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SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

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					                               SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
                            CHAPTER 16: GROUP DYNAMICS

Course Objective:        To master the necessary skills to predict and manipulate
                         juror behavior.

Methodology:             Course will be taught in a series of lectures that will total
                         about 10 hours. Students will be required to take a pretest and a
                         posttest.


Theories to be covered:

Group Dynamics


a.      (BBPM-BB)

Beware of the bias of “powerful” members of the jury panel.

The powerful, on the other hand, are too busy, too unconcerned with accuracy, and possibly too dominance
oriented to invest any attention in their appraisals of the powerless. They tend, therefore, to form highly
stereotypical impressions of those over whom they can exert power (Fiske & Depret, 1996); Fiske, Morling, &
Stevens, 1996).

Reynolds, K.J., Oakes, P.J., Haslam, S.A., Nolan, M.A., & Dolnik, L. (2000). Responses to powerlessness:
stereotyping as an instrument of social conflict. Group Dynamics: Theory, Research, and Practice, 4, 275-290.




b.      (JRGP-BB)

Jurors will respond better to group process if placed in groups in which they feel that the
boundaries are permeable. Wide diversity in social strata is undesirable.

Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) argues that collective challenge to low status and powerlessness
is likely to occur in cases in which group boundaries are perceived to be impermeable and the status
hierarchy is seen as illegitimate and/or unstable. In contrast, permeable boundaries encourage attempts at
individual mobility up the status hierarchy and a decreased emphasis on group membership. There is
extensive evidence of the effects of these variables on members’ identification with groups and the likelihood
of individual or collective responses to status differentials (see, e.g., Ellemers, 1993; Ellemers, van
Knippenberg, & Wilke, 1990/ Tajfel, 1978; Wright, 1997; Wright, Taylor & Moghaddam, 1990).

Reynolds, K.J., Oakes, P.J., Haslam, S.A., Nolan, M.A., & Dolnik, L. (2000). Responses to powerlessness:
stereotyping as an instrument of social conflict. Group Dynamics: Theory, Research, and Practice, 4, 275-290.




c.      (SJPS-BB)
A “sophisticated” juror will be perceived with suspicion by other members of the group.

…closed group boundaries provoked a strong preference for collective action and, more importantly, a clear
rejection of an out-group stereotype “consistent with…social position” (Jost and Banaji, 1994).

Reynolds, K.J., Oakes, P.J., Haslam, S.A., Nolan, M.A., & Dolnik, L. (2000). Responses to powerlessness:
stereotyping as an instrument of social conflict. Group Dynamics: Theory, Research, and Practice, 4, 275-290.



d.      (PPII-BB)

Power, or perceived power, influences interrelationships in decision making.

Since Mulder’s (1977) work on power—distance it has been widely assumed that the powerless strive to
minimize the differences between themselves and powerful others, whereas those with power seek to enlarge
the distance between themselves and powerless others.

Reynolds, K.J., Oakes, P.J., Haslam, S.A., Nolan, M.A., & Dolnik, L. (2000). Responses to powerlessness:
stereotyping as an instrument of social conflict. Group Dynamics: Theory, Research, and Practice, 4, 275-290.




e.      (DRBJ-BB)

The definition of the relationship between jurors affects their interaction and subsequent
decision making.

On the basis of our analysis, we propose that whether power reduction or power enlargement occurs within
an organization depends on the way the relationship between groups is defined—either intergroup (us vs.
them) or intragroup (“we are all in this together”)…As is the case in this study, if there are impermeable
structural divisions within an organization, then the powerless are likely to perceive more intergroup
division.

Reynolds, K.J., Oakes, P.J., Haslam, S.A., Nolan, M.A., & Dolnik, L. (2000). Responses to powerlessness:
stereotyping as an instrument of social conflict. Group Dynamics: Theory, Research, and Practice, 4, 275-290.




f.      (JRP-BB)

Jurors who are reluctant to participate will be more reluctant to contribute as the group
size increases.

In earlier work, Bales and his associates (Bales, 1950, 1953; Bales & Slater, 1955) observed that, even in
equal-status and same-gender groups, differentiation of participation quickly developed, with few members
dominating the discussion. Stephan and Mishler (1952) observed a similar distribution in their groups. They
found that the distribution of participation was not random but hierarchical, and the difference in
participation rate between the most and the least talkative member increased as group size increased.

Kuk, G. (2000). “When to speak again”: self-regulation under facilitation. Group Dynamics: Theory,
Research, and Practice, 4, 291-306.
g.      (MTM-BB)

More talkative members will dominate the group, be aware of the values of the more
talkative members of the venire.

It is logical that the most talkative members will select the next speakers and alternate turns with them. But
whether others will respond at that specific point in time depends on their disposition to speak (Stasser &
Taylor, 1991)…Taken together, it is likely that more talkative members will self-select themselves by
competing with others for participation, whereas less talkative members will wait for others to allocate them
their turns.

Kuk, G. (2000). “When to speak again”: self-regulation under facilitation. Group Dynamics: Theory,
Research, and Practice, 4, 291-306.



h.      (SFSR-BB)

A strong foreperson will ensure self-regulation of the jury.

Cox regression estimates showed that, over time, groups with a facilitator exhibited more self-regulatory
characteristics than groups without one….under facilitation, over time the more airtime individual members
had occupied before speaking again, the longer the delay before they would speak again.

Kuk, G. (2000). “When to speak again”: self-regulation under facilitation. Group Dynamics: Theory,
Research, and Practice, 4, 291-306.




i.      (HSDP-BB)

High-status men will take over in the deliberation process.

…group size may alter the effects of facilitation on self-regulation and, hence, when to speak again. Further
research should extend the present framework to the study of a larger group. Furthermore, high-status men
usually occupy a disproportionately higher amount of airtime and higher numbers of turns than low-status
women (Balkwell & Berger, 1996; Cohen & Zhou, 1991; Rideway, 1987).

Kuk, G. (2000). “When to speak again”: self-regulation under facilitation.

Group Dynamics: Theory, Research, and Practice, 4, 291-306.



j.      (DPPA-BB)

The deliberation process tends to produce accountability among jurors.

There are several feasible explanations that may help explain the tempering effect of deliberation on juror
bias due to inadmissible evidence…Kerwin and Shaffer (1994) have suggested that deliberations may produce
accountability among jury members. That is, jury members may remind one another that they may not
consider inadmissible evidence in reaching their verdicts.

London, K., & Nunez, N. (2000). The effect of jury deliberations on jurors’ propensity to disregard
inadmissible evidence. Journal of Applied Psychology, 85, 932-939.




k.      (TGF-BB)

There is a tendency for groups to focus only on information that was shared before the
discussion. Because of self-censor and the desire to conform to group norms, unpopular
beliefs are downplayed and the deliberation is therefore biased in favor of the majority
opinion.

Stasser and Titus (1985, 1987) presented evidence that raises doubts about the effectiveness of [face to face]
group discussions for disseminating unshared information. Their research shows that how information is
distributed among group members before discussion significantly determines the resulting quality of
judgments made by groups. In [face to face] encounters, groups tend to focus on information that members
shared before the discussion. Any unshared information is given comparatively little consideration. Stasser
and Titus suggested that group members self-censor their inputs to conform to group norms. In addition, the
dynamics of group discussion tend to place new or discrepant information in an advocacy position that is
unpopular with other members and accordingly downplayed. In this way group discussion tends to be biased
in favor of the majority’s initial position, and it largely ignores information that is not held in common among
members.

Lam, S.S.K., & Schaubroeck, J. (2000). Improving group decisions by better pooling information: a
comparative advantage of group decision support systems. Journal of Applied Psychology, 85, 565-573.




l.      (GMCS-BB)

Group members will remain committed to their prediscussion decisions because they feel
pressured to defend their initial stance.
…group members will tend to remain committed to their pre-discussion preferences. Stasser and Titus
(1985) reviewed the various reasons for this phenomenon, such as the psychological need to justify oneself to
others. When people raise their views in public, they feel pressure to defend them and put less emphasis on
considering new information.

Lam, S.S.K., & Schaubroeck, J. (2000). Improving group decisions by better pooling information: a
comparative advantage of group decision support systems. Journal of Applied Psychology, 85, 565-573.



m.      (JWT-BB)

Emphasize the fact that jurors need to work together toward their common goal. Increase
their desire to employ prosocial methods.
Through incentives, instructions, inducements of positive affect, and emphasis on the fact that parties need to
work together in the future, managers and instructors may increase the negotiators’ prosocial motivation
that, provided high resistance to yielding, facilitates problem solving and the attainment of collectively
functional, integrative agreements. Thus, we argue that Dual Concern Theory is an empirically valid theory
of negotiation and also offers a variety of strategies to improve negotiator effectiveness.

De Dreu, C.K.W., Weingart, L.R., & Kwon, S. (2000). Influence of social motives on integrative negotiation: a
meta-analysis review and test of two theories. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 78, 889-905.
                                Social Psychology:
                             Ch. 16 (Group Dynamics)


1.   How are “powerful” jurors perceived?

2.   How are “sophisticated” jurors perceived?

3.   Why are concrete words important?

4.   How are unpopular beliefs treated during deliberations?

5.   Why should you encourage jurors to work toward a common goal?

				
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posted:12/16/2011
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