Due Process and Voluntariness; the Miranda Doctrine by AL5oUKlK

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									Due Process and Voluntariness;
    the Miranda Doctrine
       Involuntary Statements
• Inadmissible for any purpose
  (impeachment) at trial
• Fruit of the poisonous tree?
   Problems with Voluntariness
• Inevitably normative, murky inquiry
• Case-by-case analysis fails to communicate
  clear standards to police
• Fact-finding particularly difficult due to
  isolation
• Largely eclipsed by Miranda, Massiah
• But still valid law, possibly resurgent
        The Miranda Doctrine
• Grounded in Fifth Amendment privilege
  against incrimination
• Police, prior to any custodial interrogation,
  must admonish suspect of 1) right to remain
  silent; 2) responses will be used in court; 3)
  right to have counsel present before
  answering; 4) right to court-appointed
  counsel if indigent
       Custodial Interrogation
• Questioning initiated by the police
• Person in custody or otherwise deprived of
  freedom in any significant way
      Purposes of Admonitions
• Right to remain silent – to offset inherent
  co-ercion
• Statement will be used against you – to
  convey significance of encounter
• Right to counsel – defendant can’t stand
  alone for long
• Appointed counsel – to guarantee right to
  counsel to indigent suspects
    Other Purposes for Counsel
• Presence discourages coercion
• Can testify at trial to coercion
• Ensure that client’s statements accurate, and
  accurately reproduced at trial
         Effect of Invocation
• If suspect invokes right to silence before or
  during questioning, police must stop
• Any subsequent statement per se compelled
• If right to attorney invoked, questioning
  may only resume after consultation, and in
  presence of attorney
• If attorney unavailable, police must wait
       Determining “Custody”
• Formal arrest
• Would a reasonable person in suspect’s position
  have understood herself to be deprived of freedom
  in a significant way? (Berkemer v. McCarty)
• Uncommunicated police intentions irrelevant
  (Stansbury v. CA), but communicated intentions
  can be considered
• Location important, but not dispositive (OR v.
  Mathiason; Orozco v. TX)
• Routine traffic or Terry stop is not “custody” -
  (Berkemer)
Other factors bearing on Custody
•   When interrogation occurs
•   How suspect reached encounter
•   Length
•   How many police present
•   Display of weapons
•   Physical restraint, guards
•   Subsequent events
•   Suspect’s age? (Yarborough v. Alvarado)
             Problem 8-11
• Was Holmes in custody at the time of
  interrogation?
• Would reasonable person in Holmes’
  position have believed that his freedom was
  deprived in a significant way?
             Problem 8-13
• Was DeLaurier in custody when questioned
  by Officer Dostanko (two times)?
• Would reasonable person in DeLaurier’s
  position have believed that his freedom was
  deprived in a significant way?
       Defining “Interrogation”
• Expess questioning
• Or its “functional equivalent”
• Words or actions on the part of police, other than
  those normally attendant upon arrest and custody,
  that police should have known were reasonably
  likely to elicit incriminating response from suspect
• Objective standard, but police intent and
  knowledge relevant
               Next time:
• Custodial Interrogation and the Miranda
  Doctrine, pp. 661-698

								
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