CRITICAL PATH APPROACH TO
COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS
BY
D. J. LAMB AND P. F. O'NEILL
OPERATIONAL RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS
NATIONAL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS
OTTAWA, CANADA
OUTLINE OF PRESENTATION
DEFINITIONS
PARADIGMS
METRICS AND MEASURES
TIMELINES
CF LAND FORCE EXAMPLE
CF AIR FORCE EXAMPLE
CONCLUSIONS
DEFINITIONS
0 COMMAND
(1) THE AUTHORITY VESTED IN AN INDIVIDUAL O F THE ARMED
FORCES FOR THE DIRECTION, COORDINATION, AND CONTROL
OF MILITARY FORCES.
(2) THE EXERCISE OF AUTHORITY AND DIRECTION BY A PROPERLY
DESIGNATED COMMANDER OVER ASSIGNED FORCES IN THE
ACCOMPLISHMENT OF A MISSION.
-2-
CONTROL
(1) THE AUTHORITY EXERCISED BY A COMMANDER OVER PART OF
THE ACTIVITIES OF SUBORDINATE ORGANIZATIONS, OR OTHER
ORGANIZATIONS NOT NORMALLY UNDER HIS COMMAND,
WHICH ENCOMPASSESS THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR
IMPLEMENTING ORDERS OR DIRECTIVES. ... MAY BE
TRANSFERRED OR DELEGATED.
(2) COMMAND AND CONTROL FUNCTIONS ARE PERFORMED
THROUGH AN ARRANGEMENT OF PERSONNEL, EQUIPMENT,
COMMUNICATIONS, FACILITIES AND PROCEDURES EMPLOYED
BY A COMMANDER IN PLANNING, DIRECTING, COORDINATING,
AND CONTROLLING FORCES AND OPERATIONS IN THE
ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE MISSION.
CCIS
A COMMAND, CONTROL, AND INFORMATION SYSTEM (CCIS) IS
AN INTEGRATED SYSTEM COMPRISED OF DOCTRINE,
PROCEDURES, ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE, PERSONNEL,
EQUIPMENT, FACILITIES AND COMMUNICATIONS WHICH
PROVIDES AUTHORITIES AT ALL LEVELS WITH TIMELY AND
ADEQUATE DATA TO PLAN, DIRECT AND CONTROL THEIR
ACTIVITIES.
-3-
C"1"
m = 3 COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS (C3)
m = 4 C3 + COMPUTERS
n = l INTEL
n = 2 INFORMATION
ADDITIONAL TERMS FOR COMMAND & CONTROL
+ m 1 5 COORDINATION, CAPABILITY, COMPATABILITY,
CONSULTATION, ...
n 2 3 INTEROPERABILITY, INTEGRATION/FUSION, ...
IRRELEVANT TERM FOR COMMAND & CONTROL
COMMAND DESTRUCT SIGNAL
-4-
PARADIGMS
0 SPCDA (LAWSON)
SAGSPD (MORS NPG WORKSHOP)
0 MCES
0 HEAT
0 ACCES
0 SHOR
C2RM (MAYK&RUBIN)
METRICS AND MEASURES
MOPS
BIT ERROR RATE; END TO END DELAY
PDET; PFA; COVERAGE VOLUME
MOEs
No OF TARGETS DESTROYED PER DAY
SURVIVABLXTY
MOFEs
BDE SUCCESS AT BREACHING MINEFIELD
MOPES
VICTORY OR DEFEAT; TERMS; IMPACT ON FUTURE
2
\ V
C0"lml ' .Cl
f SCMSC 1
Launch under attack timeline.
U W C N Of
SOVIE1 I C I Y .
AND SLIMS
IMPACTS FROM
;LO~~.INAsLBY. , K*Y
IMPACTS
4 r?
ATTACK 4
0 5 10 1s 20 2s 30 YlNS
SAlLLLIlES RADARS
DETECT DETECT
LAUNCHES SLIM.
I I I I
D E ECTION
I
I
I I I 1 1
+
0 5 10 1s 20 25 30 YINS
NUCLEAR D E l E C l l O N S V S I L Y
DETECTS SLBM DElONAlIONS
P w P a n E AND
CONflRYAlION: IRANSY11
ASSEMILL LYERGEWCI
m s i nmu.LEvLL ACllON LAUWC.
DElONAlION MESSAGE SL OUE.Cf
LAUNCH
UNDER
ATTACK
,A h I
ACTIONS
ASSEYBLL DECISION DLCOOL AND ~ 1 R S 1YSSllt
LOW LEVEL AUlMtNflClff . .10 L A 5 1
I ,
LEAOLRS YI.
-e Diaanm Derived from US Army Declslon M o m
nand Brlaade Planning
b/ y- A--.
FIGHTER GROUP DEPLOYMENT PLAN 360 (1992)
DEPLOYMENT OF FIGHTER AIRCRAFT TO
FORWARD OPERATING LOCATIONS:
Comox, B.C. 1
Inuvik, NWT 1 from Cold Lake, Alberta
Yellowknife, NWT I
lqaluit, NWT 1 from Bagotville
Goose Bay, Labrador I Quebec
NORAD AIR SOVEREIGNTY MISSION
ANALYSIS CARRIED OUT ON 1992 VERSION OF THE PLAN
by Operational Research Field Station
Fighter Group / Canadian NORAD Region HQ
FIGHTER GROUP DEPLOYMENT PLAN 360 (1992)
SIMPLIFIED PERT VIEW
U
.
.
SIMPLIFIED PERT VIEW WAS EXPANDED
TO AN APPRORIATE LEVEL OF DETAIL
WARNING PHASE: AIRLIFT OF ADVANCE PARTIES TO FOLs I
CF-18 LOAD CONFIGURATION & PREPARATION I
ATG RECALL OF CC130S & KC-130s I
RECONFIGURATIONOF CC130s & KC130s I
DEPLOYMENT OF CT-33s TO FOLs I PRINCIPAL
ATCCU PREPARATION FOR AIRLIFT 1 SUB-STEPS
I MODELLED
DEPLOYMENT PHASE: I
AIRLIFT OF PERSONNEL & MATERIEL TO FOLs I
CF-18 FINAL PREPARATION & DEPLOYMENT I
KC-130 FINAL PREPARATION & DEPLOYMENT I
FINDINGS
AIRLIFT COULD NOT BE COMPLETED WITHIN THE TARGET
COMPLETION TIME
IMPACT OF SHORTFALLS MIGHT BE MINIMIZED BY:
LOAD PRlORlTlZTlON
DESTINAT1ON PRIOR ITI AT ION
2
INCREASED DAILY FLYING RATES
AUGMENTING AIRLIFT ASSETS
A2
The ABCA Scenario - Issues for Analysis
Mr. William J. Krondak
TRADOC Analysis Center
Scenario and Wargaming Center
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027
Abstract
The Scenario and Wargaming Center has supported the American, British, Canadian and
Australian (ABCA) Quacfripartite Working Groups (QWG) with scenario effortsfor more than ,
twoyears. 7he scenarios are designed to assist the ABCA QWG develop conceptsfor
standardization agreements and plans that allow those nations to cooperate in engagements
rangingfiom operations other than war (OOrw) to mid-intensity conventional battles. This
paper briefly describes the background of the most recent scenario eflort, the scenario
development criteria, the scenario overview, and some analytical issues that the scenario
supports. The scenario provides a realistic, reasonable, and robust settingfor examining the
activities of rapidly deployed ABCA forces at brigade, division, and corps level. It generates
opportunitiesfor analysis o doctrine, organization, equipment, and command and control issues
f
across a Jpectrum o combat intensity. The scenario allows exploration o such topics as
f f
winning the information war and dealing with c o m m d , control, communications, and
intelligence (C3I) in a multinationalforce.
1: Introduction
1.1: The Scenario and Wargaming Center built the ABCA scenario to assist the ABCA QWG
develop and explore doctrinal concepts. Each participating nation developed a scenario at the
hs
request of the Washington Standardization Office. T i scenario focuses on mid-intensity
operations requiring the commitment of ABCA forces in corps strength. The scenario is designed
to be used as a test bed for interoperability,not contingency planning. It is incorporated in the
latest ABCA doctrine guide.
hs
1.2: T i paper covers the background of this effort, provides an overview of the scenario, and
discusses some of the analytical issues that the scenario generates.
1.3: The scenario provides a realistic, reasonable, and robust setting for examining the activities of
rapidly deployed ABCA forces at levels from brigade through corps. Although set in a fictitious
country, the scenario uses actual terrain and weather to facilitate simulation and analysis efforts.
It represents a significant effort to create a useful and plausible setting. Many of the details reflect
arbitrary choices and can be modified at the user‘s discretion to support analysis.
1
2: Background.
2.1: Washington Standardization Officer memorandum dated 19 February 1992, subject: ABCA
Combat Development Scenarios, tasked the QWG Army Operations Research (AOR) group to
develop four scenarios (1). Australia was to develop a low intensity counterinsurgency scenario.
Canada was responsible for low intensity protected evacuation. WSO asked the UK to develop a
low intensity peace operations scenario, and asked the U.S. to develop a mid-intensity
conventional operations scenario. The U. S. scenario focuses on mid-intensity operations
requiring the commitment of ABCA forces in corps strength.
2.2: The U.S. national point of contact (NPOC) asked the Training and Doctrine Command
Analysis Center (TRAC) to develop the mid-intensity scenario. TRAC's Scenario and Wargaming
Center responded by modifjmg an existing unclassified scenario. Taking the Generic 1.O scenario
originally designed for analysis of U.S. doctrinal concepts, scenarists modified the force structure
lists, deployments, and employment concepts to support ABCA work. The initial scenario effort
was submitted for review in August 1992 (2).
2.3: During 1993, the UK evaluated the draft scenarios, using a cardinal points specification
(CPS) to ensure that all essential information was included. In October 1993, the UK NPOC
provided the CPS and comments on the U.S. scenario (3). Table 1 shows the features of the
CPS. Although the actual scenario document addresses each CPS item, in the interest of brevity,
this paper only discusses some of the highlights. In November 1993, in response to tasking &om
the U.S. NPOC (4), Scenario and Wargaming Center modified the scenario in preparation for
presentation at the January 1994 QWG AOR meeting at Fort Monroe, Virginia. Further review
generated additional changes and TRAC submitted the latest version in April 1994 (5). The
QWG Doctrine incorporated the scenario into its Doctrine Guide in mid- 1994.
Table 1. Cardinal Dohts wecification
Scenario factor Examples of factor details *
Location Terrain, weather, ports, infkastructure
Geopolitical situation Economy, form of government, treaties,
political afEiliations
Command, control, information,
and communications Levels of command, communication capabilities
Military objectives Military aims, timing
Constraints Rules of engagement, environmental issues
Oppositiodthreat Military order of battle, insurgentdguerillas
Order of battle (fiiendly) Land, air, maritime forces for allies and host nation
Logistics Resources, positioning, host nation support
Opening situation Force dispositions, readiness, intelligence summary
* examdes are not commehensive
2
3: Scenario Overview
3.1: Country setting. This conflict is set in a coastal nation on a fictitious Pacific continent
located approximately at latitude 32 degrees north, longitude 150 east (see figure 1). Terrain
includes a coastal prairie, f d a n d s , and rolling hills with increasing vegetation as one moves
inland. The nation, Blueland, is bordered by hostile Redland and the neutral countries of
Brownland and Greenland. Orangeland, an ally of Redland, Lies to the Northwest. The terrain
and weather are based on the actual Gulf coast data of the U.S. state of Texas (see figure 2).
Figure 1. Geography
3
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I.
c
!
!
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Figure 2. Area of operations
3.1.1: e
K y terrain features include large cities, airports and aifields, major highways and rail
lines, major rivers, dams, ports, beaches suitable for amphibious operations, and offshore oil
fields.
3.1.2: The climate is temperate with hurricanes and tropical storms possible along the coast and
significant periods of precipitation and fog. Temperatures are moderate along the coast and more
variable moving inland.
3.1.3: Blueland experienced economic prosperity by pursuing a democratic form ofgovemment
and exploiting its significant natural resources. Redland continues to be ruled by a communist
government. Its lack of access to ports retards its economic growth.
3.1.4: Blueland maintains modem communications facilities and services in its large cities.
Telephone, television, and radio serve as a "man means of communicating information
throughout the country.
3.1.5: Blueland possesses moderate capability to provide host nation support to deploying military
forces. About 500,000 gallons of drinking water per day can be made available. Available fuel
resources can supply about a million gallons of fuel per day. Food stuffs are available although
4
western menus cannot be readily supported. Moderate amounts of construction material can be
made available.
3.1.6: Blueland patterns its democratic government on a mix of western and oriental concepts.
The aggressor nation, Redland, is ruled by a firmly established communist party structure.
Redland supports a radical political party, the Blueland Reunification Party,and its insurgent
force, the Blueland Reunification Force, in Blueland. The group advocates unification of
Blueland and Redland.
3.1.7: Figure 3 shows the various countries in the region, their political afEliations, and their
involvement in the crisis.
Regional Strategic UN Involvement
Miation Affiliation Membership in Crisis
Blueland Former Red Pact - Treaty w/ Yes (not on Victim
member ABCA nations security council)
- Regional
economic union
Redland Red Pact communist Yes (security) Aggressor
council)
Orangeland Red Pact communist No 90 days wait and
see...
Orangeland poses a
serious threat to
regional balance of
power if it commits
forces in this
conflict.
Brownland Armed neutral - Regional No Only if attacked
economic
union
Greenland Armed neutral - Regional No Only if attacked or
economic sealanes threatened
union
Figure 3. International af€iliations.
5
3.2: Road to war.
3.2.1: Over 50 years ago, Redland and Blueland formed a league of nations (Red Pact)with a
common economic, political, and military structure. The pact dissolved about ten years ago
because of economic differences and political revolutions. Redland’s economy suffered since the
breakup because of the loss of access to deep water ports. Redland threatened to reestablish the
pact by force to regain access to Blueland‘s resources and ports.
3.2.2: Blueland’s significant mineral resources and democratic posture caused western nations,
including the ABCq to provide diplomatic and economic support. When Redland deployed
forces to the Blueland border regions, Blueland requested and received ABCA m l t r assistance
iiay
- initially a naval show of force and some military advisors and advance party personnel. ABCA
forces were alerted and received marshaling instructions.
3.2.3: When Redland attacked, the UN Security Council issued a mandate requiring an immediate
cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of Red forces from Blueland. UN negotiators arrived on
the scene but made little progress. Redland continued the attack to seize the port of Cville.
3.2.4: Blueland military forces, unable to defend their border, delayed southward and created
strong defenses around Blueland’s capital, Sville, and its southernmost port city, Bville.
3.2.5: Redland forces assumed a defensive posture after seizing Cville. Upon learning of ABCA
military preparations, they resumed the offensive toward Bville to seize the port and prevent
deployment of any international military forces. AE3CA forces begin deploying to Blueland.
3.3: Scenario facts and assumptions.
3.3.1: Facts.
3.3.1.1: No ABCA forward deployed units or prepositioned materials exist in Blueland.
3.3.1.2: The majority of ABCA forces will move equipment by sealift. The early arriving U.S.
heavy brigade will use Afloat Prepositioned Ship (APS)equipment. The APS asset is within five
days of sailing time of Bville.
3.3.1.3: The insurgent Blueland Reunification Forces aggressively work to undermine Blueland’s
resistance to the invasion. They are also exploiting other minority groups within Blueland, trying
to create.a coordinated effort by making wild promises.
3.3.1.4: Redland possesses chemical weapons that can be delivered by tactical ballistic missiles
and fixed wing aircraft. No clear intelligence exists regarding Redland‘s possession of fbnctional
nuclear weapons.
6
3.3.2. Assumptions.
3.3.2.1: No other major regional conflict is in progress, although other trouble spots around the
globe may flare up concurrently.
3.3.2.2: Redland would not attack into Blueland if ABCA or other international coalition forces
were already present. Success can only be achieved prior to the introduction of si@cant
international forces.
3.3.2.3: ABCA nations can use international sealanes. The Suez and Panama canals are open.
3.4: Military Situation
3.4.1: National strategic objectives.
3.4.1.1: Redland seeks to seize Blueland's port and lines of communication to aid failing
commerce, install a government in the Blueland capitol that is favorable to Redland, and gain
international recognition of the annexation of territory. The desired end state is a stronger
economy and worldwide recognition as a regional power.
3.4.1.2: Blueland wants to defend against the Redland attack, gain international military
assistance, expel Redland forces fiom its territory, strengthen political and economic ties with the
ABCA nations and receive worldwide recognition and sympathy. The desired end state is
re-establishment of country boundaries and stronger relations with western countries.
3.4.1.3: ABCA nations want to expel and defeat Redland forces, and assist Blueland in restoring
its borders. The desired end state is restoration of military and economic stability in the region
on terms favorable to ABCA nations.
3.4.1.4: Blueland insurgent forces and the Blueland Reunification Party (BRP)want unification of
Blueland and Redland under a BRF-led socialist system. Ifnecessary, they will resort to terrorism
to achieve their goals.
3.4.2: Military objectives and missions.
3.4.2.1: Redland's military objectives include seizure of port facilities, annexation of the port and
lines of communication, isolation and capture of the Blueland capitol, defense of new boundaries
against aggressors, and denial of ports to any incoming international military forces.
3.4.2.2: Redland forces mission and intent. Attack rapidly into Blueland to seize port facilities at
Cville and related lines of communication. Defend new boundaries against aggressors, deny Bville
port to incoming international military forces, and initiate negotiations to gain international
consent of annexation.
7
3.4.2.3: Blueland military objectives include defense of homeland borders, delay enemy advaacc,
strongpoint capitol and other critical facilites, and seek hternatiod d a n c e .
3.4.2.4: Blueland forces mission and intent. Delay while gaining international military as&ance.
With external help, expel Redland forces, regain ls territory, and restore boundaries. See figure
ot
4 for sketch of initial campaign.
I
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I
.- -._..
0 100 zoo
Figure 4. RedlBlue initial campaign sketch @day to D+6)
3.4.2.5: The militaty objectives ofthe ABCA nations include: Assist Blueland defeat and expel
Redland forces, restore country boundaries, reestablish economic and military stability, and
protect Gendly interests in the region.
3.4.2.6: ABCA mission and intent. Secure Blueland territory and critical facilities, on order,
defeat Redland forces in Blueland, and disable Redland offensive capabilities. Resolve situation
i e
rapidly to “ z casualties and limit damage to Blueland resources.
8
3.4.3: Order of battle.
3.4.3.1: Redland order of battle is shown in figure 5 . The Army consists of four army corps, two
independent motorized rifle brigades, an artillery brigade, multiple rocket regiment, two missile
brigades, an antitank regiment, air defense brigade, attack helicopter regiment, and two special
operations brigades. Redland uses the special operations brigades to exert significant control over
the five provincial brigades of the Blueland Reunification Forces. The a r force consists of a
i
fighterhomber regiment, two interceptor regiments, a ground attack regiment, radio electronic
combat regiment, attack helicopter regiment, transport helicopter regiment, and a remotely piloted
i
vehicle regiment, The air force controls the Ar Defense Command that includes four brigades of
surface to air missiles. Equipment in the army and air force is largely of Russian or Chinese
origin. Redland economic difficulties retarded modernization.
, - = , RedI and
I Insurgents 1
mF m
X X Ill X
23
1
-2
I 9ox2A36
El
36 X 8W22 18 x SS-21
MIG-23
Hind-D
HIP
24 IMRB 18x9A52
T-62
T-72 BMP2
BMP2 X Ill X Ill
SA8
SA-14
12 x SS-1C 54 x MT-12 24 x SA-4 40 x Mi-24
27 x AT-6
Figure 5 . Red order of battle
3.4.3.2: Blueland order of battle is shown in figure 6. Blueland ground forces include four
divisions, one independent armored brigade, an artillery brigade, and an air defense brigade. The
air force includes four wings of modem aircraft 0;- Tornado, F/A- 18). Blueland invested in a
15,
modem air force while equipping its ground forces with early generation U.S. and Russian
equipment.
9
r 1
Blue land
G o w rn m e nt
- xxxx
Air Force
L I
I I I 1
I
I T V Tow M48 F15CID
TOWW II 155 How (1) MIOA3 BRDM2
155 How ( T ) Tornado
Stinger Avenger M 108A3 FlAl8
Vulcan
I
X
'1999 Equlpmonr Cur-of1 Dale
M 109A3 Avenger
MLRS
Figure 6. Blueland order of battle
3.4.3.3: ABCA forces are shown in figure 7. In keeping with the ABCA lead nation concept for
various scenarios, the U.S. is the lead nation in this operation. British, Canadian, and Australian
forces are under operational control of the U.S.corps.
1:
-9
YAllFOR
rlSOCFOR
0 round
Fors. (-1
1111
Figure 7. Coalition order of battle
10
3.4.4: Scenario situation. When ABCA forces begin to arrive, the Bville port and lodgment are
threatened by Redland forces. Redland forces have been given a mission to seize the port at
Bville and isolate the Blueland capitol at Sville to prevent reinforcement. Redland air forces will
assist by conducting preemptive strikes against Blueland airfields and communications centers.
3.4.5: ABCA campaign concept. The ABCA forces campaign concept consists of four phases as
shown in figure 8. Phase I consists of deployment and defense of lodgment. Phase II includes
stabilizing the situation and setting conditions for decisive operations. Tasks include blockading
the captured Cville port, relieving the capitol, and recapturing airfields critical to the air effort.
During Phase 1 1 the ABCA forces conduct decisive operations to cut Redland LOCs, and defeat
1,
and expel Redland forces. Phase IV includes reconstitution, reconstruction, counterinsurgency
suppression, humanitarian assistance, and redeployment. The actual scenario documentation
provides more detail for operations during the first two phases.
Proiecied
Phase I - Deployment and defense of lodgment
D-Day - -Deploy and build-up
D+12
-Defeat Redland attack on lodgment
-Reconstitute Blueland forces
Phase It - Stabilizing the situation and setting the conditions
D+13 - -Blockade Cville port
D+74 -Protect civilian population and critical resources/facilities
-
-
Break siege of Sville (capitol)
Recapture critical airfields and establish air superiority
D+75 - Phase 111 - Decisive operations
D+90 -Cut Red LOCs
- Defeat Redland forces in Blueland
Phase IV - Peacekeeping
D+91-
- Nation building
- Counter-insurgency
- Humanitarian assistance
- Redeployment I
Figure 8. CINC Concept
4: Analytical issues. The Scenario and Wargaming Center designed the scenario to support
exploration of key doctrinal issues for the ABCA. In addition, the scenario provides an excellent
setting for analysis of a number of combat development issues. These issues range fiom
evaluation of doctrine, organization, and materiel, to exploration of issues unique to the ABCA
combined operations environment. Some key analytical issues are shown in figure 9. The
following paragraphs provide some additional discussion.
4.1: Deployment and redeployment. The scenario document provides a sample ABCA
deployment scheme by tonnage, l i i requirement, and closure day. The Commander in Chief must
11
accomplish a number of deployment and early entry tasks. These include securing sea and air
lines of communication to Blueland, securing the air and sea points of debarkation, establishing a
secure lodgment, coordinating early entry operations with the Blueland land and air forces,
actually deploying the ABCA forces, initiating his air campaign and countering the Redland
tactical ballistic missile threat. Redland's resumption of offensive operations to deny ports also
results in the capture of several important airfields. This restricts the availability of runways and
ramps for deployment of air and land forces and requires some flexibility on the part of the air
commander. He must arrange for significant air support from bases outside of Blueland (carrier
based aviation and in-flight refueling) to set the stage for achieving air superiority.
Although no other contingency operation is underway, the commander must also make
arrangements for rapid and efficient redeployment of any or all of his forces, either when
operations against Redland are terminated or when a higher priority contingency requires forces
under his control. Analysts can explore various deployment schemes, basing schemes, and assist
in analyzing the criteria for prioritization of lift and basing assets.
Deployment and redeployment
Lead nation command and control concept
-Communication and intel linkage
-Coordination with Blueland forces
Airpower and seapower integration
-Air defense integration
-Air tasking coordination
-Fire support coordination
Logistical support issues
-Automation interoperability
-Common items (POL, water)
Other issues
-Winning the "information w r a"
-Identification of fiiend and foe
-Militaxy assistancehraining
-Counterinsurgency assistance
Figure 9. Scenario analysis issues
4.2: Lead nation command and control concept. The current ABCA command and control
concept calls for the lead nation to provide the headquarters and the command and control for the
highest level organization committed (whether it is a corps, division, or brigade). The other
12
ABCA forces link into that headquarters with appropriate staff and liaison elements. The lead
nation prescribes the doctrinal procedures to be followed. Analysts can explore potential
disconnects in doctrine, shortages of liaison personnel and equipment, and differences i the
n
organizational structure that may impact on effectiveness of this concept. Another area for
exploration that links command and control with deployment and redeployment is the structure
and hnction of a combined movement control element.
4.2.1: Communication and intelligence linkage. Interoperability of communications provides a
fertile field for analysis. Allocation of satellite communications channels and arrangements for
communications support to Blueland and ABCA countries is a good area for review and analysis.
Countries must arrange for sharing of intelligence. U.S. commands such as Pacific Command
have a Joint Intelligence Center. For the operation portrayed in this scenario, ABCA countries
might consider establishing a combined intelligence center.
4.2.2: Coordination with Blueland forces. This scenario requires ABCA countries to assist
Blueland in the defense and then help prepare Blueland forces for later operations. In additions to
the types of command and control issues listed above, combat service support requires attention.
Blueland support requirements in terms of equipment, support materiel, maintenance capability,
transportation assets, and other service support operations provide a broad range of analytical
issues. Provision of liaison personnel, special operations forces, and other personnel with
knowledge of Blueland language and customs also generates possible areas for analysis.
4.3: Airpower and seapower integration.
4.3.1: Air defense integration. The commander and staffs must plan to integrate air defense.
Because of the initial shortage of available airfields, air superiority may not be immediately
accomplished. The command and control aspects of detecting, identifling, tracking, arid engaging
enemy aircraft present a challenge. The ABCA forces must also consider several aspects of
missile defense (battle command and control, passive defense, active defense, and attack
operations). These four areas must be integrated to decrease risk to deploying forces. Analysts
can examine various techniques and capabilities.
4.3.2: Air tasking coordination. Fixed wing interceptors and air superiority aircraft provide a
major component of air defense. With significant numbers of friendly and enemy aircraft flying,
generating air tasking orders and coordinating the execution of those orders will be a challenge.
Analysts can look at the methodologies, communications linkages, and administrative support
aspects of the air campaign.
4.3.3: Fire support coordination. The availability of cannon and rocket assets in the ABCA and
Blueland forces poses significant fire support coordination issues. Ensuring the safety of fiiendly
forces, getting appropriate munitions on targets, and precluding unnecessary collateral damage to
Blueland infrastructure and resources requires significant effort. Being a coastal nation, naval gun
and missile fires must be integrated into the overall fire plan. Analysts can examine these areas as
well as the interoperability of the automated command, control, and communicationssystems for
artillery and naval fires.
13
4.4: Logistical support issues.
4.4.1: Automation interoperability. With new concepts such as split-based support and total asset
visibility, automation becomes extremely important in logistics support. The linkage or
interoperability of logistics automation systems requires analysis. With limitations on lift and
ports of debarkation, what to carry, what to bring later, and what to bring in "as required" is an
important analysis issue.
4.4.2: Common items (POL, water). Although each nation brings its own supplies and repair
parts and is responsible for its first and second level maintenance support, limitations on
deployment and the availability of facilities in the host nation present significant challenges to the
logisticians. The commander and stafFmust arrange for common item support from the host
nation wherever possible to minimize the burden on strategic lift assets.
4.5: Other issues.
4.5.1: Winning the "information war." Just as the air commander plans the air campaign and the
naval commander designs his sea superiority efforts, the combined commander must plan to win
the "information war." Coordination between military and political leaders of ABCA nations and
Blueland is a critical element. Considering the ubiquity of Cable News Network,, the commander
must arrange support for the media. ABCA operations must meet the test of acceptability in
terms of ways and means. The commander must plan for the types of information he wants the
enemy to know and must plan to restrict information flow or overwhelm the enemy with
information depending upon the situation. Civil affairs, humanitarian assistance, and
psychological operations must be coordinated to maximize the impact on friendly and enemy
leaders, soldiers, and civilians.
IF.
4.5.2: Identification of Friend and Foe (F) Although some casualties from friendly fire may be
unavoidable in war, the social and ethical values of ABCA countries call for significant efforts in
this area. Recent reviews of historical data show that fiiendly fire casualties may be higher than
commonly believed (6). Available technologies and techniques can certainly help in this area.
Analysts can evaluate the interoperability of such systems between ABCA countries (and host
nation countries such as Blueland). In some cases, simple procedures may greatly reduce risk.
4.5.3: Military assistancdtraining to Blueland. Paragraph 4.2.2 discussed some host nation
support issues. Analysts can also help in determining the content of training assistance packages,
military equipment transfers or sales, and training and assistance facility requirements. Although
the specifics of each program would differ depending upon host nation circumstances, analysts
can certainly develop methodologies and techniques to facilitate determination of the specifics.
4.5.4: Counterinsurgency assistance. Success against insurgencies requires significant
commitment from the host nation government and population. Australia and the UK have
significant experience in support to counterinsurgency efforts. Examining the theoretical
principles of counterinsurgency is certainly one type of analytical issue. Developing or evaluating
methodologies for counterinsurgency programs is another.
14
4.5.5: Restorationheconstruction. At the termination of combat operations, restoration and
reconstruction must begin. Planning must be ongoing during combat operations. Analysts can
develop or evaluate methodologies for planning. They can assist by analyzing the personnel,
equipment, and materiel requirements, the time and money cost of restoration and reconstruction,
and the impact on redeployment and availability of combat service support forces.
5: Summary. Although the ABCA scenario is fictitious, it provides a realistic, reaspnable, and
robust tool for analysis of a variety of mid-intensity conflict issues. In various forms, the scenario
has been used for doctrinal analysis by the U.S. Army and the ABCA QWG. By examining the
i
scenario or by enhancing or m- og it in their particular area of interest, analysts can make
significant contributions to military operations and planning. In particular, evaluation of current
doctrine, equipment, and organizations can help. Development and analysis of methodologies to
support actual (not fictitious) operations perhaps provide the most benefit for fbture commanders
and staffs. With great uncertainty about the future, analysts must help their military plan for
coalition operations over a wide range of situations. The ABCA scenario supports such efforts in
mid-intensity conflict.
Bibliography
1. Memorandum, Washington Standardization Officers, WSO (7794) CD Guide, dated 19
February 1992, subject: ABCA Combat Development Scenarios.
2. U.S. Army TRADOC Analysis Command, Generic 1.1 Scenario (ABCA Division),
TRAC-SC-0692, Fort Leavenworth, KS, October 1992.
3. Memorandum, Ministry of Defence, Defence Operational Analysis Centre, D/DOAC/47/7,
dated August 1993, subject: ABCA Fictitious Scenarios. Enclosure consisted of the cardinal
points specificationoutline.
4. Memorandum, Headquarters, Department of Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for
Operations and Plans, DAMO-ZDS, dated 17 November 1993, Subject: American, British,
Canadian, and Australian (ABCA) Combat Development Scenarios.
5 . U.S. Army TRADOC Analysis Center, Generic 1.1 Scenario Mid-Intensity Conflict,
TRAC-SC-0194, Fort Leavenworth, KS, April 1994.
6. Hawkins, Charles F. "Rules of Thumb for Representing Fratricide Casualties in Wargames,"
Phalanx, Vol27, No 1, Alexandria, VA, March 1994.
William J. Krondak is the senior civilian analyst at the Scenario and Wargaming Center,
TRADOC Analysis Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He received a Bachelor of Science degree
from the University of Nebraska and a Masters in Public Administration fiom the University of
Oklahoma. He graduated from the Armed Forces StaECollege and is enrolled in the U.S. Army
War College. Mr. Krondak possesses nearly 20 years of experience in building and using combat
development scenarios for military analysis. He can be reached at (913) 684-4015 or by F A X
number (9 13) 684-40 11. .
15
The Use of Analysis and Test and Evaluation
to Support the Acquisition of the
Army Tactical Command and Control System
ATCCS Overview
The Army Tactical Command and Control System (ATCCS) is an automated,
standardized, secure, integrated family of interoperable systems which supports
commanders at all levels in commanding their forces and which assists the staff in
controlling their functions in support of the commander. It is an information network
that provides automated and integrated command and control support to enhance the
processing and dissemination of time sensitive tactical information. ATCCS will be
employed in the tactical corps and below to the battalion level. ATCCS consists of a
deployable network of hardware, software and tactical shelters with combined local
area network (LAN) and wide area network (WAN) capabilities that can be operated in
both garrison and field environments. It can operate as a cluster of interactive work
stations on a LAN and as an interactive network consisting of numerous independent
work stations and LANs connected by existing tactical communications systems. It
operates as a system integrating command post facilities, communications, and
automation equipment to generate common data bases and pictures of C2 information
providing a consistent view of the corps battle
ATCCS provides a hierarchy of distributed data bases within five component
battlefield functional areas (BFAs); maneuver, fire support, intelligence and electronic
warfare, air defense, and combat service support. The composite of all BFA's data
information systems becomes the commander's distributed data base. The common
picture of the battlefield is the sum) of all information in this distributed data base in a
graphic display (functional data base situational maps, battle resource reports and
intelligence products) tailored in content, size, area of coverage, map and overlay
features for the subsystems and echelons where applied.
Each of the five component BFAs has an automated system to process and store
data generated internally or provided by external sources. These systems are briefly
described below:
Maneuver Control System - MCS primarily supports the planning and
controlling of close combat resources such as armor, cavalry, aviation and infantry
f
units. It also supports the coordination and synchronization o aviation, engineer,
nuclear, biological and chemical, signal and military police operations. MCS is the
component of ATCCS over which the common picture of the battlefield will be provided.
Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System - AFATDS will provide the
fire support coordinator with a fully automated means for the planning, coordination,
control and execution of fire support missions. AFATDS integrates all fire support
assets including naval gunfire, close air support and mortars as well as tube artillery.
All Source Analysis System - ASAS produces and disseminates all source
intelligence to US forces. The ASAS Collateral Workstation permits the reporting of
military intelligence information to the commander's common distributed data base.
Forward Area Air Defense Command, Control and Intelligence System -
FAADC21 provides the consolidated air defense profile to other battlefield functional
area commanders through ATCCS. FAADC21 interfaces with all elements of the FAAD
weapons systems and provides the automation necessary to conduct AD engagement
operations.
Combat Service Support Control System - CSSCS provides integrated
and accurate combat service support information to field and theater commanders. The
automated processing of critical resource data and transmittal to higher echelons is
used to evaluate current and projected force sustainment capabilities.
These five battlefield functional area systems and /or their LANs are
interconnected using standard Army communications systems. The systems available
are Combat Net Radio, the Army Common User System (a type of battlefield cellular
telephone system) and the Army Data Distribution System (ADDS).
Acquisition of each of the five battlefield functional area system programs are
managed by a program office headed by a Colonel. The five program managers report
to the Program Executive Officer for Command and Control Systems, a Major General.
Also reporting to the PE0 CCS is an additional program office responsible for the
acquisition of the common computer hardware and software used within the program.
Likewise, the three communications program each are managed by a Colonel, and they
report to the Program Executive Officer for Communications, a Brigadier General.
Analvsis Strateclv
Department of Defense and Army policies require the performance of a Cost and
Operational Effectiveness Analysis to support major acquisition decisions. A COEA is
a comprehensive analysis of a system in development and any viable alternatives. The
analysis focuses on the battlefield effectiveness contribution made by the system and
the costs to field and sustain the system.
The Army is conducting COEAs for MCS, AFATDS, FAADC21 and CSSCS at the
present time. The COEA for ASAS was completed last year. The MCS COEA will
address the integration of the five programs, thus a separate ATCCS COEA will not be
performed. These analyses are utilizing common methodologies. While each analysis
is being conducted individually, one overarching supportability analysis is being done
to assess the merits of using products from the common hardwarekoftware program.
The results of these analyses as well as the results of testing will be used to support
the decisions to move these programs from full scale development into full scale
production. Since it has been completed, the ASAS COEA is used as an example to
provide more detail on the process employed.
The first step in the COEA process was the establishment of the COEA issues
by Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA). In the ASAS COEA, the following
issues were developed:
What are the alternatives' impacts on the performance of the tactical
intelligence system at division and corps?
What are the alternatives' impacts on overall combat results at division
and corps?
What are the alternatives' impacts on sustainability at division and corps?
What is the cost benefit of each alternative?
These issues were passed to the agency tasked to perform the study. For all these
COEAs, the study performer is the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)
Analysis Center (TRAC).
TRAC in conjunction with HQDA developed alternatives to be analyzed. The
alternatives in the ASAS COEA were the current Block I ASAS, Block II ASAS (an
enhancement to Block I needing approval to begin development) and a Marine Corps
developed intelligence analysis system.
The study employed a methodology consisting of discrete, yet interrelated and
interdependent activities. These activities included: 1) a functional analysis to
establish the ASAS functional requirements, to evaluate each alternatives' capability to
satisfy these requirements, and to screen out any infeasible alternative, 2) a
performance analysis to measure the system-level performance capabilities of each
remaining alternative and to develop system-level performance data needed to
evaluate the operational performance and effectiveness of the alternatives in the force-
on-force model, 3) an effectiveness analysis to measure the operational performance
and to determine the impact of each alternative on the commander's perception of the
battlefield and the overall force combat effectiveness, 4) a cost analysis to compute the
decision costs and life-cycle costs associated with each alternative, 5) a sustainability
analysis to measure the reliability, availability, maintainability and transportation
characteristics of each alternative and determine their impacts on logistics support
policies and force structure, and 6) an integration of the results from all these analyses
into a decision matrix.
The purposes of the functional analysis were to identify intelligence functional
area requirements, to identify the alternatives' support to the intelligence cycle, to
determine if each alternative is a feasible solution, to determine the extent to which
ASAS operational requirements are met and to determine if alternatives have clear
measurable differences. A thorough document review was performed as part of this
analysis, and it also included site visits to program management offices, testing
activities and training activities. While the Marine Corps system satisfied its
requirements] it satisfied very few Army requirements. This was due to very different
doctrine employed by each service and the Army's desire to have the intelligence
system linked with other battlefield functional areas through automation. The ASAS
Block I and Block II systems were found to have distinct differences, and they were
carried forward into the performance analysis.
The performance analysis was done with a model called ASAS NET. This model
was built with the Modeler tool, which is a stochastic, timed, attributed petri-net model
used to represent the behavior of complex humanlmachine systems. ASAS NET
modeled the functions of ASAS at the workstation level and provided measurements of
message throughput rates and times from the intelligence collection sensor to the
commander. Modeler results showed that message queues built up over time with the
Block I system, but did not with Block II.
The objectives of the effectiveness analysis were to determine the performance
of ASAS Block I and Block II in a Southwest Asia operational environment and to
determine the relative contributions of ASAS Block I and Block II to force effectiveness.
Both objectives were supported by the Vector-In-Commander Intelligence and
Electronic Warfare Functional Area Model (VIC IEW FAM). Performance data from
ASAS NET along with availability data from the sustainability analysis (see subsequent
paragraph) were used as input. The effectiveness analysis was focused on the
essential elements of analysis which were derived from the study issues. For ASAS,
the EEAs were:
What is the contribution of the alternatives to the commander's perception
of the battlefield?
What is the contribution of the alternatives to lethality of the force?
What is the contribution of the alternatives to force survivability?
What is the impact of the alternatives on mission accomplishment?
In a similar fashion, measures of performance (MOP) and measures of effectiveness
(MOE) were developed. Some examples of these were artillery targets located with an
error of 100 meters or less (MOP), percentage of enemy units in the ASAS data base
over time (MOP), number of collection management tasks generated over time (MOP),
time to mission accomplishment (MOE) and loss exchange ratios (MOE). ASAS Block
II provided the commander with more current and comprehensive intelligence than
Block I. It built a data base with a decreased target location error, thereby providing an
improvement in fire support effectiveness. The freshness and the amount of
intelligence resulted in an improved perception of the battlefield for the commander,
allowing more opportunities for optimal synchronization of maneuver and fire support.
The bottom line was improved combat effectiveness for the force.
The cost analysis was conducted to determine the decision cost associated with
each ASAS alternative. Cost categories of development, procurement, operations and
maintenance and military pay and allowances were examined. Unexpectedly, this
analysis showed that fielding the newer technology of Block II to the entire force was
less costly than expanding the fielding of Block I beyond the limited group now having it
and maintaining it for a 20 year period.
The purpose of the sustainability analysis was to assess the impact of the ASAS
alternatives on logistical force structure, considering transportability, deployability and
operational availability. Block II not only was projected to have improved reliability, but
its operational concept which consolidates terminals in one location and its enhanced
fault diagnosis capability made it superior to Block I.
The integration of these sub-analyses was relatively straight forward. Block II
offered enhanced capabilities at a lower cost than full fielding of the Block I system.
The results of the COEA along with testing results and a comprehensive review
of acquisition planning will be presented to decision making officials in the Army and in
the Office of the Secretary of Defense. These inputs, with affordability taken into
account, will form the basis for the decision to complete the limited fielding of Block I
ASAS and to begin development of Block II ASAS or to pursue some other course of
action.
Test and Evaluation Strateqy
Two basic types of testing are performed on ATCCS, technical testing and
operational testing. Technical testing is done to confirm that the system meets its
specifications and to provide a degree of confidence that the system will perform well in
operational testing. Operational testing is done to determine if the system is effective
and suitable when operated in a realistic environment with typical user troops.
Technical specifications are based on the applicable operational requirements
document (ORD), and operational testing also uses the ORD as a basis thereby
serving as the link between these tests..
Each of the ATCCS BFA systems and the communications systems undergoes
an extensive series of technical tests. These tests include things such as hot and cold
temperature, humidity , reIiab iIity , e Iectromagnetic int erference , and basic system
performance. Many of these tests are performed in the system contractor's plant with
Government personnel as witnesses. Usually the system under test is stimulated
artificially so that it is functioning under the load conditions expected in normal usage.
While this testing checks interface parameters with other systems, it does not test the
entire ATCCS.
The Army was concerned that the lack of an ATCCS level technical test could
cause system level problems to remain undetected until operational testing was
conducted. Since the operational tests are extremely expensive in terms of both
manpower and dollars, this risk was deemed unacceptable. To correct this, ATCCS
must now undergo a system confidence demonstration (SCD) prior to starting
operational tests. The SCD is performed by the ATCCS Experimentation Site (AES),
Fort Lewis, Washington. AES has the ability to link the ATCCS components together
over actual communications systems. The system is stimulated by the Army's standard
training simulation, the Corps Battle Simulation (CBS), and a mix of actual operators,
training teams and contractors serves as operators. The SCD closely replicates what
will be done during the operational test, but in a garrison vice field environment and on
a smaller scale. The results of this demonstration are key to deciding whether or not to
begin operational testing.
Operational testing of ATCCS will be divided into two distinct segments. First,
each component which is completing the development phase will undergo a stand-
alone Initial Operational Test and Evaluation. The results of the IOTE will be used to
support the decision for each component to enter full scale production, initiate the next
phase of development or complete fielding. These separate IOTEs will be conducted
concurrently. Upon completion of the individual IOTEs, the components will be
interconnected to assess the functioning of ATCCS in an operational environment.
ATCCS operational testing is conducted at Fort Hood, Texas, and is supported
by the Ill Corps. The Army has decided to limit the impact this test support has on Ill
Corps' primary mission of being prepared to support contingency operations. The
result is that a yearly test window is defined within which all testing will take place. The
window is of two or three months duration, beginning in the Spring or early Summer.
While testing itself generally takes about a month, it is preceded by a period of training
and equipment familiarization. When testing is concluded, new equipment remains in
the hands of the test unit. Testing is based on a Southwest Asia scenario and, as in
the SCD, is stimulated by CBS.
Since the development schedules for the BFA programs are not aligned, not all
systems are ready for test at the same time. In any given window one will find a mix of
systems which have undergone IOTE in a previous window, which are undergoing
IOTE in the given window and which will undergo IOTE in a future window. Those
systems in this last category are represented by a less that fully functioning capability
or by a simulator. As an example, the Fiscal Year 94 window (June-September 1994)
includes IOTEs for ASAS, CSSCS and the Enhanced Position Location Reporting
Systems (EPLRS - a part of ADDS). All remaining systems will be present during the
window. The remaining communications systems have completed IOTE, FAADC21will
undergo its IOTE after the ATCCS window at Fort Bliss, Texas (unique test range
requirements due to aircraft involvement) and AFATDS while not ready for IOTE will be;.
present in the form of lesser capable version supplemented by simulation.
The basis of operational testing is the operational requirements document. This
is a summary of the user's need for a new system. Based on the ORD, the user
produces the critical operational issues and criteria (COIC) which are used to structure
the test. The critical operational issues are high level questions that the test must
answer, and they are intentionally kept to a minimum. The criteria associated with each
issue specify the minimum acceptable system performance requirements. The two
ATCCS critical operational issues and their corresponding criteria are shown below:
1. Does ATCCS automation enhance the capabilities of commanders
and staffs to conduct tactical operations?
The commander's situation report will show no more than 2 hours
difference in information between corps/division and 1 hour difference between
division/brigade and between TAC/MAIN/REAR at an echelon.
Provide the sender with indication of unsuccessful data
transmission attempt.
2. Do the ATCCS BFA component systems effectively interoperate to
support commanders and staffs in the conduct of tactical operations and interoperate
with joint, combined and allied systems?
BFA component systems will query each other and respond and
transmit information in prescribed formats.
BFA component systems will interoperate with joint, combined and
allied automated systems.
ASAS will continue to serve as the example system, and shown below are its
COICs:
1. Does the ASAS satisfy the commander's intelligence and targeting
support requirements in an operational environment?
A majority of commanders and their staffs render a positive
assessment that ASAS provides an improved battlefield capability when considering
timeliness, accuracy and completeness.
2. Can the ASAS establish and maintain interfaces to provide
required information exchanges?
ASAS must accept and process message text formats, maintain
?
interfaces to other system through the Army Common User System, interface with other
ATCCS nodes and interface with applicable tactical/theater/joint/national C31 systems.
3. Can ASAS deploy and operate on the battlefield?
ASAS must be deployable on C-I 30 and larger aircraft, be capable
of emplacing/displacing/moving with associated command posts and operate at
acceptable reduced levels under NBC and ECM conditions.
4. Can the ASAS operators/analysts/maintainers achieve a level of
system training readiness during peacetime that provides a wartime readiness
capability for sustained combat operations?
ASAS must provide adequate training support to prepare
operational crews and maintain their levels.of proficiency and provide adequate
logistics support to sustain ASAS for combat operations.
The operational testers may generate additional operational issues and criteria
to focus testing on specific system requirements deemed important, but not adequately
addressed by the COIC. They then use both the critical and additional issues as the
foundation to develop measures of effectiveness and measures of performance. MOEs
are few in number and closely related to the COICs. MOEs for the ASAS test include
commander/staff consensus that ASAS provides an improved battlefield capability,
ability to receive/transmit information fromlto other available systems, ability to deploy
and operate on the battlefield and ability of representative soldiers to operate, maintain
and support the system. For each MOE and COlC there are several MOPs which focus
on the detailed capabilities of the system. A sample of the ASAS test MOPs is
provided below:
Proportion of intelI igence requirements satisf ied
Time to accurately enter intelligence preparation of the battlefield
templates and overlays.
Proportion of enemy units identified in the All Source Correlated Data
Base(ASCDB) as compared to message truth.
Proportion of enemy equipment identified in the ASCDB.
Time to develop and display queries against the ASAS data bases.
Time to generate intelligence report messages.
Time to generate and release tasking messages/requests for information.
Proportion of target nominations that were valid, accurate and timely.
As stated earlier, the above list is a sample. There are similar detailed MOPS that
relate to ASAS interfaces with other systems, to survivability/mobility, to
soldier/machine interfaces and to training and supportability.
The operational test evaluators in conjunction with the Training and Doctrine
Command have developed a series of expected outcome "templates" based on the test
scenario. These "templates" forecast the types of major enemy activities and unit
locations that should be identified by ASAS operators. The actual performance of the
system and its operators will be measured against these expected outcomes.
ATCCS testing will begin at Fort Hood, Texas in mid July. The first phase will
consist of an integrated pilot test of approximately two weeks to insure troops are
trained, communications are established, test instrumentation is functioning and data
collection processing is adequate. This will be followed by the individual IOTEs which
occur concurrently over a one month period. These IOTEs will be controlled in that the
battle is simulated by the Corps Battle Simulation using a Southwest Asia scenario.
Interfaces have been developed between CBS and each of the ATCCS BFAs so that
appropriate ATCCS message traffic will be generated. In this control phase the inputs
to ATCCS will be known and outputs will be collected through instrumentation. The
individual IOTEs will be followed by an Integrated lnteroperability Control Phase of
three days duration. In this phase, all ATCCS systems will be linked and be expected
to exchange messages in an operational environment. As in the previous controlled
IOTEs, this phase will be driven by CBS and data collection will be automated. The
last phase of ATCCS testing will be a free-play command post exercise (CPX). As the
name implies, this phase is not controlled so inputs to ATCCS will not be known. Some
automated data collection can be employed, but much data collection will be done
manually by observing staff functions at various echelons. While the manual data
collection will be less specific than the automated results, it is expected to provide
insights in the degree to which the staff utilizes and relies on ATCCS.
As briefly described earlier, the results of testing will be provided to decision
makers in the Army and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Test results, the
COEA, a review of the acquisition program and funding will form the basis of decisions
made on the future of these programs.
Linkage of COEA and Test and Evaluation
One of the common terms used in both the COEA and the testing program is
effectiveness (or measures of effectiveness). However, there are slightly different
meanings as can be seen from the examples previously provided. The COEA strives to
assess the value of the system in terms of its contribution to combat outcome. The
objective MOEs in the COEA focus on effectiveness of the force. The test cannot
replicate the same environment that can be created in a force-on-force model, so test
4
MOEs are really high level (aggregated) MOPs. This "disconnect" is not serious and is
resolved at the next lower level, the MOPs used in the COEA and the test.
An examination of the MOP examples previously provided for the COEA and the
test shows a strong relationship if not a direct correspondence. This is where the test
and the COEA are linked, and that linkage is not left to chance. Both test and COEA
planning documentation require the linkage between the two efforts to be described.
This linkage permits an adjustment of COEA results if that is needed.
Since the COEA and the test results are presented to decision makers at the
same major program review meeting, they are accomplished in parallel. Planning,
execution and, in the case of the test, analysis of results for these two major efforts can
take over a year. Timing is driven both by system readiness and by the planned
decision program review (program funding is often a driver in setting the date of the
review). Operational testing often is completed only months prior to the decision
review, with test personnel hurrying to complete their analysis of data collected before
the meeting. Analysts performing the COEA have had to begin their work well before
testing starts, based on estimates of system performance. The fact that the COEA and
test are linked at the MOP level, permits a direct comparison of the COEA estimates
and the actual system performance as measured in test. Any major differences can be
quickly identified and, their significance can be assessed. The COEA analyst must
determine whether or not the actual MOP value from test would cause any change in
the estimated combat effectiveness of the system or change the ranking of COEA
alternatives. The process used to make that determination can vary from a simple
inspection to a rerunning of the models used to support the COEA.