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NPA-OPS 35 FDM pre OST 04-1

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					                                       NPA OPS 35


           JAR-OPS Part 1 (Commercial Air Transportation Aeroplanes) –




                                   SUBPART B-GENERAL




ITEM B- 1 Flight Data Monitoring

    Modify paragraph JAR-OPS 1.037, as shown

JAR-OPS 1.037 Accident prevention and
flight safety programme
(See IEM ACJ OPS 1.037)

(a) An operator shall establish an accident prevention and
flight safety programme, which may be integrated with the
Quality System, including:

     (1) Programmes to achieve and maintain risk
     awareness by all persons involved in operations; and

     (2) An occurrence reporting scheme to enable the
     collation and assessment of relevant incident and
     accident reports in order to identify adverse trends or
     to address deficiencies in the interests of flight safety.
     The scheme shall protect the identity of the reporter
     and include the possibility that reports may be
     submitted anonymously (See ACJ OPS 1.037(a)(2));
     and

     (3) From 1 January 2005, an operator of an aeroplane
     of a maximum certificated take-off mass in excess of
     27,000kg shall establish and maintain a flight data
     monitoring programme for those aeroplanes in excess
     of 27,000kg MCTOM as part of its accident
     prevention and flight safety programme The flight
     data monitoring programme shall be non punitive
     and contain adequate safeguards to protect the
     source(s) of the data.
      (See ACJ OPS 1.037 (a)(3))

     (4)Evaluation of relevant information relating to
     incidents and accidents and the promulgation of


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     related information, but not the attribution of blame;
     and

     (5) The appointment of a person accountable for
     managing the programme.


(b)[(b) Proposals for corrective action resulting from the
accident prevention and flight safety programme shall be
the responsibility of the person accountable for managing
the programme.

(c) (c) The effectiveness of changes resulting from
proposals for corrective action identified by the accident
and flight safety programme shall be monitored by the
Quality Manager.




ITEM B- 2

    Modify paragraph ACJ OPS 1.037, as shown


IEM ACJ OPS 1.037
Accident prevention and flight safety programme
(See JAR-OPS 1.037)


1. Guidance material for the establishment of a safety programme and Flight Data
Monitoring can be found in:
a. ICAO Doc 9422 (Accident Prevention Manual); and
b. ICAO Doc 9376 (Preparation of an Operational Manual).

2. Where available, use may be made of analysis of flight data recorder information. (See
also JAR-OPS 1.160 (c)


ITEM B- 3

Create new ACJ OPS 1.037(a(3))as shown.

ACJ OPS 1.037 (a(3))
Flight Data Monitoring Programme




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1) Flight Data Monitoring (FDM) is the pro-active and non-punitive use of digital
   flight data from routine operations to improve aviation safety.

2) The manager of the accident prevention and flight safety programme, which includes
   the FDM programme, is accountable for the discovery of issues and the transmission
   of these to the relevant manager(s) responsible for the process(es) concerned. The
   latter are accountable for taking appropriate and practicable safety action within a
   reasonable period of time that reflects their severity.


   Note: While an operator may contract the operation of a flight data analysis
   programme to another party the overall responsibility remains with the operator’s
   accident prevention and flight safety programme accountable manager.

3) An FDM Programme will allow an operator to:


   3.1. Identify areas of operational risk and quantify current safety margins.
   3.2. Identify and quantify operational risks by highlighting when non-standard,
        unusual or unsafe circumstances occur.
   3.3. Use the FDM information on the frequency of occurrence, combined with an
        estimation of the level of severity, to assess the safety risks and to determine
        which may become un-acceptable if the discovered trend continues.
   3.4. Put in place appropriate procedures for remedial action once an unacceptable
        risk, either actually present or predicted by trending, has been identified.
   3.5. Confirm the effectiveness of any remedial action by continued monitoring.

4) FlightData Monitoring Analysis Techniques:

   4.1. Exceedence Detection: This looks for deviations from flight manual limits, and
        standard operating procedures. A set of core events should be selected to cover
        the main areas of interest to the operator. A sample list is attached below. The
        event detection limits should be continuously reviewed to reflect the operator’s
        current operating procedures.
   4.2. All Flights Measurement: A system that defines what is normal practice. This
        may be accomplished by retaining various snapshots of information from each
        flight.
   4.3. Statistics: A series of measures collected to support the analysis process. These
        would be expected to include the numbers of flights flown and analysed, aircraft
        and sector details sufficient to generate rate and trend information.

5) Flight Data Monitoring Analysis, Assessment and Process Control Tools: The
   effective assessment of information obtained from digital flight data is dependant
   on the provision of appropriate information technology tool sets. A program suite
   may include: Annotated data trace displays, engineering unit listings, visualisation
   for the most significant incidents, access to interpretative material, links to other
   safety information, and statistical presentations.




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                                     NPA OPS 35

6) Education and Publication: Sharing safety information is a fundamental principle of
   aviation safety in helping to reduce accident rates The operator should pass on the
   lessons learnt to all relevant personnel and, where appropriate, industry, .Similar
   media to air safety systems may be used. These may include: Newsletters, flight
   safety magazines, highlighting examples in training and simulator exercises,
   periodic reports to industry and the regulatory authority

7) Accident and incident data requirements specified in JAR-OPS(1.160) take
   precedenceover the requirements of a FDM system. In these cases the FDR data
   should be retained as part of the investigation data and may fall outside the de-
   identification agreements.

8) Every crew member has a responsibility to report events described in JAR OPS
   1.085(b) using the company occurrence reporting scheme detailed in JAR OPS 1.037
   (a)(2). Mandatory Occurrence Reporting is a requirement under JAR OPS 1.420.
   Significant risk- bearing incidents detected by FDM will therefore normally be the
   subject of mandatory occurrence report by the crew. If this is not the case then they
   should submit a retrospective report that will be included under the normal accident
   prevention and flight safety process without prejudice.

9) The data recovery strategy should ensure a sufficiently representative capture of
   flight information to maintain an overview of operations. Data analysis should be
   performed sufficiently frequently to enable action to be taken on significant safety
   issues.

10) The data retention strategy should aim to provide the greatest safety benefits
    practicable from the available data A full data set should be retained until the
    action and review processes are complete; thereafter, a reduced data set relating to
    closed issues can be maintained for longer term trend analysis. Programme
    managers may wish to retain samples of full-flight data for various safety purposes
    (detailed analysis, training, benchmarking etc.)..

11) Data Access and Security policy should restrict information access to authorised
    persons. . When data access is required for airworthiness and maintenance
    purposes, a procedure should be in place to prevent disclosure of crew identity
:
    .
12) Procedure Document; this document signed by all parties will, as a minimum, define:
    a) a) The aim of the FDM program
    b) A data access and security policy that should restrict access to information to
    specifically authorised persons identified by their position.
      c) The method to secure identification on those rare occasions that require specific
    flight follow-up for contextual information where such crew contact is required the
    authorised person(s) need not necessarily be the programme manager, or safety
    manager, but could be a third party (broker) mutually acceptable to unions or staff
    and management).
    d) The data retention policy and accountability including the measures taken to
    ensure the security of the data,



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                                      NPA OPS 35

   e) The conditions under which advisory briefing or remedial training should take
   place; this should always be carried out in a constructive and non-punitive manner.
   f) The conditions under which the confidentiality may be withdrawn for reasons of
   gross negligence or significant continuing safety concern.
   g) The participation of Flight crew member representative(s) in the assessment of the
   data, the action and review process and the consideration of recommendations.
   h) The policy for publishing the findings resulting from FDM.


13) Airborne systems and equipment used to obtain FDM data will range from an
    already installed full Quick Access Recorder, in a modern aircraft with digital
    systems, to a basic crash protected recorder in an older or less sophisticated aircraft.
    The analysis potential of the reduced data set available in the latter case may
    reduce the safety benefits obtainable. The operator shall ensure that FDM use does
    not adversely affect the serviceability of equipment required for accident
    investigation.




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