FERTILIZER INPUT SUBSIDY PROGRAM AND RESPECTIVELY FERTILIZER USE AND
CROP PRODUCTIVITY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA. A COMPREHENSIVE
LITERATURE REVIEW AND ANALYSIS. A pathway to decide on smart subsidies
PATRICK MAZICK
ECONOMIC POLICY PAPER SERIES 1
DECEMBER, 2011
UNIVERSITY OF MALAWI, BUNDA COLLEGE, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURAL AND
APPLIED ECONOMICS, LILONGWE, MALAWI
THE AUTHOR
Patrick Mazick is a Resource economist who is currently undertaking his research for the Collaborative Masters in
Agricultural and Applied Economics (CMAAE) and expected to graduate in September, 2012.
A part from school, Mr Mazick is business person; he produces potatoes, beans, supplies ground nuts, rice and runs salon
and cosmetics shop but enjoys writing papers. He may be contacted at:
University of Malawi
Bunda College
Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics
Box 219
Lilongwe
Malawi
Mobile: (00265) 999 365 952
pat_mazick@rocketmail.com or mazickpatrick@gmail.com
Contents
Introduction ................................................................................ 5
Fertilizer input subsidy ............................................................... 6
Literature analysis ...................................................................... 9
What is the way forward? ......................................................... 10
Bibliography ............................................................................. 12
ABSTRACT
In this paper, we critically review the comprehensive literature from studies that been undertaken
about the effects of fertilizer input subsidy program on respectively fertilizer use and crop
productivity. Through the literature review, we have found that indeed fertilizer helps to improve
crop yields but when using the econometric models to isolate the effects of fertilizer on crop
productivity, we do not assume largely on ceteris puribus (on some critical variables) which are
believed to contribute to the improved yields. These variables are; timeliness of fertilizer
application, fertilizer application rates, weather conditions related to rainfall (climatic issues),
recommended agronomic practices of crop production and technical changes due to improved
crop varieties. We have synthesized that it is true that increase in fertilizer may increase crop
productivity but issues of data and methodological challenges in analysis make it difficult to
have conclusive sentiments as such scholars have come up with potential or indicative effects.
Regarding fertilizer use, this synthesis has found that increase in fertilizer subsidy positively
correlates with increase in fertilizer use but according to some repercussions in some countries of
the Sub Saharan Africa (Cameroon, Senegal, Tanzania, Nigeria and Ghana) when subsidies
phased out and in other countries (Benin, Togo, Mali, and Madagascar) fertilizer use increased
even when the fertilizer subsidies phased out due to SAPs. Due to this phenomenon, this paper
has therefore suggested that price reductions in farm input in this case fertilizer may be taken as
one of the reasons for the increased fertilizer use not the only reason. Considering the complaints
scholars and civil society have expressed about the behavior of subsidies of undermining the
performance of private sector, this paper has suggested that when implementing this program,
ensure that input market development is promoted or implement the smart subsidies.
Key words; fertilizer input subsidy program, fertilizer use, crop productivity, Sub Saharan
Africa.
Introduction
The issue of subsidies of any kind faces all sorts of criticisms from different angles of arguments.
This controversy arises probably because of several reasons but the main one could be the
interest an individual or professional has in the issue at hand. For instance, a classical economist
by allowing its dominant thoughts to crowd the mind would at any point refuse to see the
government influencing the market mechanisms either on demand or supply side interventions,
proponents of input subsidies for example believe that the only way to jump start the African
agriculture and achieve food security and increase the incomes of the rural people is through
input subsidies of which fertilizer is central, agronomists view the fertilizer subsidies as a way of
reversing the depletion of soil nutrients, political leaders which are the decision makers when it
comes to agricultural policy and any other policy believe that the simplest way to help the rural
poor people is through subsidies and development agencies view subsidies as a way of realizing
Green Revolution in Africa.
I bet you, if you bring different professionals; lawyers, economists (remember there are also
different schools of thought in this discipline), engineers, architects, teachers and many others
into one room to debate about the benefits we get from subsidized fertilizer over the costs, many
responses will be generated and most likely the house could agree to disagree by believing that
though their ideas are different all of them are right in their own respect. What goes wrong for
these things to continue happening. The question is posed ‘’ if we, economists are smart, why
then Africa is still In shambles?’’ you move around, several projects are on the run and the
monitoring and evaluation reports show that most of these projects are on track but the poverty
levels are still embarrassing and thorough and critical analysis, may reveal that peoples’
conditions today may be worse than 1995. Why? Is it wrong to have an interest in undertaking
projects? At the same time is it right to tell people what they should have instead of them
themselves determine what they want and tell those in authority for provision of the same?
An interesting thing is that even the developed economies have most often different views and
ideas on different issues of public interest but they are still making huge progress. Is there
something invisible in our midst that affects our operations without seeing it? So, how do we
handle issues in which different groups have different interests including those that do not want
to hear that what they are implementing has negative implications or it is not just working. If you
hire them to do evaluation, what do you expect? The project has been successful and we
recommend same implementation process in the next phase becomes an obvious conclusion. Is it
helping us?
Considering all that has been said in the above paragraphs, for us to get the real results of the
projects it is recommended to use an independent party to do evaluation of a particular kind and
in this debatable topic, despite the findings of several research papers, let us approach these
papers, analyze them, check the conclusions and marry with what is really happening on the
ground with an open mind without any biasness or preconditions.
The hallmark of this paper is to review the research findings researchers have come up with
about fertilizer input subsidy and respectively; fertilizer use and crop productivity. This paper
proceeds as follows; we introduce the debate on the definition of fertilizer input subsidy to
remove all the chaos to bring order of understanding, then we will come to case studies as to how
the fertilizer inputs have worked by critiquing how conclusions reached upon and finally we will
harmonize everything to suggest what should be included in doing the analyses and what should
not and provide the suggestions on how should subsidies to be efficient and effective be
implemented considering complaints posed by experts and civil society that the way the subsidy
program is implemented undermines the performance of private sector.
Fertilizer input subsidy
Opinions about the role of fertilizer subsidies in spurring agricultural development in Sub-
Saharan Africa have fluctuated significantly over the past five decades. Many experts believe
that fertilizer subsidies represent an essential method for achieving long term food security in
Sub-Saharan Africa, while providing social support to Africa's poorest subsistence farmers. Yet
previous universal subsidy schemes enjoyed only moderate success, raising concerns about
whether the market distortions subsidies introduce can ever lead to a sustainable agricultural
system. New practices in creating more targeted subsidies may be the key to achieving durable
success.
Despite the potential benefits to crop yields, inorganic fertilizer application in Sub-Saharan
Africa lags behind other developing regions. Average application in Sub-Saharan Africa is less
than 10 kg per hectare, while the average application in Latin America and South Asia is nearly
140 kg per hectare. Sub-optimal or inefficient fertilizer use may result from farmers’ incomplete
knowledge of its benefits or proper application techniques, inadequate (liquid) funds, or aversion
to the risk associated with investing in a new input. Proponents of subsidies argue that they can
help to mitigate these circumstances and bring fertilizer use up to optimal levels. The
implementation of subsidy programs may also be argued for equity reasons. Like other forms of
social support (health, education spending) subsidies represent a redistribution of funds within a
society, and can be an effective way to target subsistence farmers (a disproportionately large
amount of Sub-Saharan Africa’s poor). Finally from theoretical point of view, subsidies may also
create positive externalities, such as decreased soil erosion from increased plant growth. These
external benefits may cause fertilizer to be undervalued in the market transaction, and thus
represent another argument for government intervention through subsidies
During the 1960s and 70s many countries in Africa provided subsidized fertilizer to their farmers
though state owned enterprises, or "parastatals," which generally enjoyed a monopoly on
fertilizer distribution and import within the country. The fertilizer distributed by these enterprises
sold at a universally reduced price, between 20 and 60 percent of the full market cost. Currency
over-valuation also created an additional "implicit" subsidy for imported fertilizer. These policies
were seen as a way to counteract the effects of soil erosion and depletion, and increase crop
yields by bringing fertilizer within the reach of subsistence farmers. This followed the dominant
‘modernization’ model of the period, which aimed to develop production systems in the sector
through the promotion of new technologies like fertilizer and improved hybrid seeds.
The subsidy programs often suffered from multiple problems. Inefficient bureaucracies
contributed to delays in fertilizer delivery. Overstaffing and lack of efficiency incentives
increased overall program costs. In cases of inadequate budgets, fertilizer was rationed, barring
farmers from accessing sufficient amounts to apply to their crops. Finally, below market-level
pricing disincentivized and displaced private distributors of fertilizer who no longer found it
economically feasible to compete with subsidized fertilizer. This seriously jeopardized the
financial sustainability of the programs.
The 1980s saw the rise of neoclassical liberalism, the Washington Consensus and Structural
Adjustment Programs. The dominant philosophy of this period saw underdevelopment as a
symptom of allocative inefficiency, placed emphasis on the power of free markets to effect
lasting development change and encouraged the minimization of the state’s role in the economy.
During this period, multilateral lending agencies and financial institutions such as the
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank placed conditionalities upon the disbursement
of development aid. Countries were required to agree to make a series of "structural adjustments"
to their economies, in order to gain financial assistance or engage in refinancing. The common
package of policies prescriptions included currency devaluation, privatization or divestiture of
state-owned industries (parastatals) in the health and agricultural sectors, trade liberalization
(lowering or elimination of tariffs on imports), cuts in social spending (agriculture, health,
education sectors) and strict deficit reductions. Structural Adjustment Programs also led to the
phasing out of most fertilizer subsidy programs. Some of the African countries following these
guidelines included Benin, Ghana, Madagascar, Senegal, Togo, Tanzania, Zambia, Cameroon,
Malawi, and Nigeria.
Results of liberalization and subsidy phase-out were mixed. In a five year study comparing
before and after cases, fertilizer use in Cameroon, Senegal, Tanzania, Nigeria and Ghana
declined 25-40 percent, while it increased 14-500 percent in Benin, Togo, Mali, and Madagascar.
Subsidies may have been only one factor affecting the price and use of fertilizer.
In economics we define subsidy as any grant most often monetary that keep down the market
price so that the farmer would look at the commodity as cheap or affordable. Generally, this
happens mostly in agricultural sector where governments with an intention of increasing
production, may contribute to the farmers’ payment of the inputs particularly to those farmers
that are deemed resource constrained at that time.
So, when we look at fertilizer input subsidy, there are several kinds and implemented in different
ways and have diverse effects. For the case of Malawi of example aborted this idea of input
subsidy because of the structural adjustments programs of IMF and World Bank but after looking
at some rigidities in the economies even in the face of SAPs, Malawi reconsidered its position on
subsidies. Agricultural input subsidies have mainly been intended to promote the realization of
household food security as a primary and principal reason, and other reasons like increase wages,
reduce food prices, and promote economic growth as reported by Crawford et al.( 2003) may
come through multiplier effects. An interesting work done by Kydd and Dorward (2003)
reported that most often, the hidden justification for implementing agricultural subsidies has
been the concern that market failures that do not involve private sector development through
market development inputs my undermine the overall performance of the economy which affects
the public at large. This regard, implementing agricultural input subsidies to promote the growth
of agricultural sector taking no regard for other sectors of the economy is purely suicidal because
the in true sense, there is no sector that is stand alone sector (this is very critical in implementing
smart subsidies) In Malawi in trying to promote food crop production, used general price
subsidies coupled with subsidized credit in the 1970s and 80s. During that period, it is reported
with evidence that Malawi achieved significant degree of enough maize (the main staple food)
(Shively et al., 2010, Dorward and Chirwa, 2011, Holden and Lunduka, 2010). It is reported that
after the force from international financial agencies, mainly the so called the Breton woods’
institutions (IMF and World Bank) to deregulate through the popular SAPs, the Malawi
Government terminated the use of subsidies in the early 1990s. Following this termination of
subsidies, Malawi suffered from lineup of severe and persistent food crises in the years leading
up to 1998. Agricultural subsidies were reintroduced in 1998, following years of perpetual food
shortages, through what the government termed the Starter Pack Scheme (SPS). Under the SPS,
which evolved into a Targeted Inputs Program (TIP), all smallholders in Malawi were entitled to
a package containing sufficient fertilizer and seed to plant about 0.1 hectare of maize. The
purpose of the SPS was to promote food security, increase agricultural productivity and improve
soil fertility. Evaluation studies suggest that the SPS succeeded in increasing food production,
thereby helping to promote national food security in the short-term. However, critics have argued
that the SPS and TIP led to the crowding out of commercial supply of chemical fertilizers and
seed (though this is obvious if smart subsidies are no factored). Despite the actual benefits of the
SPS, most of Malawi’s donors opposed the program. The program was criticized for
undermining the development of private sector input delivery.
Based on these arguments, as well as general suspicion of markets, most African governments
tightly controlled their fertilizer markets in the 1970s and 1980s. Typically, one or more state-
owned entities had a legal monopoly on importing and distributing fertilizer. Fertilizer prices
were subsidized at below-market levels and fixed at one rate throughout the country. The
fertilizer was often distributed as part of government-run agricultural credit schemes, and a large
percentage of the fertilizer was provided by donor agencies as in-kind aid. These policies,
however, resulted in high financial costs and inefficient distribution. Fertilizer was often
delivered to farmers late and in limited quantities. Although fertilizer subsidies were politically
popular, economists and policymakers began to believe that the fiscal cost was not worth the
benefits to farmers. In addition, growing evidence showed that the bulk of the benefits of these
subsidies went to larger and richer farmers, thus undercutting the equity argument for subsidies.
Under the structural adjustment programs of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the
World Bank, most African countries phased out fertilizer subsidies and opened up fertilizer
markets to competition from the private sector as part of wider market reforms in the economy.
The link between fertilizer policy and fertilizer use in Africa is not very direct.
Literature analysis
Studying Crawford et al. (2003), Kydd and Dorward (2003), Shively et al. (2010), Dorward and
Chirwa (2011), Holden and Lunduka (2010) one would come to conclude that subsidies
particularly fertilizer promote agricultural productivity which help in solving challenges of
malnutrition, food insecurity, poor incomes and macroeconomic instability. However, it is very
critical to analyze the methodology that a researcher has followed before coming to a conclusion
because in the real analysis of maize productivity for the case of Malawi, to isolate the effect of
fertilizer subsidy on the maize productivity is very complex and has a lot of methodological
challenges due to data availability and also its econometric modeling. Dorward and Chirwa
(2011) demonstrated their competence and reliability by admitting to this fact and they included
the political profile of the program, scope of the objectives and focus of evaluation, household
and market impact pathways, scale effects, measures/indicators of impact, data and analytical
methods. In trying to estimate the impact of the subsidy program on fertilizer use, Chirwa (2010)
used the propensity score matching and found out that there were mixed effects with positive
outcomes in 2006 and negative impact in 2009. Shively et al. (2010), used the two stage
Instrumental variable regressions of which in the first stage selection into the program was taken
to be endogenous and the fertilizer application rate was used as dependent variable in the second
stage. They also used the Multinomial Logit model to predict the probability of participating in
mutually exclusive categories of the program. In their conclusion on maize productivity, their
results were found to be indicative rather than conclusive in the sense that households that were
sampled as those who accessed subsidized fertilizer had two categories; farmers that used
improved varieties and that used local varieties (the report does not say anything to do with
farmers who planted both varieties in different fields) and found out that those farmers with
fertilizer and improved maize had higher yields than the ones that did use the local varieties.
We know that in conducting controlled experiments, the agronomists if they want to capture the
effect of the particular nutrient for example, allow other factors affecting the outcome remain
constant in different plots but keep what you want to analyze variable. In economics, we usually
say ceteris puribus demand decreases if price goes up for instance. Now, if we can use the same
line of thinking of the findings of Shively et al. (2010) and the conclusion reached upon that
those farmers using improved maize had higher yields than their counterparts which in any kind
of argument, the logical conclusion would be that therefore, improved maize increased the maize
productivity not fertilizer because its use in the analysis between the two counterfactuals was
kept constant across.
According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), annual
growth in fertilizer use in Sub-Saharan Africa was 9 percent over the 1960s and 1970s, but since
1981 fertilizer use has stagnated at around 1.9–2.2 million metric tons, with some possible signs
of growth since 2000. Given that few countries had begun to liberalize their fertilizer markets by
1981, it is difficult to attribute this stagnation to the reforms. In some countries, subsidy removal
and devaluation resulted in sharp reductions in fertilizer use (Cameroon, Ghana, Nigeria,
Senegal, and Tanzania), whilst in other countries fertilizer use increased (Benin, Madagascar,
Mali and Togo). This has a serious implication on the scientific research on the effect of fertilizer
subsidy policy of fertilizer and crop productivity because subjected to the same conditions of
withdrawing subsidies some reduced fertilizer use others increased portrays the fact that fertilizer
policy is not the only factr that affects fertilizer prices and that in a series of factors, price is one
of the factors determining fertilizer use. This conclusive statement goes in tandem with the
conclusions reached upon by many researchers (Green and Ng’ong’ola ,1993; Nkonya et al.,
1997; Isham, 2002; Abdoulaye and Sanders, 2005; Chirwa, 2005).
In agreeing with Dorward and Chirwa (2011), who honestly admitted the challenges in an
attempt to isolate the effect of fertilizer on maize productivity because of the highlighted above.
At the same time, most studies if not all usually run to reach to the conclusion of the fertilizer
input on maize subsidy not considering the data availability and the econometric model used.
Largely, issues of climate (weather issues), timeliness of fertilizer application, residual soil
fertility, manure application, weeding practice, other recommended husbandry practices, the
recommended fertilizer application, the amount of fertilizer from subsidy applied (to avoid
assuming that farmers would not have harvesting if had not been for subsidy). All these issues
are very crucial and critical in analyzing the impact of fertilizer subsidy though mostly neglected
but have made most reports on impact of fertilizer subsidy program dubious.
What is the way forward?
Now, how we handle challenges of crowding out effect of fertilizer subsidy of the private sector
as mostly is the case in Malawi particularly of the supply side regarding the agro-dealers unlike
in transport sector where most transport companies are contracted to do the distribution. The
Government does the import of the fertilizer without the involvement of the private investors.
The same also happened in Sri Lanka where the government was the sole importer of fertilizer
without the private sector involvement but later it was revisited such that the private sector
involvement in fertilizer importation was initiated and was successful (Ariyawardana et al.
2010).
Fertilizer market development is an alternative approach to improving farmers’ access to
fertilizer that has become more common over the past 10–15 years. This strategy involves
improving the policy environment, strengthening and expanding the network of private agro-
input dealers with training and credit, and providing farmers with information about fertilizer use
through advisory services and demonstration plots. A key policy issue, therefore, is whether
direct subsidies on fertilizer to small farmers are as effective in building sustained improved
access to fertilizer as, for example, support to intermediate actors in the fertilizer supply chain or
better information for farmers on how to make productive use of fertilizer. The answer seems to
be, it depends. If farmers have reasonable access to cash or credit, then it is more effective to
support the fertilizer supply chain than farmers directly. Evidence of this finding comes from
Kenya, which has relatively effective smallholder credit provision and higher household cash
incomes than do, many other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. A stable fertilizer policy
environment in Kenya supported increasing investment in fertilizer marketing at all levels from
importers to retailers. The number of rural stockists of fertilizer increased sharply, and the
increasingly competitive fertilizer sector worked to reduce its transaction costs, giving farmers
more incentives to use fertilizer. Moreover, fertilizer dealers tailored their
products to farmers’ needs. For example, they offered small, experimental packets of improved
seed and fertilizer for farmers with only a little cash. A sustainable fertilizer supply system
within the private sector is emerging with minimal direct delivery of subsidies to farmers. Even
with the success achieved in Kenya, however, the economics of profitable fertilizer use still
apply—fertilizer use remains limited in remote agricultural areas of the country where high
transport costs render farm gate crop prices too low and costs of fertilizer are too high to allow
its profitable use. The economically optimal fertilizer application rate in such areas is zero. As in
many other remote areas of Sub-Saharan Africa, other investments than fertilizer subsidies, such
as agricultural technologies appropriate for local economic conditions or improved roads and
communication services to foster market development, would make greater contributions to the
welfare of farm households in such areas (Benson and Minot, 2009).
Smart subsidies can also be one of the ways of promoting both the rural welfare and private
sector development and this will help in overall economic development which has public good
characteristics. Smart subsidies are mechanisms to provide subsidized goods and services
designed both to promote market development and to enhance the welfare of the poor. Below-
market-cost provision of goods and services, generally by private-sector suppliers, from which
the poor in particular are likely to benefit, can be considered smart subsidies. For example,
provision of foot-driven irrigation pumps or small seed and fertilizer packages and the creation
of local schemes to exchange breeding animals among farmers with small herds could all qualify
as smart subsidy interventions. The subsidies can be phased out once the market infrastructure
has been developed and markets are functioning.
It does not make any sense when we have full knowledge that our economy is intersectoral and
yet we want to development one sector by undermining the other sector. S such, the smart
subsidies are the way to go so much provided there is a political will and mutual understanding
between the private and public sectors.
By suspending our preoccupied minds and also selfish interests about any project and remain
vigilant to want we want to realize, then every project investment will be beneficial to all
intended people. At the same time, politicians should not look for what they should hear what
they need to hear. As researchers and scientists, let us not stop seeing things the way they are
because an econometric model is telling me a different story. Do not forget that one of the rules
of thumb when interpreting results after an analysis is use of common sense.
To ensure that we can isolate the effect of fertilizer subsidy input on crop productivity, we need
to take into consideration other relevant variables that have significant contribution to the same.
Bibliography
Abdoulaye, T., Sanders, J., 2005. Stages and determinants of fertilizer use in semiarid African
agriculture: The Niger experience. Agricultural Economics 32, 167-179.
Ayiwardana A, Kodithuwakku S and Weerehewa J (2010). The Subsidy program in Sri Lanka.
Edited by Andersen, Cornell University, New York,USA.
Bello, Warden. "Destroying African Agriculture". Foreign Policy In Focus.
Chibwana, C., Jumbe, C., Masters W and Shively, G., 2010. Measuring the Impacts Farm Input
subsidy program in Malawi. Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN.
Chirwa, E., 2005. Adoption of fertilizer and hybrid seeds by smallholder maize farmers in
southern Malawi. Development South Africa 22, 1-12.
Chirwa, T. G., 2010. Program evaluation of agricultural input subsidies in Malawi using
treatment effefcts: methods and practicability based on propensity scores. MPRA Paper No.
21236. http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/21236/.
Colin Poulton; Jonathan Kydd Andrew Dorwar. "Increasing Fertilizer Use in Africa: What Have
We Learned". Agriculture & Rural Development Department World Ban. Retrieved 25 March
2011. "World Development Indicators 2010". World Bank. Retrieved 14 March2011.
COMESA. "Getting Fertilizers to Farmers: How to do it? Who should do it? and Why it Should
be Done?". Fertilizer Symposium. AFRICA AGRICULTURAL MARKETS PROGRAM.
Crawford, E., Kelly, V., Jayne, T., Howard, J., 2003. Input use and market development in sub-
Saharan Africa: an overview. Food Policy 28, 277-292..
Denning G (2007) Agriculture leads to the MDGs: Rural development in Africa. UN Chronicle.
Available: http://www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/2007/issue4/0407p24.html. Accessed 26 December
2011.
Dorward, A., Chirwa, E., 2009. The agricultural input subsidy programme 2005 to 2008:
achievements and challenges. School of Oriental and African Studies, London..
Dorward, A., Kydd, J., 2004. The Malawi 2002 food crisis: the rural development challenge.
Modern African Studies 42, 343–361.
Friis-Hansen, Esbern. "Agricultural Policy in Africa after Adjustment". CDR Policy Paper.
Center for Development Research. Retrieved 3 April 2011.
IFAD. "Rural Poverty Report 2011: Enabling Poor Rural People to Overcome Poverty".
Retrieved 14 April 2011.
Isaac Minde; T.S. Jayne, Eric Crawford, Joshua Ariga, and Jones Govereh. "Promoting Fertilizer
Use in Africa: Current Issues and Empirical Evidence from Malawi, Zambia, and Kenya".
ReSAKSS Working Paper No. 1. Regional Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System.
Retrieved 13 April 2011.
Larsona, Bruce A.; George B. Frisvold (December 1996). "Fertilizers to support agricultural
development in sub-Saharan Africa: what is needed and why". Food Policy 21 (6): 509–525.
Maene L.M (200). Agricultural Subsidies in developed countries-overview. International
Fertilizer Industry Association. Paris.
Michael Todaro; Stephen Smith (2005). Economic Development (9 ed.). Addison Wesley.
ISBN 0321278887.
Minde, Isaac. "Promoting Fertilizer Use in Africa: Current Issues and Empirical Evidence from
Malawi, Zambia and Kenya.pdf". Working Paper Number 13. ReSAKSS. Retrieved 12
December, 2011.
Nicholas Minot; Tod Benson. "Fertilizer subsidies in Africa: are vouchers the answer".
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). Retrieved 24 Feb 2011.
President Bingu wa Mutharika (2008) Opening plenary session: “Capitalizing on opportunity.”.
World Economic Forum on Africa; 4 June 2008; Cape Town, South Africa. Available:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rmUjw1J35V4. Accessed 26 December 2011.
Sachs, Jeffrey (2005). The End of Poverty. Penguin Press. pp. 254. ISBN 1-59420-045-9.
Sharma P and Thaker H (2009). Fertilizer Subsidy in India. Who are the beneficiaries? Indian
Institute of Management, India.
Thom Jayne; Nick Minot and Shahidur Rashid. "Fertilizer Subsidies in Eastern and Southern
Africa Policy Synthesis #2". Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)
African Agricultural Markets Programme. Retrieved 15 April 2011.