Judging beauty—further notes
S.W.
27.VII.2009
(Recall: The wrong analysandum!
A partly clumsy analysans too!
Much consequent upon this, muchly
to our relief, perhaps occasionally to
Richard’s chagrin.)
Hi, Steven. I replied here and there. Let me know what you think. Clearly
some rewriting is needed to make what I intended clear—if it is defensible.
I hadn’t really thought much about what I meant by a first-person-
authoritative belief, so this is helpful both in terms of content and an
impetus to think!
I. One form of judgment; one grounding perceptual-cognitive relation.
I believe we’ve made needless trouble for ourselves by failing to distinguish
(i) a belief (“judgment”) that x is beautiful,
from
(ii) finding-beautiful (“judging beautiful”), the event of perceiving the beauty
of x.1
RW: I don’t think that there is an “event of perceiving the beauty of x”
unless that means judging x beautiful on the basis of one’s b-enjoyment.
In Section III, we require that b-enjoyment be the reason—but we have
already acknowledged that one can properly be described as judging
something beautiful on other bases (e. g. reports of others). We just use
“judgment of beauty” as a shorthand for “judgment of beauty for which the
reason is one’s b-enjoyment.” Are we saying the same thing?
An event of kind (ii) always generates an attitude of kind (i), although the belief
may be short-lived or unstable. A person P’s beliefs of kind (i) often arise from
P’s experiences of kind (ii). However they can be based on testimony or
inductive inference, and in these cases may be either rational or irrational. (ii)-
events have this special relation to (i)-beliefs: to believe that x is beautiful is to
believe that one would find-beautiful x were one appropriately attending to x; or
that some suitable counterpart of one’s would, for example with somewhat
greater reasoning powers or finer pitch discriminations. (I’ll tend to ignore this
qualification, although it’s not unimportant.)
1
“Perceiving” may occur more in the imagination or be more intellectual than sensory.
To keep language simple though, I’ll tend to assume that the beauty is visible and is
found in an act/process of seeing.
Therefore it is not problematic for me to believe that Alekhine played
hundreds of beautiful games: because Grandmaster Bisguier along with other
learned connoisseurs has personally found-beautiful hundreds of these, and I
know from my own experience with a smaller number of Alekhine games that
tend to share these perceptions. —Now this combines two thoughts. One, that I
can project from my own findings-beautiful to unexamined (by me) Alekhine
victories. In the present case this could already be sufficient. Two I have reason
to think my findings will accord with Bisguier’s, so no relativization problems arise
here.2 Were I instead reading about Christian mystical writings—some of which
I’ve enjoyed, but which tend not to do much for me—I’d be much more cautious.
My counterfactual findings-beautiful are much less likely to agree with those of
the connoisseurs.
Here moreover the proposition is indefinite enough (“hundreds of beautiful
games”) to survive some counterfactual disagreement. Maybe I’d be impressed
by a few games that leave Bisguier unmoved, and vice versa, but “hundreds” is
not threatened. Also, my agreement with the general proposition might more or
less commit me to specifics. “If you agree that hundreds of Alekhine games are
beautiful, then given __ facts about the class, you’ll pretty much have to state,
unseen, that Alekhine-Reshevsky, Kemeri 1937 is beautiful.”3 Not a problem. I
am committed, in the usual manner of being highly committed to near-certain
consequences of what I believe.
—OK, suppose someone asks me, “is Alekhine-Reshevsky, Kemeri 1937
beautiful?” Am I not a little more likely to say, not just “yes”, but rather “it must
be”, “you can be certain of that”, or the like? —Yes, and this is important. But I
will want to put it under the heading of pragmatics, and under some questions of
representational content somewhat different from whether I have the same belief
regardless of whether I myself have enjoyed Alekhine-Reshevsky. Also, I do not
quite want to make this an issue of first-person authority; again see below. The
perceptual relation to the object, and the first-person relation, are very important
[otherwise I ought to have protested to Richard a little sooner!], but they don’t
motivate anything like: two kinds of (i)-beliefs. The preceding adequately
captures the special relation of my actual and counterfactual findings-beautiful
(my “beautiful enjoyments”?) to my beliefs that: x is beautiful.
What, in the terms of our theory, is it to find x beautiful? At approximation it
is to enjoy x in a certain way; and to believe, on the basis of this enjoyment, that
others will/would (ceteris paribus) find x beautiful when attending to x as I am,
that is for example, when thoughtfully looking at it. —There’s certainly more to
come, notably about reasons. But notice (Richard!) that we’ve finessed a
problem of intensional content. Looking ahead: it will be true that I’m responding
to certain features F in x. These will/can enter into my reasons for the belief, and
2
Doesn’t always work that way. Botvinnik, Lasker, and especially Petrosian have been
both loved and hated. Korchnoi tended not to think much of Tal’s play, Spassky not
much of Korchnoi’s! (All judgments of aesthetics, not strength.)
3
Actually I’ve seen this one and found it beautiful. Too lazy to go to the Alekhine books
and devise a true example.
2
are likely to come up in conversation with you. But for the moment all I’m
thinking is that were you to, say, look at that supernova up there (and perhaps:
for a moment try to think of nothing else), you would find this enjoyment… and
would be disposed/willing to enjoin others similarly… etc. recursively… —all
that’s specified in my initial attitude is the way of apprehending x, not the features
(array) that may be hard to specify and is subject to interpersonal variation.
… The Christian mystics case is like when Jones is thinking that, for all he
knows, the Taj is just not his cup of masala chai. If someone asks me I’m willing
to tell them: “a lot of people believe x is beautiful, i.e. they do/would find-beautiful
x.” I hesitate to say “no” because I can’t reliably guess my interlocutor’s
relativization class. I don’t want to say “yes” because I do not myself find x
beautiful (and don’t at this moment have reason to think I would). And this
remains so if I surmise that my interlocutor would find x beautiful—still, I’m not
(normally, special circumstances aside) going to say so. —Our chapter as it
stands runs together the relativization problem and the question of whether I’ve
seen x myself (as I already hinted in a note a few days ago).
… We can see that the aging curator isn’t a problem. He believes x is
beautiful. He has not recently found-beautiful x, or has do so only briefly and not
with the earlier intensity.
II. First-person (non)authority, subjective facts and features, interpersonal
reasons.
No first-person authority obtains for beauty. I do have a familiar kind of
limited-but-genuine authority over whether I am finding x beautiful.
RW: Agree. We don’t claim that there is first-person authority for
beauty—far from it since we treat the judgment about beauty as an
empirical prediction about others. The relevant FPA amounts only to this:
in the case of the enjoyment associated with beauty, (1) one forms a belief
about the features the object has, and (2) one cannot be making a mistake
about a matter of objective fact in forming that belief. One may also of
course form beliefs connected with the enjoyment which satisfy (1) but not
(2). No denial of that. The only claim is that there is always a belief
satisfying (1) and (2).
Otherwise there are normal perceptual reliability; dependence of more
complex upon simpler features; and egocentric indexicality. —This will reduce
confusion and help a little with questions about reasons.
…
… Here’s a memory. It was either the fall-winter of 1971 or the winter-spring
of 1972. I was getting into a friend’s car, a VW Beetle (talk about unsafe at any
speed!), in a parking lot on the Stanford campus. We had driven to Stanford
from Berkeley to visit David Kaplan’s semantics seminar, and wanted to return
before nightfall. Somehow the friend had brought the topic of being tough-
looking into the conversation (our conversations were almost continually
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philosophical, by no means a given among philosophers, and he knew a great
deal more than I). In response to some sort of prompt I offered that I have first-
person authority (I didn’t use this phrase) over whether someone I see is tough-
looking: where F is the property of being tough-looking, there’s no difference
between looking F and being F. I would have been ready for the reply that y
could look tough to me without looking tough to Muhammed Ali, or to someone
who recognized y’s physiognomy as a mark of some inbred sect of pacifist
wallflowers with poor motor control. I would have responded with some sort of
relativization. Instead my friend rejoined that I was just wrong: one might say
that y had looked tough-looking, but that one saw he wasn’t when he moved into
the light. I disparaged the counterexample as slime, even as I found no reply.
My gracelessness was no doubt in part a reaction to my friend’s visible pleasure
at besting me.
Somewhat later I found that my friend had taken his argument verbatim from
Grice’s “Some remarks about the senses”.
RW: Well, I was young. I should have indicated the source!
This made no argumentative difference. I had seen at once that he was
right, while also feeling that the counterexample was somehow degenerate or
peripheral; the source changed neither of these. (It did make me think that I had
been perhaps just a little bit set up for that particular argumentative fall. Couldn’t
find any rational grounds to complain, though.) Only many years later (not that
I’d continuously thought about these things in the meantime) did I grant the
counterexample real respect. Of course there’s some sort of connection between
being tough-looking and how one visually appears to observers. But there is
genuine room for observational error, even if less (in some way requiring careful
statement) than for a number of “non-visual [=?] properties”.
RW: Off the top of my head, I don’t think the “looking tough-looking”
problem (an Albritton example, by the way) arises for the first-person-
authoritative judgments involved in the enjoyment of beauty. But it is OK if
it does. No need to think FPA means infallibility. You can impugn my FPA
belief by showing that my ability to make the relevant discriminations is
impaired.
…
Suppose I b-enjoy x. There is an array F of features of x causing my
enjoyment.
RW: More cautiously, plays a significant role in the causal ancestry of
my enjoyment. OK.
Here I mean objective, physical features of x. I can be more or less
conscious of these, and more or less able to label the ones I’m conscious of.
Ideally, the more the better, but anyway an experimenter can find or approximate
members of F by manipulating (near-replicas of) x. Normally, but with an implicit
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touch of scientific materialism, F would be called “the cause/s” of my enjoyment. I
am not authoritative with regard to these—indeed the question of my authority
even arises (then to be denied) only for members of F that I can state. This is
ordinary “objective” perception, in a case in which perceivers are often not very
articulate about what it is they’re seeing.
We want to say that the beauty of x (relative to me, if needed) supervenes on
F.
RW: I don’t want to say that. Maybe it is true (but talk of
supervenience always makes me nervous), but the paper does not assert
any relation between the objective features of x that play a causal role in
generating my enjoyment and the features I first-person-authoritatively
ascribe to it. That belief no doubt plays a causal role in generating the
enjoyment (along with the objective features), but the paper takes no
position here either.
However my identification of the features and my judgment of beauty are
corrigible in ordinary ways.
RW: Agree on both points. To revert to the mind-body stuff, the beliefs
are corrigible when the relevant discriminatory abilities are impaired.
I can think that a painting is beautiful, then change my mind when you move
it into better light, when I take two steps back, when you put it onto a more
neutral background or move the potted plant which, subliminally, was making the
arcs I’d liked seem more pronounced than they are.
…
Suppose I find x beautiful. Then an array F* of features supports my
enjoyment, some of which may be objective but at least some of which are
subjective, that is, they already express my pleasures and valuations.
RW: What does “supports” mean? The paper just assigns the
subjectively ascribed array a certain role characterized by the definition of
b-enjoyment, but is silent otherwise about anything else.
For example, that the black brilliantly sets off the yellow; the landscape
softens the brutality of the crucifixion; the colored squares seem to dance; the
pomegranates in the bowl have a near-lewd coloration that disturbs the
bourgeois setting [this may not pertain to beauty, but I can’t resist taking an
example from an art flyer in the coffeeshop where I’m working]; the ship’s rigging
picks up the tranquility of the waves; the washerwoman has the face and bearing
of a madonna amidst her dirty work; the goddess’s flesh evokes marble while
keeping human softness; the strong diagonal elements are broken up to just the
right degree, just short of being mechanical.
I am not authoritative regarding the F*-features either. When I change the
lighting the yellow doesn’t seem so brilliant after all. Or maybe the light is fine
and the yellow brilliant, but the black wasn’t doing as much as I’d thought—the
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effect also depends on those dark red patches. Once you take a good look at
that tree in the corner you’ll see that there’s too much diagonal after all. The
squares do seem to dance, but once I’m sufficiently used to that the painting
overall isn’t so lovely, the rest is too ordinary. Etc. —The features are more
subjective, in the sense that I have some say over whether the diagonal
composition is satisfying, the pomegranates vaguely suggestive (maybe you just
don’t take the suggestion, or don’t like it, or maybe I have a lewder imagination
(but it’s my imagination)), the geometric “rhythm” danceable, the skin comforting
and inviting caress. Good, subjective stuff—but not strict epistemic authority.
RW: I really did not mean to make any claim refuted by the above.
Part of what’s going on here is… I’m a very important judge of whether
something is beautiful (-for-me; but right now that won’t matter). I’m not
authoritative both for “tough-looking” sorts of reasons and because continued
attention and reflection can change my mind (that tree in the corner, the
painting’s ordinary features, etc.) When something is beautiful, its beauty is not a
simple, unanalyzable subjective property, any more than a basketball player’s
skill or a building’s thermal efficiency are simple, unanalyzable objective
properties. It depends on simpler properties—that’s the whole point of our
“array”—and in the formulation F* the properties depended on are themselves
subjective. (But first-person authority still fails.)
RW: It fails only if it FPA entails incorrigibility.
… In a materialist vein, I don’t want to call the F* causes of my enjoyment.
And in fact that vein still flows in me… even though Hilary did a lot to weaken it…
Overall though I have no trouble with the F* as causes, as long as we’re clear on
what we’re doing. They don’t operate for the psychological experimenter (for her
they’re explananda, like the beauty/enjoyment, not causes). But they’re much
more likely enter into my attempts to communicate aesthetically; they’re typically
what Richard (or Plato) has in mind when raising the question of reasons for our
judgment.
My imperfect authority in no way diminishes the egocentric privilege. If I’m to
state that x is beautiful, I need to find-beautiful x in suitably robust actual or
counterfactual circumstances. And when I do (actually or counterfactually), I will
likely do so on the grounds of some array F*, my identification of which is suitably
robust. (Similar remarks for F.)
…
Now for: how could my b-enjoyment of x, even under suitably favorable
circumstances (my mental state, the physical conditions, whatever), permit me to
think, even defeasibly, that others will b-enjoy x (thus also finding themselves
with suitable reasons, etc.)? I suggest factoring this question into (i) perception
in general; (ii) problems arising from the subjectivity of beauty and the F*.
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(i) is simple or at least looks so if you’ve not read philosophy. Seeing item x
on a leash, I not only judge that x is a black dog but that just about anyone
looking at x from a position roughly like mine (“any normal observer) would think
and would have sufficient reason to think that x is a black dog. And I’m right, and
rational. Explaining why turns out to lead into just a few complications (…!), but
the rough idea has to be that I have inductive reason to consider myself a reliable
identifier of black dogs in such circumstances, and to predict that just about any
human shares my perceptual-rational apparatus to a sufficient degree. Here,
unlike in the other minds case, the material for a well-grounded sort of argument
from analogy is in place. Skepticism is very important [personal opinion!], but the
only worries about the black dog case really are skeptical. If I think of how
perception gives me reasons, and how other perceivers are like me, it’s
straightforward.
One complication arises from the need for specialized knowledge—I identify
the dog in a way restricted to relatively knowledgeable dog-fanciers. [This
completely rules S.W. out, so I’ll just make something up…] “A Border-Collie-
Labrador mix with the characteristically very-dark-gray coat.” But this doesn’t
make philosophical problems.
So… if it’s so easy [setting philosophical sophistication aside] for (i), how bad
can it get for (ii)? … One problem is predictable relativizations. Agreeing with me
on beauty is in some ways more like agreeing with me on refined dog breeds, in
some ways like agreeing with me on theory-laden perceptions when there are
quite legitimately competing theories. Not unimportant… But more important is
the particularity of the beautiful object, the sensitivity of the judgment to
extremely sight changes. I don’t recall whether Kant mentions that this obstacle
to generalization is amplified by “disinterest”: broadly, a dog, a crescent wrench,
or a playable rook ending is what a dog, a crescent wrench, or a playable rook
ending respectively does. With the beautiful object there’s no functional test,
outside of the contemplation. A third problem [I’m not asserting that these are
ultimately so distinct] is that it’s much clearer how reasons are present in the
ordinary perceptual case (i) than for beauty. This is not surprising: the (i)-cases
are pretty well our paradigms for gaining reasons! While philosophy has done
the immense service of showing that “being a paradigm” needn’t make it so, let
alone count as an explanation, we can still expect complications once we step
away from the paradigm.
…
So… one focus of our theory is on how I take myself to have reasons when
standing before Riders on the Beach (I’ve actually stood before this one, despite
my deplorably minute museum-traveling experience. Also, beauty is far from its
only virtue, but anyway.) Our ultimately Platonic working hypothesis is that
solving this would at once show some level of inter- and poly-subjective reasons.
(Kantian too, but I say Platonic not just because Plato was earlier but because
we are precisely avoiding the transcendental psychology that makes this work (or
“work”) for Kant, in favor of a more elusive but also concrete understanding of
human discourse and social-political relations). That’s not free: if it’s easier to
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get outside yourself once you’ve got the reasons, it also take more work to show
reasons in the first place—but this is just how we’ve been proceeding.
A second concern is how to make use of common human nature: part of the
inductive grounding in the black dog case; has to operate in the beauty case as
well (we’re not crazy! Phenomenologically, shared humanity is just understood
to play a role; analytically, any sort of even quasi-predictive generalization to
others would be hopeless without it); but clearly cannot be used naively.
RW: In regard to the above from “Now for: how could my b-enjoyment
of x, even under suitably favorable circumstances (my mental state, the
physical conditions, whatever), permit me to think, even defeasibly, that
others will b-enjoy x (thus also finding themselves with suitable reasons,
etc.)?” to this point: Pretty much agree, I think. The current revisions fit in
much better with what you are saying than the draft you are reading.
Still I think that being really clear on how the matter is straightforward for (i),
then on how (a) relative, and (b) subjective factors complicate it for (ii), will help
the exposition and guide our thinking.
I want to connect the preceding to
The empirical claim? The hypothesis? The conjecture? The
mumbletystance? Or what? —What. —Performers of course, Henry the
Horse, dancing the waltz!
(which would be III of this letter, albeit less floridly and obscurely introduced), but
it’s better if I send this now. I hope I can help with our problem of the prediction?
or what? of shared responses and reasons in the next couple of days, thereby
concluding the long- (if not necessarily eagerly) awaited comments on
complete.5…
RW: The version of section III sent separately completely revises what is in
5 on the claim/hypothesis issue. Should fit better with what you think—I
hope!
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