The objective of this work:
to examine the geopolitical challenges and opportunities in the region, to
consider priorities in terms of the national interests of each Black Sea (BS) state
as the broader advantages of bilateral and multilateral cooperation among
them, to study the already existing structures for cooperation (institutions of
cooperation)
Delimitation of the studied region (area):
Not only the Black Sea littoral states: Turkey, Georgia, Russia, Ukraine,
Romania, Bulgaria, but also other countries of the region as Albania,
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Greece, Moldova.
1
Introduction
1.Geographic information
The Black Sea (BS) is an inland sea between southeastern Europe and Asia
Minor. It is connected to the Mediterranean Sea by the Bosporus (Turkish
Bogazici) and the Sea of Marmara.
The Black Sea region is thought to have been the original homeland of "Proto-
Indo-European", the progenitor of the Indo-European language, family by some
scholars. Others move the heartland further east towards the Caspian Sea.
In 1997, William Ryan and colleagues from Columbia University published
evidence that a massive flood through the Bosporus occurred about 5600 BC.
The event flooded 60,000 square miles of land, and significantly expanded the
Black Sea shoreline to the north and east. The Black Sea was transformed from
a fresh-water landlocked lake into a salt-water sea connected to the ocean. It
has been popularly suggested that this event was the source of the legend for
Noah's Flood.
Countries bordering on the Black Sea are Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine,
Russia and Georgia. In the present circumstances all the countries of the region
are undergoing economic transition, social adjustment
The most important cities along the coast are: Istanbul (formerly Constantinople
and Byzantium), Burgas, Varna, Odessa, and Sevastopol.
The Black Sea region constitutes the heartland1. The whole landmass has
always been at the cross of East-West, North-South routes. These civilizations
emerged, prospered and disappeared shaping diverse peoples, cultures, reforms
and ideas in the flow of a long history, going back millennia to the Paleolithic and
Caleolithic ages. In ancient times a "Black Sea culture" centering on sea faring
and trade flourished which later was influenced also by the Silk Road, its relics
giving rise to some resemblances in this vast region.
2. After the Cold War
1
In Democratic Ideals and Reality (1904), Mackinder propounded the view of Eurasia as the
geographical pivot and “heartland” of history.
2
In the closing decade of this century, rapid changes captured the Black Sea
region initiating a dramatic transformation in the area. This difficult but
challenging transition, second to none in the world, continues. It has brought the
region to a new threshold. The success of this movement is in the interest of
security and stability both within and outside the Black Sea region.
The geopolitical situation of the Black Sea region has changed radically during
the past ten years. During the existence of the Soviet Union, the Black Sea was
primarily an area of confrontation rather than cooperation. The emergence of
the countries that share the shores of the BS into independence (Ukraine,
Georgia) or into full control of their own political destiny (Romania, Bulgaria) has
given them the opportunity and the freedom to develop relationships with each
other and other BS powers that serve the real interests of their people.
Countries that lack direct access to the sea (Armenia, Moldova) also have
significant stake in arrangements that guarantee their commercial and security
interests. More distant countries, too (Greece, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan,
Turkmenistan) will benefit from the expansion of political, economic and cultural
relations with the region. The two major BS powers, Turkey and Russia, face
risks and opportunities of many kinds as they adjust their relations with each
other and with other countries of the region.
Confrontation of the harsh sense of the Cold War era is no longer the major
feature of the BS relationships, but old habits and attitudes die hard and
longstanding geopolitical factors do not, and cannot rapidly, disappear. Turkish-
Russian rivalry in the BS has a history, which stretches back to at least the 17 th
century.
Relationships between Ukraine and Russia will require years, perhaps decades,
to settle into stability. Nevertheless, cooperation of many kinds has obvious
advantages and all BS states have acknowledged the validity of the concept. Of
necessity, it is occurring on an ad hoc basis. Some promising initiatives nave
been taken to institutionalize cooperative arrangements.
PART I: Principal regional actors and their interests
3
A/ Turkey and the Black Sea
Placed between Europe and Middle East, with the strategic control on
Bosporus2 and Dardanelles Turkey (Turkey) is one of the principal geostrategic
actors of the region. Turkey’s interest in the BS has several dimensions:
ecological, economic, commercial and strategic. They are interconnected.
Ecological
Concern about halting and reversing pollution of the BS is increasing in T.
Pollution has reduced fish catches and has an adverse effect on both domestic
and international tourism. It results in increased pollution in the straits and the
Sea of Marmara. Free-flowing trade among countries with access to the BS
offers Turkey’s own rapidly growing economy many opportunities, which, in
turn, bring mutual benefits for all.
commercial and strategic
The fact that T controls maritime access to the BS continues to be of overriding
significance for both the commercial and strategic interests of all BS
countries.
As a member of NATO3, Turkey will continue to have security responsibilities in
the BS. Turkey aims for closer commercial and cultural relations with all the
countries of the BS region. By the moment no Turkish government is likely to
adopt neo-imperialist, politically expansionist policies in the region or attempt to
interfere in the internal affairs of BS countries in the foreseeable future.
2
The Bosporus (Turkish Bogazici) is a strait which separates the European part of Turkey from
the Asian part by uniting the Sea of Marmara with the Black Sea. There are two bridges across
the strait: the Bogazici (Bosporus I) Bridge (1,074 meters in length and completed in 1973) and
the Fatih Sultan Mehmed (Bosporus II) Bridge (1,090 meters in length, and completed in 1988).
Due to the importance of the strait for the defense of Istanbul, Ottoman sultans constructed a
castle on each side of the strait (Anadoluhisari and Rumelihisari). The strategic importance of
the straits is such that a number of international treaties have agreed to control vessels using
the waters. The current treaty is 1936's Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the
Turkish Straits.
3
Turkey's control of the Dardanelles and Bosporus enabled NATO to control water traffic
between the Black and the Mediterranean Sea.
4
Turkey seems to have a strong engagement to continue it’s present policy of
constructive economic, political, and cultural engagement in the BS region as
well as in the Balkans and the Caucasus, and toward Central Asia as well.
Petroleum transport
It is the most urgent BS problem for Turkey. Turkey is eager to serve as a
conduit for petroleum exports from the countries of the ex-Soviet Union, but
prefers land pipelines across Anatolia to the Mediterranean. It seeks to restrict
tanker traffic through the Turkish straights because of the danger of accidents
that would affect Istanbul, the Sea of Marmara, and the towns of Dardanelles.
Beyond this immediate issue, is Turkey’s concern (which is in some degree
shared by all countries with shores on the BS) that a steady increase in
petroleum transport through any part of the sea will increase pollution that will
eventually affect all parts of this sensitive body of water.
Disputes:
complex maritime, air, and territorial disputes with Greece in Aegean Sea;
Cyprus question with Greece; dispute with downstream riparian states (Syria
and Iraq) over water development plans for the Tigris and Euphrates rivers;
traditional demands regarding former Armenian lands in Turkey have subsided.
B/ Russia and the Black Sea
Russia is a very large country, it has an immense expanse of territory, which
spans both Europe and Asia. The traditional dividing line between the two
continents runs through the Ural Mountains and the Caspian Sea.
On August 24, 1991, the Russian Soviet Republic declared its independence
from the Soviet Union, and changed its name to "the Russian Federation.”
Geographically Russia’s frontage on the BS now extends only from the Sea of
Azov to the border of Georgia, a fraction of that of the Soviet Union.
Historically, Russia’s major interests in the BS have been strategic and
commercial.
Is Russia a neo-imperial power?
5
Russia’ BS interests are harder to analyze, establish, and predict that Turkey’s
because independent Russia has not defined them clearly or consistently. But
there has been a great deal of evidence, both declarative and implied, that
Russia may be the imperial heir of the Soviet Union, in the sense that Russian
military leaders try to maintain the privileged strategic role for Russia in defense
of countries such as Ukraine and Georgia. Tension between Russia and
Ukraine over the status of Crimea continues and may persist.
Russia’s intervention in Abkhasia in 1992-1993 deprived Georgia of effective
sovereignty over the region, caused long lasting economic damage and
enormous human suffering (at least 300.000 refugees). Under circumstances
that imply deliberate coercion Russia subsequently secured base and border
control rights in Georgia and has been given long-term formal base rights and
border-control responsibilities.
The invasion of Chechnya during the winter of 1994-95, the chronic confusion of
the Russia’s approach to the North Caucasus, the most politically volatile part of
the Black Sea geopolitical region.
And the sustained Russian military presence in Moldova likewise gives BS
states (especially Ukraine and Romania) cause for concern about Russia’s
ultimate aspirations in the region.
Russia is still maintaining the Soviet Black Sea Fleet – nowadays it is hard to
justify. The disputes between Russia and Ukraine about dividing the Black Sea
Fleet.
Pollution
The major rivers that contribute to pollution, with exception of the Danube, all
flow in from the north and bring enormous amounts of untreated industrial
waste. Russia participates in all pollution reduction and research projects.
Petroleum transport problem or Russia and the Caspean oil
Russia, the heir of the Soviet Empire, sits on the northern part of the Caspian
Region, occupying 30% of Caspian Sea shores. Although only holds 2.5% of
the total Caspian oil reserves, Russia still considers the Caspian region as a
sphere of influence and is trying to have as many pipelines as possible to cross
its territory to enforce this influence. All existing oil pipelines run through Russia
6
and terminate at Novorossisk on the Black Sea where the oil is shipped to the
world markets. The Russian pipelines system also runs westward toward
Ukraine, Hungary, and Poland and northward to Latvia, on the Baltic Sea. The
Russian influence in the Caspian Region is much more complicated than the
pipelines geographical paths. The following table clearly shows the depth of the
Russian influence in the Caspian states.
Russian Influence In The Caspian States
% / Russian Ethnic Language Religion*
Azerbaijan 2.5% 3% 2.5%
Kazakstan 37% 70% 44%
Turkmenistan 9.8% 12% 11%
Uzbekistan 8.3% 14.2% 9%
Source: http://members.tripod.com/~KELSAGHIR/Caspian/index * Russian Orthodox
Russia’s great influence over the Caspian Region’s States is not, however,
going unchallenged. Azerbaijan, which holds 18.5% of the region’s total oil
reserves and is the first to produce and export petroleum products from the
Soviet Empire, had signed contracts, despite the Russian’s objections, to
construct two pipelines, one to Georgia, on the Black Sea, and the other to
Turkey, on the Mediterranean. To overcome the Russian objections, Azerbaijan
agreed to refurbish the Baku-Novorossisk pipeline in the condition that a bypass
be constructed around Chechnya.
Turkmenistan, the least economically developed state of the former Soviet
union, and due to its proximity from Russia, seems to be enjoying its
independent. The two pipelines negotiated to ship the Turkmen oil and natural
gas are to Turkey via Iranian territory and to Pakistan via the war ravaged
Afghanistan, thus allowing no Russian control whatsoever.
The struggle for ways of transportation and routes of major pipelines is an
integral part of the big game around the Caspian energy resources. Turkey,
Russia and Iran compete to obtain the right to construct a major export pipeline
7
via its territories. Turkey actively upholds the project of constructing a pipeline
via its territory (Ceyhan-Samsun). Russia stands for Baku-Novorossiysk option,
with oil to be farther transported by tankers through Bosporus, or by Bulgarian
pipelines to Greece and further to Europe.
C/ The former URSS republics (Newly Independent States):
Ukraine
Independence was attained in 1991 with the dissolution of the USSR, but true
freedom remains elusive as many of the former Soviet elite remain entrenched,
stalling efforts at economic reform and privatization.
In addition, Ukrainian independence deprived Russia of most of its Black Sea
ports.
Geopolitically, The Black Sea region is critically important for Ukraine both from
the standpoint of its economic interests (resolving the problem of energy
resources, growth of foreign trade turnover, efficient operation of transport
communications) and position of national security of the state.
Oil and gas routes both from Russia and Transcaspian sources, as well as from
Middle East would go via Ukraine to Europe. Therefore, in such situation,
Ukraine becomes a venue of regulation of global geo-economic interests.
Ukraine should address development of favorable conditions for passage of raw
materials and energy resources through its territory, with simultaneous
elaboration of alternative routes of their transportation.
Ukraine’s loss of control over the Black Sea Fleet at present, its withdrawal from
the Balkan markets because of inactivity of the Danube transport network,
difficulties with development of the Caucasian transport and energy corridor,
Odessa oil terminal, etc. – all that reduces the opportunities of Ukraine’s
becoming a regional leader. It is significant to Ukraine to enhance its strategic
positions in the region, as well as to develop closer relationship with countries
whose accession to the European defense system is also problematic, i.e.
Balkan stares and countries of the Caucasian region. Implementation of large-
scale cooperation projects is undoubtedly connected with development of
comprehensive security and stability system in the BS region.
8
Turkey is a promising partner of Ukraine in the BS region, not only because of
the fact that the two countries have the longest coast line in the BS, but, more
significantly, due to the fact that Ukraine and Turkey are two critical factors of
the communicational crossing. Another strategic communicational crossing
integrally connected with the BS region is Transcaucasus. Most important for
Ukraine in that region are large-scale communicational projects in the EU
framework as regards construction of a ring highway around the BS and the
whole system of arterial pipelines to transit oil and gas from Central Asia,
Transcaucasus.
Geostrategically advantageous location of Ukraine provides an opportunity to
establish an additional transport artery to supply oil from the Near East to
Europe. And in this issue the interests of Turkey and Ukraine may coincide.
Construction of the oil pipeline from Odessa to Brodi (at the western border of
Ukraine) provides a possibility to supply oil to Hungary, the Czech Republic,
Slovakia, Poland, and Belarus.
Transport projects
Establishing the Transasian transport network is an important factor of regional
cooperation development. TRACECA project is a major Eurasian transport
corridor with combined use of railways, shipping lanes and air routes.
Disputes: dispute with Romania over continental shelf of the Black Sea under
which significant gas and oil deposits may exist; agreed in 1997 to two-year
negotiating period, after which either party can refer dispute to the ICJ; has
made no territorial claim in Antarctica (but has reserved the right to do so) and
does not recognize the claims of any other nation.
Georgia
9
Georgia is a country on the Black Sea in the Caucasus4 Mountains. Formerly
part of the Soviet Union. Georgia was absorbed into the Russian Empire in the
19th century. Independent for three years (1918-1921) following the Russian
Revolution, it was forcibly incorporated into the USSR until the Soviet Union
dissolved in 1991. After Georgia gained independence, Russian troops still
remain garrisoned at four military bases and as peacekeepers in the separatist
regions of Abkhasia and South Ossetia. The country continues to move toward
a market economy and greater integration with Western institutions.
Armenia
Armenia supports ethnic Armenians in the Nagorno-Karabakh region of
Azerbaijan in the longstanding, separatist conflict against the Azerbaijani
Government; traditional demands regarding former Armenian lands in Turkey
have subsided.
Moldova5
The history of the Black Sea region is known for its complexity: over the
centuries these lands, with their rich nature and favorable climate, represented
a tidbit causing rivalry among close and distant neighbors. Тhe population of the
countries in the region is still ethnically mixed and the borders still divide ethnic
groups. Moldova is not an exception for the region in this context, though it is
not considered a tension zone, especially after the successful settlement of the
Gagauz issue and transformation of the Transnistrian ethnic conflict into a
political one. However, under certain conditions it is the ethnic issue that could
present itself as one of the main security threats not only for this country, but for
its neighbors as well.
Romanians-Moldovans. An equally important security risk is connected with the
unclear ethnic identity of the titular population. Some Moldovans identify
4
The Caucasus is a region in eastern Europe and western Asia which includes the Caucasus
Mountains and surrounding lowlands. The independent nations that comprise today's Caucasus
include Russia, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Large, non-independent areas of the
Caucasus include Abkhazia, Ossetia, Chechnya, and Dagestan, among others. The Caucasus
is one of the most linguistically and culturally diverse places on earth.
5
Regional Dynamics of the Black and Caspian Sea Basins (Conference Summary) September
2-3, 2000 - Odessa, Ukraine
10
themselves with Romanians, while the majority thinks that there is a separate
Moldovan ethnicity. Pro-Romanian parties do not recognize the right of Moldova
to an independent statehood, and advocate for unification of Moldova with
Romania. Therefore, while Moldova is situated outside of the possible route of
the oil pipelines planned by GUUAM6 countries, it still represents a danger for
this project and for the all countries related to it.
D/ Romania
Romania has always been one of the richest countries in the region in terms of
natural resources.
For most of its history foreign powers (including the Ottoman and Austro-
Hungarian Empire) tried to control the country, but Rumanians managed to
maintain a certain degree of independence. It was the only country in the region
that did not fall under Ottoman control.
In modern times, Romania was the first country of Central and Eastern Europe
to have official relations with the European Community: An agreement including
Romania in the community's Generalized System of Preferences in 1974 and
an Agreement on Industrial Products in 1980 were signed. On June 22, 1995
Romania submitted its application for EU membership and on February 15,
2000, negotiations on full membership began. Romania's aim is to gain EU
membership in 2007.
Disputes - dispute with Ukraine over continental shelf of the Black Sea under
which significant gas and oil deposits may exist; agreed in 1997 to two-year
negotiating period, after which either party can refer dispute to the ICJ
E/ Bulgaria
Free elections were held in 1990, and Bulgaria began the contentious process of
moving toward political democracy and a market economy while combating
inflation, unemployment, corruption, and crime. Today, reforms and
6
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine (the GUAM countries). The Republic of Uzbekistan
joined the GUAM countries in April 1999 (GUUAM)
11
democratization keep Bulgaria on a path toward eventual integration into the EU
and NATO.
Bulgaria has generally good relations with its neighbors and has proved to be a
constructive force in the region under socialist and democratic governments
alike. Promoting regional stability, Bulgaria hosted a Southeast European
Foreign Ministers meeting in July 1996 and an OSCE conference on Black Sea
cooperation in November 1995. Bulgaria also participated in the 1996 South
Balkan Defense Ministerial in Albania and is active in the Southeast European
Cooperative Initiative.
With their close historical, cultural, and economic ties, Bulgaria seeks a mutually
beneficial relationship with Russia, on which it is largely dependent for energy
supplies. Sporadic negotiations are underway among Greece, Bulgaria, and
Russia for construction of a gas pipeline from Burgas on the Black Sea to
Alexandropolis to transport Caspian Sea oil.
Bulgaria's EU Association Agreement came into effect in 1994, and Bulgaria
formally applied for full EU membership in December 1995. In 1996, Bulgaria
acceded to the Wassenaar Arrangement controlling exports of weapons and
sensitive technology to countries of concern and also was admitted to the World
Trade Organization. Bulgaria is a member of the Zangger Committee and the
Nuclear Suppliers Group. After a period of equivocation under a socialist
government, in March 1997 an UDF-led caretaker cabinet applied for full NATO
membership, which the current government is pursuing as a priority.
Bulgaria joined NATO's Partnership for Peace in 1994 and applied for NATO
membership in 1997. It is working toward NATO compatibility in
communications and training, and has established a Peacekeeping Training
Center. The military continues to rely on Russia for much of its equipment
needs and spare parts.
F/ Greece
12
After the 1944-49 Greek civil war, Greece joined the Western democracies and
became a member of NATO in 1952. On January 1, 1981, Greece became the
10th member of the European Community (now the European Union).
Greece-Albania
After the fall of the Albanian communist regime in 1991, relations between
Athens and Tirana became increasingly strained because of widespread
allegations of mistreatment by Albanian authorities of the Greek ethnic minority
in southern Albania. A wave of Albanian illegal economic migrants to Greece
exacerbated tensions. The crisis in Greek-Albanian relations reached its peak in
the summer of 1994, when an Albanian court sentenced five members (a sixth
member was added later) of the ethnic Greek organization "Omonia" to prison
terms on charges of undermining the Albanian state. Greece responded by
freezing all EU aid to Albania and deporting tens of thousands of illegal
Albanians. In December 1994, however, Greece began to permit limited EU aid
to Albania, while Albania released two of the Omonia defendants and reduced
the sentences of the remaining four.
Today, relations between the two countries are good, and, at the Albanian
Government's request, about 250 Greek military personnel are stationed in
Albania to assist with the training and restructuring the Albanian armed forces.
Greece-Turkey
Greece and Turkey enjoyed good relations in the 1930s, but relations began to
deteriorate in the mid-1950s, sparked by the Cyprus independence struggle and
Turkish violence directed against the Greek minority in Istanbul. The July 1974
coup against Cyprus's President Makarios - inspired by the Greek military junta
in Athens and the subsequent Turkish military intervention in Cyprus - helped
bring about the fall of the Greek military dictatorship. It also led to the de facto
division of Cyprus. Since then, Greece has strongly supported Greek-Cypriot
efforts, calling for the removal of Turkish troops and the restoration of a unified
state. The Republic of Cyprus has received strong support from Greece in
international forums. Greece has a military contingent on Cyprus, and Greek
officers fill some key positions in the Greek Cypriot National Guard, as
permitted by the constitution of Cyprus.
13
Other issues dividing Greece and Turkey involve the delimitation of the
continental shelf in the Aegean Sea, territorial waters and airspace, and the
condition of the Greek minority in Turkey and the Muslim minority in Greece. In
July 1997, on the sidelines of the NATO summit in Madrid, Greek and Turkish
leaders reached agreement on six principles to govern their bilateral relations.
Within a few months, however, the two countries were again at odds over
Aegean airspace and sovereignty issues. Tensions remain high. However, the
two countries are discussing, under the auspices of the NATO Secretary
General, various confidence-building measures to reduce the risk of military
accidents or conflict in the Aegean.
Part II : From Rivalry to Cooperation
The history of the Black Sea region is known for its complexity: over the
centuries these lands, with their rich nature and favorable climate, represented
a tidbit causing rivalry among close and distant neighbors. Frequent wars cause
the movement of state borders and exchange of population. It is obvious that
the imperfect state, religious and ethnic borders serve as the major destabilizing
factor in the region. A few examples include: Abkhasia in Georgia, Crimea in
Ukraine, Karabakh in Armenian-Azerbaijan relations, the Kurdish issue in
Turkey, and the Hungarian issue in Romania. Of course, ethnic issues are not
the only or the main destabilizing factor in this part of the world. But other
factors, such as the political instability and institutional weakness of the Newly
Independent States, economic problems related to the transition from the
planned economy to a free market, create the need for cooperation between all
the BS region countries that would guarantee their security and commercial
interests.
Priorities for systematic cooperation
There are serious advantages of all BS states working together in all fields of
endeavor for mutual advantage. For many functional purposes, the basic
14
institutional framework for agreement on implementation of priorities has
already been created.
demilitarization
Of overriding importance to all arrangements in the BS region is the basic
concept of gradual demilitarization, through reduction of offensive military
forces.
Given the fact that some BS states (notably Russia) are likely to require
considerable time to develop governmental efficiency and coherence and
implement comprehensive long-range policy-making process, the task of
achieving an agreement on gradual demilitarization of the BS may require
several years.
Military-type purposes:
defense, coast guard functions, regulation of safety of shipping, control of
smuggling, including prohibition of drug and weapons trafficking and
activities of terrorists.
Petroleum transport
Given the various pressures that impact on the petroleum transport situation, it
is the most immediate priority on which agreement needs to be reached.
Turkey’s position on limitation of tanker traffic through the straights and the Sea
of Marmara hardens with each successive shipping incident. It is difficult to
envision circumstances under which an unlimited increase on tanker traffic can
be accommodated. Emphasis, therefore, should be on arrangements for
pipeline transport7 across Anatolia to the Mediterranean.
Oil Strategies
Kazakhstan Has 6 billion to 9 billion barrels of proven oil reserves at Tengiz
field alone - needs to transport the oil to world markets. US-based
Chevron holds $10 billion contract to develop Tengiz.
Azerbaijan Also has massive oil reserves in the Caspian Sea and is repairing
a pipeline through Chechnya to Novorossiysk, Russia, to ship the
7
For more details see Annex 2.
15
oil. Also working on a pipeline through Georgia to bypass Russia.
Turkey Opposed to increased oil shipments through crowded Bosporus
Strait, where Istanbul is located. Wants to build alternate pipeline
to its southern coast, making it "gatekeeper" for Azeri reserves.
Russia Wants to build new pipelines and oil terminal linking Tengiz fields
to Novorossiysk, thereby maintaining influence over Central Asia.
Has proposed a pipeline through Bulgaria and Greece to bypass
Turkey and the Bosporus Strait.
Source: www.csmonitor.com/durable/1997/10/22/intl/intl.5.html - 12k
Environment (Pollution reduction)
Pollution reduction is a both a short- and long-range requirement. The
immediate priority is to enforce measures to keep pollution from worsening.
Simultaneously, urgent research needs to be accelerated to identify the relative
size of sources of pollution and prescribe practical steps for reduction of them.
Provision and instrumentalities for enforcement, including effective penalties for
violation of standards, need to be agreed upon. Bucharest Convention on the
Protection of the Black Sea Against Pollution was signed on 21 of April 1992 (in
force 1994).
trade and other forms of economic exchange
As the economies of the countries of the BS region are reformed and recover,
trade and other forms of economic exchange (transport and services
functions, e.g., investment) between them will naturally expand. These
processes have been evolving for some time. They can be accelerated by
agreements on lowered customs tariffs and simplified procedures which can be
the subject of both bilateral and multilateral consultations.
Tourism
Given the natural attractiveness of the area and its nearness to Central and
Western Europe and The Middle East, one of the most underdeveloped aspects
of the BS region is tourism. Open economies offer enormous possibilities for
16
development of tourist facilities and services, and attraction of capital
investment from both domestic and foreign sources.
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Black Sea Economic Community,
Organization for the Black Sea Economic Community Co-operation, the
Business Council and the Black Sea Bank for Trade and Development promote
the dialogue and co-operation between 11 countries of the Black Sea region -
Turkey, Greece, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova, Ukraine, Russia as well
as Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. BSEC with the collaboration of reputable
international and local cultural organizations are developing different
multinational projects with the objective to create a series of tours in the Black
Sea region featuring historic values and contributing to the interpretation of the
concept of modern Europe.
PART III: Institutions for cooperation
A/ Regional Cooperation between the BS countries
1. BSEC (Black Sea Economic Cooperation)
a) The Initiative for Cooperation Among Black Sea Countries and the
creation of BSEC
After the end of the Cold War period, a question has been posed on whether it
would be possible to convert the area of the Black Sea to one of cooperation
and shared prosperity. Members of the regional countries started to discuss
how to create an area where persons, capital and goods would move freely,
where initiatives for cooperation would come from down to upwards rather than
vice versa, thus allowing roles for states as arranging the legal framework for
such a cooperation area.
The Istanbul Declaration - On June 25, 1992, the Istanbul Declaration was
signed by the Heads of States or Governments of Albania, Azerbaijan, Armenia,
Bulgaria, Romania, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Russian Federation, Ukraine
and Turkey.
17
The Bosphorus Statement - Parallel to this Declaration another very important
document named the Bosphorus Statement was made, which foresaw that
parties would observe the principles of the Helsinki Final Communiqué and
principles of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in
their relations.
These declarations marked two major strategic developments at that historical
period.
1) After the end of the Cold War the Bosphorus Statement constituted the first
commitment of the regional countries to adhere to OSCE principles.
2) Creation of a cooperation area of 20 million square meters situated on a
pivotal location between Europe, Asia, Central Asia and Middle East with a
potential market of 400 million people, with 2nd highest oil and natural gas
reserves of the world, also covering other rich natural resources and qualified
human resources. This important initiative has drawn the attention of many
other countries, particularly in Europe and countries like Austria, France,
Germany, Italy as well as Egypt, Israel, Poland, Slovakia and Tunisia started to
follow the activities of this initiative under observer status. Today more than 9
countries have applied for observer status to the organization whilst some are
in the row to become full members.
The initiative developed its structural framework on March 15,1995 with the
decision of its members to establish a Secretariat in Istanbul. Furthermore, the
Charter was concluded at the Summit Meeting in Yalta, on June 5, 1998 and
ratified by the respective parliaments by May 1,1999.
Thus,
a) BSEC was transformed into a regional economic organization with an
international legal identity and
b) member states by their ratification of the Charter, confirmed their permanent
commitments to the future of the organization.
Following the adoption of the Charter, with the conclusion of the Headquarters
Agreement, the Protocol Relating to the Immunities and Privileges, the Staff
Rules and Regulations, the organizational process has been completed.
b) 5 different levels for cooperation:
18
governmental
parliamentary
private enterprise
banking and finance
academic-scientific
Cooperation at the intergovernmental level
The Permanent International Secretariat (PERMIS) of BSEC is the basic organ
maintaining coordination among member states under the general policy
guidance of the Chairperson-in-Office and is located in Istanbul. The Secretariat
also coordinates the activities of the Working Groups and provides all the
necessary correspondence. Activities of the Organization are pursued under
different Working Groups named as follows: Working Group on Economic and
Trade Development, Working Group on Tourism Cooperation , Working Group
on Communication, Working Group on Environmental Protection, Working
Group on Agriculture and Agricultural Industry, Working Group on Energy,
Working Group on Electronic Communication Network, Working Group on
Scientific and Technological Cooperation, Working Group on Statistical
Information and Data Exchange, Working Group on Health Care and
Pharmaceutics, Working Group on Transport, Working Group on Emergency
Assistance, Working Group on Combating Crime.
Cooperation at the Interparliamentary Level
The BSEC Parliamentary Assembly (PABSEC), consisting of parliamentarians
of member countries, is established in Istanbul and serves as a consultative
organ for decision making. It has a separate international Secretariat and works
in 3 committees in the following fields;
a) economic, commercial, technical and environmental relations.
b) legal and political relations.
c) educational, cultural and social relations.
19
Cooperation at the Private Enterprise Level
The BSEC Business Council consisting of private enterprise representatives of
member countries also has a permanent Secretariat stationed in Istanbul.
The Council, headed by a Secretary General is run by a Board of Directors,
composed of representatives from the business circles of member states. The
Business Council tries to act as a center to create and support the infrastructure
for private sector in the region and incubate business opportunities within the
BSEC process.
Cooperation at the Banking and Financial Level
The Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (BSTDB) established in
Thessaloniki, Greece, on June 21, 1999, forms the financial pillar of BSEC. The
Bank's initial capital is provided on the basis of specified shared-quotas
purchased by participating states amounting to 300 million dollars. By the
purchase of the remaining shares, this initial capital will be raised to 1.5 billion
dollars. Turkey, Greece and Russian Federation are the main share holders
with 16.5% shares respectively. The Bank has succeeded in providing a
financial resource of 102 million dollars to different regional projects, particularly
those relating to interregional trade.
Cooperation at Academic Level
BSEC countries are faced with rapid and complex pace of technological
innovation in the world. They are working closely in identifying new forms and
directions of regional scientific and technological cooperation and in applying
the achievements of science and technology in priority fields of economic
interests. To achieve these objectives, the BSEC Working Group on
Cooperation in Science and Technology makes efforts to create the policy
framework of cooperation in this area.
a) The BSEC Standing Academic Committee was established in 1998
and adopted guidelines for further promoting academic cooperation in the
BSEC region and identified joint scientific projects.
20
b) The International Center for Black Sea Studies (ICBSS) was
established in September 1998, in Athens, to carry out policy
oriented and practical researches for the realization of BSEC
goals, specially in the fields of economics, industry and
technology.
c) The Black Sea Universities Network was initiated by the Black
Sea Foundation of Romania in 1997, now embraces some 53
universities in the region. Its goals are to identify and enhance
intellectual resources badly needed by sustainable development,
to plan common research and training projects and represent in
the best way the intellectual produce of the region.
In addition to these, BSEC has the Statistical Data and Economic Information
Coordination Center working with the Turkish State Statistical Institute.
Achievements of BSEC
During the past 10 years, BSEC member states have faced serious economic
challenges individually. In fact, most of them have gone through the process of
transition to democracy and liberal economy, have dealt with serious issues
such as internal conflicts relating to ethnic cultural differences, immigration
problems, lack of sufficient funds.
Some members have given priority to EU membership or to participating in
other regional cooperation frameworks such as the Stability Pact, SECI,
Royaumont Process etc. In spite of these challenges BSEC has covered
considerable ground which may be summarized as follows:
-Member countries with ongoing political conflicts among them have succeeded
to seek common economic goals within a common spirit of cooperation.
-BSEC has converted this area of reciprocal non-confidence into an area of
confidence which will serve as a basis of future cooperation. BSEC Members'
efforts for economic integration have also served transparency and democracy
in the respective countries.
21
-A permanent dialogue has been established between members through
BSEC.
-Previously untouchable questions such as organized crime, illicit trafficking of
narcotic drugs are being handled through BSEC
-The efforts of economic cooperation through BSEC have brought member
states closer to European contemporary standards.
-BSEC has acted as a bridge between Europe and the Caucasus which is
faced with risks comparable to the Balkans.
-BSEC has aroused the world's, the EU's and US interests in the region, with its
combined potential in different areas.
2. BLACKSEAFOR (Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group)
Six Black sea countries, that is Turkey, Russia, Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria
and Georgia, signed the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group
(Blackseafor) agreement on Monday, April 2, 2001, in Istanbul.
With this Agreement, these countries of the Black Sea came together for the
first time in the history of the region, to pool their naval forces into a joint
formation for humanitarian and environmental causes. The signing of this
Agreement is a testimony to the countries' determination to bring the
BLACKSEAFOR into life after a relatively short span of time in two years.
The idea of such a co-operation was spearheaded by Turkey, as part of its
22
foreign policy which is based on fostering and maintaining regional co-operation
and friendship, as reflected in the words of Atatürk, the founder of the modern
Turkey, “peace at home, peace in the world”. "The task group does not aim to
constitute an alliance against other countries or international organizations. It
only targets increasing cooperation between Black Sea countries. But the task
group can cooperate with international organizations like the U.N. and the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The group will be
created only by the participation of the countries' navy forces. There will be no
definite headquarters for the task group, contrary to the Turkish media stating
that Istanbul will have permanent Blackseafor headquarters. The headquarters
will be in the president country," said an official close to the government. 8
The BLACKSEAFOR initiative aims at increasing peace and stability in the
Black Sea as well as promoting regional co-operation. All items in the
Agreement are consistent with the purposes and the principles of the United
Nations Charter. Furthermore, it is stipulated that the BLACKSEAFOR is neither
directed against any state nor intended to form a military alliance against any
state or a group of states.
It is intended to promote naval co-operation, as well as providing an on-call
force to carry out certain tasks including
(1) Search and rescue operations,
(2) Humanitarian assistance operations,
(3) Mine counter measures,
(4) Environmental protection operations,
(5) Goodwill visits,
(6) Any other tasks agreed by all Participating Nations.
The BLACKSEAFOR is intended to operate in the Black Sea, but can also
be deployed elsewhere, should the Parties choose to do so. The
BLACKSEAFOR may also be available for the UN and/or OSCE-mandated
operations. Similarly, it can participate in other types of international
activities in accordance with the aims and tasks of the BLACKSEAFOR
Agreement.
8
http://www.photius.com/blackseafor/
23
The BLACKSEAFOR stands as a very timely initiative; all the countries
involved in it will be able to carry out humanitarian and environmental
operations in and around the Black Sea. The BLACKSEAFOR will also
permit better co-ordination in the event of a tragic incident at sea. This is
particularly praise-worthy as the countries of the Black Sea were rivals until
a decade ago.
3. GUUAM Group
GUUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova) was set up in
1997 as a political, economic and strategic alliance designed to strengthen the
independence and sovereignty of its members, who sought mechanisms of
interaction outside Russian influence. Uzbekistan joined the group in 19999.
The GUUAM project is an attempt to structuralize the post-Soviet area through
multilateral teamwork without Russia’s participation. GUUAM became the first
organization within CIS to remove the misbalance caused by different weight
categories of members of the post-Soviet community. GUUAM does not
compete with CIS, but attempts to balance Moscow’s congenital hegemony
within CIS. This corresponds to strategic interests of small and medium
member-states of the Commonwealth. That is why, the establishing of GUUAM
could be regarded as a sign of crystallization of collective interests in the CIS
area that are different from those of Russia (and not necessarily antagonistic to
Russia). For Ukraine, GUUAM continues to be a potential field of realization of a
leader mission. Georgia openly hopes namely for such role on the part of
Ukraine. A link with that country could be quite useful in view of the fact that
both states aspire to integrate into the European and Euro-Atlantic community.
However, a leading mission in GUUAM would require Ukraine’s ability to
conduct a truly independent foreign policy. And that task proved to be beyond
9 Uzbekistan has decided to pull out of the alliance of GUUAM. It formally notified embassies of the other members of
the group, which also includes Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova — that it was leaving the organization.
(14.06.2002)
24
Ukraine’s strength in 2001. As a result, after the June summit, cooperation
within GUUAM was in fact preserved at the existing level and nearly frozen by
the yearend. Serious deterioration of relations with Moldova and unwillingness
to interfere into the Russian-Georgian conflict resulted in theу paralysis of this
subregional project.
During the five years of cooperation GUUAM group became an important
structure, which looking to enhance regional economic cooperation through
development of an Europe-Caucasus-Asia transport corridor. It has also
become a forum for discussion on various levels of existing security problems,
promoting conflict resolution and the elimination of other risks and threats.
Cooperation among delegations of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine
started in 1996 in Vienna, Austria, at the CFE Treaty Conference, where four
states issued joint statements and proposed common initiatives.
On October 10, 1997, the Presidents of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and
Ukraine met in Strasbourg during summit of the Council of Europe and stated
their mutual interest in developing bilateral and regional cooperation, European
and regional security, political and economic contacts.
In the Joint Communiqué issued, the Presidents stressed the importance of the
four nations cooperation in establishing a Eurasian, Trans-Caucasus
transportation corridor (TRACECA), and underscored the importance of
strengthening the four-lateral cooperation “for the sake of a stable and secure
Europe guided by the principles of respect for the sovereignty, territorial
integrity, inviolability of state frontiers, mutual respect, cooperation, democracy,
supremacy of law and respect for human rights.” The leaders of the countries
agreed to undertake joint efforts in order to overcome the difficulties that Europe
faces on the threshold of the 21st century.
On September 6, 2000, at the meeting in New York in connection with the UN
Millennium Summit, the Presidents of GUUAM countries pledged to intensify
multilateral cooperation within the framework of GUUAM by giving it a multilevel
character. To this aim, it was deemed expedient to convene regular summits at
the level of Heads of State at least once a year, and meetings at the level of
25
Ministers for Foreign Affairs at least twice a year. The Committee of National
Coordinators (CNC) shall hold regular sessions on a quarterly basis.
To foster favorable conditions conducive to economic growth among the
participating states, mutually beneficial trade relations, and implementing
complex multilateral programs and projects in the fields of production,
commerce, energy, transport, the economy, international credit and
financial cooperation, border, customs and fiscal services,
communications, science, technology education and culture, direct
contacts between different state bodies and departments of the respective
agencies of the GUUAM Group Member States will be established.
There are joint decision of GUUAM states to promote development and
improvement, at different levels, of mechanisms of multilateral cooperation in
the framework of GUUAM, including at the level of the executive and legislative
branches, business circles, non-governmental and humanitarian organizations
and mass media.
GUUAM countries also agreed to strengthen and improve the mechanisms of
consultations and coordination of actions within the framework of international
organizations, and to promote actively the practice of joint statements at various
levels.
Political cooperation within the GUUAM Group
In November, 1997, as a result of consultations of the deputy foreign ministers a
joint protocol was signed in Baku, Azerbaijan. In particular, understandings
were reached among the four states to continue close cooperation in the
following fields: political interaction and cooperation; interaction in the field of
peaceful settlement of conflicts and cooperation in combating separatism;
cooperation in the field of peacekeeping activities; cooperation in the field of
development of a Eurasian Transcaucasian transport corridor; and interaction
within the framework of processes of integration to Euro-Atlantic and European
structures of security and cooperation.
Inherent in the latter two missions was a pledge to assist each other in
implementation of concrete projects in the field of production and
26
transportation of oil and gas, and the establishment of a special
partnership and dialogue with NATO on issues of mutual interest. The
essential part of cooperation will be the security of the Eurasian corridor where
the GUAM Group and Central Asian Group have great possibilities for
interaction.
Member-States also pledged to work for peaceful settlement of regional
conflicts on the basis of principles of respect for the sovereignty, territorial
integrity and inviolability of the borders of all states.
These countries also pledged to adhere to combating aggressive nationalism,
separatism and international terrorism, while continuing their interaction in
peacekeeping and other missions with the United Nations, the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as well as NATO
(Partnership for Peace), the Council of Europe, the Joint Consultative Group
of States-Parties to the CFE Treaty, and WEU (Western European Union).
4. SECI (Southeast European Cooperative Initiative)
The Participating States of the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative
held an inaugural meeting in Geneva on December 5-6, 1996 and formally
adopted the SECI Statement of Purpose on December 6, 1996. On December
19, 1996, as authorized by the Participating States, the OSCE Chairman-in-
Office (Swiss Federal Councilor Flavio Cotti), named Dr. Erhard Busek, former
vice-chancellor of Austria, as SECI "High-Level Personality", hereinafter
Coordinator.
The SECI Participating States include: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Hungary, Moldova, Romania, Slovenia, The
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey and, as of December 2000,
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
The impetus behind the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) is
encouraging cooperation among its Participating States and facilitating their
27
integration into European structures.
SECI is not an assistance program. It does not interfere with, but rather
complements with existing initiatives. SECI endeavors to promote close
cooperation among the governments of the region and to create new channels
of communication among them.
Furthermore, SECI attempts to emphasize and coordinate regionwide planning,
identify needed follow-up and missing links, provide for better involvement of
the private sector in regional economic and environmental efforts, help to create
a regional climate that encourages the transfer of know-how and greater
investment in the private sector, and assist in harmonizing trade laws and
policies.
The United States, determined to advance support mechanisms for the Dayton
Peace Agreement and to develop a viable exist strategy from the region,
advocated the idea to promote regional economic and environmental
cooperation among the countries of Southeast Europe. SECI was launched on
the basis of "Points of Common EU-U.S. Understanding"10.
SECI shall not interfere with existing plans, projects, or initiatives, and shall
interact with other initiatives for regional co-operation in southeastern Europe,
including those launched by the European Union, by the Sofia Declaration on
Good-Neighborly Relations Stability, Security and Cooperation in the
Balkans (July 1996), the Central European Initiative, and the Black Sea
Economic Cooperation. It shall seek to complement them by
(a) providing for close cooperation among the governments of the region
(b) emphasizing region-wide planning
(c) identifying needed follow-up and missing links
(d) providing for better involvement of the private sector in the regional
economic and environmental effort
(e) helping create a regional climate that encourages the participation of the
private sector.
10
For more details see Annex 1
28
SECI shall authorize a High-Level Personality (HLP) to follow up on the
decisions taken by the representatives of the participating states and to facilitate
the implementation of projects. The HLP shall assist SECI members to ensure
that decisions are effectively implemented. SECI will seek to make
arrangements which will allow the HLP to be assisted by the staff of the United
Nations Economic Commission for Europe (ECE). In this regard the HLP shall
coordinate closely with the chairman and the Executive Secretary of the ECE.
The international financial institutions, the EU, the U.S., and other interested
parties would be welcome to assist SECI if they so wish by providing their
expertise on an ad hoc basis in relation to individual projects. Further, it is
SECI's objective to attract the private sector to participation in SECI activities.
5. CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States)
The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is an alliance of 12 of the 15
former Republics of the Soviet Union (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,
Ukraine, and Uzbekistan).
The three non-members are Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.
The Agreement on establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) was signed on 8 December 1991 in Viskuli, by the leaders of the
Republic of Belarus, Russian Federation and Ukraine.
On 21 December 1991 in Alma-Ata the heads of eleven sovereign states
(except the Baltic states) signed the Protocol to the above Agreement, in which
they stressed that the Azerbaijan Republic, Republic of Armenia, Republic of
Belarus, Republic of Kazakstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Republic of Moldova,
Russian Federation, Republic of Tajikistan, Republic of Uzbekistan and Ukraine
on equality basis established the Commonwealth of Independent States.
The participants of the meeting have unanimously adopted the Alma-Ata
Declaration, which confirmed the devotion of the former union republics to
cooperation in various fields of external and internal policies, and
announced the guarantees for implementation of international commitments of
the former Soviet Union. Later, in December 1993 the Commonwealth was
29
joined by Georgia. Thus, at present the CIS comprises 12 young sovereign
states - former soviet republics.
The CIS performs its activities on the basis of the Charter, adopted by the
Council of Heads of States on 22 January 1993, which stipulates the goals and
principles of the Commonwealth, rights and obligations of the countries, which
established it voluntarily.
In the document they stated, that the Commonwealth was formed on the basis
of sovereign equality of all its members and that the member states were
independent and equal subjects of the international law. The CIS, the Charter
stated, serves further development and strengthening of relations of friendship,
good neighborhood, inter-ethnic accord, trust and mutual understanding and
cooperation between states.
The Commonwealth is not a state, it does not have supranational powers. In
September 1993 the heads of states signed the Treaty on establishment of the
Economic Union, in which they developed the concept of transformation of
economic interaction within the Commonwealth, taking into consideration the
current realities. The Treaty was based on the necessity of formation of the
common economic space on the principles of free movement of goods,
services, workers, capitals; elaboration of concerted money and credit, tax,
price, customs and foreign economic policies; rapprochement of the methods of
management of economic activities, creation of favorable conditions for
development of direct production links.
B/ Cooperation with other international organizations
Black Sea region and NATO
After the Second World War Black Sea region became a region of confrontation
between the USSR and NATO. After the collapse of the Soviet block has come
a period of cooperation but at the same time a period when countries shoud
have decided how to develop. East or West? If in n economic sphere we can
say that all countries chose a way to market economy and close cooperation, so
not all were so unanimous in political and military sphere.
30
The common aim of the foreign policies of many Black Sea countries is to join
the European security architecture. So we can present a situation in which a
region of Russian strategic interests and region of NATO-USSR confrontation
becomes a region of clear NATO influence.
Turkey is a member state of NATO since 1952. Poland, Hungary, Czech
Republic are already members of NATO and they are the closest neighbors of
the Black Sea countries. The Romanian government has political will and takes
drastic steps to join EU and NATO and it can take place in the near future.
Bulgaria has the same goal and prospects.
Ukraine and Moldova, in contrast to Romania, do not have such political
conditions. They iffer from Romania in that thay are still within the sphere of
Russia’s influence and have based their policies of integration into the
European security architecture on the common conditions and possibilities
within the framework of certain regional structure. The most acceptable form of
such cooperation may be to develop and improve the cooperation within the
GUUAM. The advantage of GUUAM cooperation is that this association allows
its member-states to take into account their individual military, military-technical
and political interests.
Another form of independent security system in BS region is BLACKSEAFOR.
So we can say that not only economic problems make the countries of the
region cooperate. Security is the basis of the modern international relations,
security understood as stability and prosperity.
NATO has serious interests in the BS region and maintains the position that
stability is not possible without the Alliance. NATO’s cooperative approach to
security has resulted in the creation of close relations with non-NATO countries
through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the Partnership for Peace
initiative, the NATO- Russia Permanent Joint Council, the NATO- Ukraine
commission, and the Mediterranean Dialogue. All these play an essential role in
establishing the multilateral and bilateral links.
The EAPC brings together the 19 member countries of NATO plus 27 countries,
and among them such Black Sea states as : Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Belarus, Bulgaria, Georgia, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Romania, Russia,
Ukraine and Uzbekistan. It is n ot only countries that directly face the Black Sea
but which also have state interests there.
31
While the EAPC is a multilateral forum , it also serves as th political framework
for the Partnership for Peace (PfP), a major programme of bilateral cooperation
between NATO and individual Partner Countries.
Conclusions
There are different kinds of cooperation in the Black Sea region – economic,
political , military, cultural, etc.; and the main reason for them is desire to live
better, and any thoughts of confrontation or neo-imperial attitudes are unviable.
So East or West? NATO or Russia ? Regional collective security system or
Common European Security architecture?
Most of the Black Sea countries have already come to the conclusion that
common peace, stability and security can be just through their own stability,
than regional, than common. We can’t reach the last goal without passing all
previous levels.
32
ANNEX 1: Final Points of Common EU - US Understanding
1. The purpose of SECI is to enhance regional stability through the
development of economic and environmental cooperation throughout the
region, in particular by involving the private sector in these activities.
2. SECI should complement other initiatives in the region, including the
process of stability and good-neighborliness in Southeast Europe
launched by the EU, and should not duplicate them. The closest
coordination and cooperation possible should be sought with other
initiatives in the region, which aim at enhancing economic and
environmental cooperation there.
3. All the countries of the region will be invited to participate in SECI.
However, participation by the FRY will be subject to the understanding
that it will be without prejudice to any limitations now in place on the
FRY’s participation in international organizations or any other current
restrictions on the FRY until conditions for their removal have been met.
Nor would FRY participation modify the respective EU and U.S. policies
concerning normalization of the relations of the FRY with the
international community.
4. The participants in SECI will select a high-level personality to facilitate
the activities of SECI. The participants in SECI may decide to approach
the OSCE Chairman-in-Office of use his good offices with regard to the
selection and naming of such a high-level personality. The EU would
prefer that the high-level personality comes from the region. If a suitable
33
personality cannot be identified within the region, an alternative could be
an individual from another European state.
5. The necessary secretarial and other professional support for the high-
level personality will be worked out by the participants in consultation
with the high-level personality, the U.S., the EU and, where appropriate,
relevant international organizations.
6. SECI will focus on projects which will not compete with those of other
international initiatives or institutions, including particularly the EU’s
policies and projects in the region (e.g., regional approach, pre-
accession strategy). SECI will be informed of the projects developed by
the Union, the U.S. and others, but will not have any oversight of them.
SECI will ensure that the EU and others providing assistance are
informed of SECI’s work.
7. The international financial institutions, the EU and the U.S. may
participate in SECI projects on a case-by-case basis. They may assist
SECI by providing their expertise.
8. SECI will not imply the provision of additional public financial
commitments. Accordingly, the participating states of SECI will be
advised not to use SECI as a basis for requesting EU or U.S. funding.
9. The timing of the launching of SECI will need to be considered in the light
of developments in the region, in particular the outcome of the 14
September elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
34
ANNEX 2: Pipeline projects around the Black sea
Source: Le Monde diplomatique (Paris), 2001
ANNEX 3: The new strategic European pattern
35
Sources : European international organizations secretariats, October 2000
Bibliography:
A/ Organizations :
36
www.bsec.org
www.ceinet.org
www.blackseafor.org
www.unece.org/seci
www.secipro.org
www.secibso.gr
www.secinet.org
www.secinet.org
www.guuam.org
http://www.unep.ch/seas/main/blacksea/bsconv.html
B/ Governmental:
www.brama.com/ukraine-embassy/1005pre.html
www.mfa.gov.tr
www.seciturk.org.tr
C/ Newspapers and magazines:
www.csmonitor.com
http://bscrap.by.ru/
http://www.cisstat.com/eng/cis.htm
http://www.cis.minsk.by/english/engl_cis.htm
http://www.irex.org/programs/conferences/odesa/proceedings.htm
D/ Publications and studies:
http://www.seecp.gov.mk/participants.htm
37
http://www.traceca.org/marco/mp66.pdf (Marco Polo, “Geopolitics of transport
and energy corridors: a view from Ukraine”, by Boris Parakhonsky)
http://members.tripod.com/~KELSAGHIR/Caspian/index (CASPIAN SEA
REGION: The Checkerboard of Oil & Minefields, University of Michigan –
Dearborn, Summer 1998, by Khalil el-Saghir)
38