En ny fiskeriforvaltning

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					      Danish reflections on Right Based Management

         1. RBM as a way to economic efficiency

         2. RBM as a way to sustainability

Mogens Schou                         BS RAC 15. january 2008
  The role of public management

In fisheries policy we don’t just decide on the legal frameworks
- we actually manage fisheries.

I suggest

• That public management of fisheries has a more direct influence on the
  industry’s ability to make money than is the case in most other commercial

• That public management of fisheries has a more direct influence on the
  degree of sustainable utilization of the resources than is the case in most
  other commercial activities

We use a lot of effort and money
 - Do we get the best out of it - or can it be done better
    RBM model in Denmark

• ITQ for pelagic and industrial species.

• TVQ (transferable vessel quota shares) for demersal fisheries

• Allocation of rights - based on historic fishery of the individual vessel

• Restrictions
    •   Rights can be withdrawn with 8 years notice
    •   Concentration rules
    •   “Fisheries Fund”. A part of the quota shares are set aside for the coastal
        fishery, support of young fishermen etc.
    •   Restrictions regarding tradeabilty (GT follows the fishing right)
    RBM results in Denmark

•   Immediate reduction of fishing capacity.

•   Increase in earnings – due to rational fishery

•   Fishermen have startet thinking in economic terms:
      •   Improving value instead of quantity
      •   Investing in optimal production (new vessels)
      •   Getting new generations into the fishery

•   Structure - Fewer vessels
      •   In the Pelagic and industrial fishery: ”Big is efficient”
      •   Demersal: The clever fisherman wins – whether he is
          small or big.
      •   Fewer active harbours - the small ones are doing well
theme paper on

september 2007
Headlines in the theme paper

Fishermen becomes younger and earnings increase

New Regulation has induced trading of rights

Biggest investment activity ever

Fishermen choose private financing instead of the Fisheries Bank

Brothers have ordered a new construction at 6 million Euro

New Regulation gives better ships

Fishermen have an increased interest in investments

Vessels are being modernised

Incentives to invest have returned

The bank believes in the fishery
RBM as a way to sustainable fishery

General aspects

• Overcapacity has been an overwhelming EU concern for 2
  decades. With RBM it vanished as dew for the sun

• Echange of rights can eliminate ”forced” discard in mixed

• Uncertain if RBM induces more og less incentive to upgrade
  (Impsel project suggest a reduction)
RBM and the TAC/quota system

RBM ensures a balance between fishing 뤀            ty and fishing
possibilities, but fishing possibilities are not the same as
TAC/quotas. Fishing possibilities depends on

•   TAC/quotas
•   The abundance of fish
•   Discards/upgrade
•   Control efficiency

To take account of “overfishing” TAC/quotas are set at a lower
level than would be the case if fishing possibilities equaled
TAC/quotas. All fishermen are “paying” equally to cover the gap
between the two
Using RBM to obtain “added sustainability”

RBM’s defines a specific right for the individual fisherman. Is it
possible to define a specific responsibility as well? And can we give
the fisherman an incentive to accept that responsibility?

Based on statistics: fishermen fishing under given circumstances
(large meshed gear, certain areas etc) are given an increase in
their right – reflecting a statistically proven relationship between
fishing effort and TAC/quota that is better than average

Individual documentation: Fishermen that document what they
fish, are given an increase in their RBM that reflects their share of
the fishing mortality. Or in other words their share of the amount
of fish that has been calculated beforehand for “unsuitable
The perspective of added sustainability

TAC’s for cod in ICES areas III and IV in 2008

- Sum up to 84.000 tonnes

Expected catches of cod in the same areas in 2008

- Sum up to about 151.000 tonnes
Annex. Danish experiment 2008

  The aim of the experiment is to,
  • obtain total catch registration of all quota restricted stocks in the experimental area for
    each participating vessels
    avoid any discards of legal sized fish – possibly of undersized fish too
  • develop a model for obtaining precise biological data in order to improve advice
  • obtain better economic performance of the vessels
  • develop a documentation that meets market demands

  The experiment,
  About 5 RBM vessels conduct a normal fishery with the following supplementary conditions:
  • They must perform a total registration of all catches of quota restricted stocks in the
    experimental area and refrain from any discards of legal sized fish
  • To ensure this, the following monitoring system must be in place:
      • a monitoring system including GPS, cameras, winch or hydraulic sensor
        (See fishery monitoring at
      • deck layouts of the fishing vessels including calibration of bins
      • an electronic registration system – (enhanced E-logbook)

  The incentive,
  • Vessel participating in the experiment is given an increase in their RBM that reflects that
    all catches are accounted for.
  • An edge on the market for sustainable fisheries and a possible certification

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