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HomeServices Lending – 2011 Summit



Mortgage Market Update



Joe Rogers, EVP

Sales and Service Systems Office

October 4, 2011

“Coming together is a beginning. Keeping

together is progress. Working together is

success.”

Henry Ford

Today’s Topics

 Consumer Trends





 Products and Programs – Issues and Opportunities





 Political/Regulatory Issues





 Tools You Will Use





 Interest Rates, Opportunities and Fun Facts





 Q&A

2

ECONOMIC UPDATE

CONSUMER

&

HOUSINGTRENDS







3

Employment Growth: Faster than 2010, but still slow.

 Employment growth has come to a virtual standstill during the past several

months. To date in 2011, 872,000 payroll jobs have been created, compared with

553,000 during the same period last year.

 Nonetheless, job creation is not sufficient to bring down the unemployment rate

significantly.



Absolute Monthly Employment Growth

600

August 2011

400





200





0

Thousands of Jobs









-200





-400





-600





-800

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics Initial Claims Peak





-1000

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011









4

Unemployment rate is making slow progress. . .

 The unemployment rate has declined from a peak of 10.1% at the end of the Great

Recession to 9.1% in August 2011. Labor force growth will prevent the

unemployment rate from falling rapidly, despite better employment growth.







Unemployment Rate

11.0

August 2011



10.0







9.0

Percent of the Labor Force









8.0







7.0







6.0







5.0







4.0



Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

3.0

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011









5

. . .but only because the labor force has declined.

 The unemployment rate has declined from a peak of 10.1% at the end of the Great

Recession to 9.1% in May 2011.

 But the labor force has declined 0.8% since its peak, so were the labor force

unchanged, never mind growing as it should be, the unemployment rate would

now be 9.9%--barely changed from its peak.



Labor Force

156000

August 2011

154000





152000

1% per year -0.4% per year



150000





148000

Thousands









146000





144000





142000





140000





138000





136000



Source: BLS

134000

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011









6

Sensitive indicator: No double dip.

 Despite this poor employment record, the best single guide to recession (when this

measure pushed above 12%) is not indicating another downturn.





Growth in the Number of Unemployed

140%

August 2011

Source: BLS, our calculations; shaded

areas represent recessions.

120%





100%





80%

Percent Change Year-Ago









60%





40%





20%





0%





-20%





-40%





-60%

1951

1952

1953

1954

1955

1956

1957

1958

1959

1960

1961

1962

1963

1964

1965

1966

1967

1968

1969

1970

1971

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1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

2099

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

11

19









7

Consumer spending is growing slower than norms.

 Consumer spending has decelerated since the end of 2010, when it was growth at

about a 3% real rate. The current growth is 2%.

 The comparison is the long term average of 3.3% per year.



Real Personal Consumption

8.0%

Expenditures--July 2011



6.0%









4.0%

% Change from Year Ago









2.0%









0.0%









-2.0%





Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis



-4.0%

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011









8

The personal savings rate has taken a recent hit.



 Declining real income has caused the savings rate to decline as well in

order to help support spending levels. In the past several months has

dropped from 5.3% to 4.5% since June 2011.

 The decline in debt service is also responsible for improving credit quality.





Household Financial Obligations Ratio

2011Q1

19.0







18.5









Percentage Points of Disposable Income

18.0







17.5







17.0







16.5







16.0







15.5



Source: Federal Reserve



15.0

80

81

82

83

84

85

86

87

88

89

90

91

92

93

94

95

96

97

98

99

00

01

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11

19

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19

19

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

9

Consumer confidence: Lagging Indicator.

 Consumer confidence is still mired in recession territory. The outlook of the

consumer sector is still bleak.



Consumer Confidence

August 2011

160







140







120

Long-Term

Average





100

Index









80







60







40



Source: Conference Board





20

80

81

82

83

84

85

86

87

88

89

90

91

92

93

94

95

96

97

98

99

00

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

10

11

19

19

19

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19

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19

19

19

19

19

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

10

Consumer sector is still deleveraging.



 Most of the deleveraging is occurring in revolving debt and

home equity lines.



Consumer Revolving Installment Debt Home Equity Lines at Commercial

Outstanding--July 2011 50%

Banks--July 2011

25%







20%

40%





15%



30%









% Change vs. Year-Ago

% Change vs. Year-Ago









10%







5% 20%







0%

10%





-5%



0%

-10% July 11: -6.1%

Soruce: Federal Reserve July 11: -3.7% Source: Federal Reserve



-15% -10%

1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

90



91



92



93



94



95



96



97



98



99



00



01



02



03



04



05



06



07



08



09



10



11

19



19



19



19



19



19



19



19



19



19



20



20



20



20



20



20



20



20



20



20



20



20









11

Total mortgage debt is declining relative to income.

 As part of deleveraging in the consumer sector, mortgage debt outstanding,

including both junior and senior liens, relative to personal income is declining

after a huge run-up that began in 2001.

 The most recent data, released earlier this month for Q2, still show mortgage

debt too high for the underlying income support.



Mortgage Debt To Income Ratio

2011Q2

100%





90%





80%





70%

Percent of Personal Income









60%





50%





40%





30%





20%





10%

Sources: Federal Reserve Z.1 and BEA.





0%

1951

1952

1953

1954

1955

1956

1957

1958

1959

1960

1961

1962

1963

1964

1965

1966

1967

1968

1969

1970

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

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1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

2099

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

11

19









12

Single family home sales are stuck.

 August housing numbers rose sharply to just under 4.5 million units.

 Pending home sales don’t offer much encouragement, despite all-time

high affordability.







Pending Home Sales Index - U.S.

140

July 2011



120









100









Index (SA): 2001=100

80









60









40









20



Soruce: NAR





0









13

Affordability is near an all-time high.

 The combination of lower prices and historically low mortgage rates are responsible for

creating favorable housing affordability.

 Since mid-2008, the index has been running in the 160 to 195 range, compared with a range

of 120 to 140 during the 1992 to 2004 period. It is now near 178.

 But this historically high affordability has not yet boosted home sales meaningfully.



Housing Affordability Index

195

July 2011



180







165







150

Index Value









135







120







105





Source: NAR

90

90



91



92



93



94



95



96



97



98



99



00



01



02



03



04



05



06



07



08



09



10



11

n-



n-



n-



n-



n-



n-



n-



n-



n-



n-



n-



n-



n-



n-



n-



n-



n-



n-



n-



n-



n-



n-

Ja



Ja



Ja



Ja



Ja



Ja



Ja



Ja



Ja



Ja



Ja



Ja



Ja



Ja



Ja



Ja



Ja



Ja



Ja



Ja



Ja



Ja

14

Because of excess supply, new construction will be low.

 Construction of new homes will be, and should be, low for some time yet.

Too much existing product, built during the boom, is on the market at

very attractive prices.

 Too many houses exist for the underlying demographic demand.





Single Family Housing Starts MF & SF Housing Stock / Households *

August 2011 2011Q1

2000 1.160





1800 1.150





1600

1.140



1400

1.130

000s Units (AR)









1200









Ratio

1.120



1000

1.110

800



1.100

600



1.090

400

*Households not living in mobile homes

Source: Bureau of the Census

1.080

200

90



91



92



93



94



95



96



97



98



99



00



01



02



03



04



05



06



07



08



09



10



11

n-



n-



n-



n-



n-



n-



n-



n-



n-



n-



n-



n-



n-



n-



n-



n-



n-



n-



n-



n-



n-



n-

Ja



Ja



Ja



Ja



Ja



Ja



Ja



Ja



Ja



Ja



Ja



Ja



Ja



Ja



Ja



Ja



Ja



Ja



Ja



Ja



Ja



Ja









Ratio Average 70-02 Projection









15

As a result, sales of new homes is still weak.

 Sales of new homes (298,000 unit annual rate in July 2011) are historically low,

and will remain low until the housing stock has aligned more closely with the

underlying demographic demand.

 Builders are not building; buyers are not buying.



New Single-Family Homes Sold

1,400

July 2011



1,200







1,000

Thausands of Units (AR)









800







600







400







200



Source: Bureau of Census





0

90



91



92





93



94





95



96





97



98



99





00



01





02



03





04



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06



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11

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20



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20



20





20



20





20



20



20





20



20





20

16

In absolute terms, inventories have declined steadily.

 In absolute terms, the inventory level of new homes has more than fully

corrected. (2.898 SF inventory today)

 The inventory of existing homes for sale is still elevated by a minimum of

750,000 units.

 Neither of these measures include the REO inventory.





For Sale Inventory-New Homes For Sale Inventory-Existing Homes

July 2011 4500

July 2011

700







600 4000







500 3500









Thousands of Units (SAAR)

Thousands of Units (SAAR)









400 3000







300 2500







200 2000







100

1500



Source: Bureau of the Census Source: NAR



0

1000

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11

19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20









17

REO inventory is about unchanged versus a year-ago.

 The REO inventory according to First American is down sharply from its peak in late 2008,

and now totaled about 230,000 units at mid-year.

 Late in 2010, REO units in inventory rose as foreclosure legalities were brought into question.

With this issue now resolved, REO inventories have come down.





REO Inventory

400

June 2011

350









300









250

Thousands of Loans









200









150









100









50



Source: First American





0

Ja 5









Ja 6









Ja 7









Ja 8









Ja 9









Ja 0

Ju 6









Ju 7









Ju 8









Ju 9









Ju 0









1

M 6



M 6









M 7



M 7









M 8



M 8









M 9



M 9









M 0



M 0









M 1



M 1

05









Se 6



N 6









Se 7



N 7









Se 8



N 8









Se 9



N 9









Se 0



N 0

0









0









0









0









1









1

-0







-0









-0

-0

l-0









-0









-0

-0

l-0









-0









-0









-0









-1

0









0









-0

l-0









-0









-1









-1

0









-0

l-0



0









-1

l-1



1









-1

n-









n-









n-









n-









n-









n-

p-









p-









p-









p-









p-









p-

ov









ov









ov









ov









ov









ov

ay









ay









ay









ay









ay









ay

ar









ar









ar









ar









ar









ar

Se



N









18

House prices have over-corrected.

 House prices have over-corrected with respect to both income and rent.

 Good prices relative to income should boost the first-time-buyer market;

good prices relative to rents should boost the investor market.

 Although investors are back in the market, total sales are still weak.



Median House Price vs Avg. HH Income Median House Price vs CPI Rental Component

WFC Mild Recovery May 2011 July 2011

2.5 140







130



2.0



120







1.5 110









Ratio (1981 = 100)

Ratio









100

1.0



90







0.5 80



Sources: History-NAR, Census Bureau, BEA; Forecast-Wells Fargo Bank NA

70

Sources: NAR and BLS; computations are ours.

0.0



60

81 -82 -83 -84 -85 -86 -87 -88 -89 -90 -91 -92 -93 -94 -95 -96 -97 -98 -99 -00 -01 -02 -03 -04 -05 -06 -07 -08 -09 -10 -11

n- n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n

Ja Ja Ja Ja Ja Ja Ja Ja Ja Ja Ja Ja Ja Ja Ja Ja Ja Ja Ja Ja Ja Ja Ja Ja Ja Ja Ja Ja Ja Ja Ja









19

US House Prices

 The Core Logic price indices (blue and green) indicate that prices are

falling on an all-transactions basis and are about stable excluding

distressed sales.

 The implied index for distressed sales (my calculation) shows sharply

falling prices.

FACL House Price Indices --

US July 2011

250







200







150







100







50







0

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011



All Transactions Excluding Distressed Implied Distressed





20

30-Day Delinquency Rates for First Mortgages: Falling.

 The 30-day delinquency rate by vintage shows a marked improvement

since 2007. In each successive vintage, the peak delinquency rate has

been about halved.



First Mortgage 30-Day Delinquency Rate, by Vintage

June 2011

0.18%





0.16%





0.14%

Percent of Number in the Month









0.12%





0.10%

2007

2008

0.08% 2009

2010

0.06% 2011





0.04%





0.02%

Source: Moody's Analytics and Equifax





0.00%

11



13



15



17



19



21



23



25



27



29



31



33



35



37



39



41



43



45



47



49



51



53

1



3



5



7



9









Months On-The-Run



21

Foreclosures Started

 As a result of improved early- and late-stage mortgage delinquency rates,

foreclosures started have declined by 44 basis points since the peak in

early 2009. In percentage terms, this is a 30% decline from the peak.



Foreclosures Started--% of Mortgages

2011Q2

1.60





1.40





1.20





1.00

Percentage Points









0.80





0.60





0.40





0.20



Source : MBA

0.00

79

80

81

82

83

84

85

86

87

88

89

90

91

92

93

94

95

96

97

98

99

00

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

10

11

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

22

Mortgage charge-off rates have peaked.

 Charge-off rates for all residential mortgages and for home equity balances have

peaked. The factors involved are the following:

 Less household financial stress (financial obligations ratio),

 House prices are about stable (excluding distressed sales),

 There is some employment growth, and

 Burnout.

Net Charge-Off Rates Comm'l Banks

3.50

2011Q2



3.00







2.50

Percent of Number









2.00







1.50







1.00







0.50



Source: Federal Reserve





0.00

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011



HEQ All Res

23

24

Case-Shiller Home Price Indices (Through July 2011, Released 9/27/11)









25

Case-Shiller Home Price Index Values for Large MSAs (Through July 2011)









Note: Home values for all individual MSAs were benchmarked to a value of 100 in the year

2000. 26

Existing Home Sales by Month (Not Seasonally Adjusted, Units in Thousands)



The homebuyer tax credit expired on June 30, 2010. Therefore, 2010 August 2011 Existing Home Sales at 502,000 units (not

650 existing home sales were relatively “front-loaded” in the first half of the seasonally adjusted); inventory at 3.6 million units (8.5

year (compared to “normal” years). months of supply)

600 Highest level for the month of August since 2007.

(Units in Thousands, Not Seasonally Adjusted)









550



500



450



400



350



300



250



200



150



100



50



0

J F M A M J J A S O N D

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011



Source: NAR . Note there is likely noise in the NAR data; numbers are estimates. 27

Products and Programs









28

Issues to cover:

 Changes to High-Balance Limits….and our

response





 Is FHA really the only valuable High LTV

option? Let’s go to the video tape.





 Portfolio opportunities … moving from theory

to reality…one step at a time







29

High Balance Changes – What We Know

 Current limits sunset September 30, 2011





 New (Old) formula will supersede current formula





115% of Average Median Home Price not to exceed 150% of

Conforming Conventional Limit





$417,000 x 150% = $625,500





 Impacts 669 Counties nationally and 208 Counties

with current limits > $417,000



30

Nonconforming PCL Simplification

Effective August 22

I. Recommend simplifying eligible funds used to meet PCL requirements









31

Nonconforming PCL Simplification

Effective August 22

I. Recommend simplifying PCL policy by reducing to two levels (10% and 20%)

on loan amounts between $750K and $2MM









32

There are a lot more options than just FHA

Scenario…Property value $170,000 w/Sales Price/Appraised Value $170,000 …credit score 740

(Price Blast 7453 – assume 1% origination fee)



VA FHA Rural Conv BPMI Conv SP Conv LPMI

Housing



Base LTV 100.00% 96.50% 100.0% 95.00% 95.00% 95.00%





Total LTV (includes 102.15% 97.46% 103.63% 95.00% 95.00% 95.00%

MIP/fnd fee)



Note Rate 3.750% 3.750% 3.750% 4.000% 4.000% 4.375%





Base loan amount $170,000 $164,050 $170,000 $161,500 $161,500 $161,500





Total loan amount $173,650 $165,690 $176,166 $161,500 $161,500 $161,500





Down Payment $0 $5,950 $0 $8,500 $8,500 $8,500





Upfront MIP (financed) $3,655 $1,641 $6,165 $0 $4,005 $0





Monthly MIP (year 1) $0 $156 $44 $90 $0 $0





Months MIP Required 0 108 111 94 0 0





Principal & interest $804 $923 $860 $861 $771 $806

(year 1)







33

There are a lot more options than just FHA (Cont’d)

Scenario…Property value $170,000 w/Sales Price/Appraised Value $170,000 …credit score 740

(Price Blast 7453 – assume 1% origination fee)



VA FHA Rural Conv BPMI Conv SP Conv

Housing LPMI



Base LTV 100.00% 96.50% 100.0% 95.00% 95.00% 95.00%









Total loan $173,650 $165,690 $176,166 $161,500 $161,500 $161,500

amount









Principal & $804 $923 $860 $861 $771 $806

interest

(year 1)









34

Future Likely Trend: FHA or MI?

 Private MIs are expanding parameters

 Limited FICO availability down to 660





 Private MIs are Re-Pricing to regain share





 Private MIs are also struggling financially





 FHA is becoming directionally more conservative





 FHA has decreased up-front MIP…..and,





 FHA has increased monthly MIP





 FICO band +/- 600





35

Portfolio Opportunities

 Non-Conforming Investment Properties Program





 Non-Conforming Doctor Program





 Non-Conforming Pricing Options

Purchase Special continues





 Other Opportunities

LTV and Property type considerations

HFI to HFI









36

Tools you are and will use









37

Tools you will use…



 CRM / MS Dynamics Update





 PPO Enhancements









38

PPO…. Looking Forward

 Customer options document / takeaway

piece





 Mobile: Blackberry app for HMCs





 CORE Integration







39

PPO….. Other Recent Adds



 Add 1-2 products to recommendation results

(June 2011)





 Marketing Flyers “engine” (end of 2010)





 Continued credit policy relevance (1-2

updates per month) – local loan limits /

market class / LTV, WFHM + WFHE policy,

etc.



40

2012 Market and Pricing Dynamics



Aka…Batten down the hatches team cause

there’s a storm brewin’









41

Topics:

 State of the GSEs….and the impact on G-fees





 HARP Status





 QM





 QRM





 Reputation Risk









42

FHFA Annual Report to Congress on FNM, FRE, and the FHLBs (Released 6/13/11)





Fannie & Freddie Combined Net Income by Year

1971-2010 ($MM)









According to the FHFA report:



 FHFA again assigned ratings of “Critical Concern” to both FNM and FRE, citing numerous areas of risk concerns;

including credit risk, operational risk, modeling risks, retention of qualified leadership and personnel, and others.

 The GSEs’ combined net loss slowed to ($28B) in 2010. From a longer-term view:

– In the last 4 years (2007-2010), the combined FNM/FRE Net Income was ($236B).

– Between 1971 and 2010 (40 years total), FNM’s and FRE’s combined Net Income was ($130B), or an

average annual Net Income of ($3.3B) per year.

 “The GSEs completed 950,000 loan modifications and other foreclosure alternative actions in 2010”.

 “Although the financial condition and performance of the FHLBanks generally stabilized in 2010, the FHLBanks

continued to be negatively affected by exposure to private-label mortgage-backed securities and declines in

advances”. All FHLBs recorded positive annual profits in 2010.









43

Dodd-Frank Rulemakings (# by Regulator by Deadline Dates)

 The Dodd-Frank 1-year mark is next month, and a number of rule-making deadlines are around that anniversary date in July. Note a large

percentage of the 109 required rulemakings due in 3Q11 for the SEC and CFTC and are related to financial derivatives regulations.

 Several regulators have stated they will miss some of the 3Q11 deadlines (and a number of the previous deadlines have been missed as well).

 Eighty-seven studies are required by Dodd-Frank; 24 have been completed (2 study deadlines have been missed).

 Financial Times: The Financial Services Roundtable recently announced that it has sent more than 100 comment letters to regulatory agencies

regarding the Dodd-Frank Act. "The scope of regulatory activity through Dodd-Frank has been just astounding," said Steve Bartlett, president

and CEO for the Roundtable. In terms of missed deadlines, “The Roundtable’s position is that while agencies are behind in issuing final rules, we

believe it is more important to get rules right than make the statutory deadlines”.









44

Source: Financial Services Roundtable (Davis Polk), Financial Times.

HARP Status



 Set to expire on June 30, 2012… Likely to be

extended





 Does not require legislation to extend





 The “Boxer Rebellion” is not expected to pass… but it

did get the discussion going









45

HARP Status – (Cont’d)



Other Considerations…

 Higher LTVs





 Rep and Warrant Relief





 LLPA Adjustments





 Loans made post May 2009





 The issue of “Re-HARPing”



46

QM…What is it and where did it come from?







The genesis is Dodd-Frank which mandated

no creditor make a mortgage loan without a

reasonable and good faith determination that

the borrower has THE ABILITY TO REPAY

the loan.









47

QM…..(Cont’d)



Ability to Repay can be met in 1 of 4 ways….





1. Determine a general ability to repay





2. Originate a Qualified Mortgage





3. Refinance a non-standard mortgage into a standard

mortgage





4. Originate a balloon payment loan as a QM in a rural

or underserved area

48

QM…..(Cont’d)

Safe Harbor…we desperately need a port in this storm….



 Lenders, Wells Fargo and industry groups believe that clarity or

a bright line set of standards is needed.





 Wells Fargo has suggested a collaborative approach with

industry, consumer groups and regulatory agencies should

occur before the issuance of any final rule





 Two alternatives were presented by the Fed with most industry

participants favoring Alternative 1…with specific suggested

changes.







49

QM….(Cont’d)

Alternative One…broadly defined as:

 No negative amortization, no balloon, no interest only payment

loans nor any term > 30 years





 Total points fees cannot exceed 3% of the total loan amount





 Borrower’s income or assets relied upon in making the ATR

decision are considered and verified





 Underwriting of the mortgage is……

 Based on the maximum rate in the first five years of the loan*

 Uses a fully amortizing payment schedule

 Takes into account any mortgage related obligations.





50

QM…(Cont’d)

Wells Fargo Suggestions include the following:

 Points and Fees Threshold of 3%

3% cap will penalize smaller loans and certain segments of

the market including larger loans in high fee states such as

NY and FL

Including loan originator compensation in the calculation on

Retail loans is double counting and difficult to determine

Affiliate-retained fees do not impact the borrower’s ATR and

may deny benefits to the consumer

Limit of 2 bona fide discount points unnecessarily restricts

consumer options.





 Suggest QM Safe Harbor include certain streamlined refinances



51

QRM….Qualified Residential Mortgage



 QRM is a subset of QM





 Dodd-Frank requires it be no more expansive than QM…it does

not “require” it to be more restrictive





 Many industry groups and associations have staked out a

common definition of QM/QRM as their position





 The Federal Reserve published a preliminary rule in April with

three criteria

 LTV

 DTI

 Credit Profile (not score)





52

QRM….(Cont’d)



Fed Proposal ……now in the hands of the CFPB

 LTV

 Purchase 80%

 Rate and Term Refinance – 75%

 Cash out Refinance – 70%





 DTI - ≤ to 36%





 Credit Profile – an implied FICO of 690 or greater





 QRM is restricted to owner occupants







53

QRM….(Cont’d)

Implications per Inside Mortgage Finance



Current Proposal would place a majority of GSE loan out of QRM status if the

GSES were not in conservatorship

 Of Freddie Mac’s 1st half of 2011 securitization volume, 64% would fail the QRM

test.

 Biggest impact is due to DTI

 36% of Freddie loans exceeded 36% DTI (Wells Fargo 32%)

 19% of Freddie purchase loans exceeded 80% LTV (Wells Fargo 15.4%)

 38% of Freddie refinances exceeded 75% LTB (Wells Fargo 37.6%)

 8% of Freddie loans scored less than a 690 credit score (Wells Fargo 8.4%)

 Less than 5% of Freddie loans were made to investors (Wells Fargo 5.6%)





Wells Fargo’s revised position suggest a 90% LTV with MI and a DTI in

the low 40’s. BofA and Chase are at 80% and varying DTIs.









54

Interest Rates & Opportunities









55

Federal Funds Futures: Low through mid-2013.

 The Fed has told us that it expects to keep short-rates low through mid-

2013.



 The Fed funds futures market has that expectation all priced in.



Fed Funds Futures Prices

September 15, 2011

1.50









1.25









1.00

Percentage Points









0.75









0.50









0.25









0.00

12

12

11









12

12

1









2









12









2









2

11









2









2









12









2

11









12

12

p1









b1









p1









b1

n1









l1









n1

pr









ug

ec









ec

n

ct





ov









ay









ct





ov

ar









Ju

Se









Fe









Se









Fe

Ju

Ja









Ja

O









O

M





A

D









D

M

N









N

A









Source: Bloomberg Oct-21 Jan 20 Mar-22 June 30 Sep-15





56

Spreads: 10 year to 3 month Treasury spread.

 The recent rally at the long end propelled long rates lower, but the yield curve is

still very steep historically. The policy of low interest rates at the short-end of the

yield spectrum is designed to do several things:

 Induce investors to assume more risk,

 Re-capitalize the banking system, and

 Encourage interest-sensitive spending.



 That policy is working, especially on points one and two. (NIM tougher in future)



10Year-3Mo Treasury Spread

August 2011

4.0





3.5





3.0





2.5

Percentage Points









2.0





1.5





1.0





0.5





0.0





-0.5





-1.0



90 9 91 9 92 9 93 9 94 9 95 9 96 9 97 9 98 9 99 0 00 0 01 0 02 0 03 0 04 0 05 0 06 0 07 0 08 0 09 0 10 0 11

19 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

57

Inflation expectations: Still anchored.

 Inflation expectations fell below 200 basis points on September 16.



 Market participants are not concerned that inflation is going to be a problem in the

next 10 years, despite some thought that excessively easy monetary policy could

shortly boost inflation. The evidence is to the contrary.



10-Year TIPs Spread

3.00

September 16, 2011



2.50









2.00

Percentage Points









Sept 16= 195 bps

1.50









1.00









0.50





Source: Federal Reserve, our calculation.



0.00

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011





58

FOMC Decision



 Operation Twist





 And More…..









59

Pricing Survey









60

Pricing Survey









61

Pricing Survey









62

Pricing Survey









63

Pricing Survey









64

Pricing Survey









65

Non-Conforming Purchase Special Results



BASE Volume – August 1 - 30 Promo – August 30 – Sept 24

Avg Daily 0/0 Avg Daily % of 0/0

Locked Locked Change

Region 91 $503,095 87 $499,637 -1% 102





Region 92 $599,665 89 $894,016 +49% 59





Branch $27,215,604 79 $33,778,213 +24% 84

Retail



Conforming $192,020,493 95 $171,197,346 -11% 94

Purchase

Locks









66

67

68

69

Top Purchase & Refinance Retail Lenders for 1H2011 ($B)

$88B

 The top purchase lenders rank-ordered by volume (purple bars) are: WF, BofA, PHH,

Chase, USAA, SunTrust, MetLife, Prime Lending, and US Bank.



 The top refi lenders rank-ordered by volume (green bars) are: WF, Chase, BofA, Citi,

PHH, Quicken, US Bank, PNC, and SunTrust.



 Note Chase’s, Citi’s, and Quicken’s refi volumes were respectively 92%, 87%, and 93%

of their total volume. All three of these firms were significantly over-indexed in

refinances (see chart on next slide).



 Chase was the #2 refi lender, and in fact was the #2 Retail lender in 2Q11 (not shown).

BofA’s Retail share has fallen by close to 50% over the past several years.



$50B * Quicken and USAA purchase/refi splits are estimated using CoreLogic/Marketrac data

$46B (these lenders did not disclose splits to IMF).









$17B

$14B



$11

B $8B $7B

$6B $6B $6B

$5B $4B

$4B $3B









70

Q&A





71



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