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REPLY BRIEF
STATE OF FLORIDA
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Division o Archives, History
f
and Records Management
I N TEIE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA
THE CITY OF DAYTONA BJUCH,
a municipal corporation
organized and existing
under the laws of t h e State
of F l o r i d a ; McMILLAN AND CASE NO. 4 3 , 3 5 2
WRIGHT, I N C . , a Florida cor-
poration; and HARRY DOAN,
Petitioners,
-vs -
TONA-RAW, I N C . , a Florida
c o r p o r a t i o n ; TJ4E STATE OF
FLORIDA BOARD O F TRUSTEES
FILED
OF THE INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT MAY I 1 193
TRUST FUND; J. DONALD JAR-
RETT; and ELMO D. JARRETT,
Respondents,
and
THE: STATE OF FLORIDA,
Intervenor .
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONERS
ISHAM W. ADAMS
1 2 1 Broadway
Daytona Beach, Florida 32018
J . LEWIS HALL
Post Office Box 1228
Tallahassee, F l o r i d a 32302
J. LEWIS HALL - ATTORNEY AT LAW - TALLAHASSEE. FLORIDA 32302
I N D E X
Authoriti Cited This page
Preliminary Statement 1
Argument :
Point 1 2-8
Point 2 9-16
Point 3 17-20
C e r t i f i c a t e of Service 21
AUTHORITIES CITED
F l o r i d a Cases
Downing v. B i r d
100 SO. 2d 57 (Fla. 1958) 5
Hunt Land Holding C o . v. Schramn
121 So. 2d 697 6
M i a m i Beach v. M i a m i Beach Improv. Co.
14 So. 2d 1 7 2 (Fla. 1943) 4, 5
Miami Beach v . Undercliff Realty &
Investment Co ,
2 1 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 1945) 4 , 5, 7, 1 7
Zetrouer v. Zetrouer
103 So. 2d 626 6
Foreign Cases
Seaway Company v. Attorney General
375 S. W. 2d 923 (Tex. Civ. App)
S t a t e , ex r e l . Thornton v. Hay
462 P. 2d 6 7 1 (Oregon)
J. LEWIS HALL - ATTORNEY AT LAW - TALLAHASSEE. FLORIDA 32302
PEELIMINARY STATEMENT
This is Reply B r i e f to the briefs filed by respond-
e n t S t a t e of Florida and by respondent Tona Rama, Inc.,
J. Donald Jarrett and Elmo D. Jarrett.
The Statement of Points Involved in both briefs are
substantially similar t o t h e P o i n t s Involved as s t a t e d in
our brief and we will therefore p r e s e n t our argument h e r e i n
under the same Statement of Points Involved as previously
s t a t e d by us,
1
J. LEWIS HALL - ATTORNEY AT LAW - TAUAHASSEE. FLORTDA 32302
POINT 1
T! EVIDENCE I N THIS CASE SHOWS CON-
JE
CLUSIVELY THAT THE USE OF PETITIONER'S
LAND BY TJE PUBLIC WAS C O N S I S T E N T WITH
OWNER'S USES AND PURPOSES AND I N NO
WAY ADVERSE THERETO.
Plaintiff S t a t e contends that the City of Daytona
Beach did not comply with i t s charter requirements and
more specifically contends that permit for construction
of the observation tower could be granted only by enact-
ment of an ordinance by the City Commission.
The answer to this argument is that the City Commis-
sion in authorizing issuance of the permit acted in accord-
ance w i t h zoning ordinances duly enacted pursuant t o charter
authority .
The City was vested with zoning powers in its
charter. (R. 24)
Pursuant to this charter authority and in f u l l com-
pliance with prescribed procedures, the City enacted a
zoning ordinance containing specific provisions for AE Dis-
trict, in which district "ocean pier facilities and obser-
vation tower facilities ** and expansion or enlargement
of any such uses or facilities." (R. 120)
Subsequently Ordinance 67-200 above described was
amended in 1969 by Ordinance 69-103 to authorize construction
of giant slide facilities in AE District and t o l i m i t height
2
J. LEWIS HALL - ATTORNEY AT LAW - TALLAHASSEE, FLORXDA 32302
of o b s e r v a t i o n tower t o 150 f e e t and g i a n t s l i d e h e i g h t t o
50 f e e t above mean s e a l e v e l . ( R , 40-41)
Ordinance e s t a b l i s h i n g AE Zoning District and adopt-
i n g map showing ocean p i e r and lands of McMillan and Wright,
Inc, , are i n t h e Record, pages 2 2 , 27.
The zoning ordinance p r e s c r i b e s t h e procedure f o r
a p p l i c a t i o n f o r p e r m i t and for g r a n t i n g permit f a r uses
permitted i n AE D i s t r i c t (R. 1 2 1 ) and t h i s was t h e procedure
followed i n i s s u a n c e of permit f o r c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e tower.
Resolution 69-165 of t h e C i t y Commission, adopted
June 18, 1969, recited t h e application f o r p e r m i t , t e n (10)
days n o t i c e of and h o l d i n g of p u b l i c h e a r i n g and approved
the a p p l i c a t i o n , s u b j e c t only t o approval by Legal Department
as t o l e g a l q u e s t i o n s . (R. 110)
A f t e r some f o u r months s t u d y and c o n s i d e r a t i o n by t h e
C i t y Attorney of t h e l e g a l q u e s t i o n s and o b j e c t i o n s , i n c l u d -
i n g conferences and correspondence w i t h t h e D i r e c t o r of t h e
T r u s t e e s of t h e I n t e r n a l Improvement Fund and w i t h t h e
Attorney General of t h e S t a t e of F l o r i d a , a l l of which w i l l
be d i s c u s s e d more f u l l y i n a following s e c t i o n of t h i s B r i e f ,
t h e C i t y Commission by subsequent resolution d a t e d October
2 2 , 1969, amended Resolution 69-165 by deleting t h e c o n d i t i o n
of approval of t h e Legal Department, t h u s g i v i n g uncondition-
a l approval t o t h e a p p l i c a t i o n f o r permit t o c o n s t r u c t t h e
tower, (R. 114)
J. LEWIS HALL - ATTORNEY AT LAW - TALLAHASSEE. FLORIDA 32302
Thus it clearly appears from the record that the
C i t y had charter authority to establish zoning classifica-
tions, to prescribe permitted uses in the several zoning
districts, and prescribe procedures for administration of
the zoning ordinance.
The zoning ordinance was duly enacted, the classi-
fications established, the permitted uses enumerated and
the procedures prescribed for implementation of the ordi-
nance.
The action of the City Commission in approving the
application w a s n o t a legislative matter requiring legislative
action by enactment of an ordinance b u t an administrative
action pursuant to an existing ordinance and was appropri-
ately d e a l t with by r e s o l u t i o n s .
The a c t i o n of the Commission was lawful as to
authority, correct a s to procedure and proper in the exercise
of its discretion.
Plaintiffs rely on the cases of Miami Beach v, Under-
cliff R e a l t y & Investment Co., 21 So, 2d 783 (Fla. 1 9 4 5 ) and
Miami Beach v. Miami Beach Improv. C o . , 14 So. 2d 1 7 2 (Fla.
1 9 4 3 ) to establish the proposition that the p u b l i c may
acquire an easement by prescription.
This is not the issue in this case. The issue herein
is whether or not the public has acquired prescriptive ease-
ment t o the owner's land s o exclusive a s to prevent use of
4
J. 'LEWIS HALL - ATTORNEY AT LAW - TAUAHASSEE. FLORIDA 32302
c
some 230 square f e e t of i t s land f o r c o n s t r u c t i o n of an
o b s e r v a t i o n tower as a n i n t e g r a l p a r t o r enlargement of
a n e x i s t i n g s t r u c t u r e on owner's land.
The two c a s e s above c i t e d l a y down t h e same r u l e s
t h a t a r e s e t f o r t h i n Downing v . Bird, 100 So. 2d 57 ( F l a .
1958) which we r e l i e d upon i n our main b r i e f .
I n M i a m i Beach v. U n d e r c l i f f , s u p r a , t h i s Court s a i d :
"It i s t r u e t h a t i n e a r l i e r days preceding
t h e remarkable development of M i a m i Beach,
when i t had a s m a l l p o p u l a t i o n , many persons
used t h e beach f o r b a t h i n g , sunning and
o t h e r r e c r e a t i o n a l purposes. The f a c t t h a t
t h e upland owners d i d n o t p r e v e n t o r o b j e c t
t o such use i s n o t s u f f i c i e n t t o show t h a t
the u s e was adverse o r under claim of r i g h t .
It has n o t been shown t h a t t h e r e has been
an open, n o t o r i o u s , continued and u n i n t e r -
rupted use of t h e beach by t h e p u b l i c , i n
d e r o g a t i o n of t h e upland p r o p r i e t o r s ! r i g h t s
f o r a period of twenty y e a r s , o r f o r any
period.
And i n M i a m i Beach v, M i a m i Beach Improv. C o . , supra,
t h i s Court said:
"The use of t h e p r o p e r t y by the p u b l i c was
c o n s i s t e n t w i t h a p p e l l e e ' s ownership ***.I'
These two cases lay down t h e r u l e s t h a t were adhered
t o i n Downing as follows:
P r e s c r i p t i v e r i g h t can be a c q u i r e d only i f :
(a) The use i s open, n o t o r i o u s , continued
and u n i n t e r r u p t e d f o r t h e p e r i o d of twenty years
o r more and -
5
J. LEWIS HALL - ATTORNEY AT LAW - TALLAI-XASSEE. FLOFUDA 32302
(b) The use i s adverse o r under claim of
right, &
(c) The u s e i s i n d e r o g a t i o n o f and n o t
c o n s i s t e n t w i t h owner's i n t e r e s t , and
(d) Mere use of a beach f o r b a t h i n g , sun-
n i n g and o t h e r r e c r e t a t i o n a l purposes w i t h o u t
p r e v e n t i o n o r o b j e c t i o n by t h e Owner i s n o t s u f -
f i c i e n t t o show t h a t t h e use was adverse o r under
c l a i m of r i g h t .
Zetrouer v . Z e t r o u e r , 103 So, 2d 626, c i t e d by
respondent S t a t e simply s t a t e s t h a t p r e s c r i p t i v e r i g h t s t o
roadways may be a c q u i r e d by open, n o t o r i o u s and continued
u s e f o r twenty y e a r s , and i n Hunt Land Holding Company v.
Schrarnn, 1 2 1 So, 2d 697, a l s o c i t e d by respondent, t h e Court
s t r e s s e d t h e element of knowledge by t h e owner a c q u i r e d by
such owner by d e c l a r a t i o n s o r a s s e r t i o n s o r by use incon-
s i s t e n t w i t h owner's use and enjoyment of h i s l a n d s .
Respondents r e l y upon and quote from numerous c a s e s
f r o m other s t a t e s , Oregon, Texas, Massachusetts, Connecti-
c u t and o t h e r s t o support t h e p r o p o s i t i o n s that t h e beaches
belong t o t h e people t o t h e e x c l u s i o n of p r i v a t e ownership,
t h a t t h e burden i s upon t h e owner t o prove t h a t he o b j e c t e d
o r prevented use of h i s lands and similar p r o p o s i t i o n s , a l l
of which a r e i n c o n f l i c t w i t h F l o r i d a d e c i s i o n s .
6
J. LEWIS HALL - ATTORNEY AT LAW - TAUAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32302
c
a In Seaway Company v. Attorney General, 375 S . W. 2d
923 (Tex. Civ. App, 1964) c i t e d by respondents, t h e r u l e i n
Texas i s s t a t e d :
lfThousands of people a r e shown t o have
used t h e beach, JCJC-EC. Evidence shows
they used i t a t w i l l without asking per-
mission and t h e r e i s no evidence of any
o b j e c t i o n by owners.
The r u l e i s of course e x a c t l y opposite t o the r u l e i n
t h i s s t a t e as s e t f o r t h i n M i a m i Beach v . U n d e r c l i f f , supra,
as f o l l o w s :
"The f a c t t h a t t h e upland Owners d i d not
prevent o r o b j e c t t o such use i s n o t s u f -
f i c i e n t t o show t h a t t h e use was adverse
o r under c l a i m of right. I 1
The Oregon c a s e , S t a t e , e x r e l . Thornton v . Hay, 462
P. 2d 671, c i t e d by respondents, l a y s down a r u l e t h a t i s
t o t a l l y a t v a r i a n c e with innumerable d e c i s i o n s of t h i s
Court that e s t a b l i s h t h e r u l e of p r i v a t e ownership t o t h e
mean high w a t e r mark. The Oregon r u l e i s :
"The landowner's record t i t l e ( t o dry sand
a r e a of beaches) i s encumbered by a s u p e r i o r
r i g h t i n t h e p u b l i c t o go upon and enjoy
t h e land for r e c r e a t i o n a l purposes. (Paren-
t h e t i c a l i n s e r t supplied)
The c o n t e n t i o n of t h e Attorney General f o r t h e Oregon
r u l e i s b u t t r e s s e d by t h e argument o r observation t h a t t h e
people of F l o r i d a would welcome a d e c i s i o n upholding t h e
r i g h t s of t h e people t o such beaches f o r r e c r e a t i o n a l pur-
poses - we have t h e t e m e r i t y t o suggest t h a t t h e r e might be
0 7
J. LEWIS HALL - ATTORNEY AT LAW - TAILA€hUSEE, FLORXDA 32302
p e o p l e who have bought, p a i d f o r and improved t h e i r beach
property which would n o t be e x a c t l y p r o s t r a t e d w i t h j o y
over such a r e v o l u t i o n a r y d e c i s i o n and r a d i c a l departure
from our p r e s e n t concept of t h e r i g h t s t o p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y .
Other cases c i t e d f r o m o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s c o n t a i n
e q u a l l y g l a r i n g d i f f e r e n c e s and d i s t i n c t i o n s readily appar-
e n t without argument o r even comment h e r e i n .
8
POINT 2
THE C I R C U I T COURT AND THE D I S T R I C T
COURT OF APPEAL F A I L E D TO CONSIDER
AND GIVE E F F E C T T O THE DOCTRINE OF
COMPARATIVE I N J U R Y AND BALANCE OF
CONVENIENCE.
Our contention is that the doctrine of comparative
injury and balance of convenience is applicable to t h i s
case because the benefits to be derived by plaintiffs from
the judgment is the making awailable for recreational pur-
poses some 225 to 230 square feet of sandy beach, but the
loss to the owner is some $125,000.00cost of construction
of the tower plus the cost of demolition - o r in other words
the benefits are wholly disproportionate to the loss that
will be sustained under the judgment.
To this plaintiff-respondents present two arguments:
(a) That the owner knew of legal questions
and objections to the construction of the tower
but nonetheless proceeded with construction,
and
(b) That the owner will not suffer the entire
loss because it will have recouped a part of the
investment through profit in operation of the
tower,
We will now discuss these two arguments.
The respondents first contend that the owner knew of
the legal questions involved and quote an isolated paragraph
9
J. LEWIS HALL - ATTORNEY AT LAW - TALIAHASSEE, FLOFUDA 32302
o f the s t i p u l a t i o n as conclusive proof of t h e p o i n t .
The s t i p u l a t i o n r e l a t i n g t o t h e knowledge of Owner,
McMillan and Wright and Harry Doan, of q u e s t i o n s and ob-
j e c t i o n s r e l a t i n g t o c o n s t r u c t i o n o f the tower i s n o t e v i -
dence of "assumption of r i s k " o r "taking a chance" t h a t
p l a i n t i f f S t a t e and p l a i n t i f f competitor would have t h i s
Court b e l i e v e . (PCB 21-22; PSB 1 7 )
The s t i p u l a t i o n (Pg. 229-230) does s t a t e t h a t t h e
owner knew of q u e s t i o n s and o b j e c t i o n s made a f t e r a p p l i c a -
t i o n f o r permit and t h e a c t u a l beginning of c o n s t r u c t i o n of
the tower - b u t what respondents do n o t include i n t h e i r
argument i s the f u l l t r u t h as shown by the e n t i r e s t i p u l a -
t i o n and bv t h e record - which t r u t h and f a c t s a r e t h a t
when t h e q u e s t i o n s were r a i s e d and o b j e c t i o n s made t h e
o f f i c i a l s of t h e C i t y of Daytona Beach gave approval f o r
c o n s t r u c t i o n of the tower on t h e c o n d i t i o n t h a t the m a t t e r be
approved from a l e g a l s t a n d p o i n t by t h e C i t y Legal Depart-
ment. (R. 110)
Subsequent t o such c o n d i t i o n a l approval on June 10,
1969, t h e City Attorney c a r r i e d on correspondence w i t h M r .
Apthorpe, Executive D i r e c t o r of Trustees of t h e I n t e r n a l
Improvement Fund, and w i t h M r . F a i r c l o t h and h e l d personal
conference w i t h M r . Apthorpe, w i t h which M r . F a i r c l o t h w a s
10
J. LEWIS HALL - ATTORNEY AT LAW - T U K A S S E E , FL0RII)II 32302
familiar (R. 111-113) and received what the City Attorney
considered was a clearance of a l l legal questions and
objections so that on October 22, 1969, the City Commission
removed the above mentioned condition as to legal approval
from the resolution of approval, thus giving unconditional
approval for construction (R. 114), which approval was im-
plemented on October 2 3 , 1969, by issuance of building
permit. (R. 115)
Certainly the Owner was entitled to understand and
believe that the questions and objections, of which he had
knowledge, had been and were resolved prior to issuance of
the pennit.
Respondents insinuation that Doan rushed in, g o t a
permit, and started construction in the face of known
questions and objections, took a chance, assumed the risk,
acted in wanton disregard of public rights, is wholly at
variance with the record and stipulated facts. (Stip. pgs.
219-230)
The truth of course is, as shown by the stipulation
and record, that the owner waited for advertisement of
his application, public hearing thereon, and then waited
further time for the City Legal Department to clear up legal
questions and objections relating to ownership of the
lands, bulkhead lines, zoning classification and prescriptive
11
J. LEWIS WALL - ATTORNEY AT LAW - TALLAHASSEE,FLORTDA 32302
r i g h t s of t h e p u b l i c and f i n a l unconditional approval b y
t h e Commission, and then, f i n a l l y , issuance of t h e permit.
This b r i n g s u s t o t h e answer t o t h e argument (PCB 7;
PSB 2 2 - 2 4 ) t h a t n e i t h e r t h e l e t t e r from M r . Apthorpe n o r
t h e l e t t e r from M r . F a i r c l o t h c o n s t i t u t e a u t h o r i t y f o r t h e
action of t h e C i t y .
The b r i e f of t h e S t a t e argues t h a t Attorney General
F a i r c l o t h ' s l e t t e r r e s t r i c t s i t s coverage t o t h e a r e a be-
tween t h e low water mark and t h e high w a t e r mark (PSB 22-
2 4 ) , and a r g u e s t h a t t h i s w a s n o t t h e a r e a upon which t h e
tower was b u i l t .
This argument of course c o n t a i n s a l l the f a l l a c i e s
u s u a l l y achieved by quoting o u t of c o n t e x t - a technique
long ago d i s c r e d i t e d by t h e courts.
The l e t t e r s of M r . Apthorpe and M r . F a i r c l o t h must
be construed i n t h e l i g h t of t h e e n t i r e s i t u a t i o n as i t
e x i s t e d and w i t h t h e s e v e r a l q u e s t i o n s and o b j e c t i o n s re-
l a t i n g thereto.
The p l a i n t i f f s i n t h e Amended Complaint c l e a r l y
presented t h e c o n t e n t i o n t h a t t h e high water mark w a s t h e
wall which l i e s westward o r landward of the tower s i t e (R.
55) and t h e S t a t e more e x p r e s s l y a l l e g e d i n i t s Motion t o
i n t e r v e n e that''t.be c o n s t r u c t i o n i s upon t h a t p o r t i o n of
s a i d lands ** l y i n g e a s t e r l y ( o r oceanward) of t h e mean
12
J. LEWIS HALL - ATTORNEY AT LAW - TALLAHASSEE. FLOFUDA 32302
ligh water mark (R. 72; emphasis and p a r e n t h e t i c a l i n s e r t
;upplied)
The S t a t e also i n i t s Cross-Complaint a l l e g e d upon
information and b e l i e f that a l l of t h e lands l y i n g ocean-
lard from t h e seawall and on which t h e tower was c o n s t r u c t e d
J e r e sovereignty l a n d s . (R. 8 3 - 8 4 )
The purposes of t h e l e t t e r s t o M r . Apthorpe and M r .
? a i r c l o t h and t h e i r l e t t e r s i n r e p l y must be construed i n
:he l i g h t of t h e contentions t o be resolved, t h e q u e s t i o n s
10 be answered and the o b j e c t i o n s t o be r u l e d upon, and
the l e t t e r s must be construed t o g e t h e r .
Mr. Apthorpe's l e t t e r makes i t c l e a r -
1. N o s t a t e approved bulkhead l i n e marking
t h e l i m i t s of oceanward development i s involved.
2. I t i s h i s understanding t h a t t h e tower
s i t e i s landward of t h e mean high water mark.
3. The high water mark i s the boundary be-
tween s t a t e and p r i v a t e ownership.
4. The Trustees do n o t have a u t h o r i t y t o
g r a n t a permit landward of the high water mark.
5. The C i t y of Daytona Beach has j u r i s d i c t i o n
over t h e tower site
It i s obvious from t h i s l e t t e r t h a t i f t h e tower
s i t e i s above t h e high w a t e r mark t h e Trustees had no j u r i s -
d i c t i o n and t h a t t h e C i t y d i d have j u r i s d i c t i o n .
13
J. LEWIS HALL - ATTORNEY AT LAW - TALLAKUSEE. FLOFUDA 32302
M r . F a i r c l o t h ' s l e t t e r supplements Mrs. Apthorpe's
l e t t e r and makes clear -
1. That by a c t of t h e L e g i s l a t u r e (Chapter
67-1274) t h e C i t y has j u r i s d i c t i o n over t h a t
p o r t i o n of t h e beach l y i n g between t h e h i g h and
low water marks.
These two l e t t e r s make i t c l e a r t h a t t h e D i r e c t o r of
t h e S t a t e agency charged w i t h p r e s e r v a t i o n and c o n t r o l of
s t a t e o r p u b l i c lands and t h e Attorney General of t h e s t a t e
informed t h e C i t y t h a t t h e C i t y had j u r i s d i c t i o n over t h e
tower s i t e , w i t h o u t regard t o t h e high water mark and i f
the e x i s t i n g p i e r i s considered a concession, b u s i n e s s , e t c . ,
the C i t y could r e g u l a t e and l i c e n s e an a d d i t i o n t h e r e t o .
Considering t h e two l e t t e r s t o g e t h e r , t h e C i t y
Attorney could h a r d l y come t o any o t h e r opinion than t h a t
t h e C i t y had j u r i s d i c t i o n , t h a t t h e S t a t e w a s n o t involved
and above a l l e l s e , t h a t t h e S t a t e a s s e r t e d no c l a i m of
j u r i s d i c t i o n over t h e m a t t e r .
The l e t t e r s a l s o make i t clear t h a t t h e s e two s t a t e
o f f i c i a l s were f u l l y advised as t o t h e s i t u a t i o n and made
no claim of r i g h t by o r f o r t h e S t a t e .
W submit t h a t t h e C i t y Commission had every r i g h t
e
t o r e l y upon t h e l e t t e r s from M r . Apthorpe and M r . F a i r -
c l o t h and i s s u e t h e permit and t h a t t h e owner had every
r i g h t t o b e l i e v e t h a t a l l q u e s t i o n s and o b j e c t i o n s had
14
J. LEWIS HALL - ATTORNEY AT LAW - TALLAHASSEE,FLORTDA 32302
been resolved by t h e City and t h e S t a t e .
In t h e S t a t e ' s b r i e f o u r b r i e f i s quoted (pgs. 20-21)
as s t a t i n g t h a t t h e c a p i t a l investment of $125,000.00 tower
-
c o n s t r u c t i o n c o s t s w i l l be recouped i n f o u r or f i v e y e a r s .
Actually we s a i d a n t i c i p a t e d recoup in f o u r o r f i v e years -
and even t h a t was an overstatement of t h e record because
M r . Doan i n h i s testimony only said t h a t he had t h e hope
t h a t he might pay o f f t h e investment i n f o u r y e a r s . (R. 410)
Thus through t h e alchemy of lawyers' advocacy t h e hope of
M r . Doan i n t h e record i s transmuted i n t o p o s i t i v e f a c t i n -
the St a t e 's b r i e f .
What has happened - what t h e p r o f i t s have been - what
t h e l o s s e s will be under t h e judgment of t h e C i r c u i t Court
i s , a t t h i s time - i n t h e absence of f u r t h e r f a c t f i n d i n g
procedures - pure s p e c u l a t i o n - and t h e r e i s nothing s o un-
c e r t a i n of r e a l i z a t i o n as t h e hopes of investers and t h e
s p e c u l a t i o n and c o n j e c t u r e of lawyers.
Thus i t i s t h a t t h e f a c t s e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e record
a r e t h a t t h e b e n e f i t s of t h e judgment t o t h e p l a i n t i f f s i s
t h e rescue of some 230 square f e e t of beach sand and t h e
l o s s t o t h e owner i s t h e $125,000.00 paid f o r c o n s t r u c t i o n
of t h e tower plus t h e c o s t s of demolition of t h e tower.
W submit t h a t on t h e b a s i s of t h e record f a c t s and
e
t h e a p p l i c a b l e l a w of F l o r i d a as shown by t h e a u t h o r i t i e s
15
J. LEWIS HALL - ATTORNEY AT LAW - TALIAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32302
c i t e d and quoted i n our main brief, the Owner i s entitled
t o the b e n e f i t s of the doctrine of comparative injury and
balance of convenience.
16
J. LEWIS HALL - A'ITORNEY AT LAW - TALLAHASSEE. FLORIDA 32302
POINT 3
THE RECORD HEREIN DOES NOT JUSTIFY D I S -
POSING OF THE ISSUES HERJ3IN BY SUMMARY
JUDGMENT.
The Summary Judgment e n t e r e d h e r e i n was c o n t r a r y
t o law and v i o l a t i v e of the Rules of C i v i l Procedure
governing such judgments and t h e l i m i t a t i o n s thereon i m -
posed by t h i s Court i n numerous d e c i s i o n s .
I n M i a m i Beach v. U n d e r c l i f f , 2 1 So. 2d 783 (quoted
i n previous s e c t i o n of t h i s b r i e f ) , t h i s Court said:
If*** many persons used t h e beach f o r bath-
i n g , swimming and o t h e r r e c r e a t i o n pur-
poses. The f a c t t h a t t h e upland owners d i d
n o t prevent o r object t o such use i s n o t
s u f f i c i e n t - t o show that t h e use was adverse
- - - - -
or under c l a i m of r i g h t . " (Emphasis sup-
Plied)
Summary judgment was e n t e r e d h e r e i n s o l e l y on t h e
basis of t h e showing t h a t t h e p u b l i c had i n f a c t used t h e
beach h e r e involved f o r more than twenty y e a r s .
This f a c t i s i n s u f f i c i e n t t o support t h e judgment.
Relevant and m a t e r i a l f a c t s shown by t h i s record
that were ignored o r overlooked a r e :
1. That t h e Owner operated on i t s t r a c t or
p a r c e l o f land a r e c r e a t i o n a l f a c i l i t y and t h a t
i t was i n t h e i n t e r e s t of t h e owner t h a t persons
bent on r e c r e a t i o n congregate on o r n e a r its
facility.
17
J. LEWIS HALL - ATTORNEY AT LAW - TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32302
2. There i s a b s o l u t e l y no evidence i n t h i s
record of any o v e r t a c t o r d i r e c t expression of
claim of r i g h t made t o t h e owner t o put i n on
n o t i c e of adverse claim.
3. There i s a b s o l u t e l y no evidence i n t h i s
r e c o r d of any use of owner's land t h a t was i n -
c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e owner's i n t e r e s t .
4. There was p o s i t i v e proof t h a t on occasion
t h e Owner had e x e r c i s e d h i s r i g h t of ownership
by having u n d e s i r a b l e members of t h e p u b l i c
removed from the p i e r and p i e r property. (R. 4 0 3 )
5. The only evidence of any member of t h e
p u b l i c using t h e p r o p e r t y under claim of " r i g h t "
i s t h e testimony of t h r e e w i t n e s s e s , one o f whom
s a i d he claimed such r i g h t because h i s f a t h e r
t o l d him he could use i t ; (R. 297) another w i t n e s s
who claimed h i s " r i g h t " because everyone used t h e
beach he thought he could (R. 321), and one w i t n e s s
who used i t because he thought i t was p u b l i c prop-
erty 248) None of t h e s e claims were communi-
c a t e d t o Owner.
It i s t h e r e f o r e apparent t h a t t h e evidence as t o
n a t e r i a l issues i s e n t i r e l y i n s u f f i c i e n t t o s u s t a i n the sum-
n a r y judgment.
The key i s s u e h e r e i n i s whether o r not t h e r e i s
18
J LEWIS HALL - ATTORNEY AT
. LAW - TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32302
proof of adverse use or proof of notice to the Owner that
the use by the publi was adv rse and h-stile.
The test of adverse use and notice thereof is
whether or not the use was so inconsistent with the owner's
use and enjoyment of the land, or so inconsistent with
owner's interest as to put the owner on notice of the ad-
verse use and claim.
The key fact in this record, and it is uncontradicted,
is that the Owner operated a recreational facility on its
property.
This fact enhances the presumption that the use by
the public for recreational purposes was permissive.
This fact establishes that the use by the public
was consistent with the owner's interest - whose business
flourished in direct proportion to the number of people
attracted to the facility and the vicinity of the facility.
This fact further raises the logical inference that
the use by the public was by invitation, express o r implied,
and that the members of the public using the beach were in
fact invitees.
Certainly the owner who operates an attraction on
his property impliedly extends an invitation to the public
to patronize it - and when the public responds in a manner
consistent with the use and interest of the owner, the
19
burden falls a l l t h e more heavily on claimants of p r e s c r i p t i v e
use t o e s t a b l i s h both the adverse use and the notice thereof
t o the Owner.
The evidence i n this case wholly fails of sufficiency
to carry the burden of adverse use and n o t i c e t o the Owner.
The judgment herein should be reversed with d i r e c t i o n s
t o dismiss the Amended Complaint.
Respectfully submitted,
ISHAM w. ADAMS
1 2 1 Broadway
Daytona Beach, F l o r i d a
st Office Box 1228
Tallahassee, Florida 32302
ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONERS
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I H m Y CERTIFY that c o p i e s hereof have been
E B
f u r n i s h e d , by m a i l , t o Grezik and Johnson, 328 South
Grandview Avenue, Daytona Beach, Florida, and t o M r .
Barry Scott Richard, Deputy Attorney General, The Cap-
i t o l , Tallahassee, Florida, t h i s
d
/d- day of May,
1973.
21
J LEWIS HALL -
. ATTORNEY AT LAW - TALWHASSEE, FLORIDA 32302
