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Fukushima and after

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					Nuclear power in Japan:
 Fukushima and after
                           Richard Tanter
               Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability


                        rtanter@nautilus.org
http://www.nautilus.org/about/associates/richard-tanter/publications




  Royal Australian Chemical Institute, Health Safety & Environment Group0, at Risk
                                Engineering Society,
                                  1 September 2011
                        Outline
•   What happened at Fukushima?
•   What is the situation at Fukushima now?
•   What will happen from now on?
•   What have been the health and environmental consequences?
•   Why did these events occur?
•   What is the future of nuclear power in Japan?
•   What are the implications beyond Japan?




                                                                1
1. What happened at Fukushima?




                                 •
                                 2
Nuclear plants and facilities in
           Japan




                               3
Nuclear power plants in Japan




                            4
Unit 4 reactor schematic - NHK




                                 5
Boiling Water reactor System




                               6
 BWR
reactor
vessel




          7
Key sequences at Fukushima No. 1 NPP, 11 March

Pre-quake:
    – Units 1,2,3 operating;
    – Units 5 and 6 offline in cold shutdown;
    – Unit 4 offline; defueled November 2010
14.46 Magnitude 9 earthquake 135 km offshore at
    – Automatic shutdown of Units 1,2, and 3.
    – Offsite power is lost.
    – Emergency diesel generators (EDGs) provide coolant power
15.46 14 metre-tsunami breaches plant seawalls and inundates
   most of the plant
    – Emergency generators knocked out
    – Battery powered pumping system starts; fails by March 12.
19.30 Fuel assemblies in Unit 1 completely exposed
                                                              8
Japanese government report to IAEA: Fukushima “worse
than meltdown?”




 Source: “'Melt-through' at Fukushima? / Govt report to IAEA suggests situation worse than meltdown”, Yomiuri
 Shimbun, 8 June 2011.                                                                                          9
Explosions and fires

• March 12:
  – 15.36 Unit 1 hydrogen explosion destroys upper
    structure exposing fuel pond; 4 workers injured
• March 14
  – 11.01 Unit 3 hydrogen explosion destroys upper
    structure exposing fuel pond; 6 workers injured
• March 15
  – Fire at Unit 4 spent fuel pond
  – Hydrogen explosion in Unit 2; suspected damage to
    wet-well in primary containment.
  – Explosion at Unit 4 spent fuel pond

                                                  10
     Spent fuel at Fukushima I NPP


     • March 16
       – Fire at Unit 4 spent fuel pond
     • March 23
           – Fire reported at base of heavily damaged Unit 3




Source: Masa Takubo, cited by David Wright, More on Spent Fuel Pools at Fukushima, All
Things Nuclear, March 21, 2010
                                                                                         11
          Fukushima I NPP, 2004




Source: Digital Globe, First Watch, Imagery Report, Japan Earthquake/Tsunami, March 2011 12
      Fukushima I NPP, March 12, before
             explosion of Unit 1




Source: Digital Globe, First Watch, Imagery Report, Japan Earthquake/Tsunami, March 2011
                                                                                           13
                  March 13, after explosion of Unit 1




Source: Digital Globe, First Watch, Imagery Report, Japan Earthquake/Tsunami, March 2011   14
         March 14, 1 minute before
            explosion of Unit 3




Source: Digital Globe, First Watch, Imagery Report, Japan Earthquake/Tsunami, March 2011   15
          March 14, 3 minutes after explosion of Unit 3




Source: Digital Globe, First Watch, Imagery Report, Japan Earthquake/Tsunami, March 2011   16
March 14




           17
Seawater
pump -
March 17




  Source: Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Photos 16, Cryptome.org
                                                                            18
Flooded
electric
equipment
room, Unit
6, March 17




 Source:
 Fukushima Daiichi
 Nuclear Power
 Station Photos 16,
 Cryptome.org


                      19
                            Potential steam production by radioactive afterheat




Source: Jan Beyea and Frank von Hippel, “Containment of a Reactor Meltdown,” Bulletin of the   20

Atomic Scientists, August/September 1982
BWR nuclear fuel structure




                             21
2. What is the situation at Fukushima
                 now?




                                        22
State of Fukushima No. 1 NPP, as of August 30:
a. reactors and spent fuel

                          Unit 1                    Unit 2                    Unit 3                    Unit 4

 Core and fuel            Damaged (core             Damaged (core             Damaged (core             No fuels loaded
 integrity                melt                      melt*                     melt
 RPV structural           Partially damaged         Unknown                   Unknown                   No damage
 integrity                and leaking
 PCV structural           Damage and                Damage and                Damage and                No damage
 integrity                leaking suspected         leaking suspected         leaking suspected

 Spent fuels in the                292                       587                       514                       1331
 SFP
 Fuel integrity in        Unknown                   Most spent fuels          Unknown                   Most spent fuels
 SFP                                                not damaged                                         not damaged
 SFP cooling              Function                  Function                  Function                  Function
                          recovered                 recovered                 recovered                 recovered




      Source: Status of countermeasures for restoring from the accident at Fukushima Daiichi Unit 1 through 4. As of August
      30th, 2011. (Estimated by JAIF)


                                                                                                                              23
Source: Asahi Shimbun 10 August 2011

                                       24
State of Fukushima No. 1 NPP, as of August 30:
b. contaminated water leakage and water storage

• Contamination of huge volumes of sea-water and freshwater
  injected and sprayed into containment buildings and spent fuel
  ponds
   – Some released to sea
   – Most stored onsite in turbine building basement, etc.
   – Some stored on floating barges

• Highly radioactive leakages from damaged reactor pressure
  vessels and containment vessels
   – into sea and into groundwater




                                                                   25
State of Fukushima No. 1 NPP, as of August 30:
c. Site debris and contamination




 Source: TEPCO, Survey map of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, August 22, 2011.   26
Key current site operations

• Heat exchange of cooling water to CPV/RPV
• Decontamination of radioactive water in containment vessel, in
  flooded areas, and in storage
    – As of 9 August, 42,000 tonnes processed, but 120,000 tonnes
      remained on site; expected end-year goal of 200,000 tonnes now
      unlikely
• Reducing/eliminating onsite radioactive hotspots
• Covering all four units with steel and plastic to reduce air-borne
  contamination




                                                                  27
Cold Shutdown Process Behind Schedule




   Source: Fukushima Cold Shutdown Process Behind Schedule, NikkeiNet, 17 August 2011

                                                                                        28
3. What will happen from now on?
• Units 1-4 to be decommissioned; Units 5-6 unclear
• New TEPCO “roadmap” presented to JAEC 31 August
    – Plastic covering for Units 1-4 to contain airborne radiation matter
     – Cold shut down by January 2012 ….?
     – By end-2011will start building ground shield between Units 1-
        4 and sea
         • 800 metres long and 20 metres deep
         • possible extension around whole of Units 1-4
•   Removal of fuel from spent fuel ponds 1-4
•   Removal of spent fuel from reactors 1-4
•   Removal of corium from Units 1,2 and 3 - from RPV and/or CPV
     – 10-50 years before attempt at reactor/corium removal possible
•   Decontamination, dismantling and clean-up …. Sometime in the
    future

                                                                            29
       Model of
        plastic
     coverage for
        Unit 1




Source: TEPCO, Attachment, Outline of
the reactor building covering plan of Unit
1 at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power
Station, Press Release


                                             30
                                  Unit 1 plastic cover:
                                  before and after




Source: TEPCO, Attachment,
Outline of the reactor building
covering plan of Unit 1 at
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear
Power Station, Press Release                          31
Seaward-side water shield plan




Source: TEPCO, Attachment, Basic Design of Water Shield Wall at the Seaside, Press Release 31 August 2011, p. 6.
                                                                                                                   32
 Seaward-side water shield - schematic cross-section
 (piles: 1 metre diameter, 14-22 mm. thick, 22-23 metres deep)




Source: TEPCO, Attachment, Basic Design of Water Shield Wall at the Seaside, Press Release 31 August 2011, p. 6.

                                                                                                                   33
Fukushima No.1 NPP hydrology (pre-quake data)




Source: TEPCO, Attachment, Basic Design of Water Shield Wall at the Seaside, Press Release 31 August 2011, p. 7.
                                                                                                                   34
   Cross-section of hydrology model (pre-quake data)




Source: TEPCO, Attachment, Basic Design of Water Shield Wall at the Seaside, Press Release 31 August 2011, p. 7.   35
Underground water trajectory modelling schematic




  Source: TEPCO, Attachment, Basic Design of Water Shield Wall at the Seaside, Press Release 31 August 2011, p. 8.


                                                                                                                     36
Anticipated underground water levels with seaside-ward
water shield in place




 Source: TEPCO, Attachment, Basic Design of Water Shield Wall at the Seaside, Press Release 31 August 2011, p. 8.
                                                                                                                    37
The corium issue: corium lava flow at Chernobyl




 Source: “Corium”, Tohoku Earthquake & Nuclear Crisis, 3 April 2011, at
 http://quakerad.blogspot.com/2011/04/corium.html
                                                                          38
 The corium issue: corium “elephant’s foot uranium fuel
 flow in Chernobyl NPP basement




Source: “Corium”, Tohoku Earthquake & Nuclear Crisis, 3 April 2011, at http://quakerad.blogspot.com/2011/04/corium.html


                                                                                                                          39
The corium issue:
Three Mile Island
 NPP Core End-
      State
  Configuration




 Source: “Corium”, Tohoku Earthquake &
 Nuclear Crisis, 3 April 2011, at
 http://quakerad.blogspot.com/2011/04/cor

 ium.html

                                            40
4. What have been the health and
environmental consequences?
• Immediate injuries and deaths
• Longterm radiation illness and mortality
• Temporary social disruption from accident
  consequences
  – social, economic, psychological
• Longterm social consequences
  – How many former residents can never go back?



                                                   41
 Schematic of 31 August accident at cesium

 decontamination equipment: two workers drenched




Source: TEPCO, 1 September 2011
                                                   42
Ionising radiation maximum permissible dose limits
(courtesy Prof. Tilman Ruff, Nossal Institute for Global Health)



• Average background radiation: 2-3 mSv/y; half due to
  radon gas
• General population: 1 mSv
    – Japan: women regulated at 5 mSv over 3 mo
    – 1 mSv/y ~ 0.11 microSv/h
• Radiation workers:
   – 100 mSv over 5 y with no more than 50 mSv in any
     year
• ICRP recommendations accidents/emergencies:
    – In lower part of 1-20 mSv range for public
    – Workers – 100 mSv, ICRP up to 500 for volunteers in
      emergency rescue operations
    – Post-Fukushima Japan:
         • 250 mSv/y workers
         • 20 mSv for public including children
• Codex Alimentarius Commission food recommendations 43
  based on max 1 mSv/y assuming contaminated food max
 Fukushima radiation releases, 11-20 March 2011




(courtesy Prof. Tilman Ruff, Nossal Institute for Global Health)                  44
                                                                   Source:AREVA
Source: TEPCO, Survey map of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, August 22, 2011.   45
     US
     Fukushima
     radiation
     monitoring,
     to April 29




(courtesy Prof. Tilman
Ruff, Nossal Institute for
Global Health)
                             46
Zoning criteria Belarus 1991


   kBq/m2     Individual              Zone
             dose (mSv)
   >1480         >5            Priority resettlement
  555-1480       <5        Secondary resettlement
  185-555        >1            Resettlement rights
   37-185        <1             Periodic radiation
                                   monitoring




                                             ICRP 111, 2009   47
    Applying
    Chernobyl
    evacuation
    criteria to
    Fukushima


•   Red and most yellow is >
    Chernobyl relocation zone
    (>1480 kBq/m2)
•   Rest of yellow, green, light
    blue and some dark blue is
    > Chernobyl dose reduction
    zone
•   Cs 137 T1/2 =30 years




    (courtesy Prof. Tilman Ruff, Nossal
    Institute for Global Health)
                                          48
Protective measures



• Evacuation for est ext >50 mSv
   – 20 vs 80 km; late – still ongoing to ?end June
• Sheltering – for ext est >10mSv, esp 20-30 km zone
• Acceptance increased exposures
• Stable iodine – appears not used?
   – initial evacuation completed by time instruction
     issued VII-9 GOJ IAEA subm 6.11)
• Food and water monitoring and restrictions
• Local monitoring
• Remediation – including local initiative eg schools
• Long-term health assessment planned – details
  sparse
                                                        49
Killing them softly: radiation exposure limits
for workers and children
•   International Commission on Radiological Protection recommendation
    for workers:
     – maximum permissible annual dose of 20 mSv averaged over five years
     – no more than 50 mSv in any one year.
•   Japanese worker exposure standard:
     – Pre-crisis: 100 mSv p.a
     – Post-crisis “emergency” exposure limits: 250 mSv p.a.
•   Resignation of Kosako Toshiso, Tokyo University,
     – Appointed Special Advisor to Cabinet, March 16; resigned 29 April
     – Reported METI now discussing 500 mSv emergency exposure limit for
       workers
     – Refused to approve promulgation of children’s exposure level at “3.8 µSv
       per hour” on the basis of “20 mSv per year”

•   See Tilman Ruff, Children of Fukushima need our protection, The Age




                                                                                  50
  MEXT data on
 Cesium-137 soil
 contamination,
  29-30 August

“According to a soil
contamination map submitted at
a study meeting of the Education,
Culture, Sports, Science and
Technology Ministry, six
municipalities recorded more
than 1.48 million becquerels of
cesium 137 per square meter--
the standard used for forced
resettlement after the 1986
Chernobyl accident.”


Sources: “34 spots top Chernobyl evacuation
standard”, Daily Yomiuri Online, 31 August
2011; original data: MEXT:
http://radioactivity.mext.go.jp/

                                              51
Social effects

•   Short- and medium-term evacuation
•   Loss of livelihood
•   Damage to deep cultural roots
•   No return zones
•   Compensation




                                        52
Nuclear labour - the return of the nuclear gypsies
 •   Pre-crisis Fukushima NPP 1 labour force
      – Regular employees (seisha’in 正社員)= 1,1,08
      – Contract employees (hiseisha’in 非正社員) = 9,195 [“day labourers”]
 •   2009 worker radiation exposure at Fukushima No. 1 NPP
      – “of those who received a dose between 5 and 10 millisieverts (mSv), there
        were 671 contract laborers against 36 regular employees.
      – “Those who received between 10 and 15 mSv were comprised of 220 contract
        laborers and 2 regular workers, while 35 contract workers and no regular
        workers were exposed to a dose between 15 and 20 mSv”

 •   Post-crisis nuclear gypsy recruitment
      – More than 2,000 workers now onsite;
      – TEPCO planning to raise to 3,000
      – Recruited by construction company:
        - jobs advertised for “10,000 yen for three hours work per day”
 •   Paul Jobin, “Dying for TEPCO? Fukushima’s Nuclear Contract
     Workers”, Japan Focus, http://www.japanfocus.org/-Paul-Jobin/3523

                                                                             53
6. Why did this happen?

• Levels of cause
• immediate/proximate causes :
   – Earthquake plus tsunami
   – Remediation efforts generating new problems (e.g.
     contaminated water)
• Immediate failures in risk assessment and management
   – E.g. sea-wall height known to be inadequate since 2008
   – E.g. subsequent discovery of five active fault lines
     immediately offshore




                                                              54
Distant/ultimate causes


• Gradations of strength/salience
• Japanese nuclear industrial regulation and safety
  regimes
• TEPCO as a repeat offender/rogue company

• Weakness of Japanese political structures




                                                      55
7. What is the future of nuclear power in Japan?




                                                   56
The forgotten side of Japan as a nuclear power: as
many planned NPP as succeeded were abandoned due
to widespread and long-lasting local opposition.




 Source: courtesy Citizens Nuclear Information Centre, Tokyo
                                                               57
            Nuclear facilities: actual   Nuclear projects abandoned




                                                                      58
Source: CNIC, 原子力市民年鑑2008年
 Nuclear power plants in
operation as of end-August




                             59
6 months after Fukushima three-quarters of Japan’s
nuclear power plants offline or shut-down




     Source: Japan's NPP Status before and after the earthquake
     as of August 29, 2011, Japan Atomic Industry Forum
                                                                  60
                                           Hokkaido Electric       Tomari-3
                                           Power
                                           Tokyo Electric Power    Kashiwazaki Kariwa-1
                                           (TEPCO)                 Kashiwazaki Kariwa-5
                                                                   Kashiwazaki Kariwa-6
Nuclear Power
                                           Kansai Electric Power   Mihama-2
   Plants in                                                       Takahama-2
 operation, as                                                     Takahama-3
of 4 September                                                     Ohi-2

     2011                                  Chugoku Electric       Shimane-2
                                           Power
                                           Shikoku Electric Power Ikata-2

                                           Kyushu Electric Power   Genkai-1
                                                                   Genkai-4


      Source: Japan's NPP Status before and after
      the earthquake as of August 29, 2011, Japan
      Atomic Industry Forum                                                               61
 Nuclear Power Plants in operation, as of 4 September, 2011

                Hokkaido Electric                           Tomari-3
                                                            Kashiwazaki Kariwa-1
                Tokyo Electric Power
                                                            Kashiwazaki Kariwa-5
                (TEPCO)
                                                            Kashiwazaki Kariwa-6
                                                            Mihama-2
                                                            Takahama-2
                Kansai Electric Power
                                                            Takahama-3
                                                            Ohi-2
                Chugoku Electric Power                      Shimane-2
                Shikoku Electric Power                      Ikata-2
                                                            Genkai-1
                Kyushu Electric Power
                                                            Genkai-4




Source: Japan's NPP Status before and after the earthquake as of August 29, 2011, Japan Atomic Industry Forum   62
63
Energy requirements and supply options




                                         64
What is the future of nuclear power in Japan?

•   Expansion of output from remaining thermal and hydroplants.
•   Note only 13 NPP online at present.
•   Great success of energy conservation and efficiency measures in
    Tokyo and Tohoku
     – E.g. TEPCO capacity fell from 64,000 MW to 56,400 MW; but peak summer
       demand has been 49,000MW
•   Spotlight on utility regional monopolies and regional “islands”
•   Alternative energy pathways:
     – Energy efficiency
     – Renewable energy
     – Distributed generation
•   Note: all three require construction of smart grids




                                                                          65
The utilities as islands




                           66
Smart grids




              67
Japan effects: nuclear power mortally wounded
•   Nuclear politics in Japan
     – Grassroots opposition
     – Nuclear alliance - makers, utilities, METI, LDP/DJP
     – JAEC
•   Revolt
     – Release of previously suppressed information
         • Safety
         • Costs
         • spent fuel cul de sac
     – Politicians will never again trust the nuclear alliance to keep them safe
     – Public trust
         • likelihood of corruption revelations over Fukushima NPP I
              – design and construction and operation
     – the failure of the plutonium project: Rokkasho reprocessing facility and
       the fast breeder reactors
     – >> support for “once-through” NPP process as first step.
     – Non-nuclear energy producers
                                                                            68
The nuclear alliance, utilities nuclear
manufacturers and the bureaucracy
•   TEPCO will be bankrupt before the clean-up is complete
•   Nationalisation as risk displacement onto tax-payers
•   The clean-up bonus for anyone by TEPCO

•   Power companies as fiefdoms;
•   power grids as islands

•   Industry restructuring:
     –   Mitsubishi Heavy Industry and Hitachi nuclear division merger
     –   MHI and other nuclear companies also reviewin non-nuclear divisions
     –   Rapid expansion of solar industries.
•   Export policies and possibilities after Fukushima
     –   Japan in world nuclear industry competition
           •   The Jordan deal
           •   The Vietnam deal
     –   Cf Korea
     –   Cf France
     –   Cf China
     –   Russia
                                                                               69
Structure of nuclear safety regulation - pre-Fukushima




Source: Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization, Roles of the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency and the Nuclear Safety Commission




                                                                                                                               70
Oversight process - - pre-

Fukushima




Source: Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization, Roles of the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency and the
Nuclear Safety Commission
                                                                                                              71
     Nuclear emergency response - on paper




Source: Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization, Roles of the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency and the Nuclear   72
Safety Commission
Oversight process - - pre-

Fukushima




Source: Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization, Roles of the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency and the
Nuclear Safety Commission
                                                                                                              73
Regulatory changes

• Dismissal of senior METI and NISA personnel
• Replacement of NISA
• Cabinet ratification of reduction of role of nuclear
  energy in national energy policy
• Revision of costing procedures in comparative
  evaluations of energy sources to include accident
  compensation, clean-up, and full decommissioning
  costs.




                                                         74
Multiple investigations

PM Kan announced investigation principles and goals:
•   To abide by the three principles of independence, openness and
    comprehensiveness.
•   the committee will:
1.  be independent of the existing nuclear administration.
2.  release all its facts and findings to the public and the international
    community, and
3.  examine not just the accident’s technical aspects, but also the effect
    of existing systems and institutional cultures in causing it.
Japan Atomic Energy Commission:
•   suspends deliberations on national Framework for Nuclear
    Energy Policy
•   Demands accident investigations include 1) efforts to restore
    control at Fukushima Daiichi, (2) efforts toward regional
    development, (3) investigations into the cause of the accident,
    (4) confirmations of safety, and (5) the release of information.
                                                                         75
    Corruption, collusion and impunity in the nuclear
    state-corporate-scientific complex
•    GE corruption and impunity in the original construction of Fukushima No. 1 BWRs Mk I
     and II
      –   Exim Bank indemnification required for nuclear export licence
      –   Korean corruption experience with GE/Bechtel BWR import
      –   Japan?
•    TEPCO 2002 mea culpa over hundreds of unreported or mis-represented incidents
      –   2011: ongoing suppression of faults data
      –   More information on suppression of design problems: sesimology
•    Amakudari and Amaagari: the revolving door between bureaucracy, regulators and
     industry
•    Four decades of intimidation of critics, including senior politicians
•    The Kan government as a break?
       – ‘Kan said "the myth of the safety of nuclear energy" was prevalent among
         government and utility officials.’ (Japan Times, April 30, 2011)




                                                                                  76
Nuclear power plants -
2008 - CNIC              77
           Public opinion: April-August 2011, Mainichi Shimbun




Source: Updated Graphs - Public Opinion Survey by Japanese Mass Media (April – August, 2011), Japan Atomic Energy Forum, 23 August 2011
                                                                                                                                78
                               Public opinion: April-August 2011




Source: Updated Graphs - Public Opinion Survey by Japanese Mass Media (April – August, 2011), Japan Atomic Energy Forum, 23 August79
                                                                                                                                  2011
                                                    Nautilus Institute
                                                     early response
                                                      reports on on
                                                       Fukushima




Available from:
http://www.nautilus.org/about/associates/richard-
tanter/publications


                                                                    80
Real world alternative energy pathways



•   Energy efficiency
•   Renewable energy
•   Distributed generation




                                         81
    Corruption, collusion and impunity in the nuclear
    state-corporate-scientific complex
•    GE corruption and impunity in the original construction of Fukushima No. 1 BWRs Mk I
     and II
      –   Exim Bank indemnification required for nuclear export licence
      –   Korean corruption experience with GE/Bechtel BWR import
      –   Japan?
•    TEPCO 2002 mea culpa over hundreds of unreported or mis-represented incidents
      –   2011: ongoing suppression of faults data
      –   More information on suppression of design problems: sesimology
•    Amakudari and Amaagari: the revolving door between bureaucracy, regulators and
     industry
•    Four decades of intimidation of critics, including senior politicians
•    The Kan government as a break?
       – ‘Kan said "the myth of the safety of nuclear energy" was prevalent among
         government and utility officials.’ (Japan Times, April 30, 2011)




                                                                                  82
                   Key questions for Japan

•   Five key questions for Japan:
•   Will serious liberalisation of nuclear energy production help?
•   Are the utilities locked into nuclear trajectory?
•   Are the nuclear manufacturers (Mitsubishi, Hitachi and Toshiba) locked
    into nuclear power?
•   Can an elected government gain control of nuclear policy?
•   Can an elected government force the abandonment of the plutonium
    economy?
•   Can a Japanese government breakthrough politically to direct new
    energy policy?




                                                                        83
What does this mean for the rest of us?




                                          84
Collective international regulation for
nuclear safety
•   Notice international responses from China, Korea and United States
     – Very slow release of US data and imagery
•   IAEA: Why so silent?
     – Mission statement: conflict of interest:
           • Promoting nuclear power
           • Regulating nuclear power
     – Capture by major nuclear states and public-private nuclear alliance
•   IAEA lack of effective powers
•   Liability regime limitations
     – The farce of the Convention on Nuclear Safety




                                                                        85
Convention on Nuclear Safety
•   Need for fundamental challenge to nuclear sovereignty embedded in
    Convention on Nuclear Safety
     – CNS parties last week deferred Fukushima review meeting till
       August 2012

•   IAEA on the Convention:
•   “The Convention is an incentive instrument. It is not designed to ensure
    fulfillment of obligations by Parties through control and sanction but is
    based on their common interest to achieve higher levels of safety which
    will be developed and promoted through regular meetings of the
    Parties. The Convention obliges Parties to submit reports on the
    implementation of their obligations for "peer review" at meetings of the
    Parties to be held at the IAEA. This mechanism is the main innovative
    and dynamic element of the Convention.”
     – http://www-ns.iaea.org/conventions/nuclear-safety.asp



                                                                           86
Global civil society response ?

• Energy and climate change interconnection central:
   – Need for parallel and inter-linked responses
• No energy regime is without costs
• Global public right to information and transparency
   – Intelligence information access.
• Rebuilding of transnational networks




                                                        87
•   EnerWebWatch's Special Nuclear Situation in Japan
     –   http://www.enerwebwatch.eu/webwatch?page=EarthQuake&id=update17

•   The Fukushima Project: SimplyInfo
     –   http://www.simplyinfo.org/

•   Andrew DeWit and Iida Tetsunari, The “Power Elite” and Environmental-Energy
    Policy in Japan, Asia-Pacific Journal/Japan Focus
     – http://japanfocus.org/-Andrew-DeWit/3479

•   After the Deluge: Short and Medium-term Impacts of the Reactor Damage Caused
    by the Japan Earthquake and Tsunami (co-author with David Von Hippel, Kae
    Takase and Peter Hayes), Special Report, Nautilus Institute for Security and
    Sustainability, March 17, 2011
     –   http://www.nautilus.org/about/staff/richard-tanter/publications

•   The Path from Fukushima: Short and Medium-term Impacts of the Reactor Damage
    Caused by the Japan Earthquake and Tsunami on Japan’s Electricity System
    (contributing author with David Von Hippel, Kae Takase and Peter Hayes), Nautilus
    Institute for Security and Sustainability, April 11, 2011
     –   http://www.nautilus.org/about/staff/richard-tanter/publications

•   TEPCO Country after Fukushima, Arena Magazine, June 2011 [footnoted version]
     –   http://www.nautilus.org/about/staff/richard-tanter/publications
                                                                                  88

				
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