prosecuted in national courts and the International Criminal Court. However, the same levels of
accountability do not apply to the private sector. The principal difference with regard to legal status is that PMC
employees are subject to the terms of their contract, but they are not subject to the military legal code of
service discipline, are not commanded by a military commander, and are not trained to conduct operations
in accordance with the Laws of Armed Conflict.208 A combatant is defined as an individual who “is commanded by a
person with responsibility, wears a fixed distinctive sign such as a uniform, carries arms openly, and conducts operations in
accordance with the Laws of War”.209 This definition is critical because contractors have the right to carry arms for self-protection,
operate in areas of conflict, and can wear company uniforms, which brings their status into question. With PMCs, command
and control structures are all too often unclear.
Planet Debate                                                                                                                      62
PMCs – Sherry Hall

                               PMSCs Violate International Law
PMCS HURT U.S. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS CREDIBILITY – ABUSE OF
CIVILIANS AND LAWLESSNESS
Gómez, 08
[José, UN Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, 9/8, “Impact in human rights of private military and security companies’
activities”,
http://www.privatesecurityregulation.net/files/Impact%20in%20Human%20Rights%20of%20Private%20Military%20and%20Securit
y%20Companies%27%20Activities.pdf]/galperin
“Private contractors” working for PMSCs may commit abuses and human rights violations while fulfilling
their activities in situations of violent or low-intensity conflict. The potential for human rights abuses in such
situations is an ever present threat, and it is nearly impossible to hold PMSC employees accountable for
their actions. In a conflict area with active hostilities fought in the heart of cities with unclear distinctions between combatant and
non combatant, it is impossible to distinguish defensive from offensive roles. PMSC personnel in Iraq are
involved in exchange of fire with insurgents on a daily basis. Security provisions necessarily involve
military engagement. There is no perceptible difference between regular soldiers and the private contractors
protecting convoys (transporting ammunitions and fuel), material, buildings or persons. Providing security in such an
environment necessitates being armed and ready to shoot, often under uncertain circumstances where combatants and
civilians are difficult to separate. As observed in many incidents, PMSC employees can use excessive force and shoot
indiscriminately resulting in civilian casualties. There are cases where PMSC employees have used forbidden
arms or experimental ammunition prohibited by international law2. Private contractors often circulate
without identification and drive in unidentified sport utility vehicles (SUVs) with tinted glasses and no
plates, behaving similarly to the infamous death squads. In Afghanistan and Iraq, the two countries with the largest
presence of PMSC staff, the population is confused and finds it extremely difficult to distinguish employees of
different companies from state forces. Reports indicate erratic behavior of PMSCs employees in Iraq with mottos such as:
“what happens here to-day, stays with us today”. It has also been alleged that “private security guards” would also detain
Iraqis without authorization.3 According to coinciding different sources, on 16 September 2007, in Al-Nisour Square in the
neighborhood of Mansour in Baghdad, security contractors protecting a United States Department convoy, which was
allegedly attacked, opened fire on civilians killing 17 persons, using security company helicopters firing into the streets,
resulting in civilian casualties and injuries. The security firm Blackwater claimed that its personnel came under attack by
“armed enemies” and fired back in self-defense. Iraqi authorities and witnesses claim the security personnel opened fire
unprovoked. In October 2007, an oversight panel of the United States House of Representatives released a report indicating that
Blackwater employees had been involved in at least 196 firefights in Iraq since 2005, an average of 1.4
shootings per week. In 84% of those cases, the report stated, Blackwater employees opened fire first, despite
contract stipulations to make use of force only in self-defense. Unfortunately, the case of Blackwater is not an exception.
Other PMSC have been reported to be involved in such incidents, in particular the killing of four women in Kirkuk
and the involvement in a shooting of employees of another PMSC protecting a convoy, in central Baghdad, which left two Iraqi
women dead.4 This type of incidents involving PMSC has been prevalent in the reconstruction of Iraq since its
2003 occupation: other PMSC have also been involved in similar incidents. Outsourcing military and security functions
has an inherent danger in losing State control over the use of force . In Iraq, by Order 17 issued by the Administrator
of the Coalition Provisional Authority on 27 June 2004, contractors are immune from prosecution. PMSCs often
operate outside government control and with limited effective oversight from State organs. They provide
services from interrogation to strategic intelligence in a field that is a key aspect of waging war and may not only cause torture
and inhumane treatment but violate rights such as freedom of movement and privacy.. When involved in
crimes or human rights violations, these private security guards have not been sanctioned or brought before
a court of justice, as exemplified by the involvement of contractors in torture and shootings against civilians in Iraq. The
employees of two PMSCs who were involved in human rights abuses in the prison of Abu Ghraib in 2003 have never been subject to
external investigations nor legally sanctioned, despite assurances given by the Government of the United States of America. U.S.
Army records would indicate that CACI and Titan translators and sub-contractors worked, in 2003, at Abu Ghraib prison when human
rights abuses were perpetrated. Although the violations were carried out mostly by military police, several private
interrogators have also been accused of torture.
Planet Debate                                                                                                                        63
PMCs – Sherry Hall

                               PMSCs Violate International Law
PMC’S ARE THE BIGGEST IMPEDIMENT TO GLOBAL ILAW COMPLIANCE – LEGAL
AMBIGUITY AND EXPLICIT VIOLATIONS
Maogoto and Sheehy, 09
[Jackson, senior lecturer @ University of Manchester School of Law, and Benedict, senior lecturer in Law, RMIT University,
Melbourne, “PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES & INTERNATIONAL LAW: BUILDING NEW LADDERS OF LEGAL
ACCOUNTABILITY & RESPONSIBILITY”, Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 11:99, http://cojcr.org/vol11no1/99-
132.pdf]/galperin
Many examples of contemporary PMC involvement in traditional military activities abound around the
globe and highlight the significance and extent of these battlefield contractors. While some involvements
may be less controversial, others are highly contentious, particularly where PMCs are used as a
substitute for political processes or engage in activities that breach international law and violate human
rights. For example, PMCs in Colombia provided a whole range of services, from flying Blackhawk
helicopters in “drug eradication missions”8 on behalf of the U.S. government to manning surveillance aircraft
in the Colombian government’s military campaign against guerrilla rebels. Executive Outcomes, a South
Africa-based PMC, used fuel air explosives in Angola, which is a highly effective but particularly torturous
weapon.9 Turning to the Middle East, it was the use of PMC personnel by California Analysis Center Incorporated
(“CACI”) in interrogations that resulted in the most widely publicized incident of misconduct of the many
reported PMC misdeeds—the Abu Ghraib prisoner scandal.10 In western countries the use of PMCs in the
ongoing global “War on Terror” manifests in the practice labeled “extraordinary rendition,” involving the
transfer of individuals to countries that harbor no qualms about using all manner of process and procedure,
including torture and extra-judicial detention and incarceration to “extract information .”11 Each of the
foregoing cases/incidents violate various international norms including the Convention Against Torture
(“CAT”)12 and the 1949 Geneva Conventions13 prohibiting governments and their militaries from taking such actions.
However, the ambiguous legal status and amorphous character of PMCs under existing international law
offers leeway for countries to not only bend but breach their international legal obligations, thus tearing
at the very fabric of the international legal order.14 These examples of PMC personnel presence and
activity in conflicts and the government trend of increasing reliance on civilian contractors to perform military operations means
that this anomaly will become more and more typical, and performance to date presents critical
problems for the implementation of international human rights laws and humanitarian norms.
Planet Debate                                                                                                                          64
PMCs – Sherry Hall

                               PMSCs Violate International Law
PMC USE EXPLICITLY VIOLATES INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW –
OFFSHORING RESTRICTIONS PROVE
Camacho, 8
[Paul, Consultant @ The William Joiner Center @ U of Mass. Boston, “Danger Across the Arc of Instability,” 4/10,
http://www.smcm.edu/democracy/_assets/_documents/Camacho%20-%20ARTICLE%20Private%20Contractors.pdf]
If prior incidents were of insufficient magnitude, the allegations of private entities being involved in the
incidents at Abu Ghraib, which were neatly sidestepped by the administration by way of the focus on and prosecution of lowly
enlisted functionaries, then certainly the incidents involving Blackwater employees brought the issue to the
systemic agenda of the legal profession. PMCs in Iraq have basically operated within their contractual
brackets issued by the Department of Defense resulting in a condition where contractors are viewed as
coalition allies, but exempt from the same rules (e.g. Geneva Conventions) which the formal military is
subject to .11 It has been noted across the literature that international and or national law bounding the activities
of the military corporate organizations is vague, weak, insufficient, and relatively unenforceable.12 Topics
in the literature that engage the legal aspects of PMCs include but are not limited to • Discussion of the
UCMJ and Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) • Geneva Conventions of 1949, their Additional
Protocols of 1977 and customary international law 13 12 • Procedural rules and processes such as the
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) which was supplemented with Defense Department involvement
(DFARS) • Discussion of issues of accountability have noted that PMCs are international entities and as such they
utilize the same principles of "off-shoring" to circumvent taxes and regulations that are available to
other multi-national corporations14 • Issues of international and humanitarian law 15 including questions
about • The extent of state responsibility for PMC operations / behavior • Reparations for violations of
International Humanitarian Law (IHL and International Human Rights Law (HRL) • Issues concerning the legal status
of civilian workers and “Status of Forces Agreements” (SOFAs) as well as The Hague (1907) and Geneva
Conventions (1949) and their applications to US in Iraq 16 At the domestic level, the conclusions of those on
the continuum of those concerned to those opposed to the present extent and expansion of the PMC
industry ask if the use and expansion of PMCs has gone too far and virtually all studies call for
comprehensive regulation. The National Defense University study notes five reasons for regulation:
challenge political-military control; rules regulating PMCs are unclear; lack of transparency;
insufficient accountability; public interest stakes.17 At the international level the concern is not simply
governmental control, but rather an issue of good global governance . Global governance both acknowledges the
state and limits of the United Nations as well as the rise of the market sector international entities that have been established in
response to a functional need accelerated by the continued 5globalization of the state and society.18 The public sector or space is
shrinking in all areas of sociopolitical and economic life; including the security and defense sector – PMCs as a factor in the
security market is accepted. The matter at hand is the degree of oversight and establishment of new
“rule sets” appropriate to this change in the global condition. 19
Planet Debate                                                                                                                        65
PMCs – Sherry Hall

                               PMSCs Violate International Law
PMC’S KILL IHL ADHERENCE – EMPHASIS ON AGGRESSIVE ACTION
Perrin, 6
[Benjamin, Max Stern Fellow and Wainwright Scholar at the Institute of Comparative Law, Faculty of Law, McGill University,
Montreal, “Promoting compliance of private security and military companies with international humanitarian law”, September,
http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/review-863-p613/$File/irrc_863_Perrin.pdf]/
One of the most significant risks to international humanitarian law is posed by private military and
security companies that profit from their ‘‘bad’’ reputations in a segmented market. Certain clients may
seek out firms that are willing to be more ‘‘aggressive’’ in their interpretation of international humanitarian law or
even to violate it for a price.85 Certain members of the private military and security company industry have recognized
that some firms are attractive, in part, precisely because they are outside formal state armed forces, ‘‘far
less trained, far less accountable, and already tainted, albeit slightly, with a whiff of dirty tricks’’.86 By hiring
these ‘‘bad’’ firms, clients may perceive a benefit in signalling that their posture is more aggressive in a
given armed conflict or post-conflict environment, as the United States has done in private military and
security company procurement in Iraq, prompted by the growing insurgency. This phenomenon is reflected in
the decision to hire Aegis Defence Services, founded by Tim Spicer (founder of the now defunct Sandline International), to
conduct ‘‘mobile vehicle warfare’’ as well as ‘‘counter-snipping’’. Commentators have speculated that Spicer’s ‘‘history and
record of taking on dicey tasks may have led him to be more attractive than the companies that play more
strictly by the rules’’.87 Indeed, given the prospect of private military and security companies rebranding or reincorporating, it
appears that the main way in which brand differentiation and market segmentation is taking place in this
industry is through the identity of the officers or directors of these firms (such as Col. Spicer).

UN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW OPPOSED TO MERCENARIES
Sarah Percy, Research Fellow -Oxford, 2007, From Mercenaries to Market: the rise and regulation of
private military companies, eds. S. Chesterman & C. Lehnardt, p. 24-5
There are two main sources of opinion on private forces within the UN system. First, the Commission on
Human Rights has been examining the question of private force since the early 1980s, and housed the Special Rapporteur on
Mercenaries. Until 2004, the Special Rapporteur was Enrique Bernales Ballesteros; he was replaced by Shaista Shameem, who took a
somewhat softer line on private force. In 2005 the position was abolished and replaced by a UN working Group on Mercenaries,
whose work will be discussed below.
Secondly, the General Assembly itself has been an active voice against the use of private force since the 1970s.
The General Assembly has adopted over one hundred resolutions making specific reference to mercenaries and indeed, has repeated a
strongly-worded resolution that calls mercenaries criminals annually since the mid-1970s. General Assembly radicalism, of course,
partially results form a vocal majority of states that have had experience with mercenaries (the African states) or states that use the
term “mercenary” to describe and condemn unwanted foreign actions in order to galvanize international opinion against a particular
situation (Colombia, Nicaragua, and Cuba).
The work of these two UN groups, in addition to the development of international law in the 1970s and
1980s, strongly institutionalized dislike of mercenaries on moral grounds within some bodies of the UN,
particularly the General Assembly and what is now the Human Rights Council. The creation of
international laws dealing with mercenaries early in their appearance on the world stage left may with a
sense that mercenaries and PMCs are banned by international law, even though in reality no such explicit ban exists.
In addition, the mention of mercenaries in other international legal instruments, including the General Assembly’s Definition of
Aggression and the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind meant that the idea of mercenarism as a criminal
act was kept alive in other instruments. Indeed, the mere fact that mercenarism was included in the Draft Code alongside crimes like
genocide and slavery demonstrates the degree to which international law-makers disliked the idea of private force.
Planet Debate                                                                                                                66
PMCs – Sherry Hall

                             PMSCs Violate International Law
FACT THAT PMSCs ARE HIRED BY LEGITIMATE STATES DOESN’T MEAN THAT THEY
DON’T VIOLATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
Chia Lehnardt, NYU School of Law - Researcher, 2007, From Mercenaries to Market: the rise and
regulation of private military companies, eds. S. Chesterman & C. Lehnardt, p. 140
The fact that PMCs are often staffed by former military personnel and retain tight links to a certain state is
often assumed to mean that such entities will be wary of acting against the interests of that state , or that it will
act in a state’s interest for commercial reasons. Some writers even speak of “foreign policy by proxy” or “covert wings of
governments.” Similarly, PMCs seek to dispel suspicions by arguing that they will work only for legitimate
governments. Nevertheless, what states perceive to be in their interests is not necessarily in line with
international law; nor do “legitimate” governments always act in accordance with international law. If
PMCs are a convenient too to pursue foreign policy ends without the appearance of state involvement, the
incentive for states to use PMCs to circumvent international obligations—or to save the costs of abiding by
them—is apparent.
Planet Debate                                                                                                                        67
PMCs – Sherry Hall

                          PMSCs Undermine Just-War Doctrine
PMSCs VIOLATE JUST WAR DOCTRINE – VIOLENCE ONLY LEGITIMATE IF
UNDERTAKEN ON BEHALF OF THE “PUBLIC”
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 147-8
A longstanding way of addressing the problem of ethical wars has been through the languages of the just-war tradition, developed by
early Christian thinkers in the aftermath of the fall of Rome and the barbarian invasions of the fifth century. Since then, it has become
the central theory by which violence is justified -- literally made just, or acceptable within a community. The West is not alone in
needing certain arguments or justifications to legitimate violence; holy war, or jihad, requires that certain moral conditions be met as
well. But for the last 1,500 years, the language of just war – debated, abused, or ignored for the most part – has characterized the way
in which war is judged, regardless of how it is fought. One of the central tenets of just-war theory is that the authority
that allows or starts a war on other violent action be legitimate. The state is the only legitimate authority
that can authorize legal violence, and the only justified violence is that authorized by a state (or people that
deserve recognition as a state). When the violence of a guerilla war takes on a kind of legitimacy, either because
it is widely supported by a people or because it attempts to overthrow a form of government widely deemed
illegitimate (for instance, the “wars of national liberation” of the mid-twentieth century), then the “nation” – the people –
can establish the legitimacy of the violence even if the “state” deems it an insurgency. In any of these cases,
even with all of their gray areas, violence is deemed justified if it is on behalf of a larger entity – a people or a
public. PMSCs seriously undermine much of the foundation of this doctrine and thus they are hard to talk
about using the traditional ethical guidelines.

JUST WAR DOCTRINE IS AN ATTEMPT TO LIMIT THE HUMAN AND ENVIRONMENTAL
COSTS OF WAR
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 146-7
In the twentieth century, the rise of wars of national liberation, or guerrilla warfare, or more widely any kind of
insurgency, signaled the end of what could be termed a war of reciprocity: bipolar warfare wherein both sides hold a
lethal balance of firepower. Here, in the ideal classical image, rules are maintained through the threat of reprisals
and an underlying idea of reciprocity: one side “behaves” because it expects the other side to behave along with it. When
fighting wars in which one side explicitly attacks the rules – aiming at civilians, using disproportionate means – then it
becomes increasingly hard to employ any kind of mutually agreed upon restraint. This is where the modern liberal
ideals of warfare run aground; where we are forced to fight wars “on the cusp” of allowable behavior (Coker
2007).
“This is ultimate challenge facing a world that would like to make war more humane for its soldiers, and for society itself: will the
other side play by the same rules. The rich man’s option is to sanitize war; the poor man’s is to make it even more
horrendous than it is.” (Coker 2001).
On the other side of global civil society, and a society of sovereign states, there is the increasing awareness of what might
be called a global “uncivil” society. The wars that are currently being fought reveal the problem resulting
from wars fought between these new configurations of combatants. Two simultaneous trends mark the
ethics of these new wars: the increasing “humanization” of combat, wherein humanitarian fighting is an
explicit goal, and the simultaneous use of enormous power and the global reach of destructive capability.
Coker’s most recent books describe a trend of increasing concern with humanizing warfare in twentieth-
century warfare, and the confusion of ethical languages that has resulted from this effort. In Humane Warfare, he chronicles
efforts to humanize the warrior. These efforts invoke language echoing that of St. Augustine, the earliest just-war
theorist, and claim that war should be fought without intentional cruelty, without explicit hatred of the
enemy, and in order to make the world safer for humanity as a whole . In recounting the complex history of the ways
the late-twentieth-century warrior has been transformed into a more “feminized” and risk-averse soldier, he notes that NATO
intervention in Kosovo symbolized the transformation:
“For the moment the West is still in the war business, but it is attempting to change its nature by fighting
wars more humanely. Post-material societies fight post-material wars – they try to avoid the material (human and
environmental) damage which was essential to warfare for two millennia. The once familiar and accepted without
question, now cast it in a light that is offensive to the liberal conscience.” (Coker 2001)
Coker notes that many find this effort to sanitize conflict a sham , and adopt a cynical attitude toward a culture whose left
hand doesn’t seem to know what its right hand is doing, and a military that wants to convince itself of its humanity through a form of
“clean an gentle” warfare.
Planet Debate                                                                                                                  68
PMCs – Sherry Hall

        Private Contracts for Security Less Ethical than Public
PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTS ETHICALLY PROBLEMATIC BECAUSE ONLY THE
GOVERNMENT HAS A SOCIAL CONTRACT TO PROTECT PUBLIC INTERESTS
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 145
The other prominent defender of the ethical use of PMSCs, Deane-Peter Baker, uses an analogy taken from the world of the domestic
private security guard: the bar bouncer, the mall cop, the bodyguard. Baker especially defends the fundamental right to
contract for certain kinds of services. Baker’s argument and the example he uses to illustrate it, however, falls flat
when the question of accountability is raised. In his example, a woman has to walk through a dangerous
neighborhood at night, and the local police are nowhere to be seen.
“Believing (rightly) that her chances of being attacked are high, Jane enters into a contractual arrangement with a
bouncer at a nightclub she happens to pass, who agrees to protect her on her walk through the neighborhood for an
agreed fee. As it happens, Jane is attacked, and her companion does intervene to save her. Do we think that
Jane’s companion is in some sense unethical? No.” (Baker 2008)
But what happens if the hired bodyguard, having gotten her safely through the neighborhood, then attacks her?
This scenario, ad-hoc contract is broken. But where would the woman go, and for what type of enforcement and
remedies? Or what if, as Jane and her bodyguard were walking through the neighborhood, they witnessed another
woman being attacked? Jane’s bodyguard would be perfectly ethical in not intervening. Since his contract
only specified Jane’s safety. But this would not be a moral act. Baker’s example is of the kind of contract
that might take place in a frontier-setting, with short-term contracts backed up by a threat of imminent violence, not the
type of embedded social contracts that would take place within a zone of relative law and order.
Imagine instead that the police had been called to escort Jane through the neighborhood (let’s say they had the
resources to do this). Jane could have been the victim of police brutality or corruption, but then two levels of
contract have been broken: the promise to protect a specific person, Jane and the social contract to offer
general security, on behalf of the public. Those two layers of responsibility are backed up by a legal
system that offers at least the hope of legal justice. Here the relevant distinction is that of center and periphery from the
previous chapter. Jane and the policeman, on the other hand, are at the legal center, in a much more
comprehensible relationship. Theirs is a social contract, not just a private contract. And with relational
contracts, as I argued in the last chapter, the remedy is most often that of just “termination of the relationship,”
with little additional care for the wider public.

PRIVATE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS ETHICALLY SUSPECT EVEN IF THEY ACT IN AN
ETHICAL MANNER
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 145-6
My second account of how PMSCs resist traditional accounts of ethical actors takes its bearings from the idea that PMSCs are a form
of policing. PMSCs can certainly be seen as a form of mercenarism: that point has already been addressed ad nauseum,
with various ethical ramifications. But another, less sensationalistic, analysis sees them as mere extensions of the
private security guard trend that has been researched domestically for at least three decades. The ethical relevance of this
argument is twofold: the expansion of privatized security makes security into a commodity only available
tot hose who can pay, and the ethical norms of private security police are frequently detrimental to wider
community norms) or to the possibility of building them. PMSCs can be said to provide security for some, but not
justice. To the extent that they are a new face of international policing, they are thus ethically problematic
in their social impact, even if their operational procedures are individually blameless.
Planet Debate                                                                                                                      69
PMCs – Sherry Hall

        Private Contracts for Security Less Ethical than Public
PMSCs LIKELY TO ENGAGE IN TRAFFICKING
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 114
In exploiting the link between the capacity to inflict violence and a willingness to turn this to profit, modern
corporations are likely to grapple with similar temptations to those experienced by mercantile empires of
centuries past. This is because wars today are in one sense no different to wars of any era. They still involve familiar
commodities; diamonds, goad, and precious gems, addictive drugs, lumber, oil, other valuable minerals, weapons sales, slavery, illicit
currency movements and the labor required to move it all. As in the past, contemporary commerce is conducted by
governments, warlords and organized crime. The means also remain unchanged: violence, diplomacy and
subterfuge. Each takes an assortment of recognizably sordid and time-proven forms. It is almost certain that there will be
potent enticements for a UN contractor to dabble in the same lucrative businesses. That lure may well be
much greater than in the past. This is because today’s contract military is better educated and organized than
their historic counterparts. In particular, they are financially and commercially far more sophisticated . Several
scenarios drive these concerns. For example, security firms originating in Southeastern Europe face difficulties with
organized crime and related political affiliations. Eastern European criminals have already tried to buy Scandinavian
security firms and a tender application from that region may warrant examination with care. Not that there is anything new in un
efforts to suppress transnational and organized crime, something which had absorbed UN energies for some years.
Planet Debate                                                                                                                           70
PMCs – Sherry Hall

    PMSCs Allow Public to Ignore True Costs of Foreign Policy
                           Decisions
HIDDEN NATURE OF PMSCs SHIELD THE PUBLIC FROM THE REALITY OF POLICY
DECISIONS
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 148
The third account of the ethics of PMSCs is unrelated to the first two, but return to a central debate in the ethics of current warfare: the
prevalence of what scholars have dubbed “virtual warfare.” In virtual warfare, technology contributes to a feeling of
practicing a sterile warfare from afar that is falsely clean and gentle; technology can deceptively increase
the felt “virtue” of those using it, even as it distances them from their targets. PMSCs are not directly a part
of this aspect of virtual warfare. But their effect on those utilizing them can be similar; as proxy forces that allow the
full cost of a war to be kept hidden, they are an example of what has been called a “virtual mobilization” .
The ethical problem is that, by outsourcing violence, Westerners may shield themselves form the reality of
their policy decisions.

VIRTUAL WAR PRODUCES SYSTEM OF TOTAL DOMINANCE WHICH MASKS ACTUAL
VIOLENCE
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 150
Another critic of virtuality, however, asks not for moral clarification, but critical theoretical understanding about the more complex
assumptions grounding such a commitment to virtuality. James Der Derian is a scholar of military and international politics and his
book, Virtuous War (2001), focuses on the ways in which the combination of virtuality and virtue have produced an
insatiable appetite for war that is technologically complex but politically facile . The original root of the word
“virtual” conveyed, he points out, a “sense of inherent qualities that can exert influence by will, as in the virtu of Machiavelli’s Prince,
or by potential, as in the virtual capacity of the computer.” And here the road becomes both murkier and more revealing. Der
Derian’s book combines interviews with those who plan and “game” new modes of warfare, visits to the
war-gaming arenas in the Mojave Desert, and simulation laboratories in Los Angeles, with the thought of
postmodern theorists such a Baudrillard, Deleuze, Foucault, and Benjamin. This cumbersome combination
supports a theory of war as a culmination of everything modern; the need for a politics that appeals to a
mass, the ability to endlessly reproduce images, the desire for a total system of domination that can be both
centrally operated and easily shifted, and an organizational theory that will allow for rapid dominance but
still respond to the need for immediate shifts of purpose and posture. Like Ignateiff, Der Derian sees the
dominant effect of this as a distancing of war from death, from destruction, from bodies, even as it needs to
produce these very things. Modern war relies on the death and mutilation of others, but in a falsely “clean
and gentle” manner.
Planet Debate                                                                                                                         71
PMCs – Sherry Hall

            PMSCs Undermine U.S. Security Goals and Policies
PMSCs CAN UNDERMINE U.S. SECURITY GOALS EVEN WHEN THEY CARRY OUT THEIR
CONTRACTS
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 19
The third question concerns the form or content of the private security provided: is it direct combat support, or is it merely advice and
training? In the language of principal-agent theory, this pertains to the task the agent is being asked to carry out. There are important
implications here, since, as many commentators have noted, some tasks are better suited to a contract, and others are
not. Colonel Hammes highlighted this problem:
“I think contractors are best used for mundane, repetitive tasks that are clearly defined within a legal structure; for
instance, running a training facility in Kuwait. MPRI [Military Professionals Resources, Inc.] runs a superb training facility
with retired NCOs [non-commissioned officers] –vast experience, but it’s not a combat zone. Very clearly defined regulations, rules,
very clearly defined product which it is hired to deliver.
You get into trouble when you put them in a situation – for instance, the security force guarding
Ambassador Bremer. Blackwater’s an extraordinarily professional organization, and they were doing
exactly what they were tasked to do: protect the principal. The problem is in protecting the principal they
had to be very aggressive, and each time they went out they had to offend locals, forcing them to the side of
the road, being overpowering and intimidating, at times running vehicles off of the road, making enemies
each time they went out. So they were actually getting our contract exactly as we asked them to and at the
same time hurting our counterinsurgency effort.” (Gaviria and Smith 2005)

CONTRACTORS TREATED WITH DISTRUST AND RESENTMENT BY REGULAR
SERVICEMEMBERS
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 30
From within the military itself, numerous concerns have been expressed with the rules and guidelines for
interaction between military and contractor security forces (Castillo 2000). At the most basic level, there is the problem
of logistics and supply, and the widely varying equipment and armor available to each company. As one ArmorGroup official
explains, the two biggest headaches for the company are the bureaucratic details on either end of any contractor’s tour; entry and exit
visa requirements, supply and resupply lines, contingency rescue operations, medical care, and evacuation guidelines going out.
Contracting out a large portion of any military’s efforts diffuses this logistical hassle, but makes it just as
labor-intensive. Discussions of interoperability begin with these essential details. Beyond this lie the legal
questions of command and control, and who bears responsibility for the individual actions of the
contractors. Finally, there is international law, including the basic laws governing armed conflict and the
status of those working in and around the regular military.
These concerns reveal underlying tensions between those within the military on a number of fronts: pay
scale, risk acceptance, evacuation and casualty procedures, rules of engagement, and organizational
cultures. Moreover, there seems to be a distrust of those who are now working as contractors, alongside a
certain amount of envy and resentment, and a knowledge that someday they could be working for the same
outfits (White 2005; Kelty 2008).
Planet Debate                                                                                                                       72
PMCs – Sherry Hall

            PMSCs Undermine U.S. Security Goals and Policies
PMSCs UNDERMINE MILITARY MORALE
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 117-8
Another reason for resistance arises from the present unpopularity of military recruitment in several societies and notably the U.S.
Here, labor targets remain unmet and some American officers have publicly suggested that their government forms
its own Foreign Legion as a military life becomes increasingly unattractive to today’s citizens. Radical
ideas of this sort are accompanied by growing concern that the commercialization of military labor is
exerting undesirable effects on both morale and military culture. Outsourced firms in the US today develop
curriculum and provide military training, so it is at least conceivable influences other than purely government requirements may color
the content of what is taught. Even if this is not the case, few would deny that those virtues military life traditionally
extols now compete with the money offered elsewhere. There is some evidence that a preoccupation with cash
rather than patriotism is causing tension amongst senior US officers . This should be expected, as older uniformed
personnel react against something they consider subversive. They have a point. Some ex-soldiers working for PMSCs
have conducted themselves in a manner which has brought discredit upon an institution that no longer
controls them. To coin the language of the market, senior American officers wish to protect “the integrity of their
brand.” On the other hand, career expectations have changed in America’s highly materialist society. Today’s US military compete
with other employers by offering education and skills to advance a potential recruit’s life after military service. For this reason the
armed forces are becoming more of an occupation and less a vocation. A second career is now likely after reaching pensionable age
of between one and two decades of service. Hence the old emphasis on selfless devotion to the state is now less noticeable in military
advertising.

PMSCs UNDERMINE TROOP MORALE
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 118
More troubling is the perception by career militaries that their governments seek the support of armed
contractors in order to sustain unpopular conflicts. This could foment a decrease in loyalty among regular
troops as they become cynical over the purposes for which they are ordered in a conflict alongside better
paid contractors. Moreover, those contractors are already viewed with competitive suspicion. Pay differences
between private security and uniformed US military in Iraq have already been the cause of some
antagonism. More significantly, if militaries become less anchored to traditional views on their roles in democracies, then
military institutions may in turn become less politically reliable. A people, their state, and their military have formed
the legs of an accepted Clausewitzean framework supporting legitimized violence for well over 200 years. A perception that this
political dependability is eroding could easily cause an apprehensive government to respond by limiting the
involvement of its citizens in UN contract operations.

PMCS VIOLATE INTERNATIONAL LAW - THEY’RE MERCENARIES WHO COMPLICATE
MILITARY OBJECTIVES AND CREATE REGIONAL TENSION
Kidwell, 05 (Last modified)
[Deborah, M.A. in history and M.S. in edu at OSU, asst. prof of military history @ U.S. Army command, 9/13, “Public War, Private
Fight? The United States and Private Military Companies”, http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/csipubs/kidwell.pdf]/galperin
In a larger sense, however, using military providers can be a volatile solution that raises ideological, legal,
moral, and ethical concerns. As profit-driven entities whose mission may derive from any conceivable
source with funding, the services PMCs offer their clients do not necessarily derive from any compelling
national or humanitarian interest. Only the written provisions of the contract define contractor responsibilities. These
organizations are largely extralegal and are not bound or protected by the International Laws of War or
typical rules of engagement. In fact, outspoken critics consider them to be simple mercenaries—warriors for
hire outlawed by the Charter of the United Nations. Many PMCs frequently conduct operations in unstable, lawless
situations and the old adage that power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely can apply. In an unstable environment,
PMCs are capable of becoming the law themselves. The extralegal status of these entities and other
sovereignty questions have the potential to create international friction among allies and enemies alike,
making joint and multinational operations more difficult for regular forces. Moreover, PMCs may
complicate civil conflicts by becoming just another belligerent party in an already complex security
environment.
Planet Debate                                                                                                       73
PMCs – Sherry Hall

          PMSCs Undermine U.S. Security Goals and Policies
PMC’S ARE PERCEIVED AS OPERATIVES OF THE U.S. AND GUT OUR CREDIBILITY
Camacho, 8
[Paul, Consultant @ The William Joiner Center @ U of Mass. Boston, “Danger Across the Arc of
Instability,” 4/10, http://www.smcm.edu/democracy/_assets/_documents/Camacho%20-
%20ARTICLE%20Private%20Contractors.pdf]/galperin
The political drawbacks actually cover a rather wide scope. In international terms PMCs are seen as an arm of the
corporate first world or first world / Western governments. This is particularly the case in Iraq. Thus
when the PMC fails to perform professionally or worse, when their behavior results in international
furor, the nation – 11 state / employer is severely compromised. Whether perception or reality, contractors
were at the center of the international incident at Abu Ghraib and DynCorp employees were linked to
organized prostitution in Bosnia and Blackwater and Triple Canopy employees to the shooting of
civilians in Iraq.
Planet Debate                                                                                                                        74
PMCs – Sherry Hall

                  PMSCs Undermine Counterinsurgency Efforts
PMC PRESENCE IN IRAQ DIRECTLY COUNTERACTS COUNTERINSURGENCY – 6
REASONS
Singer, 07 [Peter, Director of 21st century defense initiative, September, “Can't Win with 'Em, Can't Go To
War without 'Em: Private Military Contractors and Counterinsurgency”,
http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2007/0927militarycontractors.aspx]
The use of private military contractors appears to have harmed, rather than helped the counterinsurgency efforts
of the U.S. mission in Iraq. Even worse, it has created a dependency syndrome on the private marketplace
that not merely creates critical vulnerabilities, but shows all the signs of the last downward spirals of an
addiction. If we judge by what has happened in Iraq, when it comes to private military contractors and counterinsurgency, the
U.S. has locked itself into a vicious cycle. It can't win with them, but can't go to war without them. The study explores how the
current use of private military contractors: * Allows policymakers to dodge key decisions that carry political costs, thus
leading to operational choices that might not reflect public interest. The Abrams Doctrine, which has stood since the start of the
all-volunteer force in the wake of Vietnam, has been outsourced. * Enables a "bigger is better" approach to
operations that runs contrary to the best lessons of U.S. military strategy. Turning logistics and operations
into a for-profit endeavor helped feed the "Green Zone" mentality problem of sprawling bases, which runs
counter everything General Petraeus pointed to as necessary to winning a counterinsurgency in the new
Army/USMC manual he helped write. * Inflames popular opinion against, rather than for, the American mission
through operational practices that ignore the fundamental lessons of counterinsurgency. As one set of
contractors described. "Our mission is to protect the principal at all costs. If that means pissing off the Iraqis, too bad."
* Participated in a series of abuses that have undermined efforts at winning "hearts and minds" of the
Iraqi people. The pattern of contractor misconduct extends back to 2003 and has involved everything from
prisoner abuse and "joyride" shootings of civilians to a reported incident in which a drunken Blackwater
contractor shot dead the security guard of the Iraqi Vice President, after the two got into an argument on
Christmas Eve, 2006. * Weakened American efforts in the "war of ideas" both inside Iraq and beyond. As one
Iraqi government official explained even before the recent shootings. "They are part of the reason for all the hatred
that is directed at Americans, because people don't know them as Blackwater, they know them only as
Americans. They are planting hatred, because of these irresponsible acts." * Reveals a double standard towards
Iraqi civilian institutions that undermines efforts to build up these very same institutions, another key lesson of
counterinsurgency. As one Iraqi soldier said of Blackwater. "They are more powerful than the government. No one
can try them. Where is the government in this?" * Forced policymakers to jettison strategies designed to win
the counterinsurgency on multiple occasions , before they even had a chance to succeed. The U.S. Marine plan for
counterinsurgency in the Sunni Triangle was never implemented, because of uncoordinated contractor decisions in 2004 that
helped turn Fallujah into a rallying point of the insurgency. More recently, while U.S. government leaders had planned
to press the Iraqi government on needed action on post-"surge" political benchmarks, instead they are
now having to request Iraqi help in cleaning up the aftermath of the Blackwater incident. The U.S.
government needs to go back to the drawing board and re-evaluate its use of private military contractors,
especially armed roles within counterinsurgency and contingency operations. It needs to determine what roles are
appropriate or not for private firms, and what roles must be kept in the control of those in public service. As part of this
determination, it is becoming clear that many roles now outsourced, including the armed escort of U.S.
government officials, assets, and convoys in a warzone, not only are inherently government functions,
but that the outsourcing has created both huge vulnerabilities and negative consequences for the overall
mission. A process must immediately begin to roll such public functions back into public responsibility.
Planet Debate                                                                                                                          75
PMCs – Sherry Hall

                 PMSCs Undermine Counterinsurgency Efforts
PMC’S MAKE U.S. MILITARY EFFORTS IN IRAQ IMPOSSIBLE – COST-PLUS CONTRACTS,
LAWLESSNESS, AND LACK OF COMPETITION
Singer, 08 [P.W., National Security Fellow at Brookings, Ph.D. in Security Studies from Harvard,
“Outsourcing the Fight,” Brookings, June 5,
http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2008/0605_military_contractors_singer.aspx]/galperin
Handing over control to contractors has also led to allegations of war-profiteering . Almost all of today's logistics firms
are operating under "cost-plus" contracts--a structure that is ripe for abuse. Examples in Iraq range from
billing for soldiers' meals that were never cooked or served to convoys shipping "sailboat fuel " (as
Halliburton-KBR truck drivers laughingly termed charging the government for moving empty pallets from site to site). According
to testimony before the House Committee on Oversight and Government and Reform, the Defense Contract Audit
Agency has identified more than $10 billion in unsupported or questionable costs from battlefield
contractors--and it has barely scratched the surface. Such losses don't just represent misspent funds; they
represent lost opportunities to actually support our diplomatic and military goals . The situation has
gotten so bad that the special inspector general for Iraq reconstruction dubbed corruption as the "second
insurgency" in Iraq. Many worry that the lack of control due to outsourcing could weigh even heavier and even
put an entire military operation at risk. Consider what happened during the 2004 Sadr uprising, where a spike in attacks
on convoys caused many companies to either withdraw or suspend operations, causing fuel and ammunition stocks to dwindle. It
is important to remember that private contractors are not bound by the same codes, structures and obligations
as those in public service. As Tom Crum, then the chief operating officer for KBR's logistics operations, wrote in an
internal memo, "We cannot allow the Army to push us to put our people in harm's way. ... If we in management believe the Army
is asking us to put our KBR employees in danger that we are not willing to accept, then we will refuse to go." As civilians, this
choice is their right to make. But as retired Army Major Gen. Barry McCaffery testified to Congress in 2007, the consequence
of turning over so much of the supply system to private civilian firms, which have this right to decide
when and where they deploy, makes our logistics system "a house of cards." In the same way that companies
such as Cisco were forced to reconsider their outsourcing policies in the late 1990s, after they lost the ability to deliver on core
functions, the military (with a push from Congress) needs to reevaluate what is appropriate to outsource and what is not. If a task
is critical to the mission's ultimate success or failure, then perhaps it should be kept in-house. In other words: Feel free to
outsource the Burger Kings, laundries and base construction, but maybe we ought to keep roles like military interrogators, armed
troops and movement of critical supplies (all now outsourced) inside the system. The Pentagon also has to do a much better job of
being a smart client. Far too few contracts get any true competition to drive down prices. Instead, they tend
to be bundled together into massive structures, where a few prime contractors (just three in the new version of
LOGCAP) are the ones that dole out sub-contracts. Add in the largely cost-plus contract structure, and
savings tend not to accrue. There also aren't enough eyes and ears working on behalf of the government
client to monitor contractor performance. In 1998, there was one financial auditor for every $642 million in Pentagon
contracts. Today, there is one auditor for every $2.03 billion in contracts. These auditors aren't just required to catch false
billings and cost overruns, but also to ensure quality. That soldier's electrocution didn't happen because of malice; it
happened, as an internal Pentagon e-mail revealed, because KBR's inspections were never reviewed by a
"qualified government employee," and the Army wasn't aware of "the extent of the severity of the
electrical problems."
Planet Debate                                                                                                                     76
PMCs – Sherry Hall

                PMSCs Undermine Counterinsurgency Efforts
PMCS AREN’T SUBJECT TO AUTHORITY- AS A RESULT THEY UNDERMINE THE
MILITARY EFFORT TO WIN OVER THE IRAQI PEOPLE
Krepinevich, 8, [President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, frmr member of the
personal staff of three defense secretaries, the Office of Net Assessment, the National Defense Panel,
the Defense Science Board, and the Joint Forces Command’s Transformation Advisory Board, “An
Army at the Crossroads,” CSBA / hnasser]
Although the precise number of private contractors deployed in these operations is unknown, the number in Iraq alone is
reportedly approximately 160,000.132 These contractors are used in a wide variety of roles and come from at least 30 different
countries, ranging from local Iraqis to American and British workers to Guatemalans and Ugandans.133 Private contractors play a
major role in providing in-country logistical support for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, with some 20,000 American
contractors as well as large numbers of host-country or third-country nationals employed in these roles.134 More
controversial has been the use of private contractors as security guards. According to one estimate, in 2006 there
were some 181 private security companies working in Iraq alone, with some 48,000 employees.135 Military commanders
have substantially less control over private contractors than they do over military personnel. As CBO has
noted, “A military commander can influence the contractor employee’s behavior through the contracting
officer and the contractor’s desire to satisfy the customer, but the commander has limited direct control
over any one employee.”136 Moreover, unlike military personnel, civilians and contractors participating in
undeclared wars and contingency operations are not generally subject to the Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ), further reducing their accountability to military commanders. 137 Another problem is that
private contractors tend to have a narrower perspective concerning their roles. For example, private security
guards may well focus solely on protecting their clients, and discount the negative impact their actions
might have on the broader military aim of wining the “hearts and minds” of the local population. By
contrast, military personnel are much more likely to see the necessity of performing their duties in a way
that does not, if at all possible, alienate or offend the local population. The result is that, even if private
security contractors are well trained and well intentioned, they may operate in a way that undermines
the US military’s efforts. In addition to these potentially critical operational and strategic shortcomings
related to the use of private contractors, there are also concerns that the reliance on private contractors
to support deployed combat forces may have proven inefficient in budgetary terms. As noted earlier, studies
have generally shown that civilian government employees and, especially, private contractors can perform infrastructure type
functions more cheaply than can military personnel. However, as CBO has noted, that evidence “pertains to peacetime
functions performed in the United States and may not necessarily extend to combat operations
overseas.”138 Certainly, serious questions have been raised about the efficiency of private contractors
used in a variety of roles in Iraq and Afghanistan, including allegations of widespread corruption.
Planet Debate                                                                                                                                                                         77
PMCs – Sherry Hall

                       PMSCs Undermine Counterinsurgency Efforts
PRIVATE CONTRACTORS AREN’T UNDER ANY CONTROL AND CAN PUT ENTIRE
MILITARY OPERATIONS AT RISK
Singer 10 [Peter W. Singer , the director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative and a senior fellow in
Foreign Policy at Brookings., “Outsourcing the Fight” July 12 /hnasser]
http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2008/0605_military_contractors_singer.aspx?p=1
In 1992 a relatively little-known, Texas-based oil services firm called Halliburton was awarded a $3.9 million Pentagon contract.
Its task was to write a classified report on how private companies, like itself, could support the logistics of U.S. military
deployments into countries with poor infrastructure. Conspiracy theories aside, it is hard to imagine that either the company or the
client realized that 15 years later this contract (now called the Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program or LOGCAP) would be
worth as much as $150 billion. The use of private contractors in U.S wars dates back to the sutlers, merchants who followed
behind Revolutionary and Civil War armies selling incidentals to the troops like jam or whiskey. But the size and scope of
the private military industry today is unprecedented. In Iraq alone, there are some 180,000 private
military contractors performing functions that once would have been handled by soldiers in uniform.
The vast bulk of these contractors handle military support functions: building and operating military bases,
maintaining and repairing military equipment and vehicles, and moving massive convoys of supplies that are both vital to the
operation's survival (like gas and ammunition) and not so vital (like Pizza Hut Personal Pan Pizza). Getting those jobs done has
incurred a great cost, both financial and human; according to Department of Labor insurance claims, 1,292 contractors have been
killed and 9,610 wounded as of April 2008. Contracting out logistics has brought the skills and resources of hundreds of
companies from around the world to support the war effort. But, much like when a business outsources too much of
its supply chain, this process has caused a loss of control. While companies only perform the jobs
specified in their contract, war is an environment in which flexibility is needed most . Take for example the
recent news that at least 12 U.S. soldiers have been accidentally electrocuted inside their bases in Iraq. Staff Sgt. Ryan Maseth, a
highly decorated Green Beret, was killed while taking a shower 11 months after KBR (nyse: KBR) contractors had first found
potentially serious electrical problems in the facility's construction. But KBR's contract didn't cover "fixing potential hazards." It
only required them to repair items that were already broken. Handing over control to contractors has also led to allegations of
war-profiteering . Almost all of today's logistics firms are operating under "cost-plus" contracts--a structure that is ripe for abuse.
Examples in Iraq range from billing for soldiers' meals that were never cooked or served to convoys shipping "sailboat fuel" (as
Halliburton-KBR truck drivers laughingly termed charging the government for moving empty pallets from site to site). According
to testimony before the House Committee on Oversight and Government and Reform, the Defense Contract Audit Agency has
identified more than $10 billion in unsupported or questionable costs from battlefield contractors--and it has barely scratched the
surface. Such losses don't just represent misspent funds; they represent lost opportunities to actually support our diplomatic and
military goals. The situation has gotten so bad that the special inspector general for Iraq reconstruction
dubbed corruption as the "second insurgency" in Iraq. Many worry that the lack of control due to
outsourcing could weigh even heavier and even put an entire military operation at risk. Consider what happened
during the 2004 Sadr uprising, where a spike in attacks on convoys caused many companies to either withdraw or suspend operations, causing fuel and ammunition stocks to
dwindle. It is important to remember that private contractors are not bound by the same codes, structures and obligations as those in public service. As Tom Crum, then the
                                                   "We cannot allow the Army to push us to put our
chief operating officer for KBR's logistics operations, wrote in an internal memo ,
people in harm's way. ... If we in management believe the Army is asking us to put our KBR employees
in danger that we are not willing to accept, then we will refuse to go." As civilians, this choice is their
right to make. But as retired Army Major Gen. Barry McCaffery testified to Congress in 2007, the
consequence of turning over so much of the supply system to private civilian firms, which have this
right to decide when and where they deploy, makes our logistics system "a house of cards." In the same way that
companies such as Cisco were forced to reconsider their outsourcing policies in the late 1990s, after they lost the ability to deliver on core functions, the military (with a push
                                                      If a task is critical to the mission's ultimate success
from Congress) needs to reevaluate what is appropriate to outsource and what is not .
or failure, then perhaps it should be kept in-house. In other words: Feel free to outsource the Burger
Kings, laundries and base construction, but maybe we ought to keep roles like military interrogators,
armed troops and movement of critical supplies (all now outsourced) inside the system. The Pentagon
also has to do a much better job of being a smart client. Far too few contracts get any true competition
to drive down prices. Instead, they tend to be bundled together into massive structures, where a few
prime contractors (just three in the new version of LOGCAP) are the ones that dole out sub-contracts.
Add in the largely cost-plus contract structure, and savings tend not to accrue. There also aren't enough eyes and ears working on behalf of the government client to monitor
contractor performance. In 1998, there was one financial auditor for every $642 million in Pentagon contracts. Today, there is one auditor for every $2.03 billion in contracts.
These auditors aren't just required to catch false billings and cost overruns, but also to ensure quality. That soldier's electrocution didn't happen because of malice; it
happened, as an internal Pentagon e-mail revealed, because KBR's inspections were never reviewed by a "qualified government employee," and the Army wasn't aware of
"the extent of the severity of the electrical problems." Finally, the Pentagon needs to use its massive buying power to shape and sanction the market, much like Wal-Mart
does to wring out efficiencies and send warnings to any vendors that think to cross it. For example, the new LOGCAP contract, potentially worth up to $150 billion, went to
KBR, DynCorp and Fluor. Yet, as the Project on Government Oversight found, these same three companies have been cited for 29 cases of serious misconduct in the last
                                                                                                  There's
decade--a category of allegations that includes false claims against the government, violations of the Anti-Kickback Act, fraud and conspiracy to launder money.
no doubt that demand for outsourced logistics has grown, and that private military contractors are
bigger than ever. But we've yet to see whether the government will advance equally in its efforts to
become a smart regulator and customer of this marketplace.
Planet Debate                                                                                                                      78
PMCs – Sherry Hall

   PMSCs Hurt Military Retention – Drain the Best Personnel
                           Away
PMSCs COSTLY – SIPHON OFF HIGHLY SKILLED MILITARY TRAINED AT SUBSTANTIAL
TAXPAYER EXPENSE
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 119
The freedom to earn larger sums of money in private employment carries other consequences. Losing those traditionally paid
from the public purse represents the loss of a considerable investment. Training at taxpayer expense can
easily be valued at hundreds of thousands or even several millions of dollars in the case of fighter pilots.
These personnel have to be replaced in a cycle which becomes shorter than is desirable while delivering
additional costs to taxpayers. The public and their elected officials have begun to observe a circular process that has drawn
much comment: taxpayer dollars are spent on training service personnel who then leave and hire themselves
back o the government which bore the cost of their training in the first place . Moreover, the government finds
itself paying a higher rate for those skills from the same personnel when they were uniformed military.
This is exactly what is happening in the US intelligence community. CIA employees have resigned early to return as
higher-paid private sector contractors—to the public unease of the Director of Central Intelligence, General Hayden. The general is
wary of his agency becoming what he called “…a farm system for contractors.” If some of these CIA personnel offered say, analytical
services to a UN contractor offering higher pay, this may provoke resistance from the US government. These workers would be lost
to another entity, their training having been subsidized by the US taxpayer. Other states possessing advanced military/intelligence
communities could be in a similar position.

BRAIN DRAIN OF MILITARY PERSONNEL TO PMSCs COSTLY
Suzanne Simons, CNN Executive Producer, 2009, Master of War: Blackwater USA’s Erik Prince and the
Business of War, p. 255
In May 2008, some answers were delivered as to just how extensively the U.S. government had come to rely on private contractors.
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) report included the results of an investigation into just how much
brain drain the government was losing to the private sector. The investigative arm of Congress reported
that some 2,435 former senior officials with the pentagon had left to work for some fifty-two private
contractors.

PMSCs OPPOSED BY STATES THAT FEAR LOSS OF LOYAL AND SKILLED EMPLOYEES
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 119-20
There is another aspect to this argument. States which oversee costly and sometimes sensitive military training not
only lose their investment but also some of their control over how this investment is utilized . A monopoly over
pay packets, pensions and superannuation has until recently been a decisive influence over individual conduct. Historically this has
provided states with firm control over the lives of men and women trained to inflict harm on others through state-of-the-art means.
No government takes lightly the idea of several hundred of its more lethal employees being redeployed at
their own volition to serve an institution over which their government does not exercise control.
Notwithstanding ubiquitous secrecy agreements, governments may be concerned that allowing employees to become
UN contractors could risk weakening institutional loyalty. It does not matter that their nationals’ purposes may
be ethically defensible. Retaining a fraying monopoly of control holds a strong appeal for many
governments.
Planet Debate                                                                                                                       79
PMCs – Sherry Hall

   PMSCs Hurt Military Retention – Drain the Best Personnel
                           Away
PMC’S ARE DETRIMENTAL TO MILITARY RETENTION – PROVIDE A FINANCIAL
INCENTIVE TO LEAVE THE U.S. ARMED FORCES
Schreier and Caparini, 05
[Fred, consultant with the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces and Swiss Ministry of Defense and Marina,
Senior Fellow at the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces and Ph.D., King’s College, University of London,
“Privatising Security: Law, Practice and Governance of Private Military and Security Companies,” p. 46, March, Geneva Centre For
The Democratic Control Of Armed Forces, GScholar,
http://se2.dcaf.ch/serviceengine/Files/DCAF/18346/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/BA695123-3145-4CAA-B29A-
A60711724C96/en/op06_privatising-security.pdf]/galperin
PMCs differ from mercenary outfits in that they are mainly hired by governments and corporations, ostensibly to provide military and
security services, whereas non-state armed groups, aiming to undermine the constitutional order of states, generally hire mercenaries.
PMCs usually recruit former soldiers from the national armed forces of the country where they are based.
Some firms only recruit from their home military, whereas other are truly multinational in employee base, recruiting
soldiers from all corners of the world: Gurkhas from Nepal; soldiers from South Africa’s old apartheid defence forces;60 former
members of the French Foreign Legion, the Soviet, Warsaw Pact and Chilean armed forces, or paramilitaries from Fiji. Others are
recruited from different intelligence services, SWAT-teams or drug enforcement organizations. A few firms
also recruit from guerrilla and rebel groups, but the bulk of the personnel have served for at least some time in the military. The
most prized are plucked from the world’s elite Special Forces units: Americans from the Navy Seals, Delta
Force, Special Forces commandos, and Rangers; British from the Special Air Service,61 the Special Boat Service, and
Airborne Commandos; Russians from the Alpha Team and Special Forces units of the former KGB, or from the Spetsnaz of the
former Red Army.62 Representing the peak of the military profession, these typically are far more accustomed to
interacting with foreign nationals in conflict areas than the average service member. Proficiency in
reconnaissance, intelligence, foreign languages, and cultural appreciation are skills learned during their
military training and carried over into their professional approach taken as civilian specialists. Frequently
they are former and retired senior NCOs, men in their 30s and early 40s likely to have combat experience. For those
willing to pay the price, this level of experience contributes to a more relaxed environment that simplifies
operations. Since some PMCs unblushingly charge $500 to $1,500 a day for their most skilled operators,63 military
leaders are openly grumbling that the lure of such payment a day is siphoning away some of their most
experienced Special Operations people at the very time their services are most in demand.64 Competition
over elite troops from PMCs working in Iraq is now so intense that the US Special Operations Command has
formulated new pay, benefits, and educational incentives to try to retain them65 and in the UK, it has led the Army
to offer soldiers yearlong “sabbaticals” to staunch the long-term damage being caused by elite troops leaving to work for PMCs in
Iraq.66
Planet Debate                                                                                                                                                                       80
PMCs – Sherry Hall

                            PMSCs Undermine Civil/Military Relations
PRIVATIZING WARFARE WEAKENS CIVILIAN- MIILITARY RELATIONS- PRIVATIZED
FORCES CORRUPT THE VIEW OF SOLDIERS
Schreier and Caparini, 05
[Fred, consultant with the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces and Swiss Ministry of Defense and Marina, Senior Fellow at the Geneva Centre for the
Democratic Control of Armed Forces and Ph.D., King’s College, University of London, “Privatising Security: Law, Practice and Governance of Private Military and Security
Companies,” p. 46, March, Geneva Centre For The Democratic Control Of Armed Forces, GScholar,
http://se2.dcaf.ch/serviceengine/Files/DCAF/18346/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/BA695123-3145-4CAA-B29A-A60711724C96/en/op06_privatising-security.pdf]
A real dilemma in civil-military relations traditionally has been finding a way to cultivate and sustain a
body of people with the ability to do things considered abnormal by civilians – to transcend physical
discomfort, master fear, and kill and coerce enemies – without undercutting the day-to-day comity that undergirds
society. Stable civil-military relations have kept warfighters separate from the rest of society without
allowing them to become so isolated that they might turn against society. Though this risk is rather limited in
Western democracies, the privatization of warfare is likely to widen the gap between soldiers and civilians
and to weaken the link between the armed forces and society – a process that started with the abolition of mandatory conscription in
most Western countries. Since PMCs generate military power that does not reside in the nation-state, the balance in Clausewitz’ trinity between the people and passion, the
                                                                           Adding the private military industry as a third
commander, his army, and creativity, and the government and rationality will be disrupted.186
and outside party will not only reshape civil-military relations, but will complicate control and good
governance, and may even destabilize the delicate balance. In stable democracies, where the risk of mutiny or
coups is remote, the addition of that industry will raise concerns about relations between public authorities
and the PMCs. But in weak or developing states, where power often comes from the barrel of a gun, the hiring of
PMC services may undermine the regime’s control over the military. Civil-military theory and practice
require a clear separation of the military institution from the domains of politics and economics: … the
military profession is monopolized by the state. …The skill of the officer is the management of
violence; his responsibility is the military security of his client, society. The discharge of the responsibility
requires mastery of the skill; mastery of the skill entails acceptance of the responsibility. Both responsibility and skill
distinguish the officer from other social types. All members of society have an interest in its security; the state has a direct concern for the
achievement of this along with other social values; but the officer corps alone is responsible for military security to the exclusion of all other ends”. … Does the officer have
a professional motivation? Clearly he does not act primarily from economic incentives. In western society the vocation of officership is not well rewarded monetarily. Nor is
                                                                    The officer is not a mercenary who transfers his
his behaviour within his profession governed by economic rewards and punishments.
services wherever they are best rewarded, nor is he the temporary citizen-soldier inspired by intense
momentary patriotism and duty but with no steadying and permanent desire to perfect himself in the
management of violence. The motivations of the officer are a technical love for his craft and the sense of social obligation to utilize this craft for the benefit
of society. The combination of these drives constitutes professional motivation. Society, on the other hand, can only assure this motivation if it offers its officers continuing
                                                        the military professional’s “relation to society is guided by
and sufficient pay both while on active duty and when retired”.187 And
an awareness that the skill can only be utilized for purposes approved by society through its political
agent, the state.188 Today, the fact is that the values of the professional soldier within society and the spirit of
selfless service embodied in their duty on behalf of the country have begun to erode, even in such states as the US and the UK where the
military remains one of the most respected government institutions. More than other things, it is military contracting with the PMC industry and the overwhelming presence
                                                                          PMCs alter the former exclusivity of the military by
of ex-soldiers in its employment rolls that threaten these military virtues.
marketing the unique expertise their employees acquired from serving in the publicly funded military .
PMCs are hired by the civilian leadership in government because they possess skills and capabilities
that provide them greater effectiveness than would reliance on the traditional military. But by seeing
officers, NCOs, and specialists leaving public service while still remaining in the military sphere , and cashing
in on the expertise and training that taxpayers paid for, the public’s respect for the institution and its faith in the
good motives of the military leadership may fade. Since these privately recruited individuals see themselves as no longer bound by the
codes, rules, and regulations that once made military service unique, and sell their skills on the international market for profit, the privatization of military
services under contract is perceived as corrupting the armed forces both in the eyes of society and of
those who remain in the ranks. Moreover, those in the service also fear that the military pension system
might be called into question since profit is being incurred from the very same service for which the
public is paying retired personnel back. All these elements reinforce the danger even in stable
democracies that the introduction of an external, corporate party into civil-military relations ultimately
can have a serious impact on the domestic distribution of status, roles, and also the resources of the state’s
professional armed forces. In more dire circumstances, where PMCs and PSCs are called in because of real risks of, or of already existing, internal violence
and tensions between the local government and the military, the potential impact of outside actors on civil-military relations can
be much greater: either PMCs and PSCs may become a counterweight to the local military and
reinforce the regime, or they may become a real threat to civil-military relations and to regime survival
where these relations are already troubled.
Planet Debate                                                                                                       81
PMCs – Sherry Hall

                  PMSCs Undermine Civil/Military Relations
PMSCs IN IRAQ HAVE UNDERMINED CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS
Simon Chesterman & Chia Lehnardt, Professor and Researcher – NYU School of Law, 2007, From
Mercenaries to Market: the rise and regulation of private military companies, eds. S. Chesterman & C.
Lehnardt, p. 4
The use and conduct of PMCs in Iraq, by contrast, have posed different problems and challenges to regulation. This is
illustrated most starkly by the difference in treatment of individuals implicated in the Abu Ghraib torture
incidents, depending on whether they were part of the US forces or PMC employees . In chapter five David
Isenberg analyses how PMCs operating alongside the coalition forces—but outside the military chain of
command—have complicated civil-military relations. He argues that this has created problems of
coordination and created opportunities for the US government to evade public accountability for certain
aspects of the Iraq conflict.
Planet Debate                                                                                                                      82
PMCs – Sherry Hall

      PMSCs Undermine Professional Military/Military Ethics
PMCS THREATEN THE MILITARY PROFESSION- THEIR CRIMES DESTROY THE
MILITARY FUNCTION
Andrew F. Krepinevich, 8, [President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, frmr member of
the personal staff of three defense secretaries, the Office of Net Assessment, the National Defense Panel, the
Defense Science Board, and the Joint Forces Command’s Transformation Advisory Board, “An Army at the
Crossroads,” CSBA / hnasser]
In the early post-Vietnam era, the military profession went through what some considered a crisis. The justification for the war
was questionable and victory denied, but it was the lack of military professionalism of a handful of servicemen and women more
than any other factor that caused the American military to rededicate itself to the profession of arms. Today, the profession
faces another crisis, for it and its nobility are in danger of being sold to the lowest bidder. This problem,
however, is not merely a concern of soldiers, and it is not only a concern of honor. The moral argument
for professional soldiers not being responsible for the crimes of jus ad bellum (if such an argument is
possible at all) is based on the role soldiers play in the profession of arms, and mercenaries operating in
a separate chain of command undermine the very possibility of such a profession. I do not believe that the
crisis has yet reached the point where talk of the military profession is meaningless, but I know that military
professionals cannot fight alongside and independently of large numbers of mercenaries for extended
periods of time without becoming mercenaries themselves. This claim is not intended as hyperbole, and
it is not a reflection of the character of those serving in PMFs. I am not claiming that professional
soldiers become mercenaries because they are corrupted by those in PMFs. Rather, the continued
existence of PMFs performing a military function destroys 32 M. Hedahl the ability for the profession to
exist at all. If the performance of military functions in contingency operations by PMFs becomes a
commonplace occurrence (and, if something is not done very soon, we will reach this point in the very near future), then
our military uniforms, medals, and even codes of honor will become nothing more than anachronistic
window dressing.
Planet Debate                                                                                                                                                                          83
PMCs – Sherry Hall

         PMSCs Undermine Professional Military/Military Ethics
AS THE GOVERNMENT BECOMES MORE RELIANT ON PRIVATE CONTRACTORS,
THE VALUE OF THE MILITARY LESSENS
Singer 7 [Peter W. Singer , the director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative and a senior fellow in Foreign Policy at Brookings., “Black Water the Roger Clemens of
War”/ hnasser] http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2007/1214_military_contractors_singer.aspx?p=1
It seems that 2007 will go down in history as the year of artificial performance enhancers. In the world of sports, you've got guys like Roger Clemens and Barry Bonds. In
                            That's right, just when it seemed the questions that surround private military
the military realm, you've got Blackwater.
contracting couldn't get more simultaneously odd and disturbing, Blackwater (the company involved in
the September shootings in Baghdad, which left 17 Iraqi civilians dead) has been sued by the victims'
families for, among other things, sending heavily-armed "shooters" into the streets of Baghdad with the
knowledge that some of these "shooters" are chemically influenced by steroids and other "judgment-
altering substances." The lawsuit, aided by the non-profit Center for Constitutional Rights based in Washington, claims
not just that the civilians were killed by Blackwater employees, but that the company was responsible as
it "created and fostered a culture of lawlessness amongst its employees, encouraging them to act in the
company's financial interests at the expense of innocent human life." Most recently, the plaintiffs asserted that
"Blackwater knew that 25% or more of its "shooters were injecting steroids or other judgment altering
substances, yet failed to take effective steps to stop the drug use." Blackwater has, of course, vehemently denied many of the
claims in the lawsuit; its spokesperson, channeling Major League Baseball's denials, told the media that the use of steroids is "absolutely in violation of our policy." The
company also sought to defuse its recent spate of negative press with a public relations blitz that included changing the corporate logo to look less threatening, having the
firm's CEO, Erik Prince, take questions on that hard-hitting venue The Today Show (other topics covered on that episode included "tips for improving your sex life" and
"eco-friendly Halloween costumes"). The latest step: arranging for its private military parachute team to serve as the halftime show at the upcoming Armed Forces Bowl
                                                                                                                        The claims of steroid use
(how's that for irony?) football game in Fort Worth. It will remain for a jury to figure out whether the lawsuit has merit or not. (
are not without precedent, however. In 2005, U.S. Marines busted a steroid-dealing network in the U.S.
embassy complex that provided hypodermic needles and large amounts of anabolic steroids to
contractors. Nine Americans working for KBR and Blackwater were reported by the Washington Post
as being kicked out of Iraq for their role in it.) For the public, however, we should be thinking about this issue of
contractors and steroids in another way. Our military's use of the private military industry has become an
addiction that parallels athletes' increasing turn to artificial substances to get ahead. Just as a dose of
steroids give athletes the ability to hit the ball further than ever before, so too has injecting more than
160,000 private military contractors into Iraq allowed the operation to perform tasks that would
otherwise be difficult. It is for this reason that many see no problem with seeking that "competitive
advantage," on either the playing field or the battlefield. And, yet, short-term performance enhancement
comes at a cost. Just as steroid use leads to side-effects that range from acne and heart damage to even
death, the turn to more and more contractors has led to such results as billions of dollars missing in
taxpayer funds, soldiers poached away from a stretched thin military, and contractors "Getting Away
with Murder," as one recent report on the industry was entitled. As 2007 comes to a close, both sports and the military must figure out a larger question, however.
Many of these addictions' side effects may prove to be manageable, or at least pushed back under the table, be it through new designer drugs or various new laws and
policies. And yet, we cannot get around the fact that even if we were able to solve the side effects that come with our new addictions, something about just accepting them
doesn't settle right. The reason figures like Bonds and Clemens and now the dozens of other baseball stars are treated with more contempt than celebration by both fans and
fellow athletes is not merely because our concern about their shrunken testicles or bloated heads. Nor is it about them breaking the rules, per se. Even if using steroids were
made legal, it would still trouble our notion of the game's ideals. It would still run afoul of the sense that baseball is supposed to be a game won on smarts, skill, strategy, and
dedication - not out of a syringe. Achievement that comes only from a lab is not really athletic accomplishment to be honored at all.     The same sort of
concern of ideals versus reality plays out when governments become more and more reliant on private
companies in the public realm of the military. The addiction to private contractors in public military
operations is troubling not only because of side effects like lost taxpayer money or incidents as what
happened with Blackwater's shooters in Baghdad (whether they used steroids or not). Rather, it is
because the military is a unique sort of profession. It is responsible for the safety of all of society. It is
for this reason that the military is the only profession to have its own system of law and we speak of its
role in society as one of duty, honor, and sacrifice. Insert "private" in front of military and we must, in
turn, substitute such honored concepts as "service" and "mission" with profit-oriented words like "job"
and "contract." This doesn’t make the people in these roles evil or bad, much like many of the players who used steroids are
ones we will still cheer for come spring. But, just the same, our ideals begin to fall by the wayside. The long-
term health and respect of the military profession and, most importantly, its role in a democratic society
is jeopardized. Much as sports like baseball must now figure out what to do about steroids, and whether to let such figures as Bonds into the Hall of Fame, the
American military must figure out just how far it is willing to hand over its professional identity to profit seeking actors outside the force. To put it another
way, do we just accept Bonds and Blackwater as the future? Or, are we going to put an "asterisk"
besides the recent era and reign back in our addictions?
Planet Debate                                                                                                                 84
PMCs – Sherry Hall

      PMSCs Undermine Professional Military/Military Ethics
PMCS OFTEN ENGAGE IN THE ILLEGAL TRADE AND PURCHASE OF VALUABLE
NATIONAL RESOURCES IN COUNTRIES- PMCS HAVE MOTIVES AT ODDS WITH THE
MILITARY
Singer 1 [the director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative and a senior fellow in Foreign Policy at Brookings.
“Corporate Warriors Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry and Its Ramifications for
International Security” Singer, P. W. International Security, Volume 26, Number 3, Winter 2001/02, pp. 186-220
(Article) /] http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/ins/summary/v026/26.3singer.html
Another risk of outsourcing is that a firm’s motivations for fighting may differ from those of its client. This is
particularly a problem for clients that contract type 1 firms. These clients are often those most in need yet least able
to pay and thus at the highest risk of default. In a number of cases, this imbalance has led to the creation
of curious structures that attempt to align client and firm incentives. In a sort of Faustian bargain, a client locks in a
firm’s loyalties by mortgaging valuable public assets, usually to business associates of the PMF. This often takes place
through veiled privatization programs.49 To be paid, a firm must protect its new, at-risk assets,
effectively tying its fortunes to those of its client. This was how cash-poor regimes in Angola, Papua
New Guinea, and Sierra Leone allegedly compensated their PMFs—specifically, by selling off mineral
and oil rights to related companies. Rebel groups in Sierra Leone and Angola are also rumored to have reached similar
arrangements with rival corporations. In the long term, however, potentially valuable resources for the nation as
a whole are lost forever to meet short-term exigencies. “Strategic privatization,” in which the asset being
traded as payment is located within an opponent’s territory (e.g., a lucrative mine), provides an added
variation. Even if during an intrastate conflict the regime is not in military control of certain public
assets, as the internationally recognized sovereign, it can still legally privatize and sell them to a PMF
or its associates in return for the PMF’s services. In this case, the PMF must then seek out and attack the
government’s opponent in order to secure payment. This represents a modern parallel to Michael
Doyle’s notion of “imperialism by invitation,” whereby parties that control ties to the international
market acquire more power than their local rivals. 50 The Angolan government has been most effective in using this
strategy, selling concessions that have placed mining companies and their type 1 protectors astride its opponent’s lines of
communication, thus adding to the government’s recent strategic gains.
Planet Debate                                                                                                                        85
PMCs – Sherry Hall

                   Privatizing War Undermines Overall Security
THE PRIVATIZATION OF WAR RISKS A REGRESSION TO THE DARK AGES, IN WHICH
ONLY THE RICH CAN AFFORD PROTECTION
Sampson ’04, (Anthony, “MERCENARIES ARE UNACCOUNTABLE - WHICH IS WHY
GOVERNMENTS LIKE TO EMPLOY THEM; PARTS OF THE WORLD ARE LOOKING LIKE 14TH-
CENTURY EUROPE, WHEN KINGS,” The Independent, First Edition; COMMENT; Pg. 39, 8-14-04)
As the fighting escalates in Iraq, we have to be more concerned about the use of mercenary armies - oops, I mean
private military firms - which have taken over part of the role of the allied forces.
At a time when the British and American armies are stretched close to their limits, in operations which need to be strictly controlled,
are we allowing private armies and contractors too much power? Is war, like so many other industries, gradually being
privatised?
It's worth looking back at the development of mercenaries, which have always had a sinister image as "the dogs of war". They came
into the limelight nine years ago in Africa, where the weak government in Sierra Leone hired the shadowy British company Sandline
to defeat the rebel army - which it achieved in two weeks with the help of helicopter gunships.
Since then British mercenary companies have proliferated through Africa, forming and re-forming and
changing their names to baffle investigators, but showing signs of strong financial links with control from
London and South Africa. Many of the soldiers are ex-members of the Afrikaner military or police with
connections with the old apartheid regime, and a dubious record of civilised behaviour.
The Pretoria government of President Mbeki has effectively disowned them; when earlier this year mercenaries were arrested and
imprisoned in Zimbabwe, on their way to mount a coup in Equatorial Guinea, the Zimbabwe government was apparently acting on a
tip-off from Pretoria.
Their leader Simon Mann, a well-connected buccaneer from Eton and the Scots Guards - who had been a co-founder of Sandline - is
trying to use his influence in London to achieve his release; the outcome may reveal something about how far he enjoys discreet
backing from the British Government.
But the role of the mercenary companies has spread far beyond Africa, and for the past year it has been Iraq
which has provided by far their biggest opportunity for profits.
Most Western companies employed private security companies, and the American proconsul Paul Bremer was himself protected by
guards hired by the American firm Blackwater.
The American mercenaries had a dangerously ambiguous status, or lack of status. Officially the army had
no obligation to protect them, yet it felt obliged to come to their rescue when necessary. When four
Blackwater soldiers rashly arrived at the dangerous city of Fallujah, and were hideously murdered and
mutilated by the Iraqi rebels, the much-publicised atrocity encouraged American marines to take revenge,
rampaging into the city centre, and killing hundreds of Iraqis, including many innocent civilians.
Since the interim Iraqi government took over in July, the role of mercenaries has increased rather than diminished, and they received
new recognition when a contract worth nearly $ 300m was signed with Tim Spicer, the head of the British company Aegis - a co-
founder with Simon Mann of Sandline (which officially went out of business in April).
Other parts of the world were also becoming happy hunting grounds for private armies, whether in the Middle East, Africa or Central
Asia, as big corporations felt more need of protection in the wake of 11 September, which weak governments or failed states could not
provide.
Are we regressing to an earlier age, before nation-states had acquired their disciplined armies with a
monopoly of force, and both governments and business relied on mercenaries for their survival? Parts of
the world are looking like 14th-century Europe, when kings and city-states had to pay private armies to
protect them; and the English mercenary Sir John Hawkwood marched his "white company" through the continent, selling his
services to popes and potentates in return for short-lived security.
So are we heading towards the privatising of wars, whose outcomes will be decided by whoever can pay
most to freebooting soldiers beyond the control of governments?
Planet Debate                                                                                                                   86
PMCs – Sherry Hall

                 Privatizing War Undermines Overall Security
PMCS CREATE A COMPLICATED BALANCE OF POWER – MAKES IT HARDER FOR
STATES TO MAINTAIN RELATIONS
Singer 1 [the director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative and a senior fellow in Foreign Policy at Brookings.
“Corporate Warriors Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry and Its Ramifications for
International Security” Singer, P. W. International Security, Volume 26, Number 3, Winter 2001/02, pp. 186-220
(Article) / hnasser] http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/ins/summary/v026/26.3singer.html
The privatized military industry lies beyond any one state’s control . Further, the layering of market
uncertainties atop the already-thorny issue of net assessment creates a variety of complications for
determining the balance of power, particularly in regional conflicts. Calculating a rival’s capabilities or force posture has
always been difficult. In an open market, where the range of options is even more variable, likely outcomes
become increasingly hard to discern. As the Serbs, Eritreans, Rwandans, and Ugandans (whose opponents hired PMFs
prior to successful offensives) all learned, not only can once-predictable deterrence relationships rapidly
collapse, but the involvement of PMFs can quickly and perhaps unexpectedly tilt local balances of
power.

PMCS CREATE A COMPLICATED BALANCE OF POWER – MAKES IT HARDER FOR
STATES TO MAINTAIN RELATIONS
Singer 1 [the director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative and a senior fellow in Foreign Policy at Brookings.
“Corporate Warriors Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry and Its Ramifications for
International Security” Singer, P. W. International Security, Volume 26, Number 3, Winter 2001/02, pp. 186-220
(Article) / hnasser] http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/ins/summary/v026/26.3singer.html
The privatized military industry lies beyond any one state’s control. Further, the layering of market
uncertainties atop the already-thorny issue of net assessment creates a variety of complications for
determining the balance of power, particularly in regional conflicts. Calculating a rival’s capabilities or force posture has
always been difficult. In an open market, where the range of options is even more variable, likely outcomes
become increasingly hard to discern. As the Serbs, Eritreans, Rwandans, and Ugandans (whose opponents hired PMFs
prior to successful offensives) all learned, not only can once-predictable deterrence relationships rapidly
collapse, but the involvement of PMFs can quickly and perhaps unexpectedly tilt local balances of
power.
Planet Debate                                                                                                                               87
PMCs – Sherry Hall

                   Privatizing War Undermines Overall Security
PMCS UNDERMINE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WEAKEN STATE USE OF
FORCE
Wodarg 8[ Wolfgang, Member of the Parliamentary Assembly of Council of Europe (PACE) and a
Board Member of Transparency International Germany “Private military and security firms and the
erosion of the state monopoly on the use of force” Report Political Affairs Committee 12/22 / hnasser]
In recent years, the traditional state monopoly on the use of force has been diluted, or even undermined, in
a growing number of states. This phenomenon, which has become noticeable since the end of the cold
war, grew stronger after the 11 September terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre in New York. 2.
Many former military professionals and a lot of military hardware lost their raison d’être and function
after the breakdown of the Iron Curtain. This was the ground on which the new private military and
security businesses were rapidly growing. 3. The erosion of the state monopoly on the use of force is
today taking place by way of an increasing recourse by states to services offered by private
organisations providing military and policing services, hereafter referred to as private military and
security companies (PMSCs). 4. This phenomenon is not limited to sovereign states and their
governments. Other actors, such as major international organisations (like the United Nations), private
businesses, humanitarian agencies, the media and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), avail
themselves of such services in pursuit of security-related goals. 5. The shift in public security
obligations to the private sector has already contributed to transforming the balance of power inside
societies affected by this trend, and to a gradual destabilisation of international relations. 6. In all the
countries where PMSCs are active, it is becoming more and more perceptible that the relationship
between citizens and state power institutions (military and police) is changing and is becoming
increasingly disturbed. 7. The recourse to services of PMSCs – especially in “weak” and “fragile” states
– entails disempowerment of the state, the weakening of public governance and a decreasing capability
to resolve conflicts by civilian means. It often leads to erosion of public order and may ultimately result
in the collapse of the state itself. 8. The growing activities of PMSCs in various conflict zones throughout the
world, often beyond any government or public control, also weaken and undermine the role of the international
community of nations in maintaining international peace. 9. One of the consequences of this latter trend is the shift
in priorities in political choices from prevention to rapid action, and from the civilian handling of crises to the solution of conflicts
by the use of force. 10. The European democratic model, with its way of dealing with internal, common,
external and international problems in accordance with its values, has become more and more attractive
worldwide. 11. The uncontrolled activities of European private military and security companies, whose
practices often run counter to the principles to which the European states are committed, may
undermine the moral standing and international reputation of these states. 12. Therefore, Europe has particular
responsibilities in addressing the issue of the regulation of activities of PMSCs on the basis of common principles. The Council of
Europe, with its experience in defining, promoting and protecting common standards in the field of human rights, democracy and
the rule of law, offers the appropriate framework for this and should take the lead.
Planet Debate                                                                                                                88
PMCs – Sherry Hall

      PMSCs Increase Militarism – Invisible Form of Warfare
PMSCs DISTANCE WARFARE FROM CITIZEN CONTROL
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 134-5
Finally, I argue that the use of PMSCs is another form of virtual warfare . Similar to the way in which risk-
transfer warfare works to hide the costs of war from those who can authorize it, virtual warfare works to
distance citizens from those who act in their name.

PMCS MAKES MILITARY POWER EASIER TO OBTAIN AND LOWERS THE COSTS OF
WAR- ASSETS ARE EASILY CONVERTED TO MILITARY THREATS
Singer 1 [the director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative and a senior fellow in Foreign Policy at
Brookings. “Corporate Warriors Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry and
Its Ramifications for International Security” Singer, P. W. International Security, Volume 26, Number
3, Winter 2001/02, pp. 186-220 (Article) / hnasser]
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/ins/summary/v026/26.3singer.html
The military privatization phenomenon means that military resources are available on the open market.
Where once the creation of a military force required huge investments in both time and resources, today
the entire spectrum of conventional forces can be obtained in a matter of weeks, if not days. The
barriers to acquiring military strength are thus lowered, making power more fungible than ever. For
example, economically rich but population-poor states such as those in the Persian Gulf now hire PMFs to achieve levels of
power well beyond what they otherwise could. The same holds for new states and even nonstate groups that lack
the institutional support or expertise to build capable military forces. With the help of PMFs, not only
can clients add to their existing military forces and obtain highly specialized capacities (e.g., expertise in
information warfare), but they may even be able to skip a whole generation of war skills. The result,
however, may be a return to the dynamics of sixteenth-century Europe, where wealth and military
capability went hand in hand: Pecunia nervus belli (Money nourishes war).55 This ability to transform money
into force also means a renewal of Kantian fears over the dangers of lowering the costs of war .
Economic assets can now be rapidly transformed into military threats, making economic power more
threatening, which runs contrary to liberalist assumptions Likewise, modern liberalism tends to assume
only what is positive about the profit motive. It views the spread of capitalism and globalism as diminishing the
incentives for violent conflict and the rise of global civil society as an immutable good thing.56 The
emergence of a new type of private transnational firm that relies instead on the existence of conºict for
its profits counters the assumption that nonstate actors are generally peace orientated.
Planet Debate                                                                                          89
PMCs – Sherry Hall

                           Net Impact of PMSCs Negative
LONG RUN COSTS OF PMSCs OUTWEIGH SHORT-TERM BENEFITS
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 89-90
The immediate benefits of private forces may eventually be outweighed by the adverse effects of their use:
they may appear to offer a risk-free option, and may minimize risks on the ground and at home, but in the
long run, the widespread use of contractors may destabilize the trust and restraint that democracies have
imposed historically over military force.
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PMCs – Sherry Hall

                         PMSCs Blur Lines – Not Purely Private
PMSCs BLUR THE LINE BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE INDUSTRY
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 97-8
Other concerns arise from PMC mindfulness of not only great power interests, but of those illiberal men
who run what is left of decaying states. There exists some evidence that a few PMSCs have agreed to part
ownership of foreign subsidiaries also owned by leaders of weak states . These firms may generate healthy profits,
but joint ownership in those circumstances suggests erasure of the line between public governance and private interests. The
modern state becomes an armed fiefdom, supported by newly effective military and security advisers . Not
that larger powers are slow to defend their interests where some discrimination in clients is considered necessary. The British
government apparently stopped Sandline from assisting the Kosovar Liberation Army once the Foreign
Office concluded that such support would not serve UK interests. Similarly, the US State Department
prevented MPRI from assisting the Mobutu regime as it disintegrated in Zaire during 1997. Both examples
are evidence that tenacious state authority persists while undergoing the present transformation . It would seem
that Sandline was an early if faltering example of transnational PMSCs that are likely to follow. These will probably mature under the
symbiotic if watchful gaze of big power intelligence communities, tax officers, customs agencies and federal police political units.
The more powerful executive governments will allow this to occur because they have both overt and more
clandestine purposes for these entities. For example, when US firm Ronco violated a UN embargo with arms
shipments to Rwanda, influence exerted by the US government was helpful in procuring company
withdrawal intact. Discreet patronage by a strong state has been and will remain a necessity for ambitious companies and
certainly for those known to regain a paramilitary capability.
Planet Debate                                                                                                                     91
PMCs – Sherry Hall

                                   PMSCs Ineffective/Unreliable
RELIANCE ON PMSCs RISKY – LABOR DISPUTES POSSIBLE
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 107-8
Agent and principal may also encounter unhappy industrial relations that carry unexpected consequences. For example, a
threatened strike by a security firm in Baghdad in 2006 seemed likely to leave diplomats without
bodyguards and convoys without armed escorts. Another private security company guarding Baghdad
airport in 2005 briefly closed the facility over a pay dispute . The matter in 2006 remained an industrial
irritant, a threat to Iraq’ air traffic and a gnawing security problem for the Americans at nearby Camp
Victory. These kinds of problems are unlikely where regular military units are dispatched to guard airports,
convoys or diplomats. For sovereign soldiers to strike on operations would be multinous and carry consequences
much worse than losing their jobs. An individual UN contractors could be subject to military law such as that devised for a
contract legion identified in Chapter 6 and Appendix I.. However, whether a corporate employer would weather an
industrial relations buffeting as robustly as a state organ remains to be seen.

US PMSCs HAVE FARED POORLY IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 110
Some ethical and practical perils will attend contractor operations. Some might seem surprisingly conventional or even
mundane. For example, it is possible that contractor management could prove sub-standard in a host of familiar
ways. It may have an organizational culture which alienates its employees, offers the UN Secretariat,
irritates lower-paid states’ troops and fails to instill loyalty or respect in those who are exposed to it. Or it
may be simply incompetent. Some US military train-and-equip companies have already performed poorly
in Iraq. Other American corporations involved in contract policing in Afghanistan have also delivered
unsatisfactory training in some accounts. Moreover, where performance indicators are non-existent, experimental or in their
infancy, management may see opportunities to promote services which result in greater profit rather than greater effectiveness.

CONTEMPORARY CONFLICTS NO MORE LIKELY TO BE EASILY RESOLVED –
COMBATANTS STILL VERY MOTIVATED TO FIGHT
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 150-1
There are other reasons for caution. Although the history of colonial counterinsurgency over the twentieth century
was a mostly sobering chronology of recurrent defeat for Western imperialists, the contemporary context is very
different. Fewer intrastate conflicts could be termed national liberation or anti-colonial struggles. Several are
resource wars with an ethnic aspect. Others mix narco-politics with militant dissent. But none of these changes suggest that
deployments in present circumstances and any less hazardous. Future UN adversaries are likely to have learned
lessons from the conflicts of the 1990s. For example, opponents could obtain a propaganda advantage by characterizing their UN
backed foes as neo-colonialists. In expectation of an armed assault sanctioned by the UNSC, shrewd warlords
may form covert alliances with corrupt governments of neighboring states. They may agree to swap diamonds, gold
or drugs for replenishment, fuel, transport, rest, training, banking facilities and so on. Moreover, if they are fighting for the
wealth provided by extractive resources, there is not likely to be a compromise solution. If they lose, they
lose all. Retreating warlords would become fugitives before probably capture and perhaps even prosecution on human rights related
charges before a modern tribunal. If convicted they are likely to serve lengthy terms of imprisonment. Hence their motivation in
fighting is likely to be firm.
Planet Debate                                                                                                                         92
PMCs – Sherry Hall

                                    PMSCs Ineffective/Unreliable
CONTEMPORARY INSURGENCIES HAVE SUFFICIENT EQUIPMENT – NO HIGH TECH
ARMAMENTS ADVANTAGE
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 151
Nor do the distinctly modern causes of much contemporary conflict justify excessive faith in superior
technology, Western organization and highly skilled manpower. These met with widespread failure where
colonial forces sought to suppress third world insurgents of the past. And today’s opponents may be more
formidably equipped. Future suppliers to IPOA adversaries will probably evolve into bespoke outfitters, keen to meet the needs
of tomorrow’s niche war participants. These merchants are likely to equip combatants on the advice of experienced guerillas. They in
turn will probably assist in securing a new generation of supplies, paid from better organized, resource fuelled budgets. Much of
the materiel required for today’s guerrilla operations is already accessible on global markets.
It should not be difficult to purchase recent generation infra-red and thermal imaging devices; prepared
foodstuffs; signals equipment with sophisticated encryption; cheap global positioning navigation gear;
reliable Soviet designed helicopters suitable for assault, light and medium cargo lift, troop mobility and
medevac; less costly but effectively refurbished missiles and obsolete but serviceable artillery; medical
assistance including diseases prophylaxis, treatment of trauma in the field and airborne evacuation crews; and last, efficient financial
arrangements to expedite payment for all of it. Merchandise is likely to include newer items like imagery from
commercial space surveillance. Google and small, unmanned drones that supply airborne imaging. As the Tofflers suggest,
new technologies are now landing in global markets with a rapidity that is changing the nature of conflict. Newer combatants
are also likely to be trained buy competent military advisers who will be well remunerated through
extractive revenue. Their skills and other goods and services are available to the cashed-up belligerent who understands the
successful organization of future violence. In this environment even assessing an adversary’s skills and equipment could prove a
challenging task for a group of contractors.

PMSCs DON’T COORDINATE WELL WITH U.S. MILITARY
Suzanne Simons, CNN Executive Producer, 2009, Master of War: Blackwater USA’s Erik Prince and the
Business of War, p. 161
Members of the military working alongside the hired help would find poor coordination between the
commanders on the battlefield and the contractors in Iraq, and it would become apparent in increasingly
frustrating ways for leaders on the ground. Not only was it hard to know where the contractors were going,
it was also hard to know where they had been. Contractors didn’t drive around in marked vehicles, so telling one from the
other was nearly impossible without stopping the convoys and questioning the people in them. Military leaders complained
that contractor-protected convoys would blow through intersections, or even Iraqi police checkpoints,
without bothering to stop. In one sign of stunningly aggressive behavior, an unidentified contractor ran a
U.S. military Humvee off the road. Inside the Humvee was a very angry U.S. general.

CONTRACTORS UNDERMINE COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS BECAUSE OF LACK
OF DISCIPLINE
Suzanne Simons, CNN Executive Producer, 2009, Master of War: Blackwater USA’s Erik Prince and the
Business of War, p. 161-2
According to a senior DoD official, the contractors in general, and Blackwater specifically, “were very difficult to work
with, overly aggressive. Part of counterinsurgency is kicking down doors and getting people, but part of it
is winning the people…how do you that when they see Suburbans, with the guys with big muscles and
machine guns hanging out the side, driving through checkpoints? There was a discipline problem. ”
Planet Debate                                                                                                       93
PMCs – Sherry Hall

                                 PMSCs Ineffective/Unreliable
MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS IS JEOPARDIZED FROM SEPARATE COMMUNICATION
SYSTEMS AND PMC BEHAVIOR WITH CIVILIANS
Hedahl 9 [ Marcus Hedahl , served as a Program Manager in both the United States National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency (NGA) and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). He was also an Assistant Professor of
Philosophy and Ethics at the U.S. Air Force Academy . “Blood and Blackwaters: A Call to Arms for the Profession
of Arms.” Journal of Military Ethics; 2009, Vol. 8 Issue 1, p19-33, 15p/ hnasser]
                          ultimate goal of our military is not merely to be as cost effective as possible.
However, as noted earlier, the
The use of military security contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan also has negative impacts on military
effectiveness. There are the tactical concerns: for example, there are potential negative consequences of
the breakdown in a cohesive battle plan when two groups are using separate communications systems.
There are also strategic concerns: the use of these contractors brings with it negative consequences in a
counterinsurgency campaign _ ‘Iraqi citizens do not distinguish between employees of Blackwater and
the US Military. All they see is Americans with guns’ (Ricks 2007). Therefore, there also seem to be good
reasons based on military effectiveness against outsourcing security functions in Iraq and Afghanistan.

PMCS ARE UNRELIABLE AND HAVE BECOME TOO DEPENDABLE- THIS CAN RISK
MILITARY OPERATIONS
Singer 1 [the director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative and a senior fellow in Foreign Policy at Brookings.
“Corporate Warriors Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry and Its Ramifications for
International Security” Singer, P. W. International Security, Volume 26, Number 3, Winter 2001/02, pp. 186-220
(Article) / hnasser]
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/ins/summary/v026/26.3singer.html
The loss of direct control as a result of privatization carries risks even for strong states. For U.S.
military commanders, an added worry of terrorist targeting or the potential use of weapons of mass
destruction is that their forces are more reliant than ever on the surge capacity of type 3 support ªrms. The
employees of these firms, however, cannot be forced to stay at their posts in the face of these or other
dangers.47 Because entire functions such as weapons maintenance and supply have become completely
privatized, the entire military machine would break down if even a modest number of PMF employees
chose to leave.
Planet Debate                                                                                                                           94
PMCs – Sherry Hall

                                    PMSCs Ineffective/Unreliable
PMCS ARE UNRELIABLE AND HAVE FEW INCENTIVES TO STICK TO CONTRACTS-
LEAVING THE MILITARY HELPLESS- SIERRA LEON PROVES
Singer 1 [the director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative and a senior fellow in Foreign Policy at
Brookings. “Corporate Warriors Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry and
Its Ramifications for International Security” Singer, P. W. International Security, Volume 26, Number
3, Winter 2001/02, pp. 186-220 (Article) / hnasser]
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/ins/summary/v026/26.3singer.html
As PMFs become increasingly popular, so too does the danger of their clients becoming overly
dependent on their services. Reliance on a private firm means that an integral part of one’s strategic
success is vulnerable to changes in market costs and incentives. This dependence can result in two
potential risks to the security of the client: (1) the agent (the firm) might leave its principal (the client)
in the lurch, or (2) the agent might gain dominance over the principal. A PMF may have no
compunction about suspending its contract if a situation becomes too risky in either financial or
physical terms. Because they are typically based elsewhere, and in the absence of applicable international laws to enforce
compliance, PMFs face no real risk of punishment if they or their employees defect from their contractual
obligations. Industry advocates dismiss these claims by noting that firms failing to fulfill the terms of their con- tracts would
sully their reputation, thus hurting their chances of obtaining future contracts. Nevertheless, there are a number of
situations in which shortterm considerations could prevail over long-term market punishment. In game-
theoretic terms, each interaction with a private actor is sui generis. Exchanges in the international security
market may take the form of one-shot games rather than guaranteed repeated plays.45 Sierra Leone faced
such a situation in 1994, when the type 1 firm that it had hired (the Gurkha Security Guards, made up primarily of Nepalese
soldiers) lost its commander in a rebel ambush. Reports suggest that the commander was later cannibalized. The firm decided
to break its contract, and its employees fled the country, leaving its client without an effective military
option until it was able to hire another ªrm.4

OUTSOURCING LEADS TO CUTTING CORNERS TO GAIN PROFIT- PMFS DON’T HAVE
INCENTIVES TO TAKE NECESSARY RISKS
Singer 1 [the director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative and a senior fellow in Foreign Policy at
Brookings. “Corporate Warriors Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry and
Its Ramifications for International Security” Singer, P. W. International Security, Volume 26, Number
3, Winter 2001/02, pp. 186-220 (Article) / hnasser]
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/ins/summary/v026/26.3singer.html
Problems of incomplete information and monitoring generally accompany any type of outsourcing.
These difficulties are intensified in the military realm, however, because few clients have experience in
contracting with security agents. In most cases, there is either little oversight or a lack of clearly defined
requirements, or both. Add in the fog of war, and proper monitoring becomes extremely difficult.
Moreover, PMFs are usually autonomous and thus require extraterritorial monitoring, which is always
problematic. And at times, the actual consumer may not be the contracting party: Some states, for example, pay PMFs to
supply personnel on their behalf to international organizations. Another difficulty is the firms’ focus on the bottom
line: PMFs may be tempted to cut corners to increase their profits. No matter how powerful the client,
this risk cannot be completely eliminated. During the Balkans conflict, for example, Brown & Root is alleged to
have failed to deliver or severely overcharged the U.S. Army on four out of seven of its contractual obligations.43 A further
manifestation of this monitoring difficulty is the danger that PMFs may not perform their missions to
the fullest. PMFs have incentives not only to prolong their contracts but also to avoid taking undue risks
that might endanger their own corporate assets. The result may be a protracted conflict that perhaps
could have been avoided if the client had built up its own military forces or more closely monitored its
private agent. This was certainly true of mercenaries in the Biafra conflict in the 1970s, and many suspect that this was also
the case with PMFs in the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict in 1997–99. In the latter instance, the Ethiopians essentially leased a small but
complete air force from the Russian aeronautics firm Sukhoi—including Su-27 jet fighter planes, pilots, and ground staff. Some
contend, though, that this private Russian force failed to prosecute the war fully—for example, by rarely engaging Eritrea’s air
force, which itself was rumored to have hired Russian and Ukrainian pilots.
Planet Debate                                                                                                                         95
PMCs – Sherry Hall

                                     AT: PMSCs Do Good Things
IF PMSCs DO PERFORM TRULY VALUABLE SERVICES – THEN THEY SHOULD BE
INCORPORATED INTO THE MILITARY – IF WE’RE NOT WILLING TO SEND IN SOLDIERS
WE SHOULDN’T SEND IN CONTRACTORS
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 157
Can we live without PMSCs? Formally uniting these forces with our military has two major implications. First,
we may not be able to pursue the foreign policies we want to, if their true costs are revealed. If the only
way to follow through on the commitments we have made to places like Bosnia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Haiti,
Colombia, and others is to provide a surge of private security providers, then perhaps we should not be
there. If there is no political will to formally deploy those public servants who are legally allowed to use
weapons, whether within the formal military or in special reserve units, then there doesn’t seem to be a sufficient
national interest. Second, if we are only willing to send semi-combatants into war zones, or do drug
eradication or stability operations if they can be hired “on the cheap,” so to speak (that is, for short-term contracts
with minimal safeguards and benefits), then we are demonstrating our half-hearted commitment to these goals. If
we are going to live with them, we should formally invite them into the house . Can we live without them?
Repeatedly the charge is made that the only alternative to hiring armed contractors is the return of a draft, compelling the service of
citizens in the military. This is a false assumption, based on continuation of our force numbe3rs and their current basing.
Planet Debate                                                                                                                         96
PMCs – Sherry Hall

                              AT: “PMSCs More Cost Effective”
CONTRACTORS LIKELY TO INFLATE COSTS
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 110-1
Cost containment in armed conflicts is subject to notorious risks because organized violence tends to create an impetus to
raise rather than lower or at least contain expenditure. Some escalation is reasonable where equipment is unexepectedly
damaged, personnel become ill or are injured, where additional or specialized transport is required; more time is necessary than
anticipated and so on. Even so, mounting costs may be unreasonable where keeping each soldier or piece of
leased equipment in theater suggests opportunistic exploitation. For example, would the company contrive    the
deployment of unnecessary logistic support and specialized, higher cost employees who may be less than
vital in the circumstances? This type of moral hazard became infamous in cost-plus profiteering over the
last five years in Iraq. Certainly, some replacement or upgrading of equipment may be time consuming to
locate and negotiate and expensive to purchase. But military procurement is a field notoriously tarnished
through inflated prices, sub-standard quality and corruption of government bureaucracies. The UN and its
contractors enjoy no particular immunity from these risks. Complex military procurement in turn raises the
necessity for effective methods of oversight and accountability. Both are historically difficult to create and
maintain.

NO CLEAR EVIDENCE THAT PMSCs ARE COST EFFECTIVE
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 141-2
Comparative cost is another keenly debated issue. Putting IGOs like the UN to one side for a moment, a primary
question would appear to be whether profit-driven corporations carry out defense-related tasks more
efficiently and more cheaply than states’ bureaucracies. Is superior efficiency really the reason why the number and size
of states’ contractors have risen over the last two decades. On one hand, Singer argues that the cost of massive Pentagon
outsourcing over more than a decade has not provided what he calls “proven comprehensive cost savings .’
It may be that the market creates distortions which belie claims of economic efficiency. On the other hand, the
recent Republican Administration claimed that the US Department of Defense saved billions of dollars through
outsourcing over recent years via “Public-Private Competition.” Industry advocate Doug Brooks takes the view that PSCs
and PMCs provide services more efficiently, more rapidly and at a lower cost than states can provide them.
The logical consequence is that a state’s armed forces garner financial benefits and may re-deploy their
workforce, time, money and physical resources saved. He sees correct in some circumstances but emerging evidence
supports a more restrictive and less certain view. It seems likely that the American taxpayer saves money where there is genuine
competition. Otherwise, cost effectiveness appears demonstrable in some circumstances but inconclusive in others.

NO EVIDENCE THAT PMSCs SAVE MONEY
Suzanne Simons, CNN Executive Producer, 2009, Master of War: Blackwater USA’s Erik Prince and the
Business of War, p. 255-6
Just three months earlier, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) released its own figures about private contractors. The
United Stats was using contractors more than it ever had. In Iraq, they were operating on a one-to-one ratio alongside U.S. troops.
The CBO also found that U.S. agencies had awarded some $85 billion to contractors for work performed in
the Iraq theater, which included the countries of Iraq, Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United
Arab Emirates. The Department of Defense had spent $76 billion of that total; the U.S. Agency for International
Development awarded $5 billion, followed by the State Department at $4 billion. Another $10 billion had been spent for work
performed in Afghanistan.
The CBO tackled another question that had been looming over the industry for years. What was the cost of a contractor in comparison
to a member of the military? Were the taxpayers in fact saving money by hiring out, as Prince has long argued ? Industry leaders
had been boasting for years that they were a cost-saving measure, but they didn’t have the data to prove it.
“The costs of a private security contract are comparable with those of a U.S. military unit performing
similar functions,” according to the report. “During peacetime, however, the private security contract would not
have to be renewed, whereas the military unit would remain in the force structure .” In other words, there was
no savings during wartime, but “demobilization” was a lot faster with contractors: the government could shut down its contracts
quickly.
Planet Debate                                                                                                                                                                   97
PMCs – Sherry Hall

                                          AT: “PMSCs More Cost Effective”
PRIVATE CONTRACTOR OPERATIONS ARE MORE COSTLY- COSTS FOR PMCS ARE
PULLED AWAY FROM OTHER DEFENSE MEASURES
Post 4[“In Iraq, Contractors' Security Costs Rise” By Mary Pat Flaherty and Jackie Spinner Washington
Post Staff Writers 2/18 http://www.sallyportglobal.com/_build/docs/wash_post.tcharron.021804.pdf
/hnasser]
Attacks on the private contractors rebuilding Iraq are boosting security expenses, cutting into
reconstruction funds and compelling U.S. officials in Baghdad to contend with growing legions of
private, armed security teams spread throughout the country. While attacks on military targets and Iraqi citizens have
received widespread attention, the assaults on the companies, which have left at least 17 dead and
others wounded, are lesser known. Those attacks could jeopardize the success of the coalition efforts in Iraq, according to a Coalition Provisional
Authority document reviewed by The Washington Post. A draft of security guidance for contractors prepared by the CPA's
Infrastructure Security Planning Group in Baghdad says, "Spiraling costs, excessive work delays, lost
materiel and workforce casualties in the current threat environment have the potential to put Coalition
success at risk." The CPA's Program Management Office is seeking to hire a central coordinator for the private security teams in
anticipation of the thousands of foreign workers and hundreds of new work sites that will flood Iraq
starting next month, when nearly $10 billion in U.S.-funded rebuilding contracts are due to be awarded.
"The number of soft Coalition targets will grow dramatically," the draft states. U.S. and coalition military forces, which are being trimmed and face continuing attacks,
cannot provide contractor protection, and neither can fledgling Iraqi forces, the draft states, leaving private teams as the main protection for contractors. But tighter
licensing, registration and identification are needed "to prevent fratricide," the document says. The draft
says the threat to coalition forces and contractors is "assumed" to remain at current levels through next
year, leaving rebuilding companies vulnerable to attacks both from antioccupation elements and criminal rings. That combination could intensify
bidding wars for experienced security personnel and cause more money to be pulled away from
rebuilding under government contracts that allow companies to pass on security and other costs,
providing little incentive to hold down those expenses. Security costs are consuming about 10 percent of
each construction contract, up from 7 percent in October, according to the Baghdad office that manages reconstruction projects for the Coalition Provisional
Authority. Costs on high-profile targets, including pipelines, run higher. The added expenses may cause some projects to be delayed or canceled, said Darrell Crawford, chief
of staff for the office. The CPA would not publicly release information about attacks and killings of contractors. A review of news reports since last August found accounts
                                                        U.S. officials courting companies to take part in the
of 17 deaths of foreign contractors and five injuries in incidents in five cities or towns.
rebuilding insist that security is not an issue for contractors and said accounts have been overblown .
"Western contractors are not targets," Tom Foley, the CPA's director of private-sector development, told hundreds of would-be investors at a Commerce Department
conference in Washington on Feb. 11. He said the media have exaggerated the issue.
Planet Debate                                                                                                                                                            98
PMCs – Sherry Hall

                                         AT: “PMSCs More Cost Effective”
WASTEFUL DEFENSE SPENDING INEVITABLE WITH PMC USAGE- CONTRACTUAL
PRIORITIES CREATE UNRESTRAINED FUNDING
CAP 10 [ Center for American Progress, “A Dangerous Reliance on Defense Contractors
“http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/04/defense_contractors.html/print.html /hnasser ]
The Bush administration spent the better part of a decade refusing to face up to the manpower
implications of its open-ended commitment of forces—particularly in Iraq. And because they didn’t have the courage of
their convictions to reinstitute the draft, they were forced to take three disastrous steps: active duty forces have been deployed and
redeployed to both Iraq and Afghanistan without sufficient dwell time; the National Guard and Reserve
have been transformed from a strategic to an operational reserve, alternating deployments with active
forces; and private contractors have been tasked with filling in the gaps, often taking on missions
traditionally reserved for uniformed forces. The disastrous consequences of this final step—the widespread use of
contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan—are already widely known. Indeed, the incidents that were arguably the most detrimental to the U.S. mission in both
countries involved contractors, from the torture at Abu Ghraib and Bagram Air Base to the indiscriminate shootings at Nisour Square in Baghdad in 2007. Unfortunately,
the Obama administration has not fully learned from its predecessor’s mistakes. Secretary of Defense
Robert Gates announced late last month that the Pentagon will begin an internal investigation into the
Defense Department’s broader efforts to fund information operations . The inquiry was prompted by a contract
funded by the Defense Department that allegedly set up a network of private contractors in Afghanistan
to help track and kill suspected militants. Revelations of similar contracts under the Bush administration
have not been uncommon, but these new allegations demonstrate the Obama administration’s
disconcerting willingness (or acquiescence) to continue its predecessor’s reliance on private contractors to
execute wartime operations traditionally carried out only by U.S. special forces , intelligence agencies, and the State
Department. Equally troubling is the clear lack of oversight over the ballooning DOD-wide information
operations budget despite numerous instances of flagrant contractor abuse in the recent past. The scale of the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan require the United States to employ contractors in logistical and on-base functions such as supply
and equipment delivery or food preparation services. But the Obama administration must make a clean break from the Bush administration’s overreliance on private
                                                                                                                        a senior civilian Defense
contractors to conduct security and intelligence missions in combat zones. The New York Times broke the story in mid-March that
Department employee, Michael Furlong, had inappropriately used $25 million “from the Pentagon's
program against roadside bombs to hire private contractors to gather information on suspected
insurgents in Afghanistan—activities that Furlong says were authorized by top U.S. military
commanders.” Furlong allegedly hired former Special Forces and intelligence personnel to undertake surveillance on potential targets in both countries—an act
that is generally considered illegal when carried out by civilian personnel. Perhaps such instances of
abuse were inevitable given the dramatic increase in funding for Department of Defense-wide
information operations in the past several years, particularly within the Central Command area of operations. Funding for such operations
in that theater (which includes Iraq and Afghanistan) increased from $40 million in 2008 to $110 million in 2009 to a
requested $244 million in 2010. And overall information operations throughout DOD in fiscal year
2010 amounted to over $528 million. Funds under this broad category have been used to finance news articles, billboards, radio and television
programs, and even public opinion polls in several countries. The high-level priority that the Pentagon’s civilian and military
leaders have placed on such operations has created an atmosphere of virtually unconstrained funding in
which abuses were bound to occur. In fact, when Congress pressed the Pentagon to report the total amount
budgeted for information operations—or strategic communications as they are frequently called—
across all services and commands late last year, Secretary Gates “found that no one could say because
there was no central coordination.” This realization prompted “multiple studies” in late 2009 that were aimed at getting a better understanding of
individual services’ plans for strategic communications this year. It is unclear whether the Furlong program was discovered under
one of these studies or through other avenues. The current administration is wisely following Obama’s
campaign commitment to redeploy out of Iraq , which will ease the enormous strain placed on the men and women of our armed forces over
the last seven years. But this latest episode reveals that it has yet to fully reverse the dangerous U.S. dependence on private contractors.
Planet Debate                                                                                                                                                                   99
PMCs – Sherry Hall

                                          AT: “PMSCs More Cost Effective”
PRIVATE CONTRACTOR OPERATIONS ARE MORE COSTLY- COSTS FOR PMCS ARE
PULLED AWAY FROM OTHER DEFENSE MEASURES
Post 4[“In Iraq, Contractors' Security Costs Rise” By Mary Pat Flaherty and Jackie Spinner Washington
Post Staff Writers 2/18 http://www.sallyportglobal.com/_build/docs/wash_post.tcharron.021804.pdf
/hnasser]
Attacks on the private contractors rebuilding Iraq are boosting security expenses, cutting into
reconstruction funds and compelling U.S. officials in Baghdad to contend with growing legions of
private, armed security teams spread throughout the country. While attacks on military targets and Iraqi citizens have
received widespread attention, the assaults on the companies, which have left at least 17 dead and
others wounded, are lesser known. Those attacks could jeopardize the success of the coalition efforts in Iraq, according to a Coalition Provisional
Authority document reviewed by The Washington Post. A draft of security guidance for contractors prepared by the CPA's
Infrastructure Security Planning Group in Baghdad says, "Spiraling costs, excessive work delays, lost
materiel and workforce casualties in the current threat environment have the potential to put Coalition
success at risk." The CPA's Program Management Office is seeking to hire a central coordinator for the private security teams in
anticipation of the thousands of foreign workers and hundreds of new work sites that will flood Iraq
starting next month, when nearly $10 billion in U.S.-funded rebuilding contracts are due to be awarded.
"The number of soft Coalition targets will grow dramatically," the draft states. U.S. and coalition military forces, which are being trimmed and face continuing attacks,
cannot provide contractor protection, and neither can fledgling Iraqi forces, the draft states, leaving private teams as the main protection for contractors. But tighter
licensing, registration and identification are needed "to prevent fratricide," the document says. The draft
says the threat to coalition forces and contractors is "assumed" to remain at current levels through next
year, leaving rebuilding companies vulnerable to attacks both from antioccupation elements and criminal rings. That combination could intensify
bidding wars for experienced security personnel and cause more money to be pulled away from
rebuilding under government contracts that allow companies to pass on security and other costs,
providing little incentive to hold down those expenses. Security costs are consuming about 10 percent of
each construction contract, up from 7 percent in October, according to the Baghdad office that manages reconstruction projects for the Coalition Provisional
Authority. Costs on high-profile targets, including pipelines, run higher. The added expenses may cause some projects to be delayed or canceled, said Darrell Crawford, chief
of staff for the office. The CPA would not publicly release information about attacks and killings of contractors. A review of news reports since last August found accounts
                                                        U.S. officials courting companies to take part in the
of 17 deaths of foreign contractors and five injuries in incidents in five cities or towns.
rebuilding insist that security is not an issue for contractors and said accounts have been overblown .
"Western contractors are not targets," Tom Foley, the CPA's director of private-sector development, told hundreds of would-be investors at a Commerce Department
conference in Washington on Feb. 11. He said the media have exaggerated the issue.
Planet Debate                                                                                                                     100
PMCs – Sherry Hall

                              AT: “PMSCs More Cost Effective”
BLACK WATER COVERS UP THE DETAILS OF OPERATIONS FROM THE GOVERNMENT
AND PRESS- THEIR FAILURES IN IRAQ COST THE TAX PAYERS MILLIONS
Neff 8 [ Joseph Neff, reporter for “The News and Observer in North Carolina” Jun 1, 2008 “Prívate Military
Contractors: Determining Accountability”/ hnasser]
http://web.ebscohost.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=2&hid=9&sid=a66e647a-274f-
47f7-933d-36233c60b682%40sessionmgr111
In weaving this story together, we had some extraordinary luck for a mediumsized paper, circulation 170,000. We had a young
stringer in Iraq, Charles Crain, who was in Fallujah that day talking vwth local police. He vñtnessed the mob beating the men's
bodies hanging from the bridge, and he kept his head low. Crain later got his hands on a video of the ambush made by the
attackers. Families of the four men were the most helpful, sharing stories, photos and e-mails from Iraq. With what we
learned in Iraq combining with what we'd reported in North Carolina, we were able to publish a seven-
part series in which we profiled the contractors and Blackwater and unraveled events as best we could.
As our initial series ran, we started to receive calls from people who would become our reliable and invaluable sources. A big
breakthrough occurred when we obtained copies of contracts between Blackwater and its guards and
Blackwater and the companies it worked for. The contracts explained a lot. Why was it so hard to get
Blackwater workers to speak wdth us? The contract forbade it and, if someone did talk, Blackwater
could demand $250,000 in damages, payable in five business days. The contract also revealed the 70 2008
Iraq and Afghanistan flaws of the mission. The contract mentioned Fallujah by name in discussing the
dangers of Iraq. Each Blackwater vehicle must have three men so that 360-degree field of fire could be
watched. There were only two in Fallujah. There must be reconnaissance, a heavy weapon, and armored vehicles—the
Fallujah mission had none of those, and the men killed in Fallujah had none of those. We later obtained reports from
another Blackwater team that skirted Fallujah that same day and returned safely. Blackwater threatened
legal action if we published the reports, which were extremely pointed about where blame should be
placed. These reports conveyed the men's anger: They had vigorously protested about being sent out short-
staffed, without maps, and into a part of the country they didn't know. "Why did we all want to kill [the
Baghdad office manager]?" one member wrote the day after the massacre. "He had sent us on this
fucking mission and over our protest. We weren't sighted in, we had no maps, we had not enough sleep,
he was taking 2 of our guys cutting off [our] field of fire. As we went over these things, we knew the
other team had the same complaints. They too had their people cut." Had the Marines sent a lightly armed, short-
staffed squad into Fallujah, without maps or reconnaissance or planning, there would have been a court martial. The contracts
also revealed a little-reported part of the war. The reliance on private contractors and a web of
subcontractors can come with a staggering price. Four layers of private companies existed between the
taxpayer and the guards killed in Fallujah. Blackwater paid the guards killed in Fallujah $600 aday
Blackwater was contracted to Regency Hotel, a Kuwaiti company. Blackwater billed Regency $815 a
day. Blackwater also billed Regency separately for all its overhead and costs in Iraq: insurance, room
and board, travel, weapons, ammunition, vehicles, office space and equipment, administrative support,
taxes and duties. Regency then added its OVVTI profit and costs and billed it all to a European food
company, ESS. The food company added its costs and profit and sent its bill to Kellogg Brown & Root,
a division of Halliburton, which added overhead and profit and presented the final bill to the Pentagon.
What was the final tab to taxpayers? Was it double, triple or quadruple the $600 paid to the slain guard?
We knew it was far higher, but the exact added cost was impossible to figure. We also found that Army
auditors could not answer that question. The Defense Contract Audit Agency could examine the books of Kellogg
Brovm & Root, but they have no authority to audit the legion of subcontractors working indirectly for the United States. After
our story ran in October 2004, U.S. Rep. Henry Waxman requested billing information and invoices
from the Pentagon. He didn't begin to get a response for almost two years. The House Oversight and
Government Reform Committee that Waxman chairs has been aggressively investigating Blackwater
and other private military contractors. Blackwater has produced tens of thousands of pages of
documents to the committee under subpoena, and Waxman has released several investigative reports
corroborating our work. Ironically, Congressional staffers say that Blackwater has been much more
forthcoming than the State Department.
Planet Debate                                                                                                                       101
PMCs – Sherry Hall

                               AT: “PMSCs More Cost Effective”
PMCS ARE NOT COST EFFECTIVE- SALARIES AND LACK OF COMPETITION
Avant 4[ Deborah,Director of International Studies and the Center for Research on International and
Global Studies (RIGS), Political Science School of Social Sciences “Think Again: Mercenaries” July 1,
Foreign Policy /hnasser]
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2004/07/01/think_again_mercenaries?page=0,1
Numerous studies on privatization and outsourcing suggest that two conditions must be present for the
private sector to deliver services more efficiently than the government: a competitive market and
contractor flexibility in fulfilling their obligations. But governments frequently curtail competition to
preserve reliability and continuity. For instance, military contractor Kellogg, Brown & Root (a subsidiary of Halliburton)
won a no-bid contract to rebuild Iraqi oil fields in 2003 because the Pentagon determined it was the only company with the size
and security clearances to do the job. Moreover, governments often impose conditions that reduce contractors' flexibility. For
example, when the U.S. Army outsourced ROTC training in 1997, a long list of requirements for
trainers resulted in a higher estimated cost than that of the previous program. A 2000 report on logistics
support in the Balkans by the U.S. government's investigative arm, the General Accounting Office (GAO), faulted the military for
poor budgetary oversight. Perhaps most telling, cost-effectiveness is not one of the three reasons for
outsourcing listed in a 2003 GAO report on military contracting. (The reasons: to gain specialized technical skills,
bypass limits on military personnel that can be deployed to certain regions, and ensure that scarce resources are available for other
assignments.) News reports on the war in Iraq have noted the relatively high salaries of contractors -- some
$20,000 per month, triple or more what active-duty soldiers earn -- but such figures fail to explain
whether contractors are indeed cost-effective. Some analysts argue that contractors are ultimately cheaper because
they allow the military to avoid the expense of recruiting, training, and deploying personnel. However, most contractors
are recruited and trained by governments at some point in their careers. In addition, U.S. military leaders
have voiced concern that the lure of corporate contractors undermines Army personnel retention -- a
worry shared by military leaders from Britain to Chile.
Planet Debate                                                                                                                        102
PMCs – Sherry Hall

               AT: “PMSCs Provide Critical Logistics Support”
USING PMCS IN IRAQ KILLS READINESS – CONTRACTUAL ISSUES, PROTECTION
REQUIREMENTS, AND LOGISTICS
Schreier and Caparini, 05
[Fred, consultant with the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces and Swiss Ministry of Defense and Marina,
Senior Fellow at the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces and Ph.D., King’s College, University of London,
“Privatising Security: Law, Practice and Governance of Private Military and Security Companies,” p. 46, March, Geneva Centre For
The Democratic Control Of Armed Forces, GScholar,
http://se2.dcaf.ch/serviceengine/Files/DCAF/18346/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/BA695123-3145-4CAA-B29A-
A60711724C96/en/op06_privatising-security.pdf]/galperin
Outsourced support is guided by a contract – a legal, binding document outlining a statement of work and expectations. Even when
written with the best of intentions,a contract cannot cover every possible contingency in advance. If mission
requirements change, the statement of work and expectations may need changes. If changes are made, the contract
itself may require modification – and many times this will carry associated changes in cost. To stop during combat, no matter
how briefly, to rewrite or renegotiate a contractor’s obligations severely limits a commander’s ability to
accomplish the mission. Commanders need the flexibility to do what is needed, when it is needed, and to the degree it is
needed. To have any less flexibility increases risks significantly. Hence, the art and science of writing contracts is
becoming critical to ensuring flexibility, sustainability, and survivability in the battlespace, and every commander and logistician must
be familiar and knowledgeable about the contract process.136 Thus, rather than being able to concentrate on operations,
the commander may have to devote a significant amount of his time and energy to dealing with contractors’
shortcomings and problems. And rather than having a professional, dependable logistics team on which he can rely, he
must concern himself with contractual issues and problems. Moreover, the commander must be prepared for the eventuality
that the contractor’s personnel may decide to leave the theatre if they feel their security is threatened . The
issue is less whether large defence contractors will continue to service the contract, but whether or not they will be able to keep their
employees in the battlespace when and where needed. Furthermore, if subcontractors are performing for a parent contractor, will the
subcontractor be as reliable as the primary contractor?137 The military must have personnel available to backfill these
personnel. Additionally, the commander will have to provide force protection for contractor personnel.
Contractors cannot provide their own security; this is a military function and can have a significant impact on resources during
heightened activity or combat operations. This means that an additional force structure will be required to protect
contractors, even if they are former military personnel. This additional force structure will become especially
critical in a situation with asymmetrical threats or when contract personnel are directly supporting the warfighters and
moving with lead combat elements. For example, everyone in an area of operations is equally vulnerable to nuclear, biological and
chemical (NBC) threats, and everyone requires the same minimum-essential protection. There are costs, both in equipment and in
training, associated with preparing contractor personnel to survive NBC attacks .138 Given an asymmetric threat in
the nonlinear battlespace, there is no “safe” zone within the area of operation. Thus, the bottom line remains that force structure
will be required to provide force protection for all civilians working in the theatre of operations, whether in rear areas, on forward
lines, or in forward-deployed task forces. Most military personnel are classified as combatants and can be relied upon to assist and
augment the fighting force, as well as to provide self-protection and defend equipment and terrain. As history shows, logisticians have
always been the “infantry in reserve”. But PMC personnel are not necessarily cross-trained to execute tasks that are not
part of their job description. As a result, use of PMCs can compromise the ability to deal with the unexpected.
Not only may they be unlikely to take over tasks which are not part of their contractual obligations; they
cannot be ordered to do them by the military chain of command .139 In days past, the commander could routinely turn
to his troops to perform tasks other than their primary specialty when the work required relatively little skill or training. Given today’s
sophisticated weapon and support systems, however, turning to military members in times of PMC failure will
become less of an option. This contingency, more than any other, might dominate battle planning for military commanders of
the next generation.140 Using contractors also deprives some military personnel of valuable field experience and training. The
problem-solving opportunities that are so critical to the preparation of senior logistics officers and NCOs are no longer available.141
Additionally, while the contractors can relieve some of the burden on cooks and supply technicians, these personnel do not get the
operational experience they need to be effective members of the team when they really are required. A further problem resides in the
“no looking back” nature of outsourced support. When contractors become responsible for providing supplies, this
leaves no trained force structure capable of handling this function in the battlespace. If, after a long trial period,
the concept of substituting parts of the logistics by contractor services does not prove successful, the military will find itself
unable to instantly grow, train, and benefit from the experience of the mid- and upper-level managers
developed within the enlisted and officer corps. It may take close to an entire service career of 20 years
before the military can regain the capability now resident in its personnel. 142
Planet Debate                                                                                                                 103
PMCs – Sherry Hall

              AT: “PMSCs Provide Critical Logistics Support”
PMC USE GUTS MILITARY READINESS – FLEXIBILITY, VISIBILITY, AND RESOURCE
WASTE
Schreier and Caparini, 05
[Fred, consultant with the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces and Swiss Ministry of Defense and Marina,
Senior Fellow at the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces and Ph.D., King’s College, University of London,
“Privatising Security: Law, Practice and Governance of Private Military and Security Companies,” p. 46, March, Geneva Centre For
The Democratic Control Of Armed Forces, GScholar,
http://se2.dcaf.ch/serviceengine/Files/DCAF/18346/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/BA695123-3145-4CAA-B29A-
A60711724C96/en/op06_privatising-security.pdf]/galperin
The “ideal battlespace” would not contain any civilians. The presence of noncombatants as well as “civilians
authorized to accompany the force” in the area of operations greatly complicates the life of a commander.
Complexity is compounded when the commander is dependent upon PMCs to accomplish his mission . From
an operational perspective, outsourcing is supposed to improve flexibility and relieve pressures on support personnel. However, one
of the most obvious downsides of going into the battle with civilians is the loss of flexibility – one of the
key tenets of successfully waging war. A commander’s freedom and ability to improvise quickly in using tactics,
employing weapons, and deploying personnel have long been considered essential to victory in combat. Flexibility is
equally essential for effective logistics performance – adapting logistics structures and procedures to changing situations,
missions, and concepts. To resolve the challenges inherent in using contractors, the commanders must have information and awareness
of contractors working in and around their areas of responsibility. Maintaining visibility of contractors and coordinating
their movements are vital if the commander is to manage his available assets and capabilities efficiently and effectively.
However, this visibility is difficult to establish since contractors are not really part of the chain of command
and, in general, are not subject to the same orders that apply to soldiers regarding good order and
discipline.133 And commanders have no easy way to get answers to questions about contractor support.134
Lack of information and awareness of PMCs or PSCs and their presence in supporting combat operations tend to result in:
gaps in doctrine regarding who is responsible for securing lines of communication used by commercial suppliers;
loss of visibility of assets moving in and around the theatre of operations; loss of control of contractor personnel and
equipment; increased force responsibility for supporting contractor personnel in the areas of life support, force
protection, housing, medical care, transportation, and operational and administrative control; use of additional manpower,
material, and funding resources to support contractor personnel; concern about the availability of commercial
supplies and services in a hostile environment; and gaps in providing logistics support if commercial supply lines become
disrupted.135 In addition, Status of Forces Agreements and other arrangements with host nations may complicate the
commander’s situation by restricting entry, movement, and action of PMCs and PSCs .
Planet Debate                                                                                                                                                              104
PMCs – Sherry Hall

                    AT: “PMSCs Provide Critical Logistics Support”
THE USFG HAS BECOME DEPENDENT UPON CONTRACTORS- THIS CYCLE OF
DEPENDENCY TURNS PUBLIC OPINION AGAINST THE MILITARY
Singer 7 [Peter W. Singer , the director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative and a senior fellow in
Foreign Policy at Brookings., “Can't Win with 'Em, Can't Go To War without 'Em: Private Military
Contractors and Counterinsurgency”/ hnasser]
http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2007/0927militarycontractors.aspx?p=1
The recent incident involving Blackwater contractors in Iraq has brought to light a series of questions
surrounding the legal status, oversight, management, and accountability of the private military force in
Iraq. This for-hire force numbers more than 160,000, more than the number of uniformed military
personnel in Iraq, and it is a good thing that attention is finally being paid to the consequences of our
outsourcing critical tasks to private firms. An underlying question, though, is largely being ignored:
whether it made sense to have civilians in this role in the first place. Regardless of whether the Blackwater
contractors were right or wrong in the recent shootings, or even whether there is proper jurisdiction to
ensure their accountability or not, there is a crucial problem. The use of private military contractors
appears to have harmed, rather than helped the counterinsurgency efforts of the U.S. mission in Iraq.
Even worse, it has created a dependency syndrome on the private marketplace that not merely creates
critical vulnerabilities, but shows all the signs of the last downward spirals of an addiction. If we judge
by what has happened in Iraq, when it comes to private military contractors and counterinsurgency, the
U.S. has locked itself into a vicious cycle. It can't win with them, but can't go to war without them. The study explores
how the current use of private military contractors: Allows policymakers to dodge key decisions that carry political costs, thus
leading to operational choices that might not reflect public interest. The Abrams Doctrine, which has stood since the start of the
all-volunteer force in the wake of Vietnam, has been outsourced. Enables a "bigger is better" approach to operations that runs
contrary to the best lessons of U.S. military strategy. Turning logistics and operations into a for-profit endeavor helped feed the
"Green Zone" mentality problem of sprawling bases, which runs counter everything General Petraeus pointed to as necessary to
winning a counterinsurgency in the new Army/USMC manual he helped write. Inflames popular opinion against, rather
than for, the American mission through operational practices that ignore the fundamental lessons of
counterinsurgency. As one set of contractors described. " Our mission is to protect the principal at all costs. If that
means pissing off the Iraqis, too bad." Participated in a series of abuses that have undermined efforts at winning "hearts and
minds" of the Iraqi people. The pattern of contractor misconduct extends back to 2003 and has involved
everything from prisoner abuse and "joyride" shootings of civilians to a reported incident in which a
drunken Blackwater contractor shot dead the security guard of the Iraqi Vice President , after the two got
into an argument on Christmas Eve, 2006. Weakened American efforts in the "war of ideas" both inside Iraq and beyond. As one
Iraqi government official explained even before the recent shootings. "They are part of the reason for all the hatred
that is directed at Americans, because people don't know them as Blackwater, they know them only as
Americans. They are planting hatred, because of these irresponsible acts." Reveals a double standard towards
Iraqi civilian institutions that undermines efforts to build up these very same institutions, another key lesson of counterinsurgency.
As one Iraqi soldier said of Blackwater. "They are more powerful than the government. No one can try them. Where is the
government in this?" Forced policymakers to jettison strategies designed to win the counterinsurgency on
multiple occasions, before they even had a chance to succeed. The U.S. Marine plan for
counterinsurgency in the Sunni Triangle was never implemented, because of uncoordinated contractor
decisions in 2004 that helped turn Fallujah into a rallying point of the insurgency. More recently, while
U.S. government leaders had planned to press the Iraqi government on needed action on post-"surge"
political benchmarks, instead they are now having to request Iraqi help in cleaning up the aftermath of
the Blackwater incident. The U.S. government needs to go back to the drawing board and re-evaluate its
use of private military contractors, especially armed roles within counterinsurgency and contingency
operations. It needs to determine what roles are appropriate or not for private firms, and what roles must
be kept in the control of those in public service. As part of this determination, it is becoming clear that many roles now outsourced, including
the armed escort of U.S. government officials, assets, and convoys in a warzone, not only are inherently government functions, but that the outsourcing has created both huge
                                                                                                      Our
vulnerabilities and negative consequences for the overall mission. A process must immediately begin to roll such public functions back into public responsibility.
military outsourcing has become an addiction that is quickly spiraling to a breakdown. Many of those
vested in the system, both public and private leaders, will try to convince us to ignore this cycle. They
will describe such evident pattern of incidents as "mere anomalies," portray private firms outside the chain of command as
somehow "part of the total force," or claim that "We have no other choice." These are the denials of pushers, enablers, and
addicts. Only an open and honest intervention, a step back from the precipice of over-outsourcing, can
break us out of the vicious cycle into which we have locked our national security.
Planet Debate                                                                                                                      105
PMCs – Sherry Hall

               AT: “PMSCs Provide Critical Logistics Support”
PMC’S KILL U.S. MILITARY READINESS – PROFIT MOTIVE CAUSES INEFFICIENCY AND
ERRORS
Schreier and Caparini, 05
[Fred, consultant with the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces and Swiss Ministry of Defense and Marina,
Senior Fellow at the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces and Ph.D., King’s College, University of London,
“Privatising Security: Law, Practice and Governance of Private Military and Security Companies,” p. 46, March, Geneva Centre For
The Democratic Control Of Armed Forces, GScholar,
http://se2.dcaf.ch/serviceengine/Files/DCAF/18346/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/BA695123-3145-4CAA-B29A-
A60711724C96/en/op06_privatising-security.pdf]/galperin
The military focuses on life and death, whereas business seeks profit. 129 It is clear that contractors
providing combat service support to deployed missions are in business primarily to make money . Often,
they will not do any more than that which is agreed in their contract, and they will do everything they
can to save money and thereby increase their profits. This makes their employment problematic from
the outset. Typically, military operations employ a certain degree of redundancy to ensure that if there
are any failures in equipment or support, these can be rectified with minimal impact and delay. Additional
stores, equipment, and spares are usually kept close at hand. When required, military supervisors can pitch in to
ensure that tasks are completed correctly and on time. This also provides a boost to the morale of the more junior personnel and
promotes unit cohesion. However, a civilian contractor supervisor may not follow the same work ethic. In
keeping with the new “just in time” business practices, he may not have more than the minimum stock
on hand, and he may not wish to get his hands dirty when the objective in his mind is only to meet the
minimum requirement or standard.130 Conversely, once the fighting starts, the objective of the commander
and the force can no longer be to cut costs or save money but to accomplish the mission. The profit
motive and the inflexibility of contractor personnel also contribute to their lack of commitment to the
overall objectives of the military mission. While acceptable levels of service are provided when the tempo of operations is
relatively moderate, there is little doubt that the quality of service and overall readiness of the unit will go down
as the situation deteriorates and the contractor starts to experience difficulty. Additionally, the increase in
operational tempo will likely bring with it an exponential increase in cost when additional requirements
are placed on the contractor.131
Planet Debate                                                                                                                           106
PMCs – Sherry Hall

                 AT: “Can’t Afford to Pull PMSCs Out of Iraq”
PHASING OUT SECURITY COMPANIES IS KEY TO IRAQI STABILITY- LONG TERM GAIN
OF CONTRACTOR ELIMINATION OUTWEIGHS THE SHORT TERM INABILITY OF IRAQI
FORCES TO TAKE CONTROL
Towry 6 [ Bobby A., United States army colonel, “PHASING OUT PRIVATE SECURITY
CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ”/] http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil520.pdf
The primary reason the United States and our coalition partners are still in Iraq is to provide a secure
and stable environment that allows Iraq to establish their version democracy. The United States and our
coalition partners recognize Iraq as a sovereign country, and we respect Iraq’s authority and ability to
provide security within its borders. In order for this respect to have relevance, the United States and our
coalition partners cannot continue to allow, and in some cases hire, private security companies to
operate as independent paramilitary organizations. Third country nationals waving and firing weapons
indiscriminately are of little value in providing long-term stability and security for Iraq. The United States does not allow private
security companies to roam our countryside, point weapons in the faces of our citizens, and discharge their weapons
indiscriminately - therefore we cannot allow these practices to continue in Iraq. If we do, we will continue to
undermine the sovereignty of Iraq. While there are tactical risks in phasing out private security
contractors, the risks in doing nothing are much greater. Currently, there are no controls on how many
private security companies or contractors operate in Iraq – today, tomorrow, or two years down the
road. A solid strategy to phase out private security contractors and replace them with an Iraqi special
security force, manned by Iraqis, expertly trained, well equipped, and answering only to the sovereign
government of Iraq, will result in a much safer, more secure, and stable Iraq.
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                 AT: “Can’t Afford to Pull PMSCs Out of Iraq”
THE U.S. AND IRAQI GOVERNMENT CAN FORM SUSTAINABLE SECURITY IN A YEAR-
PHASING OUT CONTRACTORS AND TRAINING IRAQI SECURITY FORCES SOLVES
Towry 6 [ Bobby A., United States army colonel, “PHASING OUT PRIVATE SECURITY
CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ”/] http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil520.pdf
Phasing out private security contractors in Iraq has significant tactical risks that need to be mitigated for
the strategy to be successful. The tactical risks can best be described as the difference between the
ability of the new Iraqi special security force to protect companies involved in the Iraqi reconstruction,
and the level of protection those same companies are currently receiving from their private security
contractors. As mentioned above, the Iraqi government must fully commit to forming a new Iraqi special
security police that will provide the same level of security that the contractors are getting from their
own private security contractors. It will take time to organize, train, and equip this new Iraqi special
security force– most likely a year or more before the Iraqi government can start the recruiting effort
with any success. This is due to the need to ensure only quality citizens are recruited for the special security force. Strict
admission standards are required to ensure this quality. Recruits for this special program must meet, at a minimum, all of the
following requirements: be a natural born or naturalized Iraqi citizen; have a minimum of one-year
experience, in addition to basic training, in the new Iraqi military, Iraqi border security, or Iraqi law
enforcement; and be honorably discharged from the organization. These requirements are similar to
those required by reputable private security organizations operating in the United States and helps
ensure that only the best recruits enter into this specialized program.36 The U.S. military and coalition
members must also agree to design a training program, and certify the Iraqi special security force as
trained before they assume any security responsibilities. This certification provides assurance to the
contractors involved in the reconstruction efforts that the new Iraqi special security forces are prepared
for their role in providing security. With a single standard established by the coalition, actual training of the force
could be accomplished via contracts, with a maximum of three security firms currently operating in
Iraq. A competitive bidding process, with strict screening criteria, is the best way to ensure a quality
companies are selected at a competitive price. A minimum number of contracts allow the U.S. and
coalition military forces to focus on a small number of primary trainers to ensure standardized training
across the force. This type of standardization in training eliminates the variations in training standards
as described below by Peter Almond of The New York Times. Since 2003, the demand for private security guards
in Iraq has been so great — from guarding oil pipelines to VIP protection — that many companies have
started from scratch, and there are huge variations in the standards of recruitment and training.
Hundreds of Iraqis have been killed or injured in what are usually described as defensive actions by
private security guards as the specter of unaccountable mercenaries hangs over the country. 37 Based on
the Blackwater training model, the training facilities will be able to produce approximately 150 Iraqi
special security police officers, trained for a variety of private security missions, every eight weeks by
each training contracting firm. If contracts are given to three training contracting firms, it will take over 133
training sessions, almost seven years, to match the almost 20,000 private security contractors operating
in Iraq now. While this is not an overly aggressive replacement rate, it will allow the new Iraqi
government ample time to phase out private security contractors in an orderly manner. If the Iraqi
government wants to move this process at an accelerated rate, then the contractors responsible for training could use a model
similar to that of the police-training program that DynCorp, a subsidiary of California-based Computer Sciences Corp., used to
land the initial police-training contract in Iraq. In 2004, DynCorp contracted with the State Department to operate a training camp
capable of handling 3,000 recruits, and 1,000 trainers and support staff, at any given time. The contract called for the
camp to turn out 35,000 Iraqi police officers in just two years.38 By all accounts, DynCorp was
successful with this training program, making this a possible model to use if necessary. 39 The new Iraqi
special security police will be equipped with standard Iraqi military issued equipment. While some special
modifications to this equipment may be required in order to support specific mission requirements, the basic weapon will be that
used by the Iraqi military and police forces. Since all recruits would have received extensive training on these weapons in their
previous government service, this will reduce the need for weapons training and any “special logistics” requirements of the
security force. To ensure that the new Iraqi special security police force is properly equipped and
sustained, the U.S., as the largest financial contributor to the reconstruction efforts, should accept the
responsibility for contracting, purchasing, and fielding the equipment for the first 20,000 graduates. By
taking on this responsibility, the United States will ensure equipping standardization across the security
force thus making long-term sustainment of the equipment easier.
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                                                Should Ban PMSCs
SHOULD BAN PMSCs
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 156
It twill come as no surprise that my first suggestion is the outright ban on any armed private security contractors.
Anyone operating in conjunction with a military operating, in and around a war zone or disaster zone, and
carrying a weapon should be part of the regular armed forces, and governed by formal military law . This
requirement carries with a number of assumptions that I will detail below, but it begins with the following four principles.

U.S. TROOPS ARE SUBJECT TO REGULATIONS – PMCS AREN’T SUBJECT TO THESE,
AND SHOULD BE REMOVED FROM AREAS OF COMBAT
Hedahl 9 [ Marcus Hedahl , an Assistant Professor of Philosophy and Ethics at the U.S. Air Force
Academy . “Blood and Blackwaters: A Call to Arms for the Profession of Arms.” Journal of Military
Ethics; 2009, Vol. 8 Issue 1, p19-33, 15p/ hnasser]
Even given all these facts, there are some who continue to contend that such contractors do not infringe upon
the core military function because they are merely providing security. Their function is not inherently different from
the function provided by private security officers throughout the world. Private security personnel protect business in dangerous
countries and government buildings within the United States. These security personnel do not infringe upon the
central function of the military because they are not infantrymen; security is not combat . In order to respond
to this argument, perhaps the most important task is to discuss briefly what exactly the central function of the military profession
is. Putting oneself in danger for the betterment of the nation-state may be a necessary condition, but it cannot be a sufficient one.
For, in today’s society, numerous members of the government and private employees put themselves in some degree of danger for
the betterment of the nation-state. The function of the military has to be based on a difference in kind and not
degree. Sir Hackett famously argued that the core function was the management of violence in the service of the state (Hacket
1986: 194). This is certainly true, but, to be more precise, it is not just any violence, but rather combat for which the soldier is the
expert (for otherwise we could include police and others). It is the possibility to engage in combat, or, more precisely, the
capability to become a lawful combatant that sets the soldier apart. Security personnel within the U.S. and elsewhere are
subject to and subordinate to the local police. If the use of force becomes more than an extremely unlikely exception
to the rule, then responsibility for security of the area reverts back to the local police force. And, such domestic security
personnel have no more chance than any other citizen of engaging in combat or becoming a lawful
combatant. However, none of these features holds when security functions are outsourced in areas caught in
the penumbra of war and peace, places like Iraq and Afghanistan. So, we may not require the U.S. Department of Transportation
in Washington, D.C. to be protected by soldiers. We may not even require the security of every private company in places like
Iraq and Afghanistan to be guarded by soldiers. It seems reasonable, however, to claim that any persons involved in
security operations for the U.S. Government in an area in which it is reasonable to believe they may become
combatants need to be U.S. servicemen and women. It is the potential to become lawful combatants and the
reasonable normative expectation to be treated as such that separates the profession of arms. Therefore, the military
profession needs to insist on the elimination of any private security contractors within contingency
operations. In areas like Iraq and Afghanistan, any private contractors that continue to work directly for the U.S.
Government (i.e., not private security for businesses) should be unarmed. Furthermore, this change ought to be as
grave a concern for the military profession as the outsourcing of treatment determination is for the medical profession.
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                                               Should Ban PMSCs
IN ORDER FOR THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT TO TAKE CONTROL, ALL PRIVATE
SECURITY FORCES HAVE TO BE REMOVED. THIS IS THE ONLY WAY TO ENSURE
SOVEREIGNTY
Towry 6 [ Bobby A., United States army colonel, “PHASING OUT PRIVATE SECURITY
CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ”/ hnasser]
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil520.pdf
The solution is clear; in order for the new Iraqi government to be recognized as a sovereign country, it
must be responsible for every aspect of security in Iraq. With the recent 9 increase in Iraqi security
capabilities, the overall ability of the new Iraqi government to provide all aspects of security – to
include that of providing security for contractors operating as part of the reconstruction efforts in Iraq –
is much improved. The increasing security capability shows Iraqi citizens’ resolve for ensuring the
security of their country, and also indicates the availability a large pool of potential labor from which to
draw and form this new security force. While in 2003/2004 the strategy was not feasible due to a lack of qualified labor,
today, this labor potential exists, and is expanding. The strategy to support this solution is the elimination of all
private security personnel. This includes private security personnel operating on Iraq’s roadways for
convoy security, private bodyguards, and static security operations conducted outside of United States
government or coalition member controlled bases and camps. In short, all security requirements will
become the responsibility of the new Iraqi government, with the only exception being security for
companies that are in direct support of U.S. military or coalition member combat operations. The U.S.
military or coalition members will maintain responsibility to provide security for companies involved in supporting combat
operations, such as is presently provided by U.S. troops for Kellogg, Brown, and Root (KRB). Three pillars provide the basis of
the strategy; they are organization, command structure, and recruiting and equipping the force. First, the new Iraqi government
must recognize, and agree to form and organize a new Iraqi security organization that is responsible for
the specific mission of providing security for contractors involved in reconstruction efforts. This
acceptance of security responsibilities is crucial to ensuring that present and future companies feel safe to invest
their resources in Iraq. The second pillar of the strategy is the command structure for the new Iraqi
special security police force. Security forces must be subordinate and accountable to the Iraqi Minister
of Interior. This type of command structure will limit or eliminate the possible use of these special
security police as an unauthorized paramilitary organization for offensive engagements for personal or
local political gains. Another benefit of having them answer to the Minister of Interior will be the
increased ability to integrate the Iraqi special security police horizontally and vertically with all other
security efforts of the new Iraqi government. The third pillar of the strategy is recruiting and equipping
the force. In order for the new security organization to be relevant, the special security police must be
recruited, trained, and regulated by the new Iraqi government. The ranks of the special security force must be
comprised of only legally born or naturalized Iraqi civilians. They must not include foreign-hired contractors. This
will ensure that the Iraqis, who have a national interest in security of their country, provide security,
vice the mercenaries who do it today. As the new Iraqi security forces are trained and equipped, they will replace private
security contractors currently operating in Iraq. This phased approach is viable until all foreign private security
contractors can be replaced. In the interim period, between the initial conception and full
implementation of an Iraqi special security police, private security contractors will continue to operate
under the direct supervision of the new Iraqi special security police for the term of their contract. This
term must include a predetermined number of years to ensure a finite end date of the security contract.
MORAL OBJECTIONS JUSTIFY ABOLITION
Sarah Percy, Research Fellow -Oxford, 2007, From Mercenaries to Market: the rise and regulation of
private military companies, eds. S. Chesterman & C. Lehnardt, p. 26
Moral objections and the tendency towards abolitionism suggest six sets of implications for the current
regulatory debate and the shape of future regulation. First, it is important to emphasize that abolitionist
concerns—based on the status of private actors, rather than their actions – are unlikely to go away; improving the behavior of
private actors and ensuring that it stays improved does not address the concerns of those who belief that it is simply wrong to privatize
force.
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                   PMSCs Should Be Governed by Military Law
PLACING PMSCs UNDER MILITARY LAW GETS ADVANTAGES OF BOTH SYSTEMS
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 156
Private security providers are part of the US Military’s “total force ,” like it or not. There is no real dividing line
between offensive and defensive security in a war zone. Anyone who has ever played any kind of sport knows the expression: “The
best defense is a good offense.” In war strategy, defense and offense are linked, and private security providers
who defend their practices by invoking the distinction are playing word games . In policing, defense and offense
are also linked. Private security providers note that they, like their domestic security counterparts, will not pursue the enemy: they will
only defend their vehicles, passengers, or themselves, against incoming fire. They will only practice self-defense and the defense of
others. This tactic is not unusual during certain kinds of military fights as well: it is a form of “picking your battles,” or moderating
the use of force in order to focus on the mission on hand. Defense and offense here are just tactics employed when needed.
The recent debate about the application of military law, or USMJ, to private security contractors has made their membership in the
total force even more clear. If they are governed under military law, and they carry weapons openly, and are
under a chain of command (including a contracting officer, but now formally including the combatant commander), it is hard
not to argue that they are, legally speaking, combatants. If this is so, we should formalize this relationship,
and create a formal “combatant for hire” reserve service unit.
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                     *Statism Answers*
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                                    Statism Challenges High Now
NON-STATE ACTORS CHALLENGE TO STATISM OCCURING NOW
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 5
Speaking more broadly, the ideal image of a globe populated by territorially and legally bounded sovereign
states is being challenged by the rise of strong non-state actors of all kinds: armed groups, ranging from recognized
rebel and guerilla movements to transnational criminal and terrorist networks, multinational corporations, and international non-
governmental organizations (NGOs). Our world may consist not of territorially bounded areas so much as of
alternating zones of law and lawlessness, places where state power is so weak as to demonstrate a failed
state altogether, and where contracts are enforced and security provided in distinctly sub-state ways. This
fluid situation has contributed to a changing culture of warfare, or armed conflict, or complex emergencies---or, in the
newest nomenclature, “contingency operations.” Not only are there new actors on the ground amidst violent conflict,
but the ways in which we define and understand conflict are changing. The legal and ethical categories that have
been traditionally used to judge warfare do not seem adequate to the task: they are “on the cusp” of comprehensibility (Coker 2007).
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                                      PMSCs Not Challenging Statism
PMSCs SIGNAL A TRANSITION IN STATES – NOT THEIR COLLAPSE
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 91-2
Since the late seventeenth century it has been widely accepted that states may in part be defined by their claim to a monopoly on
legitimate violence. National defense and civil order have driven the creation of military budgets that have absorbed less than 1
percent to something like 30 percent of GNP in almost all states since 1945. The need for stability within states also
provides the impetus for much funding of police and domestic intelligence agencies. The prerogative of
legitimate violence has in turn informed tenets of international law regarding criteria for statehood, one of
which is the existence of government. And it has been states’ fundamentally coercive attributes which have
often figured most prominently in their dealings with other states . The exact nature of this situation has never been
static. Today, private authority carrying an element of coercion is again expanding and challenging traditional
notions of conduct both within and between states.
Hitherto military functions of the state are increasingly being transferred to non-state entities. This is
consistent with a decreasing political will amongst both wealthy and poor states to sustain those financial and other
costs embodied in the maintenance of a monopoly on the use of violence . However, one should be unhurried
in drawing exaggerated meaning from a shift in responsibilities. A state monopoly on violence may no
longer exist, but the authority to legitimize its use remains with states and the UN in certain circumstances.
It is the legitimate exercise of this function which is arguably in the process of devolution from
governments to others. This delegation does not suggest state authority is facing extinction. State roles are being altered,
reconfigured or contracted out in a continual transformation that should not be unexpected. Outsourcing a
capacity to wield violence is only one facet of a more general phenomenon . Spear suggests that privatization
may be seen in modern states as indispensable in achieving the “lean” condition thought desirable for
armed forces. Herbert Wulf has been quick to see that neo-liberal searches for cost effective and market-based
solutions are also created by the powerful and imposed on the weak. This creates a different kind of lean state with
more contentious results.
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                        Statist Control of the Military Good/Necessary
STATIST CONTROL OF THE MILITARY VITAL TO RESPONSIBLE AND ACCOUNTABLE
USE OF FORCE
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 136
A month after the posts about the ethics of PMSCs on the contractor list-serve in 2008, Michael Walzer entered the debate. As the
most respected force in any discussion of the ethics of war, he published a short essay in The New Republic
wherein he posed the question: “Is there an ethics that justifies Blackwater ?” In the essay he decried the ironic use
of our own “private militias” in the Iraq in the effort to disarm Iraqi private militias, and create a unified security force with a
                                                                                                          he
monopoly on the use of force. He noted that accountability on all levels was lacking with the use of private contractors. And
argued that “we had best take a statist view of military activity” if we wanted any real type of
accountability and responsibility with regard to violence.
“The state is the only reliable agent of public responsibility that we have. Of course, it often is not reliable,
and it often doesn’t represent a democratic public…Still, there isn’t any agency other than the state in the
contemporary world that can authorize and then control the use of force – and whose officials are
(sometimes) accountable to the rest of us.” (Walzer 2008).
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                     *Genocide Response Answers*
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                                                          Still Unethical
UTILIZING PMSCs TO RESPOND TO GENOCIDE DOESN’T MAKE THEM ETHICAL – IT
SHIELDS THE UNETHICAL INACTIVITY OF STATES
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 136-7
His [Walzer] signature verbal hedges, italicized above, made the difficulty of arguing about ethics apparent: it is hard to get
things right. And at the end of the essay he noted that there are “exceptions to every rule”: perhaps we should use
PMSCs in the genocide in Darfur, as its representatives have so often argued it could do. Walzer admitted to being
uncomfortable with the idea, but also with the idea that states could avoid any meaningful accountability
for inaction against genocide. Perhaps a Blackwater mission in Sudan or Chad would be exactly what
inactive states deserved, he implied. (The Blackwater offer echoed the standing offer made by Michael Grunberg, referred to
earlier in Chapter, who commented that the right PMSC could stop all civilian casualties in Africa for $1 billion). If the ends are
worthy, and the means are affordable, then why quibble over sovereignty and the international order?
Walzer’s essay perfectly characterized the lukewarm attitude toward a more widespread use of PMSCs.
His reluctant endorsement (which received a large amount of criticism) encapsulated two ethical criticisms: states
are shirking in their international treaty obligations to respond to victims of genocide, and states are being
morally two-faced as they hire militias to disarm other militias. An even deeper criticism was implied:
Americans are unwilling to admit that their chosen political goals may require questionable means . So,
although the term “mercenary” can seem sensationalistic, it does identify a central ethical problem. This
problem is not the ethics of those who fight when the opportunity calls, but the ethics of the governments and corporations that use
them. Most analysts are relatively sympathetic to the difficulties of judging the complex intents and motivations of individuals, and
no one is dumb enough to believe that patriotism or “the public good” motivates people all of the time. The most important
ethical problems is the fact that governments are using these firms.
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                                 UN Doesn’t Want to Use Contractors
UN AMBIVALENT ON USING CONTRACTORS
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 59-60
For the present the UN retains a conflictual position on private military and security services. It publicly decries them but members
employ them in various forms. There is a UN treaty for the suppression of mercenaries, yet the document is
poorly drafted and lacks widespread support. UN organs face escalating threats to their operations, which
at times compel them to hire armed contractors to secure employees’ safety . At the same time the Organization’s
senior staff issue polemical criticisms against various firms. The UN met defiant mercenaries with decisive violence once in the
1960s. But the Organization has yet to demonstrate a coherent grasp of the modern private security
phenomenon as a logical ally. It has poured resources into 17 years of reports and a more recent expert committee, but is only
beginning to engage with the industry in order to develop ethical models of operation and a suitable legal
regime.
It may be precisely because the industry understands various UN weaknesses that the Organization’s institutions go to some
lengths to resist outsiders’ assistance. Growing corporate capacities form an obvious threat to the control
of peacekeeping and other operations. At present it remains too early to tell whether modern security companies will find
eventual acceptance at the UN for constructive reasons which in turn promote adherence to a practical regulatory regime. It is
equally possible that for some time these companies will remain transgressive figures treated with
oscillating hypocrisy and ambivalence; where acceptance is stymied by obstructive conduct which serves
interests other than the purposeful service of the Charter objectives.

UN WILL NOT SPEND THE MONEY TO DEPLOY CONTRACTORS TO ALL AREAS IN NEED
OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 106
 Another issue is finite resources. Despite a recent decline in the number of conflicts, the near future will probably
supply the world with perhaps two dozen major struggles at any one time. Not even the largest UN
contractor could deploy in all of them. Rivalry amongst multiple claimants would be inescapable. Many of
them are likely to put valid cases for UNSC assistance. Less fortunate populations in some of the more cruel struggles
would doubtless request UN assistance through humanitarian intervention. But no matter how well
equipped and trained, states seem likely to resist paying for a contract force likely to reach more than a very
modest size. In the light of thinking after the Rwanda genocide, a reinforced brigade of 5000 may be adequately ambitious. This is
small in comparison to those formations even modestly equipped states may project if they choose. A disagreeable truth is that
the strength of likely opponents would determine chosen theaters as much as the merit in claims by the
suffering.
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                                  UN Doesn’t Want to Use Contractors
DIFFICULT TO RAISE THE MONEY FOR HUMANITARIAN MISSIONS EVEN IF IT IS
JUSTIFED
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 107
Cost is always a sensitive matter in multilateral operations. Over a decade ago Kinloch identified a Netherlands
government estimate of US$500-550 million for procurement and USS$300 million annually to pay for a
brigade of 5000. In the mid-1990s Urquhart suggested a figure of $380 million per year to train and equip another force 5000
strong. These figures are of limited use in 2009 because military organization and technology have moved
on. Whatever the figure, producing the money will require the goodwill of a powerful group of states. Yet in
terms of global military expenditure, the sum would be very small. If for argument’s sake a brigade cost $500 million to
equip and $500 million annually to run, that first year total of $1 billion would be less than one thousandth
of today’s arms expenditure. This seems a tiny sum when balanced against potential benefits. It is an
amount easily affordable to states in the prosperous West in particular, where leaders have become accustomed to
funding smaller defense budgets since the decline of the Cold War. The question is whether major contributors will be
inclined to spend the necessary money for reasons they believe serve their own interests as much as those
of the less fortunate. Put another way, whether or not there is a future consensus over money would be largely a consequence of
the political value donors perceive they would reap in operations that are more effective.

UN NOT READY TO EMBRACE PMSCs
Allan Gerson & Nat J. Colletta, International Relations Professors at George Washington University,
2002, Privatizing Peace; From Conflict to Security, p. 83
In the Fall of 2000 a senior UN official was approached to discuss United Nations initiatives in partnering with other
international institutions. Near the end of the discussion he was asked: “What do you think about privatizing peacekeeping?” He
reacted with dismay, recounting horror stories of mercenaries run amok in Africa. “The U nited Nations is                     a
public institution,” he remarked. “Giving its functions over to private companies would be irresponsible
and dangerous.”
The response is a symptomatic of a much larger problem. Although the United Nations has for the last four years
eagerly pursued the idea of partnering, not one of its historical peacekeeping initiatives mentions the idea of
privatization. And yet without privatization of certain security functions, prospects for meaningful improvement of peacekeeping
operations are slim.
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               UN Contractors Ineffective at Humanitarian Missions
LITTLE EVIDENCE THAT UN CONTRACTORS CAN SUCCESSFULLY QUELL OR DETER
HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 105
Another concern is the paucity of evidence supporting the proposition that future humanitarian intervention
is likely to deter gross human rights abuses (although it may inhibit some in the short term). Sustained combat operations
may be necessary to subdue delinquent government, insurgents or both. Consider the ferocious violence in the former Yugoslavia or
Rwanda during the 1990s or the present situation in Sudan in 2009. The problem is the absence of certainty that grave
human rights abuses carried out by a ruthless enemy may be quelled in weeks or months. What is the
Security Council to do should operations be prolonged over months or longer with no clear victory?
Determined guerrilla tactics and a war of attrition against UN company forces could only be sustained for a
finite time. At some point, political and contractual pressure would necessitate deployment of either larger
UN formation or regional units. On the other hand, the consequence of a failure by UN members to provide the
required troops and materiel would be a humiliating contractor withdrawal . The consequences for a distressed
people expecting sustained assistance would be considerably more serious.

UN CONTRACTOR FORCES INEFFECTIVE AT REGIONAL INTEGRATION
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 144
There is also a question of how well a contractor might be able to coordinate its operations with regional
forces. Contrasts may be conspicuous. For example there have been limited if well publicized efforts to develop
African Union forces to the point where they possess a modest ability to function within a regional
peacekeeping framework. However, this multi-state force has limited training, inadequate logistic capacity
and a restricted supply of modern equipment. The practical value of its performance in Darfur has been very limited.
Imagine this force finding itself assisted by several battalions of professional UN contractors in a context other than Darfur. The
corporate soldiers would probably be largely ex-NATO. They would have contrasting ethnic origins, the
latest equipment, better training and vastly superior logistics extending from ordnance supply to their diet .
Where contrasts are this stark there could well be some tension. A more general rupture is quite likely where the
purposes of a regional force are purportedly the same as those prescribed by the Security Council, but in
reality serve more selfish ends. One is mindful that the record of some African forces is less than faultless. In these
circumstances a regional organization might contemplate a corporate presence with something less than
comradely empathy.

PMCS ARE TOO CORRUPT TO CONTRIBUTE POSITIVELY TO GENOCIDE PREVENTION.
The Boston Globe ’06, (“PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES RAISE CONCERNS,” Third Edition,
LETTERS; Pg. E10, 4-30-06)
The article treats as credible the argument that "private military companies" such as Blackwater should be contracted to carry
out peacekeeping operations in places like Darfur. It further offers without serious rebuttal their claim that they are retooling
themselves to become defenders of human rights.
You quote Blackwater vice chairman J. Cofer Black as you might cite an Apple Computer executive describing the next generation of
ipod technology. Shouldn't the reader have been told that Black is a former career intelligence officer at the CIA? Isn't
it relevant that Black most recently headed the agency's Counterterrorism Center, an office to which some
of the Bush administration's most egregious violations of human rights have been traced?
There was a time not long ago when the media commonly employed terms like "soldier of fortune" and
"mercenary" to describe trained military personnel who hire themselves out on a contract basis to anyone
able to pay them. That these contractors have organized themselves into Beltway-savvy corporations does
not change the nature of their enterprise. Such corporations have nothing to offer efforts to end genocide in
Darfur.
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              UN Contractors Ineffective at Humanitarian Missions
PRIVATE SECURITY FIRMS ARE NOT NECESSARILY MORE EFFECTIVE
Allan Gerson & Nat J. Colletta, International Relations Professors at George Washington University,
2002, Privatizing Peace; From Conflict to Security, p. 91
Use of private security firms does not guarantee better implementation. Many of the mistakes in
peacekeeping or peace enforcement come not from misapplication of resources, but from mistaken objectives or
unclear objectives. Military missions are often confused by the conflicting demands of interested parties. When this
confusion is transmitted down the chain of command, military forces necessarily become ineffective,
regardless of whether they are private or public entities. This was evident in Bosnia, where UN
peacekeeping forces received contradictory messages fro their superiors about how to respond to various
situations. Private security forces would have to be monitored closely and could thus be expected to behave more cautiously.

MANY RISKS USING PMSCs IN HUMANITARIAN MISSIONS
Allan Gerson & Nat J. Colletta, International Relations Professors at George Washington University,
2002, Privatizing Peace; From Conflict to Security, p. 94-5
In addition to the inherent limitations of employing private security forces, there are several special risks. First,
member states, not being involved in the conflict themselves, may not be able to accurately determine the
amount of funding that should be given to private security firms. If the private security firm receives less
than it needs to protect itself, it could withdraw or forego achieving its objectives. And if the PSC is
dishonest, it could inflate the risk. Still, UN force faces similar hazards. Setting standards for gauging performance in
peacekeeping or peace enforcement thus becomes necessary where private security forces are to be used.
Secondly, the legitimacy of private security companies remains open to question. How should they be registered
and regulated? Should only the UN be allowed to use them? If the UN, why not NATO, OSCE, other regional bodies? Some
Security Council resolutions ban the use of mercenaries, albeit in an unregulated context.
Mercenaries were used in Sierra Leone and various other African conflicts with mixed results. Being
professional soldiers, they were merciless in combat and in the field; while effective, they were not well-
liked. Moreover, the violence that mercenaries inherently engender could produce lingering problems,
contributing to further violence and extensive conflict.
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                       PMSCs Undercut State’s Obligations to the UN
PMSCs UNDERCUT NATION-STATE OBLIGATIONS TO THE UN
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 105
From the other side of the transaction, expected benefits of reliable deployment, increased efficiencies and
at least some lower costs would be balanced against raised risks in other areas arising from a decrease in
principal control. One of these is likely to be Security Council management over battlefield choices in the use of force. A certain
respect for the agent’s judgment would be desirable whether first-class military skill has been purchased by a principal holding less
than flawless military proficiency. Theater operations should not be micro-managed by the UN Secretariat and
UNSC where confidence building between principal and agent would benefit from the exercise of
unaccustomed latitude towards those holding and exercising military expertise. One may take the view that a
corresponding and perhaps competing risk emerges: that contracting out the execution of UN policy to a
corporation may create a shift away from the idea of common obligation amongst the UN membership.
One might also suggest that many relieved governments are likely to welcome decreased exposure for
exactly this reason.

PMSCs CAN UNDERMINE UN UNITY
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 108
Finally, there may be some truth in a discouraging observation offered by Adam Roberts when he considered the merits of a UN rapid
reaction force. Roberts opined that the UN and the office of the Secretary-General might be undermined by a
grasp at military functions. He emphasized that some of the more notable UN achievements had been based on
negotiation and consent of the parties. This is a point not easily contradicted. Would a robust mandate which
directs a corporate agent to absorb or dispense violence test the boundaries of state cooperation and inflame
suspicion of UNSC purposes? Even in a disciplined, corporatized form, experiments with effective forces could
prove inimical to those fragile and finite possibilities open to the UN in advancing the cause of peace.
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                                 Unpopular With Less Powerful States
UN CONTRACTOR INTERVENTION FORCE WILL BE RESISTED BY LESS POWERFUL
STATES
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 16
It is not difficult to tease out other scenarios in which states’ interests would prove incompatible with attempts to create a permanent
force from donor states’ units. Take a handful of Hoffman’s observations: states that are powerful are not likely to create an entity
that would interfere with their own efforts to shape international politics as they would wish. On the other hand, less powerful
states will resist an institution likely to enforce their role as weaker instruments of stronger states. They
would object to a force likely to interfere with their own attempts to resolve disputes should they view such
efforts as fair by their lights. And should a weaker state challenge the status quo for reasons arising from its
vital interests, many other states would be likely to find their sympathies or interests engaged on the side
opposing the status quo – which an intervention force would probable be ordered to defend .
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                   UN Contractor Force Undermines US Military
SUPPORTING UN CONTRACTOR FORCE EXACERBATES MILITARY RETENTION
PROBLEMS
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 121
Until relatively recently the West has watched with a generally indifferent gaze as parts of the third world have
weakened. However, affluent UN members now contemplate their own unwelcome wave of domestic
disruption. Radicalized Islamic minorities are increasingly vocal in their empathy with violent struggles
Moslems face elsewhere. Some first-world states may become wary of losing limited resources to private
contractors at a time of increased subversion and occasional political violence within their borders . A
changing climate since 9/11 has imposed escalating budgets and expanded personnel targets within
intelligence and security services. Finding the labor to staff the military segment of these bureaucracies
could become a sensitive issue. In several affluent states, ranks of uniformed volunteers are proving increasingly
hard to fill. Regardless, few Westerners are willing to tolerate conscription to their armed forces as an
alternative. Again, retention of existing personnel is a persuasive reason to resist recruitment to a UN
contract legion.
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                     **PMSCs Good**
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                       Long Historical Tradition of Mercenaries
MERCENARIES ARE AN ANCIENT TRADITION
Suzanne Simons, CNN Executive Producer, 2009, Master of War: Blackwater USA’s Erik Prince and the
Business of War, p. 65
Hiring soldiers to fight other people’s wars is an ancient practice, from antiquity to Renaissance Italy to,
indeed, the American Revolution. The British hired German soldiers from the Hesse region to take up guns on their behalf
during the Revolutionary War. Friedrich von Steuben, born in the Magdeburg region of what is now Germany, fought for the freedom
of the colonies. Once the war was won, his service was honored with U.S. citizenship and a state that today sits in Lafayette park
across the street from the White House in Washington D.C.

LONG TRADITION OF USING PRIVATE SECURITY FIRMS
Allan Gerson & Nat J. Colletta, International Relations Professors at George Washington University,
2002, Privatizing Peace; From Conflict to Security, p. 95
The use of private security is as old as mercantilism itself. The United East India Company of the
Netherlands was granted powers to make war, conclude treaties, acquire territories, and build fortresses as
part of its service to the government or crown. Chartered companies such as the British East Africa Company, which
extended the imperial power of governments and royalty, were common in the age of imperialism. The United Kingdom is
reputed to have hired 30,000 Hessian soldiers to fighting the American Revolutionary war in order to avoid
conscripting its own citizens. Lord Lugard observed that these “empire-building” companies were, at best, an imperfect form of
government. Today, however, the use of regulated private force may prove essential to meeting contemporary
needs.

LONG HISTORY OF MERCENARIES
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 40-1
These criticisms do not obscure the fact that there is nothing natural or permanent about the present organization of
military forces. It was only comparatively recently that state building autocrats wrested a monopoly over
legitimate violence from their competitors. Mercenarism has traditionally been an unremarkable means of waging
war for any number of groups and causes. From the ancient world to the formation of modern states in the seventeenth century,
hiring mercenaries has been a matter of unremarkable convention. Particular regions held reputations for the efficiency and skill of
their troops. In the ancient era the Greeks were well-considered. Much later, it was the Swiss. As late as the eighteenth
century all the major European armies relied heavily on mercenaries serving an internationalized military labor
market. For example, the British employed their King’s German Legion in the late eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries while the selection of mercenaries for service within regular British and Indian Gurkha units
continues today. And the Papacy enjoys the distinction of being the beneficiary of the longest continuous
mercenary contract in history: that between the Vatican and its Swiss guard. Both cheerfully celebrated a five
hundredth year of loyal service in 2006.
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                       Long Historical Tradition of Mercenaries
LONG HISTORY OF MERCENARIES – OBJECTION TO THEM IS QUITE RECENT
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 41-2
One does not have to delve back far in more modern times to find examples of military employment which confound stereotypes of
enduring crudity. During the Spanish Civil War General Franco deployed colonial forces against an International
Brigade that by some yardsticks was also mercenary. Perhaps surprisingly for a regime that elevated racial purity, Nazi
Germany employed more foreign soldiers than any other state involved in World War II . On the other side
Americans donned foreign uniforms and took foreign orders and currency when fighting in the Battle of
Britain for the RAF; and the French Foreign Legion did not prove so sentimental over the notion of a democratic rather than
Vichy French state as to prevent its regiments fighting on both sides. Whether ancient or modern, warfare has often
confounded those who expect a predictable demonstration o f allegiance to one party and no other.
During the Cold War communist advisers from East Germany, Russia, China and Cuba assisted fraternal
comrades in various theaters for honorable reasons as they probably saw it. The West had its own examples. British
officers and NCOs commanded Baluchi and Omani troops on behalf of the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman
from the 1950s to the 1970s. Nor is there a shortage of more recent examples likely to confuse those seeking an easy, homogenous
profile. The Saudis employ Pakistanis. The French have their Foreign Legionnaires and the Spanish their own less-publicized
French Legion, which employed foreigners until the mid-1980s. There have been Tamil separatists from Sri Lanka fighting
in the Maldives; Koreans in the Congo; Britons assisting Turks in Cyprus; South Africans and Britons in
Papua New Guinea; and American mercenaries in Colombia and Azerbaijan. Depending on how liberal one’s
criteria might be, the idea of the mercenary is further clouded by the difficult categorization of several thousand Western security
personnel who have been employed in Iraq from 2003 to the present.
The use of mercenaries has been common over the centuries for very plausible reasons. When life was
much briefer, those who lived a comfortable existence did not wish to risk their lives fighting when they
could hire foreigners to carry out this task. The idea that there is something wrong with this arrangement is
quite recent. In the mid-eighteenth century the French king Charles VII found himself contemplating thousands of unemployed
Gascon and French mercenaries who had returned from an unsuccessful campaign in the service of Emperor Frederick III. These
bands were a threat to Charles’s feudal authority. Mockler records that Charles took some of them into his pay, crushed the rest and
formed the first regular standing army in Europe.
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                                        PMSCs Challenge Statism
PMSCs CHALLENGE THE FUNDAMENTAL NATURE OF THE STATE
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 4
PMSCs challenge the essential and longstanding idea of what constitutes a political state, and how violence,
anywhere, is named legitimate, or not. An abbreviated version of Max Weber’s definition of a state is often repeated by
social scientists: a state “claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory (Weber 1946:78).
Weber’s definition is much wider than this, however, and underscores the connection between justice, power,
community, and security that is the essence of politics:
“Today, the relation between the state and violence is an especially intimate one . Today, we have to say that the
state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly on the use of physical force within a
given territory…Specifically, at the present time, the right to use physical force is ascribed to other institutions or to individuals
only to the extent to which the state permits it. The state is considered the sole source of the ‘right’ to use violence .
Hence ‘politics’ for us means striving to share power or striving to influence the distribution o f power, either among states or among
groups within a state.” (Weber 1946:78)
A few sentences later he specifies that “legitimate” means “considered to be legitimate,” that is, law and “right” rest upon a shared
consideration among people, which is the essence of politics. The connection between the state and the use of fore, and
by extension modern political life itself (which includes the debates about what should or should not be considered legitimate),
is explicitly challenged by the flourishing industry of PMSCs, whose access to the use of force is so often
only weakly linked to the state. The issue is even more important than Weber’s definition, however. As Deborah Avant puts
it: “state control of force (though often imperfect) has provided the best (even if highly uneven) mechanisms human kind has known
for linking the use of violence to political processes and social norms within a territory.” In other words, Max Weber’s definition of
the state represents the best way by which violence actually is judged, and by extension, controlled.

PMSCs CHALLENGE NOTION THAT STATES HAVE MONOPOLY ON VIOLENCE
Simon Chesterman & Chia Lehnardt, Professor and Researcher – NYU School of Law, 2007, From
Mercenaries to Market: the rise and regulation of private military companies, eds. S. Chesterman & C.
Lehnardt, p. 1
The claim to legitimate violence has long been understood to be the exclusive domain of states. Internally, the
German sociologist Max Weber used this monopoly to define what a state is; externally, international law on the use of
force seeks to regulate what a state does. Mercenaries and the modern phenomenon of private military companies (PMCs) –
commercial firms offering military services ranging from military training an advice to combat – challenge this neat schema, a
challenge that has achieved greater significance due to the rise in private military activity following the end
of the Cold War.

CRITICIZING PMSCs IS PART OF THE EFFORT TO PROP UP THE STATE
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 13-4
So far, the group has kept its name, perhaps echoing the sentiment expressed by Washington Post reporter Steve Fainaru,
who – when he was criticized for using the term “mercenary” in many of his accounts – replied:
“The other day you were suggesting that I used the M word, as you call it, because it sells. In fact, I think it’s self-evident that
we’re talking about mercenary activity. I wouldn’t use if it I didn’t believe it, and I’m not throwing it around to call people
names. I know all the arguments, etc., but to me that’s the most accurate term available.” (Fainaru 2008)
In fact, the history of the modern state begins with the explicit rejection of mercenaries . Although rarely adhered
to in practice, the ideal of a state-based standing army drawn from its own citizenry, holding in Max Weber’s oft-
quoted line, “a monopoly on the legitimate use of force,” has become almost a truism, posted like a motto over
the door of the state. Private militias and mercenary companies need to be disbanded and delegitimized if
the project of proper state-building is going to occur, and part of this effort involves condemning them –
justly or unjustly – as dirty and dangerous. No one was more explicit about this project than Machiavelli.
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                                       PMSCs Challenge Statism
OPPOSITION TO AND CRITICISM OF PMSCs AS MERCENARIES GROUNDED IN SUPPORT
FOR THE NATION-STATE SYSTEM
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 14
Machiavelli’s two major works, The Prince and the Discourses on Livy, constitute the beginnings of a modern
political theory. The centerpiece of his advice for new states, whether republics or principalities, is the need for a
state to possess its “own arms,” that is, sovereign control over those who fight for it.
“The principal foundations that all states have, new ones as well as old…are good laws and good arms, and where
there are good arms there must be good laws, I shall leave out reasoning on laws and shall speak of arms.” (Machiavelli 1985)
The use of the word “arms” is deliberate. Not only must a state possess the ability to defend itself with an
army and armaments; these arms must be attached to “the body politic.” They must be “one’s own,” and
not borrowed or rented from any others. Machiavelli’s rejection of mercenary forces is explicit : they are lazy,
untrustworthy, bad fighters, and motivated only by pay.
“Mercenary and auxiliary arms are useless and dangerous…for they     are disunited, ambitious, without discipline,
unfaithful; bold among friends, among enemies cowardly; no fear of God, no faith with men; ruin is postponed only as
long as attack is postponed and in peace you despoiled by them, in war by the enemy. The cause of this is that they have no love
nor cause to keep them in the field other than a small stipend, which is not sufficient to make them want to
die for you.” (Machiavelli 1985).
The connection between a rejection of mercenaries and the creation of a state-based citizen army as the
foundation of the modern state system is made again and again in the writings of political theorists .
Sovereign control over militias, the monopoly over the use of force, is the lifeblood of the state. The
condemnation of PMSCs as a return to the days of mercenary armies, regardless of their efficacy, stems from this
sense that they are anathema to the meaning of a nation-state. The mercenary label thus accounts for much of the
negative reaction to these firms; we are culturally and politically opposed to anything that seems to symbolize the
undoing of the state (Lanning 2005).

RELIANCE ON AUXILIARY FORCES UNDERMINES THE LEGITIMACY OF THE STATE
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 16-7
Machiavelli’s criticism of auxiliary forces comes from his reading of Roman history, in which the empire’s
military forces were divided between legions, composed of Roman citizens, and auxiliary forces, made up
of non-citizens from various ethnic groups who often served at the edges of the empire, far from their own
ethnic base. According to Machiavelli, auxiliary units were well-organized, well-coordinated, and highly skilled.
And, importantly for Machiavelli, they were aware of their power and had varying levels of loyalty to the central
state of Rome:
“Let him, then, who wants to be unable to win make use of these arms [armies], since they are much more dangerous than
mercenary arms. For with these, ruin is accomplished; they are all united, all resolved to obey someone
else…A wise prince, therefore, has always avoided these arms and turned to his own…And it has always been the
opinion of judgment of wise men ‘that nothing is so infirm and unstable as the reputation of power not sustained by
one’s own force.’”
If PMSCs are a new type of auxiliary force, more dangerous precisely because of their organizational unity
and skill, what type of force might this be? Recent examples of auxiliary or proxy forces resemble those of the Romans:
either ethnically based units that serve alongside regular military units, such as the Ghurkas in the British Army, or the Swiss Guard
unit that has historically guarded the Vatican. The French Foreign Legion might be a better example, since its members come from a
variety of national backgrounds. The ability to become a French citizen after three years’ service is similar to the Roman example.
But these auxiliary units serve in a specific branch of the French armed services: soldiers are governed under military law, and
classified as members of the military. By contrast, PMSCs are a distinctly new version of auxiliary force .
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                                       PMSCs Challenge Statism
TREND TOWARD PRIVATIZATION OCCURS SIMULTAENOUSLY WITH A GROWING
QUESTIONING OF THE SYSTEM OF STATES
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 53
This rise of private authority is helped by an ideology that the market provides a more efficient playing ground and the fact
that certain professional identities are tied to a notion of mobility and flexibility. There is another level of explanation, however,
that looks at the vacuum that private authorities rushed in to fill, the waning or declining power of the state
itself. The same series of questions that opened up around the end of the Cold War – about the potentials of
globalization, or the rise of a global civil society—also included a number of serious questions about the
future role of the state itself. Many scholars began to see the end of the Cold War not as a victory of one form of
state (liberal democratic capitalist) over another (communist), but as heralding a gradual demise of states altogether .
Either states were failing because they were no longer propped up by the Cold War superpowers, or they were failing because they
had over-extended themselves during the Cold War, or else they were heading toward eventual collapse as they faded into obscurity
and irrelevancy. “State death” became a focus of much study, along with the end of all sorts of other things.

MERCENARISM DECLINED AS STATES SOLIDIFIED THEIR POWER
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 42
Evolving states’ interests eventually caused mercenarism to weaken for other reasons. Governments required citizens (some
of whom were no longer subjects) to restrain themselves from individual acts of violence against other states or
their citizens. As Thompson observed, states’ rulers began to claim exclusive authority over the space within
their boundaries, making it increasingly difficult to disclaim responsibility for violence originating from
within those some borders. A sensitive distinction arose: between international violence carried out by an individual –
characterized as a private and usually criminal act; and the act of a nation-state, being one of aggression. Thomson is probably correct
in her view that the origin of anti-mercenary laws was the need to prevent citizens from intriguing with other states
or forming their own private armies. She also points out how states’ leaders did not intend to eliminate merenarism
altogether, as many benefited from it. Instead, mercenarism was gradually displaced by the rise of neutrality.
Through neutrality state’ governments could create new controls over their citizens and enhance their
monopolistic authority to make war. This seems a strong claim and states retain a clear interest in restraining
their citizens from interfering with a sovereign posture of neutrality.

PMSCs SUPPLANTING THE STATE’S ROLE IN MONOPOLIZING VIOLENCE
Allan Gerson & Nat J. Colletta, International Relations Professors at George Washington University,
2002, Privatizing Peace; From Conflict to Security, p. 88
Max Weber defined the authority and legitimacy of the State by its monopoly over the means and
instruments of violence. As seen from the African experience in particular, private security companies are
increasingly supplanting this primary responsibility of the State to provide security for people and
investment. Globalization, coupled with the weakening of the State – particularly in Africa due to the changing
patronage systems in the wake of the end of the Cold War, and in Asia due to the economic shocks of the financial crisis—has led to
an uncoupling of the West’s security reach and its business engagement. This vacuum has led to the increased privatization
of violence to obtain and sustain political power. Private security companies (PSCs) have flourished under
these conditions—Executive Outcomes and Sandline in Angola and Sierra Leone, Military Professional Resources Incorporated
(MPRI) in Croatia and Bosnia, to mention two of the most prominent. PSCs have become the modern embodiment of
mercenary forces, protecting governments and multinational business interests alike. Globalization has made its
mark on the security field as arms proliferation, illegitimate resource appropriation, transnational corporate greed, and the rise of
multinational private security firms became inextricably linked.
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                                         Statism Root of Violence
STATES RESPONSIBLE FOR MORE VIOLENCE AND THREATS TO THEIR CITIZENS
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 55
Mr. Ballesteros’s view was unconvincing in another sense. For it has not been mercenary corporations or interstate war
which have routinely inflicted the most harm upon citizens of states over the latter half of the last century .
A point made by Steven Brayton is that corrupt native soldiers and their dictatorships have proved far more
dangerous than mercenaries. This arguments points to a larger and quite remarkable argument put by the American R.J.
Rummell: that interstate warfare destroyed fewer lives in the twentieth century than governments inflicted
within their own borders. It is government which has proved more lethal to its own citizens. Ironically, it was
the search for a general interstate peace after World War II which drove the drafters of the UN Charter to
forge a document that explicitly defends principles of the sovereign equality of states, non-use of force and
non-intervention amongst members. These serve to protect UN states whose conduct shows an acceptance of rules
and norms. They also shelter those whose conduct suggests otherwise.

STATE GOVERNMENTS POSE A GREATER DANGER TO CIVILIANS THAN PMSCs
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 48-9
For rulers of these states personal enrichment is a major determinant when considering foreign deployments. This is why their
military commands are often warlord fiefdoms which defend valuable assets rather than less selfish goals. Hence there is nothing
ill-conceived or wrong-headed in identifying their behavior as “mercenary.” Earlier reasoning suggested that the
motives of privately employed mercenaries are difficult to determine and categorize. That is not the case
here. Financial ambition was unambiguously identified as a criterion in the definition of an individual
mercenary in the 1977 First Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions; and with some incongruity, in the anti-mercenary
OAU Convention. The irony in both suggests a yawning conceptual vacuum. With or without their own mercenaries,
states’ governments pose a much greater danger to civilians than PMSCs, while at the same time imperiling
the value of sovereignty. Several African elites profit from Dietrich calls “patrimonial networks.” Some occasionally escape
criticism through undistinguished analyses of anti-mercenary treaties. And all benefit from a muted response by Africans to state
mercenarism.

STATES KILL AND REPRESS PEOPLE
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 56
This should not be surprising. “War makes states,” declaimed Charles Tilly, before establishing a convincing analogy for
state making as a form of racketeering or organized crime. Tilly was careful to acknowledge that the analogy could be overdone.
However, in lurching to judgment on the industry, it is well to recognize that government remains the chief
extractive, repressive and threatening authority likely to inflict itself on any state’s citizen. This is the case
whether government is a modern democracy or an oppressive dictatorship .
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                                          Statism Root of Violence
STATES MONOPOLIZE VIOLENCE TO INCREASE THEIR POWER – THEY DO NOT ACT IN
WAYS TO PROTECT THE INTERESTS OF THEIR PEOPLE
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 56-7
It is also helpful to remember that Mr. Ballesteros and his successor Dr. Shameem never represented the welfare of hapless victims
within states. They presented States. The distinction matters greatly because it is states’ representatives who execute and
ratify treaties, not those often captive populations who endure their governments’ sometimes brutal
administrations. The demos or political entity represented by a population does not find its personification in every
government. Tyrannical leaders will resist threats to their monopoly on legitimized violence by resorting to
indigenous forces or ill-disciplined foreign mercenaries. Since 1945 both have been employed to subjugate unfortunate
populations. Such governments will have been heartened by Mr. Ballesteros’s sixteenth and final report, which was an essay in
unrelenting dogmatism, in which PMSCs were painted in the blackest of terms. He also referred to the need for international and
national laws to regulate these companies and means to:
“…differentiate military consultancy services from participation in armed conflicts and from anything that could be considered
intervention in matters of public order and security that are the exclusive responsibility of the state.”
But it is precisely the authority of a number of states which poses an increasingly vexed issue . What of
states administered by delinquent governments whose daily occupation is extracting resources from state
assets? This is the case in several African examples. For that matter, how would Mr. Ballesteros have categorized the training of
Croats within their fledgling republic by the American military train-and-equip firm MPRI? This preparation subsequently
led to a very successful military action against Serbian components of the former Yugoslav state . Did Mr.
Ballesteros support the uti possidetis principle (in keeping borders stable) and thereby side against the Croats; or for them through
support for the “self-determination” of their people? And how would he reconcile one position with the other?

STATE IS OFTEN THE CAUSE OF THE PROBLEM – NOT THE SOLUTION
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 57
One might turn the same argument on its head and argue that a genuine liberation movement attacking an illegitimate
government should not be restrained as to where it might seek advice. Oddly, Ballesteros appeared to contest the
nature of a perhaps legitimate national liberation movement which might oppose a tyrannical government. Even the Committee of
Experts which followed Ballesteros and Shameem cautioned that there may be “some difficulty” in his proposal to define a mercenary
as one recruited to “deny self-determination” while simultaneously “undermining the territorial integrity of a State.” He cannot have
both. These conundrums suggest that human suffering in several troubled regions arises where government has
become the problem rather than the solution. Mr. Ballesteros believes that internal security should be a role for state organs
and not delegated to a private company. Yet all over the world this is exactly what is occurring amongst states both rich and poor.
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            “Moral” Objections to PMSCs Grounded in Statism
MORAL OBJECTIONS TO MERCENARIES GROUNDED IN TRUST IN THE STATE
Sarah Percy, Research Fellow -Oxford, 2007, From Mercenaries to Market: the rise and regulation of
private military companies, eds. S. Chesterman & C. Lehnardt, p. 26
The Working Group demonstrates the influence of moral objections to private force in another way. The Group has stated that
one of its main priorities is examining “the role of the State as the primary holder of the monopoly of the
use of force and related issues such as sovereignty and State responsibility to protect and ensure respect for
human rights by all actors.” This focus rather than a focus on the activities of the private military industry itself, underlines the
fact that moral objections to private force are objections based on status . The Working Group is interested in private
force because of what it is:, by its nature, private force upsets conventional understandings of the monopoly on
force. The notion that the state has (and out to have) not only monopoly on the use of force but also must protect its citizens is related
to the objections about tyranny outlined above.
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                PMSCs Challenge “Total” and Ideological Wars
CONTRACTED MILITARY LESS LIKELY TO ENGAGE IN TOTAL WARFARE AND
BARBARIC SLAUGHTER THAN SOLDIERS FIGHTING FOR THE “STATE”
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 61-2
Metaphysical wars were fought by soldiers who had a “calling” to be a soldier ; that is, they were those non-
mercenary citizen-soldiers (eventually, all volunteer professional soldiers) who took an oath to a profession, or a way
of life. The state set itself up as the ultimate “end” for which such soldiers fought, and this language
remains the mainstay of military ethics, the ethics of a profession with allegiance to the higher,
metaphysical (literally non-material) entity of the Constitution, or the state itself. The (public) social contracts, civil and
military, that mark the political theory of the seventeenth-century state were not at all the same as the (private) contracts of today.
They were, in Coker’s insightful formulation, more covenants than contracts. The distinction is crucial:
“professional armies had moved from having a contract with a feudal master or the Crown to a covenant
with Society. Social contracts produce governments, nations, and centralized power: they are the basis for all political
society. A covenant, by comparison, produces families, communities, and traditions. It is the basis of civil society. The
two forms of association are maintained in different ways: a contract by external threat if it is broken and a
covenant by internalized identity, loyalty, obligation and responsibility. What makes a covenant more
‘virtuous’ than a contract is that it is unconditional. Contracts are bilateral and are based on terms. They are enforced by
penalties. Their conditions precede agreement. Covenants, by contrast, tend to be open-ended. What Hegel saw in the modern
soldier was a man with a vocation, not a job.” (Coker 2001)
This vocational calling to something beyond the soldier was what constituted his metaphysical existence,
and his potential ability to sacrifice his life for that state. It led to the total mobilization and total warfare of
the Hegelian state, the inability to individualize the millions killed (civilian and soldier alike) in such conflicts
that became the apotheosis of the modern state, and the ironic postmodern retreat to contracts, rather than
covenants and individualized goals instead of sacrifice for the state. Compared to the wholesale slaughter
of early-twentieth-century battlefields, and the annihilation of whole cities that accompanied it, the non-metaphysical
nature of late-twentieth-century warfare is a positive step away from what looked like a lofty but horrific
abyss. Now, the army boasts that “it’s not just a job, it’s an adventure”: the professional vocation that still endows the officer ranks
of the military is sold to new recruits as a chance for individual betterment, and adventurous experience. But this may only be a real
problem for those who overly romanticize the modern battlefield as a place where thousands would accept the authoritative demand
that they sacrifice themselves for a noble cause. This is metaphysical war, and it now strikes most Westerners as
something almost barbaric, as nationalism gone horribly wrong.

PRIVATIZED WARS LESS LIKELY TO BE TOTAL WARS FOUGHT ON IDEOLOGY
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 61
Second, the types of new wars that are being fought do not lend themselves to the horrific demands of what
Christopher Coker called “metaphysical warfare,” war fought for abstract ideals, especially that of the nation-
state. What Edward Luttwak referred to as “post-heroic warfare” is now fought for unclear reasons. As one former
British army officer put it, “In Iraq, the look on most American soldiers’ faces says: ‘Why am I here?’” In contrast, the culture of
private military contractors has no ideal of heroism to live up to, and needs no larger justification for the
mission than the fact of a business contract. These “postmodern” militaries are rarely fighting classic wars
of defense, and have often tangential or more opaque relationships to overt state goals. Although there are still
traditions of military service, many of these globalized soldiers join the military “more for the desire to have a
meaningful personal experience than out of either national patriotism or an occupational incentive ” (Battistelli
1997).
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                PMSCs Challenge “Total” and Ideological Wars
CONTRACTORS MORE LIKELY TO FIGHT ACCORDING TO JUST WAR PRINCIPLES –
STATE-CENTRIC MOTIVES MORE LIKELY TO LEAD TO TOTAL WAR
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 67
Companies hold another advantage over states which have traditionally determined moral conduct in war. Where
states’ troops fight, each side is indoctrinated to believe that truth and morality is invested solely in its side.
One way of life is usually portrayed as virtuous and the other as typically beyond redemption . Consequently,
aside from irregular observance of the laws of war, it is hardly surprising that costly and time consuming brutalities
result. As Roggeveen argues, it is often fighting “evil” which leads to ethnic cleansing and atrocities. Fighting
for money and loyalty to a contract legion is much more desirable than fighting for one’s ethnicity, to
avenge wrongs committed centuries ago, or in defense of a wounded god. It is not that contractors will be devoid of
cruelty and viciousness. Far from it. Paramilitary conduct in Iraq has supplied strong anecdotal evidence of serious shortcomings.
But UN contractor violence is likely to be constrained by the new military law described in Chapter 6 and the
international humanitarian principles this would embody.
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                                   PMSCs Challenge Militarism
DIFFICULTY CATEGORIZING PMSCs RUPTURES TRADITIONAL PARADIGMS OF THE
HIERARCHICAL MILITARY STRUCTURE
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 37-8
The profile of the private contractor, with its shifting identity that has aspects of humanitarian aid, business,
and the military, easily becomes the focus of anxiety and mistrust. The contractor becomes a “dirty” or
“polluted” category, a type that fits in many worlds at once, but none of the unambiguously. Contractors are
akin to those whom anthropologist Mary Douglas describes as “marginal” and “dangerous”: “These are people who are
somehow left out of in the patterning of society, who are placeless. They may be doing nothing morally
wrong, but their status is indefinable” (Douglas 1966). There are always dangerous entities, she points out, but what dangers
we choose to focus upon and what we choose to ignore speak volumes about our social life. Specifically, we create social
categories – businessman, humanitarian, soldier – that allow s to judge certain kinds of actions as
acceptable or unacceptable, even comprehensible or incomprehensible. For a while, we push ambiguous entities into some
non-ambiguous category (mercenary or soldier, for instance), but eventually the cognitive dissonance builds and we are forced to
invent new social categories, and ultimately new legal identities. Seen in this light, PMSCs show up in the same ambiguous
and fraught ambiguous category as transnational terrorists, or our enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay,
currently stuck in a strange legal limbo, awaiting some workable legal categorization.
Protean organizations may be perplexing, but they can also signal a powerful new realignment of forces
that speak to novel ways of seeing the world. They may result in new legal doctrines, or new paradigms of
governance, and new ways of fighting wars. In the midst of the agitation they cause, they may signal a shift in the
larger environment that nurtures them. It could be that PMSCs are in fact powerful adaptations to under-
analyzed institutional and cultural trends. Organizational theorists have studied these types of protean and informal
organizations that arise in complex environments, wherein established laws and customs are breaking down, and new practices are
emerging. These organizations are not necessarily lawless, or without governing principles, but they may
seem to appear out of nowhere. For instance, John Padgett has looked at how certain kinds of new
organizations, hard to characterize and understand, can often be the springboard for novel ways of
structuring a social and legal world (Graham 19998). These newly emerging organizations often act in a “multivocal” way,
as I have argued PMSCs do, spanning boundaries and creating new alliances and networks (Padgett and Ansell 1993).

SHIFT AWAY FROM METAPHYSICAL WARFARE UNDERMINES RATIONALE FOR
MILITARISM
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 62
Metaphysical warfare demanded bodily sacrifice for communal needs. In its place, non-metaphysical warfare
elevates the physical body of the solder as something to be protected and rescued. This makes war itself a
completely disorienting pursuit: the anarchic ethics of global civil society make it harder for militaries to do their jobs: “In a
world in which individuals must produce, stage and cobble together their biographies themselves,” militaries must balance
individual rights against the need for the subordination of the individual to group demands (Coker 2001). And
it is not just the individual soldier who receives our care and attention; the individualized victim of our
policies is also recognized.
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                PMSCs Reduce Military Operational Lethality
PMSCs REDUCE LETHALITY OF MILITARY OPERATIONS
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 62-3
Finally, there is the complex issue of what is variously called “casualty aversion,” or more negatively “casualty phobia.” High
numbers of battlefield casualties are no longer seen as readily justifiable. Casualties of all sorts require
accounting and explanations, within the force and to the public. Lamentable to some, and a sign of a welcome change
to others, this has led many analysts of the private military industry to see them as part of a picture that will
help minimize the lethal effects of military operations by hiding a large part of the force from view . The
relationship between casualty aversion and the rise of contract ethics are both related to the death of what Coker calls
“metaphysical warfare.” This change is addressed more fully in the next chapter, but provides the background
assumptions that make “new soldiers” good material for the PMSC industry.
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           PMSCs Promote Universalized Rights and Standards
PMSCs ETHICAL – PROMOTE COSMOPOLITANISM AND UNIVERSALIZED RIGHTS IN AN
ANARCHIC INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 142-3
Jowitt’s theory helps to clarify the problem with defending the use of PMSCs as acceptable if only they are better regulated. If, by
definition, they operate in zones wherein regulation is not available, in frontier zones, the calls for oversight, regulation, and better
contracts will never be enough. The only rule of law that operates effectively in frontier-like settings is military law, imposed on the
chaos of war, so to speak. Nevertheless, two recent defenses of the ethics of PMSCs do use the language of civil and human rights
law. Mervyn Frost’s article “Regulating Anarchy: the Ethics of PMSCs in Global Civil Society” is one such defense. Frost bases
his defense of PMSCs in his larger theory of an “anarchic ethics,” those ethics that mark a world wherein
every person has membership in a “society of sovereign states, and simultaneously in a “global civil
society.” Based on these memberships, a certain language of a set of practices develops that reinforces these
principles, including the right to contract, and to act beyond the borders of one’s own state, as long as in
doing so, no one else’s rights are abused. Given this, there is nothing intrinsically wrong with PMSCs. His
defense of PMSCs comes from the perspective of the cosmopolitan world of boundaries, populated by self-conscious “rights holders.”
Any person, as citizen of a state, has an intrinsic right to set up a firm, and as long as that company does not
harm the rights of others, do whatever business the market and the state I which that business is located
allow them to do. Frost uses the example of Tim Spicer, the head of Aegis, the PMSC profiled earlier in my Introduction:
“For citizens who are setting up a PMSC, it is crucial that they do not flout the rules of the practice within which they are constituted
as citizens…For if [Spicer] were to be seen as an enemy of the state, as an international terrorist, as a person guilty of treason and so
on, this would undermine the standing of his PMSC in the public domain.” (Frost 2008)
Global civil society, along with functioning sovereign states, offers hope for the extension of rights and
multiple versions of sovereignty; and, by extension, it offers freedom from overarching control of a group’s
way of life. Defending “anarchic ethics” means defending the messy, complex, layered reality of multi-
faceted rights-based claims for justice and recognition. This is the cosmopolitan vision that offers an escape from the
stranglehold of modernity’s inclination to standardize and universalize.
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                               PMSCs Promote Democracies
MANY PMSCs ENGAGED IN PROCESSES THAT HELP PROTECT AND PROMOTE
DEMOCRACIES
James O. C. Jonah, Finance Minister Sierra Leone, 2007, From Mercenaries to Market: the rise and
regulation of private military companies, eds. S. Chesterman & C. Lehnardt, p. v
Although political scientists often announce the withering of the state and the prominent role of non-state
actors, there is still a residue of belief that only sovereign states should possess a monopoly over the use of
force. This may be one reason why the use of PMCs is so abhorrent to many. There has been a tendency to
label most, if not all, PMCs “mercenaries”. Even though some types of PMCs share some attributes with mercenary groups,
they are not stereotypical mercenaries. More often than not, PMCs have contracts with legal governments and they
are not collaborating with rebel forces to topple established governments . In one instance in Sierra Leone a
PMC made a valuable contribution to the democratic process. Furthermore, not all PMCs have been engaged
in combat operations. Many are engaged in training of police personnel and other forms of training, along
with the provision of logistic support.
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                                 PMSCs Effective at Many Tasks
MANY MILITARY AND SECURITY FUNCTIONS CAN BE DONE BY PMSCs
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 98
In Afghanistan and Iraq much outsourced work has been in logistics, in which a large provider like KBR has received income that
dwarfed EO’s earnings at its apogee. The logistic field supplies much of the revenue generated by armed conflict
through embedding the support necessary to maintain a military organization . The domain is very broad and
extends from surveys, planning and assessments to the provision of food, fuel, billets, troop transport and other materiel. It involves
tasks as varied as washing uniforms, managing mess halls and removing waste of all kinds . It encompasses
construction of bases, airports, fences and roads. There are roles in linguistic and interpreter services,
recruitment, records, inventory maintenance and other administrative jobs. In military support the technical field is
also lucrative and US weapons systems are heavily dependent on contractor maintenance . Chalmers Johnson has
listed Patriot missiles, Apache helicopters, Paladin artillery, M1A1 Abrams tanks and “virtually all the unmanned aerial vehicles used
by the military and the CIA.” One might add F-117 stealth fighters, the B-2 bomber and the aging U-2 surveillance aircraft. Growth
continues. Expanding areas include information technology, communications and new weapons systems;
intelligence collection and analysis; and various forms of training. The collection, processing and
distribution of military mail for US forces form a billion dollar enterprise that may also be privatized .

PMSCs PERFORM MULITIPLE FUNCTIONS THAT HELP U.S. MILITARY MEET ITS GOALS
Suzanne Simons, CNN Executive Producer, 2009, Master of War: Blackwater USA’s Erik Prince and the
Business of War, p. 147-8
Finally, Taylor’s panel was up. In his opening statement, he laid out one of Prince’s favorite arguments in support of using private
military contractors:
“Since the American Revolution, private security firms have played an integral role in the successful
development and defense of our nation. The role of the private security firm has not changed that much over
time. Providing specialized capabilities and surge capacity to U.S. government in flexible, cost-effective
packages, and building capacity for friendly foreign governments continue to be more competencies of our
industry.”
His testimony shed light not only on what Blackwater was doing for the U.S. government, but also on what it wanted to do.
“Today, private security firms perform a number of roles from executive protection and static security, to
training partner nations, to providing both ground and aviation logistics support, all in dangerous
environments. In the future private security firms will likely be called upon to support stability operations
and peacekeeping efforts.”

CONTRACTORS PERFORM MANY JOBS FOR THE MILITARY
Janine Wedel, (Prof., Public Policy, George Mason U.), LESSONS FROM IRAQ, 2008, 117-118.
Contractors do the following: Draft official documents. Websites of contractors working for the Department of Defense have posted
announcements of job openings for analysts to perform such functions as preparing the Defense Department budget. One contractor
boasted of having written the Army's Field Manual on "Contractors on the Battlefield." Choose other contractors. The Pentagon
has employed contractors to counsel it on selecting other contractors. Perform most information technology
(IT) work: Contractors were doing more than three-quarters of the federal government's IT work, even
before the war-related major push to contract out. Information technology is a critical force behind
contemporary military operations.
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                              PMSCs Effective at Reconstruction
US INCREASINGLY RELYING ON PRIVATE CONTRACTORS FOR RECONSTRUCTION
MISSIONS
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 109
In a pivotal December 2005 Presidential Directive, President Bush announced that the State Department would be given control of
Iraqi reconstruction. His Administration wished to bolster stabilization operations in Iraq at the same time as it fought an escalating
conflict. That decision removed Pentagon responsibility. This had been expected, as the Department of Defense had proved unsuited
to the task. A defense policy directive issued soon after the announcement made it clear how reconstructing shattered
states and engaging in stability operations was to become “a core military mission” and an integral part of
US military doctrine. These operations are to occur once an enemy has collapsed on the battlefield although it may be able to
sustain guerrilla operations. The doctrine represents a shift away from the earlier, established belief that
stabilization and reconstruction operations were detrimental to wider combat readiness.
Even though there remains some uncertainty as to whether US plans will be adequately funded, the American strategy for
provincial reconstruction teams is likely to employ civilian contractors in growing numbers. In 2006 five
teams were created in Iraq and they have been judged by military analysis to be a “cornerstone” of a broader counter-insurgency
strategy. At about the same time the US Defense Department’s February 2006 Quadrennial Review formalized a doctrine
the Pentagon termed “The Long War.” This was followed the next month by a new National Security Strategy for the United
States which embraced a doctrine of “Post Conflict Stabilization and Reconstruction.” If civilian involvement is greatly
expanded in the newer conflicts, the attendant most of private security is likely to be considerable if US or
friendly armed forces do not provide it. American PMSCs in particular seem likely to enjoy enhanced
growth as a consequence of the US government’s apparent belief in the inevitability of American
involvement in perpetual armed conflict.

BLACKWATER PERSONNEL DID AID U.S. MILITARY IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ
Suzanne Simons, CNN Executive Producer, 2009, Master of War: Blackwater USA’s Erik Prince and the
Business of War, p. 199-200
“After 9/11, when the U.S. began its stabilization efforts in Afghanistan and then Iraq, the United States
government called upon Blackwater to fill a need for protective services in hostile areas . Blackwater responded
immediately. We are extremely proud of answering that call in supporting our country,” Prince read, adding that “Blackwater
personnel supporting our overseas missions are all military and law enforcement veterans, many of whom
have recent military deployments. No individual ever protected by Blackwater has ever been killed or
seriously injured. There is no better evidence of the skill and dedication of these men.” It was a claim that elided the plane crash
in Afghanistan – technically, his men were not performing security duties in that case.
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                           PMSCs Necessary for Success in Iraq
US HAD TO TURN TO PMSCs TO HELP PROVIDE SECURITY IN IRAQ
Daniel Isenberg, Senior Research Associate- British American Security Information Council, 2007,
From Mercenaries to Market: the rise and regulation of private military companies, eds. S. Chesterman &
C. Lehnardt, p. 83-4
This reliance on private contractors increased greatly after the initial major combat operations phase, due primarily to
the fact that the U.S. political leadership grossly underestimated the number of troops that would be
required for stability and security operations. As part of its plan to bring democracy to the Middle East, Iraq was to be
made into a new country: this would in turn require a massive reconstruction project to overcome the effects of
more than two decades of war, against Iran and then the United States, and sanctions. But, once again, the United States miscalculated
and did not anticipate the emergence and growth of the insurgency. Since US forces were not available to protect those
doing reconstruction, such firms had no choice, if they were going to continue to work in Iraq, but to turn to
PMCs in order to protect their employees. At least ten to fifteen cents of every dollar spent on
reconstruction is for security, according to the Inspector General for the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA).
PMCs provided three main categories of security services in Iraq: personal security details for senior
civilian officials, non-military site security (buildings and infrastructure) and non-military convoy security. Rather than
work directly for the US government or the CPA, most PMCs were subcontracted to provide protection for prime
contractor employees, or were hired by other entities such as Iraqi companies or private foreign companies,
seeking business opportunities in Iraq.
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                                  PMSCs More Cost Effective
PMSCs MORE EFFICIENT
Allan Gerson & Nat J. Colletta, International Relations Professors at George Washington University,
2002, Privatizing Peace; From Conflict to Security, p. 34
Finally, the private sector operates on the principle that less is more, or equivalently, that efficiency is king. Unlike
the public sector, where the level of expenditure is often taken as a sign of one’s commitment, the private sector seeks to
maximize results from a minimal use of resources. These advantages have only grown stronger with the advent of
globalization. An increasingly interconnected world enhances the private sector’s interest in peace, since a
disturbance in one part of the world can lead to ripple effects that influence events thousands of miles away .
The private sector has a role in peace processes in myriad ways. The process of peace is complex and multi-staged,
from peacemaking to peace-keeping and enforcement to peacebuilding. To varying degrees of effectiveness, the private
sector has an important part to play at almost every stage. Moreover, at each step, the rise of globalization and the
shift in the nature of war only serves to increase the private sector’s influence.
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         PMSCs Provide Critical Logistic Support for Effective
                             Missions
U.S. DEPENDENT ON PMSCs TO CARRY OUT CRITICAL MILITARY MISSIONS
Suzanne Simons, CNN Executive Producer, 2009, Master of War: Blackwater USA’s Erik Prince and the
Business of War, p. 65-6
But in more recent times, corporations who hire out professionals to support military missions are often
accused of ‘war profiteering.” The fees charged by companies have come under scrutiny and raised questions about whether
the practice has gone too far, and whether the U.S. government still has a handle on what “inherently governmental” truly means.
Today’s hired help has responded to criticism in much the same way, reminding critics that they are performing work at
the request of the U.S. government. Most of the larger companies are well aware of the public perception, and many of them
don’t like the term mercenary. Thus, the term private military contractor has taken hold. Love them or hate them, the truth
is, no modern democratic government attempts to handle all supply, logistics and manufacturing needs
strictly through the public sector. The United States is no exception.

PMSCs HISTORICALLY PROVIDED IMPORTANT LOGISTICAL SUPPORT
Suzanne Simons, CNN Executive Producer, 2009, Master of War: Blackwater USA’s Erik Prince and the
Business of War, p. 66-7
U.S. contracting was initially meant to be logistical in nature. In Vietnam, the U.S. military relied on
private companies to build basses and handle other noncombat tasks. The Pentagon had more recently
employed private contractors in Colombia to help boost its total force working in support of drug
eradication. There was supposed to be a line between the military and its contractors when it came to combat
versus support. Of course, there were always hazards, and the line could blur . While contractors were generally paid
handsomely, there was always a risk.
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                PMSCs Critical to Effective Military Readiness
US MILITARY FORCES INCREASING HOLLOWED OUT � CAUSING INCREASED
RELIANCE ON CONTRACTORS
Thomas Donnelly & Frederick W. Kagan, American Enterprise Institute, 2008, Ground Truth: the
future of U.S. land power, p. 39 (HARVMP2378)
Because the Bush administration has refused until very recently to contemplate increasing the size of the ground forces, the army
and marines have had to support these strains out of a fixed pool of resources. They have responded by
deploying every combat unit in the active force, including units based in Korea and units that were serving as the
permanent "opposing force" at combat training centers. The army has hollowed out its institutional base force , drawing
officers and senior NCOs from its educational, training, doctrine, and other key base units to fill out combat units. The dramatic
increase in the use of contractors - recent reports indicate that there are now more contractors in Iraq than
soldiers - is another result of the strain on the ground forces.

MILITARY DEPENDENT ON CONTRACTORS FOR CRITICAL SERVICES
Janine Wedel, (Prof., Public Policy, George Mason U.), LESSONS FROM IRAQ, 2008, 117.
The virtual transfer of many military functions to the private sector has occurred at the same time that government
oversight, and the capacity for it, has diminished. The Department of Defense is ever more dependent on contractors to
supply a host of "mission-critical services," according to the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). These
services include information technology systems, interpreters, and intelligence analysts, as well as weapons
system maintenance and base operation support. And, today, not only such services, but also functions that
were once the responsibility of military personnel, along with entirely new portfolios, are now essentially in
private hands.

TROOP SHORTAGES MAKE PRIVATE CONTRACTORS NECESSARY
Tony Geraghty, (British War Correspondent), SOLDIERS OF FORTUNE, 2009, 5.
The major powers were cutting their standing regular armies drastically. Their combined military
manpower dropped from 6,873,000 in 1990 to 3,283,000 in 1997 and the downward trend continues. The number of
soldiers on UN peacekeeping duties also dropped from a peak of 76,000 in 1994 to around 15,000 by 1998. Marching in step
with the trend, the US bankrolled almost 4,000 contracts with PMCs. As a result, hundreds of thousands of
trained soldiers came onto a jobs market that was glad of their services.
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                   Nations have Sovereign Right to Contractors
SOVEREIGN NATIONS SHOULD BE ABLE TO MAKE THE DECISION TO HIRE
CONTRACTORS
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 57-8
The Special Rapporteur at least acknowledged the failure of the Mercenaries Convention in stopping mercenary numbers growing on
five continents. He then explained the rise with the fallacious reasoning that this occurred because “…[e]mpirical evidence shows that
international law does not deal thoroughly enough with mercenary activities.” This was a straw man. International law is often weak
in enforcement. Economic forces would have been a more plausible well-spring for an argument as to why
mercenarism thrives. He instead rebounded with a revision of the definition of “mercenary” in light of the failure of the UN
Convention. This landed him on contentious ground because he attempted to restrict a government’s prerogative in choosing personnel
it might hire to defend national interests. Why should a sovereign government be prevented from hiring advisers
and trainers from elsewhere who may assist in addressing its national security issues? He further confuses the
matter by introducing the unexplained concept of “destabilization of legitimate governments.” He is silent on what criteria are to be
met by governments seeking legitimacy. A proscription on hiring private military advisers would seem an unfair
restraint where say, an embattled government has to make decisions regarding defense against criminalized
insurgents assisted by the government of a hostile state. This would be even more unreasonable if that same beleaguered
government unambiguously met Ballesteros’s unstated criteria for legitimacy. And a proscription on hiring mercenaries
would be still more unreasonable where the government of a hostile state which funds those criminalized
insurgents does not meet his legitimacy criteria.
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                                       US PMSC Policy Modeled
US SUPPORT FOR PMSCs WILL BE MODELED
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 89-90
When a new generation of private military interests was being formed around 1990 Thomson posed a prescient notion: if changes
in the nature of war caused the decline of mercenarism, subsequent changes could lead to its revival.
Mercenarism’s resurgence had arguably more to do with changes in economics and the evolution of the
state. Nevertheless, her general train of thought presaged shifts which have driven a revival exhibiting both old and new
characteristics. Perhaps most surprising is that the authority transferred to privateers by European sovereigns in the
seventeenth century has taken form in a new and unexpected avatar. This occurred when President Bush
invited privateers to assist the US government in its war on terro r. Here was a very public rejuvenation of an old form
of non-state license in the use of violence. As Robert Mandel put it:
“For the most militarily dominant nation in the world to seek the aid of private security providers in
confronting a direct threat from abroad is truly noteworthy, reinforcing both the limits on state power and the potential
potency of nonstate coercion.”

US HAS TAKEN THE LEAD IN PMSCs
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 94
Some of these changes account for those budget pressures Elke Krahmann identifies as one of the causes of the
privatization of functions once considered the exclusive preserve of a state’s armed forces. Corporations
were also changing. They became more mobile when no longer hindered by Cold War constraints and achieved
greater efficiency through advances in commercial information technology. Most significantly, they discovered access to a
pool of military labor supplied from literally around the world. The US became the preeminent outsourcer
of military related functions and today it has never been militarily stronger . The Republicans’ deliberately
structured their war and occupation of Iraq so that the American presence became heavily dependent on the
entrenched use of private security and US logistics companies. Few modern militaries are unaffected to
some degree by similar changes.

US RELIANCE ON PMSCs MODELED BY OTHER COUNTRIES
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 95
American economic dominance carries other ramifications. In particular, US politico-economic movements
tend to define the nature and extent of globalization elsewhere. One facet of this authority is the manner in
which government choices are influenced by the agendas corporations wield . The big logistic support corporations
in particular couch their aims in terms that emphasize the economic interests of those states likely to hire them. They have been
effective. The UK government has retained billions of pounds through its “Public-Private Partnership Initiative” and “Private Finance
Initiative.” These programs are intended to extend to a very wide range of capital items, which the private sector will own, leasing
them or selling services to the government. They will include base construction, air-to-air refueling and even the procurement of
fighting ships of the Royal Navy.
This growth in influence also implies a retreat for other constituencies and their views . This in turn suggests
there is some truth in Hall and Biersteker’s claim that these corporations seek legitimization from the public and they
author norms and set boundaries for action. In doing so, corporations exercise that frequently convincing type of authority
born of expertise. The result is a fresh blurring of a recurrent and amorphous distinction between the realms of
public interest and the more private realm of business. For that matter, the larger privatized defense industry is itself a
relatively internationalized example of global commerce. Nor could capitalism exercise these more recent encroachments without
governments playing a compliant role in assisting their corporate expansion. And strong states have arguably been
penetrated most thoroughly by globalization. The US has reduced its federal employees in recent years and greatly
expanded contract work to the point that the number of contract employees working on federal projects is several times the number
actually employed by civilian agencies. Ian Clark suggests that suffusion by the forces of globalization is a source of state strength
rather than developing weakness. One can see this in the differing purposes of outsourced military services sold to imploding states as
opposed to stable, affluent examples. The Angolan government’s contract with Executive Outcomes to train their troops and lead
them in combat operations was a third world outsourcing case. The US government outsourcing the maintenance of
advanced military software is a first world example.
Planet Debate                                        147
PMCs – Sherry Hall

   **Should Deploy PMSCs to UN Humanitarian Missions**
Planet Debate                                                                                                                     148
PMCs – Sherry Hall

                                         UN Wants to Use PMSCs
UN INCREASINGLY RECEPTIVE TO PMSCs FOR HUMANITARIAN MISSIONS
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 4-5
There are some other arguments. Persuasive reasons suggest that states have for some time collaborated in the
creation of a marketplace in which PMSCs have grown and prospered. However, these companies face pressures –
notably in the form of gradually declining opportunities in Iraq and the deepening global recession. This ebb in Iraq in particular has
spurred corporate expansion elsewhere. For example, some belligerents today show less respect for the traditional
impartiality attached to humanitarian NGOs and IGOs. Consequently, humanitarian workers suffer escalating
violence. By contrast, states and PMSCs now cooperate in freshly politicized “hearts and minds” programs
with armed security as part of the corporate package. Mr Prince and those occupying rival corporate positions realized
some time ago that the UN is not immune to the effects of those changes that have assisted PMSC expansion over the last 20 years.
The UN Organization has to an extent welcomed gradual encroachment by business in less sensitive areas –
something readily demonstrable in various aspects of modern peace operations. And despite a publicly
unreceptive posture towards the industry, the UN has already canvassed armed private security to escort its
humanitarian convoys. That scenario occupies the less contentious end of a wide spectrum of operations.

UN RELIES ON CONTRACTORS FOR A VARIETY OF TASKS NOW
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 222
In one sense the UN already provides encouragement to cultivate better relations. Contractors today assist the UN in pursuits
ranging from airports to agriculture and fisheries to forestry; from pipelines to ports and telecommunications
to tourism. Literally hundreds of firms are registered with the UN and the Department of Peacekeeping
Operations is an eager consumer of their services. For example, in 2006 millions of dollars worth of aviation support was
supplied to the MONUC mission in the DRC. Fixed and rotary wing services provided half a dozen types of helicopters and jets of
military and civilian origin. MONUC also budgeted for slightly fewer than 700 guards, including funds to pay for their weapons and
ammunition. Nor have there been qualms over outsourcing where UN or regional forces acting under Security
Council authority have lacked a necessary endogenous capacity. The Americans in particular have assisted several
times. Commercially sourced US police served in the “International Police Task Force” in Bosnia and
Herzegovina; while 150 American weapons inspectors, verifiers and observers were emplaced by DynCorp in the OSCE “Kosovo
Verification Mission.” And US firm MPRI sent 45 border monitors to Serbia in order to prevent arms smuggling to Bosnian Serbs in
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Demining is another sizeable operation which is regularly outsourced to industry. More sensitive skills have
also been sought in asset tracing, imaging and intelligence. An Engagement Group could begin in these areas, expanding existing
opportunities while identifying particular DPKO and DFS weaknesses PMSCs could address.
Planet Debate                                                                                                                       149
PMCs – Sherry Hall

           UN Lacks Capacity for Humanitarian Missions Now
RWANDAN GENOCIDE PROVES THE FAILURE OF RELYING ON UN FORCES—
HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF LIVES COULD HAVE BEEN SAVED WITH DEPLOYMENT
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 17-8
It is therefore unsurprising that a similarly structured model for peacekeeping has been suggested from time to time, if in far smaller
numbers. The problem for supporters is that there has been a similar model in recent memory and it proved unsuccessful. At a
desperate point in 1994 Mr Boutros-Ghali sought to expand the UNAMIR force in Rwanda. Of the 19
states then participating in the UN “Standby Arrangements System” (or UNSAS) none would agree to contribute
military forces at precisely that moment when the need for intervention was most dire. In other words, UN
member disinclination to contribute has proved strongest when the need has been most urgent. This
arrangement was mistakenly believed to be a means of delivering forces on the ground quickly. The UN Military Commander
in Rwanda instead discovered that the approval process took months while military advisers in New York liaised
with staffers in various donor governments’ agencies. Mr. Annan has since acknowledged the merit in General Dallaire’s belief that
a single mobile brigade emplaced in theatre within a few weeks of the deaths of the Rwandan and
Burundian presidents would have saved hundreds of thousands of lives . Unfortunately, standby arrangements
failed to supply even part of what the military commander required.

THERE IS SUPPORT FOR UN ACTION TO SUPPORT HUMANITARIAN GOALS – BUT
LITTLE ACTION OF THIS KIND HAS BEEN TAKEN
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 5
International humanitarian intervention sits at the opposing pole. A capacity to assist in IHI is likely to be required of a
future PMSC contractor for two reasons. First, the UN arguably requires this capability if it is to bear most
of the organizational and legal justification in the service of a responsibility to protect. Second, few if any
states are likely to provide generous armed resistance in the face of the next humanitarian disaster. Whether
well-trained contractors might subdue by force those who inflict gross human rights abuses on others remains an adventurous
proposition, certainly in legal terms. Even so, in light of UN experiments in Somalia and the ‘no-fly’ zones in      Iraq,
IHI readdresses the contentious role of coercion in meeting both Charter objectives and normative concepts
of human rights. These were recently championed by UN advisers in A More Secure World; authoritatively if somewhat less
persuasively by heads of state at the 2005 World summit; and international humanitarian intervention sits well with
wide and enthusiastic support for the Canadian paper The Responsibility to Protect ; a document which embodied
rhetorically popular if at present unconvincing principles. Much has been written about the expanding importance of duties to which
these documents allude. Yet little has been done in the name of the UN to resist abuses where the application of
force is manifestly necessary in order to extinguish human suffering of an extensive scale and intensity.
Planet Debate                                                                                                               150
PMCs – Sherry Hall

           UN Lacks Capacity for Humanitarian Missions Now
UN’S AD HOC APPROACH TO HUMANITARIAN MISSIONS FAILS –PMSCs CONTRACTED
TO WORK FOR UN COULD HAVE PREVENTED MUCH OF THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 6
A claim to improve operations would seem worth exploring should it improve outcomes for the potential
beneficiaries. The first are those civilians who will otherwise suffer more extensive and more acute harm,
probably as a consequence of intrastate conflicts. The second is the UN membership . When a future Secretary-
General appeals for troops to staff a mission, governments seeking benefits for themselves would no longer contemplate
peacekeeping’s limited virtues while evaluating its considerable risks and uncertain costs. There would be other options.
                                                                                                                      The third
beneficiary is the UN Organization and the values it represents. Should the UN adopt more successful
methods of peacekeeping and perhaps intervention, these would lessen the disapproval frequently aimed at
both the Security Council and its Secretariat Criticism directed towards them has not always been
reasonable. Both have struggled with a peacekeeping apparatus that neither was originally created to administer. At the same
time, distrust amongst both weak and powerful members has worked to inhibit effective administration. The
alternative is a continuation of those notorious and depressingly fragile states’ negotiations over
peacekeeping responsibilities. These inevitably mix aversion to risk with a competitive desire to serve
individual state interests. Both have proved corrosive to concepts of peacekeeping and prospective
humanitarian intervention.
Alternatives to ad hoc peacekeeping are far from new. What is new in this book is a claim of the merit in
contract PMSC assistance within a system of governance given explicit form. In consultation with a preferred
corporate provider, professional ex-soldiers possessing particular expertise in peacekeeping could be
individually screened and selected by staff within a new UN Directorate of Military Contracting. Subject
to objective criteria and chosen on merit, these troops would make up the peacekeeping component of a
contract force. Where operations are likely to prove hazardous or where international humanitarian intervention requires skilled
fighting troops, the likelihood of a UN response has proved correspondingly remote. Hence the requirement for a dedicated combat
capability. The underlying premise is hardly novel. The rationale in hiring competent professionals to carry out both
kinds of work lies in a modern execution of an ancient tradition adapted to UN circumstances. A contractor
might begin its UN life as a modest asset – perhaps a single battalion containing a mix of skills in infantry, armor, signals
and engineering—supported by air mobility and a robust logistical tail. And if UN members perceive the
company as successful it is plausible to imagine that a contract force might grow to become a reinforced
brigade of 5000. Several experts claim that the latter figure would have been sufficient to quell much of
Rwanda’s genocidal turbulence in 1994.

UN FORCES NOT A WORKABLE ALTERNATIVE – STATES WON’T RELIABLY DONATE
TROOPS
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 17
Governments remain unlikely to donate battalions for rotation through an operational UN structure. The
intractable problem is that no government will follow through on an undertaking perceived to conflict with
evolving national interests. The most generous offer is likely to be a contingent pledge. A state might offer certain forces for a
fixed time and perhaps meet part of the costs in the event of a crisis. An implicit condition for rendering assistance is
likely to be emergence of no threat to the donor state’s interests (while the supply of some advantage would be an
added persuasion). And, there is little doubt that donor state interests would be interpreted indulgently while the
welfare of other would be viewed with corresponding parsimony.
Planet Debate                                                                                                                    151
PMCs – Sherry Hall

           UN Lacks Capacity for Humanitarian Missions Now
UN TROOPS TOO INFLEXIBLE TO RESPOND TO SITUATIONS LIKE RWANDA
Allan Gerson & Nat J. Colletta, International Relations Professors at George Washington University,
2002, Privatizing Peace; From Conflict to Security, p. 87
UN Troops have proven far too narrow-minded in their interpretation of their various mandates. Security
conditions can change overnight, as in Rwanda, where an assumed peace was undercut by a swift act of
genocide following the sudden death of the Hutu President, Juvenal Habaryamana, when his aircraft was shot down as it was
returning from the Arusha peace negotiations. When such cases arise, ground troops maintain the integrity of the
operation. Here, the problem lies less with the soldiers in the field than with the United Nations Executive,
specifically the Security Council.
In addition, peace enforcement has often failed because of a lack of adequate finances. In these circumstances, the
question arises: can or should peace enforcement be privatized; and if so, to what degree? What are the benefits and risks in doing so?
Can private peace enforcement be “regulated” like any other commercial enterprise?
Planet Debate                                                                                                          152
PMCs – Sherry Hall

          Limitations on Traditional UN Action Justify PMSCs
PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS CAN OVERCOME LIMITATIONS OF AD HOC UN
RESPONSES TO HUMANITARIAN CRISES
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 29
In the absence of well-resourced peacekeeping on an ad hoc basis, states, IGOs and others exercise
sporadic but continuing interest in rapid reaction forces, guards, security policy, volunteer reserves, standby and rotating
troop formations and various modern legions. Nearly all have been lost to contradictions inherent in the international
system. Governments today remain disinclined to subordinate their interests to an agenda determined by a
supra-state body where violence is likely and on balance, their own interests are insufficiently served by
risking participation in that violence. Even where governments agree to donate troop and equipment, they
will not willingly provide these resources without a web of hindering qualifications. Alex Morrison put it
simply: for many states, national interest and national control remain synonymous. None of this bodes well for future UN
operations carried out by conventional ad hoc deployments. Yet demands rise for more and better
equipment, more advanced military skills and larger numbers of personnel. The moment may be ripe to
consider a case for today’s private military contractors.
Planet Debate                                                                                                                     153
PMCs – Sherry Hall

               PMSCs Good Response to Humanitarian Crises
PMSCs OFFER MANY ADVANTAGES TO UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
Allan Gerson & Nat J. Colletta, International Relations Professors at George Washington University,
2002, Privatizing Peace; From Conflict to Security, p. 93-4
Once political consensus has been reached and once military objectives have been clearly identified, employing private security
companies could have the following advantages:
     1. Lower Costs: Specialized firms, with their own equipment, training, and common experience, can
           easily lower the costs of using military force. EO cost Sierra Leone’s government $35 million for the 22
          months it worked there, compared to a planned UN operation budgeted at $47 million for eight months. Similar cost
          comparisons can be established for the costs or private security as contrasted with those of the UNAVEM operations in
          Angola.
     2.   Better Training: This includes not just the training in the security firm itself-which is likely to be
          superior to the training in other firm itself-which is likely to be superior to the training in other
          groups as security firms are specialists-but also includes the ability of the firm to train other firms .
     3.   Better Command and Control. A clear chain of command is set up: soldiers report directly to the firm,
          which then reports to the UN. This avoids the problems in the field where nationals would report to
          their domestic superiors first rather than to their UN field officers. The use of standardized state-of-the-art
          communications.
     4.   More Determined Forces. PSCs generally pay significantly more than what the UN offers its
          troops. Indeed, UN troops often have little stake in the conflicts or the lives of the people they are sent to protect. A
          private security firm, on the other hand, has a financial interest in achieving results, and thus is likely to be more
          determined to succeed in performing the task at hand to preserve its current contract and enhance its potential for future
          contracts with the UN.
     5.   Speedy Delivery: Fast action is a major UN challenge. It cannot summon troops until a resolution has passed
          the Security Council. Often this is long after a crisis has begun. This occurred in Rwanda, where genocide was
          carried out with blazing speed. The UN could have stepped in once word of the killings came out
          but the political process of moving resolutions through the Security Council made early
          intervention impossible. While the use of private security firms would not, in and of itself, reduce the political
          process, it could diminish the lag between the passage of a UN Security Council resolution and the
          deployment of troops.
     6.   Greater Willingness to Act. When all that is at issue is relatively small financial risk, a nation’s
          proclivity to act is enhanced, especially where the risk of casualties is severe. For example, in providing
          for the protection of humanitarian aid workers, or the monitoring of elections, only a small force may be necessary. But
          even here the mustering of a small number of soldiers can be difficult politically if the situation is still fraught with
          physical danger. By contrast, private security operations take advantage of the narrow gap between a
          nation’s willingness to spend lives and its willingness to spend money.
Planet Debate                                                                                                                     154
PMCs – Sherry Hall

                PMSCs Good Response to Humanitarian Crises
CONTRACTORS FURTHER HUMANITARIAN GOALS OF THE UN – NOT A THREAT TO
NATION-STATES
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 224-5
For the author, this research has frequently been an education in the durability of erroneous perceptions and the equally robust
purposes their longevity serves. States’ governments commonly misinterpret PMSC purposes and some view the
growing influence on the industry as an affront to sovereignty. This is misleading . To coin a second phrase from
earlier in the text, armed conflicts amongst and within states have never involved a firm division between
private and public resources. This truth stretches form ancient Greece to Iraq today. Nor is there a
compelling reason why Charter purposes should not be furthered by sourcing UN needs from an
international military market offering a widening range of labor, goods and services. There is no insuperable
reason why modern contractual relations could not evolve from historically ubiquitous arrangements amongst UN members and their
more ancient predecessors. For UN members to adopt these measures implies an acceptance of dissenting ideas. This would seem
desirable if there is to be more than sluggish progress in achieving Charter objectives concerning the maintenance of international
peace and security. A corporate agent will never be a panacea for the entirety of that human misery laid at the
door of the Security Council. Nevertheless, the deployment of disciplined, professional contractors under
rigorous conditions may offer improvements on those currently mixed standards of peacekeeping that
prevail today. International humanitarian intervention would also become a less remote aspiration in terms
of the means by which unconventional legal doctrines might be given practical form. Both would enable
the Security Council to better address its Charter responsibilities and in particular the Preamble and its
admonition on war.

PMCS CAN PROVIDE CRITICAL SUPPORT IN FIGHTING GENOCIDE
Tony Geraghty, (British War Correspondent), SOLDIERS OF FORTUNE, 2009, 17
The case for the freelance soldier was put shortly before the Iraq war by Doug Brooks, president of the
International Peace Operations Association, in response to a re-examination of their role by the British Foreign Office. In this version
the agenda is also changing from aggressive military interventionism to the defensive role of protector.
Brooks claimed, "PMCs offer the only military forces both willing and capable of providing rapid and effective
military services in most Third World conflicts. Their operations have saved tens of thousands of lives but
their potential is even greater. Working as 'force multipliers' -- that is, training indigenous armies -- PMCs can
provide the competent military backbone to ensure the success of UN or regional multinational
peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations..." More critically, given an international mandate, PMCs can
decisively intervene in instances of genocide, as in Rwanda. Executive Outcomes' offer to the UN of a rapid
intervention force during the Rwanda genocide was declined at a time when member states were callously turning their backs to UN
pleas for military support.

PMSCs DIVERT POTENTIALLY THREATENING EX-MILITARY PERSONNEL INTO
PRODUCTIVE FORCES TO RESPOND TO HUMANITARIAN CRISES
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 44
Nevertheless, the idea that PMSCs can provide work for potentially destabilizing veterans in need of
employment is a powerful one with historical force. Complex humanitarian emergencies, including
genocide, and increasingly strong insurgencies in places like Sierra Leone, the Congo, Rwanda, Liberia, and Angola,
created a great demand for well-trained and equipped forces. This demand for military power against
internal insurgents, as in the well-documented cases of Executive Outcome’s contracts in Angola and Sierra Leone, was
readily supplied by ex-combatants and officers from a newly downsized and reconstitute South African
military.
Planet Debate                                                                                                                        155
PMCs – Sherry Hall

                PMSCs Good Response to Humanitarian Crises
PMSCs COULD HAVE PREVENTED GENOCIDE IN RWANDA
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 53
Memory of those times carries lasting consequences which resonate in the tone and purpose of more recent UN policy. In 1995 Mr.
Annan had a chance to engage an effective private military company to separate murderous Hutu
executioners from those refugees who had escaped slaughter in Rwanda by fleeing west to camps just inside the
DRC border at Goma. He appeared to dally with the idea of hiring the notably effective firm “Executive Outcomes.”
Unfortunately for the refugees he chose not to go ahead. The PMC option would almost certainly have
been more effective than his ill-fated reliance on a Zairian police contingent. In recalling this moment three years
later Mr. Annan conceded no failure on his part. He instead responded by dryly suggesting that “…the world may not be ready to
privatize what had been possible at the time.” To others it suggested unsettling indifference to a lost opportunity for better leadership.
This was not the only example. In 1996 EO was again considered for the creation of a secure humanitarian
corridor as Rwanda’s refugee crisis escalated. No state would consider paying for it and the consequences
of inaction was thousands of Hutu deaths.

PMSCs IMPROVING THEIR CAPACITY FOR HUMANITARIAN MISSIONS
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 73
The industry is in turn becoming more efficiently organized and structured. Some firms have humanitarian
divisions which tailor packages to aid organizations and their objectives . One company has proposed a
comprehensive package for a consortium of relief groups in Aceh. Another created humanitarian packages on a not-for-profit basis
while shrewdly emphasizing the firms’ ethical conduct. A third supported an entire voter registration and poll exercise in
Afghanistan. A fourth has a philanthropic arm. A fifth secured sympathetic coverage in right-wing American press for work with
humanitarian clients. The humanitarian field is also sufficiently lucrative to sustain the risk-advisory segment
of the industry as well as security providers. In other words, there have been advances in crafting a security
“product” more adapted to UN and NGO clients. Although loathe to be identified, UN interviewees have
responded positively to the very conventional appeal of flexibility, efficiency, reliability and competitive
costs. The steady expansion of this commerce seems likely to encroach further into UN logistics and security roles. On the other
hand, UN and NGO staffs tend to emphasize a clash of cultures even when it is in their interests to foster improved relations with an
industry upon which they increasingly rely. The result is policy which leaves the UN open to negative publicity and what Cockayne
terms “strategic incoherence.”

PMSCs HIRED FOR JUST REASONS – TO PROMOTE PEACE AND RESPOND TO
HUMANITARIAN CRISES
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 148
Here it might help to bring in the just-war categories for soldiers that for over a thousand years have served to divide conduct
in battle into two categories: the justice of the war itself (jus ad bellum), and the justice of the conduct in the war
(jus in bello). Private military firms, like Blue Sky, ArmoGroup, or any number of others, could be hired for just
reasons: private security in general is an ethical alternative to global risks. They could provide “human security” for
clients, they support humanitarian missions, including de-mining missions, or guarding humanitarian
convoys or refugee camps. Like the contracted bouncer-cum-bodyguard, private security contractors provide zones of safety in
a highly dangerous, untrustworthy world. And at the extreme end of the scale, as Walzer reluctantly admits, they could also offer
hope of real “robust” peacemaking, in the face of rampant failures by nation states, international
organizations like the UN, or regional coalitions. They are as moral or ethical as any multinational corporation, and they should
be judged fairly by the rules of the market. In sum, they pull together some of the highest commitments we have in
the West: they protect people, provide “defensive” security, and they are based on the individual freedom
to contract, and the discipline of the market. They are the ultimate late-modern social entrepreneurs, doing
good while making money. This is repeatedly, how they are stressed: as realistic peace operators for profit.
Planet Debate                                                                                                                156
PMCs – Sherry Hall

                  PMSCs Good Response to Humanitarian Crises
PMSCs LIKE BLACKWATER CAN ASSIST THE UN IN HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN
PLACES LIKE DARFUR
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 3-4
Mr. Prince has also demonstrated considerable entrepreneurial flair . For example, he proposed sending 250 of
his contractors to Darfur in order to train 1000 local soldiers in the effective defense of internally displaced
refugees. Putting foreseeable constraints to one side and even if this exercise was to achieve measurable success, critics will
correctly observe that the positive effect would be tiny in a region as vast as the south and west of Sudan. However, Mr. Prince’s
intentions may not have been entirely plain. His suggestion seems to have been an act of political assertiveness
rather than a literal claim. If so, his more genuine purposes lie elsewhere. He knows that contractors are not likely to
replace sizeable formations of insurgent or state forces. As he suggested, contractors can and do supply ‘force
multipliers’ to others. It would seem likely that future profits will be earned from continuing to provide
instruction in both basic and more specialized military skills. However, the choice of Darfur was manifestly untenable
in diplomatic and probably military terms as well. One can nonetheless imagine another client. Skilled assistance in
various forms also seem likely to enhance the effectiveness of UN operations. And should this firm deliver
success in places other than Darfur through either more competent UN troops or more proficiently trained
host forces, he will be able to point to ‘proof of concept’ – which could be profitably repeated.

FAILURE TO UTILIZE PMSCs FOR HUMANITARIAN MISSIONS COULD RESULT IN GROSS
HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 4
The prospect of Blackwater securing a peace operations contract with the UN may seem improbable for ideological, ethical or perhaps
more practical reasons. Some may be ingrained. In particular, the ordure attached to twentieth century mercenaries tend to cloud
informed examination of today’s military and security services industries. This is noticeable amongst certain UN organs and states.
Defenders of the status quo will inevitably emphasize peacekeeping successes achieved with more
conventional forms of mission support. Examples might include operations in Namibia, El Salvador,
Nicaragua, Mozambique and to a lesser degree, East Timor and Cambodia . Even so, it would appear
imprudent to reject the rich possibilities that Blackwater’s less tainted competitors could offer the UN.
This seems especially pointed where ineffective Security Council responses to future armed conflicts are
likely to result in gross human rights abuses.

PMSCs ARE PREPARED TO MEET UN NEEDS FOR A RAPIDLY DEPLOYABLE FORCE
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 39
Until the UN establishes the concept of rapidly deployable force s, or as a minimum a rapidly deployable headquarters
element to fill that initial vacuum, UN PSOs [peace support operations] will deploy against a strong counter current.
PMCs are formed entities—they are responsive. Their force structures are already identified, their logistical and
administrative tails organized. They have a leadership cadre ready to deploy. This is their core business
rationale. They have personnel who are motivated to serve; they have personnel who are experienced, who
are trained, who are physically equipped, and who are disciplined .
J.D. Jefferies.
Planet Debate                                                                                                              157
PMCs – Sherry Hall

                    PMSCs Good for Peacekeeping Operations
GROWING PRIVATIZATION TREND IMPROVES PROSPECTS FOR PEACEKEEPING
Allan Gerson & Nat J. Colletta, International Relations Professors at George Washington University,
2002, Privatizing Peace; From Conflict to Security, p. xi-xii
Globalization can be a force for peace, not merely for enhanced commerce. Success hinges on whether a new architecture can be
developed for not allowing the new energy it unleashes to be harnessed rather than allowed to dissipate. Privatization of many
peace-related functions carried out in union with civil society and the public sector, both national and
supranational, can be its fundamental building block. With commitment to such an undertaking, the
gnawing sense of futility that underlies so much of today’s armed conflicts can give way to the promise of a
better tomorrow.
The idea that governments and multilateral institutions are alone capable of peacemaking and
peacebuilding is already recognized as an anachronism. In the age of globalization the open dissemination of
knowledge, information and culture goes hand in hand with openness of markets and the enterprise of producers, rewarding whomever
can deliver goods or services more efficiently.

PARTNERSHIPS GOOD WAY TO MEET PEACEKEEPING NEEDS
Allan Gerson & Nat J. Colletta, International Relations Professors at George Washington University,
2002, Privatizing Peace; From Conflict to Security, p. 5
The problem begins with fragmentation. Many state systems that bear responsibility for providing security for their
populations have fallen apart. So too, to a lesser degree, have the systems intended to provide solace and relief.
Compounding the problem is the fragmentation of the overarching political systems intended to serve as
peacemakers and peace-builders. In this context, the idea of partnering has emerged, offering enhanced
cooperation and coordination among all the relevant players and the promise of cohesiveness rather than
fragmentation.
Planet Debate                                                                                                                   158
PMCs – Sherry Hall

 UN More Likely to Respond with a Force of Contractors than
                 Regular Service Personnel
DEATHS OF CONTRACTORS LESS POLITICALLY SENSITIVE FOR COUNTRIES THAN
SERVICE-PERSONNEL
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 20
A capacity to absorb casualties and those advantages in the paragraph above would also apply to contractors. However,
on the question of casualties a contract force would again be more attractive than a legion because its members would
be another step removed from the UN Organization. When a handful of UN employees are killed or
injured, their home states and the Security Council sometimes withdraw. This was the case when the UN
Headquarters in Iraq was largely destroyed in August 2003 due to poor security. Twenty-two staff died, resulting in a prompt decision
to pull out most other UN employees. The point is that the value of human life in international affairs is a political
matter. Management of disruption caused by unexpected losses could be dealt with more expeditiously
when counting contract casualties rather than in-house losses. Consider an existing analogy. In Iraq and
Afghanistan today the deaths of Western service personnel are sensitive matters. Nevertheless, to establish how
many security contractors of mixed nationality have been maimed or killed is quite difficult. To the US led
invasion force, contractor lives are politically less important than those of their own troops . And because the
war in Iraq has been unpopular in America for some time, the US government holds a keen political interest in obscuring truths that
undermine its objectives. Hence the limited figures it releases.

CONTRACTORS SHIELD STATES FROM POLITICAL BACKLASH AGAINST GETTING
INVOLVED
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 64-5
A second argument is that few governments wish to risk the lives of their military forces where national interests
are not directly at issue. Contractors’ lives could be risked where the consequences would be less
politically sensitive. No state would have sent them (although states could in theory covertly do so for uncertain purposes.)
Voluntary enlistment is a considerable advantage, especially where the risk of casualties grows in dangerous operations, those that
unexpectedly become hazardous and certainly during any humanitarian intervention. The nationality of soldiers in a
corporate unit would remain more or less anonymous, much like those in the French Foreign Legion. For the same
reason, those awaiting deployment would promote no state’s interest apart from the collective interests
embodied in a Security Council mandate. This is something likely to ease the path to authorization.
Political leaders are likely to welcome reduced risks to their more personal interests . They wish to avoid
unfavorable media coverage of their nationals and particularly those engaged in unsavory violence or sexual misconduct. This is a
concern not because it is tawdry, but because peacekeeping is electorally sensitive. Any Prime Minister or President would be
embarrassed by a mission in which their citizens are repeatedly portrayed by an unsympathetic media as thugs and sexual deviants; or
where their nationals might be identified during warfare’s more grisly moments. But through the partisan eye of a
journalist’s camera, no contractor would be indentified by nationality. A contract employee may well be
photographed misbehaving or for that matter, in distress, wounded or deceased. But an electorate is less
likely to blame its elected representatives for financing a peacekeeping operation where violence affects
personnel or uncertain and mostly foreign origin. Corporate soldiers may or may not be fellow nationals. For a
politician this is preferable to contemplating the degree of unstable public approval necessary to sustain an
ad hoc deployment.
Planet Debate                                                                                                                       159
PMCs – Sherry Hall

 UN More Likely to Respond with a Force of Contractors than
                 Regular Service Personnel
CONTRACTORS LESS POLITICALLY SENSITIVE WAY FOR THE US TO SUPPORT UN
MISSIONS
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 65
Contractors could also bring fresh strengths to international diplomacy when an operation is in trouble . Ad
hoc troops donated from past colonial masters may arouse indigenous hostility. Contract troops of mixed
origin are less likely to have this effect. Moreover, by paying for contractors, states would purchase a pleasing
sense of distance from an unexpectedly unstable or escalating conflict. They could not benefit form this if their own
troops were involved. There could also be more freedom for a state to consider a Security Council mandate on
its merits, unencumbered by the requirement to weigh risks in sending its own troops to volatile regions .
Politicians could then more objectively face the two problems which a deteriorating situation is likely to present: revising a fragile and
precariously dated UN mandate; and/or making practical decisions as to what to do in the face of unanticipated violence. Many
politicians will recall unpleasant consequences arising from an imprudently ambitious mandate for
UNOSOM II in an already hazardous situation. Pulling out a contractor would at least carry fewer
diplomatic consequences than removing multiple states’ contingents along with their bruised prestige.

COUNTRIES MORE LIKELY TO SUPPORT INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN MISSIONS
TO HALT GENOCIDE WITH CONTRACTORS
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 68-9
Another argument for contractors is the appeal in requesting governments to contribute taxpayers’ treasure
rather than their blood. A business solution will be a more attractive impost on UN members where they
are asked to contribute money and not lives which might be lost or shattered and thereby a political liability at home. A
business solution for this reason may have a better chance of overcoming domestic disapproval of intervention
in a conspicuously vicious struggle. Where the need for help is most dire, history’s lesson is that the will to
assist will probably be at its weakest. Consider the reference in the Introduction to Rwanda in 1994. UN Members
could probably have stopped much of the mayhem by paying for assistance from a contract brigade. But no
state would countenance losing even a few lives to preserve 800,000 strangers. To engage contractors is to
limit those risks to national prestige and citizens’ lives which accompany the dispatch of sovereign troops. Considerable
political and diplomatic capital could also be reaped from a financial contribution to a successful mission.

CONTRACTORS MORE ATTRACTIVE WAY FOR US TO FULFILL HUMANITARIAN
OBLIGATIONS TO UN
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 65
Another reason is the assistance the United States may be encouraged to contribute. Since the Clinton Administration and the
unhappy results of UNOSOM II, the US has been wary of UN operations, particularly where American casualties
are likely. Even so, a decade ago military researchers in the US canvassed the possibility of conducting
operations with friendly PMCs. The climate has since altered dramatically and the US agenda is now dominated by terrorism
and two wars. But this does not necessarily spell the indefinite cessation of US support for UN peace operations. US warfighting
doctrine altered fundamentally during the Iraq campaign and eventually elevated reconstruction operations to be a core part of US
military doctrine. Leading American strategists now believe that a strong peacekeeping capability would
“…buy more time to address the underlying causes of that instability : [upon which terrorism thrives]. This
argument enjoys currency among those who believe that terrorist threats to the US will be diminished if the
Americans assist “full spectrum” operations which advance post-conflict public security. It seems reasonable to
suggest that the US may become sympathetic to a UN contractor should the Americans believe that more
effective deployments would serve US interests at least as much as those of the collective UN membership.
Planet Debate                                                                                                                 160
PMCs – Sherry Hall

                         UN Empirically Relied on Contractors
UN USED CONTRACTORS FOR PROTECTION IN SIERRA LEONE
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 55
An uneasy UN duality over mercenaries, contractors and private security is noticeable elsewhere. In the 1990s the UN hired
“Lifeguard Security” to protect its premises in Freetown during instability in Sierra Leone. It was well known that
Lifeguard was staffed with former Executive Outcomes personnel, one of Mr. Ballesteros’s recurring targets. Yet they protected
UN officials’ homes and offices and apparently provided UN staff with use of a military transport helicopter .
An ex-military pilot has described how UNAMSIL in May 2000 also supplied rockets and fuel to pilots of “HESA Air West Africa.”
It appears company aircrew undertook military operations using Sierra Leonean helicopters in accordance with authorization provided
by the UNAMSIL Force Commander. The same personnel apparently rescued embattled UNAMSIL peacekeepers on several
occasions while other PMC employees also assisted ECOMOG in Sierra Leone. Contract aviators from Sandline transported UN
officials and are alleged to have rescued various expatriates who would have been killed if captured b y the RUF.
Planet Debate                                                                                                                     161
PMCs – Sherry Hall

                UN Command More Effective with Contractors
CONTRACT FORCE BETTER FOR UN MISSIONS THAN AD HOC – EASIER TO COMMAND
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 63-4
The case for a privatized adjunct in support of peacekeeping operations may be summarized in a dozen
reasons. Some directly address those arguments for states’ resistance to ad hoc donation listed in the Introduction. First, states
tend to inhibit the vigor of even the most disciplined and well-equipped peacekeeping contingents through
the attachment of operational directives. These directives enable governments to retain a measure of
control, limiting the tasks which troops may carry out consistent with the aims and interests of the sending state. Whether overt or
covert, these are potentially obstructive. This is why commanders of peacekeeping operations face notoriously
difficult negotiations with subordinate contingent commanders. It follows that a UN commander does not
issue an order in the conventional military sense. A contentious request is likely to be sent to a foreign capital for
evaluation (consistent with operational directives) before a contingent commander either consents or declines to follow it. This is
damaging to unity of command and demonstrates a fractured of unity of purpose as a military commander has to
first ascertain what a contingent commander is prepared to do before asking for a particular task to be carried out. But a contract
force would be much less likely to face manipulations as a result of this type of interstate competition. In a
contract unit the troops would be entirely volunteers subject to unified command. Moreover, they would be
motivated to attempt to fulfill their mandate in order to receive bonuses or other incentives.

CONTRACTORS WOULD BE MORE EFFECTIVE AT CARRYING OUT UN HUMANITARIAN
MISSIONS
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 66
Another strength would be multiple organizational improvements. There would be a single doctrine,
language and training, the latter specialized for the work that peacekeepers and intervention troops would
carry out. Simulation and scenario planning could be devised for the kind of environments in which the troops would be likely to
find themselves. Contractors would consequently be more familiar with the nature of their missions than those
troops who presently make up the bulk of peacekeepers. Standardized systems of supply and maintenance
could end variations in logistic capability. Uniform types of armor, artillery and infantry equipment would
remove many of the problems of current incompatibility. In particular, uniform signaling equipment throughout
the unit would ensure that command, control, communications, and intelligence would be conveyed more
effectively than has sometimes been the case in the past.
A tender would specify the type and nature of capabilities sought, a tenderer’s response subsequently evaluated by a new entity titled
the “UN Directorate for Military Contracting.” To be classified as competent to undertake tasks matching purported
capabilities, contractors would meet industry best practice standards as far as possible. If successful, an
applicant would be licensed and subsequently sent on those operations in which it would be expected to
prove proficient. Meeting rigorous criteria prior to participation in some missions—and particularly hazardous operations – would
seem highly desirable. Somewhat similar concepts are aired elsewhere from time to time. A past director of the Australian “Army
Land Warfare Studies Center” in Canberra supported the idea of an international register of accredited private military and security
providers for UN service. UNTAC Commander General Sanderson suggested to the author that standardized procedures and a UN
Inspector-General would be desirable, even under the present ad hoc regime. The UN does not at present appear receptive. The
general nonetheless thought it likely that a UN legion or private military company would serve the UN at some
point in the future.
Planet Debate                                                                                                                      162
PMCs – Sherry Hall

                UN Command More Effective with Contractors
CONTRATORS BETTER: LESS LIKELY TO BE HAMPERED BY RELIGIOUS AND ETHNIC
PROBLEMS, MORE LIKELY TO TARGET EXPERTISE
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 66-7
Another virtue of the privatized adjunct is that unlike a permanent legion vulnerable to greater manipulation, contractor
management would not conform to pressure for ethnic or nationality quotas . In liaison with the UN
Directorate for Military Contracting, contractor management would exercise freedom to make
discriminating choices when evaluating individual candidate s. This will be helpful for two reasons. First,
particularly religio-ethnic influences have on occasion exerted unhealthy pressures amongst UN peacekeepers
and some of these could be avoided. In early 1994 Mr. Boutros-Ghali made it clear how troops holding a political objective
and/or from a state that bordered on Yugoslavia would not be accepted in Bosnia. Unfortunately, this kind of foresight was not
applied to the emplacement of a Moslem Jordanian battalion on the Oecussi enclave during UNTAET’s East Timor operations. The
population there was largely Roman Catholic and grave consequences were probably predictable. In the future contract troops
could be drawn from wherever the most suitable sources are thought to exist for the job at hand, while
acknowledging that religio-ethnic issues will never be eliminated altogether.
As each mission is likely to dictate requirements for particular forms of knowledge, troops could also be selected because
they hold various forms of expertise. For example, some will be proficient in the conduct of operations in jungles, deserts,
mountains or very cold environments. Others will be skilled in amphibious or airborne operations. There will be certain medical
officers experienced in the prophylaxis and treatment of particular diseases and surgical techniques in the field. Other candidates will
hold invaluable familiarity with particular languages, customs, cultures and likely indigenous reaction to foreign intervention. It is
noteworthy that this knowledge is increasingly valued in today’s American military doctrine, in which “human terrain specialists”
assist in reconstruction operations.

RELIANCE ON PMSCs INCREASES FLEXIBILITY FOR UN MISSIONS
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 71-2
So long as states’ troops are involved in peacekeeping, mandate formation will be bedeviled by the
counterproductive machinations of states constantly seeking avoidance of risk. Should a contract force be
deployed, some anxieties will remain and in particular, the risk of unexpected changes to mandates. But in
peacekeeping and especially hazardous peacekeeping, state responsibility would no longer be directly attached to
operational risk. Tasks would be approached with greater clarity and practicality in mandate formation,
impartiality (but not neutrality), interposition, rules of engagement and the role of violence more generally. All
contract missions would be created under Chapter VII of the Charter. In intrastate conflicts in particular, hindsight has demonstrated
the need to provide a future corporate commander with a wide range of options regarding the use of force.
Planet Debate                                                                                                                163
PMCs – Sherry Hall

                UN Command More Effective with Contractors
MANY SPECIFIC AREAS WHERE CONTRACTORS WOULD IMPROVE EFFECTIVENESS OF
UN MISSIONS
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 70
Another strength is contractor versatility. Specialist airlift, sealift and land transport companies could assist the DPKO more
thoroughly in its logistic tail. Construction is another area where there could be expansion: temporary or more
robust roads and bridges, airstrips and hangars, jetties, accommodation, warehouses and ordnance dumps .
Catering, rubbish removal and cleaning, postal services, perimeter defense, medical support and evacuation are other candidates.
Inroads could also be made in outsourced computer support, document management and record keeping. A politically sensitive
area in which UN contractors might also encroach is work which NGO and humanitarian groups presently
perform. The considerable advantage would be an absence of NGO insistence on freedom from
institutional control, maintenance of political neutrality and stoutly independent management . Many NGOs are
suspicious of attempts to drive them in a particular direction which might compromise their neutrality in the eyes of others. A UN
agent would instead be bound by explicit contractual obligations and the mandate under which it would
operate. This would bind it to effective UN planning so the company could get on with its tasks while tied
to clear lines of principal/agent authority.
Medical aid is one example. The British Director-General of Army Medical Services in 2006 told the author he saw the age of
the corporate humanitarian actor fast approaching. General Hawley believes contractual obligations held by a sending government
and a company will appeal to government ministers because of the accountability and control they offer. The UN position is not
necessarily different. Instead of negotiating with states or NGOs over these resources, the UN could purchase similar
services with superior control and accountability built into the bargain. Militarized medical support would
in any case be an integral facet of a contractor legion. An expanded humanitarian relief role for contract
medical services could take form in manmade or naturally occurring disasters. Related aspects like power
generation, communications, food and water supplies could also be delivered with security built into a task order.

CONTRACTORS BETTER PERFORM DISARMAMENT AND DEMOBILIZATION
PROGRAMS
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 70-1
Another promising area is expansion in the collection of small arms and light weapons (SALW). This is one
element of “disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration” programs (DDR) which are in turn a part of “security sector
reform” (SSR). When advanced states’ national capacities are insufficient or unavailable, this is another
task the UN could countenance for corporate contractors. To first-world troops this assistance is frequently
unwelcome as they consider it peripheral to their key purposes. Time spent on rotations by soldiers unfamiliar with a
region is also likely to be unhelpfully brief—perhaps six months or so. This is understandable as states are wary of lengthy
encumbrances. By contrast, companies would welcome the steady revenue that longer term contracts
provide. Their employees could be stationed in-country for lengthy periods as part of an overall plan
lasting years. For this reason, company ex-soldiers could be deployed because they hold prior military
experience with a particular people and their culture. For example, suitable ex-NATO military could carry out these
tasks while an absence of foreign uniforms would be politically desirable. Other SSR programs could be undertaken by
contractors competent to retrain personnel from various occupations: police and prison administrators;
customs officials; armed forces and coast guards. Nor should transfers stop at skills. There is a case for military
technology transfer carried out by corporations rather than governments.
Planet Debate                                                                                                                      164
PMCs – Sherry Hall

                        PMSCs More Efficient Use of Resources
PMSCs ALLOW MORE EFFICIENT USE OF UN RESOURCES
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 69
The cost of a PMSC contract should be keenly scrutinized. Logically enough, UN members’ money should be
spent in a business-like fashion according to the completion of agreed contractual criteria. Examples arising in a
contested humanitarian intervention could include strategically important infrastructure and utilities taken
and held; enemy materiel destroyed; particular military commanders or political leaders captured; villages
or town liberated; or completion of other specified tasks within time and on budget. Each of these could
trigger performance incentives for soldiers and management. The corollary is that failure would attract specified
financial or other penalties through a structure of payment suspension according to a schedule agreed between the parties.

COSTS OF PMSCs JUSTIFIED EVEN IF THEY GO OVER BUDGET
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 69-70
In the wake of poor standards of American contracting evident during the recent Iraq invasion and occupation, some of these
suggestions may remind the skeptical reader of inflated and unmet corporate claims. War is a notoriously uncertain business
and any military unit involves formidable fixed costs which would have to be paid for the life of a contract;
although the cost of a contract legion could be to some degree balanced against what they actually deliver.
Critics will suggest that it is always possible for the costs of a commercial operation to exceed the sums
expected. This is of course true. And militaries notoriously exceed their budgets. Yet if what is paid delivers mandate
objectives because troops and support staff are skillfully led, reliable and not risk-averse, then up to a point
the outcome will have been worth the expenditure. Cost in a military context is not necessarily the primary
criterion in any case. Deborah Avant observed that in the Iraq campaign genuinely competitive markets and contractor flexibility
were sacrificed by the US government in order to preserve reliability and continuity of service. There is a balance to be struck. In the
alternative it is possible that states’ troops may be found in time to justify a mission’s purposes. But if their
deployment does not prove effective for familiar reasons, they will not have been worth the money and effort
whatever the figure involved. And the chances of success for an ad hoc deployment would seem relatively
higher if supported by a professional military contractor.
Planet Debate                                                                                                               165
PMCs – Sherry Hall

                PMSCs Less Likely to Pull Out of UN Missions
PMSCs MORE LIKELY TO FULFILL THEIR MISSIONS – NOT CUT AND RUN
Allan Gerson & Nat J. Colletta, International Relations Professors at George Washington University,
2002, Privatizing Peace; From Conflict to Security, p. 89
Private security companies (PSCs) are less likely to defect. First, every member of the company, from
commanders to soldiers, has a financial incentive to complete his tour of duty. It is , after all, a contractual
obligation. As a result, soldiers are less likely to desert as they have a stake in “seeing it through .” In m any instance where
remuneration is tied to shared profits from a mineral resource such as the diamond mines in Sierra Leone
and Angola withdrawal is tantamount to foregoing payment as well as a breach of contract. Secondly, the
security company has an incentive to complete its objectives. As a private company it has a reputation to
protect, and a failure in one campaign could easily adversely affect the prospect of future contracts.
Planet Debate                                                                                             166
PMCs – Sherry Hall

             Should Increase Role of PMSCs in UN Missions
SHOULD INCREASE ROLE OF PMSCs IN UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
Allan Gerson & Nat J. Colletta, International Relations Professors at George Washington University,
2002, Privatizing Peace; From Conflict to Security, p. 34
In speaking of privatizing peace, we suggest injecting the private sector in all UN and other multilateral
peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, and peacebuilding efforts. The anticipated result is
greater clarity of mission, better articulation of performance objectives, and the delineation of measures for
judging results in an open, transparent and accountable framework.
Planet Debate                                                                                                                    167
PMCs – Sherry Hall

           UN Can Hold PMSCs it Contracts with Accountable
UN SHOULD DEVELOP A CRIMINAL JUSTICE REGIME TO HOLD THE PMSCs THEY
CONTRACT WITH ACCOUNTABLE
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 5-6
Before a contract deployment might occur, the interests of the UN and PMSCs dictate settling one matter in particular. Over the
last five years journalists, lawyers and human rights groups have justifiably criticized the conduct of armed
contractors in Iraq (and to some extent Afghanistan) in the absence of a functional criminal justice regime. By
contrast, UN agents of tomorrow should contemplate a criminal justice system that provides both clarity of
obligation and reliable enforcement. This is possible. UN organs hold the authority to create an
endogenous criminal justice system that meets international legal standards, yet is not inimical to either legitimate
corporate purpose of limits to UN Charter authority. This apparatus should also improve on those inconsistent and
unreliable criminal processes presently applied to states’ troops who serve in and sometimes weaken UN
operations. Such a structure is described in Chapter 6 and in diagrammatic form in Appendix I. The goal of this approach is to
build on the UN strength in multilateral legitimacy and avoid the inherent UN weakness in ad hoc recruitment.

UN HAS SUFFICIENT AUTHORITY TO CREATE AND REGULATE CONTRACTOR FORCES
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 196-7
Helpfully, the Security Council’s competence to establish an international criminal tribunal to serve the
Council’s principal function of the maintenance of international peace and security was affirmed in the
ICTY Tadic case. As the UN criminal tribunal would be limited to matters arising from deployments concerning threats to the
peace, the Security Council’s intention would not fall before a Charter separation of powers and the limited scope of Article 42. The
Tadic decision is consistent with Bowett’s explanation that the constitutional basis supporting subsidiary organs with
given functions lies in articles justifying those functions and not in the Article 29 general power to establish
those organs. Article 29 is concerned with procedure rather than limits to substantive authority.
The criminal court would be competent to prosecute corporate as well as human persons, whether uniformed or otherwise. These
would include directors and management of a UN contractor. One is aware that the trial of a civilian rather than military
contractor within a court having military attributes will arouse familiar criticisms attached to trial rights of
civilians. In the corporate context, civilian consent to be bound by UN military law would serve three purposes. The first would be
prompt location on a suitable judicial forum for criminal trials. Second, UN military law could proscribe with some
precision at least most of those moral hazards which are likely to tempt white collar management and
directors. Third, uniformed commanders in the field would hold authority to direct civilians accompanying the force consistent with
the good order and discipline of the unit. The latter is not new. The Australians have in place a system which controls consenting
civilians in identified theaters, an arrangement that appears to provide operational cohesion.
The new court would observe internationally recognized principles of criminal justice identified in
international treaties to which the majority of states have bound themselves; along with adherence to
international customary law and desirable principles of civilized conduct as recognized by most states. These
attributes would be assisted by another court characteristic: mobility. The court would shift about to whatever its presence would be
required. This benefit would provide palpable advantages in witness accessibility and other evidentiary matters. And should there
be a conviction, the court would also exercise competence to compel the transfer of sums in compensation
from a guilty person or a company to a person or other entity harmed or who had suffered loss at the hands
of criminal or negligent UN corporate forces. Supplying a measure of material justice would be an integral part of the
court’s purposes. UN responsibility for effecting material remedies is not new, as the proposed court revives aspects of a
compensation process stretching back to the 1950s.
Planet Debate                                                                                                                 168
PMCs – Sherry Hall

           UN Can Hold PMSCs it Contracts with Accountable
UN CAN MAINTAIN CONTROL OVER PMSCs
Allan Gerson & Nat J. Colletta, International Relations Professors at George Washington University,
2002, Privatizing Peace; From Conflict to Security, p. 88
By privatizing peace enforcement, many of the problems of PSCs can be addressed. In a private company
the chain of command is clear. One end of the chain—the United Nations or another international
organization or government deals with how its mandates will be implemented, while the other end of the
chain—the ground troops – knows precisely where it receives its commands. Few better examples of this
understanding exist than the Sierra Leone experience. When the Kabbah government had Executive Outcomes under its employ in
Sierra Leone, the RUF were brought to the bargaining table, where the rebels made the withdrawal of EO from the country a key
condition of a cease fire. Kabbah reluctantly agreed, under pressure from the international community. Unfortunately, Freetown and
its defending ECOMOG forces were subsequently overrun by the unforeseen combination of rebelling government soldiers and the
RUF. Kabbah was only returned to power when Sandline joined forces with ECOMOG.
Planet Debate                                                                                                                    169
PMCs – Sherry Hall

               US Action Critical to UN Employment of PMSCs
UN CAN’T REALLY EMPLOY CONTRACTORS WITHOUT US APPROVAL
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 104
To engage contractors successfully the UN will need to resolve some divisive matters. One is attainment of
P5 consensus on deployments in the Security Council at a time of strong Anglo-American bloc influence. There are
perhaps four reasons for this drift; the US and UK governments exercise considerable influence over the
leading PMSCs; management and sometimes the workforce and shareholders of these companies are frequently
British or American; both states exercise a veto power on mandate formation in the Security Council; and
the US exercises such a preponderance of individual influence that no decision to engage contract
peacekeepers could succeed without approval from the US government , quite apart from its P5 privileges. In that
context, rotating states on the Security Council are very likely to register the existence of both American and UN incentives. Recent
work by Harvard economists Kuziemko and Werker suggests that developing states extract rents during the two years in which these
poorer rotating members sit on the Security Council. This rent takes the form of US aid inflated by an average of 59 percent and UN
aid inflated by an average of 8 percent. That is powerful encouragement (or bribery, depending on one’s view.) The risk of
withholding it implies correspondingly potent coercion.

US SUPPORT FOR UN CONTRACTOR MISSIONS IMPORTANT
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 223
Any transformation would require favorable US views. Within the UN the Americans exercise formidable
financial authority coupled with an earnest pre-occupation with their “long war.” US national security policy has evolved greatly
in light of recent mistakes; to the point where acceptance of a growing sophistication in counter-insurgency campaigns suggests an
understanding of the value that complex interventions hold in promoting American security. For this reason, the Obama
Administration may be persuaded that US interests are served through support for enhanced UN peacekeeping operations which may
extend to armed intervention and state stabilization. American support seems plausible where US responsibilities are manageable. In
this event Washington seems likely to encourage these deployments. Re-kindling pro-UN policy in America coupled with the
emergence of enlightened self-interest by other states would bolster the case for an experiment in adjunct forces.
Planet Debate                                                                                                                   170
PMCs – Sherry Hall

                                 Proposal for Using Contractors
PRACTICAL MODEL FOR UN USING CONTRACTORS TO HELP WITH HUMANITARIAN
AND PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 9
The sixth chapter is titled “A Modest Proposal” and depicts a fresh governance model suited to a corporate peacekeeping and
intervention force. Early observation on UN/donor criminal justice shed light on chronic shortcomings arising
from sovereign deployments. Curiously, these tend to receive limited and fleeting public attention. The new structure is
intended to harness contractor strengths while addressing hazards identified in the prior two chapters. This
include means to measure contractor capability and standards of competence on which the UN could rely; a
fair criminal justice system; and inculcation of a normative attachment to t he rule of law. The proposal
lies in five parts: a constitutional basis; a new disciplinary structure; performance measurement; a
hypothetical deployment in support of UN and NGO agencies in a revived form of UN trusteeship; and a
summary of those elements that constitute one view of a practical model .

UN MODEL FOR UTILIZING CONRACTORS MORE EFFECTIVE THAN AD HOC FORCES
TO RESPOND TO HUMANITARIAN CRISES
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 223-4
The first chapter began with the sub-heading ‘An Intractable Problem,” a title prompted by the panoply of difficulties evident in UN
peacekeeping today. Ad hoc forces have not delivered the promise they once seemed to hold . And conventional
alternatives have never been sufficiently acceptable to states’ governments. This has been the case regardless of
various permutations arising from the three variations identified in the second chapter, along with a wave of other proposals. The
third chapter canvassed widely misperceived aspects of mercenarism, organized violence and legitimacy. The taxonomy was intended
to add clarity to contemporary firms’ roles; and the advocate’s case asserted a view conspicuously at odds with accepted wisdom in
UN circles. The fourth and fifth chapters investigated some of the tensions which ebb and flow between states and non-state actors in
the organization of violence. Some of these tensions take the form of risks common to any business. Others are peculiar to the
commerce of war. A third category attaches to the United Nations Organization, its Charter and a membership characterized by
diverse and competing agendas. Heedful Security Council members might ponder these risks at length. One should in
particular remain aware that PMSCs may remain instruments of individual state power projection, whether
this be overt or covert; and whether for publicly defensible goals or more squalid purposes. These are some of
the influences which provide the impetus for the new model in the sixth chapter. Through this UN creation, the Security Council
might form agency agreements and conduct business with a contract companies while acting within Charter
powers. To repeat a remark from the Introduction, this scheme builds on the UN strength in multilateral legitimacy
and avoids the inherent UN weakness in ad hoc recruitment.
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               AT: Should Not Replace UN Forces with PMSCs
PMSCs ASSIST – DO NOT REPLACE – UN FORCES
Allan Gerson & Nat J. Colletta, International Relations Professors at George Washington University,
2002, Privatizing Peace; From Conflict to Security, p. 31
The fear of privatization of peace-related functions arises out of a series of misconceptions about the
meaning of privatization that tends to cloud thinking on the subject. Perhaps the biggest misconception can be cleared up with a
single statement: Privatization is not replacement. Even the most ardent supporters of privatizing peace functions do
not expect the private sector to supersede the public sectors. The private sector is surely no substitute for
the United Nations and other international organizations, but it can proceed on parallel tracks, with adequate
supervision, toward a common objective.
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             *Answers to Arguments Against PMSCs*
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                      AT: PMSCs Dangerous and Unaccountable
MUCH OF THE DISTRUST OF PMSCs FLOWS FROM THEIR PROTEAN, HARD TO
CATEGORIZE AND UNDERSTAND, NATURE
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 12
For the sake of both accuracy and consistency, I will use the term “protean” to refer to PMSCs: they are more than just
hybrids, since they combine more than two organizational types. “Protean” suggests a flexible, changing, and
multifaceted organization – but one that also has underlying ominous powers: after being captured, Proteus
the sea god changed into a lion, a serpent, and a leopard, before he could be subdued. One way to
understand the conceptual (and normative) confusion that surrounds PMSCs is to see it as a direct result of
their protean character. We do not know how to judge what we cannot understand, and existing categories
of classification and judgment fall short. The fault here is with us, not them; we are stuck with outdated ways of
seeing, and need to adapt. And in the meantime, we greet unfamiliar categories with a mixture of paranoia and
suspicion. The anthropologist Mary Douglas argued famously that “dirt is just matter that is out of place”: shoes on the kitchen
table are much harder to tolerate than shoes on the floor; trash at the dump is not as offensive as trash by the side of the road.
Cultures invent complex rules to assign places to things, and to order and make sense of the world. Objects
“out of place” then come to inspire varying amounts of animosity and anxiety, as well as a desire to clean them up
and put them into place. They are described as “dirty,” but that is only because they are out of place, not
because they actually are dangerous.
Ambiguous and hard-to-place entities also inspire fascination and wonder . In Plato’s Republic, Socrates tells
his interlocutors that philosophy begins in questioning, and questioning begins with a puzzle, and
ambiguous entities are always puzzling. These ambiguous things “roll around” between categories and
appear to be more than one thing at the same time (Plato 1991). The fascination that PMSCs hold for scholars
is partly due to this ambiguous character.

PMSC REGULATION COULD BE BETTER – BUT CRITICISMS ARE OVERSTATED
Simon Chesterman & Chia Lehnardt, Professor and Researcher – NYU School of Law, 2007, From
Mercenaries to Market: the rise and regulation of private military companies, eds. S. Chesterman & C.
Lehnardt, p. 5
One of the reasons why international law is repeatedly dismissed as irrelevant in the discussion of governance of PMCs is the fact that
it largely focuses on states. As a result, despite the fact that governments constitute one of the major clients of PMCs or authorize their
operations in foreign states, the question of under what circumstances the misconduct of PMCs engages the responsibility of states has
received surprisingly little attention. Chia Lehnardt addresses this issue in chapter eight. She argues that the fact that PMCs
might be used by Western governments to conduct “foreign policy by proxy” is only partially warranted:
from an international law perspective, states cannot evade responsibility merely by hiring a private actor to
carry out certain functions. The conduct of PMCs is under certain circumstances attributed to the state,
making that state responsible for any violation of international law committed by PMC personnel . Even
where no such attribution exists, the state might still be responsible for lack of due diligence to adequately regulate and control PMC
conduct. Like Doswald-Beck, Lehnardt concludes that claims of a “vacuum” in international law are overstate,
although factual power relationships between the PMC, the host state, and the exporting state remain
unaddressed on the international level.

REGULATIONS CAN ADDRESS MORAL CONCERNS
Sarah Percy, Research Fellow -Oxford, 2007, From Mercenaries to Market: the rise and regulation of
private military companies, eds. S. Chesterman & C. Lehnardt, p. 27
Although it is not difficult to overcome moral objections based on status with regulation, it is not
impossible to devise regulation that takes moral concerns seriously. The second implication of moral concerns for
regulation is that regulation should strictly hold PMCs to their promise of avoiding combat and try to shrink the “grey area” between
combat and non-combat operations as much as possible. Such regulation would go an extremely long way to
eliminating the objection that private force is problematic because private fighters kill for money. This
objection, as noted above, is already difficult to apply to today’s PMCs; making it more difficult still would
be a worthwhile goal of regulation.
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                     AT: PMSCs Dangerous and Unaccountable
SHOULD UTILIZE CONTRACT LAW TO MAKE PMSCs ACCOUNTABLE FOR ACTIONS
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 129
One way of understanding contracts is to see them squarely within a continuum of organizational relationships, somewhere between a
hypothetically pure market mechanism and an equally hypothetically pure hierarchical organization. Contracts are ways of
ensuring some degree of control and predictability between entities that are often antagonistic, or
competitive. Well-written contracts try to minimize the natural uncertainty of this relationship: how else does the principal makes
sure that the “agent” keeps the promises made? Organizational and economic theory has much to say about the so-called transaction
costs of this arrangement: chief among them being the lack of real knowledge about the agent’s aims. The risk of non-
compliance, or of misuse of the power conveyed by the contract, is an ever-present one, and the nuances of
contract theory are an attempt to minimize it.
Laura Dickinson has argued that contract law can be one of the most effective legal tools to regulate PMSCs.
Contracts could be made to include mechanisms to require “public law values”: they could mandate
specific training in human rights law, or use of force rules. They could include clauses that would require
monitoring and certification by independent NGOs, or military lawyers. This would require a shift in organizational
culture to protect these new public values, but those values could be reflected in oaths required by contract. With better written
contracts, the only impediment would be the will to enforce them. This might require investigatory organizations that could act
quickly, and judges willing to make criminal acts a form of breach of contract, and hold companies accountable.

PRIVATE CONTRACTORS HAVE BEEN HELD CRIMINALLY LIABLE FOR WRONGDOING
Suzanne Simons, CNN Executive Producer, 2009, Master of War: Blackwater USA’s Erik Prince and the
Business of War, p. 151
If members of Congress were looking for accountability for private contractors, they began to see signs of
it in August 2006. David Passaro, a contractor for the Central Intelligence Agency, was found guilty of assaulting
a detainee he interrogated at a military base in Afghanistan three years earlier. He was the first civilian contractor
convicted of any wrongdoing in the twenty-first century. Though he didn’t work for Blackwater, his case was a harbinger
of trouble for the industry. The detainee Passaro had questioned later died of his injuries. Passaro wasn’t convicted for the death,
because there was no direct evidence that beating the man—with a flashlight – caused his death. Instead, Passaro was convicted
of assault in connection with the death, news that didn’t sit well with CIA Director Michael Hayden.
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                     AT: PMSCs Dangerous and Unaccountable
IRREGULAR NATURE OF CONFLICTS CREATES IMPRESSION THAT PMSCs ARE
UNREGULATED
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 102
This chapter has two central arguments. First, I maintain that behavior in wartime operates on a two-track system, with
central, regular combatants held under strict command and control, and more peripheral, irregular
combatants held at arm’s length and less-strictly controlled. The spatial metaphor of center and periphery can help to
explain the different ways in which law operates close to, and further out from, law-makers and those charged with oversight. Here
“peripheral” means three types of war: wars fought at a geographical distance from the nation’s capital —
wars at the frontiers of what we think of as civilization; wars peripheral to our consciousness (covert wars, even if fought
close by); and wars using paramilitary proxy forces.
International humanitarian law, which includes the law of armed combat (and which in turn gets combined with domestic
military law) includes processes that attempt to fill in the spaces and extend the power of law from the center
out to the periphery. Partially this is intentional – it comes with the territory of mercenaries and covert
operators, for better or worse. But, until it is understood how legal doctrines show up in this hazy peripheral
realm, any attempt to bring contractors back into the fold, so to speak, will fail. This is why contractors are
– or appear to be – unregulated.

CURRENT REGULATION ATTEMPTS FAIL BECAUSE THERE IS NOT A COHERENT AND
DEDICATED BODY OF LAW GOVERNING PMSCs
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 102-3
Second, I argue that the attempt to regulate PMSCs is stymied by a clash of legal cultures . As the legal world
attempts to control these forces—or at bare minimum bring them under some workable legal clarification—it creates
dissonance between international humanitarian law, military law, and regulatory and contract law. The
clash of these three legal cultures and the assumptions that go with them treats PMSCs as three different
legal persons – soldiers, businessmen, and disaster zone NGO workers – each unrecognizable within the
legal culture of the other two. This leaves those who seek to understand these contractors through law in a
world that is legally obscure and hard to navigate.
In this clash of legal cultures, the worlds of IHL, military law, and contract law all combine to form a novel and perhaps unworkable
mix. In the same ways in which PMSCs combine three different “persons” and ways of life, the legal
remedies offered to govern their conduct take bits and pieces form various legal frameworks that have very
different orientations, goals, and histories. These types of laws have historical “genealogies,” so to speak, wherein various
assumptions and ways of doing things are inherited by those who operate under, or within, them. There is a lot of crossover in these
genealogies: military law may bear a certain “family resemblance” to human rights law; contract law may contain some precursors of
human rights law. The genealogies are intermixed for sure, but in their extreme forms, each form of law analyzed here
requires a different legal structure or process to adjudicate.
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                      AT: PMSCs Dangerous and Unaccountable
PMSCs SHOULD BE REGULATED AND SUBJECT TO OVERSIGHT
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 158-9
If it turns out that PMSCs are here to stay, and governments will continue to use them, there still must be a strict licensing
regime for both the firm and private security contractor. Individual contractors would have to become part
of a profession, like a plumber, a securities trader, a doctor, or an engineer. Individual contractors would get relicensed
every year, in order to be allowed to work as international security guards. There would have to be
reporting mechanisms available for watchdog groups (many of whom, like Human Rights First, already track contractor
activity), and a citizens’ rights group. In the same way that police forces are policed by citizens as well as the
state, citizens in the states where contractors were deployed would have to have access to ombudsmen,
complaint bureaus, or even just video cameras (the NGO Witness.org provides cameras to people and helps them download
footage of abuse). The actions of individual contractors would be compiled and would affect the rating of the PMSC as a whole,
which would also have to have yearly license renewals. In other words, there would need to be a strict oversight apparatus
available on the ground (not back in Washington) in order to receive accurate information from frontier-like environments.
The creation of a specific profession of “international security guard” would re-embed the PMSC world
back in the domestic private security world, rather than forward into a military operations world. Anyone who worked
abroad as an armed security provider would be characterized as a bodyguard, rather than a military
auxiliary. Hopefully this would be combined with a reassertion of military forces (including National
Guard) in the tasks like convoy security that are sometimes subcontracted to a PMSC.
This pragmatic solution would attempt to re-brand PMSCs as a more global version of the domestic security guard, and embed
the contractors themselves in a new international profession. The caveat would be the need for strict,
regular licensing requirements, including perhaps continuing education credits, licensing exams,
memberships in professional organizations, and other badges of a recognized profession. The most
professional force with the best ratings would also, it is assumed, get the best contracts.

REGULATION CAN ELIMINATE MANY OBJECTIONS TO PMSCs
Sarah Percy, Research Fellow -Oxford, 2007, From Mercenaries to Market: the rise and regulation of
private military companies, eds. S. Chesterman & C. Lehnardt, p. 27
Thirdly, regulation that forges clear links between home states and PMCs will help eliminate some of the
objections about activities alluded to above. In particular regulation could reduce fears about accountability and
human rights abuses. It is hard to argue that a PMC that only works for the state in which it is based undermines the sovereignty
of that state. However, creating tight links between the state and PMCs will not address the concern that using
private force undermines control over force, and in fact, might heighten these concerns. Unless a
regulatory framework places home state PMCs under the same level of scrutiny—both in the public eye and in
government – as national soldiers, then those companies can still be criticized for threatening citizens’ control
over the use of force. The state bears the lion’s share of responsibility for ensuring that regulation, if it exists, is improved so that
oversight mechanisms are enhanced, and for treating regulation where it does not exist. PMCs themselves cannot be accused
of immorality on their own; they exist because of demand from states. Regulatory mechanisms are also
only as weak as states wish them to be, and it remains to be seen whether or not states choose to make the
use of private force more difficult.

RAISING MORAL CONCERNS LEADS TO BETTER REGULATORY REGIME
Sarah Percy, Research Fellow -Oxford, 2007, From Mercenaries to Market: the rise and regulation of
private military companies, eds. S. Chesterman & C. Lehnardt, p. 27-8
Fifthly, a different way to deal with the role of moral objections in creating a regulatory regime is to let the objections persist. Moral
objections, especially as expressed by individuals in blogs, by the press, and by human rights organizations, are in a
sense the reassertion of democratic controls over the use of force. A lively public debate about the morality
of PMCs can serve an informal but effective oversight role. The industry can be “regulated” through
criticism designed to hold the private military industry to high moral standards, even in the absence of
formal legal standards. Making sure ethical questions continue will also ensure that regulation does not
become simply a way to facilitate the profitability of companies without considering the broader impact of
privatizing security. While this informal role could not and should not replace more concrete regulation, it might be important
not to quash moral concerns.
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                     AT: PMSCs Dangerous and Unaccountable
MORAL OBJECTIONS DRIVE REGULATION OF PMSCs
Sarah Percy, Research Fellow -Oxford, 2007, From Mercenaries to Market: the rise and regulation of
private military companies, eds. S. Chesterman & C. Lehnardt, p. 28
The industry works actively to demonstrate that it is not “mercenary” and seeks to distance itself from its more unsavory ancestors.
The difficulty is that moral objections to private force reveal there are very clear lines of descent form
mercenaries through the PMCs and to the private security companies of today. While PMCs can, and have,
worked hard to avoid the ethical objections regarding killing for money, they run into the same objections about tyranny as
their predecessors. The disruption of the military relationship between citizen and state, in particular the
removal of structures traditionally used to limit the use of force and the reduced influence of public
opinion, could be leading states which use PMCs don a path that Rousseau and Machiavelli would have
recognized and criticized. The obstacles created by ethical objections to the use of private force may be the only real obstacles
in the way of the industry’s route to genuine public acceptance. It may not be possible to remove these obstacles. As it might require
significant changes in both the industry and the way we regulate it; even so, latent ethic al worries may not go away. This is as it
should be. If moral concerns continue to serve as a check on the state’s ability to use force, and the state must
work harder to start and to sustain wars, then moral objections might serve an important purpose alongside
regulation.

STATES ARE RESPONSIBLE AND ACCOUNTABLE FOR THE ACTIONS OF PMSCs
Chia Lehnardt, NYU School of Law - Researcher, 2007, From Mercenaries to Market: the rise and
regulation of private military companies, eds. S. Chesterman & C. Lehnardt, p. 155-6
The above analysis demonstrates that there is no legal vacuum in which PMCs operate. States are internationally
responsible where PMCs engage in law enforcement or interrogation of prisoners, or where their conduct is
controlled by a state. Where states do not directly control PMCs, but rather give a quiet nod to risk prone or abusive conduct, the
same reasons why their conduct is not attributed to the state for lack of control can generate state responsibility for lack of due
diligence shown with regard to PMCs in conflict zones falls significantly short of what is required under international law. It is
open to question whether states are willing to implement an effective oversight and monitoring system:
costs are considerable and might raise the costs for retaining PMCs to such an extent that the economic
rationale for retaining PMCs’ services is called into question . The fact that the US government responded to the
communications and co-ordination problems in Iraq between PMCs on the one hand and between PMCs and the Coalition Force on
the other by hiring yet another PMC suggests that prospects are rather bleak.
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                         AT: PMSCs Violate International Law
INTERNATIONAL LAWS AGAINST MERCENARIES DON’T APPLY TO PMSCs
Allan Gerson & Nat J. Colletta, International Relations Professors at George Washington University,
2002, Privatizing Peace; From Conflict to Security, p. 95
Regulating the use of private security has become a necessity. This involves setting clear standards to guard
against conflict of interest, govern entry and exist, establish human rights criteria, and provide guidelines
for costs and pricing of the services. Pre-certification and/or licensing of private security firms would be required condition
for every. While the UN has acted to ban mercenaries – as early as 1968, Resolution 2465 condemned the use of
mercenaries; international humanitarian law reinforced this man with the adoption of Article 47 to the Additional Protocols to the
Geneva Convention of 1977 and, more recently, with the 1989 International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and
Training of Mercenaries. It is, at best, questionable that these measures were meant to apply in the context of a
regulatory framework for the certification and governance of private security firms.

UN LIKELY TO INCREASE RELIANCE ON PMSCs – CONSISTENT WITH INTERNATIONAL
LAW
Allan Gerson & Nat J. Colletta, International Relations Professors at George Washington University,
2002, Privatizing Peace; From Conflict to Security, p. 95-6
With post-Cold War downsizing there is an abundance of inexpensive military hardware on the
international market, and numerous well-trained military personnel. In weak states, possessing less than
effective and loyal armies, private security firms are in demand. This combination of global market supply
and State failure has led private security firms to become more active on several fronts; protecting assets of
multinationals; protecting humanitarian workers, and assisting, sometimes even supplanting, state security
forces. Given this global dynamic, it is increasingly likely that the United Nations will choose to expand its
capability in peacekeeping and peace enforcement by acknowledging and properly regulating private security.
International law permits states to employ necessary measures to maintain effective control over their
territory, and as recently affirmed by the Organization of African Unity thus includes necessary measures
to “respect the frontiers existing on their achievement of national independence.”
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                                   AT: PMSCs are Mercenaries
PMSCs SERVE A LEGITIMATE ROLE – DISTINCT FROM MERCENARIES
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 15
Another line of defense is to show that defining a mercenary by “intent” to profit from military service will include
practically any serviceman or woman. Defenders may offer a long list of reasons why they believe these
companies are nothing like the feared mercenaries of the past: they are under corporate control; they are
contracted by legitimate entities; they are transparent and well-regulated (whatever others may think); and they
are accountable on all kinds of levels. Defenders note that PMSCs are legitimate businesses filling a
necessary niche in a service industry that has long operated in and around the military. And their actions
are undergirded by a fundamental right to contract. Optimists paint a picture of an adaptive and responsive
industry that has freed up businesses and governments to pursue legitimate goals with maximum flexibility
and responsiveness.
Defenders argue that PMSCs do not operate in shadowy illegitimate ways; they are licit, transparent, and
organized. PMSCs are “lawful, profit-seeking international companies” that operate “under normal legal
and financial constraints. They have little in common with the infamous ‘mercenaries’ of the past that thrived on
anonymity and individual gain. PMSCs are legal, visible, and accountable” (Doug Brooks at State Department Forum,
quoted in Fisher-Thompson 2003).

MORAL OBJECTIONS TO MERCENARIES DON’T APPLY TO PMSCs
Sarah Percy, Research Fellow -Oxford, 2007, From Mercenaries to Market: the rise and regulation of
private military companies, eds. S. Chesterman & C. Lehnardt, p. 23
However, the link provided by shared criticism is the only link between these different types of private force. Objections that
center around the idea that it is morally problematic to kill for money rather than cause do not apply as
obviously to non-combat PMCs because these companies make a point of avoiding active combat where
killing is likely, and indeed supply some services where the potential to use force is not part of the
contracts, such as translation. One of the reasons that PMCs have become more internationally acceptable
is that they can avoid one of the primary criticisms leveled at mercenaries.

PMSCs CAN REDUCE MERCENARY VIOLENCE – LARGE POTENTIAL FOR
HUMANITARIAN AND PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 15-6
But even if they are mercenary-like, defenders argue that it might be possible to admit them back into the
coalition of forces working in Iraq or Afghanistan under certain new rules . The feared dangers might be
diminished by the very fact that they are “only” motivated by money and “only” restrained by contracts, so
they can be fired if anything goes wrong. Moreover, given the large number of potential mercenaries out
there, it is better to give them some organized cover of legitimacy, and put them to some good use, lest they
come back to haunt us. According to Doug Brooks:
“However, widespread international bias against these companies means that their potential for peacekeeping,
peace enforcement, and humanitarian rescue missions could very well remain tragically untapped.
Ironically, not using legitimate private firms will probably lead to a resurgence of uncontrollable individual
freelance mercenaries who will flock to satisfy the profitable demand for military expertise, but who have
far less regard for the legitimacy of their clients.” (Brooks 2000)
Among these optimists are those who see humanitarian use of these forces augmenting United Nations or NATO missions or even
replacing them altogether (see the IPOA Concept Paper in Brooks and Wright 2007; Newton 2008).
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                                     AT: PMSCs are Mercenaries
MORE ACCURATE TO CATEGORIZE PMSCs AS “AUXILIARY FORCES” THAN
“MERCENARIES”
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 17
Some contemporary scholars recognize the various and distinct eras of Roman auxiliary forces, and agree with
Machiavelli’s general assessment that, eventually, their skill and organization made them a danger to the
overburdened Roman army. One even likens Roman Auxiliary forces to modern-day PMSCs. And while the
concept of “auxiliary forces” is less well-known than “mercenary,” it does fit the industry’s own self-definition,
offered in defense of the accusation that they are mercenary-like. PMSCs are proxy forces, they work alongside a
wholly state-based military, but do not meet the strict definition of national force.
Proxy forces come in many shapes and sizes (for an excellent summary of the subject see Davis and Pereira 2003).
Sometimes they are indigenous forces, such as Afghanistan’s Northern Alliance, which in late 2001 helped the US military oust the
Taliban from Afghanistan. Sometimes they are indigenous forces trained by external militaries, such as the Sunni militias that were
coopted, armed, and trained as part of the Iraqi counter-insurgency strategy initiated in 2007. In all of these cases, as with the Roman
auxiliary forces, rewards have been given for those who align their own strategic goals to those of the central
power that provides them logistical support. And in all of them, citizenship is not assumed, and loyalty is
in some sense problematic, or based on a different set of incentives than that of a regular military force .
Treating PMSCs as proxy forces, rather than mercenaries, allows for a more nuanced and accurate
understanding of their activities and functions. It also helps to clarify the dangers of these types of forces, which –as
Machiavelli points out—are dangerous precisely because their organizational loyalty, unity, and spirit. But how
can we begin to characterize these new proxy forces more precisely? How are they distinct from their predecessors?

“MERCENARY” HAS HISTORICALLY BEEN A DEROGATORY TERM
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 40
In mixed company the term “mercenary” carries a reliably disquieting if wholly explicable connotation . Whether
dependent on conscripts or volunteers, the modern army relies implicitly on loyalty to the state . As Anthony Mockler
put it, the mercenary has no place here because s/he scandalizes a fundamental myth of the nation-state: that
patriotism sustained by a wider ignorance of military history. Nor is the stigma attached to the mercenary label an historical oddity.
The mercenary ordure has been actively inflated, sustained and promoted for rational political purposes.
Ideological opponents labor diligently to successfully transfer to the present the semantics and imagery
attached to undesirables of another era.

PROFESSIONAL SOLDIERS JUST AS LIKELY TO ACT ON UNSAVORY MOTIVES AS
MERCENARIES – PMSCs INCREASES PROFESSIONALISM
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 45-6
If some of the mercenaries of the 1960s held motives that may have been unhealthy, one should
acknowledge that it is equally possible for states’ soldiers to be driven by violent or morbid pathologies of
one form or another. These could afflict the recruits of most states’ armies and one might expect the poorer
militaries to be more vulnerable. It is prudent forms of discrimination are likely to be primitive in these less advanced. (Bear
in mind that poorer states fill the ranks of major UN donors today.) Perhaps surprisingly, this is not so. The most advanced
military in the world has recently lowered standards on have done so in the face of falling supply as the war
in Iraq becomes increasingly unpopular at home. The decline has reached a point where conservative
commentators have suggested that recruiting healthy foreigners with the enticement of US citizenship is better than the
preferred option of recruiting Americans with criminal convictions, incomplete high school education and
poor cognitive aptitude. In this climate it is not surprising that the US Defense Department seeks changes to legislation which
will make it easier to re-classify civilian jobs so that occupants may be sent overseas. More perplexing is the growing gap
between the demographic cohort recruited to the armed forces and the US population as a whole. This is
manifest in what David Kennedy terms the modern military’s “disjunction” from American society. Perhaps American elites
have more in common with privileged medieval Europeans than they care to admit. Both sought (or seek) to
avoid ending a relatively pleasant life on a squalid battlefield.
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                                     AT: PMSCs are Mercenaries
STATES ENGAGE IN MERCENARY BEHAVIOR AS WELL – NOT LIMITED TO
INDIVIDUALS
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 50
A different and very old kind of state mercenarism occurs when strong states go to war while paying weaker
allies to support them. The governments of Thailand, South Korea and the Philippines were paid by the US
(or bribed, depending on one’s view) to send soldiers to aid the Americans in their misadventure in Vietnam. The usual
retort is that these states held a strategic interest in supporting the anti-communist campaign in Indo-China. This may have been so.
But one wonders how enthusiastic the Thai, South Korean and Filipino governments would have remained if each had been required
to pay the entire cost of their deployments. Some were sizeable and lengthy.
Mercenary states seeking political and financial advantage also send their troops to train and sometimes
fight within the armies of other states in unstable parts of the world . Past colonial masters routinely
dispatch trainers, advisers and military technical experts to former colonies to serve various purposes
arising from self-interest: to secure sales of armaments which benefit home-state corporations; to exercise
influence over choices of military and strategic policies as these evolve in newly independent states; to
identify sympathetic or subversive elites and maneuver them as interests dictate; and to retain intelligence
collection assets and exercise a valuable strategic presence in the region in an apparently benign form. For
their part elites within ex-colonial states have been pleased to benefit from this form of state mercenarism.
Some use their new skills to put down rebellions by those ethnically distinct citizens who might inconveniently seek their own self-
determination.

PMSCs ARE DISTINCT FROM MERCENARIES
Sarah Percy, Research Fellow -Oxford, 2007, From Mercenaries to Market: the rise and regulation of
private military companies, eds. S. Chesterman & C. Lehnardt, p. 12-3
There are three main variants of private force in the international system: mercenaries; combat PMCs; and
security or non-combat PMCs. A mercenary can be defined as an individual soldier who fights for a state
other than his own or for a non-state entity to which he has no direct tie, in exchange for financial gain. The
two main instruments of international law dealing with mercenaries, Article 47 of Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions
and the International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing, and Training of Mercenaries, both highlight the idea that
mercenaries are defined by profit-seeking motivations and the fact that they are foreign. Mercenaries will sell their services
to the highest bidder and are usually unconcerned about the nature of their clientele.
Mercenaries were once common actors on the international stage. Until the sixteenth century, the practice of
individual mercenaries organizing bands and selling their services to the highest bidder was widespread; by the seventeenth century, it
had largely disappeared. The mercenary trade continued in the sale of entire regiments by one state to another, and by states selling
licenses to other states that would allow the recruitment of private citizens. The state-to-state trade in mercenaries ended by the mid-
nineteenth century. Mercenaries, again in the form of individual contractors reappeared on the international stage in the 1960s, 1970s,
and 1980s, fighting in the wars of decolonization in Africa.’
Combat PMCs are tightly organized companies with a clear corporate structure that provide military
services, including offensive combat, in exchange for payment, for states or other actors. Examples include the
now-defunct companies Executive Outcomes (EO) and Sandline. Both of these companies insisted that they would only fight for
sovereign states and would be selective about their clients. There are currently no companies of this type operating openly in the
international system.
Non-combat PMCs are similarly organized companies that exchange military services stopping short of
combat for payment. These services include translation, close protection, interrogation, logistics, and
training, as well as security services for states, NGOs, and corporations. These companies may claim to
use force only in self-defense; however, the majority of these services are provided in a military context,
and the line between self-defense and combat might be blurred. Nonetheless, it is important to differentiate between
the kinds of services provided by EO and Sandline and the type of services offered today. PMCs are no longer in the
business of replacing the combat functions of state militaries. PMCs seeking to maintain a legitimate
market presence today must be selective about those to whom they offer their services. They are similar to
combat companies in that they will work for a variety of states, including, in some cases, the state in which
they are based. PMCs also differ in the degree to which they are tied to their home states. American PMCs maintain closer ties
with the US government, and do not undertake projects without the government’s explicit approval of that state, granted through the
Arms Export Control Act (ACEA). In other states, such as Britain, PMCs are free to choose their own clients, although the state often
grants implicit or informal consent.
Planet Debate                                                                                                                        182
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                           AT: PMSCs Bad – Motivated by Profit
PROFIT MOTIVE IS NOT A UNIQUE CRITICISM OF PMSCs
Sarah Percy, Research Fellow -Oxford, 2007, From Mercenaries to Market: the rise and regulation of
private military companies, eds. S. Chesterman & C. Lehnardt, p. 14-5
The private military industry has been criticized because of the idea that fighting for financial gain is
morally problematic. More specifically, killing in warfare is usually justified by some sort of attachment to an
appropriate cause, which has differed throughout history. Causes that have been deemed by society to justify war have
varied over time; they include the pursuit or defense of religious or national interests, or the pursuit or defense of the interests of the
sovereign state.
Mercenaries have been defined as actors who do not share this cause. This objection is not necessarily fair, in that is not
inconceivable that some mercenaries or PMCs might adopt the cause of those for whom they fight . Soldiers
might also be financially motivated, and not motivated by attachment to a cause. However, as we will see, there
have been persistent objections to mercenaries, private military, and private security companies on the grounds that fighting for
financial gain rather than for a cause is problematic. Indeed, international law relating to mercenaries makes specific
reference to financial gain. In the Diplomatic Conference that led to the creation of the Geneva Conventions, state negotiators
defined a mercenary as a “person who is motivated to fight essentially or primarily by the desire for… “hard cash.” Article 47(2)(c) of
Protocol I states that a mercenary “is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain” and this
language was adopted wholesale in the UN Convention.

PROFIT MOTIVE DOESN’T MORALLY CONDEMN PMSCs
Sarah Percy, Research Fellow -Oxford, 2007, From Mercenaries to Market: the rise and regulation of
private military companies, eds. S. Chesterman & C. Lehnardt, p. 27
Although it is difficult to overcome moral objections based on status with regulation, it is not impossible to devise regulation that
takes moral concerns seriously. The second implication of moral concerns for regulation is that regulation should
strictly hold PMCs to their promise of avoiding combat and try to shrink the “grey area” between combat
and non-combat operations as much as possible. Such regulation would go an extremely long way to
eliminating the objection that private force is problematic because private fighters kill for money . This
objection, as noted above, is already difficult to apply to today’s PMCs; making it more difficult still would be a worthwhile goal of
regulation.
Planet Debate                                                                                                                   183
PMCs – Sherry Hall

                                        AT: Mercenaries are Bad
PROFESSIONAL SOLDIERS MOTIVATED BY MONEY AS WELL – NOT A DISTINCTION
WITH MERCENARIES
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 43-4
A modern definition of the term “mercenary” would be helpful in order to avoid confusion over several types of related but
quite different employment. Yet the question of definition is surprisingly difficult. If most mercenaries are
professional soldiers but all professional soldiers are not thought to be mercenaries, what is the difference?
Contrary to popular belief, this is not a question that revolves around money or nationality and little else . After all,
no state’s soldier can carry out his or her task entirely on a diet of patriotism and taxpayer-funded board.
At some point they have to be paid. There is simply no means of being certain that money is not a primary
motivation for many states’ soldiers. This is particularly the case in armies where volunteers rather than conscripts fill the
ranks. In both poor and wealthy states, money will at least be a consideration and one not necessarily tied to
patriotism. It would seem ignorant to assert that a state recruit’s motivations do not spring form social
forces like ethnic and racial exclusion, limited vocational opportunities and poverty.
Professor Detter goes further, suggesting that the sort of trained person who would have sought personal gain as a
mercenary in the past may now be a typical volunteer with UN peacekeeping forces. This person might
also work in private security. Fijians in Iraq have been employed by both the British Army as well as UK security companies.
Employees of both send home remittances which in 2006 represented one of the country’s highest exports earners. Why should one
group face discriminatory judgment when both sell their skills to foreigners on the same belligerent side?



MERCENARIES MOTIVATED BY PLEASURE IN THE MILITARY LIFE
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 45
At a base level some mercenary recruits are doubtless attracted by what might be considered exciting or gratifying.
The notorious mercenaries who fought in the Congo in the 1960s were there for money to some extent. But
they probably held other, less easily defined motives about which it is not easy to generalize. And these may not have
been reprehensible. In the West there is much euphemistic cant about “the military life .” Romantic sophistry to
one side, military life is largely concerned with the repetitive rigors of training in efficient forms of multiple homicide. There is
nothing wrong in principle in many thousands finding this a satisfying life, even if smaller numbers actually enjoy fighting.
But for those who do, Mockler suggests society demands that pleasures in war “…should be masked, often
hypocritically, under the pretence of devotion to duty. ” He points out how in some places a culture of fighting has been
historically free from these constraints. Japan is one example.
Planet Debate                                                                                                                        184
PMCs – Sherry Hall

                                             AT: PMSCs Unethical
“DIRTY HANDS” CONCEPT DEMONSTRATES ETHICAL JUSTIFICATION OF PMSCs
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 137
Any discussion of the idea of ethics in political life has to confront the problem of “dirty hands .” The phrase
comes from the title of a play by Jean Paul Sartre, in which an assassin tries to justify his actions by arguing that
politics may sometimes require dirty but necessary acts, and those who care not to dirty themselves should
stay away from it. This idea was around long before the twentieth century. Many have thought that politics requires
constant moral compromise, necessary evils—and that anyone who thought any different was deluding
themselves. An ethical person engaged in politics would have to make this compromise. Walzer addressed the
problem in his now-famous essay, “The Problem of Dirty Hands.” PMSCs can easily be seen as an instance of the problem of dirty
hands (especially since, as noted in earlier chapters, they are organizations whose protean nature is easily characterized as “dirty”).
Those who defend PMCs in the light of the “dirty hands” problem characterize their use as an unfortunate
necessity, dictated by uncontrollable circumstance. They claim that the problems caused by their use are
minimal compared to the problems caused by their unavailability, and that they are a consequence of the situation: a
shortage of military resources, the lack of political will for conflicts, the necessity of doing business in hostile environments. They are
the lesser evil, so to speak, and though our use of them is regrettable, it is necessary given the greater good accomplished.
Walzer, and Max Weber before him, referred to his problem using a language of tragedy: the policy-maker
would rather do something else, but this is all that can be done under the circumstances . Many of the problems
associated with the ethics of violence contain this element of tragedy. More often, defenders of the “dirty” aspects of
political choices avoid the language of tragedy, and instead employ the language of utility and necessity . In
the end, a greater good is accomplished when one makes certain choices; PMSCs are in the businesses of
“saving lives” even if they do have bad aspects. The dirty hands are dirty for a clean reason. And there is
no tragedy here, only cold, hard, necessary choices, rationally undertaken. They claim that only the politically naïve
would imagine that anyone could provide purely ethical security – the real world requires compromises and choices, and
the variety of particular situations and problems often justify these “dirty hands.” A realistic justification of
PMSCs simply accepts the full consequences of the political choices to fight wars in the way they are not
being fought: with an over-stretched military; and in the midst of civil and infrastructure reconstruction
goals that require businesses to operate with their own security on the ground.

CONTRACTORS CAN BE MOTIVATED BY EQUALLY GOOD AND SELFLESS MOTIVES AS
THE PROFESSIONAL SOLDIER MOTIVATED BY PATRIOTISM
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 47
If one persists in attempts to divide soldiers into those who fight for patriotic nationalism and those who do
not, there exist further inconvenient facts which defeat that intention. For example, to suggest that a
mercenary fights for both money and in the service of a foreign power is historically unsatisfactory . Hessian
conscripts were involuntarily sent to fight by their German superiors who hired them out to George III and the English in their war
against the Americans during the 1770s. They in turn fought other German mercenaries who were hired by George Washington to
lead and train the army upon which the Americans relied. Motives for mercenarism have varied over the centuries. But military labor
forces seem to have been consistently mobile.
Urquhart suggests that service to a UN legion would carry a noble cachet in the minds of recruits . This may be true,
but why should it be any different if these recruits were members of a contract legion? If one looks further than conventional
prejudice there is no reason to think pure motives might not inform the purposes of an upright contract
soldier. Why shouldn’t s/he believe that his or her service would make the world a better place in some small but tangible degree?
This is why the case that Lynch and Walsh argue is one not easily dismissed: that a mercenary might take up arms for the
UN solely in the name of what s/he considers a just cause while rejecting all others. This appears at least an
intuitively reasonable premise. The distinction between a mercenary available to oppose internationally
legitimized conduct and one willing to carry out that same conduct is one never drawn by those who
oppose the use of mercenaries. One could put the point more dramatically: what soldier could be more selfless than an
individually recruited contractor who effects a contested entry in a collapsed state as part of an humanitarian intervention? Here is a
modern military exemplar waiting to take form.
Planet Debate                                                                                                                        185
PMCs – Sherry Hall

                                            AT: PMSCs Unethical
ARGUMENT THAT MILITARY PERSONNEL ACT IN A MORE PROFESSIONAL AND
ETHICAL MANNER NOT SUPPORTED
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 67-8
A related issue is the vexed one of the “military ethic.” It is sometimes suggested by defenders of sovereign forces
that suitable ethical convictions are the product of constancy in national military training. The argument
holds that lateral recruitment into a small military organization with short career paths and an uncertain
turnover does not provide the constancy required to inculcate principled beliefs. This view is unconvincing.
Contractors chosen in a discriminating fashion may possess principled beliefs learned from earlier and
lengthy experience in first world armies. On the other hand, the military ethic possessed by states’ troops from
Canada, Italy and Belgium did not inhibit them from torturing, raping, and killing civilians in Somalia in the
early 1990s. There seems little or no reason why fruitful indoctrination could not be inculcated in talented
candidates. The alternative is a mix of sovereign troops holding uncertain convictions and deployed
through more arbitrary means. The point may be illustrated through example.

EMPIRICALLY PMSCs BEHAVED IN A MORE ETHICAL AND DISCIPLINED MANNER
THAN UN PEACEKEEPING FORCES
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 68
The ECOMOG force in Sierra Leone was well known for its ill discipline and criminality. The Nigerians in
particular were noted for their vicious retaliation towards suspected RUF members and sympathizers. In contrast , an adviser to
both EO and Sandline has emphasized that the EO force was disciplined and well-behaved. Others in the
industry stress the absence of delinquent conduct by EO towards civilians , something which critics seemed to fear.
Some academic opinions corroborated EO’s restraint in relations with the populace, while elements of the
citizenry expressed respect for the effectiveness of the company. EO’s corporate intervention enabled
thousands of displaced persons to re-settle in the Kono region, although this may have been an incidental consequence of an
extractive agenda. It seems that EO also assisted civilian re-settlement while providing security, logistics and
intelligence to humanitarian groups. One might speculate as to why the company apparently devoted some effort to
humanitarian support which was not strictly a military necessity. Zarate suggests this was undertaken with an eye to future legitimacy,
something necessary in order to engage new clients and address broader international politics. This makes some sense. The British
Special Representative to Sierra Leone also suggested to the author that by the 1990s the South Africans saw it in their commercial
interests to improve their battlefield adherence to international humanitarian norms.

PMSC CONTRACTORS LESS LIKELY TO ENGAGE IN TRAFFICKING
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 71
The corporate approach may also result in a decrease in trafficking of goods and persons: fuel, ammunition,
cigarettes, prostitutes, and amongst certain UN troops. Many of those responsible are also subject to unsatisfactory
criminal law regimes. By contrast, future crime control over contractors could be assisted by a new UN criminal
justice regime, perhaps resembling the model described in Chapter Six and supported by a culture of rigorous behavior towards
internal discipline, treatment of civilians, property, juveniles, and proscribed drugs. To that end management would find it in
its interests to hire personnel from the better armed forces and to exclude those from the more disreputable
militaries. One might consider candidates from units where both morale and military professionalism spring not from unreliable
patriotism, but a distinctive espirit de corps. Candidates might include veterans of established mercenary units like the Nepalese
Gurkhas or the French Foreign Legion.
Planet Debate                                                                                            186
PMCs – Sherry Hall

                        AT: PMSCs Undermine Democracy
PMSCs MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR DEMOCRACIES TO TAKE NECESSARY BUT UNPOPULAR
ACTIONS
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 138-9
Legal scholar Floyd Abrams goes even further: democracies, and especially democracies during wartime, need the
ability “to do things off the books and below the radar screen.” Without the ability for the right to “not
know” what the left hand is doing, no democracy can survive. This is a version of the “dirty hands’
problem, but one in which the pure and clean right hand remains oblivious to the nefarious but effective left
hand. Given the propensity of PMSCs for fraud and their ability to pursue policies that are beyond the
reach of democratic control, any attempt to establish some kind of reasonable command and control seems
insincere and half-hearted. Sometimes the right hand wants to allow the left hand to get away with certain
behaviors even as it scrambles for the image of doing the right thing .
Planet Debate                                                                                                                     187
PMCs – Sherry Hall

                          AT: PMSCs Undermine Security Goals
MODERN SECURITY NEEDS BETTER MET BY BUSINESS MODEL THAN TRADITIONAL
HIERARCHICAL ONES
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 33
The military is under pressure from three fronts: from the changing realities of new wars, from the political
requirement of low-risk wars, and from their distance from the surrounding civilian culture . As Martin van
Creveld noted, “the most powerful modern armed forces are largely irrelevant to modern war—indeed their
relevance stands in inverse proportion to their modernity.” By contrast, the civilian world in the age of rapid
globalization has moved away from strict hierarchy, vertically integrated structures and formal rules toward
businesses and organizations run by much looser and informal models, watched and monitored by the
regulatory state. Large bureaucratic organizations with hierachically based notions of authority that
privilege the group over the individual and a way of life over a short-term contract, are out of step with the
late-modern world, for better or worse. As Christopher Coker noted to a sober group of military officers at a conference, “’Sorry
guys, it’s all contracts now.’ They didn’t want to believe me,” he admitted.

PMSCs WILL SUPPORT THE INTERESTS OF THE STATES THAT HIRE THEM
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 96-7
Unlike train-and-equip corporations based in the United States, Sandline management did not appear to
promote British foreign policy in the same prescriptive sense in which American PMSC directors seem to
view the world on behalf of US Administrations. This is a matter hinging on differing political history and military
cultures on either side of the Atlantic. Clive Jones has argued that British history bequeathed a more tolerant legacy for UK-controlled
PMSCs. The candidly titled “British Mercenary Organization” operated in Yemen on the side of the Royalist forces during the 1962-
65 hostilities. Jones contends that this entity was the historical antecedent to modern PMCs which took form 30 or more years later.
Of course, Sandline’s Western-oriented interests dictated an expedient and understandably businesslike view
of politics. Keeping on positive terms with Washington and London in order to avoid being identified as an
irritant to the hegemonic order was a different obligation, if at times a no less onerous one. It is sometimes said that
modern PMSCs are unlikely to subvert the policies of those states in which they are based . This argument
appears strongest where companies are registered or have head offices in powerful states with global interests and complex
responsibilities. Likewise, the implications of an absence of patronage can be crucial . One reason for EO’s decline was
that it did not enjoy the support of the (then) new South African regime. The company instead attracted ideological hostility,
suspicion and eventually restrictive legislation.

PROTEAN ORGANIZATIONS LIKE PMSCs BEST ABLE TO RESPOND TO
CONTEMPORARY SECURITY ISSUES
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 38-9
These protean organizations are also operating in complex environments, and dealing with what have been called
“wicked” public policy issues – that is, hard to solve problems like urban crime or healthcare . “Wicked”
issues require networks of many different types of organizations working alongside each other in various
partnership arrangements (see especially Lowndes and Skelcher 1998). Complex emergencies wherein military,
humanitarian, intelligence, diplomatic, and reconstruction activities exist simultaneously, like in Iraq or
Afghanistan, could easily be seen as one of these “wicked issues” requiring just these kinds of complex
organizational arrangements, and shape-shifting agencies.
The protean quality of PMSCs must be put front and center as an object of analysis. Any calls for better regulation, oversight, and
transparency are only possible when the phenomenon to be regulated is better understood. PMSCs combine aspects from
very different cultures, or ways of life: the business world, the world of the military, and the world of non-
governmental humanitarian organizations. This is not a benign clash of cultures. Since the work of these firms takes place
in “hostile environments” and “complex emergencies” amidst “wicked issues,” and involves men who are more often than not heavily
armed, the stakes are much higher.
Planet Debate                                                                                                                         188
PMCs – Sherry Hall

                          AT: PMSCs Undermine Security Goals
NATURE OF WARFARE IS SHIFTING AWAY FROM THE NEED FOR STRICT
HIERARCHICAL MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 54-5
Former President George W. Bush repeatedly reminded the world after the attacks of September 11, 2001 that “we
are fighting a new war, against a new enemy.” This new war would require new types of weaponry, anew
array of forces on the ground, and new strategies for combat. In fact, his announcement of a new enemy and a new way
of war was old news. Throughout the previous decade, scholars and military analysts had been united in
describing the types of conflicts as new, even if they were divided on exactly what these new wars actually were. Most
famously, Israeli military scholar Martin van Creveld announced a fundamental “transformation of war.” Classic
state-based war was being eroded; and current strategies were “either wrong or obsolete…today the most
powerful modern armed forces are largely irrelevant to modern war – indeed that their relevancy stands in
inverse proportion to their modernity.”
In order to understand these new wars, it is necessary to first understand what is being overturned; or perhaps more appropriately,
defeated. There are many ways to describe what has been left behind . Van Crevald referred to it as
“trinitarian warfare,” after Clausewitz’s oft-repeated thesis that wars are the result of a “remarkable trinity” of
forces: the irrational passions of a people, the rational calculations of a government’s policy, and the
‘probability and chance’ that the army and its commanders try to bend to their will. War is suspended between
these three forces, “like an object suspended between three magnets.” Warfare now is distinctly “non-trinitarian”; the
state, army and people are often disconnected; the forces that once might have balanced a magnet are more
chaotic than ever. Some modern military strategies now refer to various ‘generations” of warfare: we have now passed into
the fourth generation since the beginning of the modern nation state in 1648. Earlier generations stressed order above
all: war was state-directed, commands were to be obeyed, soldiers were to fight in ordered columns.
Gradually more and more decentralization began to occur: initiative in achieving goals rather than obeying
orders was accepted, strategy began to stress maneuver and “non-linear” battles. Fourth generation warfare
is more chaotic and decentralized than ever: we now fight non-state actors who are more protean than
anything, and we fight with an array of protean forces ourselves. In general, then, old wars were inter-state conflicts,
where massive firepower was brought to bear, often requiring a total-war economy in order to produce and sustain the necessary
military might.

GROWTH OF PMSCs PART OF THE TREND TOWARD THE CHANGING NATURE OF
WESTERN WARFARE
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 59
These essential features of warfare have supplied a foundation for military transformation: only those changes which do not challenge
these genetic features will be easily accepted. How does contemporary conflict comply with these features? On the one hand, the
military’s use of technological solutions has not changed; new uses of unmanned aerial vehicles are only
the tip of the robot-warrior iceberg. But on the other three fronts, new wars present significant challenges for the
contemporary military. The new battlefield is populated by mostly unseen, hidden, enemies, who if they
are seen at all, are often seen in the act of blowing themselves up. The regular army is being augmented by
contractors, many of them non-citizens. The ideas which are fought for, as van Creveld notes, are either so
broad as to be meaningless (“humanity, freedom for all”) , or too suspect to be workable (“to make the world safe for
business”). The political ideologies which substituted for religious holy wars have devolved (or evolved) into vague humanitarian
ideals. The culture of Western war, in other words, is undergoing a massive shift, for better or worse.
Despite the proliferation of violence, especially violence to civilians, some scholars argue that these wars are not wars at all: they are
remnants of a type of war that has slowly been delegitimized in the last half of the twentieth century. John Mueller compares “old”
warfare with slavery, which has occurred in some horrific form or another for thousands of years, only to be gradually delegitimized
and eventually outlawed. Warfare itself could be undergoing a similar slow demise. Instead, warfare is being replaced with
the violence of criminality on the one hand, and law enforcement (often by state-based militaries) on the
other (Mueller 2004).
Planet Debate                                                                                                                         189
PMCs – Sherry Hall

                          AT: PMSCs Undermine Security Goals
PMSCs RISE ARE A NATURAL RESPONSE TO CHANGING NATURE OF WARFARE –
OBJECTIONS ARE REALLY TO THE SHIFT NOT THE PMSCs
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 59-60
Mueller argues that war has not been transformed into something new, but is slowly disappearing
altogether. In its place is the kind of indiscriminate violence that targets civilians, sometimes in genocidal
numbers, and for the purpose of mass terror. Meuller is not arguing that violence has abated at all: but the shape of
violence is markedly different, and even more importantly, the way in which it is judged, culturally and
politically, has been transformed. The cultural idea of warfare is the big shift and transformation, and only by
fully understanding this cultural shift can we see how private military firms have begun to flourish as defensive
security actors, doing a form of policing in an insecure world.
Much of the outcry over private military firms, I maintain, has to do with these underlying transformations,
themselves aspects of late-modern warfare, all of which present fundamental challenges to centuries-old ideas about
how warfare should be conducted. First and foremost is the bifurcation of the battlefield into legitimate, regular, state-
supported, soldiers, and illegitimate, irregular enemy combatants. But the cultural ideals of the military are often years
behind the reality of its composition, and the popular imagination of the battles it fights rarely bear
resemblance to their reality.

“HIDDEN” NATURE OF PMSC CASUALTIES ALLOWS MILITARY OPERATION THAT
WOULD OTHERWISE BE PUBLICLY OBJECTED TO
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 89
Analysts of the PMSC industry have long noted that one of the perceived benefits of the use of contractors is that their
casualties (and risks) go unrecognized or under-reported. Awareness of contractor deaths is hampered by two things: there
is no centralized means of reporting them, and many of the contractors, including security forces, are hired from other countries, and
so their deaths go unnoticed by the American press. There is no question that contractor casualties are generally under-
reported, and that the public display of mourning or acknowledgement of heroism is muted in contrast to the
treatment of the deaths of soldiers. Debates have arisen about whether or not to add the names of
contractors to war memorials, and on the proper ritual for an honorable burial.
The use of contractors is thus the result of a political risk calculation: how much loss can be openly
sustained, or risked, in any current use of the military? How much of that loss could be minimized through
the use of contractors, whose actions will be understood and calculated on a different “risk/return” rubric?
Again the point here is not the search for an actual cost, or the actual risk. These assessments are qualitative, not quantitative in
nature. The costs and benefits of any given policy choice will be different depending on how the risks are characterized. Much of the
social science and economic research on the problem of rational risk assessment involves trying to ascribe meaning to the hidden costs
of any policy choice, costs that may not figure in the initial risk assessment, but which show up as unintended consequences, or as
costs of the simple act of choosing one strategy over another. As the mission changes, the costs of one choice over another may grow.

PMSCs ARE A RESPONSE TO GROWING RISK-AVERSION BY THE MILITARY
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 66
At the same time, the military has been criticized in recent decade as too risk-averse to fight wars properly.
They have been accused of flying too high to bomb accurately, or of avoiding the political cost of casualties
by outsourcing jobs to contractors or other proxy forces, and in general putting more of a premium on the
lives of its soldiers than on the lives of those they are sent to protect. The last part of this chapter will address the
ways in which the military has adapted to the new risk environment of what Edward Luttwak called “post-heroic warfare,” and the
role of PMSCs in this shift. Later in this chapter, I will analyze these two different risk cultures or postures in order to explain the
expanding role of PMSCs in military operations.
Planet Debate                                                                                                                 190
PMCs – Sherry Hall

                         AT: PMSCs Undermine Security Goals
PMSCs WILLING TO TAKE ON RISKS THAT THE “CASUALTY-AVERSE” MILITARY WILL
NOT
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 90-1
Around the same time that the insurance industry was stepping in to underwrite political risks no longer
seemingly secured by the state, the US military seemed to become , for a variety of reasons, wary of taking
military risks. For it seemed as if the Untied States especially had entered an era in which foreign policy and military engagements
had to be done light-handedly, with technology doing the most of the work, and civilians taking most of the hits. In the midst of
this debate about how much risk could be justified by regular military forces, the private military industry
offered itself as a “risk-free” alternative to exposing expensive troops to anything but their “core mission.”
“Acting as if these guys are only risking their lives for money is false. In fact, it may be that this is a kind
of risk acceptability they can stomach. The conventional military may be too risk averse, too sclerotic, to
compete.” (Mandel 2002)
The term “casualty phobia” – sometimes referred to as “casualty aversion” or “force protection fetishism” – has come to describe
the reluctance of military commanders to risk the lives of ground troops, and the corresponding overuse of
air power and “overwhelming force.” As the use of psychoanalytic terms suggests, this phobia or fetish is somewhat
irrational and unreal: it denied the reality of what is required on the ground, and perhaps even the moral status
of the endeavor. In fact, as with the debate about what a true “risk” actually is, the debate about casualties is often based
on a strange combination of assigning a certain value to casualties – a body count – and then predicting
when the political will for a certain mission will be lost. The language of risk and return is wrapped up in the debate
about how casualties literally “count” and what proportionate value should be placed on measures which may complete a mission but
expose more soldiers to threats.

PMSCs INCREASE STATE FLEXIBILITY IN MEETING SECURITY GOALS
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, International Law & Relations Professor – University of New South Wales,
2009, Privatizing Peace: A corporate adjunct to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
p. 167-8
The incident was foreseeable. It arose form the fact that those attributes which states value when deploying contract
personnel in violent circumstances are exactly the same traits which create various moral and other hazards .
To reiterate some of the material in Chapter 3, contractors are sufficiently detached to deliver to states a degree of
political convenience where a military uniform may prove unpopular in theater; they supply greater
expendability where the political consequences of injured or deceased military personnel may otherwise
give pause to political decision makers; or where the costs to the state of those injured or ill are likely to be
less than soldiers who may enjoy more generous benefits for a longer period; and PMSCs sometimes lower
the costs of state association where contractors (rather than troops) conduct themselves in an unsavory fashion.
Modern governments continue to balance what they see as desirable features of armed agents against the
risks and consequences of losing an uncertain degree of control – choice of weaponry being one example.
Planet Debate                                                                                                           191
PMCs – Sherry Hall

                        Impact of PMSCs on Stability Unclear
UNCLEAR IF RISE OF PMSCs WILL INCREASE OR DECREASE STABILITY
Kateri Carmola, Political Philosophy Professor Middlebury College, 2010, Private Security Contractors
and New Wars, risk, law and ethics, p. 60
I have to admit to a certain amount of ambivalence about the waning of state power in the arena of war and combat. On the one
hand, one of the primary purposes of state creation was to rein in disparate violent groups of people. On
the other hand, in so doing the nation-state created an abstract reason for violence; defense of the abstract
entity known as “the state” and, along with it, inaugurated an era of total warfare, from the French Revolution to nuclear
war. The apparent weakening of the state, evidenced in part by the rise of private security forces, may
herald an age of not only mercenaries, but limited wars, in the best of circumstances, “policing wars” in
areas of instability, and in the worst case a return to the endemic instability and disorder of the early-
modern age.

				
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