An Evaluation of the Concepts of Direct, Structural and Cultural Violence in
Relation to Nomadic Bedouin Tribes in Israel
Susie Fielding
Introduction
This article will define the three terms of violence and then use the Bedouin in Israel
as a case study for all of them, showing examples of their use in practicality today.
The three types of violence, although distinguished from each other in terms of
definition, overlap in reality. Where direct and structural violence can be seen as
actual types of violence shown towards a group of people, cultural violence is more
the legitimisation of the violence in and of itself. What will also be discussed is
whether it is possible to truly differentiate between the former two in reality. Although
the definitions will be much simplified, this is necessary in order to apply then to the
case study effectively. The outcome will be an analysis of which types of violence
can be identified against the Bedouin society in Israel and combine academic theory
and practical experience.
Firstly, it is important to outline the three main different types of violence: direct,
structural and cultural, and attempt to define the key differences between them. It is
inadequate to say that direct, or intended, violence is the only type of violence
evident in the world today, although it may be the most obvious. Johan Galtung
introduced the terms structural and cultural violence into the field of conflict analysis
in both his articles „Violence, Peace and Peace Research‟i (1969) and „Cultural
Violence‟ii (1990). He defines any type of violence as being “present when human
beings are influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realisations are below
their potential realisations”iii which can incorporate more definitions of violence than
merely direct. Although he expands his reference to violence to at least six different
dimensions in his study, for the purposes of simplicity only the main three
aforementioned will be the focus of this evaluation. In terms of achieving peace, if
only one of these types of violence is taken away, there becomes a negative peace,
as for the achievement of positive peace it is necessary to eliminate both structural
and direct violenceiv.
Direct Violence
Direct violence is the most apparent form of violence, being noticeable, intended and
perceived by the victim, and therefore at the focus of attention. Direct violence, also
referred to as personal violence by Galtung, is an active rather than a passive
violence and is the most obvious point of departure in terms of violence studiesv.
Direct violence is where a subject proactively performs in order to disadvantage a
victim. Although in most cases of violence there is a subject and an object, the
definitive thing being that the subject intends to carry out violence and does so in a
way whereby there is a physical act which denies the object their rights to the
„potential realisations‟ referred to earlier.
Structural Violence
Structural violence occurs whenever people are disadvantaged by political, legal,
economic or cultural traditions. Johan Galtung coined the term in his article
„Violence, Peace and peace Research‟ (1969) and defines it as existing when
structures of inequality prevent the potential victims being reached, particularly in
terms of the distribution of power, and whereby an unequal vulnerability can be seen
by different groups in society. It is the central notion from the field of conflict analysis
and can be defined as ongoing and institutionalised deprivation of the needs of
survival, well-being, identity and freedom: “Structural violence is built into everyday
life, into the economy, a political system, and into the landscape”vi. The object of
structural violence may be persuaded not to perceive the violence at all; it is silent
and does not show, it can be seen as natural, as the violence is inherent within a
society. Although the “tranquil waters of structural violence may contain much more
violence”vii than direct violence, it is not apparent and is less easily noticed.
There are four spheres where both types of violence can be seen in society and
examples of the types of violence may aid their definition:
Typology of Violenceviii
Direct Violence Structural Violence
Survival needs (life or Killing Exploitation, starvation
death) and disease
Well-being needs (full Maiming, siege, sanctions, Exploitation, malnutrition
health potential) misery
Identity needs De-socialisation, Segmentation, caste
prevention of use of systems
mother tongue
Freedom needs Detention, expulsion Marginalisation
Cultural Violence
The notion of cultural violence is important to both the aforementioned types of
violence because it is via culture that these two types of violence are legitimised,
particularly in terms of structural violence which can be passed on through
generations and which groups are „inferior‟ can be subject to change. The concept
of an inferior group of people in a society holds a notion of chosen and not chosen
groups: at a grassroots level we could even talk about the human species over the
animal world. Cultural violence is that which gives the reason for the evident direct
or structural violence, “thus rendering it acceptable to society”ix.
An analysis of the Bedouin Arabs in Israel will follow, which provides practical
examples of these types of violence evident in societies today.
Bedouin Background
Bedouin, traditionally, are desert dwelling Arab nomadic pastoralists found
throughout most of the desert belt extending from the Atlantic coast to the Arabian
Desert. There are many different types of Bedouin tribes, but this article will focus
on the ones affected by the Middle East conflict in the Negev region of Israel.
Although they are traditionally nomadic, over recent years they have moved to a
more sedentary way of living, arguable due to pressures from the Israeli government.
They have gone through a rapid urbanisation process since the 1960s and are now
dependent upon integration into the modern Israeli labour market for their livelihood.
Violence against Bedouin Tribes
The first type of violence toward the Bedouin is the State of Israel not recognising
their land ownership rights, which date back as far as the 1858 Ottoman Land Order
and the Land Order of the British Mandate Government of 1921 based upon it, both
of which stated that „dead‟ lands which the Bedouin inhabited needed to be
registered in order to be deemed their property. The Bedouin failed to adhere to this,
thus meaning that the State of Israel claimed the lands as their own. In defence of
the Israeli government, the Bedouin had been given the opportunity to register the
lands yet did not. During the 1948 War, however, most of the Bedouin either fled or
were driven out of these lands, and at the end of the war were relocated to
settlements on these laws‟ basis. In 1950, the „Absentees Property Law‟ was
passed, allowing the state to confiscate and register the land the Bedouin had fled
from, and in 1953 this was legitimised by the „Land Acquisition (Validation of Acts
and Compensation) Law‟.
These laws give an indication of the structural way in which violence towards the
Bedouin can be seen. Through the laws and the structure of society, the violence is
inherent in the legal system and therefore both indirect and structural. Although the
Bedouin in some cases took their land claims to court, the state contended that the
Bedouin had no proof of ownership and their only hope of proof were certificates of
land tax payment which were claimed to be lost. This arguable may display all three
Types of violence against the Bedouin‟s identity needs. Direct in terms of the act of
losing the certificates, structural if not, and also through the inherent need for
Bedouin to prove themselves before the state in an unequal manner to Israelis, and
in the legitimisation through the laws. It is also cultural through the separate way in
which the Bedouin are treated to other Israeli citizens, and through the influence
culture has on these laws in their initial presence. Swirski and Hasson have
described the Bedouin as the „invisible citizens‟ of Israel, a term which unwittingly
connotes a direct connection with the ideas of structural violencex.
Because of this infrastructure, the Bedouin are victims of marginalisation which is
identified in the typology of violence as a violation of their freedom needs. The
outcome of the 1948 war left the Jews with a state and the Palestinian Arabs without
one, struggling to obtain full official recognition of their ownership rights to the lands
on which they live and full rights to government services. Because the Arab-Bedouin
were outside the hegemonic Jewish Zionist society, they had no place in the nation
of Israel and were systematically led to live in the cultural, political and economic
margins. This marginalisation can be seen as an example of structural violence in
means but can also be seen to be a clear example of cultural violence. Their
difference from the majority of society and their rejection of Zionism was used to give
legitimacy to their marginalisation from the rest of society.
The Bedouin are also victims of violence through the process of resettlement.
Throughout the1960s, the Israeli government moved the Bedouin from their lands,
often settling and resettling them in closed military zones and then in specific small
areas, denying them access to their former lands and furthermore excluding them
from its development plans. The result of this movement is that Bedouins are left
with two options: to live in the established Bedouin towns or live illegally dispersed in
settlements across the Desert, creating two different types of Bedouin, those who
are „recognised‟ and living in government-created towns and the „unrecognised‟ by
the Israeli government. This can be seen as violence against their identity and
freedom needs, as Article Seven of the Universal Definition of human rights states
that all people have the right to recognition and equality without discrimination before
the lawxi. Israel is a signatory of the major human rights treaties, yet it can be seen
from the government‟s treatment of the Bedouin that they are exerting structural
violence upon them. This relocation policy links with the denial of their lands and
infringes their freedom rights to their traditional nomadic lifestyle. Forcing the
Bedouin into settlements means that they have to live a sedentary way of life, which
is evidence of structural violence and cultural violence due to the legitimisation of this
violence through the differences in culture between Bedouin and Israelis.
It is next important to differentiate between the Bedouin in recognised villages and
those in unrecognised ones. Most of the recognised towns have been around for
approximately twenty years, yet they still lack many of the basic living standards
across the economic, political and social spheres and therefore do not appear to be
an attractive alternative to those in unrecognised villages. Those in recognised
villages are often left out of government development plans, as well as lacking the
infrastructure and employment opportunities available to those in neighbouring
Jewish villages. They also have a lower standard of education and basic facilities
such as healthcare, banks and libraries. There are nine points laid out by Swirski
and Hasson in „Invisible Citizens‟xii which demonstrate what the main disadvantages
are in comparison to neighbouring Jewish localities:
Smaller area of jurisdiction
The lowest municipal budgets in Israel
Lower watering allotments
Sewerage infrastructures non-existent or inadequate
Inadequate road systems
Lack of internal or external public transportation
Lack of reliable telephone lines
Lack of public facilities
Large number of schools operating in temporary structures
Higher rates of unemployment
Lower wages
This is apparent structural violence against their well-being needs. It is not direct
violence as they are not, for example, having their telephone lines taken away, but
are rather not being given these services in the first place, even though Israel has
the capability to provide them.
The Bedouin in unrecognised villages are victim to all of the above, but furthermore
have additional disadvantages. The above problems are evident in unrecognised
towns but tend to be of an even worse standard of living, affecting their well-being
needs. They are not allowed to construct permanent dwellings, which has
implications for their identity needs. Also, because of their unrecognised status, they
do not have the right to put the name of their village on their ID cards, and therefore
are left with no address. This is also a clear infringement of their identity needs, and
is apparent through the terms of structural violence. They also lack a local
government and the right to vote and to be elected to local office which infringes their
freedom needs, along with lacking the basic property rights of home purchase and
sale which affects both their freedom and identity needs.
Those in unrecognised villages are subject to government demolition orders on their
property, which the Israeli government claims is theirs. Although this can be seen as
a form of direct violence, there is also evidence of cultural and structural violence in
that the authorities use the cover of legality to undertake demolitions within these
unrecognised villages: “The common knowledge as to the illegality of the Bedouin
settlements is derived from a power context embedded in the social structure of
society, which is framed by the rhetoric of the government”xiii. The rhetoric of the
government is the example of cultural violence: it gives legitimacy to the treatment of
the Bedouin in this way. The structural violence evident is the way in which the
power context is embedded within the social framework of society, these laws
allowing this demolition to take place and for the voices of the minority Bedouins to
be silenced.
The Future of the Bedouin
In terms of peace, there is a danger that with the changing form of cultural violence
over time, if Palestinians gained control there may well be structural violence seen
against the Israelis in retaliation. Also, there is a danger of links between structural
and direct violence, in terms of the Bedouin, as they may resort to direct violence as
a result of the structural violence they are subjected to. The recent Sharon Plan of
2003, which was intended to be an attempt at making progress with Bedouin
integration, only served to appear to set up further law enforcement upon them,
leading to its perception by the Bedouin as a „declaration of war‟ on unrecognised
villages. This shows how close structural violence can come to erupting into direct
violence. If we hold, as Galtung suggests, that full and positive peace can only be
achieved if we can see an elimination of both types of violence then this reiterates
the dangers of them both.
The possibility of a resolution to the violence has been addressed by Winter and
Leighton, who concur with Opotow‟s view that,: “structural violence is not inevitable if
we become aware of its operations and build systematic ways to mitigate its
effects”xiv. John Galtung looks to Ghandian „unity of life‟ and „unity of means and
ends‟ as a solution, along with the ideas of collaborative co-existence. Amnesty
International has expressed concern regarding the Bedouin and set up an
organisation called Dikium to look at infringements of their human rights, and so
structural violence seen there has been noted. Whether it is likely that a difference
will be made is yet to be seen, however the fact that they are drawing attention to
this violence in Israel is at least a start.
Conclusion
Although government policies in Israel have had an effect upon the ability of Bedouin
tribes to be nomadic and free to live life how they wish, it is important to be aware
that other factors also contribute to this situation. Examples include the oil
production in Libya and the Persian Gulf, their own desire for improved living
standards and the examples of Syria and their drought from 1958-1961 which forced
many to give up herding for standard employment. Also, although government
policies putting pressure on the Bedouins into settlements may be due to the desire
for control over their land, it may also be put in place through a desire to provide
services such for them in recognised settlements and also to protect themselves
from threats they perceive from the Bedouin.
However, we have still seen many different examples of violence toward them, and
the conclusion is to see that more structural violence can be seen than direct
violence. In reference to the typology of violence, although their survival needs are
not evidently infringed per se, their identity, well-being and freedom needs are clearly
under attack through structural violence. The important thing to highlight here is that
violence is evident because there is the capability by the Israeli government to act
otherwise, yet they choose not to do so. Although there are some examples, such
as the demolition laws, which on the surface appear to be direct violence, they are in
fact structural violence due to the legitimacy of carrying out the acts through its
inherency within the social structure. Because of the laws in Israel other citizens do
not protest because of the assumption that the law is fair. Cultural violence can be
seen as the backdrop of this structural violence through the legitimacy of it through
the difference in culture of Israelis and Bedouin.
i
Galtung, J., ‘Violence, Peace and Peace Research’, Journal of Peace Research, Vol.6, No.3 (1969) pp.167-191.
ii
Galtung, J., ‘Cultural violence’, Journal of Peace Research, Vol.27, No.3 (1990) pp.291-305.
iii
Galtung, J., ‘Violence, Peace and Peace Research’, Journal of Peace Research, Vol.6, No.3 (1969) p.168.
iv
Ibid. p.168.
v
Ibid. p.168.
vi
Bornstein, A. S. Crossing the Green Line Between the West bank and Israel, (2001) p.26.
vii
Galtung, J., ‘Violence, Peace and Peace Research’, Journal of Peace Research, Vol.6, No.3 (1969)
viii
Ibid. pp.167-191.
ix
Galtung, J., ‘Cultural violence’, Journal of Peace Research, Vol.27, No.3 (1990) p.292.
x
Swirski and Hasson ‘Invisible Citizens: Israeli Government Policy Toward the Negev Bedouin’, Israeli Equality
Monitor, Feb. (2006) p8.
xi
United Nations (1948) Universal Declaration of Human Rights. http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html
xii
Swirski and Hasson ‘Invisible Citizens: Israeli Goverment Policy Toward the Negev Bedouin’, Israeli Equality
Monitor, Oct. 2005.
xiii
Hiller & Chaitin ‘The Bedouins in Israel’s Negev Desert’, Annotated Conflict Cases (2006)
http://crinfo.beyondintractability.org/case_studies/bedouins_israel.jsp?nid=6798
xiv
Winter, D. D. & Leighton, D. C. (2001). ‘Structural violence’, In D. J. Christie, R. V. Wagner, & D. D. Winter
st
(Eds.), Peace, conflict, and violence: Peace psychology in the 21 century. New York: Prentice-Hall. p.5.