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									ANTI-DUMPING AGREEMENT (AGREEMENT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE VI OF
THE GATT 1994)

JUMP TO A SPECIFIC PROVISION/TOPIC WITHIN THE AGREEMENT:

Article 1 | Article 2 | Article 3 | Article 4 | Article 5 | Article 6 | Article 7 | Article 8 |
Article 9 | Article 10 | Article 11 | Article 12 | Article 15 | Article 17 | Article 18 |
Annex I | Annex II | Other Terms and Concepts

   Article 1 (Principles: Imposition of Anti-dumping Duties Must be Consistent with GATT
   Article VI and AD Agreement)

       U.S. - Zeroing (Japan) (Panel) (Based on its rejection of the claims against simple
        zeroing under other provisions, Panel rejected claims under AD Agreement Articles 1 and
        18.4 and WTO Agreement Article XVI:4. See paras. 7.171-175; rejected Japan's claims
        that simple zeroing as applied in 11 periodic reviews is inconsistent with AD Agreement
        Articles 1, 2.1, 2.4, 2.4.2 and 9.1-9.3, GATT Articles VI:1 and VI:2. See paras. 7.225-227)
       U.S. - "Zeroing" of Dumping Margins (AB) (Declared "moot, and of no legal effect" the
        Panel's finding that the zeroing methodology used by the United States in administrative
        reviews is not inconsistent, as such, with AD Agreement Articles 1, 2.4, 2.4.2, 9.3, 11.1,
        11.2, and 18.4, GATT Articles VI:1 and VI:2, and WTO Agreement Article XVI:4. See
        paras. 226-227; declared "moot, and of no legal effect" the Panel's finding that Section
        351.414(c)(2) is not inconsistent with AD Agreement Articles 1, 2.4, 2.4.2, 9.3, 9.5, 11.1,
        11.2, 11.3, and 18.4, GATT Articles VI:1 and VI:2, and WTO Agreement Article XVI:4.
        See paras. 235-242)
       U.S. - "Zeroing" of Dumping Margins (Panel) (Found that Sections 771(35)(A) and (B),
        731 and 777A(d) of the Tariff Act are not "as such" inconsistent with AD Agreement
        Articles 1, 2.4, 2.4.2, 5.8, 9.3 and 18.4, GATT Articles VI:1 and VI:2, and WTO
        Agreement Article XVI:4 with respect to the use of a "zeroing" methodology in the
        calculation of margins of dumping in original investigations. See paras 7.37-69; with
        regard to the claims that the "Standard Zeroing Procedures" used by the United States in
        administrative reviews or the U.S. practice or methodology of zeroing, Sections
        771(35)(A) and (B), 731, 777A(d) and 751(a)(2)(i) and (ii) of the Tariff Act, and Section
        351.414(c)(2) of the DOC Regulations are inconsistent with AD Agreement Articles 1,
        2.4, 2.4.2, 9.3, 11.1, 11.2 and 18.4, GATT Articles VI:1 and VI:2, WTO Agreement Article
        XVI:4, Panel majority said that these claims are "dependent upon a violation of Articles
        2.4 and/or 2.4.2" and thus it also rejected these dependent claims. See paras. 7.289-291;
        with regard to the claims that the "Standard Zeroing Procedures" used by the United
        States in new shipper reviews, changed circumstances reviews and sunset reviews,
        Sections 771(35)(A) and (B), 731, 777A(d) and 751(a)(2)(i) and (ii) of the Tariff Act, and
        Section 351.414(c)(2) of the DOC Regulations are inconsistent with AD Agreement
        Articles 1, 2.4, 2.4.2, 9.3, 9.5, 11.1, 11.2, 11.3 and 18.4, GATT Articles VI:1 and VI:2,
        WTO Agreement Article XVI:4, Panel majority said that the claims are "dependent upon a
        violation of Articles 2.4 and/or 2.4.2" and thus it also rejected these dependent claims.
        See paras. 7.292-294)
       EC - Pipe Fittings (AB) (Upheld Panel's finding that Brazil did not establish that the
        European Communities violated AD Agreement Article 1 or GATT Article VI:2 in imposing
        an anti-dumping measure in this case following the devaluation of the Brazilian currency
        at the beginning of the fourth quarter of the investigation period. See paras. 65-84)
       EC - Pipe Fittings (Panel) (Found that Brazil did not establish that the European
        Communities violated AD Agreement Article 1 or GATT Article VI:2 in imposing an anti-
        dumping measure in this case following the devaluation of the Brazilian currency at the
        beginning of the fourth quarter of the investigation period. See paras. 7.87-108)
       U.S. - 1916 Act (Panel) (Discussed in context of Claims under the AD Agreement; based
        on violations of other provisions of the AD Agreement, Panel found violation of Article 1.
     See para. 6.217 of panel report in complaint by EC; para. 6.264 of panel report in
     complaint by Japan)

Article 2 (Determination of Dumping)

    Article 2.1 (Dumping)

    U.S. - Zeroing (Japan) (AB) (Reversed Panel's findings that "simple zeroing" in original
     investigations is not inconsistent with AD Agreement Article 2.1 and GATT Articles VI:1
     and VI:2; said that Article 2.1 and Article VI:1 are "definitional provisions," as they set out
     a definition of "dumping" for the purposes of the AD Agreement and the GATT, and "read
     in isolation, [they] do not impose independent obligations." See paras. 139-140)
    U.S. - Zeroing (Japan) (Panel) (Found that "by maintaining simple zeroing procedures in
     the context of original investigations," the DOC does not act inconsistently with AD
     Agreement Articles 2.1 and 2.4.2 and GATT Articles VI:1 and VI:2 -- reversed on appeal.
     See paras. 7.90-143; found that by maintaining simple zeroing procedures in the context
     of periodic reviews and new shipper reviews, the DOC does not act inconsistently with
     AD Agreement Articles 2.1, 2.4, 2.4.2, 9.1-9.3, 9.5, 18.4, GATT Articles VI:1 and VI:2,
     and WTO Agreement Article XVI:4 -- reversed on appeal. See paras. 7.189-224; for the
     same reasons, Panel rejected Japan's claims that simple zeroing as applied in 11
     periodic reviews is inconsistent with AD Agreement Articles 1, 2.1, 2.4, 2.4.2 and 9.1-9.3,
     GATT Articles VI:1 and VI:2 -- reversed on appeal. See paras. 7.225-227; after
     concluding that Japan has failed to adduce evidence necessary to establish that a rule,
     norm or standard of general and prospective application exists by virtue of which the
     DOC relies on margins of dumping calculated in prior proceedings to support its
     determinations in changed circumstances reviews and sunset reviews, Panel found that
     Japan has failed to make a prima facie case that by maintaining zeroing procedures in
     the context of these reviews the DOC acts inconsistently with AD Agreement Articles 2
     and 11. See paras. 7.230-244; based on its finding that the AD Agreement does not
     proscribe simple zeroing in periodic reviews within the meaning of Article 9.3, Panel
     found that the DOC did not violate AD Agreement Articles 2 and 11 in relying on margins
     of dumping calculated in periodic reviews on the basis of simple zeroing -- reversed on
     appeal. See paras. 7.245-257)
    U.S. - Hot-Rolled Steel from Japan (AB) (Upheld, under modified reasoning, Panel's
     finding that the U.S. "arm's length" test violates Article 2.1. See paras. 131-158; reversed
     Panel's finding that the replacement of excluded sales with downstream replacement
     sales violates Article 2.1, finding that the identity of the seller is not necessarily the
     determinative factor as to whether or not a sale is "comparable." See paras. 159-173)
    U.S. - Hot-Rolled Steel from Japan (Panel) (Concluded that the U.S. "arm's length" test
     does not relate to a permissible interpretation of the term "sales in the ordinary course of
     trade," such that this practice, as applied in the hot-rolled investigation, is inconsistent
     with AD Agreement Article 2.1. See paras. 7.91-120; also found the use of downstream
     sales in place of excluded affiliated sales to violate Article 2.1, holding that the
     comparison prices must come from the exporter under investigation and not a
     downstream re-seller -- reversed on appeal. See paras. 7.91-120)
    Guatemala - Cement II (Panel) (Nothing in Articles 2.1 or 2.2 prevents a Member from
     requesting cost data, even if there are no allegations of sales below costs. See paras.
     8.180-183)
    U.S. - 1916 Act (Panel) (Finding that the 1916 Act does not specify a comparison price
     that must be used, and finding that the Act could be interpreted consistently with the AD
     Agreement Article 2 comparison requirements, rejected Japan's claim that the 1916 Act
     requires a comparison to an improper home market price. See paras. 6.242-250; in
     complaint by EC, found that the EC failed to make its prima facie case on its claim under
     this provision. See paras. 6.209-210)
    Article 2.2 (Constructed Value)

    Korea - Paper AD Duties (Panel) (In response to claim of violation of Article 2.2 based on
     investigating authority's failure "to make a determination as to whether or not one of the
     two bases that would allow resorting to constructed normal value was present in the
     investigation at issue," Panel recalled its finding that "the KTC's decision to disregard the
     domestic sales data submitted by Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli was not WTO-inconsistent
     because those data were not verifiable," and concluded that "the KTC did not act
     inconsistently with Article 2.2 in basing its normal value determination on constructed
     value under Article 2.2 for these two companies." See paras. 7.87-94)
    EC - Pipe Fittings (Panel) (Found that Brazil did not establish that the European
     Communities acted inconsistently with Articles 2.2 and 2.2.2 by including data from sales
     of product types with internal product codes 68 and 69 -- which fell within the definition of
     "like product" but were alleged not to be "identical" to the export products -- for the
     purposes of constructing normal value. See paras. 7.141-151)
    Thailand - Steel (Panel) (Interpreted "category of products" in Article 2.2.2(i) to suggest a
     narrow category as opposed to a broad one; no separate "reasonability" test necessary in
     determining profit amount; rejected claim of violation of Article 2.2. See paras. 7.97-129)
    EC - Bed Linen (Panel) (When applied correctly, Article 2.2.2(ii) "necessarily yields
     reasonable amounts for profits," and nothing in AD Agreement Article 2.2 requires
     consideration of a separate reasonability test. See paras. 6.88-101)
    Guatemala - Cement II (Panel) (Nothing in Articles 2.1 or 2.2 prevents a Member from
     requesting cost data, even if there are no allegations of sales below costs. See paras.
     8.180-183)
    U.S. - 1916 Act (Panel) (Finding that the 1916 Act does not specify a comparison price
     that must be used, and finding that the Act could be interpreted consistently with the AD
     Agreement Article 2 comparison requirements, rejected Japan's claim that the 1916 Act
     requires a comparison to an improper home market price. See paras. 6.242-250; in
     complaint by EC, found that the EC failed to make its prima facie case on its claim under
     this provision. See paras. 6.209-210)

    Article 2.2.1.1 (Cost Data)

    U.S. - Lumber AD Final (AB) (Reversed Panel's legal interpretation under AD Agreement
     Article 2.2.1.1 that the phrase "consider all available evidence on the proper allocation of
     costs" does not require that investigating authorities compare various cost allocation
     methodologies in deciding which methodology to use; on this basis, reversed Panel's
     finding that the United States did not act inconsistently with AD Agreement Article 2.2.1.1
     in its calculation of the amount for financial expense for softwood lumber for Abitibi;
     however, Appellate Body did not make findings on whether the United States acted
     consistently or inconsistently with that provision. See paras. 118-143; upheld the Panel's
     finding that the United States did not act inconsistently with AD Agreement Article 2.2.1.1
     in its treatment of by-product revenue for the company Tembec. See paras. 146-181)
    U.S. - Lumber AD Final (Panel) (Said that "Article 2.2.1.1 does not ... require that costs
     be calculated in accordance with GAAP nor that they reasonably reflect the costs
     associated with the production and sale of the product under consideration," but rather "it
     simply requires that costs be calculated on the basis of the exporter or producer's
     records, in so far as those records are in accordance with GAAP and reasonably reflect
     the costs associated with the production and sale of the product under consideration";
     also said that "Article 2.2.1.1 "does not require that investigating authorities compare
     various allocation methodologies to assess their advantages and disadvantages but to
     'consider' all available evidence on the proper allocation of cost" -- reversed on appeal;
     Panel "reject[ed] Canada's contention that the United States failed to 'consider all
     available evidence on the proper allocation of costs,'" and therefore found that the DOC
     "met the requirement set forth in Article 2.2.1.1" -- reversed on appeal; rejected Canada's
     claim that the United States is in breach of Article 2.2.1.1 "by failing to make an allocation
     of financial expense to softwood lumber which 'reasonably reflects the costs associated
     with the production and sale of the product under consideration.'" See paras. 7.227-245;
     found that "an unbiased and objective investigating authority could have determined the
     amounts for G&A expenses for softwood lumber as DOC did [for the respondent
     Tembec]," and therefore rejected Canada's claim that the United States acted in violation
     of Article 2.2.1.1 by basing the G&A expense on the company-wide financial statement,
     rather than the divisional financial statement. See paras. 7.246-269; rejected Canada's
     claim that the United States violated Article 2.2.1.1 "by improperly ignoring
     Weyerhaeuser's books and records and establishing G&A costs for Weyerhaeuser
     Canada that did not 'reasonably reflect' its costs for producing and selling softwood
     lumber," in relation to the hardboard siding settlement fund. See paras. 7.270-297;
     concluded that, "an unbiased and objective investigating authority could have used the
     actual cost of the input as recorded in Tembec's books as a benchmark for valuing
     internal transfers of wood chips," and therefore rejected Canada's claim that the United
     States acted inconsistently with Article 2.2.1.1; in this regard, rejected Canada's
     argument that Article 2.2.1.1 requires that a by-product offset must reasonably reflect
     "market value"; rejected Canada's claim that, "in re-valuing West Fraser's revenue from
     sales of wood chips to affiliated parties, instead of using the value recorded in West
     Fraser's books, the United States acted inconsistently with Article 2.2.1.1." See paras.
     7.298-348; in considering Canada's argument that the DOC should have offset Slocan's
     financial expenses with the futures profits in determining constructed normal value in
     accordance with Article 2.2.1.1, the Panel considered that Canada's argument does not
     "relate to any of the obligations imposed in Article 2.2.1.1," and therefore rejected the
     argument. See paras. 7.349-373)
    Egypt - Rebar from Turkey (Panel) (Because Turkey failed to provide any evidence to
     demonstrate a relationship between short-term interest income and the cost of producing
     rebar, Panel found that "Turkey has not established a prima facie case that the
     [investigating authority] violated Article 2.2.1.1 or 2.2.2 in deciding not to make an interest
     income offset in calculating cost of production and constructed normal value." See paras.
     7.389-426)
    U.S. - DRAMS (Panel) (Korea failed to make its prima facie case challenging DOC's
     acceptance of certain cost data; in particular, Korea failed to address DOC's bases for
     rejecting the information; therefore, claim under Article 2.2.1.1 was rejected. See paras.
     6.63-73)

    Article 2.2.2 (SG&A Costs and Profits)

    U.S. - Lumber AD Final (Panel) (Rejected Canada's argument that the DOC's calculation
     of financial expense was not based on "actual data pertaining to production and sales" of
     softwood lumber, as required by Article 2.2.2. See paras. 7.227-245; found that the
     United States did not violate Article 2.2.2 "by determining the G&A ratio – and the
     resulting amounts for G&A for softwood lumber – based on Tembec's company-wide
     G&A data [rather than data specific to one division]." See paras. 7.246-269; rejected
     Canada's argument that the DOC calculated an "inflated amount" for Weyerhaeuser
     Canada's G&A costs, in violation of Article 2.2.2, by including a cost that in Canada's
     view did not "pertain to" Weyerhaeuser Canada's production and sale of Canadian
     softwood lumber. See paras. 7.270-297)
    EC - Pipe Fittings (AB) (Upheld Panel's finding that the European Communities did not
     act inconsistently with Article 2.2.2 "by including actual data from 'low-volume' sales in
     determining the amounts for SG&A and profits for the construction of normal value." See
     paras. 85-102)
    EC - Pipe Fittings (Panel) (Found that Brazil did not establish that the European
     Communities violated Article 2.2.2 by including data relating to "low volume" sales in its
     calculation of constructed normal value. See paras. 7.121-139; found that Brazil did not
     establish that the European Communities acted inconsistently with Articles 2.2 and 2.2.2
     by including data from sales of product types with internal product codes 68 and 69 --
     which fell within the definition of "like product" but were alleged not to be "identical" to the
     export products -- for the purposes of constructing normal value. See paras. 7.141-151)
    EC - Bed Linen, Article 21.5 (Panel) (Rejected claim that the EC violated Article 2.2.2(ii)
     when it calculated a weighted average on the basis of sales value instead of volume. See
     paras. 6.69-94)
    Egypt - Rebar from Turkey (Panel) (Because Turkey failed to provide any evidence to
     demonstrate a relationship between short-term interest income and the cost of producing
     rebar, Panel found that "Turkey has not established a prima facie case that the
     [investigating authority] violated Article 2.2.1.1 or 2.2.2 in deciding not to make an interest
     income offset in calculating cost of production and constructed normal value." See para.
     7.389-426)
    Thailand - Steel (Panel) (Interpreted "category of products" in Article 2.2.2(i) to suggest a
     narrow category as opposed to a broad one; no separate "reasonability" test necessary in
     determining profit amount; rejected claim of violation of Article 2.2. See paras. 7.97-129)
    EC - Bed Linen (AB) (Reversed Panel's finding regarding the number of other producers
     necessary for a profit calculation under Article 2.2.2(ii), holding that profit so calculated
     must be based on more than one "other" producer; reversed Panel's finding regarding the
     treatment of sales outside the ordinary course of trade, and held instead that
     investigating authorities may not exclude data from sales outside the ordinary course of
     trade in this profit calculation. See paras. 67-85)
    EC - Bed Linen (Panel) (There is no hierarchy among the different Article 2.2.2
     provisions; profit calculated under Article 2.2.2(ii) may be based on one "other" producer -
     - reversed on appeal; profit calculation may exclude data from sales outside the ordinary
     course of trade -- reversed on appeal. See paras. 6.49-87)

    Article 2.4

       Article 2.4 (General)

    U.S. - Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review (AB) (Reversed Panel's legal
     interpretation concerning the use of past dumping margins as part of the "likelihood"
     determination in sunset reviews, concluding that such margins must be consistent with
     AD Agreement Article 2.4; however, concluded that it could not complete the analysis on
     this issue, due to insufficient factual findings by the Panel. See paras. 118-138)
    U.S. - Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review (Panel) (Concluded, "[w]e … do not
     believe that the substantive disciplines in Article 2 governing the calculation of dumping
     margins in making a determination of dumping apply in making a determination of
     likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping under Article 11.3"; therefore, found
     that the United States did not act inconsistently with Article 2.4 in its use of past margins
     as evidence under Article 11.3 -- reversed on appeal. See paras. 7.157-170)

       Article 2.4 (Due Allowances for Differences Affecting Price Comparability)

    U.S. - "Zeroing" of Dumping Margins (AB) (Upheld Panel's finding that "zeroing is not an
     impermissible allowance or adjustment under Article 2.4, third to fifth sentences"; noted
     that "adjustments or allowances made in relation to differences in price between export
     transactions and domestic transactions—such as zeroing—cannot be adjustments or
     allowances covered by the third sentence of Article 2.4, including its a contrario
     application." See paras. 148-159)
    U.S. - "Zeroing" of Dumping Margins (Panel) (Rejected claim that "zeroing" in duty
     assessment proceedings amounts to "an allowance or adjustment to export price, normal
     value or otherwise, so as to effectively reduce the (true) export price, for a difference
    other than a difference affecting price comparability" and is thereby inconsistent with the
    third to fifth sentences of Article 2.4, stating that such a conclusion cannot be reconciled
    with the fact that "zeroing" is only addressed by Article 2.4.2 in the context of original
    investigations, and also that Article 2.4.2 permits "zeroing" in certain circumstances. See
    paras. 7.276-280)
   Korea - Paper AD Duties (Panel) (Panel was not convinced that there were sales-related
    services provided by CMI with respect to domestic sales of Indah Kiat's and Pindo Deli's
    products in the Indonesian market which were not provided in these two companies'
    export sales to Korea, and therefore rejected Indonesia's claim related to differences
    affecting price comparability under Article 2.4. See paras. 7.132-147)
   U.S. - Lumber AD Final (Panel) (Stated, "[a] discernible pattern of price differences is in
    our view necessary for a conclusion that a given difference affects price comparability";
    concluded that Canada "has not established that the United States acted in a manner
    inconsistent with Article 2.4 of the AD Agreement in not granting the requested
    adjustment for differences in dimension." See paras. 7.159-184; in response to Canada's
    argument that the DOC should have made an adjustment, under AD Agreement Article
    2.4, for Slocan's profits and losses from lumber futures hedging contracts traded on the
    Chicago Mercantile Exchange, the Panel concluded, "an unbiased and objective
    investigating authority could have concluded that the adjustment requested by Slocan
    under Article 2.4 … was not warranted and, hence, that such an investigating authority
    could have refused granting that adjustment." See paras. 7.349-373)
   EC - Pipe Fittings (Panel) (Found that Brazil did not establish that the European
    Communities violated AD Agreement Article 2.4 or GATT Article VI in not granting an
    adjustment in relation to the IPI Premium Credit and did not establish that the European
    Communities violated the obligation to ensure a fair comparison under AD Agreement
    Article 2.4 or its obligations under GATT Article VI by the methodology it applied in
    calculating the PIS/COFINS adjustment. See paras. 7.152-179; found that Brazil did not
    establish that the European Communities acted inconsistently with its obligations under
    Article 2.4 by: (1) denying an adjustment with respect to packing costs; (2) failing to
    indicate what information was necessary to ensure a fair comparison; or (3) imposing an
    unreasonable burden of proof in respect of packing costs. See paras. 7.181-193)
   Argentina - Poultry AD Duties (Panel) (Concluded that Argentina violated Article 2.4 by
    failing to make the freight cost adjustment to normal value requested by Sadia; by
    contrast, found that there is nothing on the record to suggest that Avipal had supplied any
    documentary evidence in support of its request for a freight cost adjustment and therefore
    the DCD was entitled to reject the freight cost adjustment requested by Avipal. See
    paras. 7.231-240; found that Argentina violated Article 2.4 "by failing to make
    adjustments when comparing the export price with normal value established on the basis
    of JOX domestic sales data." See paras. 7.241-249; found that the DCD violated Article
    2.4 by increasing all exporters' normal values by 9.09 percent to reflect alleged
    differences in the physical characteristics of poultry sold in Brazil and Argentina. See
    paras. 7.250-260)
   Egypt - Rebar from Turkey (Panel) (Stating that respondents should have raised their
    "concerns" regarding credit cost adjustments at the time the investigating authority shifted
    its analysis to a constructed normal value approach, Panel found that Turkey did not
    make a prima facie case of a violation of Article 2.4. See paras. 7.347-388)
   Argentina - Floor Tiles (Panel) (Article 2.4 means "at a minimum that the authority has to
    evaluate identified differences in physical characteristics to see whether an adjustment is
    required to maintain price comparability and to ensure a fair comparison between normal
    value and export price under Article 2.4 of the AD Agreement, and to adjust where
    necessary"; here, found that the Argentine authority violated Article 2.4 by failing to make
    due allowance for price differences resulting from model differences. See paras. 6.106-
    117)
   U.S. - Hot-Rolled Steel from Japan (AB) (In context of findings under Article 2.1,
    emphasized that "due allowances" under Article 2.4 must be made to ensure the
    comparability of the downstream sales; here, based on a lack of undisputed facts, the
    Appellate Body was unable to complete the analysis and determine whether the
    replacement sales used by DOC in the hot-rolled investigation required any further "due
    allowances." See paras. 167-180)
   U.S. - Sheet/Plate from Korea (Panel) (With respect to unpaid sales made through the
    Korean exporter's affiliated importer, the United States improperly calculated a
    constructed export price by deducting the bad debt costs as "allowances" under AD
    Agreement Article 2.4; similarly, DOC's adjustment for unpaid sales through unaffiliated
    importers was not a permissible "due allowance" and was thus inconsistent with the third
    sentence of AD Agreement Article 2.4. See paras. 6.56-101)

      Article 2.4 (Fair Comparison)

   U.S. - Zeroing (Japan) (AB) (Reversed Panel's finding that the United States does not act
    inconsistently with AD Agreement Article 2.4 by maintaining zeroing procedures when
    calculating margins of dumping on the basis of T-T comparisons in original investigations;
    found instead that the United States acts inconsistently with this provision. See paras.
    141-147; reversed Panel's finding that zeroing in the context of periodic reviews and new
    shipper reviews is not, as such, inconsistent with Article 2.4; found instead that zeroing is,
    as such, inconsistent with that provision. See paras. 167-169; reversed Panel's finding
    that zeroing, as applied by the United States in the 11 periodic reviews at issue in this
    appeal, is not inconsistent with AD Agreement Articles 2.1, 2.4, 9.1, and 9.3 and GATT
    Articles VI:1 and VI:2; found instead that the United States acted inconsistently with
    Articles 2.4 and 9.3 and Article VI:2. See paras. 172-177)
   U.S. - Zeroing (Japan) (Panel) (Found that in "maintaining simple zeroing procedures in
    the context of original investigations," the DOC does not act inconsistently with Article 2.4
    -- reversed on appeal. See paras. 7.144-161; found that by maintaining simple zeroing
    procedures in the context of periodic reviews and new shipper reviews, the DOC does
    not act inconsistently with AD Agreement Articles 2.1, 2.4, 2.4.2, 9.1-9.3, 9.5, 18.4, GATT
    Articles VI:1 and VI:2, and WTO Agreement Article XVI:4 -- reversed on appeal. See
    paras. 7.189-224; for the same reasons, Panel rejected Japan's claims that simple
    zeroing as applied in 11 periodic reviews is inconsistent with AD Agreement Articles 1,
    2.1, 2.4, 2.4.2 and 9.1-9.3, GATT Articles VI:1 and VI:2 -- reversed on appeal. See paras.
    7.225-227; after concluding that Japan has failed to adduce evidence necessary to
    establish that a rule, norm or standard of general and prospective application exists by
    virtue of which the DOC relies on margins of dumping calculated in prior proceedings to
    support its determinations in changed circumstances reviews and sunset reviews, Panel
    found that Japan has failed to make a prima facie case that by maintaining zeroing
    procedures in the context of these reviews the DOC acts inconsistently with AD
    Agreement Articles 2 and 11. See paras. 7.230-244; based on its finding that the AD
    Agreement does not proscribe simple zeroing in periodic reviews within the meaning of
    Article 9.3, Panel found that the DOC did not violate AD Agreement Articles 2 and 11 in
    relying on margins of dumping calculated in periodic reviews on the basis of simple
    zeroing -- reversed on appeal. See paras. 7.245-257)
   U.S. - Lumber AD Final, Article 21.5 (AB) (Reversed Panel's finding that the DOC's
    Section 129 Determination is not inconsistent with AD Agreement Article 2.4; instead,
    Appellate Body concluded that the DOC's use of "zeroing" under the transaction-to-
    transaction comparison methodology in the Section 129 Determination is inconsistent
    with the "fair comparison" requirement of Article 2.4. See paras. 125-146)
   U.S. - Lumber AD Final, Article 21.5 (Panel) (Rejected claim that the DOC's use of
    "zeroing" in the transaction-to-transaction comparison methodology violates the fair
    comparison obligation provided for in the first sentence of Article 2.4 -- reversed on
    appeal. See paras. 5.67-78)
   U.S. - "Zeroing" of Dumping Margins (AB) (Declined to rule on whether the Panel's
    finding under AD Agreement Article 2.4 is in error, and "declare[d] moot, and of no legal
    effect" the finding of the Panel that zeroing, as applied by the DOC in the administrative
    reviews at issue, is not inconsistent with the first sentence of Article 2.4; saw "nothing
    incorrect" in the Panel's reasoning that the "fair comparison" language in the first
    sentence of Article 2.4 "creates an independent obligation" and that "the scope of this
    obligation is not exhausted by the general subject matter expressly addressed by
    paragraph 4 (that is to say, the price comparability)"; with regard to the meaning of "fair
    comparison," the Appellate Body agreed with the Panel that "the legal rule set out in the
    first sentence of Article 2.4 is expressed in terms of a general and abstract standard,"
    which, it said, implies that "this requirement is also applicable to proceedings governed
    by Article 9.3." See paras. 136-147; declared "moot, and of no legal effect" the Panel's
    finding that the zeroing methodology used by the United States in administrative reviews
    is not inconsistent, as such, with AD Agreement Articles 1, 2.4, 2.4.2, 9.3, 11.1, 11.2, and
    18.4, GATT Articles VI:1 and VI:2, and WTO Agreement Article XVI:4. See paras. 226-
    227; declared "moot, and of no legal effect" the Panel's finding that Section 351.414(c)(2)
    is not inconsistent with AD Agreement Articles 1, 2.4, 2.4.2, 9.3, 9.5, 11.1, 11.2, 11.3, and
    18.4, GATT Articles VI:1 and VI:2, and WTO Agreement Article XVI:4. See paras. 235-
    242)
   U.S. - "Zeroing" of Dumping Margins (Panel) (Found that Sections 771(35)(A) and (B),
    731 and 777A(d) of the Tariff Act are not "as such" inconsistent with AD Agreement
    Articles 1, 2.4, 2.4.2, 5.8, 9.3 and 18.4, GATT Articles VI:1 and VI:2, and WTO
    Agreement Article XVI:4 with respect to the use of a "zeroing" methodology in the
    calculation of margins of dumping in original investigations. See paras 7.37-69; Panel
    majority found that the United States did not act inconsistently with Article 2.4 "when in
    the administrative review proceedings challenged by the European Communities in this
    dispute USDOC calculated dumping margins by comparing average monthly normal
    value with prices of individual export transactions and did not include in the numerator of
    the dumping margins any amounts by which export prices of individual transactions
    exceeded the normal value" (i.e., "simple zeroing") -- on appeal, Appellate Body declared
    this finding to be "moot, and of no legal effect." See paras. 7.224-284; with regard to the
    claims that the "Standard Zeroing Procedures" used by the United States in
    administrative reviews or the U.S. practice or methodology of zeroing, Sections
    771(35)(A) and (B), 731, 777A(d) and 751(a)(2)(i) and (ii) of the Tariff Act, and Section
    351.414(c)(2) of the DOC Regulations are inconsistent with AD Agreement Articles 1,
    2.4, 2.4.2, 9.3, 11.1, 11.2 and 18.4, GATT Articles VI:1 and VI:2, WTO Agreement Article
    XVI:4, Panel majority said that these claims are "dependent upon a violation of Articles
    2.4 and/or 2.4.2" and thus it also rejected these dependent claims. See paras. 7.289-291;
    with regard to the claims that the "Standard Zeroing Procedures" used by the United
    States in new shipper reviews, changed circumstances reviews and sunset reviews,
    Sections 771(35)(A) and (B), 731, 777A(d) and 751(a)(2)(i) and (ii) of the Tariff Act, and
    Section 351.414(c)(2) of the DOC Regulations are inconsistent with AD Agreement
    Articles 1, 2.4, 2.4.2, 9.3, 9.5, 11.1, 11.2, 11.3 and 18.4, GATT Articles VI:1 and VI:2,
    WTO Agreement Article XVI:4, Panel majority said that the claims are "dependent upon a
    violation of Articles 2.4 and/or 2.4.2" and thus it also rejected these dependent claims.
    See paras. 7.292-294; one panelist dissented, stating that he would have found: (a) that
    simple and model zeroing are inconsistent with Articles 2.4 and 2.4.2 in assessment
    proceedings, except where there is targeted dumping; (b) that § 351.414 (c)(2) of the
    U.S. Anti-Dumping Regulations, which foresees simple zeroing in review proceedings, is
    inconsistent with Articles 2.4 and 2.4.2; and (c) that the United States zeroing
    methodology used in assessment and review proceedings is inconsistent with Articles 2.4
    and 2.4.2. See paras. 9.1-62)
   U.S. - Lumber AD Final (Panel) (With respect to Canada's claim of violation under Article
    2.4, based on the argument that "zeroing" does not produce a "fair comparison," Panel
    majority considered that as a result of its finding that the DOC's methodology violates
    Article 2.4.2, "it is neither appropriate, nor necessary for us to rule on Canada's Article
    2.4 claim." See paras. 7.225-226; one panelist dissented on the issue of "zeroing,"
    stating: "Canada has not established that the application of zeroing in the underlying
     investigation methodology was inconsistent with the United States' obligation under
     Article 2.4 to conduct a 'fair comparison.'" See paras. 9.1-24)
    EC - Pipe Fittings (Panel) (Found that Brazil did not establish that the European
     Communities violated AD Agreement Article 2.4 or GATT Article VI in not granting an
     adjustment in relation to the IPI Premium Credit and did not establish that the European
     Communities violated the obligation to ensure a fair comparison under AD Agreement
     Article 2.4 or its obligations under GATT Article VI by the methodology it applied in
     calculating the PIS/COFINS adjustment. See paras. 7.152-179; with respect to Brazil's
     allegation that, by using data from "low volume" sales and not making an adjustment for
     the use of this data under Article 2.4, the European Communities breached the Article 2.4
     requirement to make a "fair comparison" between normal value and export price, Panel
     said this argument relates to the identification of normal value under Article 2.2 and 2.2.2,
     rather than to the requirement to ensure a fair comparison under Article 2.4, and
     therefore declined to consider Brazil's allegation on this point under Article 2.4. See para.
     7.140; found that Brazil did not establish that the European Communities acted
     inconsistently with its obligations under Article 2.4 by: (1) denying an adjustment with
     respect to packing costs; (2) failing to indicate what information was necessary to ensure
     a fair comparison; or (3) imposing an unreasonable burden of proof in respect of packing
     costs. See paras. 7.181-193)
    Argentina - Poultry AD Duties (Panel) (Noted that "Article 2.4 imposes obligations in
     respect of the comparison between normal value and export price," and therefore,
     because "Article 2.4 does not impose obligations in respect of the fixing of the period of
     investigation by the investigating authority," Panel rejected Brazil's claim. See paras.
     7.261-266)
    Egypt - Rebar from Turkey (Panel) (Found that Article 2.4 relates to the comparison of
     export price to normal value and does not establish generally applicable rule as to burden
     of proof, such that Article 2.4 is not applicable to the investigating authority's decision to
     resort to facts available. See para. 7.269)
    U.S. - Sheet/Plate from Korea (Panel) (Rejected claim that the "double conversion" of
     local sales from dollars to won and back to dollars was inconsistent with a "fair
     comparison" requirement in the chapeau of Article 2.4. See paras. 6.42-45; use of
     multiple averaging periods did not violate the fair comparison requirement. See paras.
     6.132-136)

       Article 2.4 (Unreasonable Burden of Proof)

    EC - Pipe Fittings (Panel) (Found that Brazil did not establish that the European
     Communities acted inconsistently with its obligations under Article 2.4 by: (1) denying an
     adjustment with respect to packing costs; (2) failing to indicate what information was
     necessary to ensure a fair comparison; or (3) imposing an unreasonable burden of proof
     in respect of packing costs. See paras. 7.181-193)
    Egypt - Rebar from Turkey (Panel) (Found that Article 2.4 relates to the comparison of
     export price to normal value, and thus does not apply to the investigating authority’s
     establishment of normal value as such; found that Turkey had not established that the
     request for certain cost information imposed an unreasonable burden of proof under
     Article 2.4. See paras. 7.330-337)

    Article 2.4.1 (Currency Conversion)

    EC - Pipe Fittings (Panel) (Found that Brazil did not establish that Article 2.4.1 provides a
     legal basis for its claim concerning the currency conversions for adjustments, and
     therefore the Panel did not "consider the merits of Brazil's claim under Article 2.4.1." See
     paras. 7.194-200)
    U.S. - Sheet/Plate from Korea (Panel) (Investigating authority violated Article 2.4.1 when
     it knowingly converted the won price to a dollar price, despite the fact that the authority
     should have known that the won price already reflected a dollar value; there was no
     violation, however, in the investigation of a different product, for which the investigating
     authority could not have known that the won price reflected a dollar value. See paras.
     6.7-41)

    Article 2.4.1 (Applicability to Multiple Averaging)

    U.S. - Sheet/Plate from Korea (Panel) (Article 2.4.1 does not prohibit the use of multiple
     averaging periods, even when that methodology is undertaken to account for currency
     depreciation. See paras. 6.126-131)

    Article 2.4.2, first sentence (Comparison of a Weighted Average Normal Value with a
    Weighted Average of Prices of All Comparable Export Transactions / Comparison of
    Normal Value and Export Prices on a Transaction-to-Transaction Basis)

    U.S. - Shrimp AD Measure (Ecuador) (Panel) (Concluded that by using "zeroing" in
     calculating the margins of dumping in the three measures challenged by Ecuador, the
     DOC has acted inconsistently with AD Agreement Article 2.4.2, first sentence in its final
     and amended final affirmative anti-dumping determinations, and also in its final
     antidumping duty order, with respect to certain frozen warmwater shrimp from Ecuador.
     See paras. 7.13-43)
    U.S. - Zeroing (Japan) (AB) (Reversed Panel's finding that the United States does not act
     inconsistently with Article 2.4.2 by maintaining zeroing procedures when calculating
     margins of dumping on the basis of T-T comparisons in original investigations; found
     instead that the United States acts inconsistently with that provision. See paras. 117-138)
    U.S. - Zeroing (Japan) (Panel) (Concluded that model zeroing procedures in the context
     of original investigations are, as such, inconsistent with Article 2.4.2, and thus found that
     "by maintaining model zeroing procedures in the context of original investigations" the
     DOC acts inconsistently with Article 2.4.2. See paras. 7.60-86; found that "by maintaining
     simple zeroing procedures in the context of original investigations," the DOC does not act
     inconsistently with AD Agreement Articles 2.1 and 2.4.2 and GATT Articles VI:1 and VI:2
     -- reversed on appeal. See paras. 7.90-143; found that "by using model zeroing in the
     anti-dumping investigation of imports of certain cut-to-length carbon quality steel products
     from Japan," the DOC acted inconsistently with AD Agreement Article 2.4.2. See paras.
     7.176-179; found that by maintaining simple zeroing procedures in the context of periodic
     reviews and new shipper reviews, the DOC does not act inconsistently with AD
     Agreement Articles 2.1, 2.4, 2.4.2, 9.1-9.3, 9.5, 18.4, GATT Articles VI:1 and VI:2, and
     WTO Agreement Article XVI:4 -- reversed on appeal. See paras. 7.189-224; for the same
     reasons, Panel rejected Japan's claims that simple zeroing as applied in 11 periodic
     reviews is inconsistent with AD Agreement Articles 1, 2.1, 2.4, 2.4.2 and 9.1-9.3, GATT
     Articles VI:1 and VI:2 -- reversed on appeal. See paras. 7.225-227; after concluding that
     Japan has failed to adduce evidence necessary to establish that a rule, norm or standard
     of general and prospective application exists by virtue of which the DOC relies on
     margins of dumping calculated in prior proceedings to support its determinations in
     changed circumstances reviews and sunset reviews, Panel found that Japan has failed to
     make a prima facie case that by maintaining zeroing procedures in the context of these
     reviews the DOC acts inconsistently with AD Agreement Articles 2 and 11. See paras.
     7.230-244; based on its finding that the AD Agreement does not proscribe simple zeroing
     in periodic reviews within the meaning of Article 9.3, Panel found that the DOC did not
     violate AD Agreement Articles 2 and 11 in relying on margins of dumping calculated in
     periodic reviews on the basis of simple zeroing -- reversed on appeal. See paras. 7.245-
     257)
    U.S. - Lumber AD Final, Article 21.5 (AB) (Reversed Panel's finding that the U.S.
     Department of Commerce ("DOC") "was entitled not to offset the non-dumped
     transactions against the dumped transactions when calculating the margin of dumping for
    each respondent foreign producer or exporter"; also reversed Panel's conclusion that the
    determination of the DOC in the Section 129 proceeding investigation is not inconsistent
    with AD Agreement Article 2.4.2; instead, Appellate Body concluded that the use of
    "zeroing" by the DOC under the transaction-to-transaction comparison methodology in
    the Section 129 Determination is inconsistent with Article 2.4.2. See paras. 71-124)
   U.S. - Lumber AD Final, Article 21.5 (Panel) (Concluded that "neither the ordinary
    meaning of the first sentence of Article 2.4.2 as a whole, nor the ordinary meaning of the
    phrase 'margins of dumping' in particular, require that all transaction-specific
    comparisons under the T-T comparison methodology must be treated as 'intermediate
    values' and aggregated, without zeroing, in order to arrive at a single margin of dumping
    for the product as a whole"; thus, concluded that "the DOC was entitled not to offset the
    non-dumped transactions against the dumped transactions when calculating the margin
    of dumping for each respondent foreign producer or exporter"; accordingly, rejected claim
    that the DOC's use of "zeroing" in the transaction-to-transaction comparison methodology
    at issue is inconsistent with AD Agreement Article 2.4.2 -- reversed on appeal. See
    paras. 5.9-66)
   U.S. - "Zeroing" of Dumping Margins (AB) (Stated that it did not express any view as to
    whether Article 2.4.2 is applicable to administrative reviews under Article 9.3; thus, it said,
    the Panel's findings on this issue "should not be considered to have been endorsed by
    the Appellate Body." See paras. 160-164; upheld Panel's conclusion, "albeit for reasons
    different from those set out by the Panel," that "the zeroing methodology, as it relates to
    original investigations in which the weighted-average-to-weighted-average comparison
    method is used to calculate margins of dumping, is inconsistent, as such," with AD
    Agreement Article 2.4.2. See paras. 173-222; declared "moot, and of no legal effect" the
    Panel's finding that the zeroing methodology used by the United States in administrative
    reviews is not inconsistent, as such, with AD Agreement Articles 1, 2.4, 2.4.2, 9.3, 11.1,
    11.2, and 18.4, GATT Articles VI:1 and VI:2, and WTO Agreement Article XVI:4. See
    paras. 226-227; declared "moot, and of no legal effect" the Panel's finding that Section
    351.414(c)(2) is not inconsistent with AD Agreement Articles 1, 2.4, 2.4.2, 9.3, 9.5, 11.1,
    11.2, 11.3, and 18.4, GATT Articles VI:1 and VI:2, and WTO Agreement Article XVI:4.
    See paras. 235-242)
   U.S. - "Zeroing" of Dumping Margins (Panel) (Found that the United States acted
    inconsistently with Article 2.4.2 "when in the anti-dumping investigations at issue USDOC
    did not include in the numerator used to calculate weighted average dumping margins
    any amounts by which average export prices in individual averaging groups exceeded the
    average normal value for such groups" (i.e., when it used "model zeroing"). See paras
    7.9-32; found that Sections 771(35)(A) and (B), 731 and 777A(d) of the Tariff Act are not
    "as such" inconsistent with AD Agreement Articles 1, 2.4, 2.4.2, 5.8, 9.3 and 18.4, GATT
    Articles VI:1 and VI:2, and WTO Agreement Article XVI:4 with respect to the use of a
    "zeroing" methodology in the calculation of margins of dumping in original investigations.
    See paras 7.37-69; found that "the United States' zeroing methodology, as it relates to
    original investigations, is a norm which, as such, is inconsistent with Article 2.4.2." See
    paras. 7.70-106; Panel majority found that the United States did not act inconsistently
    with Article 2.4.2 when, in the administrative reviews at issue, the DOC "used a
    methodology that involved asymmetrical comparisons between export price and normal
    value and in which no account was taken of any amount by which export prices exceeded
    normal value" (i.e., "simple zeroing"). See paras. 7.113-223; with regard to the claims that
    the "Standard Zeroing Procedures" used by the United States in administrative reviews or
    the U.S. practice or methodology of zeroing, Sections 771(35)(A) and (B), 731, 777A(d)
    and 751(a)(2)(i) and (ii) of the Tariff Act, and Section 351.414(c)(2) of the DOC
    Regulations are inconsistent with AD Agreement Articles 1, 2.4, 2.4.2, 9.3, 11.1, 11.2 and
    18.4, GATT Articles VI:1 and VI:2, WTO Agreement Article XVI:4, Panel majority said that
    these claims are "dependent upon a violation of Articles 2.4 and/or 2.4.2" and thus it also
    rejected these dependent claims. See paras. 7.289-291; with regard to the claims that the
    "Standard Zeroing Procedures" used by the United States in new shipper reviews,
    changed circumstances reviews and sunset reviews, Sections 771(35)(A) and (B), 731,
     777A(d) and 751(a)(2)(i) and (ii) of the Tariff Act, and Section 351.414(c)(2) of the DOC
     Regulations are inconsistent with AD Agreement Articles 1, 2.4, 2.4.2, 9.3, 9.5, 11.1,
     11.2, 11.3 and 18.4, GATT Articles VI:1 and VI:2, WTO Agreement Article XVI:4, Panel
     majority said that the claims are "dependent upon a violation of Articles 2.4 and/or 2.4.2"
     and thus it also rejected these dependent claims. See paras. 7.292-294; one panelist
     dissented, stating that he would have found: (a) that simple and model zeroing are
     inconsistent with Articles 2.4 and 2.4.2 in assessment proceedings, except where there is
     targeted dumping; (b) that § 351.414 (c)(2) of the U.S. Anti-Dumping Regulations, which
     foresees simple zeroing in review proceedings, is inconsistent with Articles 2.4 and 2.4.2;
     and (c) that the United States zeroing methodology used in assessment and review
     proceedings is inconsistent with Articles 2.4 and 2.4.2. See paras. 9.1-62)
    U.S. - Lumber AD Final (AB) (Upheld the Panel's finding that the United States acted
     inconsistently with AD Agreement Article 2.4.2 in determining the existence of margins of
     dumping on the basis of a methodology incorporating the practice of "zeroing." See
     paras. 63-117)
    U.S. - Lumber AD Final (Panel) (Panel majority found that through the use of "zeroing,"
     the United States violated AD Agreement Article 2.4.2 "by not taking into account all
     comparable export transactions when DOC calculated the overall margin of dumping as
     Article 2.4.2 requires that the existence of margins of dumping has to be established for
     softwood lumber on the basis of a comparison of the weighted-average-normal value with
     the weighted average of prices of all comparable export transactions, that is, for all
     transactions involving all types of the product under investigation." See paras. 7.185-224;
     one panelist dissented, stating: "I consider that the US interpretation of Article 2.4.2 as
     not prohibiting zeroing is a permissible one"; thus, the dissenter found that "the
     application by DOC of 'zeroing' in this case was not inconsistent with Article 2.4.2 of the
     AD Agreement." See paras. 9.1-24)
    EC - Pipe Fittings (Panel) (Noted that the European Communities "has admitted" that it
     applied "zeroing" in this case and that this "practice" has been found in other WTO
     dispute settlement cases to be a violation of Article 2.4.2; on this basis, found that the
     European Communities violated Article 2.4.2 "by failing to consider the weighted average
     of 'all comparable export transactions.'" See paras. 7.209-219)
    Argentina - Poultry AD Duties (Panel) (Because the DCD established weighted average
     normal values on the basis of "statistical samples" of domestic sales transactions, rather
     than on the basis of all domestic sales transactions, the Panel found that the DCD
     violated Article 2.4.2 by failing to compare the weighted average export price with a
     "proper" weighted average normal value. See paras. 7.267-276)
    EC - Bed Linen (AB) (Upheld Panel's finding of a violation of Article 2.4.2 based on the
     EC's use of "zeroing." See paras. 46-66)
    EC - Bed Linen (Panel) (Found EC's use of "zeroing" to violate Article 2.4.2 -- by using
     zeroing for some models, the EC failed to carry out a comparison with all transactions.
     See paras. 6.102-119)
    U.S. - Sheet/Plate from Korea (Panel) (Use of multiple averaging periods without a
     proper determination of non-comparability violates the Article 2.4.2 requirement to
     compare "a weighted average normal value with a weighted average of prices of all
     comparable export transactions." See paras. 6.106-125)

    Article 2.4.2, second sentence (Comparison of a Weighted Average Normal Value with
    Individual Export Transactions)

    U.S. - Lumber AD Final, Article 21.5 (AB) (In the context of its findings under AD
     Agreement Article 2.4.2, first sentence, Appellate Body explained that Article 2.4.2,
     second sentence is an "exception." See paras. 95-100)

    Article 2.6 ("Like Product" Shall Be Interpreted To Mean a Product which is Identical To,
    or Closely Resembles, the Product under Consideration)
    Korea - Paper AD Duties (Panel) (Rejected Indonesia's argument that PPC and WF are
     not, in fact, like products, and therefore "to conform to the provisions of Article 2.6 of the
     Agreement, the KTC should have analyzed the effect of Indonesian PPC on Korean PPC
     producers and the effect of Indonesian WF on Korean WF producers, separately";
     therefore rejected Indonesia's claim that the KTC's like product definition was
     inconsistent with Article 2.6, and, consequently, also rejected the claims related to
     Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5 and 3.7. See paras. 7.211-224)
    U.S. - Lumber AD Final (Panel) (Found that having defined the "product under
     consideration," the DOC "used an identical definition for the 'like product'"; therefore, the
     Panel said, "[o]n its face … it would appear that DOC has defined the 'like product' in this
     investigation in a manner consistent with the definition found in Article 2.6"; rejected
     Canada's interpretation of Article 2.6, under which, "rather than comparing the overall
     scope of the product under consideration with the overall scope of the like product,"
     Article 2.6 would require "that each individual item within the 'like product' must be 'like'
     each individual item within the 'product under consideration'"; on this basis, Panel
     concluded that the DOC's "approach" to "like product" was "not inconsistent" with the
     definition of "like product" in Article 2.6. See paras. 7.139-158)
    EC - Pipe Fittings (Panel) (Found that Brazil did not establish that the European
     Communities acted inconsistently with Articles 2.2 and 2.2.2 by including data from sales
     of product types with internal product codes 68 and 69 -- which fell within the definition of
     "like product" but were alleged not to be "identical" to the export products -- for the
     purposes of constructing normal value. See paras. 7.141-151)

Article 3 (Determination of Injury)

    Applicability of Article 3 to Sunset Reviews

    U.S. - OCTG Sunset Reviews (AB) (Upheld Panel's finding that the obligations in Article 3
     "do not apply to likelihood-of injury determinations in sunset reviews.". See paras. 271-
     280; in response to Argentina's argument that Article 11.3, "in and of itself, imposes
     'substantive obligations' on investigating authorities to make their sunset review
     determinations in a particular manner, and that the Panel erred in failing to recognize the
     existence of these obligations," Appellate Body concluded: "We are not persuaded by the
     argument of Argentina that a likelihood-of-injury determination can rest on a 'sufficient
     factual basis' and can be regarded as a 'reasoned conclusion' only after undertaking all
     the analyses detailed in the paragraphs of Article 3." See paras. 281-284)
    U.S. - OCTG Sunset Reviews (Panel) (Concluded that the obligations contained in Article
     3 pertain to injury determinations and not the likelihood determinations carried out in
     sunset reviews under Article 11; stated, therefore, that Article 3 applies to a sunset
     review to the extent that an investigating authority carries out an injury determination or
     relies upon a previous injury determination. See paras. 7.268-276)
    U.S. - Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review (Panel) (Found that the obligations in
     Article 3.3 pertain to cumulative analysis in "investigations," and that they are not
     applicable to "sunset reviews''; concluded that "the United States did not act
     inconsistently with Articles 11.3, 3.3 or 5.8 in the instant sunset review by cumulating
     imports from Japan with imports from other countries without applying the negligibility
     standard set out in Article 3.3 and 5.8 for original investigations." See paras. 7.89-105)

    Article 3.1 ("Positive Evidence"; "Objective Examination")

    Mexico - Pipes and Tubes AD Duties (Panel) (Explained that "positive evidence" is
     "evidence that is relevant and pertinent with the issue to be decided, and that has the
     characteristics of being inherently reliable and creditworthy"; explained that "[a]n
     'objective examination' requires that the domestic industry, and the effects of dumped
    imports, be investigated in an unbiased manner, without favouring the interests of any
    interested party, or group of interested parties, in the investigation" and that "the
    identification, investigation and evaluation of the relevant factors must be 'even-handed.'"
    See paras. 7.211-215; concluded that Guatemala failed to establish that Economía
    violated AD Agreement Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5 "by relying on data from an
    investigation period that terminated about eight months prior to the initiation and about
    two years prior to the imposition of the definitive measures." See paras. 7.217-240;
    concluded that "Economía's reliance, without sufficient justification, upon a subset of data
    temporally limited to three six-month periods (July-December) over three consecutive
    years (1998, 1999, 2000), as proposed by the applicant, was not capable of yielding an
    accurate and representative picture enabling Economía to make an objective
    examination of positive evidence in reaching its affirmative injury determination";
    therefore concluded that Economía acted inconsistently with AD Agreement Articles 3.1,
    3.2, 3.4 and 3.5. See paras. 7.241-261; with regard to volume effects, concluded that "the
    methodology applied by Economía to estimate the volume of imports from sources other
    than Guatemala – i.e. reliance on limited samples of varying magnitudes for the three
    relevant periods in 1998, 1999 and 2000 as the basis for identifying the ranges of
    minimum and maximum prices for the imports known to be of the relevant product, and
    on the assumption that all imported products with prices within those ranges were
    investigated products – was inconsistent with the requirements of Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of
    the Anti-Dumping Agreement to conduct an objective examination of positive evidence";
    with regard to price effects, concluded that "Guatemala failed to establish a prima facie
    case of inconsistency with Articles 3.1 and 3.2." See paras. 7.262-295; concluded that
    "Economía failed to conduct an objective examination on the basis of positive evidence,
    as required by Article 3.1, of injury to the domestic industry as that term is defined in
    Article 4.1, and consequently also violated Articles 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5, by failing to gather
    and analyse representative and consistent data pertaining to the domestic industry, in
    particular the data concerning the financial indicators of the 'domestic industry,' as
    defined by it." See paras. 7.296-333; rejected Guatemala's claims that changes in the
    definition of the product under investigation/like product in the course of the investigation
    rendered the determinations of injury and causal link inconsistent with AD Agreement
    Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, 4.1 and 5.4. See paras. 7.334-347; with regard to
    causation/non-attribution, Panel found that Economía acted inconsistently with Articles
    3.1, 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5 in its treatment of the decrease in exports in its causation analysis;
    however, concluded that Guatemala failed to establish a prima facie case of
    inconsistency with Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5 in relation to the treatment of operating
    costs. See paras. 7.348-372)
   U.S. - Zeroing (Japan) (Panel) (Based on its rejection of the claims against simple
    zeroing under other provisions, Panel rejected claims under Articles 3.1-3.5. See paras.
    7.162-166)
   Mexico - Rice AD Measures (AB) (In light of Panel's assessment of various
    circumstances, Appellate Body said it accepted that "a gap of 15 months between the
    end of the period of investigation and the initiation of the investigation, and another gap of
    almost three years between the end of the period of investigation and the imposition of
    the final anti-dumping duties, may raise real doubts about the existence of a sufficiently
    relevant nexus between the data relating to the period of investigation and current injury";
    thus, upheld Panel's finding that Economía's use of a period of investigation ending in
    August 1999 resulted in a failure to make a determination of injury based on "positive
    evidence" as required by Article 3.1, and also upheld the Panel's finding that by choosing
    this period of investigation Mexico acted inconsistently with Articles 3.2, 3.4, and 3.5. See
    paras. 158-172; upheld Panel's finding that "in limiting the injury analysis to the March to
    August period of 1997, 1998, and 1999, Mexico failed to make a determination of injury
    that involves an 'objective examination,' as required by Article 3.1," and thus also upheld
    the finding that "Mexico acted inconsistently with Article 3.5." See paras. 173-188; upheld
    Panel's findings that Economía's injury analysis with respect to the volume and price
    effects of dumped imports was inconsistent with the requirements of Articles 3.1 and 3.2
    to conduct an objective examination based on positive evidence. See paras. 189-206)
   Mexico - Rice AD Measures (Panel) (Concluded, "by choosing to base its determination
    of injury on a period of investigation which ended more than fifteen months before the
    initiation of the investigation," Mexico acted inconsistently with the Article 3.1 requirement
    to make a determination of injury which is based on positive evidence and which involves
    an objective examination "of the volume and price effects of the alleged dumped imports
    or of the consequent impact of these imports on domestic producers of the like product at
    the time measures were imposed." See paras. 7.50-65; due the exclusion of six months
    of data from each year of the investigation period, found that the investigating authority's
    injury analysis is inconsistent with AD Agreement Article 3.1 "as it is not based on
    positive evidence and does not allow for an objective examination, as it necessarily, and
    without any proper justification, provides only a part of the picture of the situation"; in
    addition, it found that "the particular choice of the limited period of investigation in this
    case was not that of an unbiased and objective investigating authority as the authority
    was aware of, and accepted, the fact that the period chosen reflected the highest import
    penetration, thus ignoring data from a period in which it can be expected that the
    domestic industry was faring better." See paras. 7.66-87; found that the investigating
    authority's use of assumptions in its evaluation of export volumes and price effects
    resulted in a violation of AD Agreement Articles 3.1 and 3.2; said that it was not
    convinced "that an objective and unbiased investigating authority had no choice but to
    base itself on the above unsubstantiated assumptions"; on this basis, found that the
    investigating authority's injury analysis with regard to the volume and price effects of
    dumped imports is inconsistent with the AD Agreement Articles 3.1 and 3.2 requirement
    "to conduct an objective examination based on positive evidence of the volume and price
    effects of the dumped imports." See paras. 7.89-116)
   Korea - Paper AD Duties (Panel) (Rejected Indonesia's argument that PPC and WF are
    not, in fact, like products, and therefore "to conform to the provisions of Article 2.6 of the
    Agreement, the KTC should have analyzed the effect of Indonesian PPC on Korean PPC
    producers and the effect of Indonesian WF on Korean WF producers, separately";
    therefore rejected Indonesia's claim that the KTC's like product definition was
    inconsistent with Article 2.6, and, consequently, also rejected the claims related to
    Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5 and 3.7. See paras. 7.211-224; in response to Indonesia's claim
    that "the data collected by the KTC with respect to prices could not support its finding that
    dumped imports caused material injury to the Korean industry," Panel concluded that "the
    KTC has clearly considered whether there was price undercutting, price suppression and
    price depression caused by dumped imports"; therefore, Panel rejected Indonesia's claim
    that the KTC's analysis concerning the price effects of dumped imports on the Korean
    industry was inconsistent with Articles 3.1, 3.2 and 3.4. See paras. 7.238-254)
   U.S. - OCTG AD Measures (Panel) (Found that 19 U.S.C. §§ 1675a(a)(1) and (5) are not
    inconsistent with AD Agreement Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.7, 3.8, 11.1 and 11.3 in relation to
    the determination of whether injury is likely to continue or recur. See paras. 7.84-108)
   U.S. - OCTG Sunset Reviews (Panel) (Observed that the ITC's determination makes
    clear that it is about the likelihood of continuation or recurrence of injury, and Argentina
    did not argue that the ITC carried out an injury determination nor did it claim that the ITC
    relied on a past injury determination that is now inconsistent with Article 3; thus, the
    Panel said that it would examine only the Article 11.3 aspects of Argentina's claim and
    would "decline" those relating to Article 3. See paras. 7.278-279)
   U.S. - Lumber ITC Investigation (Panel) (While it made no findings on the AD Agreement
    Article 3.1 and SCM Agreement Article 15.1 claims, Panel nonetheless recognized "the
    importance of these obligations to its evaluation of the determination at issue"; thus, it
    said that it "considered the obligations established in those provisions in evaluating the
    determination" and "kept in mind statements of the Appellate Body regarding the
    meaning of 'positive evidence' and 'objective examination.'" See paras. 7.24-28)
   EC - Pipe Fittings (AB) (Found that the Panel did not fail to assess whether the European
    Commission's establishment of the facts was proper under Article 17.6(i) and did not
    incorrectly interpret Articles 3.1 and 3.4 "by including Exhibit EC-12 within its assessment
    of the European Commission's evaluation of the injury factors listed in Article 3.4." See
    paras. 119-133)
   EC - Pipe Fittings (Panel) (Found that the European Communities did not violate Articles
    3.2 and 3.1 with respect to its use of "zeroing" as part of its price undercutting
    methodology. See paras. 7.268-285; found that the European Communities did not
    violate Articles 3.2 and 3.1 in not granting an adjustment for price comparability in its
    comparison of sales prices of black heart and white heart fittings in the context of its
    consideration of price undercutting. See paras. 7.286-297; concluded that the European
    Communities did not violate Articles 3.4 or 3.1 in its evaluation of injury factors. See
    paras. 7.298-345)
   Argentina - Poultry AD Duties (Panel) (Found that the CNCE acted inconsistently with
    Article 3.1 by only examining 1999 data for certain injury factors, but not others. See
    paras. 7.277-288; found that Argentina violated Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5 by including
    "non-dumped" imports from Nicolini and Seara in the injury analysis. See paras. 7.295-
    307; found that Argentina violated Articles 3.1(b) and 3.4 by failing to evaluate all of the
    factors and indices listed in Article 3.4. See paras. 7.308-327)
   EC - Bed Linen, Article 21.5 (AB) (Found that the EC violated Articles 3.1 and 3.2 when it
    considered all imports from unexamined Indian producers/exporters to be "dumped" for
    purposes of the injury analysis. See paras. 101-146)
   EC - Bed Linen, Article 21.5 (Panel) (Rejected claim that the EC violated Articles 3.1 and
    3.3 by conducting a cumulative assessment of the effects of dumped imports from India
    and Pakistan, given that, at the time of the redetermination, the only determination
    regarding imports from Pakistan established that those imports were dumped. See paras.
    6.95-116; rejected argument that the EC violated Articles 3.1 and 3.2 when it considered
    all imports from unexamined Indian producers/exporters to be "dumped" for purposes of
    the injury analysis -- reversed on appeal. See paras. 6.117-144; concluded that the EC's
    analysis and conclusions in respect of its evaluation of the Article 3.4 factors were
    consistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.4. See paras. 6.145-217)
   Egypt - Rebar from Turkey (Panel) (Found that Turkey had not established that an
    objective and unbiased investigating authority could not have found "price undercutting"
    to exist on the basis of the evidence on the record; therefore, rejected Turkey's claim that
    the price undercutting finding at issue was not based on "positive evidence" under Article
    3.1. See paras. 7.67-76; rejected Turkey's claim that the investigating authority failed to
    develop "positive evidence" (i.e., by failing to collect a certain type of evidence), under
    Articles 3.1 and 3.5, that dumped imports had an effect on domestic prices, or any impact
    on the domestic industry. See paras. 7.97-106; finally, rejected Turkey's claim under
    Articles 3.1 and 3.5 that the investigating authority improperly found a causal link
    between imports and injury despite certain alleged timing discrepancies between
    decreased prices and falling profits. See paras. 7.127-132)
   Mexico - HFCS, Article 21.5 (AB) (Upheld Panel's finding of a violation of Article 3.1. See
    paras. 94-101)
   Mexico - HFCS, Article 21.5 (Panel) (Violation of Article 3.1 found on the basis of a lack
    of evidence supporting investigating authority's projections in respect of factors contained
    in AD Agreement Article 3.7. See paras. 6.24-36)
   U.S. - Hot-Rolled Steel from Japan (AB) (Upheld Panel's conclusion regarding Japan's
    challenge to the captive production provision "as such," albeit under different reasoning;
    in particular, emphasized that the captive production provision does not require exclusive
    focus on the merchant market and would allow the investigating authority to examine
    both market segments; reversed Panel's conclusion that the United States did not violate
    Article 3.1 in respect of its application of the captive production provision in the hot-rolled
    investigation; emphasized that the ITC report in the hot-rolled investigation discloses no
    data on the captive market. See paras. 181-215)
   U.S. - Hot-Rolled Steel from Japan (Panel) (In the context of the U.S. captive production
    provision, found that because the provision does not require an exclusive focus on the
     merchant market, it is not inconsistent on its face with the "objective examination"
     requirement of Article 3.1; similarly, as applied in the hot-rolled investigation, the U.S.
     investigating authority in fact examined injury to the domestic industry as a whole,
     consistently with Article 3.1 -- reversed on appeal. See paras. 7.169-215; U.S. ITC
     properly evaluated all of Article 3.4 factors and justified its focus on a two-year, period
     consistently with Article 3.1. See paras. 7.216-236)
    Thailand - Steel (AB) (Reversed the Panel's interpretation of Articles 3.1 and 17.6(i),
     holding that investigating authorities may rely on confidential information not shared with
     the parties in reaching their determinations. See paras. 98-112)
    Thailand - Steel (Panel) (Article 3.1, read together with standard of review in Article
     17.6(i), dictates that "the reasoning supporting the determination be 'formally or explicitly
     stated' in documents in the record of the anti-dumping investigation to which interested
     parties (and/or their legal counsel) have access at least from the time of the final
     determination," and similarly, the factual basis relied upon by the authority "must also be
     discernible from those documents" -- reversed on appeal. See paras. 7.130-152; found
     that Thailand violated Article 3.2 and Article 3.1 on the basis of the lack of any "positive
     evidence" supporting its finding of negative price effects. See paras. 7.153-215; violation
     of Article 3.4 (and 3.1) found on basis of authority's failure to examine all of the Article 3.4
     factors, and its failure to provide a sufficient explanation of "how and why, in light of the
     positive trends in so many injury factors, they nonetheless concluded that the domestic
     industry was injured." See paras. 7.216-256; because it had rejected the Thai authority's
     conclusions as inconsistent with certain other AD Agreement provisions, held that there
     was no basis for a finding of a causal link, in violation of Articles 3.5 and 3.1. See paras.
     7.258-284)
    EC - Bed Linen (Panel) (A dumping determination is made in respect of a product, such
     that, if any dumping is found, then the investigating authority can consider all import
     volumes of the product from particular producers/exporters to represent "dumped
     imports" in the context of the injury determination; therefore, no violation of Article 3.1
     found based on inclusion of non-dumped transactions in injury analysis. See paras.
     6.121-142)
    Guatemala - Cement II (Panel) (Discussed in the context of Article 3 - Final Injury
     Determination; because Guatemala was unable to answer the Panel's question as to
     whether its import volume table included certain imports, Panel found a violation of
     Articles 3.1, 3.2 and 3.5 on the basis that Guatemala failed to rebut Mexico's prima facie
     case that it had improperly excluded certain imports. See paras. 8.261-272)
    Mexico - HFCS (Panel) (In the context of "threat of material injury," found that Article 3.1
     requires that all Article 3.4 factors be examined; here, failure to examine all of those
     factors resulted in a violation of Article 3.1. See paras. 7.111-142; similarly, in the context
     of Mexico's examination of the domestic industry, Mexico's failure to examine the
     domestic industry as a whole resulted in a violation of Article 3.1. See paras. 7.143-162)

    Article 3.2 (Increase in Dumped Imports / Price Effects / Price Undercutting)

    Mexico - Pipes and Tubes AD Duties (Panel) (Concluded that Guatemala failed to
     establish that Economía violated AD Agreement Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5 "by relying
     on data from an investigation period that terminated about eight months prior to the
     initiation and about two years prior to the imposition of the definitive measures." See
     paras. 7.217-240; concluded that "Economía's reliance, without sufficient justification,
     upon a subset of data temporally limited to three six-month periods (July-December) over
     three consecutive years (1998, 1999, 2000), as proposed by the applicant, was not
     capable of yielding an accurate and representative picture enabling Economía to make
     an objective examination of positive evidence in reaching its affirmative injury
     determination"; therefore concluded that Economía acted inconsistently with AD
     Agreement Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5. See paras. 7.241-261; with regard to volume
     effects, concluded that "the methodology applied by Economía to estimate the volume of
    imports from sources other than Guatemala – i.e. reliance on limited samples of varying
    magnitudes for the three relevant periods in 1998, 1999 and 2000 as the basis for
    identifying the ranges of minimum and maximum prices for the imports known to be of the
    relevant product, and on the assumption that all imported products with prices within
    those ranges were investigated products – was inconsistent with the requirements of
    Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement to conduct an objective examination
    of positive evidence"; with regard to price effects, concluded that "Guatemala failed to
    establish a prima facie case of inconsistency with Articles 3.1 and 3.2." See paras. 7.262-
    295; concluded that "Economía failed to conduct an objective examination on the basis of
    positive evidence, as required by Article 3.1, of injury to the domestic industry as that
    term is defined in Article 4.1, and consequently also violated Articles 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5, by
    failing to gather and analyse representative and consistent data pertaining to the
    domestic industry, in particular the data concerning the financial indicators of the
    'domestic industry,' as defined by it." See paras. 7.296-333; rejected Guatemala's claims
    that changes in the definition of the product under investigation/like product in the course
    of the investigation rendered the determinations of injury and causal link inconsistent with
    AD Agreement Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, 4.1 and 5.4. See paras. 7.334-347; with regard
    to causation/non-attribution, Panel found that Economía acted inconsistently with Articles
    3.1, 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5 in its treatment of the decrease in exports in its causation analysis;
    however, concluded that Guatemala failed to establish a prima facie case of
    inconsistency with Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5 in relation to the treatment of operating
    costs. See paras. 7.348-372)
   U.S. - Zeroing (Japan) (Panel) (Based on its rejection of the claims against simple
    zeroing under other provisions, Panel rejected claims under Articles 3.1-3.5. See paras.
    7.162-166)
   Mexico - Rice AD Measures (AB) (Upheld Panel's finding that Economía's use of a period
    of investigation ending in August 1999 resulted in a failure to make a determination of
    injury based on "positive evidence" as required by Article 3.1, and also upheld the Panel's
    finding that by choosing this period of investigation Mexico acted inconsistently with
    Articles 3.2, 3.4, and 3.5. See paras. 158-172; upheld Panel's findings that Economía's
    injury analysis with respect to the volume and price effects of dumped imports was
    inconsistent with the requirements of Articles 3.1 and 3.2 to conduct an objective
    examination based on positive evidence. See paras. 189-206)
   Mexico - Rice AD Measures (Panel) (Concluded, "by choosing to base its determination
    of injury on a period of investigation which ended more than fifteen months before the
    initiation of the investigation," Mexico acted inconsistently with the Article 3.1 requirement
    to make a determination of injury which is based on positive evidence and which involves
    an objective examination "of the volume and price effects of the alleged dumped imports
    or of the consequent impact of these imports on domestic producers of the like product at
    the time measures were imposed"; as a consequence, it found that Mexico violated
    Articles 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5 "when considering the volume and price effects of the dumped
    imports, all relevant factors affecting the state of the industry and the causal relationship
    between dumped imports and the alleged injury to the domestic industry, respectively."
    See paras. 7.50-65; found that the investigating authority's use of assumptions in its
    evaluation of export volumes and price effects resulted in a violation of AD Agreement
    Articles 3.1 and 3.2; said that it was not convinced "that an objective and unbiased
    investigating authority had no choice but to base itself on the above unsubstantiated
    assumptions"; on this basis, found that the investigating authority's injury analysis with
    regard to the volume and price effects of dumped imports is inconsistent with the AD
    Agreement Articles 3.1 and 3.2 requirement "to conduct an objective examination based
    on positive evidence of the volume and price effects of the dumped imports." See paras.
    7.89-116)
   Korea - Paper AD Duties (Panel) (Rejected Indonesia's argument that PPC and WF are
    not, in fact, like products, and therefore "to conform to the provisions of Article 2.6 of the
    Agreement, the KTC should have analyzed the effect of Indonesian PPC on Korean PPC
    producers and the effect of Indonesian WF on Korean WF producers, separately";
    therefore rejected Indonesia's claim that the KTC's like product definition was
    inconsistent with Article 2.6, and, consequently, also rejected the claims related to
    Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5 and 3.7. See paras. 7.211-224; in response to Indonesia's claim
    that "the data collected by the KTC with respect to prices could not support its finding that
    dumped imports caused material injury to the Korean industry," Panel concluded that "the
    KTC has clearly considered whether there was price undercutting, price suppression and
    price depression caused by dumped imports"; Panel also stated its view that it did not
    read Article 3.2 as requiring that the word "significant" appear in the text of the
    determination, and said that the requirements of that provision "will be satisfied if the
    determination demonstrates that the [investigating authority] properly considered whether
    or not prices of dumped imports had one of the three price effects set out under Article
    3.2"; here, Panel concluded that the determination properly addressed this issue and
    therefore it did not agree with Indonesia that the KTC acted inconsistently with Article 3.2;
    therefore, Panel rejected Indonesia's claim that the KTC's analysis concerning the price
    effects of dumped imports on the Korean industry was inconsistent with Articles 3.1, 3.2
    and 3.4. See paras. 7.238-254)
   U.S. - OCTG AD Measures (Panel) (Found that 19 U.S.C. §§ 1675a(a)(1) and (5) are not
    inconsistent with AD Agreement Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.7, 3.8, 11.1 and 11.3 in relation to
    the determination of whether injury is likely to continue or recur. See paras. 7.84-108)
   U.S. - OCTG Sunset Reviews (Panel) (Observed that the ITC's determination makes
    clear that it is about the likelihood of continuation or recurrence of injury, and Argentina
    did not argue that the ITC carried out an injury determination nor did it claim that the ITC
    relied on a past injury determination that is now inconsistent with Article 3; thus, the
    Panel said that it would examine only the Article 11.3 aspects of Argentina's claim and
    would "decline" those relating to Article 3. See paras. 7.278-279)
   U.S. - Lumber ITC Investigation (Panel) (Noting that it saw no basis for concluding that
    the injury factors set out in AD Agreement Article 3.2 and SCM Agreement Article 15.2
    must be directly considered in a "predictive" context in making a threat of material injury
    determination, Panel found "no violation" of AD Agreement Articles 3.2 and 3.4 and SCM
    Agreement Articles 15.2 and 15.4. See paras. 7.97-112)
   EC - Pipe Fittings (AB) (Upheld Panel's finding that the European Communities did not
    act inconsistently with AD Agreement Articles 3.2 or 3.3 by failing to analyze the volume
    and prices of dumped imports from Brazil individually, pursuant to Article 3.2, as a pre-
    condition to cumulatively assessing the effects of these imports under Article 3.3. See
    paras. 103-118)
   EC - Pipe Fittings (Panel) (Found that the European Communities did not violate Articles
    3.2 and 3.1 with respect to its use of "zeroing" as part of its price undercutting
    methodology. See paras. 7.268-285; found that the European Communities did not
    violate Articles 3.2 and 3.1 in not granting an adjustment for price comparability in its
    comparison of sales prices of black heart and white heart fittings in the context of its
    consideration of price undercutting. See paras. 7.286-297; rejected Brazil's claim that
    prior to an Article 3.3 cumulation analysis, the investigating authority must conclude,
    pursuant to Article 3.2, that there has been a "significant increase" in imports from the
    country at issue; with regard to claim as to whether the European Communities'
    "determination" regarding the cumulative assessment was "appropriate" in light of the
    "conditions of competition between the imported products and the conditions of
    competition between the imported products and the like domestic product," found no
    violation of Article 3.3(b). See paras. 7.220-267)
   Argentina - Poultry AD Duties (Panel) (Found that Argentina violated Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4
    and 3.5 by including "non-dumped" imports from Nicolini and Seara in the injury analysis.
    See paras. 7.295-307)
   EC - Bed Linen, Article 21.5 (AB) (Found that the EC violated Articles 3.1 and 3.2 when it
    considered all imports from unexamined Indian producers/exporters to be "dumped" for
    purposes of the injury analysis. See paras. 101-146)
    EC - Bed Linen, Article 21.5 (Panel) (Rejected argument that the EC violated Articles 3.1
     and 3.2 when it considered all imports from unexamined Indian producers/exporters to be
     "dumped" for purposes of the injury analysis -- reversed on appeal. See paras. 6.117-
     144)
    Egypt - Rebar from Turkey (Panel) (Stated that the "plain text" of Article 3.2 does not
     contain a requirement that a price undercutting analysis be conducted "in any particular
     way, that is, at any particular level of trade"; therefore, Panel rejected Turkey's claim,
     finding that an "objective and unbiased" investigating authority could have performed a
     price undercutting analysis on the basis used here. See paras. 7.67-76)
    Thailand - Steel (Panel) (Found, inter alia, that an explicit finding (i.e., one that uses the
     word "significant") on import volumes and price effects is not required under Article 3.2;
     here, Thailand violated Article 3.2 on the basis of the lack of any "positive evidence"
     supporting its finding of negative price effects. See paras. 7.153-215)
    Guatemala - Cement II (Panel) (Discussed in the context of Article 3 - Final Injury
     Determination; because Guatemala was unable to answer the Panel's question as to
     whether its import volume table included certain imports, Panel found a violation of Article
     3.1, 3.2 and 3.5 on the basis that Guatemala failed to rebut Mexico's prima facie case
     that it had improperly excluded certain imports. See paras. 8.261-272; in addition, Panel
     considered a 1-year price data collection period to be proper and found that the
     investigating authority in fact examined prices in all regions of the country; moreover,
     given that there was only one domestic producer, the Panel noted that negative effects in
     the single region in which that producer was located could evidence injury to the
     domestic industry; thus, Guatemala did not violate Article 3.2 on this basis. See paras.
     8.273-277)
    Mexico - HFCS (Panel) (Failure to examine the domestic industry as a "whole" resulted in
     a violation of Article 3.2, among other provisions. See paras. 7.143-162)

    Article 3.3 (Cumulation)

    U.S. - Zeroing (Japan) (Panel) (Based on its rejection of the claims against simple
     zeroing under other provisions, Panel rejected claims under Articles 3.1-3.5. See paras.
     7.162-166)
    U.S. - OCTG AD Measures (AB) (Upheld the Panel's finding that the ITC's decision to
     conduct a cumulative assessment of imports in making its likelihood-of-injury
     determination was not inconsistent with Articles 3.3 and 11.3. See paras. 144-173)
    U.S. - OCTG AD Measures (Panel) (Concluded that the ITC's determination in the sunset
     review of OCTG "is not inconsistent with Articles 3.3 and 11.3 of the Agreement because
     it involved a cumulative analysis." See paras. 7.145-151)
    U.S. - OCTG Sunset Reviews (AB) (Upheld Panel's findings that AD Agreement Article
     11.3 "does not preclude investigating authorities from cumulating the effects of likely
     dumped imports in the course of their likelihood-of-injury determinations, and that the
     conditions of Article 3.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement do not apply in the context of
     sunset reviews." See paras. 286-304)
    U.S. - OCTG Sunset Reviews (Panel) (Rejected claim that the ITC acted inconsistently
     with AD Agreement Articles 3.3 and 11.3 in its use of cumulation in the sunset review,
     finding that cumulation is permitted in sunset reviews and is not subject to the conditions
     established under Article 3.3; stated that the conditions contained in Article 3.3 are limited
     to the application of cumulation in investigations. See paras. 7.323-338)
    U.S. - Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review (Panel) (Found that the obligations in
     Article 3.3 pertain to cumulative analysis in "investigations," and that they are not
     applicable to "sunset reviews''; concluded that "the United States did not act
     inconsistently with Articles 11.3, 3.3 or 5.8 in the instant sunset review by cumulating
     imports from Japan with imports from other countries without applying the negligibility
     standard set out in Article 3.3 and 5.8 for original investigations." See paras. 7.89-105)
    EC - Pipe Fittings (AB) (Upheld Panel's finding that the European Communities did not
     act inconsistently with AD Agreement Articles 3.2 or 3.3 by failing to analyze the volume
     and prices of dumped imports from Brazil individually, pursuant to Article 3.2, as a pre-
     condition to cumulatively assessing the effects of these imports under Article 3.3. See
     paras. 103-118)
    EC - Pipe Fittings (Panel) (Rejected Brazil's claim that prior to an Article 3.3 cumulation
     analysis, the investigating authority must conclude, pursuant to Article 3.2, that there has
     been a "significant increase" in imports from the country at issue; with regard to claim as
     to whether the European Communities' "determination" regarding the cumulative
     assessment was "appropriate" in light of the "conditions of competition between the
     imported products and the conditions of competition between the imported products and
     the like domestic product," found no violation of Article 3.3(b). See paras. 7.220-267)
    EC - Bed Linen, Article 21.5 (Panel) (Rejected claim that the EC violated Articles 3.1 and
     3.3 by conducting a cumulative assessment of the effects of dumped imports from India
     and Pakistan, noting that, at the time of the redetermination, the determination regarding
     imports from Pakistan established that those imports were dumped. See paras. 6.95-116)

    Article 3.4 (Impact of Dumped Imports -- Injury)

    Mexico - Pipes and Tubes AD Duties (Panel) (Concluded that Guatemala failed to
     establish that Economía violated AD Agreement Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5 "by relying
     on data from an investigation period that terminated about eight months prior to the
     initiation and about two years prior to the imposition of the definitive measures." See
     paras. 7.217-240; concluded that "Economía's reliance, without sufficient justification,
     upon a subset of data temporally limited to three six-month periods (July-December) over
     three consecutive years (1998, 1999, 2000), as proposed by the applicant, was not
     capable of yielding an accurate and representative picture enabling Economía to make
     an objective examination of positive evidence in reaching its affirmative injury
     determination"; therefore concluded that Economía acted inconsistently with AD
     Agreement Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5. See paras. 7.241-261; concluded that
     "Economía failed to conduct an objective examination on the basis of positive evidence,
     as required by Article 3.1, of injury to the domestic industry as that term is defined in
     Article 4.1, and consequently also violated Articles 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5, by failing to gather
     and analyse representative and consistent data pertaining to the domestic industry, in
     particular the data concerning the financial indicators of the 'domestic industry,' as
     defined by it." See paras. 7.296-333; rejected Guatemala's claims that changes in the
     definition of the product under investigation/like product in the course of the investigation
     rendered the determinations of injury and causal link inconsistent with AD Agreement
     Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, 4.1 and 5.4. See paras. 7.334-347; with regard to
     causation/non-attribution, Panel found that Economía acted inconsistently with Articles
     3.1, 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5 in its treatment of the decrease in exports in its causation analysis;
     however, concluded that Guatemala failed to establish a prima facie case of
     inconsistency with Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5 in relation to the treatment of operating
     costs. See paras. 7.348-372)
    U.S. - Zeroing (Japan) (Panel) (Based on its rejection of the claims against simple
     zeroing under other provisions, Panel rejected claims under Articles 3.1-3.5. See paras.
     7.162-166)
    Mexico - Rice AD Measures (AB) (Upheld Panel's finding that Economía's use of a period
     of investigation ending in August 1999 resulted in a failure to make a determination of
     injury based on "positive evidence" as required by Article 3.1, and also upheld the Panel's
     finding that by choosing this period of investigation Mexico acted inconsistently with
     Articles 3.2, 3.4, and 3.5. See paras. 158-172)
    Korea - Paper AD Duties (Panel) (Rejected Indonesia's argument that PPC and WF are
     not, in fact, like products, and therefore "to conform to the provisions of Article 2.6 of the
     Agreement, the KTC should have analyzed the effect of Indonesian PPC on Korean PPC
    producers and the effect of Indonesian WF on Korean WF producers, separately";
    therefore rejected Indonesia's claim that the KTC's like product definition was
    inconsistent with Article 2.6, and, consequently, also rejected the claims related to
    Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5 and 3.7. See paras. 7.211-224)
   U.S. - OCTG AD Measures (Panel) (Found that 19 U.S.C. §§ 1675a(a)(1) and (5) are not
    inconsistent with AD Agreement Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.7, 3.8, 11.1 and 11.3 in relation to
    the determination of whether injury is likely to continue or recur. See paras. 7.84-108)
   U.S. - Lumber ITC Investigation (Panel) (Stated that a threat determination is made
    against the background of an evaluation of the condition of the industry in light of the
    Article 3.4/15.4 factors; once such an analysis has been carried out in the context of an
    investigation of material injury, however, Panel said that none of the relevant provisions
    of Article 3 or Article 15 require a second analysis of the injury factors in cases involving
    threat of material injury; Panel found it "clear on the face of the USITC determination" that
    the ITC considered the relevant injury factors in the context of finding no present material
    injury and that the ITC took this consideration into account in its threat of material injury
    analysis; noting that the ITC then went on to address the additional threat factors set out
    in AD Agreement Article 3.7 and SCM Agreement Article 15.7, Panel further stated, "this
    is an adequate approach to the analysis of threat of material injury with respect to the
    requirements of consideration of the elements set out in Articles 3.2, 3.4, and 3.7 of the
    AD Agreement, and the corresponding provisions of the SCM Agreement"; therefore, the
    Panel found "no violation" of AD Agreement Articles 3.2 and 3.4 and SCM Agreement
    Articles 15.2 and 15.4. See paras. 7.97-112)
   Mexico - HFCS, Article 21.5 (AB) (Upheld Panel's finding of a violation of Article 3.4;
    emphasized improvement in domestic industry's financial indicators despite underselling
    by imports. See paras. 94-101)
   Mexico - HFCS, Article 21.5 (Panel) (Violation of Article 3.4 found, based on lack of
    evidence in support of investigating authority's projections and the fact that these
    projections are contrary to observed trends. See paras. 6.24-36)

      "all relevant ... factors"

   Mexico - Rice AD Measures (Panel) (Concluded, "by choosing to base its determination
    of injury on a period of investigation which ended more than fifteen months before the
    initiation of the investigation," Mexico acted inconsistently with the Article 3.1 requirement
    to make a determination of injury which is based on positive evidence and which involves
    an objective examination "of the volume and price effects of the alleged dumped imports
    or of the consequent impact of these imports on domestic producers of the like product at
    the time measures were imposed"; as a consequence, it found that Mexico violated
    Articles 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5 "when considering the volume and price effects of the dumped
    imports, all relevant factors affecting the state of the industry and the causal relationship
    between dumped imports and the alleged injury to the domestic industry, respectively."
    See paras. 7.50-65)
   Korea - Paper AD Duties (Panel) (In response to Indonesia's claim that "the data
    collected by the KTC with respect to prices could not support its finding that dumped
    imports caused material injury to the Korean industry," Panel concluded that "the KTC
    has clearly considered whether there was price undercutting, price suppression and price
    depression caused by dumped imports"; therefore, Panel rejected Indonesia's claim that
    the KTC's analysis concerning the price effects of dumped imports on the Korean
    industry was inconsistent with Articles 3.1, 3.2 and 3.4. See paras. 7.238-254; in
    response to Indonesia's argument that "the KTC should have considered the fact that the
    Korean producers were importing substantial quantities of the subject product from
    Indonesia as an injury factor under Article 3.4 of the Agreement," the Panel did not view
    this factor as descriptive of the state of the Korean industry, and therefore did not
    understand "in what sense this fact could qualify as an injury factor under Article 3.4."
    See paras. 7.278-288; concluded that "since the KTC did not adequately evaluate the
    injury factors, especially those that showed a positive trend, and explain their relevance
    in the determination of material injury," Korea acted inconsistently with Article 3.4. See
    paras. 7.265-273)
   U.S. - OCTG Sunset Reviews (Panel) (Based on its conclusion that Article 3 does not
    apply to sunset reviews, the Panel declined Argentina's claim that the ITC failed to
    address some of the Article 3.4 injury factors. See paras. 7.313-317)
   EC - Pipe Fittings (AB) (Found that the Panel did not fail to assess whether the European
    Commission's establishment of the facts was proper under Article 17.6(i), and did not
    incorrectly interpret Articles 3.1 and 3.4 "by including Exhibit EC-12 within its assessment
    of the European Commission's evaluation of the injury factors listed in Article 3.4." See
    paras. 119-133; upheld the Panel's finding that the European Communities' "implicit"
    analysis of the "growth" factor did not violate Article 3.4. See paras. 151-166)
   EC - Pipe Fittings (Panel) (Found that the European Communities did not violate its
    obligations under Article 3.4 in its treatment of "growth" and that it addressed each of the
    listed Article 3.4 factors; concluded that the European Communities did not violate
    Articles 3.4 or 3.1 in its evaluation of injury factors. See paras. 7.298-345)
   Argentina - Poultry AD Duties (Panel) (Found that Argentina violated Articles 3.1(b) and
    3.4 by failing to evaluate all of the factors and indices listed in Article 3.4. See paras.
    7.308-327)
   EC - Bed Linen, Article 21.5 (Panel) (Found that the EC had properly collected data on
    inventories and capacity utilization in the original investigation and therefore rejected
    claim that data had not been collected in violation of Article 3.4; concluded that the EC's
    analysis and conclusions in respect of its evaluation of the Article 3.4 factors were
    consistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.4. See paras. 6.145-217)
   Egypt - Rebar from Turkey (Panel) (Found that while the investigating authority "gathered
    data on all of the factors listed in Article 3.4," it failed to "evaluate" some of these factors -
    - productivity, actual and potential negative effects on cash flow, employment, wages,
    and ability to raise capital or investments -- in violation of this provision; by contrast, with
    regard to "capacity utilization" and "return on investment," the Panel rejected the claim
    that the authority "failed to adequately evaluate" these factors; also said that "all factors"
    affecting domestic prices and profits does not mean that the investigating authority must
    consider "all" possible factors, but only that they must carry out an evaluation in this
    regard; here, Turkey raised no claim that the investigating authority failed to analyze
    profit factors and, in respect of domestic prices, the investigating authority in fact carried
    out the price analysis required under Articles 3.1 and 3.2, thereby fulfilling this
    requirement; finally, the Panel rejected Turkey's argument that Article 3.4 requires a full
    "non-attribution" analysis. See paras. 7.33-66)
   U.S. - Hot-Rolled Steel from Japan (AB) (Held that examination of market segments
    (such as merchant market or captive market) is permissible as long as segments are
    examined in an "objective" manner; upheld (albeit under partly different reasoning)
    Panel's finding that the captive production provision on its face does not violate Article
    3.4 because it allows the U.S. authority to examine both the merchant market and the
    captive market; reversed Panel's finding regarding the captive production provision as
    applied in the hot-rolled investigation -- specifically, found that the U.S. authority failed to
    examine the captive market, as it was required to do, once it had examined the merchant
    market segment. See paras. 181-215)
   U.S. - Hot-Rolled Steel from Japan (Panel) (Held that the U.S. captive production
    provision, on its face, does not violate, inter alia, Article 3.4 because it does not require
    the U.S. authority to examine the Article 3.4 factors only with respect to the merchant
    market; rather, it allows for examination with respect to the domestic market as a whole
    as well; similarly, the captive production provision as applied in the hot-rolled
    investigation did not violate, inter alia, Article 3.4 because the U.S. authority in fact
    examined the domestic market as a whole in addition to the merchant market segment --
    reversed on appeal. See paras. 7.169-215; U.S. ITC properly evaluated all of Article 3.4
    factors. See paras. 7.216-236)
    Thailand - Steel (AB) (Upheld Panel's finding of violation of Article 3.4, and that each of
     the 15 listed factors must be considered by an investigating authority. See paras. 121-
     128)
    Thailand - Steel (Panel) (Each of the 15 factors listed in Article 3.4 must be considered by
     investigating authority; here, violation of Article 3.4 (and 3.1) found on basis of authority's
     failure to examine all of the Article 3.4 factors, and its failure to provide a sufficient
     explanation of "how and why, in light of the positive trends in so many injury factors, they
     nonetheless concluded that the domestic industry was injured." See paras. 7.216-256)
    EC - Bed Linen (Panel) (Held that all of the listed Article 3.4 factors must be considered
     by investigating authority; here, found a violation in light of EC failure to collect data on all
     of the factors, let alone consider this data. See paras. 6.145-169)
    Guatemala - Cement II (Panel) (Discussed in the context of Article 3 - Final Injury
     Determination; held that authorities must consider all of the Article 3.4 factors; here,
     violation found based on failure to consider all Article 3.4 factors. See paras. 8.278-286)
    Mexico - HFCS (Panel) (Investigating authorities must consider each factor listed in
     Article 3.4 any time they are called upon to reach an injury determination, either of
     material injury or threat of material injury. See paras. 7.111-142; failure to examine the
     domestic industry as a "whole" resulted in a violation of Article 3.4, among other
     provisions. See paras. 7.143-162)

       consideration of "dumped imports"

    Argentina - Poultry AD Duties (Panel) (Found that Argentina violated Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4
     and 3.5 by including "non-dumped" imports from Nicolini and Seara in the injury analysis.
     See paras. 7.295-307)
    EC - Bed Linen (Panel) (A dumping determination is made in respect of a product, such
     that, if any dumping is found, then the investigating authority can consider all import
     volumes of the product from particular producers/exporters to represent "dumped
     imports" in the context of the injury determination; India failed to make a prima facie case
     in respect of its claim regarding dumped imports during the period before the dumping
     investigation. See paras. 6.121-142)

       use of samples

    EC - Bed Linen (Panel) (EC had conducted injury analysis in respect of a sample of 17 of
     the 35 companies that it defined as the domestic industry; Panel found that it was not a
     violation of Article 3.4 when the EC examined data from companies outside the sample of
     17 (but within the 35 defined as composing the domestic industry); however, it was a
     violation of Article 3.4 when the EC examined a company falling outside of the 35
     companies that had been defined as the domestic industry. See paras. 6.170-183)

    Article 3.5 (Causation/Attribution)

    Mexico - Pipes and Tubes AD Duties (Panel) (Concluded that Guatemala failed to
     establish that Economía violated AD Agreement Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5 "by relying
     on data from an investigation period that terminated about eight months prior to the
     initiation and about two years prior to the imposition of the definitive measures." See
     paras. 7.217-240; concluded that "Economía's reliance, without sufficient justification,
     upon a subset of data temporally limited to three six-month periods (July-December) over
     three consecutive years (1998, 1999, 2000), as proposed by the applicant, was not
     capable of yielding an accurate and representative picture enabling Economía to make
     an objective examination of positive evidence in reaching its affirmative injury
     determination"; therefore concluded that Economía acted inconsistently with AD
     Agreement Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5. See paras. 7.241-261; concluded that
    "Economía failed to conduct an objective examination on the basis of positive evidence,
    as required by Article 3.1, of injury to the domestic industry as that term is defined in
    Article 4.1, and consequently also violated Articles 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5, by failing to gather
    and analyse representative and consistent data pertaining to the domestic industry, in
    particular the data concerning the financial indicators of the 'domestic industry,' as
    defined by it." See paras. 7.296-333; rejected Guatemala's claims that changes in the
    definition of the product under investigation/like product in the course of the investigation
    rendered the determinations of injury and causal link inconsistent with AD Agreement
    Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, 4.1 and 5.4. See paras. 7.334-347; with regard to
    causation/non-attribution, Panel found that Economía acted inconsistently with Articles
    3.1, 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5 in its treatment of the decrease in exports in its causation analysis;
    however, concluded that Guatemala failed to establish a prima facie case of
    inconsistency with Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5 in relation to the treatment of operating
    costs. See paras. 7.348-372)
   U.S. - Zeroing (Japan) (Panel) (Based on its rejection of the claims against simple
    zeroing under other provisions, Panel rejected claims under Articles 3.1-3.5. See paras.
    7.162-166)
   U.S. - Lumber ITC Investigation, Article 21.5 (AB) (Concluded that Panel failed to comply
    with DSU Article 11 "in the standard of review that it articulated and applied to assess the
    consistency of the Section 129 Determination with" AD Agreement Articles 3.5 and 3.7
    and SCM Agreement Articles 15.5 and 15.7; therefore, Appellate Body reversed Panel's
    finding that there was no violation of these provisions; however, it was not able to
    complete the analysis as to whether the measure at issue was consistent with these
    provisions. See paras. 89-161)
   U.S. - Lumber ITC Investigation, Article 21.5 (Panel) (Concluded that the determination of
    the ITC is not inconsistent with the requirements of AD Agreement Article 3.5 and SCM
    Agreement Article 15.5 with respect to causal link -- reversed on appeal. See paras. 7.58-
    63; concluded that the ITC's determination regarding other factors potentially threatening
    injury to the U.S. industry is not inconsistent with AD Agreement Article 3.5 and SCM
    Agreement Article 15.5 -- reversed on appeal. See paras. 7.64-70)
   Mexico - Rice AD Measures (AB) (Upheld Panel's finding that Economía's use of a period
    of investigation ending in August 1999 resulted in a failure to make a determination of
    injury based on "positive evidence" as required by Article 3.1, and also upheld the Panel's
    finding that by choosing this period of investigation Mexico acted inconsistently with
    Articles 3.2, 3.4, and 3.5. See paras. 158-172; upheld Panel's finding that "in limiting the
    injury analysis to the March to August period of 1997, 1998, and 1999, Mexico failed to
    make a determination of injury that involves an 'objective examination,' as required by
    Article 3.1," and thus also upheld the finding that "Mexico acted inconsistently with Article
    3.5." See paras. 173-188)
   Mexico - Rice AD Measures (Panel) (Concluded, "by choosing to base its determination
    of injury on a period of investigation which ended more than fifteen months before the
    initiation of the investigation," Mexico acted inconsistently with the Article 3.1 requirement
    to make a determination of injury which is based on positive evidence and which involves
    an objective examination "of the volume and price effects of the alleged dumped imports
    or of the consequent impact of these imports on domestic producers of the like product at
    the time measures were imposed"; as a consequence, it found that Mexico violated
    Articles 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5 "when considering the volume and price effects of the dumped
    imports, all relevant factors affecting the state of the industry and the causal relationship
    between dumped imports and the alleged injury to the domestic industry, respectively."
    See paras. 7.50-65; due the exclusion of six months of data from each year of the
    investigation period, found that the investigating authority's injury analysis is inconsistent
    with AD Agreement Article 3.1 "as it is not based on positive evidence and does not allow
    for an objective examination, as it necessarily, and without any proper justification,
    provides only a part of the picture of the situation"; in addition, it found that "the particular
    choice of the limited period of investigation in this case was not that of an unbiased and
    objective investigating authority as the authority was aware of, and accepted, the fact that
    the period chosen reflected the highest import penetration, thus ignoring data from a
    period in which it can be expected that the domestic industry was faring better"; as a
    consequence, also found that Mexico acted inconsistently with AD Agreement Article 3.5
    "as it failed to base its determination of the existence of a causal relationship between the
    dumped imports and the alleged injury to the domestic industry on all relevant evidence
    before the authorities." See paras. 7.66-87)
   Korea - Paper AD Duties (Panel) (Rejected Indonesia's argument that PPC and WF are
    not, in fact, like products, and therefore "to conform to the provisions of Article 2.6 of the
    Agreement, the KTC should have analyzed the effect of Indonesian PPC on Korean PPC
    producers and the effect of Indonesian WF on Korean WF producers, separately";
    therefore rejected Indonesia's claim that the KTC's like product definition was
    inconsistent with Article 2.6, and, consequently, also rejected the claims related to
    Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5 and 3.7. See paras. 7.211-224; in response to Indonesia's
    argument that, pursuant to Article 3.5, the KTC should have considered the fact that the
    Korean producers were importing substantial quantities of the subject product from
    Indonesia as a "potential other factor that might have contributed to the material injury
    suffered by the Korean industry," Panel observed that the KTC did in fact exclude two of
    the Korean producers who imported significant amounts of the subject product from the
    subject countries and noted the share that these imports represented for the remaining
    14 producers, and also that these imports stopped completely as of 2001. See paras.
    7.278-288)
   U.S. - OCTG Sunset Reviews (Panel) (Based on its conclusion that Article 3 does not
    apply to sunset reviews, the Panel declined Argentina's claim that the ITC failed to
    conduct the causal link analysis required under Article 3.5. See paras. 7.318-322)
   U.S. - Lumber ITC Investigation (Panel) (Given that the ITC's causation analysis "rests
    upon" the determination of substantially increased imports found to be in violation, and
    having found that "a fundamental element of the causal analysis is not consistent with the
    Agreements," Panel found, therefore, that "the causal analysis cannot be consistent with
    the Agreements"; thus, Panel concluded that the determination is "not consistent" with
    AD Agreement Article 3.5 and SCM Agreement Article 15.5 in this regard. See paras.
    7.119-122; in light of its earlier finding of a violation in respect of the ITC's causation
    analysis, Panel said that it could not "meaningfully evaluate" the question of violation of
    the non-attribution aspect of AD Agreement Article 3.5 and SCM Agreement Article 15.5;
    nonetheless, it said that "[g]iven the overall absence of discussion of other factors
    potentially causing injury in the future," it "would conclude that the USITC determination
    is not consistent with the obligation in [these provisions] that 'injuries caused by these
    other factors must not be attributed' to the subject imports." See paras. 7.123-137)
   EC - Pipe Fittings (AB) (Upheld Panel's finding "that the difference in cost of production
    between the Brazilian exporter and the European Communities industry was not a 'known
    factor[ ] other than the dumped imports which at the same time [was] injuring the
    domestic industry,'" and therefore there was no violation of Article 3.5; upheld Panel's
    finding "that the causality methodology applied by the European Commission in this
    investigation, which did not include an examination of the collective impact of other
    known causal factors, did not attribute the injuries caused by those other factors to the
    dumped imports," and therefore the European Communities did not violate Article 3.5.
    See paras. 167-195)
   EC - Pipe Fittings (Panel) (Concluded that Brazil did not establish that the causation
    methodology applied by the European Communities violates Article 3.5 -- upheld on
    appeal under different reasoning; found that Brazil did not establish that the European
    Communities' evaluation of injury caused by factors other than the dumped imports was
    inconsistent with Article 3.5. See paras. 7.350-416)
   Argentina - Poultry AD Duties (Panel) (Found that there is nothing in the AD Agreement
    to suggest that the periods of review for dumping and injury must necessarily end at the
    same point in time, and therefore rejected Brazil's claim of violation of Article 3.5. See
    paras. 7.277-288; concluded that imports from Nicolini and Seara should have been
    excluded from the CNCE's injury analysis, but it "is clear from the record that CNCE
    failed to do this," therefore the Panel found that Argentina violated Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4
    and 3.5 by including "non-dumped" imports from Nicolini and Seara in the injury analysis.
    See paras. 7.295-307)
   EC - Bed Linen, Article 21.5 (Panel) (Found that India failed to demonstrate that the EC
    causation determination was one that an unbiased and objective investigating authority
    could not reach on the basis of the evidence, and, therefore, concluded that the EC did
    not violate Article 3.5; as an "alternative" finding to its earlier finding that the "other
    factors" claim was outside the terms of reference, concluded that the "other causes"
    pointed to by India were not actually "causes" of injury at all, such that the EC measure is
    "not inconsistent with Article 3.5 for failure to properly ensure that injury caused by other
    factors is not attributed to dumped imports." See paras. 6.218-246)
   Egypt - Rebar from Turkey (Panel) (Rejected Turkey's claim that the investigating
    authority failed to develop "positive evidence" (i.e., by failing to collect a certain type of
    evidence), under Articles 3.1 and 3.5, that dumped imports had an effect on domestic
    prices, or any impact on the domestic industry; said it is was undisputed that the
    investigating authority "gathered and analyzed the kinds of information that are
    specifically required by the plain language of the AD Agreement, and that the
    respondents made no attempt during the course of the investigation to complement or
    expand that information with additional sorts of evidence that are not specifically referred
    to by the AD Agreement." See paras. 7.97-106; Panel also found that Turkey had not
    established that "the [investigating authority's] evaluation of the possible causation of
    injury by factors other than the dumped imports was inconsistent with Article 3.5." See
    paras. 7.107-126; finally, Panel dismissed Turkey's claim under Articles 3.1 and 3.5 that
    the investigating authority improperly found a causal link between imports and injury
    despite certain alleged timing discrepancies between decreased prices and falling profits.
    See paras. 7.127-132)
   U.S. - Hot-Rolled Steel from Japan (AB) (Reversed Panel's interpretation of the non-
    attribution language in Article 3.5 (relying in large part on findings in U.S. - Wheat Gluten
    (AB)); said that under Article 3.5, an investigating authority is required to separate and
    distinguish the injurious effects of imports and other factors; due to insufficient record
    information, Appellate Body was unable to complete the analysis under a proper
    interpretation of Article 3.5. See paras. 216-236)
   U.S. - Hot-Rolled Steel from Japan (Panel) (Interpreted Article 3.5 to require that an
    authority "examine and ensure" that any "other factors" do not "break the causal link that
    appeared to exist between dumped imports and material injury on the basis of an
    examination of the volume and effects of the dumped imports"; here, found that the U.S.
    authority considered any relevant "other factors" appropriately, such that there was no
    violation of Article 3.5 -- reversed on appeal. See paras. 7.237-261; held that the U.S.
    captive production provision, on its face, does not violate, inter alia, Article 3.5; similarly,
    the captive production provision as applied in the hot-rolled investigation did not violate,
    inter alia, Article 3.5 -- reversed on appeal. See paras. 7.169-215)
   Thailand - Steel (Panel) (Because it had rejected the Thai authority's conclusions as
    inconsistent with certain other AD Agreement provisions, held that there was no basis for
    a finding of a causal link, in violation of Articles 3.5 and 3.1; also held that a panel need
    only consider those "other factors" that are "clearly raised" by an interested party; here,
    found that the Thai authority had examined all of those "other factors" that had been
    clearly raised before it -- the "clearly raised" standard has been called into question by
    the Appellate Body in U.S. - Wheat Gluten (AB) in the context of the Safeguards
    Agreement. See paras. 7.258-284)
   EC - Bed Linen (Panel) (A dumping determination is made in respect of a product, such
    that, if any dumping is found, then the investigating authority can consider all import
    volumes of the product to represent "dumped imports" in the context of the injury
    determination; India failed to make a prima facie case in respect of its claim regarding
    dumped imports during the period before the dumping investigation. See paras. 6.121-
    142)
    Guatemala - Cement II (Panel) (Discussed in the context of Article 3 - Final Injury
     Determination; Guatemala's apparent failure to examine imports by an affiliate of the
     petitioner violated Article 3.5, because these figures are a potential "other cause" of
     injury. See paras. 8.261-272)

    Article 3.6

    U.S. - Hot-Rolled Steel from Japan (Panel) (Held that the U.S. captive production
     provision, on its face, does not violate, inter alia, Article 3.6; similarly, the captive
     production provision as applied in the hot-rolled investigation did not violate, inter alia,
     Article 3.6 -- reversed on appeal. See paras. 7.169-215)

    Article 3.7 (Threat of Material Injury)

       Article 3.7 - General

    U.S. - Lumber ITC Investigation, Article 21.5 (AB) (With regard to "threat" determinations,
     Appellate Body expressed concern about certain statements by the Panel, but did not
     find these statements to constitute error; in particular, it said that one of the Panel's
     statements "could imply a greater likelihood of panels upholding a threat of injury
     determination, as compared to a determination of current material injury, when those
     determinations rest on the same level of evidence"; the Appellate Body said that "[a]ny
     such implication would be erroneous," but said, "we do not view the Panel's statement as
     having such an implication"; in addition, in relation to another of the Panel's statements,
     the Appellate Body said "[w]e are not persuaded that, in making this observation, the
     Panel intended to express the view that a threat of injury determination must be upheld if
     the investigating authority's report discloses the occurrence of injury as one reasonable
     prediction within the possible range of future occurrences"; the Appellate Body
     emphasized that such a view "would be erroneous." See paras. 106-110)
    U.S. - Lumber ITC Investigation, Article 21.5 (Panel) (Recalling a prior Appellate Body
     statement on "threat" determinations, the Panel said that "[t]he possible range of
     reasonable predictions of the future that may be drawn based on the observed events of
     the period of investigation may be broader than the range of reasonable conclusions
     concerning the present that might be drawn based on those same facts"; further noted,
     "predictions based on the observed facts may be less susceptible to being found, on
     review by a panel, to be outside the range of conclusions that might be reached by an
     unbiased and objective decision maker on the basis of the facts and in light of the
     explanations given." See para. 7.13)
    Korea - Paper AD Duties (Panel) (Rejected Indonesia's argument that PPC and WF are
     not, in fact, like products, and therefore "to conform to the provisions of Article 2.6 of the
     Agreement, the KTC should have analyzed the effect of Indonesian PPC on Korean PPC
     producers and the effect of Indonesian WF on Korean WF producers, separately";
     therefore rejected Indonesia's claim that the KTC's like product definition was
     inconsistent with Article 2.6, and, consequently, also rejected the claims related to
     Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5 and 3.7. See paras. 7.211-224)

       Article 3.7 ("Change in circumstances" must be "clearly foreseen and imminent")

    U.S. - OCTG Sunset Reviews (Panel) (Concluded that Articles 3.7 and 3.8 do not apply
     to sunset reviews, and therefore rejected Argentina's argument that Sections 752(a)(1)
     and (5) of the Tariff Act are inconsistent with Articles 3.7 and 3.8 due to the use of a
     "within a reasonably foreseeable time" standard. See paras. 7.188-192)
    U.S. - Lumber ITC Investigation (Panel) (Noted that the change in circumstances that
     would give rise to a situation in which injury would occur encompasses a single event, or
    a series of events, or developments in the situation of the industry, and/or concerning the
    dumped or subsidized imports; Panel concluded that the ITC did, in fact, "consider[]
    whether there would be a change in circumstances such that the dumped and subsidized
    imports would cause injury," as required under AD Agreement Article 3.7 and SCM
    Agreement Article 15.7. See paras. 7.45-60)

      Article 3.7 (Factors to be considered in the threat of material injury determination)

   U.S. - Lumber ITC Investigation, Article 21.5 (AB) (Concluded that Panel failed to comply
    with DSU Article 11 "in the standard of review that it articulated and applied to assess the
    consistency of the Section 129 Determination with" AD Agreement Articles 3.5 and 3.7
    and SCM Agreement Articles 15.5 and 15.7; therefore, Appellate Body reversed Panel's
    finding that there was no violation of these provisions; however, it was not able to
    complete the analysis as to whether the measure at issue was consistent with these
    provisions. See paras. 89-161)
   U.S. - Lumber ITC Investigation, Article 21.5 (Panel) (Concluded that the determination of
    the ITC with respect to the likely volume and price effects of imports from Canada is not
    inconsistent with AD Agreement Article 3.7 and SCM Agreement 15.7 -- reversed on
    appeal. See paras. 7.17-57)
   U.S. - OCTG AD Measures (Panel) (Found that 19 U.S.C. §§ 1675a(a)(1) and (5) are not
    inconsistent with AD Agreement Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.7, 3.8, 11.1 and 11.3 in relation to
    the determination of whether injury is likely to continue or recur. See paras. 7.84-108)
   U.S. - Lumber ITC Investigation (Panel) (Panel found no violation of AD Agreement
    Article 3.7 and SCM Agreement Article 15.7 based on claims relating to the listed factors;
    however, Panel found, "in light of the totality of the factors considered and the reasoning
    in the USITC's determination, we cannot conclude that the finding of a likely imminent
    substantial increase in imports is one which could have been reached by an objective
    and unbiased investigating authority"; as a result, Panel concluded that the ITC's
    determination is "not consistent" with AD Agreement Article 3.7 and SCM Agreement
    Article 15.7. See paras. 7.61-96)
   Mexico - HFCS, Article 21.5 (AB) (Upheld Panel's finding of a violation of Article 3.7 with
    respect to the likely impact of dumped imports; because the Mexican authority had
    treated the existence of the alleged restraint agreement as if it were a "fact," the Panel
    was correct in examining the authority's assumptions regarding that agreement, and
    therefore upheld Panel's finding that the redetermination was inconsistent with AD
    Agreement Article 3.7(i). See paras. 77-101)
   Mexico - HFCS, Article 21.5 (Panel) (Found that, in its redetermination, the Mexican
    authority's analysis regarding the projected effects of the alleged restraint agreement
    "remains the same" as it was in Mexico's original determination, such that the Panel
    found a violation of Article 3.7; concluded that the redetermination with respect to the
    likely impact of dumped imports is inconsistent with AD Agreement Articles 3.1, 3.4 and
    3.7. See paras. 6.6-36)
   Mexico - HFCS (Panel) (Violation of Article 3.7(i) found in light of the Mexican authority's
    failure to evaluate properly the facts concerning, and provide a reasoned explanation of
    its conclusions regarding, the potential effects of the alleged restraint agreement. See
    paras. 7.163-178; Panel concluded that, in an investigation of threat of material injury,
    factors relating to the impact of imports on the domestic industry must also be
    considered, in particular those contained in Article 3.4; here, because Mexico failed to
    address adequately the factors set out in Article 3.4, Panel concluded that Mexico's
    determination of threat of material injury is in violation of AD Agreement Articles 3.1, 3.4
    and 3.7. See paras. 7.111-142; Panel determined that Mexico failed to consider the
    domestic market "as a whole," and, as a result, Mexico's "determination of threat of injury
    is inconsistent with its obligations under Article 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 and 3.7 of the AD
    Agreement." See paras. 7.143-162)
    Article 3.8 (Special Care in Threat Cases)

    U.S. - OCTG AD Measures (Panel) (Found that 19 U.S.C. §§ 1675a(a)(1) and (5) are not
     inconsistent with AD Agreement Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.7, 3.8, 11.1 and 11.3 in relation to
     the determination of whether injury is likely to continue or recur. See paras. 7.84-108)
    U.S. - OCTG Sunset Reviews (Panel) (Concluded that Articles 3.7 and 3.8 do not apply
     to sunset reviews, and therefore rejected Argentina's argument that Sections 752(a)(1)
     and (5) of the Tariff Act are inconsistent with Articles 3.7 and 3.8 due to the use of a
     "within a reasonably foreseeable time" standard. See paras. 7.188-192)
    U.S. - Lumber ITC Investigation (Panel) (Panel considered the phrase "special care" to
     mean that "a degree of attention over and above that required of investigating authorities
     in all antidumping and countervailing duty injury cases is required in the context of cases
     involving threat of material injury"; furthermore, despite the use of the term "application"
     in the provisions, Panel found that AD Agreement Article 3.8 and SCM Agreement Article
     15.8 apply "during the process of investigation and determination of threat of material
     injury, that is, in the establishment of whether the prerequisites for application of a
     measure exist, and not merely afterward when final decisions whether to apply a
     measure are taken"; however, because the factual circumstances underlying the Article
     3.8/15.8 claims were the same as those for the other specific violations alleged, Panel
     made no findings on these claims. See paras. 7.29-37)

Article 4 (Definition of Domestic Industry)

    Article 4.1

    Mexico - Pipes and Tubes AD Duties (Panel) (Concluded that "Economía failed to
     conduct an objective examination on the basis of positive evidence, as required by Article
     3.1, of injury to the domestic industry as that term is defined in Article 4.1, and
     consequently also violated Articles 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5, by failing to gather and analyse
     representative and consistent data pertaining to the domestic industry, in particular the
     data concerning the financial indicators of the 'domestic industry,' as defined by it." See
     paras. 7.296-333; rejected Guatemala's claims that changes in the definition of the
     product under investigation/like product in the course of the investigation rendered the
     determinations of injury and causal link inconsistent with AD Agreement Articles 3.1, 3.2,
     3.4, 3.5, 4.1 and 5.4. See paras. 7.334-347)
    Argentina - Poultry AD Duties (Panel) (Rejected claim that Argentina violated Article 4.1
     by defining the "major proportion" of the "domestic industry" in terms of domestic
     producers representing 46 percent of total domestic production. See paras. 7.328-344)
    U.S. - Hot-Rolled Steel from Japan (AB) (Upheld Panel's finding that the captive
     production provision is not, on its face, inconsistent with AD Agreement Articles 3 and 4.
     See paras. 181-209)
    U.S. - Hot-Rolled Steel from Japan (Panel) (Because the captive production provision
     allows the U.S. authority to examine the domestic industry "as a whole," it is not
     inconsistent with AD Agreement Articles 3 and 4, either on its face or as applied --
     findings on the provision as applied reversed on appeal. See paras. 7.169-215)
    U.S. - 1916 Act (Panel) (Found a violation of AD Agreement Articles 4 and 5 because the
     1916 Act does not require that a complaint be made "on behalf of the domestic industry."
     See paras. 6.212-214 of panel report in complaint by EC; paras. 6.255-257 of panel
     report in complaint by Japan)
    Mexico - HFCS (Panel) (Examined as context to Article 3; Article 4.1 defines the term
     "domestic industry" as "referring to the domestic producers as a whole"; Mexico's
     exclusion of the household sector from its injury analysis violated AD Agreement Article
     3. See para. 7.147)
Article 5 (Initiation and Subsequent Investigation)

    Article 5.1 (Domestic Industry Representation)

    U.S. - 1916 Act (Panel) (Found a violation of AD Agreement Articles 4 and 5 because the
     1916 Act does not require that a complaint be made "on behalf of the domestic industry."
     See paras. 6.212-214 of panel report in complaint by EC; paras. 6.255-257 of panel
     report in complaint by Japan)

    Article 5.2 (Sufficiency of Application for Initiation of an Investigation)

    U.S. - Lumber AD Final (Panel) (Panel said that it must establish "whether the application
     contained information on the matters specified in Article 5.2, in particular as required by
     sub-paragraph (iii) thereof [regarding information on prices], and not whether it contained
     all such information as is reasonably available to the applicant"; found that "the
     application contained the information required by Article 5.2(iii)," and it concluded "that
     Canada has failed to establish that the United States has acted inconsistently with Article
     5.2." See paras. 7.44-61)
    Argentina - Poultry AD Duties (Panel) (Panel stated: "Without ruling on this matter, we do
     not exclude the possibility that Article 5.2 could oblige Members to verify that applications
     contain evidence, and not mere assertion, of dumping, injury, and causal link." See
     paras. 7.90-98)
    Thailand - Steel (Panel) (Article 5.2 claim rejected on basis that the application in fact
     contained data, evidence, and information regarding injury and causation. See paras.
     7.60-79)
    U.S. - 1916 Act (Panel) (Violation of Article 5.2 found on basis that the U.S. Federal
     Rules of Civil Procedure do not require evidence of dumping, injury or causation in the
     "application" for a lawsuit. See para. 6.258 of panel report in complaint by Japan;
     violation of AD Agreement Articles 4 and 5 found because the 1916 Act does not require
     that a complaint be made "on behalf of the domestic industry." See paras. 6.212-214 of
     panel report in complaint by EC; paras. 6.255-257 of panel report in complaint by Japan)
    Mexico - HFCS (Panel) (Found that Article 5.2 establishes a flexible standard as to the
     specific types of information that must be included in an investigation application; rejected
     the argument that Article 5.2 includes a requirement that an application for an anti-
     dumping investigation must contain specific information regarding the injury factors
     contained in AD Agreement Article 3; here, noting that the application contained evidence
     pertaining to the relevant Article 5.2 factors, Panel concluded that the application met the
     requirements of Article 5.2. See paras. 7.63-78)

    Article 5.3 (Sufficiency of Evidence to Justify Initiation)

    Mexico - Pipes and Tubes AD Duties (Panel) (Found that the Mexican Ministry of
     Economy violated AD Agreement Article 5.3 in its assessment of the sufficiency of the
     evidence of dumping and injury in relation to the initiation of the anti-dumping
     investigation at issue. See paras. 7.10-60)
    U.S. - Lumber AD Final (Panel) (Panel concluded, "an unbiased and objective
     investigating authority could have concluded that there was sufficient evidence on
     dumping in the application to justify the initiation of the softwood lumber anti-dumping
     investigation at issue"; therefore, it found, "the United States has not violated the
     provisions of Article 5.3 of the AD Agreement." See paras. 7.62-127)
    Argentina - Poultry AD Duties (Panel) (Concluded, on several bases, that Argentina acted
     inconsistently with Article 5.3 by determining that there was sufficient evidence of
     dumping to justify the initiation of an investigation. See paras. 7.51-89)
    Thailand - Steel (Panel) (Article 5.3 claim rejected on the basis that the application for a
     dumping investigation did in fact contain data, evidence and information regarding injury
     and causation. See paras. 7.60-79)
    EC - Bed Linen (Panel) (Article 5.3 says nothing about how a Panel is to examine the
     evidence contained in the application; here, the Panel was convinced that the European
     Commission had examined the evidence, such that there was no violation of Article 5.3.
     See paras. 6.185-201)
    Guatemala - Cement II (Panel) (An objective and unbiased investigating authority could
     not have properly determined that there was sufficient evidence of threat of injury to
     justify the initiation of an investigation; the obligations contained in Articles 5.2 and 5.3
     are different, and an authority may gather information on its own initiative in order to meet
     its Article 5.3 obligations and justify initiation. See paras. 8.29-62)
    Mexico - HFCS (Panel) (Noting that the Mexican authority relied on evidence contained in
     the application, as well as evidence that it collected itself, and stating that an authority
     does not have to consider all of the Article 3.4 factors in the context of initiation, the Panel
     found that an unbiased and objective authority could have found sufficient evidence to
     justify initiation; Article 5.3 does not require investigating authorities to resolve all factual
     disputes prior to initiation. See paras. 7.91-110)
    Guatemala - Cement I (Panel) (Violation of AD Agreement Article 5.3 found on the basis
     that the investigating authority did not have sufficient evidence of dumping, threat of
     material injury and causal link upon which to justify initiation -- this panel report was
     reversed on procedural grounds. See paras. 7.44-80)

    Article 5.4 (Domestic Industry Support for Investigation)

    Mexico - Pipes and Tubes AD Duties (Panel) (Rejected Guatemala's claims that changes
     in the definition of the product under investigation/like product in the course of the
     investigation rendered the determinations of injury and causal link inconsistent with AD
     Agreement Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, 4.1 and 5.4. See paras. 7.334-347)
    U.S. - Offset Act ("Byrd Amendment") (AB) (Reversed Panel's finding of violation of
     Article 5.4. See paras. 275-299)
    U.S. - Offset Act ("Byrd Amendment") (Panel) (Found that the measure "undermined the
     value" of the Article 5.4 "standing" requirement and therefore violated this provision --
     reversed on appeal. See paras. 7.53-66)
    EC - Bed Linen (Panel) (No violation found; Panel considered that EC demonstrated over
     25% support based on individual statements made by domestic producers; it was
     unnecessary for the Panel to decide whether, under Article 5.4, it was proper for the EC
     to count the support of industry associations in its evaluation of overall support for the
     investigation. See paras. 6.202-218)
    U.S. - 1916 Act (Panel) (Violation of AD Agreement Articles 4 and 5 found because the
     1916 Act does not require that a complaint be made "on behalf of the domestic industry."
     See paras. 6.212-214 of panel report in complaint by EC; paras. 6.255-257 of panel
     report in complaint by Japan)

    Article 5.5 (Notification Prior to Initiation)

    Thailand - Steel (Panel) (Thailand's verbal notification to the Polish Government
     regarding the filing of the application for the anti-dumping investigation at issue, which
     occurred six weeks prior to initiation, satisfied the requirements of Article 5.5. See paras.
     7.80-94)
    Guatemala - Cement II (Panel) (Guatemala violated AD Agreement Article 5.5 by failing
     to notify the Government of Mexico prior to its initiation of the dumping investigation. See
     paras. 8.76-83)
    U.S. - 1916 Act (Panel) (1916 Act violates AD Agreement Article 5.5 because it fails to
     provide for notification to the governments concerned before a case is initiated. See
     paras. 6.215-216 of panel report in complaint by EC)
    Guatemala - Cement I (Panel) (Failure to notify initiation of the investigation to the
     Government of Mexico in a timely fashion resulted in a violation of Article 5.5 -- this panel
     report was reversed on procedural grounds. See paras. 7.30-43)

    Article 5.6 (Investigation Shall Proceed Only with Sufficient Evidence)

    U.S. - Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review (Panel) (Rejected argument that the
     same evidentiary standards that apply to the self-initiation of original investigations under
     Article 5.6 also apply to the self-initiation of sunset reviews under Article 11.3; therefore,
     found that U.S. statute and regulations at issue are not inconsistent with Article 11.3, nor
     with Articles 11.1, 12.1, 12.3, and 5.6, in respect of the evidentiary standards applicable
     to the self-initiation of sunset reviews and that the United States did not act inconsistently
     with the AD Agreement by automatically self-initiating the instant sunset review. See
     paras. 7.11-57)

    Article 5.7 (Simultaneous Consideration of Dumping and Injury)

    Argentina - Poultry AD Duties (Panel) (Noting that it is with respect to the Secretary's
     decision on initiation that evidence of dumping and injury must be considered
     simultaneously, the Panel rejected claim of violation of Article 5.7; also rejected argument
     regarding the periods of investigation for dumping and injury, noting that such an
     argument deals with the substantive nature of the determinations rather than the
     procedural timing. See paras. 7.113-124)
    EC - Bed Linen, Article 21.5 (Panel) (Finding that the obligation set out in Article 5.7 to
     consider evidence of dumping and injury simultaneously applies only to "Initiation and
     Subsequent Investigation," the Panel rejected India's argument that the EC violated this
     provision in respect of the redetermination and subsequent partial review. See paras.
     6.95-116)
    Guatemala - Cement II (Panel) (Rejected argument that a lack of evidence supporting a
     finding of dumping and injury resulted in an automatic violation of the requirement in
     Article 5.7 to consider dumping and injury simultaneously; held that Article 5.7 is about
     timing and is not conditioned upon the substantive nature of the evidence. See paras.
     8.63-68)

    Article 5.8

       Article 5.8 (Rejection of Application and Termination of Investigation Due to Lack of
       Sufficient Evidence)

    Mexico - Pipes and Tubes AD Duties (Panel) (On the basis of the findings relating to
     evidence of dumping and injury for purposes of initiation, Panel concluded that "[a]s there
     was no proper determination that there was sufficient evidence of dumping or injury to
     justify proceeding with the case under Article 5.3, the application should have been
     rejected and the investigation should not have been initiated by the terms of Article 5.8."
     See para. 7.61)
    U.S. - Zeroing (Japan) (Panel) (Based on its rejection of the claims against simple
     zeroing under other provisions, Panel rejected claims under Article 5.8. See paras. 7.167-
     170)
    U.S. - "Zeroing" (Panel) (Found that Sections 771(35)(A) and (B), 731 and 777A(d) of the
     Tariff Act are not "as such" inconsistent with AD Agreement Articles 1, 2.4, 2.4.2, 5.8, 9.3
     and 18.4, GATT Articles VI:1 and VI:2, and WTO Agreement Article XVI:4 with respect to
    the use of a "zeroing" methodology in the calculation of margins of dumping in original
    investigations. See paras 7.37-69)
   Mexico - Rice AD Measures (AB) (Upheld Panel's finding that Mexico acted inconsistently
    with AD Agreement Article 5.8 "when it did not terminate immediately the investigation in
    respect of Farmers Rice and Riceland because Economía did not exclude them from the
    application of the definitive anti-dumping measure, whereas these exporters were found
    by Economía not to have been dumping," but rather considered them to be "covered" by
    the measure. See paras. 207-221; by requiring Economía to conduct a review for
    exporters with no margins and de minimis margins, Appellate Body concluded that Article
    68 of the Foreign Trade Act is inconsistent with AD Agreement Article 5.8 and SCM
    Agreement Article 11.9. See paras. 300-307)
   Mexico - Rice AD Measures (Panel) (Concluded that "by not terminating the investigation
    against two US exporters which the authority found to have exported at undumped prices
    and by not excluding these two exporters from the application of the definitive anti-
    dumping measure, Mexico acted in a manner which is inconsistent with Article 5.8 of the
    AD Agreement." See paras. 7.133-145; concluded that Article 5.8 "requires the
    termination of the investigation with regard to such exporters found not to have been
    dumping above de minimis levels, and requires that such exporters be excluded from the
    measures imposed"; therefore, it found, Article 68 of the Act "is as such inconsistent with
    Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement," as it "requires the review of producers for which during
    the original investigation it was determined that they had not been engaged in dumping
    practices or had not received any subsidies"; for the same reasons, Article 68 violates
    SCM Agreement Article 11.9. See paras. 7.243-251)
   U.S. - Lumber AD Final (Panel) (Given the earlier finding that there was no violation of
    Article 5.3, Panel also found no violation of Article 5.8 in respect of initiation of the
    investigation; found that Article 5.8 does not impose "a continuing obligation after
    initiation to continue to assess the sufficiency of the evidence in the application and to
    terminate the investigation on the grounds that other information undermines the
    sufficiency of that evidence"; on this basis, Panel rejected Canada's claim under Article
    5.8. See paras. 7.128-138)
   U.S. - Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review (Panel) (Concluded that "the United
    States did not act inconsistently with Articles 11.3, 3.3 or 5.8 in the instant sunset review
    by cumulating imports from Japan with imports from other countries without applying the
    negligibility standard set out in Article 3.3 and 5.8 for original investigations." See paras.
    7.89-105)
   Argentina - Poultry AD Duties (Panel) (Found that, pursuant to Article 5.8, the Secretary
    should have rejected the application "as soon as" it received the CNCE's negative injury
    determination; because the Secretary "kept the file open, subsequently deciding to
    initiate the investigation following the submission of additional information by the
    applicant," the Panel concluded that the Secretary "failed to meet the requirements" of
    Article 5.8. See paras. 7.99-112)
   Guatemala - Cement II (Panel) (Because the Panel had already found there to be a lack
    of sufficient evidence to justify initiation under Article 5.3, concluded that the Guatemalan
    authorities also should have rejected the application under Article 5.8. See paras. 8.69-
    75)
   Mexico - HFCS (Panel) (Because the Panel had already found initiation to be proper
    under AD Agreement Article 5.3, considered that SECOFI also acted properly under
    Article 5.8 when it decided not to reject the domestic industry's application for an anti-
    dumping investigation. See para. 7.99)

      Article 5.8 (De minimis Amounts in a Duty Assessment Procedure / Sunset Review)

   U.S. - Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review (Panel) (Concluded that the 2 percent de
    minimis standard of Article 5.8 "does not apply in the context of sunset reviews," and
    therefore the U.S. law and instant sunset review are not inconsistent with Article 11.3 or
     Article 5.8 in respect of the de minimis standard applicable in sunset reviews. See paras.
     7.58-88)
    U.S. - DRAMS (Panel) (Held that the de minimis requirement of Article 5.8 does not apply
     to Article 9.3 duty assessment procedures. See paras. 6.83-91)

    Article 5.10 (Deadline for Completion of Investigation and Decision to Impose Duties)

    U.S. - 1916 Act (Panel) (Failure to include in the 1916 Act an 18 month deadline for
     completion of the investigation and issuance of a decision does not necessarily constitute
     a violation of Article 5.10, as courts could interpret the 1916 Act consistently with the
     provision. See paras. 6.259-260 of panel report in complaint by Japan)

Article 6 (Evidence)

    Article 6.1 (Notice of Information Required)

    Mexico - Rice AD Measures (AB) (Concluded that the notification requirements in AD
     Agreement Articles 6.1 and 12.1 apply only to interested parties for which the
     investigating authority had "actual knowledge," and do not cover those for which the
     authority merely "could have obtained knowledge"; here, Appellate Body was satisfied
     that Economía sent questionnaires to all companies of which it had actual knowledge and
     thus did not violate Articles 12.1 or 6.1; thus, Appellate Body reversed the Panel's
     findings that, with respect to the exporters that Economía did not investigate, Mexico
     acted inconsistently with Articles 6.1 and 12.1. See paras. 245-253)
    Mexico - Rice AD Measures (Panel) (Found that the investigating authority failed to
     comply with AD Agreement Articles 6.1 and 12.1 "as it failed to notify all interested parties
     known to have an interest in the investigation of the initiation of the investigation and of
     the information required of them" -- reversed on appeal; said that in case the authorities
     do not properly notify and inform the interested parties, they are "not permitted to apply
     the facts available to make determinations with regard to these interested parties," and
     thus, "by applying the facts available in the calculation of a margin of dumping for the US
     exporters or producers that were known or could reasonably have been known to the
     authority, Mexico acted in a manner which is inconsistent with Article 6.8 and paragraph
     1 of Annex II of the AD Agreement." See paras. 7.169-201)
    Egypt - Rebar from Turkey (Panel) (Found that Turkey had not established that the
     investigating authority violated Articles 6.1 and 6.2 in respect of the scope of the injury
     investigation (i.e., whether the investigation covered threat or material injury) and the
     notice thereof provided to the Turkish respondents. See paras. 7.77-96)

    Article 6.1 (Submission of Evidence During Investigation)

    U.S. - OCTG Sunset Reviews, Article 21.5 (Panel) (Rejected Argentina's claims that the
     DOC "failed to give the Argentine exporters an ample opportunity to submit evidence,
     inconsistently with Article 6.1" and that "Argentine exporters were denied the right to
     defend their interests as mentioned in Article 6.2"; also noted that hearings are to be held
     when requested, but there was no "clear indication" that such a request had been made
     here; thus, Panel rejected Argentina's claims under Articles 6.1 and 6.2. See paras.
     7.109-120)
    U.S. - OCTG Sunset Reviews (AB) (With respect to respondents who file incomplete
     submissions in response to the DOC's notice of initiation of a sunset review, Appellate
     Body upheld Panel's findings that Section 351.218(d)(2)(iii) is inconsistent, as such, with
     Articles 6.1 and 6.2; by contrast, with respect to respondents that file no submission in
     response to the DOC's notice of initiation, Appellate Body reversed Panel's finding that
     "the failure to accord those respondents the rights detailed in Articles 6.1 and 6.2 renders
     the deemed waiver provision inconsistent, as such, with those provisions." See paras.
     236-253)
    U.S. - OCTG Sunset Reviews (Panel) (Found that Section 351.218(d)(2)(iii) of the
     Regulations relating to deemed waivers, as such, is inconsistent with AD Agreement
     Articles 6.1 and 6.2. See paras. 7.104-128; in response to Argentina's claim that the
     conduct of an expedited sunset review and the application of the waiver provisions in the
     instant sunset review violated AD Agreement Articles 6.1 and 6.2, Panel rejected claim
     under Article 6.1, but found a violation under Article 6.2 due to the absence of a hearing.
     See paras. 7.227-236)
    U.S. - Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review (Panel) (Concluded that the DOC "did
     not act inconsistently with Articles 6.1 or 6.2 of the Anti-dumping Agreement by declining
     to consider the information contained in NSC's submission dated 11 May 2000 on the
     grounds of untimeliness." See paras. 7.247-263)
    Guatemala - Cement II (Panel) (Stated that Article 6.1 does not require authorities to
     establish time limits for the presentation of arguments and evidence -- it simply requires
     them to provide "ample opportunity" to present written evidence; therefore, claim under
     Article 6.1 was rejected. See paras. 8.115-119; rejected another claim, finding that the
     respondent was given two weeks to present the additional data, and was therefore given
     "ample opportunity to present in writing" relevant evidence as required under Article 6.1.
     See para. 8.178; rejected claim that by failing to inform respondent of a change in injury
     theories, the Ministry violated AD Agreement Articles 6.1, 6.2, and 6.9. See paras. 8.233-
     239)

    Article 6.1.1 (30-Day Deadline for Questionnaires) and footnote 15

    Mexico - Rice AD Measures (AB) (Concluded, "we cannot deduce from footnote 15 to
     Article 6.1.1, alone, an obligation for diplomatic authorities of the exporting Member to
     make their exporters or producers aware of the investigation." See paras. 7.262-263;
     upheld Panel's findings that Article 53 of the FTA -- which provides that "[t]he interested
     parties shall submit their arguments, information and evidence in conformity with the
     applicable legislation, within a period of 28 days from the day following the publication of
     the initiating resolution" -- is inconsistent, as such, with AD Agreement Article 6.1.1 and
     SCM Agreement Article 12.1.1. See paras. 7.276-283)
    Mexico - Rice AD Measures (Panel) (Found that, "by using the date of publication of the
     initiation notice as the starting point for the time period for questionnaire responses,
     Article 53 of the Act effectively prevents Mexico from giving each exporter or foreign
     producer receiving a questionnaire 30 days to respond"; therefore, it concluded, Article
     53 is inconsistent "with the unequivocal requirement in Article 6.1.1 of the AD Agreement
     to provide for 30 days to respond to questionnaires." See paras. 7.213-225)
    Argentina - Poultry AD Duties (Panel) (Concluded that since the DCD did not allow
     certain exporters an initial period of at least 30 days to respond to the "questionnaires" at
     issue, Argentina failed to comply with Article 6.1.1; found that the failure to send a
     particular questionnaire to exporters or foreign producers does not constitute a violation
     of Article 6.1.1, and therefore Argentina did not violate Article 6.1.1 by not sending the
     CNCE's injury questionnaire to the exporters identified by Brazil. See paras. 7.136-147)
    Egypt - Rebar from Turkey (Panel) (Concluded that the investigating authority's
     supplemental requests for information did not constitute "questionnaires" under Article
     6.1.1 and, therefore, the deadline imposed for those responses was not inconsistent with
     that provision. See paras. 7.270-279 and paras. 7.285-287)

    Article 6.1.2 (Availability of Evidence)

    Argentina - Poultry AD Duties (Panel) (Concluded that because the exporters in
     question were not even aware of the investigation, they could not have "participated" in
     that investigation and the investigating authority was not required to make evidence
     promptly available to them; therefore, rejected claim that Argentina violated Article 6.1.2.
     See paras. 7.148-154)
    Guatemala - Cement II (Panel) (Discussed in context of AD Agreement Article 6 --
     Access to Case File; Guatemala violated Article 6.1.2 when it: 1) failed to grant Mexico
     regular and routine access to the investigation file, and 2) delayed by 20 days the
     provision of a copy of one of the petitioner's submissions to the Mexican respondent
     company. See paras. 8.126-158)

    Article 6.1.3 (Requirement to Provide Full Text of Application)

    Argentina - Poultry AD Duties (Panel) (Concluded that Argentina did not "provide" the full
     text of the application to the known Brazilian exporters and the Brazilian authorities, and
     thus acted inconsistently with Article 6.1.3. See paras. 7.163-173)
    Guatemala - Cement II (Panel) (Held that the term "as soon as" in Article 6.1.3 is
     interchangeable with the term "immediately"; here, Guatemala's provision of the text of
     the application to both the known exporters and the Mexican Government did not meet
     the "as soon as" standard. See paras. 8.97-104)

    Article 6.2 (Rights of Defense)

    U.S. - OCTG Sunset Reviews, Article 21.5 (Panel) (Rejected Argentina's claims that the
     DOC "failed to give the Argentine exporters an ample opportunity to submit evidence,
     inconsistently with Article 6.1" and that "Argentine exporters were denied the right to
     defend their interests as mentioned in Article 6.2"; also noted that hearings are to be held
     when requested, but there was no "clear indication" that such a request had been made
     here; thus, Panel rejected Argentina's claims under Articles 6.1 and 6.2. See paras.
     7.109-120)
    Korea - Paper AD Duties (Panel) (Stating that Article 6.2 does not address interested
     parties' right to see the information on the record, Panel considered that "there is no legal
     basis for Indonesia's claim under Article 6.2 in light of the acknowledged facts." See
     paras. 7.304-307)
    U.S. - OCTG Sunset Reviews (AB) (With respect to respondents who file incomplete
     submissions in response to the DOC's notice of initiation of a sunset review, Appellate
     Body upheld Panel's findings that Section 351.218(d)(2)(iii) is inconsistent, as such, with
     Articles 6.1 and 6.2; by contrast, with respect to respondents that file no submission in
     response to the DOC's notice of initiation, Appellate Body reversed Panel's finding that
     "the failure to accord those respondents the rights detailed in Articles 6.1 and 6.2 renders
     the deemed waiver provision inconsistent, as such, with those provisions." See paras.
     236-253)
    U.S. - OCTG Sunset Reviews (Panel) (Found that Section 351.218(d)(2)(iii) of the
     Regulations relating to deemed waivers, as such, is inconsistent with AD Agreement
     Articles 6.1 and 6.2. See paras. 7.104-128; in response to Argentina's claim that the
     conduct of an expedited sunset review and the application of the waiver provisions in the
     instant sunset review violated AD Agreement Articles 6.1 and 6.2, Panel rejected claim
     under Article 6.1, but found a violation under Article 6.2 due to the absence of a hearing.
     See paras. 7.227-236)
    U.S. - Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review (Panel) (Concluded that the DOC "did
     not act inconsistently with Articles 6.1 or 6.2 of the Anti-dumping Agreement by declining
     to consider the information contained in NSC's submission dated 11 May 2000 on the
     grounds of untimeliness." See paras. 7.247-263)
    EC - Pipe Fittings (AB) (Found that the European Communities acted inconsistently with
     Articles 6.2 and 6.4 "by failing to disclose to the interested parties during the antidumping
     investigation the information on the injury factors listed in Article 3.4 that is contained in
     Exhibit EC-12," thereby reversing Panel's finding to the contrary. See paras. 134-150)
    EC - Pipe Fittings (Panel) (Given that certain information was considered not relevant
     and was not specifically relied upon in making the anti-dumping determination, the Panel
     found that the European Communities did not violate Articles 6.2 or 6.4 -- reversed on
     appeal. See paras. 7.346-349; noting that certain information was considered to be
     confidential within the meaning of Article 6.5, and that Brazil had not invoked Article 6.5 in
     this connection, the Panel found that the European Communities did not violate Article
     6.2 or 6.4 in this respect. See paras. 7.379-380)
    Argentina - Poultry AD Duties (Panel) (Said that it did not consider it necessary to
     address claims under Article 6.2 where it had already made findings concerning the
     conduct allegedly violating Article 6.2 under other, more specific, provisions of the AD
     Agreement. See paras. 7.155-162)
    Egypt - Rebar from Turkey (Panel) (Found that Turkey had not established that the
     investigating authority violated Articles 6.1 and 6.2 in respect of the scope of the injury
     investigation (i.e., whether the investigation covered threat or material injury) and the
     notice thereof provided to the Turkish respondents. See paras. 7.77-96; also found that
     because, as a factual matter, the deadline given to respondents to respond to the
     investigating authority's August 19 request for additional information was "reasonable,"
     the investigating authority did not violate Article 6.2. See paras. 7.280-284; similarly,
     because, inter alia, respondents did not object to the deadline given in the September 23
     letter, the Panel found that the investigating authority did not violate Article 6.2. See
     paras. 7.288-295; based on its factual finding that respondents did not "request" a
     meeting with the investigating authority, but merely "offered" to meet with the authority,
     the Panel rejected Turkey's claim under Article 6.2. See paras. 7.338-346)
    Guatemala - Cement II (Panel) (Rejected claim under Article 6.2, based on Mexico's
     failure to submit evidence regarding Guatemala's response to a request for a non-
     confidential version of certain evidence. See paras. 8.159-165; found no evidence to
     suggest that the views of a particular respondent were sought, and, therefore, the
     Ministry violated Article 6.2 by failing to provide the company with "a full opportunity for
     the defence of [its] interests." See para. 8.179; rejected claim that by failing to inform
     respondent of a change in injury theories, the Ministry violated AD Agreement Articles
     6.1, 6.2, and 6.9. See paras. 8.233-239)

    Article 6.4 (Opportunities to See Relevant Information)

    U.S. - OCTG Sunset Reviews, Article 21.5 (Panel) (Examining five memoranda at issue,
     Panel rejected Argentina's claims regarding the first three, two of which dealt with the
     DOC's "reasoning," to which, the Panel said, Article 6.4 does not apply; with regard to the
     latter two, however, Panel noted that for one, the DOC used this information, but the
     Argentine exporters had not been informed about it; and for another, which covered
     information taken from the original sunset review, the DOC had not demonstrated that it
     was not practicable to allow the Argentine exporters to see it; therefore, Panel found that
     the DOC acted inconsistently with Article 6.4 with regard to these two memoranda. See
     paras. 7.121-129)
    Korea - Paper AD Duties (Panel) (Concluded that the KTC acted inconsistently with
     Article 6.4 "with respect to disclosing information regarding the calculation of the
     constructed normal values for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli to those companies." See paras.
     7.195-201; since the Sinar Mas Group's request was directed at confidential information,
     Panel concluded that Indonesia failed to establish a legal basis for its claim under Article
     6.4. See paras. 7.299-303 and paras. 7.321-322)
    EC - Pipe Fittings (AB) (Found that the European Communities acted inconsistently with
     Articles 6.2 and 6.4 "by failing to disclose to the interested parties during the antidumping
     investigation the information on the injury factors listed in Article 3.4 that is contained in
     Exhibit EC-12," thereby reversing Panel's finding to the contrary. See paras. 134-150)
    EC - Pipe Fittings (Panel) (Given that certain information was considered not relevant
     and was not specifically relied upon in making the anti-dumping determination, the Panel
     found that the European Communities did not violate Articles 6.2 or 6.4 -- reversed on
     appeal. See paras. 7.346-349; noting that certain information was considered to be
     confidential within the meaning of Article 6.5, and that Brazil had not invoked Article 6.5 in
     this connection, the Panel found that the European Communities did not violate Article
     6.2 or 6.4 in this respect. See paras. 7.379-380; said that it did not "view information that
     is already in the possession of an interested party and that has been submitted by an
     interested party to an investigating authority in the course of an anti-dumping proceeding
     as information that an investigating authority must provide opportunities for that same
     interested parties to see within the meaning of Article 6.4," and therefore found that the
     European Communities did not violate Article 6.4. See paras. 7.201-208)
    Guatemala - Cement II (Panel) (Discussed in context of AD Agreement Article 6 --
     Access to Case File; Guatemala violated Article 6.4 when it 1) failed to provide Mexico
     with two copies of the investigation file upon request and upon Mexico's offer to pay the
     requisite fee, and 2) failed to grant Mexico regular and routine access to the investigation
     file; Guatemala's failure to provide Mexico with a complete copy of the record from the
     hearing, based simply upon Guatemala's inadvertent failure to include a couple of pages,
     did not rise to the level of a violation of Article 6.4. See paras. 8.126-158)
    Mexico - HFCS (Panel) (Rejected a U.S. claim of violation of Article 6.4, made on
     grounds that certain documents had not been shared with the parties during the
     investigation; held that Article 6.4 should not be interpreted to impose an independent
     obligation on the investigating authority to issue explanations or conclusions that are not
     required to be issued under Article 5.3. See paras. 7.106-109)

    Article 6.5 (Confidential Information)

    Mexico - Pipes and Tubes AD Duties (Panel) (Found that Guatemala "has not
     established that Mexico violated its obligations under Article 6.5 and 6.5.1 in its treatment
     of requests for confidentiality and assertions of reasons why summarization of
     confidential information was not possible." See paras. 7.373-399)
    Korea - Paper AD Duties (Panel) (Concluded that "the KTC acted inconsistently with
     Article 6.5 in the investigation at issue by not requiring that good cause be shown with
     respect to the information submitted in the application which was by nature confidential."
     See paras. 7.329-335)
    Guatemala - Cement II (Panel) (Guatemala violated Article 6.5 by granting confidential
     treatment to submissions by the petitioner even though Guatemala could present no
     evidence that the petitioner had even requested confidential treatment. See paras. 8.207-
     223)

    Article 6.5.1 (Confidential Information)

    Mexico - Pipes and Tubes AD Duties (Panel) (Found that Guatemala "has not
     established that Mexico violated its obligations under Article 6.5 and 6.5.1 in its treatment
     of requests for confidentiality and assertions of reasons why summarization of
     confidential information was not possible." See paras. 7.373-399)
    U.S. - OCTG Sunset Reviews, Article 21.5 (Panel) (Panel concluded that the DOC "acted
     inconsistently with its obligation under Article 6.5.1 of the Agreement to require [the
     petitioner] to provide a non-confidential summary of the confidential information that it
     excluded from its submission to the USDOC, or, alternatively, to explain why the
     information is not susceptible to summarization"; in addition, Panel rejected the U.S.
     argument that "because US law allows counsel for parties to access all confidential
     information on the record, there was no violation of Article 6.5.1 in the sunset review at
     issue"; with regard to two other sets of documents, the Panel noted that for the first,
     Argentina had not submitted the text of document at issue; and for the second, the
     documents were memoranda prepared by the DOC, which the Panel said were not
     covered by Article 6.5.1; thus, Panel rejected these other claims. See paras. 7.131-139)
    Guatemala - Cement II (Panel) (Guatemala violated Article 6.5.1 because there was no
     evidence demonstrating either that petitioner provided a statement of reasons as to why
     summarization was not possible or that the Ministry even requested such a statement.
     See paras. 8.207-223)

    Article 6.5.2 (Confidential Information)

    Guatemala - Cement II (Panel) (Article 6.5.2 does not require a party to provide a
     justification for confidential treatment, but simply establishes rules in the situation where
     the authority finds that a request for confidentiality "is not warranted"; rejected Mexico's
     claim that certain information should have been summarized, in light of Mexico's failure to
     demonstrate that the information at issue could be summarized. See paras. 8.207-223)

    Article 6.6 (Satisfaction as to Accuracy of Information)

    U.S. - OCTG Sunset Reviews, Article 21.5 (Panel) (Concluded that Article 6.6 "could not
     have been violated by the USDOC because of the information that it declined to use in its
     determination." See paras. 7.140-143)
    Guatemala - Cement II (Panel) (Because the Panel classified Mexico's concerns as
     pertaining to the substantive relevance of the information at issue, rather than to the
     accuracy of the information, rejected Mexico's claim regarding import data under Article
     6.6. See paras. 8.166-174)
    U.S. - DRAMS (Panel) (Article 6.6 does not require verification of all information upon
     which the authority relies, as there are many ways to "satisfy" oneself as to the accuracy
     of information, including "reliance on the reputation of the original source of the
     information"; Panel rejected claims under this provision. See paras. 6.74-82)

    Article 6.7 (Verification)

    Korea - Paper AD Duties (Panel) (Because the KTC "did not inform the two Sinar Mas
     Group companies of the verification results in a manner that would allow them to properly
     prepare their case for the rest of the investigation," Panel concluded that "the KTC acted
     inconsistently with Article 6.7 of the Agreement in this regard." See paras. 7.183-193)
    Egypt - Rebar from Turkey (Panel) (Rejected Turkey's argument that the investigating
     authority violated Article 6.7 and Annex I(7) by waiting until after the "on-the-spot"
     verification to raise certain cost issues; noting the use of the word "may" in Article 6.7, the
     Panel concluded that "on-the-spot" verifications are "permitted, but not required" under
     this provision. See paras. 7.322-328)
    Guatemala - Cement II (Panel) (The inclusion on the verification team of non-
     governmental experts with a conflict of interest does not violate Article 6.7. See paras.
     8.184-198)

    Article 6.8 (Facts Available)

    Mexico - Pipes and Tubes AD Duties (Panel) (Concluded that Economía acted
     inconsistently with Annex II, paragraphs 3 and 5, and thus Article 6.8, "when it decided to
     reject in their entirety the data that Tubac had submitted and to rely instead on facts
     available." See paras. 7.108-184; found that Economía "acted inconsistently with
     paragraph 6 of Annex II, and thus Article 6.8, by failing to inform Tubac that its data were
     being rejected and of the reasons for that decision, and by failing to provide Tubac with
     an opportunity to submit further explanations." See paras. 7.185-190; concluded that
     Economía "acted inconsistently with paragraph 7 of Annex II and Article 6.8 because in
     applying as facts available the normal value evidence that was provided by the applicant
    and used in Economía's initiation decision it failed to use 'special circumspection.'" See
    paras. 7.191-197)
   Mexico - Rice AD Measures (AB) (Upheld Panel's finding that "by applying the facts
    available contained in the application submitted by the petitioner in calculating the margin
    of dumping for United States exporters that Economía did not investigate," Mexico acted
    inconsistently with AD Agreement Annex II(1) and, therefore, with AD Agreement Article
    6.8. See paras. 258-261; noted that Article 64 of the Foreign Trade Act "does not on its
    face permit the agency to use any information that might be provided by a foreign
    producer or exporter, even if incomplete, where the use of such information would result
    in a margin lower than the highest facts available margin," "[n]or does it allow the agency
    to engage in the 'evaluative, comparative assessment' necessary in order to determine
    which facts are 'best' to fill in the missing information"; thus, upheld Panel's findings that
    Article 64 is inconsistent, as such, with AD Agreement Article 6.8 and Annex II(1, 3, 5,
    and 7), as well as SCM Agreement Article 12.7. See paras. 284-298)
   Mexico - Rice AD Measures (Panel) (Examining the record, Panel said that it found "no
    basis to consider that the authority made any attempt to check the applicant's information
    against information obtained from other interested parties or undertook the evaluative,
    comparative assessment that would have enabled the authority to assess whether the
    information provided by the applicant was indeed the best information available," nor did
    the investigating authority use the applicant's information with "special circumspection" as
    required by paragraph 7 of Annex II; thus, Panel found that the Mexican investigating
    authority calculated a dumping margin on the basis of facts available for the exporter
    Producers Rice in a manner which is inconsistent with AD Agreement Article 6.8, read in
    light of Annex II, paragraph 7. See paras. 7.160-168; Panel found that the investigating
    authority failed to comply with AD Agreement Articles 6.1 and 12.1 "as it failed to notify all
    interested parties known to have an interest in the investigation of the initiation of the
    investigation and of the information required of them"; said that in case the authorities do
    not properly notify and inform the interested parties, they are "not permitted to apply the
    facts available to make determinations with regard to these interested parties," and thus,
    "by applying the facts available in the calculation of a margin of dumping for the US
    exporters or producers that were known or could reasonably have been known to the
    authority, Mexico acted in a manner which is inconsistent with Article 6.8 and paragraph
    1 of Annex II of the AD Agreement." See paras. 7.169-201; found that since Article 64 of
    the Foreign Trade Act effectively prevents the authorities from using the best information
    to replace the missing data, it "is inconsistent with Article 6.8 and paragraphs 1, 3, 5 and
    7 of Annex II of the AD Agreement." See paras. 7.226-242)
   Korea - Paper AD Duties (Panel) (Concluded that "CMI's financial statements and
    accounting records constituted 'necessary information' for purposes of the investigation at
    issue"; stated that the financial statements at issue were submitted past the deadline
    established by the KTC in the investigation at issue; concluded that the Sinar Mas
    Group's submission of CMI's financial statements on April 10 was not made within a
    reasonable period, and that the KTC "was entitled to disregard CMI's financial statements
    and resort to facts available"; furthermore, the Sinar Mas Group's post-verification
    submission was limited to CMI's financial statements, and the Group "never attempted to
    submit other accounting records which … were also sought by the KTC during verification
    and not submitted by the Group"; thus, Panel concluded that "the KTC did not act
    inconsistently with Article 6.8 in resorting to facts available with respect to Indah Kiat and
    Pindo Deli." See paras. 7.40-56; concluded that "the KTC did not act inconsistently with
    Article 6.8 of the Agreement and paragraph 3 of Annex II in disregarding the domestic
    sales data provided by Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli in determining normal values for these
    two companies." See paras. 7.57-72; concluded that the KTC did not act inconsistently
    with Article 6.8 and Annex II(6) "with respect to informing the Sinar Mas Group of its
    decision to reject the domestic sales data submitted by Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli and
    giving them an opportunity to make further explanations within a reasonable period." See
    paras. 7.73-86; rejected two claims that the KTC failed to use "special circumspection" in
    using information from secondary sources, but concluded that "the KTC acted
    inconsistently with Article 6.8 of the Agreement and paragraph 7 of Annex II with respect
    to determining financial expenses of CMI in the context of calculating the constructed
    normal values for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli." See paras. 7.95-111; concluded that the
    KTC acted inconsistently with Article 6.8 and Annex II(7) "by failing to fulfil its obligation to
    corroborate information obtained from secondary sources for purposes of calculating
    Tjiwi Kimia's dumping margin against other independent sources at its disposal";
    regarding Indonesia's argument that "the magnitude of the margin of dumping calculated
    for Tjiwi Kimia also demonstrates that the KTC failed to exercise special circumspection,"
    Panel said this does not "have a bearing on the WTO-consistency of the KTC's
    calculation as long as the calculation conforms to the relevant provisions of the
    Agreement." See paras. 7.121-127; found that the KTC "did not act inconsistently with
    Article 6.8 and paragraph 6 of Annex II in not giving either Tjiwi Kimia or the Sinar Mas
    Group another opportunity to submit information which had already been withheld from
    the KTC." See paras. 7.128-131)
   U.S. - OCTG Sunset Reviews (Panel) (Found that the DOC did not act inconsistently with
    AD Agreement Article 6.8 and Annex II in its use of facts available in the sunset review at
    issue. See paras. 7.237-245)
   Argentina - Poultry AD Duties (Panel) (Considered three separate claims under this
    provision, as follows: (1) found that the DCD was justified in disregarding data submitted
    by one company because the company "had not accredited itself in accordance with
    domestic legislation," such that there was no violation of Article 6.8; (2) after examining
    the record of the investigation, the Panel said that it could not find reference to any of the
    reasons provided by Argentina with respect to certain other companies, and considered
    that Argentina's arguments here were an "ex post rationalization" that should not be
    taken into account, leading to a violation of Article 6.8; (3) considered that one company
    did not submit "the necessary information within a reasonable period," and therefore
    Argentina was justified in disregarding this information under Article 6.8. See paras.
    7.174-198)
   Egypt - Rebar from Turkey (Panel) (Determined that the cost information that had been
    requested was "necessary" in the sense of Article 6.8; concluded that "Egypt violated
    Article 6.8 and Annex II, paragraph 6, in respect of IDC and Icdas, because the
    [investigating authority], having identified to these respondents the information
    'necessary' to verify their cost data, and having received that information, nevertheless
    found that they had failed to provide 'necessary information'; and further, did not inform
    these companies of this finding and did not give them an opportunity to provide further
    explanations"; by contrast, found that "an unbiased and objective investigating authority
    could have found that Habas, Diler and Colakoglu failed to provide necessary information
    in the sense of Article 6.8," and therefore Egypt did not violate Article 6.8 or Annex II(5) in
    resorting to "facts available" for these respondents. See paras. 7.143-266)
   U.S. - Steel Plate from India (Panel) (DOC's decision to reject U.S. sales price
    information "lacked a valid basis" under Annex II, paragraph 3; therefore, DOC acted
    inconsistently with AD Agreement Article 6.8 and Annex II, paragraph 3 in concluding,
    with respect to the respondent's U.S. sales information, that "necessary information" was
    not provided and in relying entirely on facts available in determining the dumping margin.
    See paras. 7.34-80; U.S. statutory provisions governing the application of facts available
    are discretionary and therefore do not "on their face" violate Article 6.8 and Annex II,
    paragraph 3. See paras. 7.81-100)
   Argentina - Floor Tiles (Panel) (Argentine authority violated AD Agreement Article 6.8 by
    disregarding the exporters' information in whole or in part and applying facts available;
    violation also found based on the failure to inform the exporters as to why certain
    information supplied by them was not accepted, the failure to provide an opportunity to
    provide further explanations within a reasonable period, and the failure to give, in any
    published determinations, the reasons for the rejection of evidence or information. See
    paras. 6.12-81)
   U.S. - Hot-Rolled Steel from Japan (AB) (Upheld Panel's findings of violations of Article
    6.8 with respect to all exporters; stated that the "'reasonable period' must be interpreted
     consistently with the notions of flexibility and balance that are inherent in the concept of
     'reasonableness,' and in a manner that allows for account to be taken of the particular
     circumstances of each case," and it listed a set of factors that authorities should consider;
     U.S. authority was not entitled to reject data submitted by exporters solely because it was
     received after the deadlines for the submission of that information. See paras. 63-110)
    U.S. - Hot-Rolled Steel from Japan (Panel) (Despite the fact that two of the exporters
     submitted certain data after the official deadlines set by the United States, the Panel held
     that because the data could have been verified and incorporated into the U.S. analysis,
     the information had been submitted in a "reasonable period of time," and it was a
     violation of Article 6.8 to reject that data and apply facts available in its place; because an
     unbiased and objective authority could not have concluded that a third exporter did not
     cooperate with the U.S. investigating authority, the Panel held that the United States' use
     of adverse facts available violated Article 6.8 and Annex II(7). See paras. 7.31-74)
    Guatemala - Cement II (Panel) (Because the exporter acted reasonably in refusing to
     allow verification of its information (based on the fact that Guatemala had included people
     with a conflict of interest on its proposed verification team), Guatemala's determination
     that the exporter impeded the investigation was improper, and therefore the use of facts
     available in place of the data submitted by the exporter violated Article 6.8. See paras.
     8.240-256)

    Article 6.9 (Essential Facts under Consideration)

    U.S. - OCTG Sunset Reviews, Article 21.5 (Panel) (Noting that the memoranda at issue
     contained the DOC's "reasoning, and not facts," Panel found that the obligation under
     Article 6.9 "applies to essential facts," and thus rejected the claim under this provision.
     See paras. 7.147-150)
    Korea - Paper AD Duties (Panel) (Noted that "the obligation under Article 6.9 is one that
     requires the IA to make a one-time disclosure and that is before a final determination is
     made as to whether or not a definitive measure will be applied." See paras. 7.202-204;
     rejected Indonesia's claim that the KTC's failure to include in the non-confidential version
     of the final investigation report the absolute figures with respect to the Korean industry's
     prices was inconsistent with Article 6.9. See paras. 7.323-328)
    Argentina - Poultry AD Duties (Panel) (Panel concluded: "Since some of the elements
     identified by Brazil are not 'essential facts,' and the remainder are facts which do not
     'form the basis for the decision whether to apply definitive measures,' we reject Brazil's
     claim that Argentina failed to inform interested parties of 'the essential facts under
     consideration which form the basis for the decision whether to apply definitive
     measures.'" See paras. 7.218-230)
    Argentina - Floor Tiles (Panel) (Violation of Article 6.9 found, based on fact that exporters
     could not have been aware from the record that the Argentine authority would rely largely
     on petitioners' information in calculating the dumping margin; harmless error defense
     rejected. See paras. 6.118-131)
    Guatemala - Cement II (Panel) (Violation of Article 6.9 found, in light of Panel's rejection
     of Guatemala's reference to its disclosure of the facts underlying the preliminary
     determination as evidence that the "essential facts" had been disclosed; held that when
     the basis for the preliminary determination is significantly different from the factual basis
     for the final determination, disclosure of only those facts pertaining to the preliminary
     determination is insufficient. See paras. 8.224-232; rejected claim that by failing to inform
     respondent of a change in injury theories, the Ministry violated AD Agreement Articles
     6.1, 6.2, and 6.9. See paras. 8.233-239)

    Article 6.10 (Margins for Individual Exporters/Producers)

    Mexico - Rice AD Measures (AB) (Found that the word "known" in Article 6.10 refers to
     exporters/producers known to the investigating authority, and does not include ones
     which the authority "should have known"; here, Appellate Body said, Economía acted
     consistently with Article 6.10 "given that it determined an individual margin of dumping for
     each exporter of which it knew at the time it calculated the dumping margins"; thus,
     Appellate Body reversed Panel's finding that "with respect to the exporters that Economía
     did not investigate, Mexico acted inconsistently with Article 6.10." See paras. 254-257)
    Mexico - Rice AD Measures (Panel) (Panel found that Mexico violated Article 6.10 "by
     remaining entirely passive in the identification of exporters or producers interested in the
     investigation, and by not calculating an individual margin for dumping for each exporter or
     producer that was known or should reasonably have been known to the investigating
     authority" -- reversed on appeal. See paras. 7.169-201)
    Korea - Paper AD Duties (Panel) (Concluded that "when read in context, Article 6.10
     does not necessarily preclude treating distinct legal entities as a single exporter or
     producer for purposes of dumping determinations in anti-dumping investigations";
     therefore, rejected Indonesia's claim that the KTC acted inconsistently with Article 6.10
     "by treating Indah Kiat, Pindo Deli and Tjiwi Kimia as a single exporter for purposes of its
     dumping margin calculations." See paras. 7.148-168)
    U.S. - Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review (AB) (Upheld Panel's finding that the
     DOC's use of an "order-wide" basis to make the "likelihood" determination did not violate
     AD Agreement Articles 6.10 or 11.3, either "as such" or as applied in the sunset review at
     issue. See paras. 139-163)
    U.S. - Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review (Panel) (Concluded that Article 6.10
     does not require "that the determination of likelihood of continuation or recurrence of
     dumping under Article 11.3 be made on a company-specific basis," and therefore found
     that "the United States did not act inconsistently with its obligations in this case by
     determining likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping on an order-wide basis."
     See paras. 7.192-208)
    Argentina - Poultry AD Duties (Panel) (Rejected argument that a condition for the
     determination of an individual margin is that the exporter must supply the necessary
     information, and therefore concluded that Argentina violated Article 6.10 by not
     determining an individual margin for Catarinense and Frangosul. See paras. 7.209-217)
    EC - Bed Linen, Article 21.5 (AB) (Discussed in the context of findings under AD
     Agreement Articles 3.1 and 3.2. See paras. 116-117 and paras. 134-139)
    Argentina - Floor Tiles (Panel) (Argentina's failure to provide an explanation in its final
     determination as to why it could not calculate individual dumping margins constitutes a
     sufficient basis on which to determine that the investigating authority failed to perform an
     objective and unbiased evaluation of the facts; moreover, based on the facts in this case,
     the Argentine authority should have determined an individual dumping margin for each of
     the four exporters in the sample. See paras. 6.82-105)

Article 7 (Provisional Measures)

    Article 7.4 (Period of Application of Provisional Measure)

    Mexico - HFCS (Panel) (Mexico's application of the measure for more than six months
     was inconsistent with Article 7.4. See paras. 7.179-183)

Article 8 (Price Undertakings)

    Article 8.3 (Acceptance of Undertakings by the Authorities)

    U.S. - Offset Act ("Byrd Amendment") (Panel) (Because the measure at issue did not
     mandate the U.S. investigating authority to reject offers for undertakings, Panel rejected
     claims of violation of Article 8.3. See paras. 7.67-82)
Article 9 (Imposition and Collection of Anti-Dumping Duties)

    Article 9.1 (Decision to Impose Duties and Decision on Amount of Duties)

    U.S. - Zeroing (Japan) (Panel) (Found that by maintaining simple zeroing procedures in
     the context of periodic reviews and new shipper reviews, the DOC does not act
     inconsistently with AD Agreement Articles 2.1, 2.4, 2.4.2, 9.1-9.3, 9.5, 18.4, GATT
     Articles VI:1 and VI:2, and WTO Agreement Article XVI:4 -- reversed on appeal. See
     paras. 7.189-224; for the same reasons, Panel rejected Japan's claims that simple
     zeroing as applied in 11 periodic reviews is inconsistent with AD Agreement Articles 1,
     2.1, 2.4, 2.4.2 and 9.1-9.3, GATT Articles VI:1 and VI:2 -- reversed on appeal. See paras.
     7.225-227)

    Article 9.2 (Appropriate Amounts)

    U.S. - Zeroing (Japan) (Panel) (Found that by maintaining simple zeroing procedures in
     the context of periodic reviews and new shipper reviews, the DOC does not act
     inconsistently with AD Agreement Articles 2.1, 2.4, 2.4.2, 9.1-9.3, 9.5, 18.4, GATT
     Articles VI:1 and VI:2, and WTO Agreement Article XVI:4 -- reversed on appeal. See
     paras. 7.189-224; for the same reasons, Panel rejected Japan's claims that simple
     zeroing as applied in 11 periodic reviews is inconsistent with AD Agreement Articles 1,
     2.1, 2.4, 2.4.2 and 9.1-9.3, GATT Articles VI:1 and VI:2 -- reversed on appeal. See paras.
     7.225-227)
    Argentina - Poultry AD Duties (Panel) (Since it had already found that Argentina's
     variable anti-dumping duties are not inconsistent with Article 9.3, the Panel rejected
     Brazil's claim that the duties are not in "appropriate amounts" under Article 9.2. See
     paras. 7.345-367)

    Article 9.3 (Amount of Duty Shall Not Exceed the Dumping Margin Established Under
    Article 2)

    U.S. - Zeroing (Japan) (AB) (Reversed Panel's finding that the United States does not act
     inconsistently with AD Agreement Articles 9.3 and 9.5 and GATT Article VI:2 by
     maintaining zeroing procedures in periodic reviews and new shipper reviews; found
     instead that the United States acts inconsistently with these provisions. See paras. 149-
     166; reversed Panel's finding that zeroing, as applied by the United States in the 11
     periodic reviews at issue in this appeal, is not inconsistent with AD Agreement Articles
     2.1, 2.4, 9.1, and 9.3 and GATT Articles VI:1 and VI:2; found instead that the United
     States acted inconsistently with Articles 2.4 and 9.3 and Article VI:2. See paras. 172-177)
    U.S. - Zeroing (Japan) (Panel) (Found that by maintaining simple zeroing procedures in
     the context of periodic reviews and new shipper reviews, the DOC does not act
     inconsistently with AD Agreement Articles 2.1, 2.4, 2.4.2, 9.1-9.3, 9.5, 18.4, GATT
     Articles VI:1 and VI:2, and WTO Agreement Article XVI:4 -- reversed on appeal. See
     paras. 7.189-224; for the same reasons, Panel rejected Japan's claims that simple
     zeroing as applied in 11 periodic reviews is inconsistent with AD Agreement Articles 1,
     2.1, 2.4, 2.4.2 and 9.1-9.3, GATT Articles VI:1 and VI:2 -- reversed on appeal. See paras.
     7.225-227)
    U.S. - "Zeroing" of Dumping Margins (AB) (Found that the "simple zeroing" methodology
     applied by the DOC in the administrative reviews at issue is inconsistent with AD
     Agreement Article 9.3 and GATT Article VI:2. See paras. 108-135; declared "moot, and of
     no legal effect" the Panel's finding that the zeroing methodology used by the United
     States in administrative reviews is not inconsistent, as such, with AD Agreement Articles
     1, 2.4, 2.4.2, 9.3, 11.1, 11.2, and 18.4, GATT Articles VI:1 and VI:2, and WTO Agreement
     Article XVI:4. See paras. 226-227; declared "moot, and of no legal effect" the Panel's
    finding that Section 351.414(c)(2) is not inconsistent with AD Agreement Articles 1, 2.4,
    2.4.2, 9.3, 9.5, 11.1, 11.2, 11.3, and 18.4, GATT Articles VI:1 and VI:2, and WTO
    Agreement Article XVI:4. See paras. 235-242)
   U.S. - "Zeroing" of Dumping Margins (Panel) (Found that Sections 771(35)(A) and (B),
    731 and 777A(d) of the Tariff Act are not "as such" inconsistent with AD Agreement
    Articles 1, 2.4, 2.4.2, 5.8, 9.3 and 18.4, GATT Articles VI:1 and VI:2, and WTO
    Agreement Article XVI:4 with respect to the use of a "zeroing" methodology in the
    calculation of margins of dumping in original investigations. See paras 7.37-69; because
    it had rejected the claims under AD Agreement Articles 2.4 and 2.4.2, the Panel also
    rejected the "dependent" claims under AD Agreement Articles 1, 9.3, 11.1, 11.2 and 18.4,
    GATT Articles VI:1 and VI:2, and WTO Agreement Article XVI:4 with regard to "zeroing"
    in administrative reviews -- reversed on appeal with regard to "as applied" claims under
    Article 9.3. See paras. 7.286-288; with regard to the claims that the "Standard Zeroing
    Procedures" used by the United States in administrative reviews or the U.S. practice or
    methodology of zeroing, Sections 771(35)(A) and (B), 731, 777A(d) and 751(a)(2)(i) and
    (ii) of the Tariff Act, and Section 351.414(c)(2) of the DOC Regulations are inconsistent
    with AD Agreement Articles 1, 2.4, 2.4.2, 9.3, 11.1, 11.2 and 18.4, GATT Articles VI:1
    and VI:2, WTO Agreement Article XVI:4, Panel majority said that these claims are
    "dependent upon a violation of Articles 2.4 and/or 2.4.2" and thus it also rejected these
    dependent claims. See paras. 7.289-291; with regard to the claims that the "Standard
    Zeroing Procedures" used by the United States in new shipper reviews, changed
    circumstances reviews and sunset reviews, Sections 771(35)(A) and (B), 731, 777A(d)
    and 751(a)(2)(i) and (ii) of the Tariff Act, and Section 351.414(c)(2) of the DOC
    Regulations are inconsistent with AD Agreement Articles 1, 2.4, 2.4.2, 9.3, 9.5, 11.1,
    11.2, 11.3 and 18.4, GATT Articles VI:1 and VI:2, WTO Agreement Article XVI:4, Panel
    majority said that the claims are "dependent upon a violation of Articles 2.4 and/or 2.4.2"
    and thus it also rejected these dependent claims. See paras. 7.292-294)
   Mexico - Rice AD Measures (AB) (Based on the provision in Article 68 of the Foreign
    Trade Act requiring "respondents, in order to obtain an administrative or changed
    circumstances review, to show that the volume of their exports to Mexico during the
    period of review was 'representative,'" Appellate Body upheld Panel's findings that Article
    68 is inconsistent, as such, with AD Agreement Articles 9.3 and 11.2 and SCM
    Agreement Article 21.2. See paras. 308-316)
   Mexico - Rice AD Measures (Panel) (Found that "by imposing th[e] additional
    requirement that interested parties requesting a review are required to always satisfy the
    authority that the volume of the export sales was representative, Article 68 of the Act is
    as such inconsistent with Articles 9.3 and 11.2 of the AD Agreement and, mutatis
    mutandis, Article 21.2 of the SCM Agreement." See paras. 7.243-260)
   Korea - Paper AD Duties (Panel) (Rejected Indonesia's argument that "Article 9.3 was
    violated because the single margin imposed on the single entity was higher than the
    individual margin calculated for Indah Kiat in the KTC's preliminary dumping
    determinations … ." See paras. 7.169-171)
   Argentina - Poultry AD Duties (Panel) (Rejected claim that the "variable" anti-dumping
    duties imposed violate Article 9.3. See paras. 7.345-367)
   U.S. - DRAMS (Panel) (Discussed in context of the de minimis margin provision under
    Article 5.8; held that the de minimis requirement of Article 5.8 does not apply to Article
    9.3 duty assessment procedures. See paras. 6.83-91)

      Article 9.3.2 (Prospective Duty Assessment)

   Mexico - Rice AD Measures (AB) (Noting that Articles 68 and 97 of the Foreign Trade Act
    "appear to impose a condition on duty assessment and changed circumstances
    reviews—that is, the completion of judicial proceedings—that is not provided for in" AD
    Agreement Articles 9.3.2 and 11.2 and SCM Agreement Article 21.2, Appellate Body
    upheld Panel's findings that Articles 68 and 97, read together, are inconsistent, as such,
     with AD Agreement Articles 9.3.2 and 11.2 and SCM Agreement Article 21.2. See paras.
     339-350)
    Mexico - Rice AD Measures (Panel) (Concluded that AD Agreement Articles 9.3.2 and
     11.2 make clear that in case the conditions set out there are met, "the authority is not
     allowed to reject such requests for reason that the judicial review of the measures in
     question is still ongoing"; therefore, found that Articles 68 and 97 of the Foreign Trade
     Act are inconsistent as such with AD Agreement Articles 9.3.2 and 11.2 and SCM
     Agreement 21.2 "by requiring the authority to reject requests for reviews until after the
     conclusion of the judicial review proceedings." See paras. 7.281-297)

    Article 9.4 (Other Exporters or Producers)

    Mexico - Rice AD Measures (Panel) (With respect to U.S. claim that the residual duty for
     Producers Rice should have been determined on the basis of the methodology described
     in Article 9.4, Panel said that Article 9.4 deals only with the issue of duty calculations
     where a "sampling" of producers/exporters is used, and does not apply in any other
     situations; since sampling was not used here, Article 9.4 does not apply. See paras.
     7.155-159)
    EC - Bed Linen, Article 21.5 (AB) (Discussed in the context of findings under AD
     Agreement Articles 3.1 and 3.2. See paras. 119-132)
    U.S. - Hot-Rolled Steel from Japan (AB) (Upheld Panel's findings that the U.S. statute is
     "on its face" inconsistent with Article 9.4, to the extent that it requires the inclusion of
     margins based in part on facts available in the calculation of the "all others" rate; also
     upheld Panel's finding of a violation in the context of the hot-rolled investigation, based
     on the application of the inconsistent U.S. statute. See paras. 111-130)
    U.S. - Hot-Rolled Steel from Japan (Panel) (U.S. statute is "on its face" inconsistent with
     Article 9.4, to the extent that it requires the inclusion of margins based in part on facts
     available in the calculation of the "all others" rate; given that the United States applied
     this statute in this investigation, also found that the investigating authority's calculation of
     the all others rate in the hot-rolled investigation violated Article 9.4. See paras. 7.75-90)

    Article 9.5 (Expedited New Shipper Reviews)

    U.S. - Zeroing (Japan) (AB) (Reversed Panel's finding that the United States does not act
     inconsistently with AD Agreement Articles 9.3 and 9.5 and GATT Article VI:2 by
     maintaining zeroing procedures in periodic reviews and new shipper reviews; found
     instead that the United States acts inconsistently with these provisions. See paras. 149-
     166)
    U.S. - Zeroing (Japan) (Panel) (Found that by maintaining simple zeroing procedures in
     the context of periodic reviews and new shipper reviews, the DOC does not act
     inconsistently with AD Agreement Articles 2.1, 2.4, 2.4.2, 9.1-9.3, 9.5, 18.4, GATT
     Articles VI:1 and VI:2, and WTO Agreement Article XVI:4 -- reversed on appeal. See
     paras. 7.189-224)
    U.S. - "Zeroing" of Dumping Margins (AB) (Declared "moot, and of no legal effect" the
     Panel's finding that Section 351.414(c)(2) is not inconsistent with AD Agreement Articles
     1, 2.4, 2.4.2, 9.3, 9.5, 11.1, 11.2, 11.3, and 18.4, GATT Articles VI:1 and VI:2, and WTO
     Agreement Article XVI:4. See paras. 235-242)
    U.S. - "Zeroing" of Dumping Margins (Panel) (With regard to the claims that the
     "Standard Zeroing Procedures" used by the United States in new shipper reviews,
     changed circumstances reviews and sunset reviews, Sections 771(35)(A) and (B), 731,
     777A(d) and 751(a)(2)(i) and (ii) of the Tariff Act, and Section 351.414(c)(2) of the DOC
     Regulations are inconsistent with AD Agreement Articles 1, 2.4, 2.4.2, 9.3, 9.5, 11.1,
     11.2, 11.3 and 18.4, GATT Articles VI:1 and VI:2, WTO Agreement Article XVI:4, Panel
     majority said that the claims are "dependent upon a violation of Articles 2.4 and/or 2.4.2"
     and thus it also rejected these dependent claims. See paras. 7.292-294)
    Mexico - Rice AD Measures (AB) (Based on the requirement of Article 89D of the Foreign
     Trade Act that "[p]roducers of goods subject to a final countervailing duty who exported
     no such goods during the period under investigation in the proceedings that gave rise to
     such duty may request the Ministry to initiate a procedure for new exporters with a view
     to assessing individual margins of price discrimination, provided that: … The requesting
     party shall satisfy the Ministry that the volume of exports during the period of review is
     representative," Appellate Body upheld Panel's findings that Article 89D is inconsistent,
     as such, with AD Agreement Article 9.5 and SCM Agreement Article 19.3. See paras.
     317-324)
    Mexico - Rice AD Measures (Panel) (Found that to the extent that Article 89D of the
     Foreign Trade Act "subjects the entitlement to a prompt review to a showing of
     representative volumes of export sales, it is inconsistent with Article 9.5 of the AD
     Agreement"; for similar reasons, the Panel considered that Article 89D is inconsistent
     with SCM Agreement Article 19.3, "as it imposes an additional requirement not provided
     for in Article 19.3 of the SCM Agreement for the exporters to be entitled to an expedited
     review." See paras. 7.261-269; with regard to the U.S. challenge related to expedited
     reviews under AD Agreement Article 9.5 and SCM Agreement 19.3, Panel stated that the
     United States "has provided insufficient evidence that Article 68 of the Act, or Articles 97
     of the Act or 366 of the FCCP deal with such reviews." See para. 7.299)

Article 10 (Retroactivity)

    Article 10.2 (Retroactive Application of Anti-Dumping Duties)

    Mexico - HFCS (Panel) (Mexico's retroactive application of dumping duties, despite its
     failure to reach an explicit finding on whether, in the absence of provisional measures,
     the effect of the dumped imports would have led to a determination of injury to the
     domestic industry, constitutes a violation of Article 10.2. See paras. 7.184-193)

    Article 10.4 (Refunds of Cash Deposits and Release of Bonds)

    Mexico - HFCS (Panel) (Having found a violation of Article 10.2, the Panel further
     concluded that "the failure expeditiously to release bonds and/or cash deposits collected
     under the provisional measure is inconsistent with Article 10.4 of the AD Agreement."
     See para. 7.193)

    Articles 10.1, 10.6 and 10.7 (Critical Circumstances)

    U.S. - Hot-Rolled Steel from Japan (Panel) (The U.S. statute governing critical
     circumstances, on its face, properly addresses the requisite issues and requires evidence
     therefore; rejected Japan's claim of an Article 10 violation in the hot-rolled investigation,
     finding that sufficient evidence existed with respect to critical circumstances. See paras.
     7.121-168)

Article 11 (Duration and Review of Anti-Dumping Duties and Price Undertakings)

    Article 11.1 (Remain in force only as long as and to the extent necessary to counteract
    injurious dumping)

    U.S. - "Zeroing" of Dumping Margins (AB) (Upheld Panel's finding that zeroing, as applied
     by the DOC in the administrative reviews at issue, is not inconsistent with Articles 11.1
     and 11.2. See paras. 165-169; declared "moot, and of no legal effect" the Panel's finding
     that the zeroing methodology used by the United States in administrative reviews is not
     inconsistent, as such, with AD Agreement Articles 1, 2.4, 2.4.2, 9.3, 11.1, 11.2, and 18.4,
     GATT Articles VI:1 and VI:2, and WTO Agreement Article XVI:4. See paras. 226-227;
     declared "moot, and of no legal effect" the Panel's finding that Section 351.414(c)(2) is
     not inconsistent with AD Agreement Articles 1, 2.4, 2.4.2, 9.3, 9.5, 11.1, 11.2, 11.3, and
     18.4, GATT Articles VI:1 and VI:2, and WTO Agreement Article XVI:4. See paras. 235-
     242)
    U.S. - "Zeroing" of Dumping Margins (Panel) (With regard to the claims that the
     "Standard Zeroing Procedures" used by the United States in administrative reviews or the
     U.S. practice or methodology of zeroing, Sections 771(35)(A) and (B), 731, 777A(d) and
     751(a)(2)(i) and (ii) of the Tariff Act, and Section 351.414(c)(2) of the DOC Regulations
     are inconsistent with AD Agreement Articles 1, 2.4, 2.4.2, 9.3, 11.1, 11.2 and 18.4, GATT
     Articles VI:1 and VI:2, WTO Agreement Article XVI:4, Panel majority said that these
     claims are "dependent upon a violation of Articles 2.4 and/or 2.4.2" and thus it also
     rejected these dependent claims. See paras. 7.289-291; with regard to the claims that the
     "Standard Zeroing Procedures" used by the United States in new shipper reviews,
     changed circumstances reviews and sunset reviews, Sections 771(35)(A) and (B), 731,
     777A(d) and 751(a)(2)(i) and (ii) of the Tariff Act, and Section 351.414(c)(2) of the DOC
     Regulations are inconsistent with AD Agreement Articles 1, 2.4, 2.4.2, 9.3, 9.5, 11.1,
     11.2, 11.3 and 18.4, GATT Articles VI:1 and VI:2, WTO Agreement Article XVI:4, Panel
     majority said that the claims are "dependent upon a violation of Articles 2.4 and/or 2.4.2"
     and thus it also rejected these dependent claims. See paras. 7.292-294)
    U.S. - OCTG AD Measures (Panel) (Found that 19 U.S.C. §§ 1675a(a)(1) and (5) are not
     inconsistent with AD Agreement Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.7, 3.8, 11.1 and 11.3 in relation to
     the determination of whether injury is likely to continue or recur. See paras. 7.84-108)
    U.S. - Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review (Panel) (Rejected argument that the
     same evidentiary standards that apply to the self-initiation of original investigations under
     Article 5.6 also apply to the self-initiation of sunset reviews under Article 11.3; therefore,
     found that U.S. statute and regulation at issue are not inconsistent with Article 11.3, nor
     with Articles 11.1, 12.1, 12.3, and 5.6, in respect of the evidentiary standards applicable
     to the self-initiation of sunset reviews and that the United States did not act inconsistently
     with the AD Agreement by automatically self-initiating the instant sunset review. See
     paras. 7.11-57)
    EC - Pipe Fittings (Panel) (Found that Brazil did not establish that the European
     Communities violated Articles 11.1 or 11.2 "by imposing definitive anti-dumping
     measures in this case or by not, simultaneously with that imposition, self-initiating a
     review following the devaluation of Brazil's currency … at the beginning of the fourth
     quarter of the [investigation period]." See paras. 7.109-120)

    Article 11.2 (Authorities shall review the need for the continued imposition of the duty)

    U.S. - Zeroing (Japan) (Panel) (After concluding that Japan has failed to adduce
     evidence necessary to establish that a rule, norm or standard of general and prospective
     application exists by virtue of which the DOC relies on margins of dumping calculated in
     prior proceedings to support its determinations in changed circumstances reviews and
     sunset reviews, Panel found that Japan has failed to make a prima facie case that by
     maintaining zeroing procedures in the context of these reviews the DOC acts
     inconsistently with AD Agreement Articles 2 and 11. See paras. 7.230-244)
    U.S. - "Zeroing" of Dumping Margins (AB) (Upheld Panel's finding that zeroing, as applied
     by the DOC in the administrative reviews at issue, is not inconsistent with Articles 11.1
     and 11.2. See paras. 165-169; declared "moot, and of no legal effect" the Panel's finding
     that the zeroing methodology used by the United States in administrative reviews is not
     inconsistent, as such, with AD Agreement Articles 1, 2.4, 2.4.2, 9.3, 11.1, 11.2, and 18.4,
     GATT Articles VI:1 and VI:2, and WTO Agreement Article XVI:4. See paras. 226-227;
    declared "moot, and of no legal effect" the Panel's finding that Section 351.414(c)(2) is
    not inconsistent with AD Agreement Articles 1, 2.4, 2.4.2, 9.3, 9.5, 11.1, 11.2, 11.3, and
    18.4, GATT Articles VI:1 and VI:2, and WTO Agreement Article XVI:4. See paras. 235-
    242)
   U.S. - "Zeroing" of Dumping Margins (Panel) (With regard to the claims that the
    "Standard Zeroing Procedures" used by the United States in administrative reviews or the
    U.S. practice or methodology of zeroing, Sections 771(35)(A) and (B), 731, 777A(d) and
    751(a)(2)(i) and (ii) of the Tariff Act, and Section 351.414(c)(2) of the DOC Regulations
    are inconsistent with AD Agreement Articles 1, 2.4, 2.4.2, 9.3, 11.1, 11.2 and 18.4, GATT
    Articles VI:1 and VI:2, WTO Agreement Article XVI:4, Panel majority said that these
    claims are "dependent upon a violation of Articles 2.4 and/or 2.4.2" and thus it also
    rejected these dependent claims. See paras. 7.289-291; with regard to the claims that the
    "Standard Zeroing Procedures" used by the United States in new shipper reviews,
    changed circumstances reviews and sunset reviews, Sections 771(35)(A) and (B), 731,
    777A(d) and 751(a)(2)(i) and (ii) of the Tariff Act, and Section 351.414(c)(2) of the DOC
    Regulations are inconsistent with AD Agreement Articles 1, 2.4, 2.4.2, 9.3, 9.5, 11.1,
    11.2, 11.3 and 18.4, GATT Articles VI:1 and VI:2, WTO Agreement Article XVI:4, Panel
    majority said that the claims are "dependent upon a violation of Articles 2.4 and/or 2.4.2"
    and thus it also rejected these dependent claims. See paras. 7.292-294)
   Mexico - Rice AD Measures (AB) (Based on the provision in Article 68 of the Foreign
    Trade Act requiring "respondents, in order to obtain an administrative or changed
    circumstances review, to show that the volume of their exports to Mexico during the
    period of review was 'representative,'" Appellate Body upheld Panel's findings that Article
    68 is inconsistent, as such, with AD Agreement Articles 9.3 and 11.2 and SCM
    Agreement Article 21.2. See paras. 308-316; noting that Articles 68 and 97 of the Foreign
    Trade Act "appear to impose a condition on duty assessment and changed
    circumstances reviews—that is, the completion of judicial proceedings—that is not
    provided for in" AD Agreement Articles 9.3.2 and 11.2 and SCM Agreement Article 21.2,
    Appellate Body upheld Panel's findings that Articles 68 and 97, read together, are
    inconsistent, as such, with AD Agreement Articles 9.3.2 and 11.2 and SCM Agreement
    Article 21.2. See paras. 339-350)
   Mexico - Rice AD Measures (Panel) (Found that "by imposing th[e] additional
    requirement that interested parties requesting a review are required to always satisfy the
    authority that the volume of the export sales was representative, Article 68 of the Act is
    as such inconsistent with Articles 9.3 and 11.2 of the AD Agreement and, mutatis
    mutandis, Article 21.2 of the SCM Agreement." See paras. 7.243-260; concluded that AD
    Agreement Articles 9.3.2 and 11.2 make clear that in case the conditions set out there
    are met, "the authority is not allowed to reject such requests for reason that the judicial
    review of the measures in question is still ongoing"; therefore, found that Articles 68 and
    97 of the Foreign Trade Act are inconsistent as such with AD Agreement Articles 9.3.2
    and 11.2 and SCM Agreement 21.2 "by requiring the authority to reject requests for
    reviews until after the conclusion of the judicial review proceedings." See paras. 7.281-
    297)
   U.S. - OCTG AD Measures (Panel) (Concluded that the DOC did not act inconsistently
    with Article 11.2 "in determining not to revoke the anti-dumping duty in the fourth
    administrative review." See paras. 7.152-177)
   EC - Pipe Fittings (Panel) (Found that Brazil did not establish that the European
    Communities violated Articles 11.1 or 11.2 "by imposing definitive anti-dumping
    measures in this case or by not, simultaneously with that imposition, self-initiating a
    review following the devaluation of Brazil's currency … at the beginning of the fourth
    quarter of the [investigation period]." See paras. 7.109-120)
   U.S. - DRAMS (Panel) (Panel rejected Korea's claim that AD Agreement Article 11.2
    requires revocation as soon as an exporter is found to have ceased dumping, and also its
    claim that the continuation of an anti-dumping duty is precluded a priori in any
    circumstances other than where there is present dumping. See paras. 6.24-34; rejected
    the U.S. "not likely" standard as inconsistent with the "necessity" requirement in Article
     11.2. See paras. 6.35-51; finding a U.S. certification requirement to be non-mandatory,
     the Panel rejected Korea's challenge to it under Article 11. See paras. 6.52-53; rejected
     Korea's challenge to (1) the U.S. authority's alleged failure to self-initiate a review in the
     DRAMS investigation and (2) the absence in the statute of any provision for self-initiation.
     See paras. 6.56-62)

    Article 11.3 (Five Year/"Sunset" Review)

    U.S. - OCTG Sunset Reviews, Article 21.5 (AB) (Appellate Body noted that under the
     amended waiver provisions, "a company-specific finding is not based on an assumption
     but, rather, on a statement by the waiving exporter indicating that it is likely to dump if the
     order were revoked or the investigation terminated"; moreover, the amended waiver
     provisions "do not preclude the USDOC from considering other evidence on the record of
     the sunset review" as part of its order-wide determination; therefore, Appellate Body
     reversed Panel's finding that Section 751(c)(4)(B) of the Tariff Act, operating in
     conjunction with Section 751(c)(4)(A) of the Tariff Act and Section 351.218(d)(2) of the
     Regulations, is inconsistent with AD Agreement Article 11.3. See paras. 87-122; upheld
     Panel's finding that the DOC did not act inconsistently with AD Agreement Articles 11.3
     and 11.4 "by developing a new factual basis pertaining to the original review period for
     purposes of its Section 129 Determination." See paras. 153-175)
    U.S. - OCTG Sunset Reviews, Article 21.5 (Panel) (Said that given that Section
     751(c)(4)(B) requires the DOC to make an affirmative likelihood determination for
     individual exporters who waive their right to participate, the Panel said "it seems to us
     that such company-specific determinations would necessarily have a significant impact
     on, or even determine, the outcome of the USDOC's order-wide determination"; thus, it
     concluded that "in every sunset review involving multiple exporters the USDOC will have
     to find likelihood on an order-wide basis if one exporter waives its right to participate,
     because otherwise the USDOC would have found no likelihood with respect to the
     exporters who waive their right to participate"; concluded that having found that the U.S.
     statutory and regulatory waiver provisions "may, in some situations, preclude the USDOC
     from making a reasoned determination of likelihood of continuation or recurrence of
     dumping based on an adequate factual foundation," Section 751(c)(4)(B) of the Tariff Act,
     operating in conjunction with Section 751(c)(4)(A) of the Tariff Act and Section
     351.218(d)(2) of the Regulations, is inconsistent with AD Agreement Article 11.3 --
     reversed on appeal. See paras. 7.5-41; rejected Argentina's claim that the DOC acted
     inconsistently with AD Agreement Articles 11.3 and 11.4 "by developing a new factual
     basis pertaining to the original review period for purposes of its Section 129
     Determination." See paras. 7.43-60; recalling that it had found that "both factual
     foundations of the USDOC's order-wide likelihood determination with respect to the
     imports of OCTG from Argentina, i.e. its findings regarding likely past dumping and the
     volume of imports, lack a sufficient factual basis," Panel found that the DOC's
     determination is inconsistent with AD Agreement Article 11.3. See paras. 7.62-104)
    U.S. - Zeroing (Japan) (AB) (Reversed Panel's finding that the United States acted
     consistently with Articles 2 and 11 when, in the sunset reviews at issue in this case, it
     relied on margins of dumping calculated in previous periodic review proceedings using
     simple zeroing; found instead that the United States acted inconsistently with Article 11.3.
     See paras. 178-187)
    U.S. - Zeroing (Japan) (Panel) (After concluding that Japan has failed to adduce
     evidence necessary to establish that a rule, norm or standard of general and prospective
     application exists by virtue of which the DOC relies on margins of dumping calculated in
     prior proceedings to support its determinations in changed circumstances reviews and
     sunset reviews, Panel found that Japan has failed to make a prima facie case that by
     maintaining zeroing procedures in the context of these reviews the DOC acts
     inconsistently with AD Agreement Articles 2 and 11. See paras. 7.230-244; based on its
     finding that the AD Agreement does not proscribe simple zeroing in periodic reviews
    within the meaning of Article 9.3, the Panel found that the DOC did not violate AD
    Agreement Articles 2 and 11 in relying, for the purposes of certain sunset reviews, on
    margins of dumping calculated in periodic reviews on the basis of simple zeroing --
    reversed on appeal. See paras. 7.245-257)
   U.S. - "Zeroing" of Dumping Margins (AB) (Declared "moot, and of no legal effect" the
    Panel's finding that Section 351.414(c)(2) is not inconsistent with AD Agreement Articles
    1, 2.4, 2.4.2, 9.3, 9.5, 11.1, 11.2, 11.3, and 18.4, GATT Articles VI:1 and VI:2, and WTO
    Agreement Article XVI:4. See paras. 235-242)
   U.S. - "Zeroing" of Dumping Margins (Panel) (With regard to the claims that the
    "Standard Zeroing Procedures" used by the United States in new shipper reviews,
    changed circumstances reviews and sunset reviews, Sections 771(35)(A) and (B), 731,
    777A(d) and 751(a)(2)(i) and (ii) of the Tariff Act, and Section 351.414(c)(2) of the DOC
    Regulations are inconsistent with AD Agreement Articles 1, 2.4, 2.4.2, 9.3, 9.5, 11.1,
    11.2, 11.3 and 18.4, GATT Articles VI:1 and VI:2, WTO Agreement Article XVI:4, Panel
    majority said that the claims are "dependent upon a violation of Articles 2.4 and/or 2.4.2"
    and thus it also rejected these dependent claims. See paras. 7.292-294)
   U.S. - OCTG AD Measures (AB) (Disagreed with Mexico that there is a requirement to
    establish the existence of a causal link between likely dumping and likely injury in a
    sunset review determination under Article 11.3. See paras. 103-125; stated that where
    the likelihood-of-dumping determination is flawed, "it does not follow that the likelihood-of-
    injury determination is ipso facto flawed as well"; however, it added, "if a likelihood-of-
    injury determination rests upon a likelihood-of-dumping determination that is later found
    to be flawed, the former determination may also be found to be WTO-inconsistent, after a
    proper examination of the facts of that determination." See paras. 126-127; upheld the
    Panel's finding that the ITC's decision to conduct a cumulative assessment of imports in
    making its likelihood-of-injury determination was not inconsistent with Articles 3.3 and
    11.3. See paras. 144-173; emphasized that "when an authority chooses to cumulate
    imports in a likelihood-of-injury determination under Article 11.3," it may in some cases be
    necessary "for it to determine whether such a cumulative assessment is appropriate in
    the light of the conditions of competition in the market place"; in particular cases, it said,
    "a cumulative assessment of the effects of the imports may be found to be inappropriate
    and, therefore, inconsistent with the fundamental requirement that a determination rest
    on a sufficient factual basis and reasoned and adequate conclusions." See para. 171;
    rejecting claim under AD Agreement Article 2, Appellate Body said, "we do not see how a
    margin that the USDOC did not 'rely upon' could taint the USITC's and the USDOC's
    determinations in the context of the OCTG sunset review at issue." See paras. 179-180;
    found that the Panel "did not fail to comply with Article 11 of the DSU in declining to make
    a specific finding that the United States had no legal basis to continue the antidumping
    duties on OCTG from Mexico beyond the five-year period established by Article 11.3 of
    the Anti-Dumping Agreement." See paras. 183-190; found that "in assessing the
    consistency of the SPB, as such, with Article 11.3," the Panel "failed to make an objective
    assessment of the matter, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case, as
    required by Article 11 of the DSU"; accordingly, the Appellate Body reversed the Panel's
    finding that Section II.A.3 of the SPB, as such, is inconsistent with Article 11.3. See
    paras. 191-210; saw "no merit in Mexico's contention that the Tariff Act, the SAA, and the
    SPB, 'collectively and independently,' establish a standard that is inconsistent with Article
    11.3." See paras. 212-214)
   U.S. - OCTG AD Measures (Panel) (Concluded that "the SPB establishes an irrebuttable
    presumption [with regard to the determination of likelihood of continuation or recurrence
    of dumping], and consequently that Mexico has demonstrated that the SPB is, as such,
    inconsistent with Article 11.3 of the AD Agreement" -- reversed on appeal. See paras.
    7.9-64; concluded that "the sunset determination at issue is not consistent with Article
    11.3 of the AD Agreement because USDOC's determination that dumping is likely to
    continue or recur is not supported by reasoned and adequate conclusions based on the
    facts before it." See paras. 7.68-80; found that 19 U.S.C. §§ 1675a(a)(1) and (5) are not
    inconsistent with AD Agreement Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.7, 3.8, 11.1 and 11.3 in relation to
    the determination of whether injury is likely to continue or recur. See paras. 7.84-108;
    concluded that 19 U.S.C. §§ 1675a(a)(1) and (5) were not applied inconsistently with
    Articles 11.3 and 3 of the AD Agreement in the OCTG sunset review in relation to the
    time-frame for determining likelihood of continuation or recurrence of injury. See paras.
    7.109-112; concluded that the ITC did not act inconsistently with Article 11.3 in making its
    determination of likelihood of continuation or recurrence of injury in the sunset review at
    issue. See paras. 7.113-143; concluded that the ITC's determination in the sunset review
    of OCTG "is not inconsistent with Articles 3.3 and 11.3 of the Agreement because it
    involved a cumulative analysis." See paras. 7.145-151)
   U.S. - OCTG Sunset Reviews (AB) (Because the Panel did not "make an objective
    assessment of the matter" as required by DSU Article 11, Appellate Body reversed the
    Panel's finding that Section II.A.3 of the Sunset Policy Bulletin is inconsistent, as such,
    with AD Agreement Article 11.3. See paras. 190-215; upheld Panel's findings that the
    waiver provisions in Section 751(c)(4)(B) of the Tariff Act of 1930 and Section
    351.218(d)(2)(iii) of the DOC Regulations are inconsistent, as such, with AD Agreement
    Article 11.3. See paras. 224-235; upheld Panel's finding that the obligations in Article 3
    "do not apply to likelihood-of injury determinations in sunset reviews." See paras. 271-
    280; in response to Argentina's argument that Article 11.3, "in and of itself, imposes
    'substantive obligations' on investigating authorities to make their sunset review
    determinations in a particular manner, and that the Panel erred in failing to recognize the
    existence of these obligations," Appellate Body concluded: "We are not persuaded by the
    argument of Argentina that a likelihood-of-injury determination can rest on a 'sufficient
    factual basis' and can be regarded as a 'reasoned conclusion' only after undertaking all
    the analyses detailed in the paragraphs of Article 3." See paras. 281-284; upheld Panel's
    findings that AD Agreement Article 11.3 "does not preclude investigating authorities from
    cumulating the effects of likely dumped imports in the course of their likelihood-of-injury
    determinations, and that the conditions of Article 3.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement do
    not apply in the context of sunset reviews." See paras. 286-304; found that "the Panel did
    not err in its interpretation of the term 'likely' in Article 11.3 of the Anti-Dumping
    Agreement." See paras. 305-314; upheld Panel's findings that the ITC's likelihood-of-
    injury determination was consistent with Article 11.3. See paras. 315-352; upheld Panel's
    findings that the standard of continuation or recurrence of injury "within a reasonably
    foreseeable time," as provided in the U.S. statute and as applied here, is not inconsistent
    with AD Agreement Article 11.3. See paras. 353-364)
   U.S. - OCTG Sunset Reviews (Panel) (Found that "both affirmative and deemed waivers
    provisions of US law, i.e. Section 751(c)(4)(B) of the Tariff Act and Section
    351.218(d)(2)(iii) of the … Regulations, are inconsistent with the … obligation to
    determine likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping under Article 11.3 of the
    Anti-Dumping Agreement." See paras. 7.72-103; found that the alleged "irrefutable
    presumption" in Section II.A.3 of the Sunset Policy Bulletin is inconsistent with Article
    11.3 -- reversed on appeal. See paras. 7.129-173; found that Sections 752(a)(1) and (5)
    of the Tariff Act, and their application in the instant sunset review, are not WTO-
    inconsistent in respect of the "within a reasonably foreseeable" time-frame. See paras.
    7.174-193 and paras. 7.256-260; concluded that the DOC's determination in the instant
    sunset review is inconsistent with AD Agreement Article 11.3, regarding the likelihood of
    continuation or recurrence of dumping, because the factual basis of the DOC's finding
    that dumping continued over the life of the measure was "not proper" and because of the
    application of the deemed waivers provisions. See paras. 7.194-223; rejected Argentina's
    claim that instead of the "likely" standard contained in AD Agreement Article 11.3, the
    ITC, in the OCTG sunset review, impermissibly applied a "possibility" standard in respect
    of its determinations regarding the likely volume of dumped imports, the likely price effect
    of such imports and their likely impact on the U.S. domestic industry. See paras. 7.261-
    312; rejected claim that the ITC acted inconsistently with AD Agreement Articles 3.3 and
    11.3 in its use of cumulation in the sunset review, finding that cumulation is permitted in
    sunset reviews and is not subject to the conditions established under Article 3.3. See
    paras. 7.323-338)
    U.S. - Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review (AB) (Reversed Panel's legal
     interpretation concerning the use of past dumping margins as part of the "likelihood"
     determination in sunset reviews, concluding that such margins must be consistent with
     AD Agreement Article 2.4; however, concluded that it could not complete the analysis on
     this issue, due to insufficient factual findings by the Panel. See paras. 118-138; upheld
     Panel's finding that the DOC's use of an "order-wide" basis to make the "likelihood"
     determination did not violate AD Agreement Articles 6.10 or 11.3, either "as such" or as
     applied in the sunset review at issue. See paras. 139-163; was "unable to rule" on
     Japan's claim that the Sunset Policy Bulletin, as such, is inconsistent with Article 11.3 in
     respect of the factors considered by the DOC in reaching its likelihood determination;
     rejected Japan's claim that certain provisions of the Sunset Policy Bulletin, as applied in
     this sunset review, are inconsistent with Article 11.3 as regards the factors to be
     considered by DOC in making a likelihood determination in a sunset review. See paras.
     164-207)
    U.S. - Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review (Panel) (Found that the failure of the
     exporter at issue to raise concerns about the use of past dumping margins during the
     sunset review meant that the United States did not act inconsistently with Article 11.3 in
     relying on the past margins -- reversed on appeal. See paras. 7.172-184; found that the
     obligations in Article 3.3 pertain to cumulative analysis in "investigations" and that they
     are not also applicable to "sunset reviews," and thus concluded that "the United States
     did not act inconsistently with Articles 11.3, 3.3 or 5.8 in the instant sunset review by
     cumulating imports from Japan with imports from other countries without applying the
     negligibility standard set out in Article 3.3 and 5.8 for original investigations." See paras.
     7.89-105; concluded that the 2 percent de minimis standard of Article 5.8 "does not apply
     in the context of sunset reviews," and therefore the U.S. law and instant sunset review
     are not inconsistent with Article 11.3 or Article 5.8 in respect of the de minimis standard
     applicable in sunset reviews. See paras. 7.58-88; rejected argument that the same
     evidentiary standards that apply to the self-initiation of original investigations under Article
     5.6 also apply to the self-initiation of sunset reviews under Article 11.3, and therefore
     found that U.S. statute and regulations at issue are not inconsistent with Article 11.3, nor
     with Articles 11.1, 12.1, 12.3, and 5.6, in respect of the evidentiary standards applicable
     to the self-initiation of sunset reviews and that the United States did not act inconsistently
     with the AD Agreement by automatically self-initiating the instant sunset review. See
     paras. 7.11-57; concluded that Article 6.10 does not require "that the determination of
     likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping under Article 11.3 be made on a
     company-specific basis," and therefore found that "the United States did not act
     inconsistently with its obligations in this case by determining likelihood of continuation or
     recurrence of dumping on an order-wide basis." See paras. 7.192-208; rejected argument
     that the "not likely" standard in the U.S. regulations on sunset reviews is not consistent
     with the "likely" standard in Article 11.3. See paras. 7.209-239; rejected argument that the
     DOC's non-consideration of the information submitted by NSC near the end of the
     investigation period indicates that the DOC failed to properly determine likelihood in this
     sunset review, and the argument that the DOC failed to make a proper, prospective
     likelihood determination within the meaning of Article 11.3. See paras. 7.265-283)

    Article 11.4 (Provisions of Article 6 on Evidence Shall Apply to Reviews)

    U.S. - OCTG Sunset Reviews, Article 21.5 (AB) (Upheld Panel's finding that the DOC did
     not act inconsistently with AD Agreement Articles 11.3 and 11.4 "by developing a new
     factual basis pertaining to the original review period for purposes of its Section 129
     Determination." See paras. 153-175)
    U.S. - OCTG Sunset Reviews, Article 21.5 (Panel) (Rejected Argentina's claim that the
     DOC acted inconsistently with AD Agreement Articles 11.3 and 11.4 "by developing a
     new factual basis pertaining to the original review period for purposes of its Section 129
     Determination." See paras. 7.43-60)
Article 12 (Public Notice and Explanation of Determinations)

    Article 12.1 (Public Notice of Initiation)

    Mexico - Rice AD Measures (AB) (Concluded that the notification requirements in AD
     Agreement Articles 6.1 and 12.1 apply only to interested parties for which the
     investigating authority had "actual knowledge," and do not cover those for which the
     authority merely "could have obtained knowledge"; here, Appellate Body was satisfied
     that Economía sent questionnaires to all companies of which it had actual knowledge and
     thus did not violate Articles 12.1 or 6.1; thus, Appellate Body reversed Panel's findings
     that, with respect to the exporters that Economía did not investigate, Mexico acted
     inconsistently with Articles 6.1 and 12.1. See paras. 245-253)
    Mexico - Rice AD Measures (Panel) (Found that the investigating authority failed to
     comply with AD Agreement Articles 6.1 and 12.1 "as it failed to notify all interested parties
     known to have an interest in the investigation of the initiation of the investigation and of
     the information required of them" -- reversed on appeal; said that in case the authorities
     do not properly notify and inform the interested parties, they are "not permitted to apply
     the facts available to make determinations with regard to these interested parties," and
     thus, "by applying the facts available in the calculation of a margin of dumping for the US
     exporters or producers that were known or could reasonably have been known to the
     authority, Mexico acted in a manner which is inconsistent with Article 6.8 and paragraph
     1 of Annex II of the AD Agreement." See paras. 7.169-201)
    U.S. - Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review (Panel) (Rejected argument that the
     same evidentiary standards that apply to the self-initiation of original investigations under
     Article 5.6 also apply to the self-initiation of sunset reviews under Article 11.3; therefore,
     found that U.S. statute and regulations at issue are not inconsistent with Article 11.3, nor
     with Articles 11.1, 12.1, 12.3, and 5.6, in respect of the evidentiary standards applicable
     to the self-initiation of sunset reviews and that the United States did not act inconsistently
     with the AD Agreement by automatically self-initiating the instant sunset review. See
     paras. 7.11-57)
    Argentina - Poultry AD Duties (Panel) (Found that Argentina violated Article 12.1 by
     failing to notify the exporters in question of the initiation of the investigation. See paras.
     7.125-135)
    Guatemala - Cement II (Panel) (Interpreted this provision to require notification and public
     notice once the decision to initiate has been made, but not before the decision to initiate;
     here, the notice met the requirements of Article 12.1; viewed the "requirement" under
     Article 12.1 for the authority to "satisfy" itself of the sufficiency of the evidence as
     imposing a procedural obligation, rather than a substantive one, and it rejected Mexico's
     substantive challenge. See paras. 8.84-89)
    Mexico - HFCS (Panel) (The "summary of factors" required under Article 12.1.1(iv)
     cannot reasonably be read to establish a requirement that the investigating authority
     address, in the notice of initiation, the definition of the relevant domestic industry; here,
     Mexico's notice of initiation met the requirements of Articles 12.1 and 12.1.1. See paras.
     7.79-90)

    Article 12.1.1 (Contents of the Public Notice)

    Guatemala - Cement II (Panel) (Considered that all of the listed elements must have
     been included in the public notice to meet the requirements of Article 12.1.1; here, under
     the third element of Article 12.1.1, while Guatemala's notice included a legal basis on
     which dumping is alleged, it failed to refer to any factual basis for this allegation. See
     paras. 8.90-96)
    Mexico - HFCS (Panel) (The "summary of factors" required under Article 12.1.1(iv)
     cannot reasonably be read to establish a requirement that the investigating authority
     address, in the notice of initiation, the definition of the relevant domestic industry; here,
     Mexico's notice of initiation met the requirements of Articles 12.1 and 12.1.1. See paras.
     7.79-90)

    Article 12.2 (Public Notice of Determination)

    Mexico - Pipes and Tubes AD Duties (Panel) (Made no findings for the claim under AD
     Agreement Article 12.2, noting that "it is meaningless to consider whether the notice of a
     decision that is substantively inconsistent with the requirements of the Anti-Dumping
     Agreement is, as a separate matter, insufficient under Article 12.2." See para. 7.400)
    Korea - Paper AD Duties (Panel) (Stated that, "[g]iven that the KTC was precluded from
     including confidential information in the public notice by virtue of Article 6.5 and that the
     KTC's Final Determination and the Final Investigation Report were attached to the public
     notice," Indonesia failed to make a prima facie case with regard to the alleged violation of
     Article 12.2. See paras. 7.205-210; recalling that the information at issue was confidential
     and that Indonesia has not raised any claim under Article 6.5 regarding its confidentiality,
     explained that Article 12.2 "does not allow an IA to disclose confidential information in its
     public notice imposing a final measure," and it therefore rejected claims under Article
     12.2 and 12.2.2. See paras. 7.311-316)
    U.S. - OCTG Sunset Reviews (Panel) (Rejected both aspects of Argentina's Article 12
     claim, concluding, first, that the determination was consistent with Article 12.2 because
     when "viewed in its entirety" the memorandum's explanation of the treatment of Siderca
     is clear, and, second, that contrary to Argentina's implication "neither Article 12.2 nor the
     other paragraphs of Article 12 contain substantive obligations regarding the conduct of
     sunset reviews." See paras. 7.246-254)
    EC - Pipe Fittings (Panel) (Found that the European Communities did not violate Article
     12.2 by not including the issue of exploration of constructive remedies in its published
     final determination; found that the European Communities acted inconsistently with
     Articles 12.2 and 12.2.2 "in that it is not directly discernible from the published Provisional
     or Definitive Determination that the European Communities addressed or explained the
     lack of significance of certain listed Article 3.4 factors"; concluded that the European
     Communities did not violate Articles 12.2 or 12.2.2 in respect of information relating to
     export performance. See paras. 7.417-444)
    U.S. - Sheet/Plate from Korea (Panel) (No violation found on basis that Korea had
     established a claim only with respect to the substantive adequacy of the U.S.
     determination on this issue, and failed to establish that the United States did not provide
     a statement of reasons for its determination. See paras. 6.46-54)
    Mexico - HFCS (Panel) (The lack of any findings or conclusions on the authority's
     decision to impose duties on a retroactive basis was inconsistent with Mexico's
     obligations under Articles 12.2 and 12.2.2. See paras. 7.194-198)

    Article 12.2.2 (Public Notice of Conclusion of Investigation Shall Contain All Relevant
    Information on the Matters of Fact and Law and Reasons Which Have Led to the
    Imposition of Final Measures)

    Korea - Paper AD Duties (Panel) (Recalling that the information at issue was confidential
     and that Indonesia has not raised any claim under Article 6.5 regarding its confidentiality,
     explained that Article 12.2 "does not allow an IA to disclose confidential information in its
     public notice imposing a final measure," and it therefore rejected claims under Article
     12.2 and 12.2.2. See paras. 7.311-316)
    U.S. - OCTG Sunset Reviews (Panel) (Rejected both aspects of Argentina's Article 12
     claim, concluding, first, that the determination was consistent with Article 12.2 because
     when "viewed in its entirety" the memorandum's explanation of the treatment of Siderca
     is clear, and, second, that contrary to Argentina's implication "neither Article 12.2 nor the
     other paragraphs of Article 12 contain substantive obligations regarding the conduct of
     sunset reviews." See paras. 7.246-254)
    U.S. - Lumber ITC Investigation (Panel) (Noted the finding of a previous panel that "[a]
     finding that the notice of an inconsistent action is inadequate does not add anything to
     the finding of violation, the resolution of the dispute before us, or to the understanding of
     the obligations imposed by the AD Agreement," and the Panel said that it shared these
     views and "adopt them as our own"; therefore, the Panel said that it would "make no
     findings with respect to the alleged violations of" AD Agreement Article 12.2.2 and SCM
     Agreement Article 22.5. See paras. 7.38-42)
    EC - Pipe Fittings (Panel) (Found that the European Communities acted inconsistently
     with Articles 12.2 and 12.2.2 "in that it is not directly discernible from the published
     Provisional or Definitive Determination that the European Communities addressed or
     explained the lack of significance of certain listed Article 3.4 factors"; concluded that the
     European Communities did not violate Articles 12.2 or 12.2.2 in respect of information
     relating to export performance. See paras. 7.417-444)
    Argentina - Poultry AD Duties (Panel) (Found that it was "not necessary" to make findings
     under Article 12.2.2 where a violation of the AD Agreement's substantive provisions has
     already been found with regard to the factual circumstances at issue. See paras. 7.199-
     208, paras. 7.289-294, para. 7.326 and para. 7.366)
    EC - Bed Linen (Panel) (EC explanation of the basis for its determination was sufficient to
     meet the requirements of Article 12.2.2; rejected India's argument that the EC was
     required to give sufficient notice that it was applying Article 2.2.2 to calculate profit and to
     explain why it chose a certain alternative; disagreed that Article 12.2.2 requires any
     explanation relating to initiation to be set forth in the final determination notice. See
     paras. 6.239-261)
    Mexico - HFCS (Panel) (The lack of any findings or conclusions on the authority's
     decision to impose duties on a retroactive basis was inconsistent with Mexico's
     obligations under Articles 12.2 and 12.2.2. See paras. 7.194-198)

    Article 12.3 (Article 12 Shall Apply to the Initiation and Completion of Reviews Pursuant to
    Article 11)

    U.S. - Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review (Panel) (Rejected argument that the
     same evidentiary standards that apply to the self-initiation of original investigations under
     Article 5.6 also apply to the self-initiation of sunset reviews under Article 11.3; therefore,
     found that U.S. statute and regulations at issue are not inconsistent with Article 11.3, nor
     with Articles 11.1, 12.1, 12.3, and 5.6, in respect of the evidentiary standards applicable
     to the self-initiation of sunset reviews and that the United States did not act inconsistently
     with the AD Agreement by automatically self-initiating the instant sunset review. See
     paras. 7.11-57)

Article 15 (Developing Country Members)

    Article 15, first sentence (Special Regard to Developing Country Members)

    EC - Pipe Fittings (Panel) (Said that the second sentence of Article 15 provides
     "operational indications as to the nature of the specific action required" and "articulates
     certain operational modalities of the first sentence." See paras. 7.56-85)
    U.S. - Steel Plate from India (Panel) (Found that because there are no specific
     requirements for actions to be taken under AD Agreement Article 15, first sentence, this
     provision imposes "no specific or general obligation" on Members to undertake any
     particular action; therefore, rejected India's claim under Article 15, first sentence. See
     paras. 7.104-118)

    Article 15, second sentence (Constructive Remedies)
    EC - Pipe Fittings (Panel) (Concluded that the European Communities' failure to explore
     undertakings other than price undertakings did not violate Article 15; found that the
     European Communities' failure to explore possibilities of constructive remedies before the
     imposition of the provisional measure did not violate Article 15; found that contact by the
     European Communities with the Brazilian government in relation to constructive
     remedies, as opposed to the exporter itself, was consistent with Article 15. See paras.
     7.56-85)
    EC - Bed Linen, Article 21.5 (Panel) (Because the EC had not yet "applied" duties against
     bed linen from India, the Panel rejected India's claim of a violation of Article 15 based on
     an alleged failure to explore possibilities of constructive remedies. See paras. 6.247-261)
    U.S. - Offset Act ("Byrd Amendment") (Panel) (Rejected claim under Article 15, based on
     rejection of factual premise that the measure would lead to the rejection of price
     undertakings. See paras. 7.83-88)
    U.S. - Steel Plate from India (Panel) (Rejected India's claim under Article 15, second
     sentence, finding it clear that the possibilities of "constructive remedies" under this
     provision had been explored by the U.S. (in the form of discussions of a proposed
     suspension agreement). See paras. 7.104-118)
    EC - Bed Linen (Panel) (Article 15 requires an authority "to actively consider, with an
     open mind, the possibility of such a remedy prior to imposition of an anti-dumping
     measure"; here, the EC's "bare rejection" of a request for constructive remedies,
     particularly given that a desire for undertakings had been expressed by the exporters,
     constituted a violation of Article 15. See paras. 6.219-238)

Article 17 (Consultation and Dispute Settlement)

    Article 17.4 (Referring a Matter to the DSB)

    Mexico - Rice AD Measures (Panel) (Stated that, provided the panel request "concerns a
     dispute on which consultations have been requested, there is no need for the matter (i.e.
     the specific measures at issue and the legal basis of the complaint) as identified in the
     request for establishment to be identical to the matter on which consultations were
     requested"; here, concluded that "consultations were … held on the matter on which the
     establishment of a Panel was requested," and it therefore rejected Mexico's argument
     that the panel request "contains a number of violations of Agreement provisions which
     were not mentioned in the request for consultations and on which … no consultations
     were held." See paras. 7.38-45)
    Mexico - HFCS (Panel) (Because the U.S. panel request did not simply list the provisions
     at issue, but "also sets forth facts and circumstances describing the substance of the
     dispute" in a sufficiently detailed manner, it was sufficient to meet the requirements of
     DSU Article 6.2 and AD Agreement Article 17.4; AD Agreement Article 17.4 does not set
     forth any additional requirements with respect to the degree of specificity with which
     claims must be set out, above those set out in DSU Article 6.2. See paras. 7.6-18; also
     discussed in context of terms of reference, where U.S. claim against provisional measure
     was found to be within these terms. See paras. 7.44-55)
    Guatemala - Cement I (AB) (Under DSU Article 6.2 and AD Agreement Article 17.4,
     Members must identify one of the following three measures in a panel request relating to
     an antidumping investigation: definitive antidumping duties, the acceptance of a price
     undertaking, or a provisional measure; here, Mexico failed to identify one of the three
     measures, and therefore the Appellate Body reversed Panel's finding that the matter
     raised in Mexico's panel request was within its terms of reference. See paras. 57-89)
    Guatemala - Cement I (Panel) (The matter raised in Mexico's panel request was within
     the terms of reference, despite Mexico's failure to identify one of the three types of anti-
     dumping measures described in Article 17.4 -- reversed on appeal. See paras. 7.4-27)
    Article 17.5(i) (Allegation of Nullification or Impairment)

    Mexico - Rice AD Measures (Panel) (Panel said that U.S. allegations of violation are
     sufficient to indicate how nullification or impairment occurred; in any event, concluded
     that contentions of violation of Article 17.5(i) were dependent on allegations made against
     panel request, which it had already rejected. See paras. 7.46-48)
    Mexico - HFCS (Panel) (Rejected Mexico's argument that the U.S. panel request violates
     AD Agreement 17.5(i) because it fails to provide an explicit statement indicating how
     Mexico's final anti-dumping measure nullifies or impairs benefits; considered that Article
     17.5(i) does not require a complaining Member to use the words "nullify" or "impair" in a
     panel request; here, description of the factual and legal circumstances leading to
     allegations of violations of specific AD Agreement provisions was sufficient to meet the
     requirements of Article 17.5(i). See paras. 7.19-30)

    Article 17.5(ii) (Factual Basis for Panel's Examination)

    U.S. - Lumber AD Final (Panel) (Excluded from its consideration regression analyses that
     had not been part of the underlying investigation, even though the data itself had been on
     the record of the investigation. See paras. 7.31-43, as well as para. 7.168; by contrast,
     did not exclude certain charts, stating, it "is clear to us that these charts display in
     graphical form data which was before DOC during the course of the investigation." See
     para. 7.168)
    EC - Pipe Fittings (Panel) (Excluded certain evidence submitted by Brazil because it was
     not on the record of the underlying investigation. See paras. 7.28-36, fn. 156, fn. 169, and
     para. 7.174; referring to Articles 17.5 and 17.6(i), found that it is "required … to take into
     account all information upon which the investigating authority relied in order to reach its
     final determination, whether or not this information forms part of the non-confidential or
     disclosed record of the investigation or whether its consideration can be discerned from
     the published documents." See paras. 7.42-47)
    Egypt - Rebar from Turkey (Panel) (Because it was clear, and the parties agreed, that
     certain evidence at issue had not been made available to the investigating authority, and
     because consideration of this evidence would constitute an impermissible de novo
     review, the Panel said that it would not take this evidence into consideration "when
     reviewing the measures of the determinations and actions of" the Egyptian investigating
     authority. See paras. 7.15-21; Panel dismissed Turkey's challenge to Egypt's reliance on
     a document that had not been sent to Turkey or respondents, but had been made
     available to them as part of the public file. See paras. 7.110-113)
    EC - Bed Linen (Panel) (Discussed in context of Other Evidentiary Issues; refused to
     exclude a document submitted by the EC, explaining that, while AD Agreement Article
     17.5(ii) requires panels to consider only facts made available in conformity with the
     domestic anti-dumping investigation at issue, this provision does not require a panel to
     consider those facts only in the format in which they were originally presented to the
     authority; here, because the exhibit does not contain any new evidence outside the facts
     established in the investigation record, the Panel found no basis to exclude it. See paras.
     6.41-43)
    U.S. - Steel Plate from India (Panel) (Panel admitted affidavits submitted by India, finding
     that they did not constitute "new evidence," but simply served as an "expert opinion"
     about one of India's arguments. See paras. 7.10-13)
    U.S. - Hot-Rolled Steel from Japan (Panel) (Discussed in the context of the Exclusion of
     Certain Evidence; considered that, when examining a claim of violation of the AD
     Agreement in a particular determination, a panel may not consider facts or evidence
     presented to it, unless they had been made available in conformity with the appropriate
     domestic procedures to the authorities of the investigating country during the
     investigation; here, Panel refused to exclude evidence at the outset in light of the
     possible relevance of the evidence to Japan's claims under the GATT, which is not
     subject to the Article 17.5(ii) restrictions. See paras. 7.2-12)
    Thailand - Steel (Panel) (Discussed in the context of the Standard of Review; stated that
     "the 'facts' upon which the determination is based must be properly established in both
     the confidential and non-confidential record of the investigation" -- effectively reversed on
     appeal through the Appellate Body's findings under Article 17.6(i). See para. 7.52)
    Guatemala - Cement II (Panel) (Panel considered that its review of the evidence is limited
     by AD Agreement Article 17.5(ii) to "facts before the investigating authority" and,
     therefore, the Panel refused to examine any "new evidence that was not part of the
     record of the investigation." See para. 8.19)
    Mexico - HFCS (Panel) (The U.S. objected to consideration of a particular Mexican
     exhibit, arguing that it is not part of the record, and may therefore not be taken into
     account; Panel rejected this argument, stating that it was "satisfied, based on Mexico's
     arguments and submissions in this proceeding, that [the exhibit] is genuine, and may be
     considered in this dispute under Article 17.5(ii)." See paras. 7.106-108)

    Article 17.6(i) (Factual Standard of Review)

    U.S. - Lumber ITC Investigation, Article 21.5 (AB) (Noted that it need not answer the
     question of "whether there may ever be circumstances in which separate consideration of
     a single injury determination would be required in the light of the standards of review
     under the Anti-Dumping Agreement and the SCM Agreement," as "this is not such a
     case, and neither of the participants requests such separate consideration"; whether
     "such separate consideration is called for," it said, "may depend not only on Article 11 of
     the DSU and Article 17.6 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, but also on the substantive
     provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and SCM Agreement that are at issue in the
     dispute"; provided a detailed explanation of the requirements for panels reviewing
     determinations of domestic investigating authorities, including: (1) "[a] panel's
     examination of those conclusions must be critical and searching, and be based on the
     information contained in the record and the explanations given by the authority in its
     published report"; (2) "the standard of review to be applied in a given case is also a
     function of the substantive provisions of the specific covered agreements that are at issue
     in the dispute"; (3) "the panel's scrutiny should test whether the reasoning of the authority
     is coherent and internally consistent"; (4) "[t]he panel must undertake an in-depth
     examination of whether the explanations given disclose how the investigating authority
     treated the facts and evidence in the record and whether there was positive evidence
     before it to support the inferences made and conclusions reached by it"; (5) "[t]he panel
     must examine whether the explanations provided demonstrate that the investigating
     authority took proper account of the complexities of the data before it, and that it
     explained why it rejected or discounted alternative explanations and interpretations of the
     record evidence"; (6) when the inferences and conclusions of an investigating authority
     are challenged, "it is the task of a panel to assess whether the explanations provided by
     the authority are 'reasoned and adequate' by testing the relationship between the
     evidence on which the authority relied in drawing specific inferences, and the coherence
     of its reasoning"; on the facts of the case here, the Appellate Body rejected Canada's
     argument that the Panel "erred in identifying the appropriate standard of review to be
     applied in reviewing a determination of threat of injury, in particular, by identifying a lower
     standard for such determinations" and applying that "more deferential standard" here;
     however, considering all the evidence, concluded that "the Panel failed to comply with"
     DSU Article 11 "in the standard of review that it articulated and applied to assess the
     consistency of the Section 129 Determination with" AD Agreement Articles 3.5 and 3.7
     and SCM Agreement Articles 15.5 and 15.7. See paras. 89-140)
    EC - Pipe Fittings (AB) (Found that the Panel did not fail to assess whether the European
     Commission's establishment of the facts was proper under Article 17.6(i) and did not
     incorrectly interpret Articles 3.1 and 3.4 "by including Exhibit EC-12 within its assessment
    of the European Commission's evaluation of the injury factors listed in Article 3.4." See
    paras. 119-133)
   EC - Pipe Fittings (Panel) (Referring to Articles 17.5 and 17.6(i), found that it is "required
    … to take into account all information upon which the investigating authority relied in
    order to reach its final determination, whether or not this information forms part of the
    non-confidential or disclosed record of the investigation or whether its consideration can
    be discerned from the published documents." See paras. 7.42-47)
   EC - Bed Linen, Article 21.5 (AB) (Rejected India's claims that the Panel acted
    inconsistently with Article 17.6(i) by failing to seek information pursuant to DSU Article 13
    and by failing to "actively" review the facts. See paras. 165-171)
   Egypt - Rebar from Turkey (Panel) (Said that it would not engage in a de novo review of
    the facts. See paras. 7.8-14; also, after dismissing Turkey's claim under Article 17.6(i) --
    that the investigating authority failed to establish the facts properly and evaluate the facts
    in an objective and unbiased manner -- as outside the terms of reference, the Panel
    expressed doubts as to whether this provision can be the subject of a claim, since it sets
    forth the panel's standard of review in examining a matter. See paras. 7.134-142)
   U.S. - Steel Plate from India (Panel) (Because there is no conflict between Article 17.6
    and DSU Article 11 and because Article 17.6 supplements DSU Article 11, India's
    reference to DSU Article 11 in its discussion of the standard of review was proper. See
    paras. 7.1-7)
   Mexico - HFCS, Article 21.5 (AB) (Rejected a challenge to the Panel's application of the
    standard of review, disagreeing with Mexico's characterization of the issue as one of
    legal interpretation, and finding instead that the Panel had correctly applied the factual
    standard of review. See paras. 127-134)
   U.S. - Hot-Rolled Steel from Japan (AB) (Found no conflict between Article 17.6(i) and
    DSU Article 11, explaining "it is inconceivable that Article 17.6(i) should require anything
    other than that panels make an objective 'assessment of the matter'"; panels interpreting
    the AD Agreement must also follow the additional standards provided in Article 17.6(i)
    (proper establishment of facts and objective and unbiased evaluation), standards which
    the Appellate Body saw as effectively defining when investigating authorities can be
    considered to have acted inconsistently with the AD Agreement. See paras. 55-56)
   U.S. - Hot-Rolled Steel from Japan (Panel) (Described a two-step factual standard of
    review similar to that used by the Panel in Mexico - HFCS (see below). See para. 7.26)
   Thailand - Steel (AB) (Stated that "to the extent that the Panel examined the facts in
    assessing whether Thailand's injury determination was consistent with Article 3.1, we are
    of the view that the Panel correctly conducted its examination consistently with the
    applicable standard of review under Article 17.6(i) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement." See
    para. 137; reversed the Panel's interpretation of Articles 3.1 and 17.6(i), holding that
    investigating authorities may rely on confidential information not shared with the parties in
    reaching their determinations. See paras. 98-120)
   Thailand - Steel (Panel) (Discussed in the context of the Standard of Review and in the
    injury context in conjunction with AD Agreement Article 3.1; described a factual standard
    of review similar to that of the panel in Mexico - HFCS (see below). See para. 7.51; held
    that Article 3.1, read together with the standard of review established in Article 17.6(i),
    dictates that "the reasoning supporting the determination be 'formally or explicitly stated'
    in documents in the record of the anti-dumping investigation to which interested parties
    (and/or their legal counsel) have access at least from the time of the final determination,"
    and similarly the factual basis relied upon by the authority "must also be discernible from
    those documents" -- reversed on appeal. See paras. 7.130-151)
   U.S. - Sheet/Plate from Korea (Panel) (Adopted what it considered to be the approach of
    the panel in Mexico - HFCS (see below). See para. 6.3)
   Guatemala - Cement II (Panel) (See the Commentary section of the DSC; citing Articles
    17.6(i) and 17.5(ii), Panel said that it would limit its review of the facts to "facts before the
    investigating authority." See paras. 8.17-19)
    Mexico - HFCS (Panel) (Discussed in the context of claims regarding Sufficiency of the
     Evidence and the Examination Thereof; described its approach under Article 17.6(i) as:
     to examine whether the evidence before the investigating authority at the time it initiated
     the investigation was such that an unbiased and objective investigating authority
     evaluating that evidence could properly have determined that sufficient evidence of
     dumping, injury, and causal link existed to justify initiation. See para. 7.95)

    Article 17.6(ii) (Legal Standard of Review)

    U.S. - Zeroing (Japan) (AB) (Said that "there is no room for recourse to the second
     sentence of Article 17.6(ii) in this appeal" because AD Agreement Articles 2.4, 2.4.2, 9.3,
     9.5, and 11.3 and GATT Articles VI:1 and VI:2, "when interpreted in accordance with
     customary rules of interpretation of public international law, as required by the first
     sentence of Article 17.6(ii), do not admit of another interpretation of these provisions as
     far as the issue of zeroing before us is concerned." See paras. 188-189)
    U.S. - Zeroing (Japan) (Panel) (On the basis of its consideration of AD Agreement Article
     2.1 and GATT Articles VI:1 and VI:2, as well as AD Agreement Article 2.4.2, the Panel
     concluded that "it is permissible within the meaning of Article 17.6(ii) of the AD
     Agreement to interpret Article VI of the GATT 1994 and relevant provisions of the AD
     Agreement to mean that there is no general requirement to determine dumping and
     margins of dumping for the product as a whole, which, by itself or in conjunction with a
     requirement to establish margins of dumping for exporters or foreign producers, entails a
     general prohibition of zeroing." See para. 7.142)
    U.S. - Lumber AD Final, Article 21.5 (AB) (Having found that AD Agreement Article 2.4.2
     "does not admit an interpretation that would allow the use of zeroing under the
     transaction-to-transaction comparison methodology," Appellate Body said that "the
     contrary view is not a permissible interpretation of Article 2.4.2 within the meaning of
     Article 17.6(ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement." See para. 123)
    U.S. - Lumber AD Final, Article 21.5 (Panel) (Rejected Canada's interpretation of the
     phrase "margins of dumping" in the context of the transaction-to-transaction comparison
     methodology provided for in the first sentence of Article 2.4.2 and found that "the
     interpretation put forward by the United States is permissible" -- reversed on appeal. See
     para. 5.66)
    U.S. - "Zeroing" of Dumping Margins (AB) (Noted that it was "mindful of the standard of
     review" set out in AD Agreement Article 17.6(ii), but said that Article 9.3 and Article VI:2
     "when interpreted in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public
     international law, as required by Article 17.6(ii), do not, in our view, allow the use of the
     methodology applied by the United States in the administrative reviews at issue." See
     para. 134)
    Mexico - Rice AD Measures (AB) (With regard to Mexico's argument that Panel should
     have found that Mexico's interpretation concerning the "integration" of the data collection
     period was "permissible" under AD Agreement Article 17.6(ii), Appellate Body noted that
     the issue was "the manner in which Economía conducted the injury analysis," not the
     interpretation of a specific provision of the Anti-Dumping Agreement; furthermore, it said,
     "[i]t appears to us that the Panel's view is compatible with Mexico's own reading of the
     Anti-Dumping Agreement"; therefore, the Appellate Body concluded that Mexico's
     argument regarding Article 17.6(ii) "is without merit." See paras. 170-171)
    U.S. - Lumber AD Final (AB) (Rejected two U.S. arguments that the Panel had not
     followed the Article 17.6(ii) standard of review, concluding that the U.S. interpretation was
     not a "permissible" one and that the Panel had not, in fact, acknowledged that the U.S.
     interpretation was "permissible." See paras. 113-116)
    U.S. - Lumber AD Final (Panel) (A dissenting opinion found that the U.S. interpretation of
     AD Agreement Article 2.4.2 to allow "zeroing" was a "permissible" one under the Article
     17.6(ii) standard of review. See paras. 9.1-24)
    Argentina - Poultry AD Duties (Panel) (Discussed in Commentary section; in the context
     of claims under AD Agreement Article 4.1 and Articles 9.2 and 9.3, found that the
     interpretation by the Member complained against was "permissible," in the sense of
     Article 17.6(ii), and therefore there was no violation. See paras. 7.340-341 and para.
     7.361)
    EC - Bed Linen, Article 21.5 (AB) (In the context of findings under AD Agreement Articles
     3.1 and 3.2, found that the requirements at issue are not ambiguous, and they do not
     "admit of more than one permissible interpretation" within the meaning of the second
     sentence of Article 17.6(ii); therefore, said: "[t]his leaves no room, in this appeal, for
     recourse to the second sentence of Article 17.6(ii) in interpreting paragraphs 1 and 2 of
     Article 3." See para. 118)
    U.S. - Steel Plate from India (Panel) (Because there is no conflict between Article 17.6
     and DSU Article 11 and because Article 17.6 supplements DSU Article 11, India's
     reference to DSU Article 11 in its discussion of the standard of review was proper. See
     paras. 7.1-7)
    Mexico - HFCS, Article 21.5 (AB) (Rejected a challenge to the Panel's application of the
     standard of review, disagreeing with Mexico's characterization of the issue as one of
     legal interpretation and finding instead that the Panel had correctly applied the factual
     standard of review. See paras. 127-134)
    U.S. - Hot-Rolled Steel from Japan (AB) (Found no conflict between Article 17.6(ii) and
     DSU Article 11 and also noted the similarity between Article 17.6(ii) and DSU Article 3.2;
     said that Article 17.6(ii) confirms that the traditional customary rules of interpretation
     apply to the AD Agreement; recognized that the second sentence of Article 17.6(ii)
     "presupposes" that application of the customary rules of interpretation could give rise to
     two or more interpretations of some provisions in the AD Agreement; emphasized,
     however, that "a permissible interpretation is one which is found to be appropriate after
     application of the rules of the Vienna Convention." See paras. 57-62; concluded that the
     Panel did not err in its application of the standard of review under Article 17.6(ii) in its
     interpretation of Article 9.4. See para. 130)
    U.S. - Hot-Rolled Steel from Japan (Panel) (Explained that under Article 17.6(ii), it would
     first interpret the provisions of the AD Agreement in accordance with the principles set
     out in the VCLT, and it would then evaluate whether the interpretation by the investigating
     authority is one that is "'permissible' in light of the customary rules of interpretation of
     international law." See para. 7.27)
    Thailand - Steel (AB) (In the context of the Panel's findings under AD Agreement Article
     3.4, upheld Panel's initial interpretation of the provision under the customary rules of
     international law and the Panel's subsequent finding that Thailand's interpretation was
     not "permissible." See paras. 121-128)
    EC - Bed Linen (AB) (EC argued that the Panel did not establish that the EC
     interpretation of Article 2.4.2 was "impermissible," and therefore argued that the Panel
     acted inconsistently with Article 17.6(ii); Appellate Body rejected this argument, finding
     that the Panel properly interpreted Article 2.4.2 in accordance with international law and
     also found the EC interpretation not to be "permissible." See paras. 63-65)
    U.S. - Sheet/Plate from Korea (Panel) (Stated that it would first consider the appropriate
     interpretation of the AD Agreement in accordance with the principles set out in the VCLT;
     then it would determine whether the United States' interpretation was "permissible" in
     light of the customary rules of interpretation of international law. See para. 6.4)

Article 18 (Final Provisions)

    Article 18.1 (Specific Action Taken against Dumping Must Be in Accordance with GATT, as
    interpreted by AD Agreement)

    Mexico - Rice AD Measures (Panel) (Concluded that under Article 93V of the Foreign
     Trade Act fines may be imposed "only following a determination that the constituent
     elements of dumping or subsidization are present, and such fines therefore constitute a
     'specific action' related to dumping or a subsidy within the meaning of Article 18.1 of the
     AD Agreement and of Article 32.1 of the SCM Agreement"; in addition, found that "by
     threatening to impose fines on anyone importing the product subject to an anti-dumping
     investigation, Article 93V of the Act clearly provides for a specific action against dumping
     or subsidization which is not provided for in the AD or SCM Agreement"; thus, Panel
     concluded that Article 93V is inconsistent with AD Agreement Article 18.1 and SCM
     Agreement Article 32.1. See paras. 7.270-280)
    U.S. - Offset Act ("Byrd Amendment") (AB) (Upheld Panel's finding that the measure was
     a non-permissible "specific action against" dumping, in violation of Article 18.1. See
     paras. 224-274)
    U.S. - Offset Act ("Byrd Amendment") (Panel) (Found that the measure was a non-
     permissible "specific action against" dumping, in violation of Article 18.1. See paras. 7.7-
     51)
    U.S. - 1916 Act (AB) (Discussed in context of Applicability of GATT Article VI and the AD
     Agreement to the 1916 Act; considered that a "specific action against dumping" can be
     taken only when the constituent elements of "dumping" are present; moreover, concluded
     that it follows from this provision that GATT Article VI "is applicable to any 'specific action
     against dumping' of exports, i.e., action that is taken in response to situations presenting
     the constituent elements of 'dumping.'" See paras. 121-126)
    U.S. - 1916 Act (Panel) (Discussed in context of claims under the AD Agreement; based
     on violations of other provisions of the AD Agreement, Panel found violation of Article
     18.1. See para. 6.204, para. 6.231, and para. 6.264 of panel report in complaint by
     Japan)

    Article 18.3 (Temporal Application)

    U.S. - DRAMS (Panel) (Discussed in the context of the Terms of Reference claims; under
     the temporal restriction of Article 18.3, refused to review the U.S. 1993 scope
     determination in the DRAMS investigation. See paras. 6.10-17)

    Article 18.4 (Necessary Steps to Ensure Conformity of Laws, Regulations and
    Administrative Procedures)

    U.S. - Zeroing (Japan) (Panel) (Said that the "zeroing procedures" norm can be
     characterized as an "administrative procedure" within the meaning of Article 18.4. See
     para. 7.55; based on its rejection of the claims against simple zeroing under other
     provisions, Panel rejected claims under AD Agreement Articles 1 and 18.4 and WTO
     Agreement Article XVI:4. See paras. 7.171-175; found that by maintaining simple zeroing
     procedures in the context of periodic reviews and new shipper reviews, the DOC does
     not act inconsistently with AD Agreement Articles 2.1, 2.4, 2.4.2, 9.1-9.3, 9.5, 18.4, GATT
     Articles VI:1 and VI:2, and WTO Agreement Article XVI:4. See paras. 7.189-224)
    U.S. - "Zeroing" of Dumping Margins (AB) (Declared "moot, and of no legal effect" the
     Panel's finding that the zeroing methodology used by the United States in administrative
     reviews is not inconsistent, as such, with AD Agreement Articles 1, 2.4, 2.4.2, 9.3, 11.1,
     11.2, and 18.4, GATT Articles VI:1 and VI:2, and WTO Agreement Article XVI:4. See
     paras. 226-227; declared "moot, and of no legal effect" the Panel's finding that Section
     351.414(c)(2) is not inconsistent with AD Agreement Articles 1, 2.4, 2.4.2, 9.3, 9.5, 11.1,
     11.2, 11.3, and 18.4, GATT Articles VI:1 and VI:2, and WTO Agreement Article XVI:4.
     See paras. 235-242)
    U.S. - "Zeroing" of Dumping Margins (Panel) (Found that Sections 771(35)(A) and (B),
     731 and 777A(d) of the Tariff Act are not "as such" inconsistent with AD Agreement
     Articles 1, 2.4, 2.4.2, 5.8, 9.3 and 18.4, GATT Articles VI:1 and VI:2, and WTO
     Agreement Article XVI:4 with respect to the use of a "zeroing" methodology in the
     calculation of margins of dumping in original investigations. See paras 7.37-69; with
    regard to the claims that the "Standard Zeroing Procedures" used by the United States in
    administrative reviews or the U.S. practice or methodology of zeroing, Sections
    771(35)(A) and (B), 731, 777A(d) and 751(a)(2)(i) and (ii) of the Tariff Act, and Section
    351.414(c)(2) of the DOC Regulations are inconsistent with AD Agreement Articles 1,
    2.4, 2.4.2, 9.3, 11.1, 11.2 and 18.4, GATT Articles VI:1 and VI:2, WTO Agreement Article
    XVI:4, Panel majority said that these claims are "dependent upon a violation of Articles
    2.4 and/or 2.4.2" and thus it also rejected these dependent claims. See paras. 7.289-291;
    with regard to the claims that the "Standard Zeroing Procedures" used by the United
    States in new shipper reviews, changed circumstances reviews and sunset reviews,
    Sections 771(35)(A) and (B), 731, 777A(d) and 751(a)(2)(i) and (ii) of the Tariff Act, and
    Section 351.414(c)(2) of the DOC Regulations are inconsistent with AD Agreement
    Articles 1, 2.4, 2.4.2, 9.3, 9.5, 11.1, 11.2, 11.3 and 18.4, GATT Articles VI:1 and VI:2,
    WTO Agreement Article XVI:4, Panel majority said that the claims are "dependent upon a
    violation of Articles 2.4 and/or 2.4.2" and thus it also rejected these dependent claims.
    See paras. 7.292-294)
   U.S. - Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review (AB) (Upheld Panel's findings that the
    measures at issue were not in violation of AD Agreement Article 18.4 and WTO
    Agreement Article XVI:4. See paras. 208-211; stated that, "[t]aken as a whole, the phrase
    'laws, regulations and administrative procedures' seems to us to encompass the entire
    body of generally applicable rules, norms and standards adopted by Members in
    connection with the conduct of anti-dumping proceedings." See para. 87)
   U.S. - Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review (Panel) (Because the Panel did not find
    any aspect of U.S. law to be inconsistent with the covered agreements, it did not find any
    violation of AD Agreement Article 18.4 and WTO Agreement Article XVI:4. See paras.
    7.311-315; in the context of the issue of the Use of Dumping Margins in Sunset Reviews,
    rejected claim that the Sunset Policy Bulletin is covered by the phrase "administrative
    procedures" under AD Agreement Article 18.4 -- reversed on appeal. See paras. 7.132-
    139)
   U.S. - Offset Act ("Byrd Amendment") (AB) (Based on violation of Article 18.1, found a
    violation of Article 18.4. See paras. 300-302)
   U.S. - Offset Act ("Byrd Amendment") (Panel) (Based on violations of Articles 18.1 and
    5.4, found a violation of Article 18.4. See paras. 7.89-93)
   U.S. - Steel Plate from India (Panel) (Discussed in context of Examination of U.S.
    "Practice"; stated that the "practice" challenged by India is not within the scope of
    measures that may be challenged under AD Agreement Article 18.4, which refers to
    "laws, regulations, and administrative procedures," stating, "we do not agree with the
    notion that the practice is an 'administrative procedure' in the sense of Article 18.4," since
    "[i]t is not a pre-established rule for the conduct of anti-dumping investigations." See
    paras. 7.21-22)
   U.S. - Hot-Rolled Steel from Japan (AB) (Upheld Panel's finding of violation of Article
    18.4 in context of claims under Article 9.4. See para. 129)
   U.S. - Hot-Rolled Steel from Japan (Panel) (Discussed in context of findings under
    Articles 9.4, 10, 3 and 4; where the Panel found specific violations of the AD Agreement
    by the measures on their face, it also found a violation of Article 18.4; where there were
    no violations by the measures on their face, there was no violation of Article 18.4. See
    para. 7.90, para. 7.150 and para. 7.199)
   U.S. - 1916 Act (Panel) (Based on its findings of specific violations of the AD Agreement,
    also found a violation of Article 18.4. See paras. 6.282-288 of panel report in complaint
    by Japan)

Annex I ("On-the-Spot Investigations" -- Verification)

   Egypt - Rebar from Turkey (Panel) (Rejected Turkey's argument that the investigating
    authority violated Article 6.7 and Annex I(7) by waiting until after the "on-the-spot"
    verification to raise certain cost issues. See paras. 7.322-328)
    Guatemala - Cement II (Panel) (Nothing in Annex I explicitly prohibits the inclusion on the
     verification team of non-governmental experts with a conflict of interest; noted, however,
     that "an impartial and objective investigating authority would not include
     nongovernmental experts with a conflict of interest in its verification team"; Guatemala
     violated Annex I(2) by failing to inform Mexico of the inclusion of non-governmental
     experts in the Ministry's verification team; rejected the argument that Annex I(2) requires
     authorities to inform exporting Members not only of the names of the experts, but also of
     the "exceptional circumstances" that the Member believes justifies including such
     experts; found that Annex I(7) permits an authority to request new information during
     verification, and rejected claim of violation of this provision. See paras. 8.184-198)

Annex II ("Best Information Available" -- Facts Available)

    Annex II (General)

    U.S. - OCTG Sunset Reviews (Panel) (Found that the DOC did not act inconsistently with
     AD Agreement Article 6.8 and Annex II in its use of facts available in the sunset review at
     issue. See paras. 7.237-245)

    Annex II(1) (Specification of Information Required)

    Mexico - Rice AD Measures (AB) (Upheld Panel's finding that "by applying the facts
     available contained in the application submitted by the petitioner in calculating the margin
     of dumping for United States exporters that Economía did not investigate," Mexico acted
     inconsistently with AD Agreement Annex II(1) and, therefore, with AD Agreement Article
     6.8. See paras. 258-261; noted that Article 64 of the Foreign Trade Act "does not on its
     face permit the agency to use any information that might be provided by a foreign
     producer or exporter, even if incomplete, where the use of such information would result
     in a margin lower than the highest facts available margin," "[n]or does it allow the agency
     to engage in the 'evaluative, comparative assessment' necessary in order to determine
     which facts are 'best' to fill in the missing information"; thus, upheld Panel's findings that
     Article 64 is inconsistent, as such, with AD Agreement Article 6.8 and Annex II(1, 3, 5,
     and 7), as well as SCM Agreement Article 12.7. See paras. 284-298)
    Mexico - Rice AD Measures (Panel) (Panel found that the investigating authority failed to
     comply with AD Agreement Articles 6.1 and 12.1 "as it failed to notify all interested parties
     known to have an interest in the investigation of the initiation of the investigation and of
     the information required of them"; said that in case the authorities do not properly notify
     and inform the interested parties, they are "not permitted to apply the facts available to
     make determinations with regard to these interested parties," and thus, "by applying the
     facts available in the calculation of a margin of dumping for the US exporters or
     producers that were known or could reasonably have been known to the authority,
     Mexico acted in a manner which is inconsistent with Article 6.8 and paragraph 1 of Annex
     II of the AD Agreement." See paras. 7.169-201; found that since Article 64 of the Foreign
     Trade Act effectively prevents the authorities from using the best information to replace
     the missing data, it "is inconsistent with Article 6.8 and paragraphs 1, 3, 5 and 7 of Annex
     II of the AD Agreement." See paras. 7.226-242)
    Egypt - Rebar from Turkey (Panel) (Rejected Turkey's claim that the investigating
     authority's request for supplemental cost information violated Annex II(1), noting that the
     request simply asked for follow-up information to the cost information that had been
     initially requested with the original questionnaire; stated that neither Annex II(1) nor any
     other provision precludes authorities from seeking additional information during an
     investigation. See paras. 7.318-320)
    Guatemala - Cement II (Panel) (Found that neither Annex II(1) nor any other provision of
     the AD Agreement prevents an investigating authority from extending the POI during the
     course of an investigation; concluded that, since Mexico had not advanced any argument
     that it was possible for the Ministry to have requested information concerning the
     extended POI before it actually did so, Mexico's claim that the Ministry's extension of the
     POI violated Annex II(1) must fail. See paras. 8.175-177)

    Annex II(2)

    U.S. - Hot-Rolled Steel from Japan (AB) (Annex II(2) is an expression of "good faith,"
     which restrains investigating authorities from imposing on exporters burdens which, in the
     circumstances, are not reasonable. See para. 101)

    Annex II(3)

    Mexico - Pipes and Tubes AD Duties (Panel) (Concluded that Economía acted
     inconsistently with Annex II, paragraphs 3 and 5, and thus Article 6.8, "when it decided to
     reject in their entirety the data that Tubac had submitted and to rely instead on facts
     available." See paras. 7.108-184)
    Mexico - Rice AD Measures (AB) (Noted that Article 64 of the Foreign Trade Act "does
     not on its face permit the agency to use any information that might be provided by a
     foreign producer or exporter, even if incomplete, where the use of such information would
     result in a margin lower than the highest facts available margin," "[n]or does it allow the
     agency to engage in the 'evaluative, comparative assessment' necessary in order to
     determine which facts are 'best' to fill in the missing information"; thus, upheld Panel's
     findings that Article 64 is inconsistent, as such, with AD Agreement Article 6.8 and Annex
     II(1, 3, 5, and 7), as well as SCM Agreement Article 12.7. See paras. 284-298)
    Mexico - Rice AD Measures (Panel) (Found that since Article 64 of the Foreign Trade Act
     effectively prevents the authorities from using the best information to replace the missing
     data, it "is inconsistent with Article 6.8 and paragraphs 1, 3, 5 and 7 of Annex II of the AD
     Agreement." See paras. 7.226-242)
    Korea - Paper AD Duties (Panel) (Explained that "during the verification the Sinar Mas
     Group clearly refused to submit corroborating information," and therefore said "we do not
     see how the domestic sales data submitted by the Sinar Mas Group could have been
     considered reliable and taken into consideration by the KTC"; in response to Indonesia's
     argument that the "completeness" of the domestic sales data "could have been verified
     through a comparison of the list of sales from Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli to CMI with the
     list of CMI's sales to independent buyers," said that this comparison could not verify the
     values of domestic sales; rejected Indonesia's assumption that the sole purpose of
     verification is to confirm the "completeness" of the data, noting that accuracy of the data
     is also important, and also rejected the argument that verification of sample transactions
     was sufficient; concluded that "the KTC did not act inconsistently with Article 6.8 of the
     Agreement and paragraph 3 of Annex II in disregarding the domestic sales data provided
     by Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli in determining normal values for these two companies." See
     paras. 7.57-72)
    Argentina - Poultry AD Duties (Panel) (Concluded that information submitted by
     Catarinense was not "appropriately submitted" within the meaning of Annex II(3) because
     Catarinense had not complied with Argentina's accreditation requirements; concluded
     that Frangosul's information was not supplied in a "timely fashion" under Annex II(3). See
     paras. 7.174-198)
    Egypt - Rebar from Turkey (Panel) (Held that Annex II(3) does not apply to an
     investigating authority's choice of particular "facts available." See paras. 7.306-309 and
     paras. 7.311-313)
    U.S. - Steel Plate from India (Panel) (DOC's decision to reject U.S. sales price
     information "lacked a valid basis" under Annex II(3); therefore, DOC acted inconsistently
     with AD Agreement Article 6.8 and Annex II, paragraph 3 in concluding, with respect to
     the respondent's U.S. sales information, that "necessary information" was not provided
     and in relying entirely on facts available in determining the dumping margin. See paras.
     7.34-80; U.S. statutory provisions governing the application of facts available are
     discretionary and therefore do not "on their face" violate Article 6.8 and Annex II,
     paragraph 3. See paras. 7.81-100)

    Annex II(5)

    Mexico - Pipes and Tubes AD Duties (Panel) (Concluded that Economía acted
     inconsistently with Annex II, paragraphs 3 and 5, and thus Article 6.8, "when it decided to
     reject in their entirety the data that Tubac had submitted and to rely instead on facts
     available." See paras. 7.108-184)
    Mexico - Rice AD Measures (AB) (Noted that Article 64 of the Foreign Trade Act "does
     not on its face permit the agency to use any information that might be provided by a
     foreign producer or exporter, even if incomplete, where the use of such information would
     result in a margin lower than the highest facts available margin," "[n]or does it allow the
     agency to engage in the 'evaluative, comparative assessment' necessary in order to
     determine which facts are 'best' to fill in the missing information"; thus, upheld Panel's
     findings that Article 64 is inconsistent, as such, with AD Agreement Article 6.8 and Annex
     II(1, 3, 5, and 7), as well as SCM Agreement Article 12.7. See paras. 284-298)
    Mexico - Rice AD Measures (Panel) (Found that since Article 64 of the Foreign Trade Act
     effectively prevents the authorities from using the best information to replace the missing
     data, it "is inconsistent with Article 6.8 and paragraphs 1, 3, 5 and 7 of Annex II of the AD
     Agreement." See paras. 7.226-242)
    Argentina - Poultry AD Duties (Panel) (Failed to see how Catarinense could be said to
     have acted to the "best of its ability" under Annex II(5); said that it cannot consider that
     Frangosul acted to the "best of its ability" in the sense of Annex II(5). See paras. 7.174-
     198)
    Egypt - Rebar from Turkey (Panel) (Stated that the phrase "to the best of one's ability"
     connotes a high level of effort; found that "an unbiased and objective investigating
     authority could have found that Habas, Diler and Colakoglu failed to provide necessary
     information in the sense of Article 6.8," and therefore Egypt did not violate Article 6.8 or
     Annex II(5) in resorting to "facts available" for these respondents. See paras. 7.143-266)

    Annex II(6)

    Mexico - Pipes and Tubes AD Duties (Panel) (Found that Economía "acted inconsistently
     with paragraph 6 of Annex II, and thus Article 6.8, by failing to inform Tubac that its data
     were being rejected and of the reasons for that decision, and by failing to provide Tubac
     with an opportunity to submit further explanations." See paras. 7.185-190)
    Korea - Paper AD Duties (Panel) (Concluded that the KTC did not act inconsistently with
     Article 6.8 and Annex II(6) "with respect to informing the Sinar Mas Group of its decision
     to reject the domestic sales data submitted by Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli and giving them
     an opportunity to make further explanations within a reasonable period." See paras. 7.73-
     86; found that the KTC "did not act inconsistently with Article 6.8 and paragraph 6 of
     Annex II in not giving either Tjiwi Kimia or the Sinar Mas Group another opportunity to
     submit information which had already been withheld from the KTC." See paras. 7.128-
     131)
    Egypt - Rebar from Turkey (Panel) (Concluded that "Egypt violated Article 6.8 and Annex
     II, paragraph 6, in respect of IDC and Icdas, because the [investigating authority], having
     identified to these respondents the information 'necessary' to verify their cost data, and
     having received that information, nevertheless found that they had failed to provide
     'necessary information'; and further, did not inform these companies of this finding and
     did not give them an opportunity to provide further explanations." See paras. 7.143-266;
     as a factual matter, found that the deadline given the respondents to respond to the
     August 19 request for additional information was "reasonable." See paras. 7.280-284;
     given that the September 23 letter constituted a "follow-up" request, Panel held that
     Turkey failed to establish a factual basis of violation of Annex II(6). See paras. 7.288-295;
     in light of its findings that the investigating authority did not violate Article 6.7 or Annex
     II(1) by waiting until after the completion of the "on-the-spot" verification before it raised
     certain cost issues, the Panel also rejected Turkey's claim under Annex II(6). See para.
     7.329; based on its factual finding that respondents did not "request" a meeting with the
     investigating authority, but merely "offered" to meet with the authority, the Panel rejected
     Turkey's claim of a violation of Annex II(6). See paras. 7.338-346)
    Argentina - Floor Tiles (Panel) (Argentine authority acted inconsistently with Article 6.8,
     read in conjunction with Annex II(6), in that the authority (i) did not inform the exporters
     why certain information supplied by them was not accepted; (ii) did not provide the
     exporters an opportunity to provide further explanations within a reasonable period; and
     (iii) did not give, in any published determinations, the reasons for the rejection of
     evidence or information. See paras. 6.12-81)

    Annex II(7)

    Mexico - Pipes and Tubes AD Duties (Panel) (Concluded that Economía "acted
     inconsistently with paragraph 7 of Annex II and Article 6.8 because in applying as facts
     available the normal value evidence that was provided by the applicant and used in
     Economía's initiation decision it failed to use 'special circumspection.'" See paras. 7.191-
     197)
    Mexico - Rice AD Measures (AB) (Noted that Article 64 of the Foreign Trade Act "does
     not on its face permit the agency to use any information that might be provided by a
     foreign producer or exporter, even if incomplete, where the use of such information would
     result in a margin lower than the highest facts available margin," "[n]or does it allow the
     agency to engage in the 'evaluative, comparative assessment' necessary in order to
     determine which facts are 'best' to fill in the missing information"; thus, upheld Panel's
     findings that Article 64 is inconsistent, as such, with AD Agreement Article 6.8 and Annex
     II(1, 3, 5, and 7), as well as SCM Agreement Article 12.7. See paras. 284-298)
    Mexico - Rice AD Measures (Panel) (Examining the record, Panel said that it found "no
     basis to consider that the authority made any attempt to check the applicant's information
     against information obtained from other interested parties or undertook the evaluative,
     comparative assessment that would have enabled the authority to assess whether the
     information provided by the applicant was indeed the best information available," nor did
     the investigating authority use the applicant's information with "special circumspection" as
     required by paragraph 7 of Annex II; thus, Panel found that the Mexican investigating
     authority calculated a dumping margin on the basis of facts available for the exporter
     Producers Rice in a manner which is inconsistent with AD Agreement Article 6.8, read in
     light of Annex II, paragraph 7. See paras. 7.160-168; found that since Article 64 of the
     Foreign Trade Act effectively prevents the authorities from using the best information to
     replace the missing data, it "is inconsistent with Article 6.8 and paragraphs 1, 3, 5 and 7
     of Annex II of the AD Agreement." See paras. 7.226-242)
    Korea - Paper AD Duties (Panel) (Rejected two claims that the KTC failed to use "special
     circumspection" in using information from secondary sources, but concluded that "the
     KTC acted inconsistently with Article 6.8 of the Agreement and paragraph 7 of Annex II
     with respect to determining financial expenses of CMI in the context of calculating the
     constructed normal values for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli." See paras. 7.95-111;
     concluded that the KTC acted inconsistently with Article 6.8 and Annex II(7) "by failing to
     fulfil its obligation to corroborate information obtained from secondary sources for
     purposes of calculating Tjiwi Kimia's dumping margin against other independent sources
     at its disposal"; regarding Indonesia's argument that "the magnitude of the margin of
     dumping calculated for Tjiwi Kimia also demonstrates that the KTC failed to exercise
     special circumspection," Panel said this does not "have a bearing on the WTO-
    consistency of the KTC's calculation as long as the calculation conforms to the relevant
    provisions of the Agreement." See paras. 7.121-127)
   Argentina - Poultry AD Duties (Panel) (Panel did not see the relevance of Annex II(7)
    since Brazil failed to explain how the exercise of "special circumspection" by the DCD
    would have remedied the fact that Catarinense failed to comply with Argentina's
    accreditation requirement; Panel did not see how "special circumspection," in the sense
    of Annex II(7), would have required the DCD to accept Frangosul's normal value data.
    See paras. 7.174-198)
   Egypt - Rebar from Turkey (Panel) (Concluded that "an objective and unbiased
    investigating authority could have reached the conclusion that 5 per cent was the
    approximate average monthly inflation rate in Turkey during the period of investigation"
    and, therefore, the investigating authority exercised "special circumspection" in its choice
    of facts available. See para. 7.296-305)
   U.S. - Hot-Rolled Steel from Japan (AB) (Upheld Panel's finding of a violation, under
    different reasoning; said that the requisite degree of cooperation in Annex II(7) is a "high
    one," such that interested parties must "act to the 'best' of their abilities"; based on the
    facts in the hot-rolled investigation, agreed with Panel's finding that the DOC's conclusion
    that the exporter at issue failed to "'cooperate' in the investigation did not rest on a
    permissible interpretation of that word." See paras. 98-109)
   U.S. - Hot-Rolled Steel from Japan (Panel) (Because an unbiased and objective authority
    could not have concluded that a particular exporter did not cooperate with the U.S.
    investigating authority, the U.S. use of adverse facts available violated Article 6.8 and
    Annex II(7). See paras. 7.61-74)

Applicability of

   U.S. - 1916 Act (AB) (Upheld Panels' conclusions that GATT Article VI and the AD
    Agreement apply to 1916 Act; focused on AD Agreement Article 18.1 and fact that 1916
    Act addresses the constituent elements of "dumping," suggesting that the 1916 Act
    provides for "specific action against dumping." See paras. 103-133)
   U.S. - 1916 Act (Panel) (Panels found that GATT Article VI and the AD Agreement apply
    to the 1916 Act, noting in particular the similarity between the definition of dumping in
    these agreements and the price discrimination test under the 1916 Act. See paras. 6.93-
    165 of panel report in complaint by EC; paras. 6.108-184 of panel report in complaint by
    Japan)

"As Such" Claims

   U.S. - 1916 Act (AB) (Upheld Panel's finding that anti-dumping legislation can be
    challenged "as such," outside the context of a specific application of the legislation. See
    paras. 51-81)
   U.S. - 1916 Act (Panel) (Discussed in the context of the Scope of the AD Agreement;
    anti-dumping legislation can be challenged "as such," outside the context of a specific
    application of the legislation. See paras. 5.15-27 of panel report in complaint by EC;
    paras. 6.82-91 of panel report in complaint by Japan)

General Obligations of Investigating Authorities/Interested Parties

   Egypt - Rebar from Turkey (Panel) (AD Agreement "appears to impose two types of
    procedural obligations on an investigating authority, namely, on the one hand, those that
    are stipulated explicitly and in detail, and which have to be performed in a particular way
    in every investigation, and, on the other hand, those that establish certain due process or
    procedural principles, but leave to the discretion of the investigating authority exactly how
    they will be performed"; for the first type of obligation, Panel said that investigating
    authorities are required to perform these obligations exactly as specified in the
    agreement on their own initiative; for the second type of obligation, Panel focused on the
    responsibilities of the interested parties to raise these issues properly. See paras. 7.1-3)

Standard of Review

  See Article 17.6(i) and Article 17.6(ii)

								
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