Muslim Brotherhood Aff

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Muslim Brotherhood 1AC

Plan The United States Federal Government should provide substantial technical assistance for political

organization in Egypt without religious-based restriction.



Contention 1 --- Muslim Brotherhood



The MB is gaining power in Egypt

Urban 11 (Mark, Diplomatic and Defence Editor – Newsnight (BBC), ―Egypt's Islamists Mobilising Mass

Support‖, BBC News World, 8-3, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-14396488)



Since Friday a new factor has also entered people's calculations. When a protest was called in Tahrir Square late last

week, it was known the Islamists would dominate it. But the numbers brought in by the Salafists far exceeded even

those the Muslim Brotherhood could muster. The Salafists favour an Islamic state, with Sharia law, as soon as

possible, whereas the Brotherhood has emphasised the separation of state and religion - at least for the time being.

Hundreds of thousands of Salafists came to the square - many waving the flag of Al Nour or "The Light", the party

they have established to contest the elections. One Westernised Cairo woman who was shocked by this show of

strength said to me "I think I will have to leave Egypt". Having been in the square during the demonstration, I would

say that the striking thing, apart from the numbers of bearded Salafists, was their discipline and the friendly

reception they gave us. This seemed to project a confidence about the future. Whatever the real support for these

strict Islamists across the country - and I have seen estimates ranging from 10%-20% - it seems clear that if they

combine with the Brotherhood they might easily command majority support. It is too early of course to predict the

result of elections planned for November. But recent events suggest the Islamists are far better organised, and more

able to mobilise mass support, than parties with a more Western agenda. The rise of the Salafists could also allow

the Muslim Brotherhood to position themselves as centrists and king-makers rather than the extremists that Egypt's

military rulers portrayed them as for so long.



They’re stronger than ever because of U.S. isolation --- ―picking winners‖ creates a perception of hostility

that’s the basis of recruiting and radicalism

Duss 11 (Matthew, Policy Analyst and Director of Middle East Progress – Center for American Progress and MA in

Middle East Studies – University of Washington, ―Recognizing Reality in the Middle East‖, Center for American

Progress Report, 7-1, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/07/middle_east_reality.html)



It appears the U.S. government may finally be getting smarter after decades of failure to develop a coherent approach to the phenomenon of

political Islam in the Middle East. Speaking in Budapest, Hungary, on Thursday, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said the United States was

seeking ―limited contacts‖ with members of Egypt‘s Muslim Brotherhood ahead of elections later this year, as well as with Tunisia‘s Islamist

Ennahda. ―We believe, given the changing political landscape in Egypt, that it is in the interests of the United States to engage with all parties that

are peaceful, and committed to non-violence, that intend to compete for the parliament and the presidency," Secretary Clinton told reporters. The

negative reaction from Washington conservatives was as immediate as it was expected. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy‘s Robert

Satloff, who advocates ―democracy for all but the Islamists,‖ declared the Brotherhood ―a political force whose success would clearly be inimical

to U.S. interests.‖ It‘s quite true that Islamist parties base much of their appeal on hostility to the U nited S tates. But it‘s worth

considering that decades of refusing to recognize them have not weakened Islamists in Egypt and Tunisia and have

instead left them as the best-organized political organizations in their respective countries. Indeed, refusing to

recognize these parties may in fact have enabled them to capitalize on the perception of U.S. hostility and assisted

them in presenting themselves as the legitimate resistance to Western-backed authoritarianism. Increasing

engagement with Islamist political actors is clearly the right move for the administration. It recognizes a simple fact

of political life in the Middle East—that Islamic political parties speak for a genuine constituency—and it fulfills a promise

President Barack Obama made in his historic Cairo speech in June 2009. ―America respects the right of all peaceful and law-abiding

voices to be heard around the world, even if we disagree with them,‖ the president told those assembled at Cairo University. ―And we will

welcome all elected, peaceful governments—provided they govern with respect for all their people.‖ But, President Obama continued,

―government of the people and by the people sets a single standard for all who hold power: you must maintain your power through consent, not

coercion; you must respect the rights of minorities, and participate with a spirit of tolerance and compromise; you must place the interests of your

people and the legitimate workings of the political process above your party.‖ Secretary Clinton reiterated these conditions on Thursday, stressing

that in any contacts with Islamist parties, the United States would ―continue to emphasize the importance of and support for democratic principles

and especially a commitment to non-violence, respect for minority rights, and the full inclusion of women in any democracy.‖ Secretary Clinton‘s

comments recognize that Islamist parties such as the Muslim Brotherhood espouse a number of beliefs—especially relating to women, religious

minorities, and Israel—that many Americans and many Egyptians find offensive and retrograde. But the experience of Iraq is perhaps







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instructive for those who fear that Islamists will revert to their most extreme positions once elected. Iraq is the first Arab

country where Islamist parties have been elected and governed on a large scale, though this was clearly not the Bush administration‘s intent.

Once in office, however, rather than attempting to establish strict religious law, Islamist leaders began behaving like politicians,

squabbling over power and resources both on behalf of themselves and on behalf of the constituencies to which they were now accountable. Iraq

is still bedeviled by enormous problems. And the recent uptick in violence indicates that it probably will be for some time. But its elected Islamist

leaders plotting to transform Iraq into an Islamic state at war with the West do not appear to be among those problems. While the United States

must support principles of human rights and dignity as we continue to work with Egypt and Tunisia, we simply should not be in the

business of picking winners in the new Middle East. It is folly to imagine that we can. The focus of U.S. policy

should be on assisting the process of economic and political reform to provide the foundation for strong, accountable, and

transparent institutions—not on selecting the people who should run them. Any genuine commitment to the

development of legitimate, representative governments in the Middle East necessarily involves recognizing that such

governments will often include leaders and parties critical of, and sometimes even hostile to, the U nited S tates. But if we‘re

serious about democracy, there‘s really no other option . Secretary Clinton‘s comments were a step in that direction.



U.S. assistance gives secular groups the resources and skills necessary to compete and prevent MB control

Ali 11 (Ayaan Hirsi, Fellow – American Enterprise Institute and Founder – AHA Foundation, ―Get Ready for the

Muslim Brotherhood‖, New York Times, 2-3, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/04/opinion/04iht-edali04.html?page

wanted=all)

Those two experiences gave me some insights that I think are relevant to the current crisis in Egypt. They lead me to believe it is highly

likely but not inevitable that the Muslim Brotherhood will win the elections to be held in Egypt this coming

September. As a participant in an election campaign, I learned a few basic lessons: • The party must have a political program all members

commit to with a vision of how to govern the country until the next election. Dissent within the party is a sure way of losing elections. •

Candidates must articulate not only what they will do for the country but also why the other party‘s program will be catastrophic for the nation. •

The party has to be embedded in as many communities as possible, regardless of social class, religion or even political views. • Candidates must

constantly remind potential voters of their party‘s successes and the opponent‘s failures. The secular democratic and human-rights groups in

Egypt and in the rest of the Arab world show little sign of understanding these facts of political life. The Muslim Brotherhood, on the other

hand, gets at least three out of four. True, they have never been in office. But they have a political program and a vision not only until

the next elections, but, in their view, until the Hereafter. And they are very good at reminding Egyptians of why the other party‘s policies will be

ungodly and therefore catastrophic for Egypt. Above all, they have succeeded in embedding themselves in Egyptian society in

ways that could prove crucial. When I was 15 and considered myself a member of the Muslim Brotherhood movement, there were secular

political groups in the diasporas of Pakistanis, Yemenis and Somalis, who lived in exile in Nairobi like my family. These loosely organized

groups had vague plans for building their countries into peaceful, prosperous nations. These were dreams they never realized. The Muslim

Brotherhood did more than dream. With the help of money from Saudi Arabia and other oil-rich countries, they established cells in my school

and functioning institutions in my neighborhood. There were extracurricular activities for all age groups. There were prayer and chant hours, as

well as communal Koran readings. We were encouraged to become volunteers, to help the indigent, to spread Allah‘s message. They established

charities to which we could tithe, which then provided health and educational centers. The Brotherhood also provided the only functioning

banking networks, based on trust. They rescued teenagers from lives of drug addiction and excited them about a purposeful future for justice.

Each of us was expected to recruit more people. Most importantly, their message transcended ethnicity, social class and even educational levels.

It is true that the movement was violent, but we tend to underestimate in the West the Brotherhood‘s ability to adapt to reality and implement

lessons learned. One such adaptation is the ongoing debate within the network on the use of violence. There are two schools of thought within the

network, and both of them invoke the Prophet Mohammed. Those who want instant jihad hark back to the time when the Prophet had small

armies that defeated massive ones, as in the battles of Badr and Uhud. The nonviolent branch of the Brotherhood emphasizes the Prophet‘s

perseverance and patience. They emphasize da‘wa (persuasion through preaching and by example) and above all a gradual multi-generational

process in coming to power and holding on to it. Above all, they argue for taqiyyah, a strategy to collaborate with your enemies until the time is

ripe to defeat them or convert them to Islam. Why are the secular democratic forces in Egypt so much weaker than the

Muslim Brotherhood? One reason is that they are an amalgam of very diverse elements: There are tribal leaders, free-

market liberals, socialists, hard-core Marxists and human rights activists. In other words, they lack common ideological glue comparable to the

one that the Brotherhood has. And there is a deep-seated fear that opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood , whose aim is to

install Shariah once they come to power, will be seen by the masses as a rejection of Islam. What the secular groups fail to do is to

come up with a message of opposition that says ―yes‖ to Islam, but ―no‖ to Shariah — in other words, a campaign that emphasizes a separation of

religion from politics. For Egypt and other Arab nations to escape the tragedy of either tyranny or Shariah, there has to be a third way that

separates religion from politics while establishing a representative government, the rule of law, and conditions friendly to trade, investment and

employment. The bravery of the secular groups that have now unified behind Mohamed ElBaradei cannot be doubted. They have taken the world

by surprise by mounting a successful protest against a tyrant. The secular democrats‘ next challenge is the Brotherhood. They must waste

no time in persuading the Egyptian electorate why a Shariah-based government would be bad for them. Unlike the

Iranians in 1979, the Egyptians have before them the example of a people who opted for Shariah — the Iranians — and have lived to regret it.

The 2009 ―green movement‖ in Iran was a not a ―no‖ to a strongman, but a ―no‖ to Shariah. ElBaradei and his supporters must make clear that a

Shariah-based regime is repressive at home and aggressive abroad. Moreover, as the masses cry out against unemployment, rising food prices and

corruption, Egypt‘s secular groups must show that a Shariah-based government would exacerbate these agonies. The Muslim Brotherhood will

insist that a vote for them is a vote for Allah‘s law. But the positions of power in government will not be filled by God and his angels. These

positions will be filled by men so arrogant as to put themselves in the position of Allah. And as the Iranians of 2009 have learned to their cost, it

is harder to vote such men out of office than to vote them in. The Obama administration can help the secular groups with the





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resources and the skills necessary to organize, campaign and to establish competing economic and civil institutions

so that they can defeat the Muslim Brotherhood at the ballot box. As I have come to learn over the years, few things in

democratic politics are inevitable. But without effective organization, the secular, democratic forces that have swept

one tyranny aside could easily succumb to another .



Strong demand exists for U.S. technical assistance --- including the MB defuses anti-American resistance

Slavin 11 (Barbara, Senior Fellow – Atlantic Council, Senior Diplomatic Correspondent – USA Today, and

Assistant Managing Editor for World and National Security – Washington Times, ―U.S. "Democracy" Advisors

Suddenly in Demand‖, Inter-Press Service, 4-14, http://ipsnews.net/wap/news.asp?idnews=55266)

For years, U.S. officials and n on g overnmental o rganisation s devoted to democracy promotion toiled in the Middle East

with little expectation of success. Now, with the leaders of Egypt and Tunisia toppled and rebellions raging from Libya to

Yemen, these officials and organisations face unprecedented opportunities but also new questions about the U.S. role. Critics cite the

Barack Obama administration's inconsistency in failing to intervene more forcefully against government repression of dissidents particularly in

Bahrain, where the United States has run into Saudi determination to preserve a minority Sunni regime at all cost. In Egypt and Tunisia,

however, the U.S. has pivoted quickly from "democracy promotion to democracy consolidation", said J. Scott Carpenter, a

former deputy assistant secretary of state in the George W. Bush administration in charge of democracy programmes in the Middle East and

North Africa. Carpenter, now with the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, said U.S. aid organisations and NGOs have been

"overwhelmed by the demand" for technical assistance on how to organise parties and run campaigns, particularly in

Egypt, where legislative elections are due in September and presidential elections before the end of the year. "There is an incredible

opportunity to leverage the relationships" Americans have built with Arab civil society groups during the years

when it seemed that autocratic regimes would never change, he said. Others worry that organisations such as the National

Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute (IRI), which are funded by the quasi-governmental National Endowment for

Democracy, and the State Department's U.S. Agency for International Development lack the personnel to evaluate all the requests from civil

society groups for about 65 million dollars in reprogrammed U.S. aid for Egypt. "It's a pretty chaotic atmosphere and that's not usually a

recipe for doing things well," said Michelle Dunne, an expert on Middle East democracy programmes at the Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace. At the same time, the military-led transitional Egyptian government would prefer more economic aid to compensate for the

losses caused by political unrest and uncertainty. Dunne said two Egyptian officials are in Washington this week lobbying for debt relief.

According to Dunne, Egypt pays 330 million dollars a year in debt service – more than its annual 250 million dollars in U.S. economic aid – to

service a U.S. debt of 3.1 billion dollars. In the current austere U.S. economic climate, however, such requests are not meeting an enthusiastic

response. Stephen McInerney, executive director of the Project on Middle East Democracy, also said Egypt needs more economic support than

the Obama administration is prepared to give. At the same time, he faults U.S. officials for failing to hold Egypt's interim

government to its promises to be inclusive and transparent in organising the transition to a post-Hosni Mubarak

democracy. The military council rushed through amendments to the constitution and a Mar. 19 referendum in which 77 percent of those voting

approved the changes, which establish term limits for the president but allow him to retain extraordinary powers. Turnout in the referendum was

under 50 percent and many secular groups complained that they had been given no opportunity to comment on the amendments. Meanwhile, the

emergency law in effect in Egypt since 1981 has yet to be repealed. Police have arrested, beaten and even shot democracy advocates and sought

to break up rallies in Cairo's Tahrir Square. The situation is far worse in Bahrain, where scores have been killed, half a dozen political prisoners

have died in custody and the government moved this week to outlaw long-standing political parties representing the island's Shiite majority.

While the Obama administration has been consistent rhetorically in opposing the use of force and supporting universal rights to free expression,

"where they've been inconsistent is in the level of effort they've provided," said the Carnegie Endowment's Dunne. She attributed some of the

U.S. failings to a losing struggle with Saudi Arabia, which sent troops to Bahrain to back the local Sunni monarchy and objected bitterly when

Washington nudged Mubarak aside. "We always thought we had a set of common interests with the Saudis but always knew that we had different

values and that can't be swept under the rug anymore," Dunne said. Even where the U.S. appears to have nimbly adjusted policy to support

democratic gains, it faces scepticism and suspicion about its motives. In Egypt, critics allege that the U.S. is trying to

boost secular parties against the M uslim B rotherhood, an 83-year-old organisation that is finally able to compete openly for political

support. "An organic explosion is going on and no Western hand can help," Hisham Hellyer, an Egypt expert at the University of Warwick and

organiser of a new interactive website, Tahrir Squared, told the Center for the National Interest, a Washington think tank, earlier this week. He

said U.S. efforts would actually bolster the Brotherhood, which is expected to win 15-25 percent of seats in a new parliament. Any Egyptian

political groups that take outside money "will have their credibility shot", Hellyer said. However, Thomas Garrett, vice president for

intention of groups like his is "not to level the playing field between particular groups but to

programmes at IRI, said the

level the playing field in general." Garrett said that U.S. aid provides training for multiple groups at one time and does

not come in the form of cash payments to individual political parties. While current grant restrictions prevent U.S.

contractors from assisting the M uslim B rotherhood, Garrett said his organisation had trained Islamic groups in other countries, such as

Indonesia and Iraq. He did not rule out similar assistance to a party or parties formed by the Muslim Brothers in Egypt.



Making it openly available without restriction enables an effective democratic transition

Strasser 11 (Max, Cairo-Based Editor – Foreign Policy Magazine, ―Can USAID Be a Force For Good In Egypt?‖,

The Nation, 7-22, http://www.thenation.com/article/162239/can-usaid-be-force-good-egypt)







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In Egypt, as in much of the region, many are hostile to the U nited S tates for an overall foreign policy that is perceived as

anti-Muslim and anti-Arab. Egyptians, in particular, have reason to resent American interference in their politics. For years

Washington backed Mubarak‘s repressive regime with military and economic aid and political support as a force of ―stability‖ in the region, due

to the country‘s strategic location and peace treaty with Israel. Especially under former President George W. Bush, the White House was happy to

reap the fruits of Mubarak‘s police state for intelligence purposes, giving the green light to crackdowns on Islamist groups and employing

Egyptian intelligence in the notorious extraordinary rendition program. During the early days of the uprising US officials kept their support for

Mubarak steadfast. On January 25, the first day of what became the revolution, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called Mubarak‘s government

―stable‖ and urged ―restraint‖ from both the protesters and the security forces. (This may contribute to the Obama Administration‘s

overwhelming unpopularity in Egypt. A recent poll by the American Arab Institute found that only 5 percent of Egyptians have a favorable view

of the United States.) But with Mubarak gone, Washington seems ready to get on the right side of history. But USAID and American NGOs‘

democracy and governance programming is not just a post-Mubarak phenomenon. Under the Bush Administration‘s so-called Freedom Agenda,

the budget for this kind of programming grew and the White House and the State Department pressured Mubarak on democratic reforms. (During

last winter‘s uprising, right-wing pundits came out of the woodwork to call Egypt‘s protests a successful byproduct of Bush-era policies.) But

while US officials doled out money to Egyptian democrats, the official aid to the military and the state kept flowing and terrorism suspects were

tortured in Egypt‘s prisons. It is unlikely that Washington involves itself in another country‘s political parties and civil society without some self-

interest in mind. An October 2007 cable released by WikiLeaks from the US embassy in Cairo suggests that democracy and governance

programming were part of an effort to ―optimize American influence‖ in Egypt during the leadership succession crisis that the embassy predicted

would follow Mubarak‘s retirement or death. (They did not foresee the revolution.) With millions of dollars of US government money pouring

into Egypt‘s political life, State Department officials likely hope that the new political parties will remember fondly this support if they come to

power. There are other reasons to be skeptical. The so-called Color Revolutions in post-Soviet Eastern Europe and Central Asia saw similar

uprisings to Egypt‘s, with largely non-violent tactics used to overthrow corrupt pro-Moscow autocrats. Opposition movements in those countries

received the backing of NDI, IRI, Freedom House and other democracy and governance programs. But while those revolutions succeeded in

ousting dictators, they never brought on true democracies and, in some cases, members of the former regime to power. The US-backed model of

democratic revolution proved not to be sufficiently revolutionary. Despite the many challenges and concerns, many believe that there

is still an important role for USAID, American NGOs and other foreign funders in Egypt. Under 30 years of Mubarak‘s

repression (and even before under the late President Anwar el-Sadat), Egyptian political life was stagnated and civil society

demolished. Mubarak kept strict controls on parties and NGOs and how they obtained funding. Even in the post-Mubarak era, there

is still little support for the kinds of institutions that usually fund political movements, like religious organizations, labor

unions or the business community. If Egypt‘s emerging democrats are going to successfully build civil society

institutions and an electoral culture that was never allowed to exist before, money will be necessary. And it looks unlikely

that that money will come from inside Egypt for a while. ―There is no tradition of businessmen giving to civil society

without their own, often corrupt, motives,‖ says Ahmed Salah, a longtime anti-regime activist in his forties, as we sit on the shabby, second-hand

furniture in the barebones office of his upstart pro-democracy NGO. ―All of the civil society in Egypt, every NGO, gets its money

from abroad,‖ Salah says. ―Where else would it come from?‖ Salah has received foreign funding for his NGO and participated in democracy

and governance programs in the past, at times coming under fire from other local activists for his participation. (Fearing reprisal from the

Ministry of International Cooperation, Salah said he did not want the name of his NGO published.) As USAID and its American NGO partners

proceed with their democracy and governance programming in the run-up to the first legitimate elections in most Egyptians‘

lifetimes, they must do so with an abundance of caution and sensitivity to people‘s suspicions. Stephen McInerney, the executive

director of the Project on Middle East Democracy, realizes that. ―Training and support made available to all groups can avoid

them being seen as trying to engineer elections,‖ McInerney says. Support must be provided to ―the system,‖ rather than

any individual actors . Openness and transparency may not be enough to assuage all Egyptians‘ concerns. No matter how transparent USAID

is about its operations, it is unlikely that any party will advertise itself as receiving funding from Washington. But with the money quickly

moving out of the NGOs and USAID and into programming for a young democratic system, foreign funders and the political

organizations that benefit from them must tread carefully amid the tense atmosphere of post-Mubarak, pre-election Egypt.



A consistent mandate of open access to U.S. democracy aid is critical to shift on-the-ground policy to

accommodate the Brotherhood

Hamid 10 (Shadi, Director of Research – Brookings Doha Center and Fellow – Saban Center for Middle East Policy

at the Brookings Institution, ―The Islamist Response to Repression: Are Mainstream Islamist Groups Radicalizing?‖,

Brookings Doha Center Policy Briefing, August, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/

2010/0809_islamist_groups_hamid/0809_islamist_groups_hamid.pdf)



RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

Islamist leaders often speak of an ―American veto.‖ The veto is used by the U nited S tates and other Western powers to block

Islamists from gaining power, even if they win at the ballot box. The two examples usually raised are Algeria in 1991, when

the Western-backed military annulled parliamentary elections after the Islamic Salvation Front dominated the first round, and, more recently,

Hamas‘s 2006 election victory. Esam al-Erian explains it this way: ―Even if you come to power through democratic means, you‘re facing an

international community that doesn‘t accept Islamist representation. This is a problem. I think this will continue to present an obstacle for us until

there is a real acknowledgement of this situation.‖ 24 Democratic transitions require major political forces to fully commit to challenging the

regime‘s hold on power, something which Islamist actors appear unwilling to do out of fear of an Algerian scenario; they feel the international

community would oppose their coming to power even if, and after, they defeated ruling parties in free elections. In a sense, Islamists perceive





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themselves as fighting two fronts simultaneously – the regime as well as the regime‘s international backers – making it that much more difficult

for them to envision alternation of power as a real possibility. The international component is critical. Pro-democracy movements are usually

willing to withstand a degree of regime violence because this elicits international attention and, often, outrage. According to one study by Maria

J. Stephan and Erica Chenoweth, international condemnation of regime repression is positively correlated with the success of nonviolent action.

25 Yet, in the case of the Middle East, there have not been any instances of anti-Islamist repression that have drawn significant international

outrage. 26 In short, even if American policymakers believe their ability to influence Islamist behavior is limited,

Islamists themselves happen to think otherwise. Commenting on the Bush administration‘s pro-democracy efforts,

leading M uslim B rotherhood member Abdel Monem Abul Futouh said, ―Everyone knows it…we benefited, everyone benefited,

and the Egyptian people benefited.‖ 27 This presents a clear, if tenuous, opening for the U nited S tates to act. To be sure, the U.S.

government should not be seen as favoring one group over another. However, it should also be aware that if mainstream

Islamists abandon the political arena, it may leave a dangerous vacuum, one likely to be filled not by liberals but by

Salafi groups that are considerably more conservative and less amenable to compromise. This is what occurred in the

20 08 Kuwaiti elections, when Salafis overtook the Islamic Constitutional Movement, the political arm of Kuwait‘s Muslim Brotherhood, as

the largest bloc in parliament. Khalil al-Anani notes that, after winning 17 of 50 seats, the ―Commenting on the Bush administration‘s pro-

democracy efforts, leading Muslim Brotherhood member Abdel Monem Abul Futouh said, ‗Everyone knows it…we benefited, everyone

benefited, and the Egyptian people benefited.‘‖ 8 ―Elections without significant Islamist participation will be— and will be seen as—less

legitimate and will provide an opening to Salafi groups to fill the power vacuum.‖ Salafis‘ first demand ―was to apply sharia through a committee

to monitor ‗unethical behaviors‘…[and] creating a moral police similar to the one in Saudi Arabia.‖ 28 With both Egypt and Jordan holding

much-anticipated elections in 2010 and 2011, the U nited S tates must develop clear policies that advance its interests and

ideals. As a longtime financial sponsor of the Mubarak regime and the Hashemite monarchy, the U nited S tates enjoys a significant

degree of leverage . As an initial step, President Obama should publicly affirm the right of all nonviolent political actors –-

including Islamist parties – to freely participate in elections. This should be coupled with a consistent American policy of

opposing not just the arrests of secular activists, but Islamist ones as well. More generally, the United States along with European allies should

exert direct pressure on the Egyptian and Jordanian governments, in both private and public, to take practical steps to open up political space for

opposition groups. This is particularly important in Jordan where the IAF in early August announced a boycott of the November elections but

said it would reconsider its position if the government provided guarantees. At the same time it presses for more political freedoms, the United

States can begin improving its institutional knowledge of Islamist political participation, a requisite to effective action. One way, obviously, to

learn more about Islamists is to talk to them. 29 Along these lines, the U.S. State Department should give clear guidance to

embassies, empowering them to begin substantive engagement with the M uslim B rotherhood in Egypt and the Islamic

Action Front in Jordan, particularly in the context of the upcoming elections. To be sure, the U nited S tates already talks to Islamist

members of parliament but only in their capacity as elected officials (and not as representatives of the Brotherhood or

IAF). In any case, these are ad-hoc meetings lacking a substantive agenda. 3



Even if the Brotherhood takes control, assistance now gives the U.S. leverage to moderate its behavior

Duss 11 (Matthew, Policy Analyst and Director of Middle East Progress – Center for American Progress and MA in

Middle East Studies – University of Washington, ―Are We Serious About A Democratic Egypt?‖, ThinkProgress

Security, 2-4, http://thinkprogress.org/security/2011/02/04/176481/are-we-serious-about-a-democratic-egypt/)

I agree that U.S. has an interest in helping the Egyptians create a ―real democracy,‖ which is more than just elections but a

working, durable set of institutions and procedures. It seems obvious, however, that stating at the outset of such a process that one of our

goals is to prevent a particular disfavored group from winning political power is a great way not to achieve that .

While it‘s true that Hamas considers itself the Palestinian wing of the Muslim Brotherhood (this is how it defined itself in the 1970′s when Israel

quietly supported it, in an attempt to draw support away from the secular nationalist Fatah) it‘s lazy at this point to simply conflate the two

movements, as their separate experiences and evolution over the last three decades have diverged significantly. (Conor Friedersdorf took a deeper

look at this yesterday.) As for whether Gaza today provides a good example of what Egypt would look like under the Muslim Brotherhood, I

suppose if the U.S. immediately responded to a Brotherhood electoral victory by refusing to deal with the new government, then supported a

failed coup attempt, and then placed the entire country under a blockade while periodically invading and bombing it, then yes, Egypt under the

Muslim Brotherhood might come to look like Gaza under Hamas. I think a better example of how the M uslim B rotherhood might

govern, as I noted previously, can be found in Iraq, where Sunni and Shia Islamist parties dominate. The new Iraq still has enormous

problems, but as far as I can tell, its various Islamist governors and parliamentarians clamoring for the destruction of Israel and

the establishment of an Islamic caliphate isn‘t one. In a new Foreign Affairs piece analyzing the evolution of the Brotherhood, Emory

University‘s Carrie Rosefsky Wickham writes: Those who emphasize the risk of ―Islamic tyranny‖ aptly note that the Muslim Brotherhood

originated as an anti-system group dedicated to the establishment of sharia rule; committed acts of violence against its opponents in the pre-1952

era; and continues to use anti-Western, anti-Zionist, and anti-Semitic rhetoric. But portraying the Brotherhood as eager and able to

seize power and impose its version of sharia on an unwilling citizenry is a caricature that exaggerates certain features

of the Brotherhood while ignoring others, and underestimates the extent to which the group has changed over time .

Wickham concludes, ―The Brotherhood has demonstrated that it is capable of evolving over time, and the best way to

strengthen its democratic commitments is to include it in the political process, making sure there are checks and

balances in place to ensure that no group can monopolize state power and that all citizens are guaranteed certain freedoms

under the law‖: In the foreign policy domain, the Brotherhood rails against ―U.S. and Zionist domination,‖ demands the recognition of Palestinian





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rights, and may one day seek to revise the terms of Egypt‘s relationship with Israel through constitutional channels. The Brotherhood will likely

never be as supportive of U.S. and Israeli interests in the region as Mubarak was. Yet here too, the best way for the U nited S tates to

minimize the risk associated with the likely increase in its power is to encourage and reward judiciousness and

pragmatism. With a track record of nearly 30 years of responsible behavior (if not rhetoric) and a strong base of support, the

M uslim B rotherhood has earned a place at the table in the post-Mubarak era. No democratic transition can succeed without it. We

obviously shouldn‘t be sanguine about what the Muslim Brotherhood represent. These are not liberals in disguise. They hold a lot of views that I,

and I think many Egyptians, find abhorrent. But so does Mike Huckabee. The important thing is having processes in place that

encourage moderation and coalition-building, thereby preventing extreme religious conservatives from

implementing their crazier ideas . But the bottom line is that a truly democratic Egypt, if and when it arrives, will make choices and

include actors that the U.S. doesn‘t like. We should start getting used to that idea.



Engagement undermines MB radicalism. Exclusion drives violent elements underground.

al-Anani 10 (Khalil, Visiting Fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy – Brookings Institution and

Assistant to the Managing Editor – al-Siyassa al Dawliya (Cairo Newspaper), ―Egypt‘s Muslim Brotherhood:

Opposite Effects‖, Ikkwan Web, 3-1, http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=23446)

Suppression may tax the Muslim Brotherhood organizationally but it also gives them reason to tighten ranks and

focus on recruitment. In today‘s political climate, repressive tactics can only be counterproductive, enhancing the

group‘s popular image and allowing it to appeal to potential recruits on the basis that it is being persecuted. Surely it

would be more astute for the regime to allow the Muslim Brotherhood to formally engage in public life since

nothing could be more guaranteed to throw it into ideological confusion and organizational disarray.

The Muslim Brotherhood, like most closed organizations, tightens ranks when exposed to outside threats but

splinters in environments where it must compete on the basis of political ideas rather than the ability to purchase

support through handouts and the provision of social services. When the Muslim Brotherhood unveiled its platform

for a proposed political party in 2007 it faced vehement criticism not from the regime but from independent

politicians, intellectuals, human rights groups and other members of civil society. I believe that, if there were greater

freedom to form political parties in Egypt, Mohamed Habib, who resigned two months ago as deputy to the former

supreme guide, or the reformist brother Abdel-Moneim Abul-Fotouh, would establish a political party with no ties to

the Muslim Brotherhood. This is precisely what Recep Tayyip Erdogan did when he split away from the Turkish

Prosperity Party led by Nijmeddin Erbakan.

The generation gap in the Muslim Brotherhood would give impetus to such a move. Many younger members of the

organization are in a state of shock following the elimination of reformists from a hierarchy now dominated by

elderly, conservative hardliners. A good many young reformers now love to leave the Brotherhood, their problem

being there is nowhere for them to go.

If the regime can not tolerate the Muslim Brotherhood as a political faction, why does it not permit them to re-

establish themselves as a philanthropic society engaged solely in charity work? At least then they would fall under

the law.

Let me make three observations that relate to the above. First, the Egyptian regime makes no distinction between

conservatives and moderates (reformists) within the Muslim Brotherhood, a fact that obviates any possibility of

assimilating the group into Egypt‘s formal political life. Second, the regime‘s current policy will propel the Muslim

Brothers to organize themselves secretly and resume subversive activities, at which point the allegation that they

are a militant organization bent on violence will become a self-fulfilling prophesy. Third, many groups among the

Egyptian political elite have no objection to the suppression and political death of the Muslim Brotherhood on the

pretext of saving the country from the specter of a Khomeini-like state. They would then position themselves to

carve up the political spoils with the regime.

The Muslim Brotherhood as a legitimate political faction will constitute no real threat to the regime. Any challenge

it might face in the future will come from a political figure with sufficient charisma to attract mass public support.

My worst fear is that continued pressure on the Muslim Brotherhood will drive it underground.



Exclusion fosters radicalism and violence that destabilizes the Middle East

Philpott 11 (Daniel, Associate Professor of Political Science and Peace Studies – University of Notre Dame,

Timothy Shah, Associate Director of the Religious Freedom Project – Georgetown University's Berkley Center for

Religion, Peace & World Affairs, and Monica Duffy Toft, Professor of Public Policy – Harvard University and

Director – Initiative on Religion in International Affairs, ―The Dangers of Secularism in the Middle East‖, The

Christian Science Monitor, 8-11, Lexis)







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Since the Arab Spring began last December, Western analysts have voiced a recurrent fear: that a long era of Arab stability will be replaced

not by secular democrats but by Islamic theocrats. In Egypt, they warn, the M uslim B rotherhood will overtake the young secular activists

who bravely brought down dictator Hosni Mubarak. In Syria, they have claimed, Bashar al-Assad's dictatorship may be brutal, but it is a lesser evil than a Sunni

majority that will oppress Christians, Shiites, and women. Such anxiety plays perfectly into the ruling rationale of the region's secular sultans, who have resisted

popular governance with the argument that it spells theocracy. But such fear and false choices should be resisted. A stable Middle East

will be achieved not through the suppression of religion but through its robust inclusion in politics. The choice facing Arab

Spring nations at this point isn't one between religion and secular government. It's a choice between democracy that includes all parties -

religious and secular - and a regime that imposes a rigid and exclusive secularism . By allowing religious parties to have political

participation, is there a risk that such groups will win some votes and acquire some political power? Yes. The question, though, is not whether such

groups oppose liberal democracy and threaten stability - some surely do - but which kind of political environment mitigates

their extremist tendencies. And which kind intensifies them. America's policy of negative secularism The reflexive fear of politically active

religious groups is rooted in an ideology of secularism that persists among elite American foreign policy makers. Now, if secularism means a healthy distinction

between religious and political authority, it is essential to democracy. Pope Benedict XVI called this "positive secularism." Negative secularism, by contrast, presumes

that religion is irrational, premodern, violent, and headed for extinction - and has no place in democratic politics. Negative secularism mistakenly equates religious

political participation with religious takeover and the subversion of democracy. Its answer to theocracy is "seculocracy:" the absolute supremacy of nonreligious

principles in politics. Pro-government forces in Syria illustrated the attitude of seculocracy last week in Hama after they crushed protests there. They scrawled on the

the cold war, negative secularism

walls of the city such slogans as: "No God but al-Assad" and "God falls down and Assad lives." During

undergirded America's policy in the Middle East. America's overriding concern was finding reliable allies against the Soviets. In a few cases

these allies were highly religious, as were Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Far more often, though, they were regimes built on nationalism, economic and social

modernization - and the secular containment of grassroots Islam. From Tangiers to Tehran, such regimes sought to control Islam by marginalizing, privatizing, and

sharply regulating it. They gave legal and financial support to approved moderate Muslims; they jailed and tortured traditional dissident

Muslims. When Western liberals questioned why Mr. Mubarak imprisoned 20,000 of his Egyptian citizens, Mubarak replied: It's either me or the Muslim

Brotherhood. The US bought the argument. Such thinking partly explains why the Obama administration was slow to abandon Mubarak. Only days before the

dictator's downfall, according to The New Yorker's Ryan Lizza, a White House official summarized Mubarak's message to the US as "Muslim Brotherhood, Muslim

America's policy of promoting secular

Brotherhood, Muslim Brotherhood." Repressive secular regimes foster religious extremism In the end, however,

undermined democracy and stability and bolstered religious radicals. Instead, the U nited

dictatorships has simultaneously

S tates will best advance its long term interests by encouraging the Middle East's transitioning regimes to invite all

nonviolent religious groups into the political arena. To be sure, the region contains many unsavory religious groups. Some advocate a harsh form

of sharia that denies the rights of women and minorities, calls for the destruction of Israel, and declares America an enemy. Factions within Egypt's Muslim

growth of extremist religious groups is less likely within a

Brotherhood think along these lines, as do even more extreme Salafists. But the

political structure that includes, rather than excludes, them. In our recently published book, "God's Century: Resurgent Religion and Global

Politics," we present evidence that religious groups are most likely to become radicalized and violent when they live under

regimes that deny them autonomy and political participation. America's longtime friend, the shah of Iran, epitomized the dangerous

relationship between repressive secularism and Islamic radicalism. The shah's harsh repression and manipulation of Iran's ayatollahs helped turn many of them from

quiet political indifference to violent militancy, generating the revolution of 1979 and all of the continuing challenges the Islamic Republic poses to American

interests. The dynamic is similar for religious terrorist groups that have arisen in the ensuing years. Overwhelmingly Islamic, these groups were incubated largely by

sets the ground for peace, partnership

the repressive policies of America's Arab and South Asian allies, most of which were secular. Inclusion

groups are most likely to be peaceful and supportive of democracy when they live under

Conversely, we find that religious

regimes that respect their autonomy. Islamic countries as diverse as Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mali, Senegal,

and Turkey demonstrate that when Islamic parties participate in politics they not only operate by the rules of the

democratic game but also, in time, become more moderate . Moderate Islam also exists in today's Middle East. While some Egyptian

Muslims have attacked Coptic Christians, others have formed protective prayer chains around Coptic churches. Today, a popular Muslim Brother is running for

Egypt's presidency on an independent platform of liberal democratic principles - even to the point of provoking his formal expulsion from the Brotherhood. Earlier

this summer, the US government resumed formal contact with the Egyptian M uslim B rotherhood. This, in our view, suggests a positive

turn toward a policy of religious engagement. If the U nited S tates wishes to advance democracy, stability, and the defeat of terrorism in the upheaval

in the Middle East, it must continue to abjure the brand of secularism that views religion only as a threat. It must realize not only that religion is here to

stay but also that, in the right kind of setting and through the right kind of policies, religion can become an ally, not an enemy, of American

interests and ideals.





Contention 2 --- Leadership



U.S. credibility in the Middle East is plummeting

Zogby 11 (Dr. James J., Founder and President – Arab American Institute, ―America in Trouble in the Middle East:

Obama Understands, But GOP Gloats‖, Huffington Post, 7-16, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/james-zogby/ameri

ca-in-trouble-in-the_b_900649.html?ir=World)



Well, the results are in, and the president was right. In our survey of over 4,000 Arabs from six countries (Morocco, Egypt, Lebanon,

Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE), we found that favorable attitudes toward the U.S. had declined sharply since our last poll (which

had been conducted in 2009 after Obama's first 100 days in office). Back then, Arabs were hopeful that the new president would bring needed

change to the U.S.-Arab relationship and the early steps taken by his administration only served to reinforce this view. As a result, favorable

attitudes toward the U.S. climbed significantly from Bush-era lows. But as our respondents made clear in this year's survey, those expectations





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have not been met and U.S. favorable ratings, in most Arab countries, have now fallen to levels lower than they were in

2008, the last year of the Bush administration. In Morocco, for example, positive attitudes toward the United States went from 26% in 2008

to a high 55% in 2009. Today, they have fallen to 12%. The story was much the same in Egypt, where the U.S. rating went from 9% in

2008 to 30% in 2009 and has now plummeted to 5% in this year's survey. A review of the poll's other results makes it clear that the continuing

occupation of Palestinian lands is seen by most Arabs as both the main "obstacle to peace and stability in the Middle East" and "the most

important issue for the U.S. to address in order to improve its ties with the Arab World." That Palestine trumps all of the other issues measured in

the survey throws cold water on the wishful thinking of some analysts in the U.S. and Israel who want to imagine that, in the context of this

"Arab Spring," Arabs now feel "that the Israeli-Palestinian issue is not as central to their lives as they were led to believe" (Bechor, Yedioth

Ahronoth, July 14, 2011). What our respondents tell us is the second highest ranking "obstacle to peace and stability" is "U.S. interference in the

Arab World," which explains why the U.S. role in establishing a no-fly zone over Libya is neither viewed favorably in most countries, nor is it

seen as improving Arab attitudes toward America. In fact when presented with several countries (e.g. Turkey, Iran, France, China, the U.S. etc.)

and asked to evaluate whether or not each of them play a constructive role "in promoting peace and stability in the Arab World" eight in ten

Arabs give a negative assessment to the U.S. role -- rating it significantly lower than France, Turkey, China, and, in four of six Arab countries,

even lower than Iran! All of this might have been expected, as it was by the president, but it is still sobering news that should send a strong

signal to all Americans and should serve as a check on the reckless behavior of some lawmakers. For example, when Congress invites the prime

minister of Israel to give an address that challenges and insults the president -- and then gives the foreign leader repeated standing ovations -- they

are telling Arabs that America can't and won't play a constructive peace-making role. And when Congress continues to obstruct diplomacy

and supports bills cutting much needed assistance programs to the Palestinians, Lebanon, and Egypt, they are sending Arabs

the wrong message at the wrong time. And when neo-conservatives continue to argue for a more muscular Middle East foreign policy,

urging the White House to use force or to make more demands on various Arab parties, they are blind to the realities of the region and are

treading on dangerous ground. To his credit, the president understands the dilemma America confronts across the Arab World. He began his term

in office with the right intentions and sent signals he would move in the right direction. But, as I have noted, on Inauguration Day Barack Obama

did not receive a magic wand. Instead, he was handed the shovel that George W. Bush had been using to dig deep holes all over the Middle East.

Getting out of those holes has been harder than he imagined. In addition to confronting the worst domestic economic crisis in generations, the

president had to face down two failed wars, an incorrigible and manipulative Israeli leader, a divided and dysfunctional Palestinian polity, and a

wary but hopeful (maybe too hopeful) world that expected him to deliver on promised change. If that weren't enough, the president was

confronted from Day One by a deeply partisan Washington, in which a unified Republican opposition behaved as if they wanted nothing more

than to see him fail. If anything, the results of this latest poll of Arab opinion demonstrates how precarious the position of the

U nited S tates is in the Middle East and how important it has become for American policy makers to pay attention to

what Arabs are saying to us. Some may play politics with critical Middle East issues and gloat at their success at having stymied the

president's efforts to make peace and restore America's image in the region. But as the results of this survey make clear, their success has come at

a price; one that is being paid by the entire country.



Obama won’t follow through on pledged election assistance for Egypt. That devastates regional influence.

Dorsey 11 (James A., Senior Research Fellow – Middle East Institute, National University of Singapore, ―US Risks

Missing Opportunity to Play Leading Role in Middle East Transition‖, Al Arabiya News, 7-5,

http://english.alarabiya .net/articles/2011/07/05/156264.html)



The window of opportunity to throw off the yoke of autocratic rule in the Middle East and North Africa and reposition the U nited

S tates as a force that promotes democracy and freedom is closing six months into the popular revolt that is sweeping the region.

The transition to a democratic government after the fall in January of President Zine Abedine Ben Ali is stalling. Protesters have returned

to Cairo‘s Tahrir Square to push for political reform and economic opportunity five months to the day some of the harshest clashes with

police and supporters of President Hosni Mubarak that led two weeks later to Mr. Mubarak stepping down after 30 years in office. The ever more

evident difficulty in the transition from authoritarian to democratic rule is compounded by the fact that traditional forces are in the ascendancy

while the youth activists who initiated the revolt are losing ground. The ascendancy of Islamist groups like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt has

persuaded the Obama administration to engage in a dialogue in a bid to forge relations with all major political players. While that is a smart

move, it is insufficient for the Obama administration to capitalize on the fact that opposition to US policies has not factored in the revolts that

toppled the regimes in Egypt and Tunisia and have wracked Syria, Libya, Bahrain and Yemen. It also doesn‘t compensate for the fact that the

revolt has already rewritten the geopolitical map of the Middle East and North Africa from Washington‘s perspective. Gone are the days where

the United States could build on Egypt and Saudi Arabia as cornerstone. For the U nited S tates to exploit the opportunity in the

changing priorities of what was once commonly described as the Arab street and help the region move forward, Mr. Obama has

to start putting his money where his mouth is. In a speech in May designed to ally the United States with protesters on the streets of

Arab capitals and to shift policy away from one that emphasized stability at the price of democracy and freedom, Mr. Obama promised that

he would employ all the ―diplomatic, economic and strategic tools‖ available to his administration to promote reform and

support transition to democracy. Several weeks later he joined leaders of the G-8 countries in pledging economic support and

debt relief to Arab nations embarking on a road of transition and to back $20 billion in available lending from international development banks.

Those were important gestures, but there has yet to be a follow-up. They position the United States to get in front of

the cart, but don‘t put it there. To ensure that his administration is not continuously trying to keep up with fast

moving events, Mr. Obama has to start acting; words alone are no longer sufficient . Mr. Obama has created

expectations. Failure to fulfill those expectations risks sparking disappointment and disillusionment . To be sure,

meeting those expectations takes time and is tough for a country that is still struggling to put a severe recession behind, is burdened by debt and





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are things Mr. Obama could do that would allow the U nited S tates

split along partisan lines on multiple issues. Nonetheless, there

to start shaping rather than reacting to events. In doing so, he could build on the widely acclaimed Middle East

Partnership Initiative (MEPI) started by his predecessor, George W. Bush, by increasing funding for MEPI grants to and support

for private groups in the Middle East and North Africa that work to strengthen civil society, empower women and youth,

encourage economic reform, and promote democratic change.



U.S. technical assistance secures credit and revives Arab relations

Hamid 11 (Shadi, Director of Research – Brookings Doha Center and Fellow – Saban Center for Middle East Policy

at the Brookings Institution, ―The Struggle for Middle East Democracy‖, Ikhwan Web, 4-28,

http://ikhwanmisr.net/article.php?id=28468&ref=search.php)



The revolutions are far from complete. Tunisia has faced sporadic violence and a succession of unstable interim cabinets. Despite being

the original spark for the region‘s uprisings, it has, perhaps predictably, become the forgotten revolution. Egypt is still governed by an

institution—the military—that was long the backbone of the Mubarak regime. For many Egyptian activists, March 9 was a turning

point, bringing back painful memories. That day, soldiers and plainclothes thugs armed with pipes and electric cables stormed Tahrir Square,

detained nearly two hundred people, and then took them to be tortured in a makeshift prison at the Egyptian Museum. As their challenges grow,

the country‘s opposition groups have returned to their old fractious ways. Indeed, democratic transitions are notoriously messy and

uncertain. Recognizing this, the Arab world‘s new emerging democracies will need support and assistance from the

international community, including the U nited S tates. This can be done through technical assistance and election monitoring.

But more high-level involvement may be necessary as well, by putting pressure on the new governments to uphold their commitments and

providing financial incentives to meet certain benchmarks on democratization. The question is whether the U nited S tates and its

European allies, with their cash-strapped governments and skeptical publics, are willing to commit billions of dollars to helping

democratize a still-troubled region.

A great deal is at stake. America was rightly credited for helping facilitate transitions in many Eastern European and

Latin American countries. If the U.S. is seen as helping make another transition possible, this time in Egypt, Tunisia,

and elsewhere, it will give Americans much-needed credibility in the region. Successful transitions could herald a

reimagined relationship between the United States and the Arab world, something that Obama promised in his 2009 Cairo

address but failed to deliver on.

To be sure, the United States has a checkered, tragic history in the region. For decades, the United States has been on the wrong side of history,

supporting and funding Arab autocrats and undermining nascent democratic movements when they threatened American interests. So critics of

Western ‗meddling‘ have a point: whenever the United States and Europe interfere in the region, they seem to get it wrong. That is precisely why

it‘s so important that, this time, they get it right. But getting it right requires that the U nited S tates fundamentally reassess its

Middle East policy and align itself with Arab populations and their democratic aspirations. This has not happened.

Egypt and Tunisia, despite all their problems, remain the most promising cases . Elsewhere, the situation is considerably more grave,

with U.S.-backed autocrats in Yemen and Bahrain having used unprecedented force against their own citizens. Saudi Arabia‘s military

intervention in Bahrain has fanned the flames of regional sectarianism and made an already explosive situation even worse.

Thus far, the Obama administration has been behind the curve in nearly every country, reacting to rather than shaping events.

President Obama adopted a slow and deliberate approach, and refused to take a stronger stand with America‘s Yemeni and Gulf allies. Even

enemies such as the Syrian regime have so far escaped any real pressure. If anything is clear, it is that Arabs have shown that something more

than caution and gradualism is called for in historic moments of change. This time, they–not the international community–are leading the way.

But they and their countries need the international community to follow. Otherwise, their revolutions may still fail.



Making it open reverses ―ala carte democracy‖ and boosts U.S. standing

Guéhenno 11 (Jean-Marie, Nonresident Senior Fellow – Brookings Institution, ―The Arab Spring is 2011, Not

1989‖, New York Times, 4-21, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/22/opinion/22iht-edguehenno22.html)

The Arab revolutions are beginning to destroy the cliché of an Arab world incapable of democratic transformation. But another caricature is

replacing it: according to the new narrative, the crowds in Cairo, Benghazi or Damascus, mobilized by Facebook and Twitter, are the latest

illustration of the spread of Western democratic ideals; and while the ―rise of the rest‖ may challenge the economic dominance of Western

nations, the West will continue to define the political agenda of the world. In that optimistic scenario, 1989 and 2011 are two chapters of the same

story, which connect in a self-congratulatory way the political appeal of democracy and the transformative power of entrepreneurship and new

technologies. In reality, the movements that are shaking the Arab world are profoundly different from the revolutions that ended the Soviet

empire. The Arab spring is about justice and equity as much as it is about democracy, because societies in which millions of young men and

women have no jobs — and millions live with less than two dollars a day — crave justice as much as democracy. As I heard one experienced

Arab diplomat say, today‘s revolutions are against ―profiteers‖ as much as they are against dictators. The movements are also profoundly

suspicious of foreign interference, and Western nations, which for many years have had a cozy relationship with dictators and

profiteers, will be utilized, but they are unlikely to be trusted or to serve as models as they were in 1989. The implications for

our Middle Eastern policies are wide-ranging. The good news is that the focus on social justice and practical issues of

development and redistribution has the potential to move the public debate further away from dreams of a return to the

mythical past of the caliphate promoted by radical Islamists. In the words of the French scholar Olivier Roy, the Arab revolutions may well





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become the first ―post-Islamist‖ revolutions. But that will happen only if we in the West accept that Muslim values — which

have, like Christian or Jewish values, many interpretations — can become part of the political debate, without being at the center of it.

The more we try to polarize secular forces against Islamic movements, the more unlikely it is that secular values will

win. We must abandon the illusion that the defining issue in the region is a battle between moderates and hardliners. Europe and the U nited

S tates could send a strong signal by ending their policy of ―à la carte democracy‖ and start talking to movements such as Hamas

or Hezbollah — which does not mean that we in any way agree with their views. Bringing the M uslim B rotherhood and related

organizations into mainstream politics rather than trying to isolate them should be a priority. This is all the more necessary as

the aspiration to justice will lead to demands that the present élites — and in particular security establishments — relinquish their grip not only on

power, but also on the economy, and that demand may eventually trigger a second wave of upheavals. A more democratic Arab world is also

likely to be less tolerant of the benign neglect with which the international community has often addressed the Israel-Palestine and the Israeli-

Arab conflicts since 2000. That should not be seen as a threat by countries that support a resolution of the conflict in accordance with

international law and a two-states solution, but it will require a ―reset‖ of the policies of the last 10 years. Lastly, as we discover that 2011 is not

1989, and that we are no more the trusted reference, we will have to navigate in unchartered waters: our engagement in Libya will probably have

less moral clarity at the end than it has had at the start. Political processes will inevitably be messy, and we will be tempted, especially in oil-

pick winners and manipulate outcomes. That would be disastrous for our long-term standing: in a

rich nations, to

region whose future has repeatedly been decided by foreigners since the end of the Ottoman empire, outside powers

will have to demonstrate that this time they are genuinely willing to support home-grown political processes. The

West has to accept that it is not the central player anymore. But it need not be an indifferent and passive spectator. Finding the

balance between engagement and restraint will be the policy challenge of this new phase . In Libya and possibly in some

other situations, the active involvement of the United Nations to find a political solution may help us find that new balance by providing the

impartiality and sufficient distance from great powers politics without which no political process will have a sustainable outcome.



Only unequivocal and clear assistance sends the right message

HRF 11 (Human Rights First – Nonprofit, Nonpartisan International Human Rights Organization, ―How to Seize

the Moment in Egypt‖, April, http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/Egypt-Blueprint-Seize-the-

Moment.pdf)

Over more than three decades since the Camp David Accords, the U.S. government has provided the Egyptian government with over

$50 billion in foreign assistance, the great majority of this in the form of military assistance. In FY 2010 and FY 2011 the level of aid has

been $1.56 billion, with $1.3 billion of that directed towards military assistance (FMF). FMF is a package of grants and loans for Egypt to

purchase weapons, military equipment, and training from the United States, and it will remain relevant to the new Egypt. Of the $250 million in

civilian aid (ESF), some $25 million was earmarked for programs related to democracy, human rights, and governance programs. It is worth

noting these programs were funded at double these levels under the Bush Administration between FY 2006 and FY 2008. There are at least two

important factors to consider in the allocation of the aid package: first, the concrete goals and outcomes that each specific outlay is intended to

achieve; and, just as importantly, the political message sent by the way the funds are allocated. The Obama Administration ran into

criticism for slashing the funds allocated to democracy and human rights, not because there were good projects that went unfunded,

but because of the perceived message that the Obama Administration cared less about human rights and democracy than its

predecessor. Sending an unequivocal and clearly understood message of support for a democratic transition in Egypt

must be one of the highest priorities for the administration at this time and adapting the foreign assistance package

would be one of the clearest ways to do that. Democracy and governance assistance should not only be in the form of direct support

for independent civil society, there is also a need for support to be provided to state institutions essential to the functioning

of a democratic system. These include resources for the judiciary, the police, and for bodies that failed to fulfill their

potential under President Mubarak but may now have a chance to flourish, like the National Human Rights Council. Egypt is at the

beginning of a daunting series of elections for members of parliament and for a new president. Several U.S. government-supported

institutions have great expertise in the technical and logistical aspects of holding free and fair elections. Such

institutions must be adequately funded so as to provide needed support to state institutions, nascent political parties, and to

civil society organizations involved in voter education and election monitoring. Each phase of the electoral process should be supported by an

independent, international election monitoring initiative, to which the U.S. government should contribute.



Tangible signals of U.S. support are critical --- Egypt’s the test case

Elshinnawi 10 (Mohamed, Foreign Affairs Writer – VOA, ―Egypt Key to Proving Obama's Commitment to Middle

East Democracy‖, Voice of America News, 6-30, http://www.voanews.com/english/news/special-reports/american-

life/Egypt-Key-to-Proving-Obamas-Commitment-to-Middle-East-Democracy.html)

There has been widespread public agreement in the Middle East that President Obama said many of the right things in his Cairo address. Experts

in Washington agree that he said them in the right place, because it is Egypt that will be the real test of Obama's commitment to

democracy. Quiet diplomacy Albertson recommends that the Obama administration engage with civil society in Egypt and

signal its support for their efforts to promote political reform and respect for human rights Andrew Albertson, executive director of the

independent Washington-based Project on Middle East Democracy, says people across the region are still looking for signs of

tangible U.S. support for political reform. He says the administration's efforts to use quiet, private, closed-door diplomacy



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sends the wrong message to people. "I think that telegraphs to people that they don't think it is important to speak

openly to them, to communicate. They think it is not important to engage them and involve them in the process of change, and that is a

problem." He adds that it sends the wrong signal to governments, as well. Albertson notes that the U.S. has urged Egyptian President Hosni

Mubarak to suspend the 28-year-old emergency laws that have curbed the nation's political life. Mubarak has refused and the Middle East analyst

says people are asking what Washington is going to do about it. He recommends that the Obama administration engage with civil society in

Egypt and signal its support for their efforts to promote political reform and respect for human rights. Time for a policy review? The Obama

Administration says it is engaging with Egyptian civil socity. But Dina Guirguis, a research fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East

Policy, says that approach has not yielded hoped-for results. "Things in Egypt on the ground have been deteriorating, manifested in the renewal of

the emergency law. Clearly the U.S. administration is not making the progress that I think it hoped it would make through quiet diplomacy," she

concludes, recommending that the Obama administration review its policy one year after Cairo to decide what has worked and what hasn't, and

look at other options. Among these other policy options, she says, is using U.S. aid or free trade agreements as pressuring tools, and showing a

stronger official response to violations of human rights or lack of progress in political reform. Egyptian activist Saad Eldin Ibrahim agrees that

the Obama administration has not used available leverage to influence political reform in his country. Now living in exile in the United States, the

sociology professor at the American University in Cairo was imprisoned by the Mubarak regime for advocating free elections and political

reform. "These dictators will never respond until they are pressured," Ibrahim insists, "and if they take pressure off the table, then the dictators

will have a free pass and they will continue to rule despotically, as they have for the last thirty years. So I hope they will do something because

we have two years that will shape not only the future of Egypt, but also the future of the Middle East, because wherever Egypt goes, so does the

Middle East." Upcoming elections Stephen Grand argues that an early test of Obama's commitment to democracy will be this

year's parliamentary elections in Egypt and next year's presidential vote Stephen Grand is Director of the Brookings Institute

Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World. He argues that an early test of Obama's commitment to democracy will be this year's

parliamentary elections in Egypt and next year's presidential vote: "Hopefully it will try to insure that there is a leveled playing field and that the

elections are free, fair and the voices of ordinary Egyptians are heard," he says, adding, "I think it would be a mistake for the U.S. to

run away from this challenge and sort of allow the existing regime to designate its own successor." Public opinion surveys in the Middle

East reflect a perception that while President Obama promised to help people have a say in how they are governed, the U.S., if faced with a

choice, would rather see stability with undemocratic leaders than an unstable democracy. But Tamara Wittes, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State

for Near East affairs, says there is no contradiction between U.S. support for democracy and its national interests in the Middle East: "Our

security interests are helped by the advancement of democracy and human rights and I think that is true for the countries of the region as well. I

think that the region as a whole will be more stable, more successful and more secure if it is more democratic, and that is the premise from which

we work." A work in progress After meeting with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Sharm el-Sheikh in June, Vice President Joe Biden

issued a statement that included a call for Egypt to continue working for a vibrant civil society and more open political competition. Those are

vital goals, he said, if Egypt is to remain strong and serve as a model for the region. Other experts acknowledge that U.S. support for political

reform across the Middle East is a long-term objective, whose success cannot be gauged only one year after the President's address in Cairo. They

agree that his Administration's efforts to foster democracy in the region are still a work in progress.



A lack of leadership and an increase in distrust fuels anti-western terrorist narratives

Asali 9 (Ziad, President and Founder – American Task Force on Palestine, et al., ―Changing Course: A New

Direction for U.S. Relations with the Muslim World‖, February, p. 9-16)



Improving relations with Muslim majority countries and communities is one of the most important foreign policy and

national security challenges facing the U nited S tates. In the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the U.S. sought to strengthen

its own security. Despite our leaders' insistence that we had no conflict with Islam or Muslims, and despite a long history of U.S. action to protect

and aid Muslims affected by war or natural disaster, our responses to 9/11 have sparked fear, mistrust, and hostility among many Muslims.

Antipathy toward the U.S. has risen not only in the countries most directly affected by U.S. military action (Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, and

Pakistan), but in many others around the world. In turn, violent extremist groups that claim to act in the name of Islam have used the

climate of distrust to gain support for further attacks on U.S. assets and allies. Though majorities in both the U.S. and Muslim

countries around the world want to reverse this spiral of violence , many fear that it will continue to escalate . The extremists who seek

to harm and destroy the U.S. represent a very small minority of Muslims, operating, for the most part, independent of governments, through loose

networks of social, financial, and logistical support. Given their strong convictions, and the limited ability of the U.S. and its allies to identify and

target them, they are difficult to dissuade or deter. Were an extremist group to use a nuclear , chemical, or biological weapon , or

sabotage a hazardous facility in a populated area in the U.S., it could kill tens of thousands or more.1 This Report begins with the premise that the

U.S. must work with Muslim counterparts who share our interest in improving mutual security to minimize the risk of such a scenario.

Responsibility for peaceful coexistence rests equally with U.S. and Muslim leaders worldwide. For the U.S., counterterrorism operations are a

necessary part of the strategy to keep Americans safe. However, these operations treat the symptoms rather than the causes of conflict. There is a

deep reservoir of grievances against the U.S. among Muslims around the world. Whether or not these grievances are justified, the climate of

hostility makes it possible for extremist groups to recruit and operate with relative ease in many countries and communities.

To reduce the risk of conflict, now and in the future, the U.S. must not only defend itself against attacks, but also build more

positive relations with key countries and counterparts across the Muslim world. Today, the U.S. stands at a crossroads in its

relations with the global Muslim community There is still a strong set of shared values and interests among American and Muslim

leaders and publics. Together, we can rebuild trust and address the core causes of tension. There are numerous diplomatic,

political, economic, and people-to-people initiatives on which to build. But if we continue on our current course, time is not on our side. The U.S.

government, in concert with business, faith, education, and civic leaders, needs to undertake major initiatives to address the causes of tension.

Working with Muslim counterparts, we can achieve substantial joint gains in peace and security, political and economic development, and respect

and understanding. The alternative is to increase our reliance on military action and counterterrorism in alliance with





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unpopular authoritarian governments. Doing so will raise the risk that our wrorst fears will be realized. For the sake of our own national security,

values, and aspirations, and those of more than a billion Muslims around the world, we must forge a new approach. The Leadership Group and

the U.S.-Muslim Engagement Project This Report presents the consensus of 34 American leaders in the fields of foreign and defense policy,

politics, business, religion, education, public opinion, psychology, philanthropy, and conflict resolution. We come from different walks of life,

faiths, political perspectives, and professional disciplines. Our shared goal is to develop and work to implement a wise, widely supportable

strategy to make the U.S. and the world safer, by responding to the primary causes of tension with Muslims around the world. We believe that a

strategy that builds on shared and complementary interests with Muslims in many countries is feasible, desirable, and consistent with core

American values. The Report also reflects dialogue with hundreds of American leaders and counterparts in Muslim countries, and research on the

views of millions of citizens in the U.S. and in Muslim countries whose perspectives and preferences we have explored. We have used the

process of dialogue and public opinion research not only to build a leadership consensus, but also to craft a strategy that can win broad public and

political support in the U.S., and build partnerships with Muslim leaders and people across the world. This project was convened, facilitated, and

supported by two organizations with expertise in building consensus on difficult public issues: Search for Common Ground and the Consensus

Building Institute. In addition, more than a dozen foundations, corporations and individuals have generously funded our work. Why Are U.S.

Relations with Muslim Countries and Communities Important? U.S. relations with Muslim countries and communities are critically

important for several reasons: the size of the global Muslim population; the geopolitical significance of key Muslim

countries and regions; the persistence of conflict in these strategically important regions over several decades; the dramatic

rise in tension and violence between the U.S. and a number of Muslim countries and groups during the past decade, and the risk of further

conflict escalation ; and the potential for both the U.S. and Muslim countries to prosper from improved relations and new partnerships.

Roughly one-fifth of the world's population, or about 1.3 billion people, is Muslim. Muslims form the majority in 56 countries across

North Africa; the Middle East; Asia Minor; and Central, South and Southeast Asia .' That geography spans major oil producing

regions, key land and sea trade routes, and areas of high political sensitivity and instability. Muslims also form important minority

communities in countries across Europe, North America, Sub-Saharan Africa, Australia, and parts of Asia. As with all major religious and ethnic

communities, there is great diversity in beliefs, values, cultures, political systems, and living standards among the world's Muslim communities.

Given this broad range of circumstances and the equally broad range of U.S. interests and relations with Muslim countries, Muslims' views about

U.S. policy have traditionally varied widely. There is, however, a clear trend. Since the 1940s, and more rapidly since the first Gulf War in the

early 1990s, more Muslims have become concerned about the U.S. role in supporting authoritarian governments. More have become angry at the

U.S. and its allies for their presence in Muslim lands. More feel resentful over the U.S. role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and more feel

humiliated by the sense that Americans do not understand or respect Islamic values or cultures. During the past six years, this set of concerns has

become even more widespread, consistent and intense. Today, the U.S. faces an extraordinarily strong and widely shared set of negative

perceptions among Muslim peoples and their leaders.' From a security standpoint, the primary U.S. focus is on armed extremist groups in

Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Lebanon, Syria, and Palestine.' However, the U.S. must also consider how our policies and

actions in those countries, their neighbors, and other Muslim countries around the world shape the ability of extremists to recruit,

operate and destabilize governments and societies. Addressing not only the immediate threat of terrorist and insurgent groups, but also

their broader bases of support and sympathy, should be a top national priority* for four reasons: • Muslim public hostility" toward the

U.S. is generating resources, recruits, and operational opportunities for extremist groups that seek to harm the U.S., Its

allies, and assets. It is also undermining mainstream Muslim leaders who seek tolerance, nonviolence, and constructive change in

relations with the U.S.* • Most Muslims' primary grievances and concerns are about "what the U.S. does," rather than "who we are." At the same

time, the U.S. has options for meeting its own interests in ways that are more compatible with most Muslims1 Interests and values. It is possible

to change our relationships to enhance mutual security, meet shared and complementary political goals, generate joint economic gains, and

demonstrate mutual respect for each others' core values. • By adopting a comprehensive strategy and implementing it now , it is likely

that the U.S. can significantly change perceptions and behavior among mainstream and politically activist Muslims in key

countries before attitudes and beliefs become "locked in" for a generation. On the other hand, failure to act soon will likely

lead to a hardening of attitudes, reinforcing extremists' claims that violent resistance to the U.S. is the best path to autonomy,

respect, and justice. • Fighting a long-term conflict with extremists in many Muslim countries will demand continued sacrifice

from the U.S. military, carry high economic costs , continue the political acrimony that has divided the country for the past several years,

and require the U.S. to use much of Its international political capital to maintain alliances. As a result, the U.S. will

have fewer resources to address pressing needs at home or other critical challenges abroad .



It spills over --- credible democracy assistance builds US/Arab cooperation on a array of issues --- including

global economic stability

Wittes 8 (Tamara Cofman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs – U.S. Department of State

and Former Senior Fellow – Brookings Institution, Freedom's Unsteady March: America's Role in Building Arab

Democracy, p. 2-12)

So it is with full awareness of the uphill climb I face with most readers that I state what should be an unremarkable thesis: promoting democracy in the Arab world



remains an imperative for the U nited S tates. This is the case not merely—or even mainly—because democracy might act as an antidote to the spread of Islamist

terrorism but because enduring American interests in the region require us to embrace and advance democracy for Arab citizens. America‘s fundamental interests in the Middle East remain

largely unchanged, despite the dramatic threats revealed by the attacks of September 11, 2001, and despite the massive, costly, and long-term intervention in Iraq. What has changed, radically, is

the U nited S tates will

the effectiveness of America‘s traditional means of securing its regional interests. What has worked in the past will not work in the future. In the coming years

find its historical tools of alliance-building in the Middle East altogether insufficient to protect American interests. As the Iraq

war has amply shown, even America‘s overwhelming military power does not enable it to achieve its regional goals









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unilaterally. U.S.-Arab cooperation remains a fundamental necessity for regional peace and global economic

stability. But the path to promoting and sustaining successful cooperation has irrevocably changed. U.S.-Arab cooperation can no longer be sustained on the crumbling

foundation of the past—the reliance on strong, autocratic leaders who can guarantee policy cooperation even in the face of domestic disapproval. A stable new basis for America‘s necessary

can be built only on the enlightened self-interest of both sides, and today, unlike in the past, that requires the consent of the region‘s citizens.

regional engagement

Only the development of liberal democracies in the Arab world‘s major states will, in the long term, secure the advancement of American goals in the

region. The Middle East is, according to Freedom House, the least democratic region on the globe. It resisted even the third wave of democratization that swept through Asia, Latin America, and eastern Europe during the 1980s and 1990s. Arab ―exceptionalism‖ has produced its

own scholarly literature of explanation and apology. 1 Scholars have explained the persistence of Arab authoritarianism through reference to historical circumstances, religious philosophy, political culture, great-power politics, and oil economics, among other factors. 2 Over the decades since

the collapse of the Ottoman Empire following its defeat in World War I, Arab states have been through many waves of political upheaval, yet the Arab world has not witnessed a single successful transition to democracy. A number of regimes in the region survive essentially unaltered from

their form at the moment of postcolonial independence. But most Arab regimes have undergone dramatic changes, including revolution, civil war, and military rule. More recently, since the end of the cold war, many Arab rulers have experimented with reforms in economics, politics, or both.

They have used the banner of ―democratization‖ to refer to the reestablishment of parliamentary bodies (Kuwait), the revision of press and association laws (Jordan and Egypt), and the holding of contested presidential elections (Yemen). Indeed, at several points in the pa st twenty years, the

relatively quick pace and broad scope of reforms in certain countries led observers to hail a democratic transformation in the region. But by and large these changes amounted to little improvement in the distribution of political power in Arab societies or in the minimal degree of public

accountability governments in the region enjoy. In recent years the rhetoric of democratization and the use of certain of democracy‘s forms have been in vogue even among Arab autocrats. Four of the conservative tribal monarchies of the Arab gulf have given women the right to vote and run

for office. 3 Egypt‘s long-time autocrat, President Hosni Mubarak, allowed himself to be reelected to his fifth term through a competitive ballot rather than, as in previous years, a yes-or-no referendum. 4 At the sixth annual Doha Forum on Democracy, Development, and Free Trade, held in

April 2006, the Qatari emir, hereditary monarch of the tiny gulf nation, said that ―the success of the democratic process is essential for addressing the manifestations of tyranny and corruption that still devour the people‘s fortunes, deprive them of their rights, and push some of them to

extremism and alienation.‖ 5 Even the calcified Arab League agreed, in March 2004, to ―keep pace with the rapid world changes, by consolidating the democratic practice, by enlarging participation in political and public life, [and] by fostering the role of all components of the civil society,

including NGOs, in conceiving of the guidelines of the society of tomorrow.‖ 6 The most dramatic change in rhetoric, however, has come not from the region but from the White House. Many commentators greeted President Bush‘s commitment, declared in November 2003, to spreading

democracy in the Middle East as a radical restructuring of American policy toward the region. But the commitment was not entirely new; the administration‘s rhetorical emphasis on transforming the politics of the Arab world had been evident since shortly after the 9/11 attacks. At West

Point in June 2002, for example, the president asserted, ―The twentieth century ended with a single surviving model of human progress, based on non-negotiable demands of human dignity, the rule of law, limits on the power of the state, respect for women and private property and free

speech and equal justice and religious tolerance. . . . Mothers and fathers and children across the Islamic world, and all the world, share the same fears and aspirations.‖ 7 Seven months later, on the eve of the Iraq war, the president argued the importance of democratization in the Arab world

for American security, asserting that ―stable and free nations do not breed the ideologies of murder.‖ 8 Bush has sustained his rhetorical emphasis on democratization in the years since then. In his second inaugural address he famously declared,―The survival of liberty in our land increasingly

depends on the success of liberty in other lands. The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world.‖ 9 And in a speech at the National Defense University in March 2005 he said that ―for the sake of our long-term security, all free nations must stand with the

forces of democracy and justice that have begun to transform the Middle East.‖ 10 The reason for this shift in presidential attitudes toward Middle East autocracy is an altered view of international security and its requirements that derives from the end of the cold war and the rise of

transnational security threats, including international organized crime, refugee and other migrant flows, and, most notably, international terrorism. 11 If events such as the Rwandan genocide or the Somali state‘s collapse demonstrated the consequences of internal political dynamics for the

security of neighboring states, then the al Qaeda attacks of September 11, 2001, drove home to many Western leaders the idea that domestic politics in one country or region might produce consequences affecting the security of states far distant. 12 The U.S. government thus embraced the

necessity of democratizing the Middle East in order to, as the phrase goes, ―drain the swamp‖ from which Islamist terrorism emerges. 13 The president‘s ―forward strategy of freedom‖ was the first attempt by the Bush administration to enunciate a positive vision for American engagement in

the post-Saddam Middle East. It was also, quite consciously, a strategy for winning the war on terrorism by transforming the dysfunctional politics of the region, which in Bush‘s view made Arab citizens resentful and repressed and so more vulnerable to the appeals of extremist ideology. The

Freedom Agenda, as the administration formally dubbed it, was billed as the political face of America‘s counterterrorism effort. Deeper and more meaningful than any attempt to ―win hearts and minds‖ for the United States itself, it was an effort to win Arab hearts and minds over to the

practice of American values and virtues—whether the new practitioners ultimately embraced the United States and its policies or not. From this perspective the goal of democracy in the Arab and broader Muslim worlds was to marginalize Islamist extremists, delegitimate political violence,

and so make the world safe for Americans. President Bush was probably correct in supposing that spreading liberal values in the Middle East would reduce the prevalence of anti-American terrorism in the long run. It is hard to imagine that, embraced by Arab societies, values such as

toleration, limited government, individual rights, and equality before the law would not help to limit the appeal of the ideology— deeply intolerant, totalitarian, even nihilistic—that undergirds the terrorists‘ actions and provides them with moral, popular, and financial support and with a pool

of willing recruits. Although democracy might not defeat terrorism, in the long run it ought to help undermine the popularity of violent, radical Islamism in countries where the ideology currently enjoys followers, sympathizers, and admirers. 14 The trouble is that although this theory has

strong philosophical roots and many friends, it is as yet entirely speculative. 15 Democratic societies produce terrorism and recently have even produced Islamist terrorists such as, to name only a few examples, Zacarias Moussaoui, Richard Reid, and the perpetrators of the July 2005 attacks

on the London subway. Democratization, moreover, is a long-term and uncertain process and, as recent scholarship has shown, often produces violence. 16 The assumption that democratization could defeat terrorism seems a thin reed upon which to build such a dramatic new commitment for

American foreign policy. But here is the rub: Although George W. Bush‘s application of America‘s traditional democratic idealism to the Middle East may derive largely from the post-9/11 logic of the global war on terror, it also responds, intentionally or not, to a real and growing crisis in

Middle East governance. The hesitant reforms of the Arab world‘s monarchs and imperial presidents and the mounting domestic and international pressure for more reform both respond to Arab societies‘ sinking circumstances in a changed global environment. In a world in which democratic

governance is an increasingly universal norm, in which political, social, and economic openness and flexibility appear to be the keys to successful development, the Arab states are increasingly out of step. 17 At the same time, demographic forces within the Arab countries are increasingly

challenging their governments‘ abilities to provide the basics: education, housing, health care, and jobs. The governance crisis in the Arab states has deep and long-standing roots. And the forces of change that are buffeting the Middle East from within and without are strong and growing.

They are not, by and large, explicitly democratic forces, meaning that the outcome of the coming change, without some concerted push, may well not be democratic either. Indeed, democratization in the Middle East is by no means inevitable—it is a very uncertain path, fraught with danger.

But it is a path that the peoples of the Middle East must take, because the alternatives are so much worse—for them, for us, and for the world. Because of this reality, America‘s new policy of democracy promotion in the Arab world is not best viewed as a naïve, ideological juggernaut that

deserves to crash and burn with the end of Bush‘s second term in office. Rather, the policy meshes with the real historical circumstances of both domestic and regional Arab politics. Bush‘s policy commitment to Arab democracy was significant not because it promised an end to Islamist



That is why getting American policy right on this

terrorism—which it could not realistically hope to deliver—but because it was responsive to historical developments already under way in the Middle East.



issue is so important and why the actual execution of the Freedom Agenda has been so disappointing. Indeed, despite the high-volume

rhetorical commitments of the Bush administration, it remains to be seen whether the U nited S tates can help to midwife the birth of

a democratic Arab future or whether, if the transformation occurs, the U nited S tates will be a mere spectator . The structures put

into place to implement President Bush‘s Freedom Agenda for the Middle East were woefully inadequate to the task at hand, and the minimal investments of funds and, more important, of

political capital made by the United States in supporting Arab democrats have so far had little effect other than threatening the credibility of the project. Already in the Freedom Agenda‘s first

few years the project has been beset by a lack of commitment among the foreign policy bureaucracy, by a mismatch between the assistance strategy and realities on the ground,

and, most notably, by a lack of support at senior policy levels to bolster democracy assistance

sufficient with frank government-to-government

dialogue. Adegree of naïveté in designing and implementing programs also limited the policy‘s force and chipped away at its effectiveness and the seriousness with which rulers and activists in

the region viewed it. Continuing down this path risks undermining the foundation of American public and congressional support for the larger project. America‘s weak-kneed policy, though, does

not result simply from indecision or an inadequate commitment to democratization on Bush‘s part. It flows, rather, from genuine dilemmas and costs associated with the promotion of

democracy—costs vividly on display in the Hamas victory and the gains by Islamists in Egypt and militants in Lebanon. The United States, while it today enjoys unprecedented and perhaps

unmatched ability to influence the direction of change in the Arab Middle East, still faces significant risks and obstacles to doing so effectively. First is the potential for democratic processes in

Arab states to produce outcomes that many Americans, including many policymakers, find unpalatable—specifically, the election of Islamists to the leaderships of what are today friendly Arab

states. Second is the possibility that a serious-minded pro-democracy policy might impede Arab regimes‘ cooperation with Washington on other issues of importance. These two factors, along

with other challenges of policy implementation, explain the hesitation and half-measures that have characterized even the most aggressive American efforts to advance democracy in this region.

ambivalence these risks and costs induce is understandable, but it creates a major impediment of its own: a significant credibility deficit on

The

America‘s part in arguing for democratic change to an Arab audience . Grassroots activists know the difference between drop-in-the-bucket

grantmaking programs administered by mid-level bureaucrats and a speech in which the president of the United States demands, as Ronald Reagan did of Mikhail Gorbachev in Berlin, that the

America‘s limited credibility with the Arab public, in any event, impairs its ability to play a

Soviet leader ―tear down this wall.‖ And

direct role in encouraging grassroots democratic development. Indeed, some Arab democracy activists argue that, given America‘s tainted reputation in the region, direct American assistance harms grassroots democrats more than it helps them. Any

effective policy of democracy promotion must begin by confronting and resolving the risks of bad outcomes and competing priorities—and addressing thereby the ambivalence they induce in America‘s own attitude toward the project. This is not, I admit, a challenge most commentators and

policymakers now wish to tackle. The United States is in the midst of a full-fledged backlash against advancing democracy as a policy objective. Democracy promotion, we are told, is naïve, unachievable, and imperialistic. And even when we win, we end up losing. The conventional wisdom

argues instead that we have no choice but to bolster the Middle East‘s extant autocratic regimes as bulwarks against extremism or at most to promote economic and other gradual reforms as spurs to eventual democratization. This is exactly the wrong answer. My purpose in this book is to

argue that, notwithstanding the failures of the past several years, America has no viable choice but to wield its power and influence firmly on behalf of democratic reform in the Middle East, alongside other reforms in economics and society. For the United States, and indeed for the rest of the

international community, the risks that accompany Arab democratization are at least balanced by, if not overwhelmed by, the risks of failing to act on behalf of democratic development in this strategic part of the world. Propping up corrupt autocrats might seem the only way to hold back

radical Islamists whom democracy would hasten to power. But, in fact, failing to press assertively for basic political rights serves to entrench the Islamists‘ position as the sole viable opposition to the autocrats, just as surely as it entrenches the autocrats—for now, at least—in power. Only by

pushing to expand political freedoms can the United States cultivate the sort of political movements that can challenge the Islamists for legitimacy as voices of dissent. In pressing for expanded political rights, the United States has more powerful tools than many policymakers and

commentators imagine. All this may seem an obtuse argument given the extent to which, in the public discourse both in the United States and abroad, the Bush administration‘s policy of advancing Middle Eastern democracy is inextricably linked to the war in Iraq. Yet this conflation

misunderstands both the Iraq war and Bush‘s policy of democracy promotion. Humanitarian intervention to topple a brutal dictatorship was a distant third among the rationales put forward by the Bush administration and its allies for the invasion; the primary arguments had to do with Iraq‘s

weapons of mass destruction, both past and presumed, and its alleged links to terrorist groups. Hope that Saddam‘s fall would produce a democratic ―domino effect‖ in the region was expressed by the president and other senior officials as a hope, not as a war aim. 18 The United States would

not have gone to war simply to create a democracy in Iraq, absent what was then viewed as a compelling security rationale. On the other hand, having made a decision to invade and topple the existing dictatorship, the United States and its allies could not reasonably have been expected to

impose a nondemocratic successor regime in Baghdad. The goal of establishing a democratic government in Iraq is properly viewed as a consequence of the decision to go to war, not as a motive. Similarly, the project of Iraqi stabilization would have been only marginally less difficult had

the American military imposed a strongman of its own. The military would still have had to contend with the competing ambitions of Kurds, Sunnis, and Shiites, and it would still have faced an insurgency by al Qaeda and by those dissatisfied with the distribution of power and wealth in post-

Saddam Iraq. The challenge of building a democracy in Iraq after the previous regime‘s defeat is more properly viewed as a project of postconflict reconstruction and nation-building than one of promoting a transition from authoritarianism to democracy. The Iraq war is a distorted prism

through which to view external efforts to cultivate Middle East democracies for another reason: almost no efforts to promote democracy, either today in the Middle East or throughout modern history, have been carried out at the point of a gun. Although international norms clearly endorse

democracy as the form of government most protective of fundamental human rights and freedoms, and although post–cold war international practice suggests the evolution of a ―duty to protect‖ citizens from an abusive government as a rationale for external intervention, a lack of democracy

in and of itself has never been suggested by any state as sufficient reason for military overthrow. Aggravated human rights abuses and transborder effects harmful to international peace and security (such as mass refugee flows) have been required to raise governments‘ indifference to their

citizens to a level worthy of international scrutiny, let alone action. 19 The notion that democracy promotion necessarily involves forcible imposition or military intervention, simply because the war in Iraq did so, is a red herring. Indeed, partly as a result of the fiasco in Iraq, the United States

is far from advocating forcible regime change in any other case, either in the Middle East or outside it. The Bush administration may have pressed its relatively ambitious agenda of democracy promotion in the Middle East simultaneous with its execution of the war in Iraq, but the two

efforts—except in Iraq itself—employ different approachesand tools. Iraq is not a model of democracy promotion likely ever to be replicated. This is not to say that the war in Iraq has no implications for efforts to promote democracy in the Middle East. Unfortunately, those implications are

vast. At least initially there was some evidence in the wake of the invasion that, as in past episodes of Arab military defeat, Western intervention in the Arab heartland had provoked the sort of introspection that might encourage internal pressures for democratic change. As in 1967, after

Israel‘s lightning defeat of the combined Arab armies and conquest of territory previously held by Syria, Jordan, and Egypt, Arab commentators asked how it was that their nations had become so feeble. The ouster of Saddam likewise compelled even nationalist journalists and intellectuals to

ask whether internal weaknesses were what had led to the humiliation of yet another external military intervention in the region. For example, a petition signed by 287 Syrian citizens and delivered to Syrian president Bashar al-Assad in May 2003 noted that ―the only force capable‖ of

combating America‘s imperialist plans in Iraq and Palestine was ―a free nation.‖ 20 More recently, however, the chaos in Iraq has overtaken Arab public perceptions, making an easy case for those who argue for the benefits of order over freedom in public life. It has also further discredited

American leadership and, in Arab eyes, motives. 21 This has made it more difficult for those both inside the region and around the world to partner with the United States in advancing Arab democracy. Whether the Iraq war will, in the end, hasten or stymie a democratic trend in the Middle

East will be a matter for historians to judge. But however much the American intervention in Iraq may color contemporary perceptions, clearly it is inappropriate to restrict a discussion of the American role in building Arab democracy to an examination of the failed military intervention in

Iraq. The more substantial objection to efforts to promote Arab democracy is that those undertaken by the Bush administration have produced very limited payoffs—and some of the farther-reaching outcomes have yielded profound regret in Washington. The elections in Iraq, Lebanon, and

Palestine produced gains by armed Islamist factions whose values are far from the liberal pluralism that the United States would like to see triumph in Arab politics. Indeed, the very commitment of these groups to democratic pluralism, given their ideologies and their continued armed

activities, is questionable.In some places, domestic agitation and initial American pressure produced substantive gains in political freedom. In Egypt, Yemen, and Morocco, for example, the period immediately following the Iraq war produced tangible results. Egypt held its first-ever

competitive presidential ballot, marred though it was by unfair rules, state harassment of opposition candidates, and repression of voters. In Yemen the president committed the government to a new anticorruption drive and allowed a significant degree of competition in his reelection bid. In

Morocco a major social reform passed the legislature that vastly improved the legal status of women. The king also accepted the report of a commission investigating state abuses of human rights during the reign of his father. But in each place, progress slowed or even was reversed (notably

in Egypt) as American efforts flagged and the executive power reasserted its authority over spheres where greater liberty had temporarily reigned. Surveying the region in late 2007, one sees the Lebanese government stalemated between allies and adversaries of neighboring Syria, with the

militant group Hizballah nearly able to tip the government into irrelevance. The Palestinian Authority, struggling under the weight of Fatah‘s entrenched corruption and Hamas‘s violent intransigence, has split into two rival entities in the West Bank and Gaza. In Egypt, major opposition

leaders are back in prison and the country holds its breath to see what Mubarak‘s death might hold in store. It is not a pretty picture, and realists are reasonably tempted to avert their eyes and try to return to the comfort of the old policy framework—one in which dictators did as America



One way or another, major changes are coming to Middle

wanted, more or less, in exchange for American indulgence of their illiberalisms. But that comforting framework is no longer available.





East governments. The U nited S tates can try to prevent those changes, but for reasons I lay out in the following chapters, it is highly unlikely

to succeed in the long run and will pay a huge price for the effort to stand behind the region‘s repressive forces. The alternative

is to try to shape the change, to encourage and cultivate those forces and institutions most congenial to Western values and interests. Uniquely at this moment

in history, the U nited S tates has a crucial role to play in the future of the Middle East. America‘s overwhelming military

and economic dominance of world affairs since the cold war, its brash but irrevocable intervention in Iraq, its indispensable role in Arab-



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Israeli relations, and its close military relations with many Arab leaders and governments make its attitude toward domestic

Arab political development a significant variable in the way these changes play out. America‘s enduring interests in the

Middle East do not allow it to take a neutral stance toward the question of Arab democracy.



Mideast is critical for the global economy --- careful diplomacy’s key to sustain access

Habibi 9 (Nader, Professor of Economics of the Middle East – Brandeis University and Dr. Eckart Woertz, Director

of the Economic Research Program – Gulf Research Center (Dubai), ―U.S. - Arab Economic Relations and the

Obama Administration‖, 34, February, http://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB34.pdf)



In this Brief we have identified four issues that affect U.S.-Arab economic relations and must be taken into consideration by the U.S.

administration as it sets a new course for the American Middle East policy. While oil will continue to dominate the U.S. strategic

concerns about the region, the growing economic and financial power of some Middle Eastern countries also deserves

some consideration. These countries are combining their large oil revenues with sound economic policy to achieve high economic growth

rates and they are being actively courted by Europe an and Asian countries who seek to expand their trade and investment

relations with these nations. The United States also has an interest in promoting economic growth and higher standards of living in lower-

income Middle Eastern countries. Poverty and inequality in countries like Egypt and Yemen often leads to the rise of militant

movements and political violence which spreads throughout the region and is frequently targeted towards U.S. interests. Global

competition for the Middle East export markets will be intense in the coming decade. The ability of the U nited S tates

to succeed in this market will partially depend on the diplomatic and military dimensions of the U.S. Middle East policy,

particularly its perceived role in the Middle East conflict.



Economic collapse causes extinction

Egyptian aid boosts regional support necessary for reliable energy access

HRF 11 (Human Rights First – Nonprofit, Nonpartisan International Human Rights Organization, ―How to Seize

the Moment in Egypt‖, April, http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/Egypt-Blueprint-Seize-the-

Moment.pdf)



President Obama noted in Cairo that governments that support human rights are more stable, successful and secure.

They make better strategic partners than the despots the U.S. government has supported for so long. It is precisely in

the countries where the United States has a long history of providing financial assistance and cultivating close

military and security cooperation that it now has the greatest opportunity to shape new relationships. These close

relationships that have for decades been placed in the service of repression and authoritarianism, earning the United

States the distrust and enmity of people in the region, are now potential assets in promoting a peaceful transition to

democracy in Egypt, the regional trendsetter, and Tunisia. Instead of the discredited reliance on alliances with

autocrats, there is a need for a new paradigm that builds genuine stability on the basis of responsive government,

respect for the rule of law and adherence to international human rights standards. Core U.S. interests and strategic

concerns in the region have not changed. Maintaining access to a reliable supply of oil and other energy resources,

combating terrorism and the threat of religious extremism, containing the influence of Iran, preventing nuclear

proliferation, and ensuring Israel‘s security all remain high on the U.S. policy agenda. These interests have been

imperfectly served by the stability-through-repression approach and will be better served by an approach that

champions government of the people, by the people, for the people as the desirable norm for America‘s regional

allies. Indeed, such an approach would take as its model the mutually beneficial relationships the United States

enjoys with its closest democratic allies in Europe and around the world. The benefits of this new approach could be

considerable: instead of U.S. alliances with dictators in the region becoming a rallying call for Al-Qaeda and other

violent anti-American extremists, partnerships with democratic allies would improve the popular perception of the

United States and thereby serve its interests.



That prevents shocks that go global

Cohen 5 (William, Cohen Group, Former U.S. Secretary of Defense, and Chair – CSIS Advisory Committee on

U.S. Policy in the Arab World, et al., ―From Conflict to Cooperation: Writing a New Chapter in U.S.-Arab

Relations‖, March, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/0503_conflictcooperation.pdf)



Right now, a significant opportunity exists not only to make progress on the Middle East peace that has eluded us for generations, but also to look

ahead at other critical challenges in the Arab world that He beyond the horizon. In this report, we have chosen to spotlight the crisis in Arab-

U.S. relations because we believe it is a serious threat to our security and interests. We have presented a variety of concrete





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recommendations because we believe we cannot afford to choose between addressing immediate and long-term needs in the region, between

reaching out to governments or nongovernmental organizations, between focusing on leaders or their citizens.

We know we share a common future; what we do in the coming years and decades will determine if that future is characterized by conflict or

cooperation. Protecting our security and our ever-increasing interests in the Arab world will require a new commitment

from policymakers and citizens on both sides to build strong partnerships with one another. Will we continue to have major

differences? Of course. But a century of polarization will serve neither Arabs nor Americans, while a relationship built on

common goals and common ground has the potential to improve the fates of us all .

U.S. Security Depends on Stability in the Arab World

The Arab world is increasingly featured on the front pages of U.S. newspapers, at the top of this country's foreign policy agenda, and on the

minds of Americans. In the wake of February's historic elections in Iraq, insurgents continue their attacks on soldiers and civilians alike. Oil

prices soar. Lebanon's former prime minister is killed by a car bomb. Hopes for peace resurface in the Middle East. Not since the Truman

administration has the United States been so deeply involved in such a broad swath of territory.

While Cold War competition focused attention on Arab countries from the 1950s to the 1980s, their importance did not fade after the fall of the

Soviet Union. To the contrary, instability in the Middle East is one of the gravest threats facing our county at the beginning of the

twenty-first century.

Over the last century, the U nited S tates has been drawn increasingly to the Arab world because of our wide range of critical

interests in the region—from energy to military facilities to Israeli security. The Suez Canal continues to be a key channel for

commerce, warships, and other vital cargo passing from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea and beyond. The Arab world is vital to global

energy security, holding nearly 60 percent of the world's proven petroleum reserves and 30 percent of natural gas

reserves. The safety of some of the United States' closest allies, including Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Morocco, depends on a

stable region. As the core of the Islamic world, what happens in Arab countries sends ripples around the globe, affecting more

than a billion people.

Most recently, the Arab world has been a primary source of terrorists—who attack the United States, defy borders and treaties, and help to fuel an

extremist movement that is global in its scope, millennial in its aims, and deadly in its actions. These dangerous networks of non-state actors have

both threatened our way of life and highlighted the inadequacy of our approach to the region.

There is a growing consensus that U.S. interests—and indeed, the American people—cannot be secured in the face of social and

political turmoil in the Arab world that expresses itself as violence against Arabs and non-Arabs alike. This realization did not begin with

the events of September 11, 2001, but the calls for change, from both inside and outside the Arab world, have been growing in volume since that

tragic day.



Oil shocks increase hostility between Asian nations

Halloran 8 (Richard, Former Foreign Correspondent in Asia and Military Correspondent – New York Times, ―Oil

Scarcity Paints a Bleak Picture for Asia‖, South China Morning Post, 2-13, Lexis)



A fresh assessment of Asia's energy outlook asserts that the region, along with the United States, is being confronted with a

"daunting challenge" as oil consumption rises much faster than production and the end of the world's oil supply is in

sight. According to Asia's Energy Future, published by the East-West Centre, a US-government-funded research and educational institute in

Honolulu: "Today, the challenge of energy security is greater than ever. The days of cheap and plentiful oil are over. World oil production is

likely to reach a peak some time in the next 10 to 15 years." It will level off and decline after that. The principal authors, Fereidun Fesharaki and

Kang Wu, warn: "Coupled with emerging supply limitations, the Asia- Pacific region's increasing demand for oil raises

fears of tensions among Asian nations and between Asia and the west." Frederick Smith, chief executive of FedEx, the world's

largest express-transport company with 700 aircraft and 80,000 trucks, is more pointed. He wrote in Newsweek: "It shouldn't be forgotten that the

proximate cause of World War II was the US oil embargo against Japan ... The first gulf war was caused totally by oil - it was Saddam Hussein's

insistence that he owned certain oilfields that led to his invasion of Kuwait and our ouster of his forces there". What he calls "the subsequent

presence" of the US in the Middle East, evidently meaning Iraq, has been driven by oil. He says some analysts think 40 per cent of US military

spending goes to protecting the oil trade. Competition for energy in Asia, even more than the confrontations between North

and South Korea, mainland China and Taiwan, and India and Pakistan could be the cause of hostilities across the

region.









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MB Gaining Power Now

The MB is gaining electoral power now—the Left is too divided

Rubin 11

(Barry, director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East

Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal, ―Polls Prove Strength, Not Weakness, of Islamists in Egypt,‖ 8-4-

11, http://pajamasmedia.com/barryrubin/2011/08/04/polls-prove-strength-not-weakness-of-islamists-in-egypt/)



Several recent polls purport to show the Muslim Brotherhood is unpopular in Egypt. An article in the Atlantic is

particularly laughable, claiming the Brotherhood is less popular than Richard Nixon when he resigned! The most

important single point is this: the Brotherhood isn‘t at an ―unpopular‖ 17 percent but a very popular 34% from

Egyptian voters who declared support for a party that might win seats. In other words, one in every three Egyptians

who have decided and will have a real role in the outcome are ready to cast their ballots for the Brotherhood. It is the

largest single party. And it has advantages that make it likely to get more than 33 percent of the seats. That isn‘t bad

in an election with more than 20 parties. With 20 political parties would you call the one supported by one-third of

decided voters ―unpopular‖? In the United States you need 50 percent plus one vote to win but the current ruling

parties in multi-party Israel, Holland, and Turkey came to power with that level of direct support. In the last German

elections, the Christian Democratic Union won with 27 percent of the votes (which yielded 31% of the seats); the

Socialists have won French parliamentary elections with 39 percent. Here are my adjusted figures for parties based

on voters who back a party likely to win seats (more than 5 percent support in the polls). I am not saying this

analysis is perfect (for example, a party with 5 percent might get 2.5 percent of the seats due to half being elected on

a national level) but it does give a good general idea of the situation. 1, Islamists: 34% Muslim Brotherhood

(Freedom and Justice Party). Note that Salafist (even more radical) Islamist groups don‘t do well. Islamist voters are

uniting behind the Brotherhood despite all the talk of splits. 2. Pro-Old Regime: 14% National Democratic Party,

Mubarak‘s old party. 3. Liberal, pro-democratic 14% Free Egyptians Party, a liberal, anti-Islamist party founded by

big businessman Naguib Sawiris. 10% Justice Party. This is the party most associated with the Facebook kids and

well-known opposition leaders. 22% Al-Wafd Party, historic liberal party. Total for liberals: 46% That is impressive

but far less than it seems. Keep in mind, though, that it is better to have 34% for one candidate than 46% for three.

In a district with that outcome the Brotherhood would win. Moreover, liberals are badly divided. The Wafd has at

times toyed with a Brotherhood alliance, while the Justice Party has some far left leanings. The Free Egyptians seem

to be a really serious anti-Islamist party but it is largely dependent on the largesse of one man. If liberals got one-

third of the seats they could block the Brotherhood from power but not from having tremendous influence. By the

same token, the Brotherhood would block a liberal majority. These three parties don‘t like each other though if they

cooperate and make election agreements that are implemented this might really change things. So far i‘ve left out the

divided radical left, four parties combining hardline anti-American, neo-Marxist and radical nationalist views:

Egyptian Labor, ElGhad Party, Tagamoe, and ElKarama. All together, they take 19 percent. But since they are rivals

they would probably get about 10% of the seats. The bottom line is that the Brotherhood will be the most powerful

party in Egypt‘s first election. There are a number of reasons to think it would get more than 34 percent: –It is quite

likely that just five parties—Brotherhood, Wafd, Justice, Free Egyptians, New Democratic Party—will have any

significant representation. With many votes ―wasted,‖ the Brotherhood will have the advantage as the largest single

party and might well take 40 percent of the seats. –The Brotherhood could win in many districts merely by coming

in first albeit with only a minority of overall ballots. Liberal parties will ―steal‖ votes from each other and put

Brotherhood candidates into office in many places. Hamas only won the Palestinian elections because Fatah

candidates ran against each other. —Egypt‘s first elected government will be very unpopular within a year or two.

The economy is going to collapse; promises cannot be kept. The Brotherhood might prefer to be in the opposition

during this period to reap more support in future. –The Brotherhood can coopt independent candidates using

ideology, offers of electoral backing, or rewards in parliament (such as—if you excuse the expression–―pork‖

projects for their districts). Thus, the Brotherhood in parliament could command seats outside of its own official

delegation more easily than its rivals. –Given its better organization, the Brotherhood will get its voters out on

election day. Intimidation and the pressure for conformity so powerful in Egyptian society will also count, especially

in the many tradition-oriented villages and poor areas of the big cities. –Don‘t assume the far left and Brotherhood

won‘t cooperate. They have similar views on foreign policy. –Presumably the National Democratic Party will be a

pariah and neither liberal nor Islamist blocs will work with it. Thus, another 14 percent of the seats will be irrelevant

in forming any coalition, proportionately increasing the Brotherhood‘s numerical edge. Liberals cannot deal with the

hated old regime party but leaders of the National Democratic Party could make a deal with the Brotherhood in





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order to keep their privileges. Brotherhood supporters would support such a bargain if it helped obtain their main

priorities. I never thought the Brotherhood will get a majority. My concern is that it will control around 40 percent

of the seats, be the largest single bloc, and get most of what it wants in a new constitution. The president will most

likely be Amr Moussa, a radical nationalist who opposes Islamism but will probably buy off the Brotherhood,

Salafists, and radical left with a militant foreign policy.









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Exclusion Bad

Excluding the MB causes it to become radical and violent

Wittes 8

(Tamara Cofman, Director of the Middle East Democracy and Development Project at the Brookings Institute,

internally cites Khalil Al-Anani, Todd G. Patkin Visiting Fellow, ―Changing Islamist Politics in the Middle East,‖ 6-

4-08, http://www.brookings.edu/events/2008/0604_arab_world.aspx)



Al-Anani said that the exclusion of moderate Islamists from the political process has negative results. These include:

radicalizing moderate Islamists; expanding the appeal of Salafist ideas among those who look to Islamist movements; and

depoliticizing the broader population. Moderate Islamists, al-Anani argued, feel pressured to radicalize because they see

that engagement with the formal political process earns them only election losses and the ire of the state. Some have come to

see political participation as a dead end, leading to the rise of what al-Anani labeled a ―New Salafism.‖ Al-Anani defined Salafism as a particular

reading of Islamic texts and history that encourages political passivity and cultural and social isolation from the rest of the world. Alone, he

argued, salafism might not be a concern. But because the followers of today‘s Islamist movements are already politicized and mobilized, he

predicted, the rise of this isolationist, exclusivist ideology has the potential to transform into dangerous Salafi-

Jihadism, in which those with very narrow-minded religious beliefs turn to more radical actions, including violence,

to turn their beliefs into reality. Finally, government repression of Islamist political participation works to depoliticize Arab societies as a

whole, as citizens begin to question the efficacy of and benefits to political participation. And when participation in the existing political system

is seen as fruitless, this strengthens the arguments of those who promote more radical action. Al-Anani said that the backlash from US

efforts at democracy promotion in the region bears some responsibility for the rise in Salafist discourse. He said that

US interests are better served by interaction with moderate Islamists than by encouraging a situation in which

Salafists are likely to make further gains. He presented a series of recommendations for US action in support of democracy in the

region: 1) the United States should support the principle of democracy in the Arab world, regardless of the outcomes.

This includes defending the rights to peaceful political participation of all opposition groups , and criticizing Arab

government repression whether it targets Islamists or liberals; 2) the United States should encourage its Arab allies to permit the inclusion of

peaceful and moderate Islamists in the political process; 3) the United States should itself enter into dialogue with Islamist party

leaders in an effort to understand their goals and their expectations from the U nited States. This could even be done, he

argued, through Europe-based representatives of these groups; and 4) the United States should encourage non-governmental

interactions between Islamists and Americans, whether through think tank-sponsored conversations, NGO conferences, or student

exchanges. He concluded by arguing that the younger generation within the region‘s Islamist movements had not yet fully evolved their political

views, and were a good audience for more intensive engagement with the United States. The discussion following Al-Anani‘s presentation

focused on how to evaluate the relative moderation, pragmatism, and commitment to democracy of moderate Islamist parties. Al-Anani argued

that there is no evidence to support the charge that moderate Islamist parties, once they gain political power, would

change the rules and refuse to renounce it. Given the nature of existing regimes, he said, Arab citizens today face a choice between

corrupt authoritarian regimes and authoritarian, but untested, Islamist movements. We must not compare Islamists to an unavailable ideal, he

argued, but to the existing alternatives in Arab politics. As regards Islamist attitudes toward democracy and toward US interests, al-Anani said

that every moderate Islamist party in the region that gained meaningful political power – from Kuwait, to Morocco, to

Turkey, to Yemen – acted strategically, in a very pragmatic fashion and in response to the opportunities of their environment.

He therefore predicted that the pragmatism of these Islamist groups would extend to their relations with the U nited States,

and that they would operate on the principle that state relations are predicated on the protection of national interests.









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Aid Key

Making aid available for the MB demonstrates a serious commitment to overhauling U.S. policy toward Arab

populations

Hamid 10 (Shadi, Director of Research – Brookings Doha Center and Fellow – Saban Center for Middle East Policy

at the Brookings Institution, ―The Cairo Conundrum‖, Democracy Journal, 15, Winter, p. 43-45)



ANSWERING THE ISLAMIST QUESTION

The second policy pillar, under the rubric of Islamist engagement, would serve effectively to resolve America‘s long-standing ―Islamist

dilemma,‖ reflected in the contradictory impulses of wanting democratic elections but fearing Islamist victories at the polls. Obama should

begin with a set of rhetorical clarifications, stating that the U nited S tates is not opposed to dealing with Islamist groups,

as long as they fulfill the conditions of renouncing violence and committing to the rules of the democratic game. The Administration has

already signaled its interest in moving in this direction. Administration officials reportedly pressured the Egyptian government to

invite members of the Muslim Brotherhood‘s parliamentary bloc to the Cairo speech. The public-diplomacy benefit was limited,

however; the Administration could not actually publicize that it had wanted the Brotherhood to attend, so very few people are aware that it

did. Meanwhile, the M iddle E ast P artnership I nitiative continues to place an informal ban on funding Brotherhood-

affiliated organizations in Egypt and has not allowed Brotherhood leaders to participate in conferences that receive

MEPI funding. As a simple first step to remove such hurdles, Clinton should issue a directive explicitly permitting all

State Department employees to meet with and incorporate members of the Brotherhood in their programming. A public

review of American policy toward Islamists would communicate several important messages. It would make clear to

the Egyptian people that the U nited S tates no longer opposes the participation of the most popular political group in Egypt. To

the Egyptian regime, it would demonstrate our renewed seriousness . Mubarak has long warned Americans that they have only two

choices, his ruling National Democratic Party or the Muslim Brotherhood, and that we best choose the former. It is time to call his bluff. Of

course, dialogue is a means, not an end. Once enough trust is developed, U.S. officials and the Brotherhood can move from discussing ideas to

discussing shared interests. If there are ever free elections in Egypt, Islamists would stand a good chance of winning either a plurality or a

majority (even with government rigging, they won well over half of the seats they contested in the 2005 elections). Truly free elections

necessarily imply a degree of uncertainty. The rise of Islamists to power could pose risks for American interests. As such, it 44

makes sense to try to influence the Brotherhood‘s positions on our strategic concerns—its position on the peace treaty with Israel

for example— before it comes to power, rather than afterward, when it will be too late . At the same time, the U nited S tates

must be careful to avoid being seen as favoring one party over the other. The key is to allow a diverse range of

opposition groups the opportunity to participate fully in the country‘s political life. Once blocks to participation are removed—if we are

able to persuade the regime to remove them—it will be up to Egyptians to decide their own political course. GREATER

EXPECTATIONS In understanding what works and what doesn‘t, there is an unfortunately thin history to draw on. With only one real

exception—a brief period in 2004 and 2005—the United States has never made a serious effort to support democracy in the Middle East. In

reality, beyond rhetoric, symbolic gestures, and relatively small increases in democracy funding, the Bush administration did not do much. Yet,

even a relatively small amount of pressure can go a long way. 2005, after all, saw Egypt‘s first ever mass-mobilization in support of democracy,

with more than 150,000 participating in protests, demonstrations, and campaign rallies. This is a lesson worth taking to heart as the Obama

Administration considers its future relationship with the Egyptian regime and the Egyptian people. Assuming the political will is present, the

policy changes outlined above can be implemented immediately. If the Administration takes the initiative on conditionality and Islamist

engagement, Egypt‘s leaders are likely to express dissatisfaction but little more. When the Bush Administration put pressure on Cairo to reform,

Mubarak did not withhold cooperation on key strategic concerns. Michele Dunne of the Carnegie Endowment notes that ―if anything, Cairo tried

harder to please Washington…in the hope of relieving pressure for political reform.‖ Counterintuitively, then, democracy promotion, if

done carefully and gradually, may actually spur increased Egyptian cooperation on Arab-Israeli peace,

counterterrorism, and other interests than would otherwise be the case. Egypt is an intuitive candidate for a strategic

reorientation in U.S. policy—both risky and necessary—that emphasizes engagement not only with Arab regimes, but Arab

publics as well. Unlike other countries in the region, Egypt can claim an educated urban population, a degree of political

institutionalization, a legacy of parliamentary politics, and an active, occasionally assertive, civil society. As important as the

government is, it is not the only constituency worth courting. Dependent on external moral and military support, the state itself, while strong, is

vulnerable and sensitive to outside pressure. Considering the regional role it plays—and the potential role it still could play—

a thriving and successful Egypt is critical to a thriving, successful Middle East. In this, the neoconservatives were not incorrect, although

their country of choice to demonstrate a ―ripple effect‖ was an odd one.









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Solvency – Moderation

Even if the plan doesn’t change the election, it establishes linkages with the Brotherhood that provide

leverage to moderate their behavior

Hamid 7 (Shadi, Director of Research – Brookings Doha Center and Fellow – Saban Center for Middle East Policy

at the Brookings Institution, ―Parting the Veil‖, Journal of Democracy, Summer, p. 45-46)



Third, the U nited S tates should seek to influence internal struggles within Islamist groups in key countries. This means

recognizing that there are serious internal divisions between ―reformists‖ and ―conservatives.‖ Unfortunately, because of

increased polarization after last summer‘s Israel-Hezbollah war, the ideologues grow stronger; today, for example, ―hawks‖ and ―Hamasists‖

dominate Jordan‘s IAF, something which was not the case three years ago. Policymakers must find ways to draw the balance of power

toward those relative moderates who are more predisposed toward rapprochement with America and coexistence with Israel. The

de-polarization of the region can be achieved by, among other steps, apologizing for the Iraq war, emphasizing the war on terror‘s non-military

aspects, and recommitting to hands-on diplomacy in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. These measures would create a reservoir of

goodwill and give reform-minded Islamists political cover to move to the center and take positions that may be

unpopular with their more conservative supporters.

Fourth, the United States should facilitate cross-ideological cooperation between Islamists and secularists. The more Islamists face real

competition, the better. Ideally, Islamist groups would come to power as part of larger coalitions with secular and liberal parties. With this in

mind, the United States should make a concerted effort to promote Islamist participation in the context of an official framework–for example a

national charter–which would encourage the participation of secular parties. A charter would clearly outline the rules of the game and guarantee

freedom of religion, freedom of expression, and equal rights for women and minorities regardless of which party came to power. There is a

precedent for such an approach. In 1995, the United States supported the Sant‘Egidio talks in Rome in which Algerian parties from across the

ideological spectrum agreed on a national platform as the basis of a new political process.

Finally, it is critical to begin building bridges with the next generation of Islamists. This can be done by using educational

and cultural exchanges as a mechanism for establishing meaningful linkages between American researchers, policymakers, and

businesspeople and their Islamist counterparts. The goal would be to identify Islamist leaders of tomorrow and provide them with a

balanced view of American culture and politics.

While these changes are unlikely in the short run to be popular domestically, they are necessary. Islamists will come to power whether

we like it or not; in Iraq, Turkey, and the Palestinian territories, they already have, It is better to have links–and leverage–with

these groups before they come to power, not afterwards. This leverage will increase our ability to hold Islamists to

their democratic commitments, and will be critical in ensuring that vital American interests are protected when

―friendly‖ dictators are finally pushed out of power . Autocracy is not permanent. It will, sooner or later, give way to an uncertain

―something else.‖ The question is whether the U nited S tates will position itself on the right side of the coming

transformation.

Risks and Benefits

willingness to engage with moderate Islamist parties is the necessary prerequisite for reviving

Given current realities, a

American support of democracy in the Middle East. Nevertheless, the question remains: Is promoting democracy really worth it

when there are so many risks? It is. Not only is supporting Arab democracy the only way for progressives to realign their policies with their

longstanding belief that America has a moral responsibility to promote human rights and democracy abroad, it is also a wise strategy for

countering the poisonous political environment that has given rise to so many of the region‘s intractable problems. Democracy would give Arabs

a newfound sense of political agency, provide an alternative to the prevailing culture of victimization, grant liberals more political space to

communicate their ideas, and focus Arab attention on internal development rather than external problems. Perhaps most importantly, democracy

promotion is the only way to effectively combat religious extremism and terrorism. On the most basic level, when people lack peaceful,

democratic channels to express their political grievances, they are more likely to resort to violent methods. In an important 2003 study, Princeton

University‘s Alan Krueger and Czech scholar Jitka Maleckova analyzed a vast amount of data on terrorist attacks and concluded, ―The only

variable that was consistently associated with the number of terrorists was the Freedom House index of political rights and civil liberties.

Countries with more freedom were less likely to be the birthplace of international terrorists.‖









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Solvency – AT: Say No

MB will say yes --- they’ve explicitly requested engagement

Hamid 10 (Shadi, Director of Research – Brookings Doha Center and Fellow – Saban Center for Middle East Policy

at the Brookings Institution, ―How to Revive Obama's Middle East Policy? Some Responses‖, Ikhwan Web, 1-5,

http://ikhwanmisr.net/article.php?id=22468)



And there are ways to make U.S. civil society assistance more effective. Depending on how you define terms, the

Muslim Brotherhood is arguably the largest civil society organization in the Arab world, with a vast, interlocking

network of hospitals, clinics, mosques, schools, foundations, boy scout troops, and day care centers in numerous

countries. Those that argue that the Muslim Brotherhood is an anti-democratic organization - and therefore uncivil -

are a bit off the mark. For instance, he Islamic Action Front, the political wing of the Jordanian Brotherhood, might

very well be the most democratically run political party in the Arab world. Even the Egyptian Brotherhood, which is

less democratic, is still more internally democratic than most of its secular counterparts.

As I note, however, the State Department‘s Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) has an informal ban on

funding Brotherhood-affiliated organizations in Egypt and has not allowed Brotherhood leaders to participate in

conferences that receive MEPI funding. This led to me to suggest the following: ―As a simple first step to remove

such hurdles, Secretary Clinton should issue a directive explicitly permitting all State Department employees to

meet with and incorporate members of Brotherhood in their programming.‖

TBE write ―but we also think it quite simplistic when writers claim that regimes in the region use the Palestinian

issue to focus citizens‘ anger away from the regimes‘ own misdeeds. It has been our experience that people (not just

in the Middle East, but everywhere, if you can imagine) are perfectly capable of denouncing injustice abroad

without forgetting about injustice at home.‖ I don't believe I made any such claim, although it is, in general terms, an

accurate one. There‘s only so much one person can be angry about, particularly when it‘s much more practical for

the average Egyptian to become angry about Israel than to become angry about domestic politics. The former is

permitted, sometimes even encouraged, while the latter can land you in jail. I think I know which one I‘d choose.

TBE then go on to critique the two policy ―pillars‖ that I recommend for U.S. policymakers – ―positive

conditionality‖ and Islamist engagement: ―We don‘t find the idea of positive conditionality likely to be

implemented.‖ Neither do I. That‘s why I wrote the article.

Later: ―Hamid presupposes that the Brotherhood wants to talk to the US.‖ This is not a presupposition or even a

supposition. A number of Brotherhood leaders and officials have explicitly told me that they want to talk to the

U.S. Of course, the conditions have to be right. But the desire is there. To some extent, it‘s already happened in

isolated instances, informally and off-the-record, sometimes through interlocutors and other times directly. More

generally, the Egyptian Brotherhood, in recent years, has devoted increased attention and resources to reaching out

to Western audiences, and in particular the policy community. In 2005, the Brotherhood‘s Guidance Bureau, the

organization‘s top decision-making body, launched an internal initiative under the title ―Re-introducing the

Brotherhood to the West.‖









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MSU 11

File Title



Extremist MB Bad – Mideast Stability

An extremist MB destabilizes the Middle East and emboldens Iran

London 11

(Herbert, President Emeritus of Hudson Institute and Professor Emeritus of New York University, ―Egypt and the

Obama Administration,‖ 2-9-11,

http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication_details&id=7715&pubType=HI_opeds)



As I see it, Brotherhood power in Egypt, even if exercised behind the political curtain, would be calamitous for U.S.

interests in the region. For the Brotherhood, violence is justified when it is consistent with the cause and that cause

is jihad. History is written in blood, not Western law. In 2007, so called reform minded leaders argued that all

government decisions must be vetted to ensure they are consistent with Islamic law. However, it is not clear how

much influence the Muslim Brotherhood has among the protestors or the military forces or even among the

peasantry. Therefore, keeping your powder dry seems a reasonable position, until the movement of historical forces

carries it away on the tide of change. The problem, at the moment, is it is not clear what the Obama administration

has in mind. On the one hand, it is calling for stability which could be interpreted as endorsing Mubarak; on the

other hand, it is continually making reference to ―transition,‖ which suggests Mubarak must be ousted. Clearly the

U.S. wants or should want a stable, civil society in Egypt that is aligned with U.S. regional interests. If that is not

possible, the U.S. should curtail its economic and military assistance in excess of $1 billion and bolster the only

enduring democracy in the Middle East neighborhood, Israel. Should Egypt become dominated by extremist forces,

the likelihood of war increases and the resultant chaos will work to the advantage of Iran. Even though a Persian

nation distrusted by Arabs and a Shia state distrusted by Sunnis, Iran is the strong horse in the region that garners

support through its messianic belief in violence. If the evolving Egyptians story reveals anything, it is how

destabilizing a weak and ineffectual U.S. can be. At another time in the distant past, the U.S. would have recognized

its interests and know exactly what it must do to secure stability. This, however, is not that time and the U.S. no

longer recognizes its strategic interests or how to protect them.









22

MSU 11

File Title



A2: Credibility High

Credibility’s plummeting

Esposito 11 (John L. Esposito, Founding Director – Prince Alwaleed bin Talal Center for Muslim-Christian

Understanding and Dr. Jonathan Githens-Mazer, Associate Professor of Ethno-Politics and Co-Director of the

European Muslim Research Centre (EMRC) – University of Exeter, ―Rhetoric vs. Action in American Diplomacy‖,

Huffington Post, 7-25, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-l-esposito/when-words-fail-rhetoric-_b_907642.html)



But by October 2010, Gallup's: "Measuring the State of Muslim-West Relations: Assessing 'The New Beginning'," reported That

Obama's approval rating decreased from 37% to 18% in Egypt and similar dips were found in other MENA countries. In

2011, despite the apparent best efforts of the Obama administration, US credibility in the Arab world has continued to plummet . A

recent Zogby poll suggests that in the eyes of many in the Arab world, the Obama administration's foreign policy has not moved

significantly beyond that of GWB. They see little difference between Bush and Obama policies on closing Guantanamo and introducing

military courts, significantly increasing troops in Afghanistan, backtracking and retreating from the President's firm stand on ending illegal

settlements in Palestine-Israel, and continuing support for authoritarian regimes. Like that of GWB, there is a failure to realize attitudes towards

America are more about whether America walks the talk. The inspiring rhetoric has made current actions even more deeply disappointing. In part,

this disappointment reflects the real world impact of WikiLeaks. Whatever the best intentions had been behind the commitment to

21st century statecraft and public diplomacy, the façade of being the unquestioned global good guy was exposed by the torrent of

documents and reports that evidenced US complicity in supporting regimes and states in the Arab and Muslim worlds

that were anti-democratic and massively repressive. The impact of these revelations, reinforced by media images of innocent civilians

killed by unmanned drones in a crescent from Northwest Pakistan to Yemen and Somalia, was compounded by the stalled peace process in Israel-

Palestine. The Arab Spring encapsulates the failure of public diplomacy whose actions do not speak louder than wor ds.

The series of popular uprisings against brutal and repressive dictatorships throughout the Middle East and North Africa apparently partially

resulted from the WikiLeaks exposure of regimes in Tunisia and Egypt and stung the US twice -- once for supporting these autocrats, and again

for failing to move quickly and decisively, choosing to remain on the sidelines. Secretary of State Clinton, meeting with Arab political and civil

society leaders, when asked about the Tunisian protests the day before Ben Ali fled Tunisia responded: "We can't take sides."









23

MSU 11

File Title



A2: Alt Causes

Action in Egypt is the vital internal link

Kerry 11 (Senator John, ―Chairman Kerry Highlights Urgent Libya Actions At Hearing On Middle East Uprisings‖,

U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 3-17, http://foreign.senate.gov/press/chair/release/?id=0d649ee0-

4e25-47d7-804f-f0200a03fdff)



This morning, we are pleased to welcome back one of our nation‘s most distinguished diplomats to discuss one of the most important issues

facing our country and, indeed, the world. Undersecretary Bill Burns has served in the Foreign Service for nearly 30 years, including as

Ambassador to Jordan and Russia and as Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs. I want to thank you, Bill, for taking time out of what I

know has been an enormously busy schedule to fill us in on the inspiring and troubling events unfolding in the Arab world . No one in

our government has had a better perspective on the changes that are sweeping across the Middle East. We are immensely fortunate to have the

benefit of your experience at this historic moment. In two short months, we have seen stirring triumphs in Tunis and Tahrir Square,

unprecedented protests in Sana and Manama, and brutal crackdowns in Tripoli and Benghazi. These uprisings constitute one of the

most momentous developments of our time. They also present an enormous challenge both for the people of the region

and for America‘s relationship with them. How we respond today will shape our strategic position in the Middle

East—and how Muslims around the world see us—for decades to come . The removal of Hosni Mubarak from office was a

victory above all for the people of Egypt. It also was a victory for democrats around the world, because it showed that political change—even

tremendous political change—can be brought about peacefully. If this liberation can be translated into lasting democracy, then the new Arab

awakening will carry a vital message: that ordinary people everywhere can determine for themselves how they are governed. The

developments in Egypt and Tunisia also represent a blow against extremism. A successful democracy in Egypt will demonstrate

that al Qaeda‘s belief that change requires the cowardly violence of terror is wrong. And it will weaken the position of states like Iran that repress

their own people and use terrorist organizations to advance their interests.









24

MSU 11

File Title



Democracy Assistance Key

Egypt is the test case for U.S. regional credibility --- Obama must deliver on democracy assistance to sustain

our influence

Vicenzino 11 (Marco, Founder and Director – Global Strategy Project and JD – Georgetown Law, ―The Obama

Administration, the G8, and Middle East Dynamics‖, Aspenia Online, 6-6, http://m.aspeninstitute.it/aspenia-

online/article/obama-administration-g8-and-middle-east-dynamics)



Although the future of the Arab Spring is still up for grabs, the international community has a real opportunity to

influence its outcome. This must be principally pursued through concerted multilateral action, bilateral efforts and effective

coordination of aid, strictly contingent upon real reform. This can help much of the region‘s short-term needs and long-term challenges. The

outcome of the recent G8 summit provides a promising start. Dubbed the ―Deauville Partnership‖ comprising the G8 states, Tunisia and Egypt,

the new initiative aims to assist the transition to democracy with up to $20 billion in aid.

As the principal investor and donor in the Middle East and North Africa, the EU has traditionally endorsed human rights and democracy

promotion as key policy components, at least in principle. In reality, the stability argument prevailed. New realities dictate new needs which

require converting the traditional rhetoric of democracy into practice. The convenient and fairly predictable top-down relationships with regional

autocrats must now give way to working with new forces and dynamics emanating from the bottom-up. Aid and investment must also extend

beyond the economic realm. Cultivating and nurturing democratization programs is essential, and constant outreach at all levels is required to

prevent former practices from prevailing. Skilful diplomacy and adept understanding of grassroots forces will be indispensable.

Despite Europe‘s prominent role and responsibility, US choices can make a difference . Barack Obama‘s May speech at the

State Department was an attempt to press another regional re-start button with the Middle East in less than two years. It certainly

grabbed global headlines, but it largely fell on deaf ears in the region, particularly to many struggling on the front lines of the Arab Spring.

Obama‘s historic 2009 Cairo speech had created high expectations: by overpromising and underdelivering, US credibility

suffered .

The complexity and speed of regional developments has understandably reduced outsiders, including the US, to a largely

reactive role. However, Obama‘s rhetorical twists and policy turns as the Arab Spring unfolded further undercut US standing in

the region. From over-cautious reluctance on Egypt‘s Hosni Mubarak to last-minute support at the UN Security Council for action against

Libya, the US president is increasingly perceived as investing more in the rhetoric of democracy and less in its

realization. Obama is now personally struggling to bridge the credibility gap in the Middle East, and initiatives

coordinated at the G8 level can play an important role.

While concerned with the region as a whole, America‘s primary focus remains Egypt. Its revolutionary outcome remains the

linchpin for much of the Arab Spring‘s future. With diminishing regional influence, US foreign policy will benefit in

the longterm from a stronger and more assertive Egypt with greater democratic credentials. Its example would provide a

constructive reference point, inspire others aspiring to open societies and undermine the credibility of other regional

autocracies and repressive systems.









25

MSU 11

File Title



US/Muslim Relations Good – Economy

Weak US/Muslim relations undermine U.S. diplomatic power --- risks global economic crisis

Ibrahim 10 (Dr. Azeem, Research Fellow at the International Security Program – Harvard University, and Mehmet

Celebi, Fellow – Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, ―How to Improve the United States‘ Image in the

Muslim World‖, October, http://ispu.org/files/PDFs/ISPU_US%20Image%20Report_Azeem_Ibrahim_and_Mehme

t_Celebi.pdf)



Defense and Security

The Obama administration‘s first national security strategy, published in May 2010 1 , both identified a wider range of threats to the American

homeland‘s future security than did previous strategies and also expanded the number of policy tools that would be used to address them.

Nuclear proliferation, al-Qaeda, the economic crisis, and climate change were identified as real threats, and it was

suggested that future national defense strategies would be best served by moving away from a traditional military defense

toward one based on counter-insurgency. Also emphasized was the need to use diplomacy as a key to the country‘s future defense in a

way that recent national security strategies had not envisioned. This report follows the lead of this document in identifying how successful

engagement with the Muslim world can contribute to the U nited S tates‘ national security and further its international security

goals as set out in that document. In addition, this report defines the United States‘ power in the world as ―the ability to achieve goals.‖ This is

an important departure from the definition of power in purely military terms. The previous decade has, we believe, demonstrated the limits of

military force to achieve the country‘s stated goals. The Bush administration‘s stated goals of capturing or killing Osama bin Laden; spreading

democracy in the Middle East; and achieving a stable, legitimate, and pro-Western government in Afghanistan with effective sovereignty over the

majority of its territory were not achieved despite significant expenditures and deployments of military force. This leads the authors of this report

to believe that military force alone is not an effective measure of global power . A more appropriate one would seem to be the

ability to achieve goals, whether the means used to do so are military or diplomatic. This point is important because while the necessity of

engaging the Muslim world is of little relevance to furthering American power, as defined by the projection of military force, it is

absolutely crucial to furthering the country‘s power as defined by the ability to achieve its international goals, particularly

where they concern Muslim or Muslim-majority countries. Traditional Interstate War Nobody would argue that engagement and diplomacy could

prevent a state that was determined to launch a military attack on the United States‘ allies or interests from doing so. however, there has been no

such conventional interstate military threat in recent decades. And the evidence is that positive engagement can help the U nited S tates

diffuse the kind of tension that might lead to military challenges to its global interests. From George H. W. Bush‘s

―coalition of the willing‖ to support the first Gulf war to the progress made by Pakistan in tackling militants in its North West Frontier Province,

to the engagement of Libya in 2007, examples abound of how the Muslim world can provide allies to help the U nited S tates

achieve its stated goals if it is handled carefully and sensitively. On the other hand, recent history also offers clear evidence that

when the U nited S tates defies international opinion, it becomes less able to achieve its goals – and thus less powerful.

Its leverage in international fora declines, and most states become increasingly willing to defy it. The best example of this is

the isolation it suffered after its invasion of Iraq in 2003, after which many Muslim governments factored in the domestic cost to

their own legitimacy of being seen to help the U nited S tates. A straight comparison with the breadth of the pre-Gulf war ―coalition of

the willing‖ against Saddam Hussein versus the contraction in international support for the United States in the years following the invasion is

instructive. The latter undertaking weakened American power both at the UN and in bilateral diplomatic efforts. This negative

development could have been avoided, however, if the diplomatic disadvantage of not engaging Muslim states had been factored

into the decision-making process that preceded and directly followed the invasion. Such a weakening of American power can – and must –

be avoided in the future.









26

MSU 11

File Title



Credibility Key Mideast Access

Credibility is essential to sustain U.S. access to the region. Otherwise, Europe and China will lock us out.

Habibi 9 (Nader, Professor of Economics of the Middle East – Brandeis University and Dr. Eckart Woertz, Director

of the Economic Research Program – Gulf Research Center (Dubai), ―U.S. - Arab Economic Relations and the

Obama Administration‖, 34, February, http://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB34.pdf)



Third, U.S. businesses will benefit from the economic growth and development of MENA countries. The U nited S tates

enjoys a comparative advantage in sales of high-tech products such as airplanes, advanced computers, electronic devices, and—for better or for

worse—advanced weapons systems. It is also a leading provider of oil technology and services, which are in high demand in

region. Even more significant for the United States is MENA‘s food deficit, which offers attractive

many parts of the

export opportunities for U.S. agricultural products. The U.S. is one of the leading food exporters in the world, and as the MENA

region—which has mostly stagnant agricultural production, due to scarcity of water and arable land—grows, demand for imported food products

will increase. 9 The U nited S tates must seek international cooperation, however, with respect to the promotion of

sustainable growth in the Middle East. Unilateral initiatives will put a higher financial burden on the U.S. government—and in light of

recent tensions between the U.S. and Arab countries over Iraq, are also less likely to gain acceptance inside the region. But if the U.S. does

not take the lead, it is likely that Europe and China, which enjoy more goodwill in the region, will launch their own

developmental assistance initiative for the region, causing a further reduction in U.S. influence.









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