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					SDI 11
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                                                         New Mock 1AC
Contention One: No Disads –

First. NMD is inevitable, the only question is what type of system the US deploys

The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 2k6
(The Independent Working Group - made up of over 25 Professors, Generals, Ambassadors and Analysts,“Missile
Defense, the Space Relationship, and the Twenty-First Century: 2007 Report”,
http://www.claremont.org/static/IWGreport.pdf)
Missile defense has entered a new era. The decades-long debate over whether to protect the American people from
the threat of ballistic missile attack has been settled – and settled unequivocally in favor of missile defense. The
rigid constraints of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which made the construction of effective anti-missile
capabilities impossible during the decades of the Cold War, are now a thing of the past. What remains an open
question is what shape the American missile defense system will take in the years ahead.

And, Militarization of Space is Inevitable – It’s Only a question of who gets there first

Stratfor 2k8
(Stratfor is a global intelligence company and has been cited by media such as CNN, Bloomberg, the Associated
Press, Reuters, The New York Times and the BBC as an authority on strategic and tactical intelligence issues.[6]
Barron's once referred to it as "The Shadow CIA".[7] “United States: The Weaponization of Space” April 10, 2008,
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/united_states_ weaponization_space)
In the 1950s, the United States began pushing for an international treaty on outer space — even before the 1957 launch of
Sputnik atop a modified version of the world’s first intercontinental ballistic missile. Fortunes have changed somewhat in the last 50
years, and the Pentagon has little interest in taking on further legally binding constraints these days. This is
especially true in space, where “weaponization” is not only inevitable, but already well under way. In 1967,
Washington became party to the “Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies” (better known as the Outer Space Treaty). This treaty was quickly and readily accepted, in part because of
its utter lack of definitions. Aside from some fairly unequivocal language about prohibiting the deployment of nuclear
weapons in outer space and more broad military activities on the moon and other celestial bodies, the treaty is much
more a loose collection of very large holes than it is a constraint on sovereign national action in space. Since then,
the military utility of space has begun to be realized. Today, it is a cornerstone of global military communications
and navigation. In Iraq today, for example, the U.S. military uses the Global Positioning System (GPS) for everything from squad level
maneuvers to joint direct attack munition (JDAM) delivery. Largely from facilities inside the continental United States, the Pentagon controls
some unmanned aerial systems half a world away. GPS has given rise to a new degree of precision in guided weapons. Imagery from space-based
surveillance platforms has become commonplace and the Defense Support Program constellation continually monitors the surface of the earth for
the launch plume of a ballistic missile. It is an incredibly valuable military domain. And just as it has become more valuable, the
United States has become increasingly dependent on it. Thus, space-based assets are susceptible targets for U.S.
adversaries. Were the United States to lose these assets, its military capability on the ground would be severely
affected. Any symmetric enemy knows that and will act to neutralize U.S. space capability. The U nited States knows
that this attack will take place and must therefore defend the assets . In this sense, space is already a domain of
military competition and conflict . There is no escaping it. In other words, space has already been weaponized, except
that the actual projectiles are not yet located in space. Beijing’s 2007 and Washington’s recent anti-satellite weapons tests
only emphasize this point.

And, the PERCEPTION of Weaponization is Occuring – Even if Weaponization itself isn’t

International Business Times News 3/6/2k11
(“Space weaponry in focus as US Air Force launches mysterious X-37B robotic plane,” pg lexis//ef)
The Air Force has said the unmanned mission is intended to test out new spacecraft technologies. The launch of a second secret space
mission in two years has given room for renewed space weaponry rumors though the Air force says the mission is
only about testing out hardware for future space shuttles. "Partly as a result of the secrecy, some concern has been
raised ” particularly by Russia and China ” that the X-37B is a space weapon of some sort," according to space.com. The
spacecraft, which was built by Boeing (NYSE:BA) for the U.S. military, looks like a NASA space shuttle and has a "payload bay about the size
of a pickup truck bed." The U.S. Air Force had launched the unmanned X-37B spacecraft in April last year. It was never fully explained if it was
entirely a military project though Air Force officials did make a mention of the 'warfighter needs'. "If these technologies on the vehicle prove to
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be as good as we estimate, it will make our access to space more responsive, perhaps cheaper, and push us in the vector toward being able to react
to warfighter needs more quickly," an Air Force statement said at that time. The craft, whose secretive mission fueled speculation
about its warfare uses, returned successfully to Earth in December as planned and landed on its own. The X-37B was originally a
NASA project. Prompt Global Strike The botched test flight of a hypersonic glide vehicle in April last year had created intense speculation about
the U.S. revving up its space weaponry program. The U.S. Air Force was counting on the hypersonic glide vehicle to give it the capability to
strike at targets anywhere in the world within one hour with conventional missiles. The project, which was jointly executed by the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the U.S. Air Force, was aimed at developing a conventional "prompt global strike" capability
with the help of the Hypersonic Test Vehicle that can Mach 20 speeds. But the test flight failed as the glider lost communication nine minutes
into the launch from Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, though it had successfully separated from its booster rocket. The U.S. Air Force had
planned to have the first Conventional Strike Missile fielded at Vandenberg by 2015, according to a Global Security report. "It would remain on
alert, backed up by two spares, for potentially hitting a time-urgent target such as top terrorist leaders spotted at a hideout or a North Korean
nuclear missile being readied for launch..." During the test, the vehicle was expected to fly roughly 5,700 kilometers in less than half an hour, the
report had said. There is also a prevailing thought that much of the existing space technologies have dual uses in military and civilian life, like the
global positioning system which was conceived as a military technology but went on to have more civilian uses. Many analysts have also
said that any space program by any nation can have a military implication as anything that travels in the space can
be a weapon if manoeuvred militarily. "The whole issue is further complicated because beyond technologies like lasers, Rods from God,
explosives, etc.... virtually any object traveling in space can be a weapon if it can be manoeuvred to run into another object," space.com quoted
Joan Johnson-Freese, a space policy analyst at the Naval War College in Newport, as saying last year.

And, the plan will be framed as NMD

Mitchell 2k1
(Gordon R., PHD, (Assoc. Prof., Communication, Univ. of Pittsburgh) 7/01 with Kevin J. Ayotte & David Cram
Helwich, ISIS Briefing on Ballistic Missile Defense #6, www.isisuk.demon.co.uk/0811/isis/uk/bmd/no6.html)
As defense analyst Daniel Gonzales notes, a prerequisite to deployment of space control weaponry '… may well be a
determined effort to develop a national ballistic missile defense system and a related decision to renegotiate key elements of the
ABM Treaty or to abrogate the treaty entirely. Until then, it is difficult to see how robust anti-ASAT weapon systems could be developed, tested
and fielded'.31 Since any US attempt to overtly seize military control of outer space would likely stir up massive
political opposition both home and abroad, defence analyst James Oberg anticipates that 'the means by which the placement
of space-based weapons will likely occur is under a second US space policy directive — that of ballistic missile
defense… This could preempt any political umbrage from most of the world's influential nations while positioning
the US as a guarantor of defense from a universally acclaimed threat'. 32 In this scenario, ABM Treaty breakout, conducted
under the guise of missile defence, functions as a tripwire for unilateral US military domination of the heavens .
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                                    New 1AC China Escalation Impact
***And, Risk of Pearl Harbor in Space will force a U.S. First Strike on Mainland China – Escalates Quickly
to Full-Scale War
Tellis 2k7
(Ashley, B.A., M.A.; University of Bombay; M.A., Ph.D., The University of Chicago, is Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace in Washington DC, specializing in international security, defense, and Asian strategic issues. While on assignment to
the U.S. Department of State as senior adviser to the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, “China's Military Space Strategy,”
Survival, pg online @ http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/tellis_china_space1.pdf //ef)
Finally, the growing Chinese capability for space warfare implies that a future conflict in the Taiwan Strait would entail serious deterrence and
crisis instabilities. If such a clash were to compel Beijing to attack US space systems at the beginning of a war, the very prospect of such a ‘space
Pearl Harbor’94 could, in turn, provoke the United States to contemplate pre-emptive attacks or horizontal escalation on the Chinese
mainland. Such outcomes would be particularly likely in a conflict in the next decade, before Washington has the opportunity to invest fully in
redundant space capabilities. Already, US Strategic Command officials have publicly signalled that conventionally armed Trident submarine-
launched ballistic missiles would be appropriate weapons for executing the prompt strikes that might become necessary in such a contingency.95
Such attacks, even if employing only conventional warheads, on space launch sites, sensor nodes and command and control installations on the
Chinese mainland could well be perceived as a precursor to an all-out war. It would be difficult for all sides to limit the intensification of such a
conflict, even without the added complications of accidents and further misperception.96 The emergence of potent Chinese counterspace
capabilities makes US military operations in Asia more risky than ever. The threat has not arisen due to a lack of a space arms-control regime, or
because of the Bush administration’s disinclination to negotiate an accord that bans the weaponisation of space. Rather, it is rooted entirely in
China’s requirement that it be able to defeat the United States in a regional conflict despite its conventional inferiority. This strategic challenge
has compelled Beijing to exploit every anti-access and battlespace-denial technology potentially available. The threat posed by this Chinese effort
cannot be neutralised by arms-control agreements, even though all countries stand to profit from the absence of threats to their assets in space.
There is a temptation, especially in the United States, to view China’s counterspace programmes in moralistic terms. This approach is undesirable
and best avoided: Beijing’s desire to defeat the stronger by asymmetric means is not a reflection of its deviousness, nor provoked by mendacity
on the part of the United States or the Bush administration. It is grounded in the objective conditions that define the relationship between the two
countries: competing political goals, likely to persist whether or not the Taiwan conflict is resolved. In such circumstances, the United States
should seek, as the Bush administration’s own National Space Policy declares, to protect the ’use of outer space by all nations for peaceful
purposes and for the benefit of all humanity’. But if this fundamental goal is threatened by Chinese counterspace activities aimed at American
space assets, the United States has no choice but to run an offence–defence arms race, and win.
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             Space-Based NMD
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                          Possible Plan Texts (BMD Version)
The United States federal government should deploy space-based missile defense systems beyond the Earth’s
Mesosphere.

The United States federal government should deploy a Brilliant Pebbles space-defense system beyond the
Earth’s Mesosphere.

The United States federal government should deploy interceptors for a missile defense space-system test bed
beyond the Earth’s Mesosphere.

The United States federal government should
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                                                       Top-Level (1AC?)
First, Missile Defense is a Trojan-Horse for U.S. Space Weaponization

Mitchell 2k1
(Gordon R., PHD, (Assoc. Prof., Communication, Univ. of Pittsburgh) 7/01 with Kevin J. Ayotte & David Cram
Helwich, ISIS Briefing on Ballistic Missile Defense #6, www.isisuk.demon.co.uk/0811/isis/uk/bmd/no6.html)
As defense analyst Daniel Gonzales notes, a prerequisite to deployment of space control weaponry '… may well be a
determined effort to develop a national ballistic missile defense system and a related decision to renegotiate key elements of the
ABM Treaty or to abrogate the treaty entirely. Until then, it is difficult to see how robust anti-ASAT weapon systems could be developed, tested
and fielded'.31 Since any US attempt to overtly seize military control of outer space would likely stir up massive
political opposition both home and abroad, defence analyst James Oberg anticipates that 'the means by which the placement
of space-based weapons will likely occur is under a second US space policy directive — that of ballistic missile
defense… This could preempt any political umbrage from most of the world's influential nations while positioning
the US as a guarantor of defense from a universally acclaimed threat'. 32 In this scenario, ABM Treaty breakout, conducted
under the guise of missile defence, functions as a tripwire for unilateral US military domination of the heavens .

Brilliant Pebbles is the Vector for Weaponization – Starts us on the Technical Road to feasibility

Dolman and Cooper 2k11
(Everett, PhD and Professor of Comparative Military Studies @ US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space
Studies and Recipient of Central Intelligence’s Outstanding Intelligence Analyst Award, and Henry, PhD and
Former Deputy for the Strategic and Space Systems, “Increasing the Military Uses of Space,” pg online @
http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/spacepower/spacepower.pdf //ef)
Arguments in the first category spill the most ink in opposition, but they are relatively easy to dispatch. Consider first that history is littered with
prophesies of technical and scientific inadequacy, such as Lord Kelvin's famous retort, "Heavier-than-air flying machines are impossible."
Kelvin, a leading physicist and president of the Royal Society, made this boast in 1895, and no less an inventor than Thomas Edison agreed. The
possibility of spaceflight prompted even more gloomy pessimism. A New York Times editorial in 1921 excoriated Robert Goddard for his silly
notions of rocket-propelled space exploration (an opinion it has since retracted): "Goddard does not know the relation between action and reaction
and the need to have something better than a vacuum against which to react. He seems to lack the basic knowledge ladled out daily in high
schools." Compounding its error in judgment, opining in 1936, the Times stated flatly, "A rocket will never be able to leave the Earth's
atmosphere."3 Bluntly negative scientific opinion on the possibility of space weapons writ large has been weeded out
over time. No credible scientist today makes the claim of impossibility, and so less encompassing arguments are
now the rule. The debate has moved to more subtle and scientifically sustainable arguments that a particular space
weapon is not feasible. Mountains of mathematical formulae have been piled high in an effort, one by one, simply to bury the concept. But
these limitations on specific systems are less due to theoretical analysis than to assumptions about future funding and available technology.4 The
real objection, too often hidden from view, is that a particular weapons system or capability cannot be developed
and deployed within the planned budget or within narrowly specified means. When one relaxes those assumptions, opposition
on technical grounds generally falls away. Furthermore, counterexamples exist—for example, the Brilliant Pebbles space-based
interceptor system was the most advanced defense concept to emerge from the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). After a
comprehensive series of technical reviews by even the strongest critics in 1989, it achieved major defense
acquisition program status in 1990, was curtailed by congressional cuts in 1991 and 1992, and then was canceled by
the Clinton administration in 1993. But the cancellation of the most advanced, least expensive, and most cost-effective missile defense
system produced by the SDI program was for political, not technical, reasons.5 The devil may very well be in the details.
But when critics oppose an entire class of weapons based upon analyses that show particular weapons will not work,
their arguments fail to consider the inevitable arrival of fresh concepts or new technologies that change all notions of
current capabilities. Have we thought out the details enough to say categorically that no technology will allow for a viable space weapons
capability? If so, then the argument is pat; no counter is possible. But if there are technologies or conditions that could allow for the successful
weaponization of space, then ought we not argue the policy details first, lest we be swept away by a course of action that merely chases the
technology wherever it may go?

And, Space BMD Causes Weaponization

Gilbert 10
(Jo-Anne, PhD candidate and research assistant at the Griffith Asia Institute, “A Spoon Full Of Sugar Makes The
Medicine Go Down? An Analysis Of The Obama Administration’s ‘New’ National Space Policy,” September,
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http://sustainablesecurity.org/article/spoon-full-sugar-makes-medicine-go-down-analysis-obama-
administration%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%98new%E2%80%99-national-space)
BMD, nuclear issues, and space weaponisation are intrinsically linked. The paradox of the push towards BMD capacity
is that it deepens the US military’s already acute dependence on space systems for their operational requirements,
subsequently increasing their sense of vulnerability. And, while the nuclear taboo has resulted in the ever-increasing
lethality of conventional weapons, it is also spurring the development of near-space and space-enabled
programs . An example is the Advanced Hypersonic Weapon, an integral component of the ‘Prompt Global Strike’ capacity - which envisages
the US being able to strike a target anywhere on Earth within sixty minutes. Additionally, although he has not explicitly linked his disarmament
agenda to BMD, Obama’s push for a nuclear-free world has the same motivation and justification as Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative. On
the other hand, US BMD systems potentially neutralise the nuclear deterrence of states such as China, thereby
providing an incentive for them to pursue weaponisation . Tied to these developments is the fact that Obama is
the first Democrat to take up a Presidency where the narrative of BMD is well entrenched; that is, the discourse about
BMD is no longer about whether or not to support the program, but rather, what form of BMD to support .(8) The
change in the base level of narrative becomes more important considering the linkage between space weapons and
BMD; progression in BMD technology, and its acceptability in political and public discourse increases the chance
that space weapons may become a solution.
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                                                               Feasibility
And, Space-Based BMD is technologically feasible and necessary to prevent attack on U.S. Space Assets
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 2k9
(Co-Chaired by Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Security Studies The Fletcher School,
Tufts University President, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Dr. William R. Van Cleave Professor Emeritus Department of Defense
and Strategic Studies Missouri State University “Missile Defense, the Space Relationship, and the Twenty-First Century,” pg online @
http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/IWG2009.pdf //ef)
Access to a secure space environment is indispensable if the United States is to deploy a robust, layered missile defense. It is essential not only to
assure that the United States will be able to use space for missile defense, but also to develop the means to protect other space-based assets
and infrastructure. Space has become an arena of crucial importance to the United States both for commercial purposes and for national
security. Just as it must maintain capabilities to defend its interests in the air, at sea, and on land, the United States needs to defend its space-
based assets. At the same time we must deny the hostile use of space by our enemies. Just as land, the seas, and the air have been conflict
arenas, space is changing how wars are fought and where they will be fought. This section addresses the role of space in twenty-first century
U.S. national security strategy and its essential contributions to future missile defense. Space offers unique opportunities for a global missile
defense. The obstacles to space-based missile defense lie primarily in the political arena rather than in technological limitations. This section
examines issues that must be addressed if the United States is to deploy a missile defense that includes space-based interdiction capabilities.
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                               Weaponization Inevitable/First Mover
And, Commercial Development Ensures Weaponization – U.S. Access first enables commercial spin-offs
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 2k9
(Co-Chaired by Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Security Studies The Fletcher School,
Tufts University President, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Dr. William R. Van Cleave Professor Emeritus Department of Defense
and Strategic Studies Missouri State University “Missile Defense, the Space Relationship, and the Twenty-First Century,” pg online @
http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/IWG2009.pdf //ef)
Space has become an essential part of daily life. This includes satellites that transmit television images, provide weather forecasting data,
emergency response, the infrastructure for the internet, the mapping of the Earth’s surface, and global positioning information. Space
technologies are transforming the process by which we conduct business and undertake research. The net result is greater productivity with
important implications for economic growth, prosperity, and innovation. Access to space-based assets is essential for a broad range of private-
sector activities, which will increase both in scope and intensity as a result of the emergence of technologies including smaller satellites and
cheaper boosters, miniaturization, and greater economies of scale. The space infrastructure originally established with government funding has
furnished the basis for both military and commercial applications. In the years ahead, the commercial sector is likely to provide innovative
impetus that spills over into the military arena. By the mid-1990s, global commercial revenues from space resulting from the rapid expansion
of consumer services such as telecommunications and television were greater than the aggregate of government spending on space. In 2007 alone,
spending on commercial space infrastructure, infrastructure support industries, and commercial satellite services (including direct-to-home
television and GPS) totaled approximately $174 billion, accounting for nearly 70 percent of total global space spending. Alongside increased
commercial spending on space, government space budgets have accounted for a steadily decreasing percentage of global space spending. In the
past two years alone, the governmental share of global space spending has slipped by 8 percentage points, from 39 percent of global space
spending in 2005 to 31 percent in 2007. Over the same period of time, aggregate government spending on space actually increased by $8.25
billion. The fact that government’s share of space spending decreased 8 points in spite of a 12 percent boost in spending further underscores the
impressive growth of the commercial space sector.36 This means that governments will have less control over access to such services as high-
resolution imagery of the Earth’s surface, which can be used for civilian or for military purposes. Growing commercialization of space will make
such access more widely available as commercial investment in space technologies increases relative to that of governments. Governments in turn
will rely increasingly on the private sector for a broader range of space products, services, and technologies. While government-sponsored
innovation provided the initial catalyst, especially during the Cold War, the private sector will play a growing role in the development of space
technologies that have potential military applications in the years ahead. Dual-use space technologies will spin off from the commercial to the
military sector in unprecedented ways. This includes areas such as communications and imaging satellites and new launch vehicles as well as
telecommunications, the broader availability of imagery, and GPS technologies, products, and services. The private sector will develop new
products such as satellites and at the same time offer services such as we see today with telecommunications and imagery. In some cases
government programs will produce infrastructure such as satellites and GPS, with the private sector then benefiting from such capabilities.
Likewise, the government, including the U.S. military, will contract with the private sector to lease communications and other capabilities. For
example, the U.S. military recently contracted with Paradigm Secure Communications, based in the United Kingdom, in an effort to augment the
capabilities of the Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS). The deal, worth up to $48 million over three years, will provide the
military with X-band communications using Paradigm’s fleet of Skynet satellites. Currently, the U.S. military receives about 80 percent of its
satellite communications capacity from commercial providers. 37 Of course, these basic trends in the growth in a commercial space sector do not
guarantee that the United States will be the greatest beneficiary. This obviously depends on strategic choices taken by the United States to
exploit such technologies for military purposes. Others bent on benefiting from space technologies will increasingly have access to a
global commercial space sector from which they are likely to be capable of spinning off technologies for military purposes if they choose
to do so. Therefore, whether or not space is “weaponized” will be increasingly beyond U.S. control as dual-use space technologies become
more readily available.

Commercial Space Development Advantage
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                                                AT: Arms Racing Turn
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 2k9
(Co-Chaired by Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Security Studies The Fletcher School,
Tufts University President, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Dr. William R. Van Cleave Professor Emeritus Department of Defense
and Strategic Studies Missouri State University “Missile Defense, the Space Relationship, and the Twenty-First Century,” pg online @
http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/IWG2009.pdf //ef)
Indeed, far from sparking a costly and deadly arms race, the deployment of a robust, global, space-based missile defense is likely to
make it more expensive, and therefore less attractive, for other states to build missiles or to engage in regional arms
races based on the deployment of missiles.
There is no empirical or historical basis for the contention that such an effort will lead other states to step up their missile-related programs,
leading to an escalating race to deploy missiles designed to overcome whatever missile defense is deployed by the United States. In fact,
following the ABM Treaty in the 1970s, the Soviet Union nevertheless deployed large numbers of advanced missile systems, negating the logic
that the ABM Treaty reduced the incentive or need to deploy new generations of missiles designed to defeat deployed missile defenses. The
ABM Treaty codified a strategic relationship of mutual vulnerability in which the Soviet Union nevertheless built large numbers of additional
intercontinental ballistic missiles and nuclear warheads whose purpose was to increase U.S., not mutual, vulnerability – and to assure that, in the
event of nuclear war, the Soviet Union would have had strategic superiority.
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                                               AT: Arms Control CP’s
Arms Control Fails: ICBMs
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 2k9
(Co-Chaired by Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Security Studies The Fletcher School,
Tufts University President, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Dr. William R. Van Cleave Professor Emeritus Department of Defense
and Strategic Studies Missouri State University “Missile Defense, the Space Relationship, and the Twenty-First Century,” pg online @
http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/IWG2009.pdf //ef)
Contrary to the assertions of many of its proponents, the lesson of the ABM Treaty is that in the absence of a U.S. missile defense capability,
other states have been developing missile programs without having to take into account an American defense. This has provided an array of
competitors with a relatively cheap option of developing even primitive missiles in order to acquire an asymmetrical advantage over the United
States.
The 30-year experience of the ABM Treaty, together with other efforts to restrict weapons proliferation and deployment by international
agreement, does not give credence to efforts now underway to impose new international legal prohibitions against space-based missile defense. If
past experience is any indicator, such efforts are more likely to place onerous restrictions on the United States, as happened with the ABM Treaty,
than to provide universally accepted norms to govern the peaceful use of space. Furthermore, access to space, as well as space control, is key to
future U.S. efforts to provide disincentives to states and terrorist organizations seeking WMD and their delivery systems. Given these factors,
space control is crucial to U.S. national security in the twenty-first century, together with space-based missile defense.
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             S&T Advantage (Missile Defense)
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                                                  Long 1AC Advantage
Advantage ______: S&T Development

First, U.S. Innovation and S&T is Slowing – We are at-risk of Falling Behind
Huffington 2k10
(Arianna Huffington, co-founder and editor in chief, 3-29-2010, “When It Comes to Innovation, Is America Becoming a Third World
Country?,” Huffington Post, pg online @ http://www.huffingtonpost.com/arianna-huffington/when-it-comes-to-innovati_b_512280.html
//ef)
Is America turning into a third world country? That was the provocative topic of a panel I took part in last week at a conference
sponsored by The Economist entitled "Innovation: Fresh Thinking For The Ideas Economy." Once upon a time, the United States was
the world's dominant innovator -- partly because we didn't have much competition. As a result of the destruction wreaked by
WWII, the massive migration of brainpower to the U.S. caused by the war, and huge amounts of government
spending, America had the innovation playing field largely to itself. None of these factors exist as we enter the
second decade of the 21st century. America now has plenty of countries it's competing with -- many of which are
much more serious about innovation than we are. Just look at the numbers: A report by the Information Technology and Innovation
Foundation looked at the progress made over the last decade in the area of innovation. Out of the 40 countries and regions it examined, the U.S.
ranked dead last. A study on innovation by the Boston Consulting Group concluded that America is "disadvantaged in several key areas,
including work force quality and economic, immigration, and infrastructure policies." In 2009, patents issued to American applicants dropped by
2.3 percent. Those granted to foreign-based applicants increased by over 6 percent. Why are we falling behind like this? For one thing, we've lost
our educational edge. America once led the world in high school graduation rates. We are now ranked 18th out of 24 industrialized countries.
And the percentage of 15-year-olds performing at the highest levels of math is among the lowest. South Korea, Belgium and the Czech Republic,
among others, have at least five times the number the U.S. does. Plus, we are no longer investing in innovation. Until 1979, around 50
percent of all research and development funds were provided by the federal government. That number has fallen to 27 percent. And, during the
1990s, the bottom fell out of U.S. funding for applied science, dropping by 40 percent. The economic crisis is also taking a toll on
innovation. Venture capital investment in the U.S. for the first three quarters of 2009 was $12 billion. Over the first three quarters of 2008, it
was $22 billion. These numbers may not place us in the third world ... yet. But the trend is not a good one . Adding to
the problem is the sense that America's best days may be behind us. Many economists and historians are warning
that our current economic downturn has created a new normal. That the country will never be the same. Things are, of course,
going to be different. But that doesn't have to mean that they are going to be worse. However, if we don't get serious about innovation,
they will be. When it comes to our approach to innovation, we desperately need some innovation.

U.S. Economic Recovery has slowed – a Shot in the Arm is Critical or a new Depression is Inevitable

Morrison 7/10/2k11
(Dennis, Economist, “US economic recovery needs shot in the arm,” pg online @ http://jamaica-
gleaner.com/gleaner/20110710/cleisure/cleisure4.html //ef)
An extremely poor US job growth report for the month of June, which came out last Friday, is the latest piece of evidence
that the economic recovery in America is faltering, while that nation's political system is gripped by ideological
polarisation. The latest report follows an equally dismal outturn in May and shows a picture of rising
unemployment, with the rate now at 9.2 per cent, a historically high number. The prospect is that Americans could well be in
for a prolonged period of weak economic recovery characterised by measly job growth - an ominous situation for Jamaica
that is so heavily dependent on ties with the US market. At a time when it is crystal clear that the recovery cannot be sustained
without further stimulation by government spending, Republican ideological purists are fixated on spending cuts as
the formula for creating jobs. According to their prescription, the American economic recovery is being held back because there is a lack of
confidence in government policies by businesses. The simple fact is businesses are not expanding because there is a lack of
demand for their goods and services, i.e., there are not enough customers ready to spend . As economists across the
spectrum have advised, short-term spending cuts by the US government would make the problem of unemployment
worse. Reduced government spending would mean lower demand and fewer customers, leading to job cuts by
employers. Indeed, spending cuts at the state and local levels that have already led to job losses are one of the factors that have contributed to
the continuing high unemployment rate nationally. And there is all the research on the policy failures that shows how cutbacks of
public spending in an economic slump drove the United States into the Great Depression. Initiatives for job recovery
Republican control of the legislative arm of the US government, with their ideological fixation on spending cuts at a
time when the economy needs stimulation, brings into sharp focus the danger posed by the political-economic
conundrum to which I have referred in recent articles. In a recent Newsweek article, former President Bill Clinton pointed to a number of
initiatives, some of them being advocated by the Obama administration, through which targeted government activity could accelerate recovery in
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the job market. These include investment in green energy involving retrofitting of public buildings, which alone could put a million people to
work while cutting electricity usage.

A HIGH-Risk Scientific Project is the Shot-in-the-Arm we need to Ensure Growth and Long-Term Scientific
Innovation

Segal 6/6/2k11
(Adam Segal, Ira A. Lipman Senior Fellow for Counterterrorism and National Security Studies, “U.S. Innovation
and Economic Recovery,” pg online @ http://www.cfr.org/economics/us-innovation-economic-recovery/p25198
//ef)
News of rising unemployment and the threat of a Moody's downgrade puts the lagging economic recovery into
sharp focus and puts pressure on the U nited S tates to spur innovations that boost global competitiveness. President
Barack Obama's 2011 State of the Union address stressed the need to "out-innovate, out-educate, and out-build the rest of the world" to remain
competitive and "win the future." While U.S. funding of research and development (R&D) has remained consistent at
around 2.5 percent of GDP over the last thirty years (WSJ), sharp increases in spending by emerging markets such
as China and India--as well as the global financial crisis and a need to sharply curtail U.S. debt-- has put the United States in a
potentially disadvantageous position. While most economists agree that the federal government must spur
innovation to remain competitive, experts are divided over the best policies to achieve this. Adam Segal emphasizes the federal
government's role in funding high-risk, high-return R&D, especially as business shifts away from research not geared toward commercial usage.
Rodney W. Nichols echoes Segal, but also calls for reducing regulatory and environmental hurdles and improving science and math education.
Robert Litan focuses on research within the academic community, arguing that universities should not be able to monopolize the licensing of
faculty members' innovations. James Dougherty argues for improving the high-skilled visa system and using the Small Business Administration
to encourage entrepreneurship and risk capital. R&D is the starting point for innovation--the discovery that, under the
right conditions, can spark the creation of a whole new industry and drive economic growth. The government's
role in funding basic research has become even more important as business has shifted away from funding "blue
sky" projects with uncertain immediate commercial use but with the promise of big breakthroughs . Alcatel-Lucent, for
example, announced in 2008 that Bell Labs--responsible for six Nobel Prizes as well as the invention of the transistor, the laser, and numerous
other communication and computer technologies--would no longer conduct basic research in material physics and semiconductors, but instead
would focus on networking, high-speed electronics, wireless, software, and other commercial applications. The Obama administration has
signaled its intention to try and fill this gap with federal funds. While the FY 2012 budget proposes $148.9 billion for federal research agencies, a
slight decrease (0.3 percent) from FY 2010, its 10.6 percent increase ($66.9 billion) for basic and applied research will produce the largest federal
research investment in real terms in history, according to the American Association for Advancement of Science (PDF). Federal investment in
R&D, however, remains hostage to the larger political debate about how to reduce spending and the deficit. No matter the final numbers, it is
essential that the money funds high-risk, high-return R&D . Hard times make scientists more conservative, as
they seek to secure grants by writing proposals that extend what they already know, not striving toward something
new. To counteract the tendency to stay in comfortable territory, more money should be directed to early-career grants
and to support well-designed failures-- ideas that push the envelope of accepted paradigms . The results of federally funded R&D are
widely available and thus mobile. It is entirely possible that companies can develop the findings of basic research to create
high-wage jobs outside of the United States. The R&D tax credit can be used to ground these results locally by forging ties among
industry, universities, and government. Research consortia involving three companies or investments in collaborative research at a federal
research laboratory or an American university could be offered a tax break equal to 20 percent of their R&D spending. Basic scientific
research remains essential to economic growth and to other American priorities, including military power and the
reduction of the country's dependence on foreign oil . The point, however, is not just to fund more, but to ensure
that it is cutting-edge and local.

And, that’s SPECIFICALLY true in the Commercial Space Sector
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 2k9
(Co-Chaired by Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Security Studies The Fletcher School,
Tufts University President, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Dr. William R. Van Cleave Professor Emeritus Department of Defense
and Strategic Studies Missouri State University “Missile Defense, the Space Relationship, and the Twenty-First Century,” pg online @
http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/IWG2009.pdf //ef)
Innovative development of technology to achieve significant and difficult goals requires visionary and persistent leadership, competent
scientists and engineers, and the necessary resources to prove that new ideas can and will work – often in the face of repeated setbacks
along the way. As discussed in section 4, these ingredients were present in sufficient quantities for the NASA’s Apollo program to fulfill
President Kennedy’s vision – a non-partisan, politically viable goal. However, programs to deploy space-based defensive interceptors have not
been politically viable – even though such programs also were consistent with the vision of another president – President Ronald Reagan – and
technology challenges were met in the 1980s, in time to have realized his vision in the 1990s if Brilliant Pebbles, the most promising missile
defense program, had been allowed to proceed.1 Furthermore, sustaining such excellence over extended periods is difficult even when initial
efforts are successful – many would argue NASA today needs a revival of visionary leadership and innovative scientific and technical
talent. It is virtually impossible when, as in the case of Brilliant Pebbles, conflicting political visions prevent a consistent sustaining science
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and technology effort. If innovation is desired, new talent must periodically be added and consistently supported in an environment that is set
apart from the normal development and acquisition bureaucracy. The squeezing out of innovation is a fact of life in the evolution of all programs
as management structures and technology mature. It has ever been thus in the field of military-technological affairs. Innovation has usually come
because of focused efforts on the part of a very few extraordinary people, and as they pass from the scene innovation has given way to the usual
risk-averse ways of bureaucracy. The history of science and technology (S&T) within the U.S. Air Force illustrates this evolution. The legacy of
General Henry H. (Hap) Arnold, unquestionably the father of the U.S. Air Force though it came into existence administratively after his
retirement, was a major commitment to S&T. He gave top priority to research, development, and innovation. He established a strong alliance with
famed aeronautical engineer Professor Theodore von Karman, who led the 1944 Toward New Horizons study that formed and documented the
vision of the Air Force – notably including a major role for USAF S&T personnel. In his lead essay, which became the new service’s blueprint in
1947, von Karman famously stated, “Scientific results cannot be used efficiently by soldiers who have no understanding of them, and scientists
cannot produce results useful for warfare without an understanding of operations.” Key to meeting this challenge in the 1950s and 1960s was
General Bernard Schriever, USAF, who led the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles and many of the nation’s early military space
systems.2 Notably, General Schriever did not rely upon the existing Air Force systems acquisition organization, then centralized at Wright
Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio, when undertaking the top priority ballistic missile program in 1954. Instead, he created a new West Coast
organization; brought in a carefully selected, highly talented group of Air Force officers and contractors – often hired right out of college – and
proceeded in less than five years to build the first operational intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).3 In many ways, accomplishing this feat at
that time was more impressive than rapidly building an effective space-based interceptor system would be today. General Schriever went on to
apply an innovative approach to the development of all Air Force weapons systems. Key to his success was his creation of Air Force Sys tems
Command, which led to the development of all Air Force systems until it was merged with Air Force Logistics Command in 1992. With its
demise was lost an unambiguous “seat at the four-star table” for S&T interests, and more importantly a clear career path to the highest ranks for
the most capable and accomplished S&T officers. This downgrading of S&T interests by Air Force leadership was not lost on junior officers
planning their careers. And it exacerbated the trends toward longer and longer development times between system definition and initial
operational capability (IOC), as illustrated in the accompanying graph.4 By the 1980s, the USAF innovative edge over the other services had
vanished – and by the 1990s, the USAF was taking even longer than the other services to develop its weapons systems. The time from USAF
system definition to initial operations more than doubled between the late 1960s and the early 1990s. Since 1999, these trends have worsened as
schedules have slipped and costs have grown. In 2005, General Greg Martin, USAF, commander, Air Force Material Command, blamed the Air
Force’s dismal acquisition record on decisions in the wake of the end of the Cold War, which passed program management from government
hands to prime contractors who in turn were squeezed through the 1990s by downsizing and early retirements of research and development
(R&D) and acquisition experts.5 While this explanation certainly has merit – and the above chart shows an increased time to IOC in the 1990s,
the major increase in development time after the heyday of the 1960s took place in the 1970s, as the acquisition process became more
bureaucratic.6 An important June 12, 2005, House Armed Services Committee (HASC) hearing focused on these problems for space systems in
particular. Among the many pertinent comments by the various participants, Dr. Peter Rustan, then S&T director for the National Reconnaissance
Office and former program manager of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) Clementine program, emphasized the key need for robustly funded
and flexibly managed S&T efforts with substantial demonstration testing programs.7 Thomas Young, former Lockheed Martin CEO and
chairman of a 2003 Defense Science Board task force that examined space acquisition problems, emphasized the need to restore within
government a systems engineering capability “which had atrophied to basically zero.”8 Of interest is that the Navy also lost its innovative edge
over the Army – its edge no doubt sharpened in the early 1960s by the development of the Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missile in the
space of about four years – following many of General Schriever’s management and technology innovations. Although such speculation may not
be entirely justified, the suggested lack of innovation in Army systems might be correlated with the fact that the Army’s elite technical cadre
specializing in building rockets was taken over by NASA and was subsequently instrumental in the historic and rapid Mercury, Gemini, and
Apollo achievements of the 1960s. A General Deterioration of Defense S&T Programs Beyond these trends in eroding innovation in programs to
build new military systems, there is on the horizon a serious problem in sustaining S&T excellence in the defense community. In his 2003
critique of a seriously deteriorating situation at defense laboratories in general and at the Naval Research Laboratory in particular, Don J.
DeYoung concluded: Should present trends continue, the Defense Laboratory will lose its competence as a performer of long-term, high-risk
work. When that happens, the risks to future military operations will grow because its abilities to provide for America’s defense and respond
quickly to crises will have passed quietly into history. Lost competence will also still the Pentagon’s strongest voice for independent, author
itative technical advice. The yardstick will be broken. The Nation’s interests will have been traded for corporate interests, with public sector
service sold for private gain. From that moment on, to use Hamlet’s final words… the rest is silence. Our country’s future takes a darker path, one
marked by the silence of the labs.9 DeYoung’s concerns were not overstated, as was made clear by the above mentioned July 2005 HASC
hearing on space acquisition. For over 15 years, key defense activities have been outsourced, allegedly to save money or because needed
competence no longer existed within the Department of Defense.10 In many cases, such outsourcing has been justified, but in others it has been
of dubious value and may have had costly consequences, as DoD’s competence to manage S&T efforts has atrophied. Increasingly, the Pentagon
leadership is losing its ability to tell the difference between sound and unsound decisions on innovative technology and is outsourcing key
decision making as well.11 General Lance Lord, USAF, commander of Air Force Space Command, acknowledged these problems at the HASC
hearing on space acquisition and indicated that the Air Force is taking actions to reverse these trends. Outsourcing government management
responsibilities has not worked because America’s defense-industrial base is in trouble, too. Perhaps Stan Crock, Business Week’s chief
diplomatic correspondent, overstated when he claimed in 2003, “While hardly anyone was watching, the infamous American military-industrial
complex died,” and “Without a seismic change, the industry is headed into a death spiral.” But his numbers sounded an alarm:12 During the
1990s, the aerospace-defense workforce • shriveled from 1.3 million in 1989 to 689,000 at the end of 2002. Industry has handed pink slips to 10
percent of its work• force since September 11, 2001. Between 2002 and 2008, nearly half the industry’s work• force - what remains of the Apollo
generation - will be eligible for retirement. This will mean the loss of unparalleled skill and experience, and potentially America’s technological
edge. Between 1999 and 2000, aeronautical engineering de• grees dropped from 4269 to 2042. The defense budget is about 3 percent of gross
domes• tic product – about half what it was at the low-point of the Cold War. The impact of these concerns is exacerbated as America’s high-tech
supply chain, seemingly at an accelerating rate, moves offshore in the non-defense sector – the source of the commercial off-the-shelf
technology upon which many key defense programs have come to rely. More and more U.S. companies are closing plants and relying on
cheap labor overseas, in Eastern Europe and countries such as China, Mexico, Malaysia, the Philippines, and India. Increasingly,
manufacturing and high-tech scientific jobs are moving offshore as well.13 As discussed in section 8, American universities, while still the
world’s leaders, may not produce the needed scientists and engineers to retain U.S. global technological leadership into the indefinite future –
demographic trends suggest a looming problem of strategic proportions.14 The result is that the United States will be increasingly de pendent on
overseas suppliers that might not be available in a protracted crisis or wartime situation. The Pentagon’s ability to exploit innovative technology
SDI 11
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to build effective defenses is at grave risk because of the trends mentioned above, and because of a lack of institutional memory owing to the
1993 political disruption to the cutting-edge SDI developments. The legacy of this lack of continuity continues to be particularly troublesome
because key advanced technology has become increasingly available to friend and foe alike, even though the Pentagon apparently judges it to be
too risky to be applied to develop U.S. missile defenses. As a Defense Science Board panel noted in its 2007 report, 21st Century Strategic
Technology Vectors,15 the decentralized and dispersed DoD management of science and technology has left the department with risk-averse and
underfunded S&T programs, such as are needed to minimize the risk in developing innovative space systems as was done in the 1960s and 1970s.
These conditions no doubt contribute to the DSB’s conclusion that U.S. strategic technology advantages are eroding. Although the DSB did not
make the observation, the 1993 cuts (from approximately $1.5 billion to approximately $50 million) to the annual funding for missile defense
S&T programs during the SDI era (1984-92) undercut the subsequent development of truly effective missile defenses – a shortcoming that has
not been rectified and continues to hamper development of truly effective missile defenses today.

Innovative S&T Leadership, Aerospace Leadership, and University-Based Space Research are Dying Now –
RE-constituting Space-Based Missile Defense Reinvigorates S&T Base and Develops Space Control, Space
Miniaturization and Effective Missile-Defense
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 2k9
(Co-Chaired by Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Security Studies The Fletcher School,
Tufts University President, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Dr. William R. Van Cleave Professor Emeritus Department of Defense
and Strategic Studies Missouri State University, Chair: Ambassador Henry F. Cooper Mr. John H. Darrah Dr. Daniel I. Fine Dr.
William R. Graham Dr. Jack Hammond General Bernard Schriever, USAF (Ret.)† Dr. William R. Van, “Missile Defense, the Space
Relationship, and the Twenty-First Century,” pg online @ http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/IWG2009.pdf //ef)
The scientific and technical base on which rests the development of truly effective missile defenses is steadily eroding. In particular, the critical
knowledge and expertise available almost 20 years ago in programs to develop and deploy an effective space-based defense have
essentially disappeared. No significant space-related program has been completed expeditiously in recent memory. Because of the erosion of the
S&T funding base in general, the quality of human capital in the aerospace sector is lower than it was two decades ago, leading to a decline of
innovative government and industry in the defense and space sectors and a similar decline in the capabilities of universities. As the competence of
government management has declined, streamlined and accountable management has been replaced by a process-oriented bureaucratization of
the S&T and acquisition process. Highly successful programs in the 1950s and 1960s were managed by small, technically competent teams with
authority and responsibility to develop, test, and deploy major systems in significantly less than half the time of today’s intended schedules.
Present-day programs are too often run by individuals lacking the necessary technical credentials to manage such accelerated programs. As a
result, there is a low probability that space-based defenses will emerge without external intervention. This would involve conducting a
space-based defense development program within an organization such as the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) more
inclined than the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) to innovation. Such an initiative might also encourage basic research on missile defense-
and space-related technologies at university campuses, which are now less ideologically opposed to “militarization of space” arguments that
carried so much weight when the Strategic Defense Initiative program began 25 years ago. II. What are the implications of the key issues raised
in section 7 for overall U.S. national security? As stated in earlier sections, space-based defenses are essential if the United States is to have a
truly effective defense against ballistic missiles. Until there is an initiative to restore the key S&T base, it is unlikely that space-based
defenses will be developed and deployed. In general, the erosion of the defense community’s S&T base undermines the prospects not only for
effective ballistic missile defenses, but also for innovative improvements in other space system capabilities such as are needed for space control
missions, assured access to space, miniaturization, and so on. The decline of our S&T base creates a serious national security problem in
government, in the defense industry, and in our universities. III. What steps need to be taken in light of these issues to achieve space-based
missile defense, both immediate and longer-term? If it were politically possible, the United States should immediately reconstitute the cadre of
scientists and engineers who worked on the Brilliant Pebbles program, provide them with the necessary resources, and let them get back
to work. Unfortunately, such a development is unlikely in the current political climate. To break the existing mindset, a sense of urgency is
needed, inspired by greater recognition of the nature of threats facing the United States, and articulated by the uppermost levels of government. It
would be preferable that this sense of urgency were in response to understanding that a growing threat warrants building truly effective global
missile defenses, space control systems, and so on, that can be accomplished best by space-based defensive systems.

And, the Plan Reverses course – Space-Based BMD revitalizes defense space programs and revitalizes U.S.
S&T and U.S. Economic Leadership
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 2k9
(Co-Chaired by Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Security Studies The Fletcher School,
Tufts University President, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Dr. William R. Van Cleave Professor Emeritus Department of Defense
and Strategic Studies Missouri State University “Missile Defense, the Space Relationship, and the Twenty-First Century,” pg online @
http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/IWG2009.pdf //ef)
A lack of institutional memory regarding the state of fundamental technology was illustrated in 2003 by delays in
the minimally funded space-based boost-phase interceptor program, because of alleged “major technology challenges” including
a claimed need to learn how to miniaturize satellite components.16 But as discussed in appendix B, the Chinese were then building miniaturized
micro- and nano-satellites, exploiting the SDI technology base developed and demonstrated in space during the Reagan-George H. W. Bush era.
Nigeria launched its first satellite in 2003, using microtechnology from Surrey Satellite Technology, also a source of technological advances in
China.17 Furthermore, all of the key technologies to support building a space-based interceptor system
available over 15 years ago were demonstrated to the whole world in the prize-winning Clementine mission of 1994, and
could be revived and deployed as a force-in-being within five years.18 Needed is an innovative technical team of the sort
assembled by General Schriever in the 1950s to overcome much more daunting technical challenges and build the first ICBM in under five years.
The remarkable thing is that such a team existed two decades ago, thanks to earlier visionary leadership by President Ronald Reagan and Defense
Secretary Caspar Weinberger and thanks to the decision of the Bush-41 administration, executed by then-Defense Secretary Dick Cheney, to
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continue to press toward building a global defense against ballistic missiles. President Reagan’s March 23, 1983, speech launched the Strategic
Defense Initiative, and Secretary Weinberger assembled the resources to pursue the president’s goals. In particular, he selected Lt. General James
A. Abrahamson, USAF, an aeronautical engineer who had successfully managed development of the F-16 and the early flights of the space
shuttle, to lead SDI. General Abrahamson assembled a first-class technical team and challenged them to answer President Reagan’s call to
evaluate the national technology base and determine how to build upon it truly effective defenses against long-range missiles. At Secretary
Weinberger’s direction, General Abrahamson formed the initial SDI effort from existing technology programs (funded at approximately $1.5
billion in 1984), previously managed by the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA) and the armed services. Drawing on advice
and support from the nation’s top technologists, he molded these existing S&T efforts into a ballistic missile defense “mission-focused” SDI
program. SDI technologists maintained this focus through the Bush-41 administration even as their budget tripled to include additional S&T
efforts aimed at demonstrating technology needed for effect tive defenses and to initiate serious military-acquisition programs as the technology
was proven.19 But in 1993, the Clinton administration renamed and reoriented the SDI program, cut its budget by 50 percent and purged the
Clinton Ballistic Missile Defense program of the most advanced technology and those who were its advocates – Defense Secretary Aspin boasted
they were “taking the stars out of Star Wars.”20 The space-based interceptor effort and its supporting S&T programs were
scuttled entirely, and the most advanced technology produced by the $30 billion investment of the SDI era was lost. In particular and as noted
previously, the baseline ~$1.5 billion per year investment in demonstrating key defensive technology was cut to ~$50 million per year, dead-
ending steady advances of many DARPA and armed services programs that SDI had absorbed a decade earlier. Most of the technically
elite missile defense cadre then in government and industry left for “greener pastures,” and administrators rather
than S&T technologists ascended to power in the Pentagon’s missile defense programs . Reviving cutting-edge technologies
demonstrated in the mid-1990s is impeded by a near total lack of institutional memory, pervasive aversion to risk, and the legacy of over three
decades of the ABM Treaty-related political constraints that sharply circumscribed engineering possibilities and even basic concepts, as discussed
in section 4. For example, Brilliant Pebbles technology was developed in the late 1980s and early 1990s. As described in
section 4, Brilliant Pebbles was the first SDI program to be approved as a major defense acquisition program by the Pentagon’s acquisition
bureaucracy in 1991. After the program was scuttled in 1993, all first-generation Brilliant Pebbles technology was space-qualified in 1994 on the
award-winning Clementine mission to the moon and on an Astrid flight (See appendix I). Since then, there has been no sign of efforts
to use those technology innovations even to enhance sea-based or other missile defenses, let alone to revive the
Brilliant Pebbles space-based interceptor program.21 With little institutional memory and few directly relevant technological
credentials to develop independent judgments regarding even decade-old cutting-edge technology, current missile defense administrators rely on
a business-school mentality and essentially have turned advanced thinking over to industry – which in turn is focused on the poor health of its
bottom line, as discussed above, and the moment-to-moment satisfaction of their government customers. Principal elements of the Clinton
program – which gave priority to preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty that banned effective ballistic missile defenses of all types –
undeniably remained through the Bush-43 administration as the primary focus of the Pentagon’s missile defense programs, though at twice the
annual funding rate as during the Clinton administration. By January 2009, 24 ground based interceptors were deployed at Ft. Greely Alaska, and
6 deployed at Vandenberg AFB, California, as noted in section 2. Such ground-based defenses are the most expensive and least effective way to
attempt to defend against ballistic missiles – hence, industry will resist efforts to move to less expensive systems (even when they are more
effective) because that reduces their profits. Unless management steps similar to those of the Air Force in the 1950s are taken, this recipe will
lead to a “death spiral” for creating effective defenses. The development of these defenses has been focused on defeating the less demanding
ballistic missile capabilities of rogue states such as North Korea and Iran. However, it is only a matter of time before these states achieve the
more advanced countermeasures employed by Russia and increasingly China. Already it is clear that rogue states understand the fundamental and
currently quite affordable way to defeat these limited defenses – as evidenced by North Korean and Iranian tests involving multiple missiles that
can overcome limited defenses against short- and medium-range missiles.22 Less expensive defenses will be required to build a capability to
overcome such “barrage” at tack scenarios, and more effective defenses will be needed to defeat more advanced countermeasures already existing
in other states. If such effective defenses are developed, they will be a disincentive to proliferation of advanced ballistic missiles and offensive
countermeasures. As argued in earlier sections, the most cost-effective missile defense concepts are space-based. Needed: A New Effort for
Innovative Missile Defense Technology Persistent visionary leadership is what is now needed to change course . The
enabling technology is viable – it was space-demonstrated in 1994. Needed now is a classic small, highly competent
government and industry effort charged with rapidly reviving and deploying that technology after the fashion that
has so often succeeded in the past – and epitomized by the recipe for successful operations defined over 50 years ago by Kelly Johnson
of Lockheed “Skunk Works” fame (see table above) and exploited by General Schriever in his ballistic missile and space programs. Of particular
importance is a very small, empowered, technically competent management and engineering team from government and industry, fully supported
with needed funds and “high cover” to minimize the bureaucratic kibitzing and mission creep. Just as General Schriever started fresh with his
innovative and successful effort to develop the first ICBM in under five years, a new organization should be given the task of developing space-
based interceptors by employing technology and engineering skills not currently evident within the Mis sile Defense Agency (MDA). A special
project office should be formed and manned with personnel skilled in developing innovative technology, perhaps under DARPA, working closely
with the Air Force Space Command to frame a comprehensive program to revive key technology and concepts demonstrated over a decade ago.
As suggested by the above figures, the needed level of funding would be a significant percentage of the DARPA budget, which has been basically
flat in recent years while the service S&T budgets have grown or held steady.23 But it would not be out of line with other DARPA projects that
have led to major improvements in defensive capabilities, especially if conducted jointly with and partially funded through the Air Force. Also
evident from the above figures is the gradual rise and then plateau of the defense S&T investment beginning in the mid-1990s. Over the same
period, the total defense R&D portfolio grew dramatically on the strength of the development account. The balance between S&T and
development investments is a related matter of concern to Congress that could be at least partially rectified by the initiative suggested above. The
Defense Science Board sounded an alarm in 1998 about the negative impact of this reduction.24 The DSB found that, on average, high-
technology companies invest 3.5 percent of their total sales in R&D, but the amount of the president’s budget invested in defense S&T was less
than 3 percent of the overall DoD budget, which the DSB recommended as a goal. General Hap Arnold would no doubt have supported a return
to his vision that recognized major S&T investments as crucial to the nation’s defense. While Bush administration officials early on stated that 3
percent was their goal25 and the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review even explicitly called for it, their budget requests and subsequent actions
showed less support for the explicit metric. Indeed, the 2005 version of the QDR did not reference the 3 percent goal. The Bush administration’s
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budget requests typically reduced or held funding flat for defense S&T. According to the American Association for the Advancement of
Science’s (AAAS) analyses of the DoD R&D budget, “In what now has become an annual ritual, the Pentagon proposes sharp cuts each year in
S&T funding and Congress adds billions of dollars in the appropriations process …26” In 2001, DoD S&T investment totaled $11.15 billion
(constant FY 2008 dollars). Investments in S&T rose steadily to a peak of $14.48 billion in 2006 before sliding back to $11.14 billion in the FY
2009 request.27 When the Congress completed the FY 2009 defense appropriation, it increased the S&T account to $14.3 billion.28 Providing
the Scientists and Engineers for the Future The exodus of human capital from the aerospace industry is further
exacerbated by broader trends in the science and engineering education sector . Enrollment in U.S. graduate programs in
science and engineering continues to rise steadily, which is a trend that began in 1999 and peaked in 2005, according to the National Science
Board’s Science and Engineering Indicators. A closer look at the trends shows that this does not hold for engineering and computer sciences.
Both disci plines saw declining enrollments beginning in 2002-03, due in large part to restrictions imposed on foreign students after September
11. Foreign graduate student enrollment drove the increase in students studying in these disciplines, as shown in the chart below. The number of
foreign students in science and engineering grew from 79,900 in 1985 to 154,900 in 2003 before declining through 2005. The number of foreign
students increased from 20 percent to 25 percent of all science and engineering graduate students from 1985 to 2005. The concentration of
foreign enrollment was highest in engineering (45 percent), computer sciences (43 percent), physical sciences (40 percent), and mathematics (37
percent). These trends look even more troubling when juxtaposed with astonishing increases in advanced degrees being awarded in some foreign
countries. For example, between 1991 and 2001, science and engineering PhDs in China and South Korea rose by 535 percent and 150 percent,
respectively.29 For eign students who for years have made up a major percentage of U.S. graduate school classes now
increasingly obtain their advanced degrees at home, as seen in the accompanying chart.30 In particular, China’s burgeoning store of
advanced science and technology capability is sobering, from both economic and military perspectives – and not only at the graduate level.31
This article claimed that China would graduate over 600,000 engineers in 2005, the United States about 70,000. Fortune noted that “Our
universities are still excellent, but the foreign students that come to them are increasingly taking their educations
back home. As other nations multiply their science and engineering graduates – building the foundation for
economic progress – ours are declining.” While these specific numbers have been disputed,32 there is little to argue with the trends
suggested by the Fortune article and the fact that the demographics are against the United States in the world’s marketplace. For example, in their
comprehensive analysis, the National Academies’ Committee on Prospering in the 21st Century observed that American twelfth-graders
performed below the international average of 21 nations on a test of general knowledge in mathematics and science.33 Furthermore, after
secondary school, fewer U.S students pursue science and engineering than in other countries. About 6 percent of U.S. students pursue
engineering, the second-lowest percentage among developed countries, compared to 12 percent in Europe, 20 percent in Singapore, and over 40
percent in China. The committee’s executive summary emphasized as its primary finding that “The scientific and technological building
blocks critical to our economic leadership are eroding at a time when many other nations are gathering strength.”
Furthermore, they observed that they feared “the abruptness with which a lead in science and technology can be lost
– and the difficulty of recovering a lead once lost, if indeed it can be regained at all .” As concluded by the National
Academies’ Committee on Prospering in the 21st Century, these and other sobering trends, coupled with the aging and
atrophy of the base of scientists and engineers upon which viable military and civil space programs rely,
suggest a requirement to reenergize our colleges and universities to support these future needs .34 Efforts to do
so now – in a new situation where the U.S. government is committed to reinvigorating its space and defense
technology programs – would be met with approval on our campuses, unlike in the not-so-distant past. The
important role of space technology in the post-9/11 world is easily understood in terms of practical military missions
and integrated into a vision of a needed systems’ “brilliance” that can capture the interest and imagination of today’s
science and engineering students and their pro fessors. While x-ray lasers from space may have once excited engineering and science
students in the first years of SDI promise, today’s counterpart is stimulated by space and land-based “smart” weaponry in operations from Kabul
to Baghdad. There had been no 9/11 when SDI was launched. The new defense requirements stimulated by 9/11 provide a new
incentive for university science and technology graduates to choose careers that include missile defense and space
security. Our universities are the source of a vast pool of talent and other resources to help meet the technology
innovation challenges of the twenty-first century. Efforts should be made to revive federal support of physical
science research and engineering, which have sharply declined relative to biological research in the last decade. Restoring a
comparable level of such funding is imperative if we are to remain on the cutting edge of innovative defense
technologies. Summary Conclusions and Recommendations Innovative development of technology to build effective ballistic
missile defenses, especially those based in space requires visionary and persevering leadership at the political level. That
leadership existed for the Apollo program; it did not for the SDI program – even though popular presidents of the United States initiated both and
both developed the needed technology to pursue the initial vision in a timely way. The history of major technological developments has
repeatedly demonstrated that such creative development can be achieved by establishing a new organization, separate from the normal
development process, staffing it with competent scientists and engineers, and giving them the necessary resources to make needed investments
without interference from excessive bureaucratic oversight. This worked with the Manhattan Project, which produced the atomic bomb in less
than four years; Corona, the project that produced America’s first spy satellites, the ICBM, and the submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM)
programs; NASA’s Apollo program; the “stealth” programs, the cruise missile Pershing II; and a host of other efforts of national importance.
History also shows that when the groups that demonstrate such creativity either become or are absorbed into large bureaucratic institutions, their
impact diminishes and is often lost after a limited period of time as the administrative processes of acquiring and operating major systems
dominate the pursuit of resources and careers. From time to time, enlightened leadership must infuse new talent with needed
resources in new organizations if new ideas are to prevail. Such an infusion of new talent is needed today to provide the
innovation required to build highly effective missile defenses. Thus, we recommend that such a Special Project Office be
established, perhaps as part of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, to revive the innovative technology that will enable
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development and deployment of an operating constellation of space-based interceptors within five years. Based upon
the technology developed and the system concept critically reviewed and approved by numerous critical groups during the SDI era – including
formally by the Defense Acquisition Board – such an operating defensive constellation of 1,000 space-based interceptors could be developed,
tested, built, and operated (for 20 years) within a three- to five-year period for $11 billion in 1989 dollars, or $19.1 in 2008 inflation-adjusted
dollars (See table 2.2). This same technology will undoubtedly provide block improvements to ongoing missile defense
development activities. For example, the lightweight kill vehicles enabled by the cutting edge work on space-based
interceptors can enable more cost-effective sea-based and ground-based interceptor systems. Thus, while this new Special
Project Office should focus on building space-based interceptors, it should maintain a liaison with the MDA and the armed services, but should
not be distracted from building a space-based interceptor system as quickly as possible.

That Literally Solves Every Impact

Dr. Federoff 2k8
(Nina, Science and Technology Adviser to the Secretary of State and the Administrator of USAID “Testimony Before The House Science
Subcommittee On Research And Science Education,” pg online @
http://gop.science.house.gov/Media/Hearings/research08/April2/fedoroff.pdf //ghs-ef)
Chairman Baird, Ranking Member Ehlers, and distinguished members of the Subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to discuss science
diplomacy at the U.S. Department of State. The U.S. is recognized globally for its leadership in science and technology. Our
scientific strength is both a tool of “soft power” – part of our strategic diplomatic arsenal – and a basis for creating
partnerships with countries as they move beyond basic economic and social development. Science diplomacy is a central element of the
Secretary’s transformational diplomacy initiative, because science and technology are essential to achieving stability and
strengthening failed and fragile states. S&T advances have immediate and enormous influence on national and global
economies, and thus on the international relations between societies. Nation states, nongovernmental organizations, and multinational
corporations are largely shaped by their expertise in and access to intellectual and physical capital in science, technology, and engineering. Even
as S&T advances of our modern era provide opportunities for economic prosperity, some also challenge the relative position of countries in the
world order, and influence our social institutions and principles. America must remain at the forefront of this new world by
maintaining its technological edge, and leading the way internationally through science diplomacy and engagement. Science
by its nature facilitates diplomacy because it strengthens political relationships, embodies powerful ideals, and creates
opportunities for all. The global scientific community embraces principles Americans cherish: transparency, meritocracy, accountability, the
objective evaluation of evidence, and broad and frequently democratic participation. Science is inherently democratic, respecting evidence and
truth above all. Science is also a common global language, able to bridge deep political and religious divides. Scientists share a common
language. Scientific interactions serve to keep open lines of communication and cultural understanding. As scientists
everywhere have a common evidentiary external reference system, members of ideologically divergent societies can use the common
language of science to cooperatively address both domestic and the increasingly transnational and global problems
confronting humanity in the 21st century. There is a growing recognition that science and technology will increasingly drive the successful
economies of the 21st century. Science and technology provide an immeasurable benefit to the U.S. by bringing scientists and students
here, especially from developing countries, where they see democracy in action, make friends in the international scientific community, become
familiar with American technology, and contribute to the U.S. and global economy. For example, in 2005, over 50% of physical science and
engineering graduate students and postdoctoral researchers trained in the U.S. have been foreign nationals. Moreover, many foreign-born
scientists who were educated and have worked in the U.S. eventually progress in their careers to hold influential positions in ministries and
institutions both in this country and in their home countries. They also contribute to U.S. scientific and technologic development:
According to the National Science Board’s 2008 Science and Engineering Indicators, 47% of full-time doctoral science and engineering faculty in
U.S. research institutions were foreign-born. Finally, some types of science – particularly those that address the grand challenges in science and
technology – are inherently international in scope and collaborative by necessity. The ITER Project, an international fusion research and
development collaboration, is a product of the thaw in superpower relations between Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and U.S. President
Ronald Reagan. This reactor will harness the power of nuclear fusion as a possible new and viable energy source by bringing a star to earth. ITER
serves as a symbol of international scientific cooperation among key scientific leaders in the developed and developing world – Japan, Korea,
China, E.U., India, Russia, and United States – representing 70% of the world’s current population.. The recent elimination of funding for FY08
U.S. contributions to the ITER project comes at an inopportune time as the Agreement on the Establishment of the ITER International Fusion
Energy Organization for the Joint Implementation of the ITER Project had entered into force only on October 2007. The elimination of the
promised U.S. contribution drew our allies to question our commitment and credibility in international cooperative ventures. More
problematically, it jeopardizes a platform for reaffirming U.S. relations with key states. It should be noted that even at the height of the cold war,
the United States used science diplomacy as a means to maintain communications and avoid misunderstanding between the world’s two nuclear
powers – the Soviet Union and the United States. In a complex multi-polar world, relations are more challenging, the threats perhaps greater, and
the need for engagement more paramount. Using Science Diplomacy to Achieve National Security Objectives The welfare and stability of
countries and regions in many parts of the globe require a concerted effort by the developed world to address the causal factors that render
countries fragile and cause states to fail. Countries that are unable to defend their people against starvation, or fail to provide
economic opportunity, are susceptible to extremist ideologies, autocratic rule, and abuses of human rights. As well, the world
faces common threats, among them climate change, energy and water shortages, public health emergencies,
environmental degradation, poverty, food insecurity, and religious extremism . These threats can undermine the national
security of the United States, both directly and indirectly. Many are blind to political boundaries, becoming regional or global threats. The United
States has no monopoly on knowledge in a globalizing world and the scientific challenges facing humankind are enormous.
Addressing these common challenges demands common solutions and necessitates scientific cooperation, common
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standards, and common goals. We        must increasingly harness the power of American ingenuity in s cience and technology
through strong partnerships with the science community in both academia and the private sector, in the U.S. and abroad among our
allies, to advance U.S. interests in foreign policy. There are also important challenges to the ability of states to supply their
populations with sufficient food. The still-growing human population, rising affluence in emerging economies, and other factors have
combined to create unprecedented pressures on global prices of staples such as edible oils and grains. Encouraging and promoting
the use of contemporary molecular techniques in crop improvement is an essential goal for US science diplomacy. An
essential part of the war on terrorism is a war of ideas. The creation of economic opportunity can do much more to combat the rise of
fanaticism than can any weapon. The war of ideas is a war about rationalism as opposed to irrationalism. Science and technology
put us firmly on the side of rationalism by providing ideas and opportunities that improve people’s lives. We may use
the recognition and the goodwill that science still generates for the United States to achieve our diplomatic and developmental goals.
Additionally, the Department continues to use science as a means to reduce the proliferation of the w eapons’ of mass
destruction and prevent what has been dubbed ‘brain drain’. Through cooperative threat reduction activities, former weapons scientists redirect
their skills to participate in peaceful, collaborative international research in a large variety of scientific fields. In addition, new global efforts
focus on improving biological, chemical, and nuclear security by promoting and implementing best scientific
practices as a means to enhance security, increase global partnerships, and create sustainability.

Moreover, Scientific Innovation and Tech Develop Corrects imbalances in the economy and ensures long-
term Economic Stability

Norris and Swezey 2k9
(Teryn, Senior Advisor @ the Breakthrough Institute. Public Policy Major at Stanford University, and Director of
Americans for Energy Leadership. Devon,-Project Director at the Breakthrough Institute and graduated from
Stanford University. ?Winning the Clean Energy Race: A New Strategy for American Leadership.? Nov. 18th, 2009.
Pg online @ http://itsgettinghotinhere.org/2009/11/18/winning-the-clean-energy-race-a-new-strategy-for-american-
leadership/ //ef)
But the growing pace of this power shift should be a cause of major concern for Americans , and it should raise
serious questions about our economic policies at the highest level. While the U.S. economy has suffered greatly from
a crisis produced by its own financial sector – losing millions of jobs, trillions in economic output, and demanding
huge spending packages financed by borrowed money – China has shrugged off the global recession with high levels
of growth and self-financed stimulus, all while purchasing billions of Treasury bills to fund a U.S. deficit that has reached historic highs.
Last November, addressing the nation on the evening of his election, President Obama declared that “a new era of American leadership is at
hand.” And indeed, his new administration has taken significant steps to remake U.S. foreign policy. But unless the U.S. quickly
improves its economic competitiveness, our global leadership will be severely damaged . What is demanded now
is a major, coordinated national project to regain our economic competitiveness in strategic sectors while
permanently correcting the imbalances that led to the Great Recession. Correcting Imbalances & Fixing Finance Speaking at the
San Francisco Fed last month, Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke declared it “extraordinarily urgent” that the U.S. and Asia take steps to
prevent a revival of global economic imbalances. There is now broad consensus on how these imbalances – the huge gaps in trade deficits and
surpluses, and the associated gaps in national savings, consumption, and investment rates – helped caused the housing bubble and the Great
Recession. Alan Greenspan offered a concise explanation in a widely-read column this spring: “The presumptive cause of the world-wide decline
in long-term [mortgage] rates was the tectonic shift in the early 1990s by much of the developing world from heavy emphasis on central planning
to increasingly dynamic, export-led market competition. The result was a surge in growth in China and a large number of other emerging market
economies that led to an excess of global intended savings relative to intended capital investment.” In other words, the U.S. housing bubble was
caused in large part by the buildup of savings in emerging market economies, especially China, accumulated from their large trade surpluses. As
this large “pool of money” was invested internationally, it drove down the costs of borrowing, drove up subprime lending, and created large
demand for mortgage-backed securities. This era of easy credit – combined with the use of “innovative” financial instruments, which relaxed
mortgage standards, concealed risk, and enabled the mass packaging and sale of these securities – gave rise to the U.S. housing bubble. This
“global pool of money” wouldn’t have existed without the U.S. running an enormous trade deficit, relying on imports and debt to support a high
consumption rate – hence the global “imbalance” of high-saving versus high-consuming countries. The U.S. deficit in the trade of goods and
services in 2008 was $695 billion, according to the Department of Commerce, compared to China’s surplus of $297 billion. Speaking in Tokyo
last week, President Obama extended this problem to its logical conclusion, calling for rebalanced growth and a new
U.S. economic strategy based on exports: “One of the important lessons this recession has taught us is the limits of
depending primarily on American consumers and Asian exports to drive growth … [our] new strategy will mean that
we save more and spend less, reform our financial systems, reduce our long-term deficit and borrowing. It will also
mean a greater emphasis on exports that we can build, produce, and sell all over the world.” The implication is clear: the United
States must shift away from a “financial” economy to an “innovation” economy, one that focuses on creating
industries that produce real innovative products to sell around the world. After years of creating imaginary wealth on the
pile of sand that was the U.S. financial sector, America must once again get into the business of producing real goods and
services. This means reducing the size of the financial sector and the Wall Street “brain drain” – which has distracted the nation’s best and
brightest minds from the work of real innovation and entrepreneurship – and refocusing on productive, export-oriented industries. And it means
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adopting a new era of innovation policies to ensure the U.S. economy is the most competitive in the world, directing
targeted public investments into strategic technologies, infrastructure, and high-tech education programs. This new
economic strategy is necessary not just for short-term recovery, but for avoiding future credit bubbles and financial
crises, slashing our trade and budget deficit, producing more innovative technologies to improve our everyday lives,
and regaining our international leadership.

And, Collapse of the economy causes conflict to erupt in hotspots around the globe

Friedberg 2k8
(Aaron, professor of Politics and IR at Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School, and Schoenfeld, senior
editor of Commentary, scholar at the Witherspoon Institute in Princeton, 2K8 Gabriel, “The Dangers of a
Diminished America,” Wall Street Journal //ef)
With the global financial system in serious trouble, is America's geostrategic dominance likely to diminish? If so, what would that mean? One
immediate implication of the crisis that began on Wall Street and spread across the world is that the primary instruments of
U.S. foreign policy will be crimped. The next president will face an entirely new and adverse fiscal position. Estimates of this year's
federal budget deficit already show that it has jumped $237 billion from last year, to $407 billion. With families and businesses hurting, there will
be calls for various and expensive domestic relief programs. In the face of this onrushing river of red ink, both Barack Obama and John McCain
have been reluctant to lay out what portions of their programmatic wish list they might defer or delete. Only Joe Biden has suggested a possible
reduction -- foreign aid. This would be one of the few popular cuts, but in budgetary terms it is a mere grain of sand. Still, Sen. Biden's comment
hints at where we may be headed: toward a major reduction in America's world role, and perhaps even a new era of
financially-induced isolationism. Pressures to cut defense spending, and to dodge the cost of waging two wars, already intense before
this crisis, are likely to mount. Despite the success of the surge, the war in Iraq remains deeply unpopular. Precipitous withdrawal -- attractive to a
sizable swath of the electorate before the financial implosion -- might well become even more popular with annual war bills running in the
hundreds of billions. Protectionist sentiments are sure to grow stronger as jobs disappear in the coming slowdown. Even before our
current woes, calls to save jobs by restricting imports had begun to gather support among many Democrats and some Republicans. In a prolonged
recession, gale-force winds of protectionism will blow. Then there are the dolorous consequences of a potential collapse of the
world's financial architecture. For decades now, Americans have enjoyed the advantages of being at the center of that system. The
worldwide use of the dollar, and the stability of our economy, among other things, made it easier for us to run huge budget
deficits, as we counted on foreigners to pick up the tab by buying dollar-denominated assets as a safe haven. Will this be possible in
the future? Meanwhile, traditional foreign-policy challenges are multiplying. The threat from al Qaeda and Islamic terrorist
affiliates has not been extinguished. Iran and North Korea are continuing on their bellicose paths, while Pakistan and Afghanistan are
progressing smartly down the road to chaos. Russia's new militancy and China's seemingly relentless rise also give cause for concern. If
America now tries to pull back from the world stage, it will leave a dangerous power vacuum. The stabilizing effects
of our presence in Asia, our continuing commitment to Europe, and our position as defender of last resort for Middle East energy
sources and supply lines could all be placed at risk. In such a scenario there are shades of the 1930s, when global trade and
finance ground nearly to a halt, the peaceful democracies failed to cooperate, and aggressive powers led by the
remorseless fanatics who rose up on the crest of economic disaster exploited their divisions. Today we run the risk that
rogue states may choose to become ever more reckless with their nuclear toys, just at our moment of maximum vulnerability.
The aftershocks of the financial crisis will almost certainly rock our principal strategic competitors even harder than they
will rock us. The dramatic free fall of the Russian stock market has demonstrated the fragility of a state whose economic
performance hinges on high oil prices, now driven down by the global slowdown. China is perhaps even more fragile, its economic growth
depending heavily on foreign investment and access to foreign markets. Both will now be constricted, inflicting economic
pain and perhaps even sparking unrest in a country where political legitimacy rests on progress in the long march to prosperity. None of
this is good news if the authoritarian leaders of these countries seek to divert attention from internal travails with external
adventures. As for our democratic friends, the present crisis comes when many European nations are struggling to deal with decades
of anemic growth, sclerotic governance and an impending demographic crisis. Despite its past dynamism, Japan faces similar challenges.
India is still in the early stages of its emergence as a world economic and geopolitical power. What does this all mean? There is no
substitute for America on the world stage. The choice we have before us is between the potentially disastrous effects
of disengagement and the stiff price tag of continued American leadership.


And, Your S&T Counterplan doesn’t solve – commercial companies wont innovate effectively in the space
sector without a push from government-driven Space-Based Missile Defense – ONLY the plan gets companies
to stay ahead of their international competitors

Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 2k9
(Co-Chaired by Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Security Studies The
Fletcher School, Tufts University President, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Dr. William R. Van Cleave
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Professor Emeritus Department of Defense and Strategic Studies Missouri State University “Missile Defense, the
Space Relationship, and the Twenty-First Century,” pg online @ http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/IWG2009.pdf //ef)
In the post-ABM Treaty era, the United States can and should take several steps to assure its continued military and com
mercial access to space, including the deployment of space-based missile defense interceptors. While reaffirming the
“peaceful uses of space” requirement set forth in the Outer Space Treaty, the United States should reject efforts to counter its
present advantages in space by agreements that would further restrict the use of space . Furthermore, the United
States should reject bilateral or multilateral efforts that would have the tangential effect of restricting
American space activities. One example is the November 2002 Hague Code of Conduct (HCOC) signed by the United States
and Russia, among others. The Russians, however, have already contravened this specific agreement by announcing that they would no longer
provide advance notice of ballistic missile launches to other signatories of the HCOC.46 The HCOC’s entirely legitimate purpose is to minimize
the consequences of a false missile attack warning by calling on member states to “exercise maximum possible restraint” with respect to ballistic
missile and space launch vehicle launches and provide other member states with advance warning of such launches. This agreement,
however, should not be expanded to an interpretation that regulates space launches to such an extent that it is applied
to systems now being designed to provide “better, faster, cheaper” access to space. The United States should
develop a national space policy that speeds the transformation of the U.S. military into a force better able to deter
and defend against a spectrum of evolving threats against the U.S. homeland and in space . This policy must recognize that
space is essential for the collection of intelligence for crisis management. Recognition of the nexus between commercial and
military uses of space is critical, as is recognition that the U.S. government depends vitally on the commercial space
sector to provide essential national security services. Most importantly, the policy must outline programmatic, policy, and
budgetary guidance to address a security environment where U.S. space systems are especially attractive targets to America’s enemies. If it is
to remain a space power, not only must the United States be capable of detecting and deterring such an attack (that is,
situational awareness, a capability that does not presently exist in most U.S. space assets), it must also possess the means of
defending against an attack, identifying the source, and quickly recovering and reconstituting vital assets . This
means that the United States must be able quickly to replace those disabled or destroyed space-based assets that it
cannot easily defend. Investigating development of redundant capabilities, hosting payloads on com mercial satellites, or integrating allied
space systems could reduce the likely impact of a strike against space assets. Both for missile defense and for space more generally,
the United States will need to make major new investments in research and technology programs in the years ahead .
As the Rumsfeld Space Commission concluded, since the 1980s there has been a dramatic decrease in the aerospace sector’s
share of the total national research and development investment, shrinking from 20 percent to less than 8 percent .
Compounding this decline, U.S. companies are investing more heavily in efforts to win modernization contracts
based on existing technologies, rather than investing in leap-ahead technologies that would dramatically transform
the U.S. space program. A concerted effort is needed to assure that the U.S. space industry can produce
systems at least one generation ahead of its international competitors . For example, if the United States is to
remain dominant in space, new approaches that reduce the cost of building and launching space systems by
emphasizing the miniaturization of those systems must be found . New sensors capable of detecting and tracking smaller, moving,
and concealed targets, together with advanced surveillance and defensive and offensive technologies for space control and information
operations, will be needed. In recent years, funding for boost-phase intercept space-defense programs has been only a
miniscule portion of the total missile defense budget. The funding sought by the George W. Bush administration, extremely limited
to begin with, has not been supported by the Congress except for a modest $5 million appropriation for the study of space-based defenses that
was approved in 2008.47 The result is a major shortfall in the R&D needed to sustain space-based missile defense
and other aspects of the U.S. space presence.
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             Short 1AC Advantage
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             Extra Cards for S&T/Innovation Advantage
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                                                               Tech Key
Failure to Develop New Technologies Results in Human Extinction
Zhong, CEO at Jade Bird Dashing, 7-31-7
(Roger, “The Effects and Influences of Technology on Society and Human Kind,” http://scienceray.com/technology/applied-science/the-
effects-and-influences-of-technology-on-society-and-human-kind/”)
The question that persists however, is, “Is technology in fact harming our society as a whole?” Albeit the fact that this is a remarkably intricate
question of sorts, it can be answered with a simple answer. The actuality of this situation remains that technology is by no means
detrimental to our society here in the United States, civilization throughout the world, or to the greater humanity of the
human race; instead, it is vital to its survival. Nuclear Technology To illustrate this point, let us first examine an exceedingly
significant technological advance of our time, nuclear technology. Nuclear technology is research that involves the reactions of atomic nuclei. It
has many vital applications in modern society, the most prominent of which are nuclear weapons, nuclear medicine, and nuclear power. The most
controversial of these is, without a doubt, nuclear weapons. First created by the United States in 1945 during World War II, they were developed
out of the fear that Nazi Germany would first develop them. A weapon of incredible power, a single nuclear weapon has to potential to decimate,
level, and destroy an entire city. The first and only times a nuclear weapon has been used are in World War II, when the United States bombed
the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki with the “Little Boy” and “Fat Man” bombs, respectively. The usage of these bombs allowed for
the near instantaneous end to the destructive World War II. Although two cities were leveled and many lives were lost, the situation involving the
usage of these nuclear weapons is not nearly as negative as one may perceive. Had the bombs not been dropped, Japan would not have
surrendered, and it would have without a doubt prolonged the war for months or even years. This would have forced an Allied Forces ground
invasion of Japan in an effort to end the war, which would have resulted in the loss of many more people than caused by the deployment of the
two nuclear weapons. When you look at the usage of nuclear technology, you must look at the situation from the viewpoint of human society as
a whole, and not from a standpoint of an individual. While the nuclear bombs destroyed two cities and killed many, they ended a horrific World
War II and prevented the loss of many other lives. Today, in more modern terms, nuclear weapons play a huge role in our lives. As citizens of the
United States, it is common knowledge that we are guaranteed many degrees of freedoms and rights, but have you ever considered who enforces
our right to these freedoms in the world? The military might of the United States is the key to us retaining our democratic freedoms. Being in
possession of nuclear weapons is not only a positive thing, it allows for us to be free. By holding an arsenal of nuclear weapons, we have a
nuclear deterrent. In this sense, we prevent wars and conflicts from escalating into another World War by instituting world order. By having
nuclear technology, we are ensuring the well-being, longevity, and freedoms of the human race. Internet Technology Another prominent
technological innovation that well represents our society today is the Internet. The Internet is the worldwide, publicly accessible network of
interconnected computer networks that transmit data between themselves. It is an extremely large network that consists of countless smaller
networks. The World Wide Web is accessible only through this Internet infrastructure which allows us our access to websites, email, file sharing,
downloads, and media. As well as being an important provider for us common citizens who wish to access the World Wide Web, the internet
serves a much greater purpose. It allows for the sharing of information almost instantaneously between scholars, researchers, and others. It allows
for information to be shared from the United States to China in less than a second. Before the times of the internet, the other alternatives to
transmit information were not nearly as efficient or effective. The Internet allows for us to, in some ways make the world smaller. In the days of
today’s stock markets, financial infrastructure, global news organizations, powerful militarizes, strong governments and big corporations,
instantaneous communication is an asset we can not afford to lose. The Internet allows for our society in modern day times to interconnect and
promote globalization and information sharing. Medical Technology Perhaps one of the most vital technological advances in our society today
is in the field of human medicine and health sciences. This field deals with the maintenance, prolongment, and restoration of human health
through the study, diagnosis, treatment, and prevention of disease and injury. Medicine is an area where knowledge is obtained, then applied to
treatment. It has been around at least as far as the beginning of recorded history, perhaps even farther. Today, modern medicine is practiced
within a well-developed framework of health-care infrastructure. Research in the field of medicine has allowed for the development of many new
treatments, drugs, medicines, and solutions that have allowed for the dramatic prolongment of the human lifespan. Today, with the influence of
medicine, the lifespan of the average human is only increasing. Medicine in today’s world provides the most vital of all services; it ensures the
survival of the human race as a whole. Review Now, let us review the implications of technology on our civilization here on Earth as a whole.
Could the notion of technology possibly have any basis? Simply put, it does not have any credibility of any sort. Technology itself does not
signify any concrete object or thing; instead it collectively portrays human kind’s achievements as a whole. Any advancements, abilities,
creations, undertakings, views, or knowledge of us as humans are in essence technology. This definition alone refutes the argument that
technology is detrimental. Take for instance the three significant technological advances of the human race covered in this article:
nuclear technology, the internet, and medicine. Nuclear technology, an important advancement for our society, creates a world order,
protects the inhabitants of the world, and ensures the longevity, freedoms, and well-being of the entire human race.
Also, the internet allows for our society to inter-connect and progress further into enlightenment. Perhaps most important of
all, medicine, allows for us to ensure our own survival on this planet. These three technologies well represent technology as a
whole, and clearly show that technology is extremely beneficial to our society. Only by advocating and advancing
technology, can we as humans, and as humanity, succeed.
SDI 11
File Title

                                          Internals: Space Key to S&T
And, Space investment in innovative strategies is CRITICAL for U.S. S&T retention and expanding U.S.
Innovation

American Aeronautical Society 2k11
(AAS Statement on Space Program Cutbacks,” pg online @ http://astronautical.org/node/94 //ef)
 (July 20, 2011) For the past 54 years, investments in America’s space program have yielded tremendous benefits* for
American taxpayers, but looming cutbacks to science and technology (S&T) investments –especially in the space
program – seriously threaten future benefits. Today’s economic situation assuredly will result in cutbacks to
government funded activities, but investments in S&T must be protected because they are the seed corn for
future economic growth and American global leadership. The first actions on the FY2012 budget are now being taken by
the House of Representatives and they do not bode well for the S&T investments in space activities. Department of Defense space
programs would be cut by at least $900 million; NASA by $1.9 billion; and NOAA’s satellite activities by more than $300 million.
The proposal to transfer the Landsat program from NASA to the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) would be denied and the Department of Energy
could not fund its share to restart plutonium-238 production for future probes to explore the solar system. At risk are not only the
programs themselves – from new generations of GPS navigation satellites and civil and military weather satellites to new astrophysics,
planetary exploration and earth science missions to human exploration – but the high tech and scientific jobs that go with them.
Also imperiled by cuts in both the defense and NASA budgets are investments in space technology that could lead to more cost
effective solutions to meeting the country’s goals and requirements in space and the myriad areas that space
technology impacts directly and indirectly. On a bipartisan basis, the White House and Congress have strongly supported the need for
increased STEM education, but if federal funding for S&T is cut substantially, relevant jobs will be lacking to attract the next generation into
pursuing these critical skills. The number one long-term issue facing our country’s leaders is economic growth, including
job creation, GDP growth and increasing the balance of trade . Without a growing economy that creates new high
wage jobs, our future is grim. For the private sector to help steward this growth, it needs sustainable, reliable
federal budgets and investments by the government in technology innovation across the board, including
aerospace. We applaud the House Appropriations Committee for the pace at which it is moving forward with the appropriations bills to fund
the fiscal year that begins on October 1. We understand the need to reduce the deficit. But we must not jeopardize our future by dramatic cuts to
the central core of our nation’s economic development – investments in science and technology, particularly those associated with the space
program. “The nation’s economic future depends on U.S. leadership in high-tech investments” said AAS Executive Director
Jim Kirkpatrick. “What this country needs is sustained investment in technological innovation – especially in aerospace
– that will assist in creating new products and markets and therefore new revenue and job growth.”
SDI 11
File Title

                                  Internals: Government Action key
And, U.S. Government Action is Key – it provides stimulus in innovation and S&T – key to future growth
and U.S. Tech Supremacy

Denney 2k11
(James, Deputy for Tactical Aircraft Systems, Port- folio Systems Acquisition, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisi- tion,
Technology and Logistics “Priming The Innovation Pump: America Needs More Scientists, Engineers, And Basic Research”/ January pg
online @ http://www.dau.mil/pubscats/ARJ_Library/ARJ57/James_ARJ57.pdf //ef)
Innovation is more important to the U.S. economy and national security now than in the past. Since World War II,
the United States has been the leader in innovation; however, international competition is posing a growing
challenge to U.S. technological supremacy. The United States has the best market environment in the world to
support innovation, but arguably weak innovation policies. Effective government innovation policies are critical to
keeping the nation at the leading edge of the scientific frontier. “What makes knowledge, innovation, and
technology such powerful drivers of economic growth is that, unlike capital and labor, they do not suffer from
diminishing returns”; therefore, America must rebuild its foundation of competitiveness—its supply of S&E talent
and basic R&D resources—that have served the country so well for the past 50 years (Atkinson & Wial, 2008, p.
19). The challenges are real and growing, so knowledge generation and innovation must become a national priority.
Sir Isaac Newton captured this continuation of innovation best when he said, “If I have seen further, it is by standing
on the shoulders of giants” (Atkinson & Wial, 2008, p. 11).
SDI 11
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                                                       AT: Space Treaty
IT fails and kills Space Missile Defense
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 2k9
(Co-Chaired by Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Security Studies The Fletcher School,
Tufts University President, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Dr. William R. Van Cleave Professor Emeritus Department of Defense
and Strategic Studies Missouri State University “Missile Defense, the Space Relationship, and the Twenty-First Century,” pg online @
http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/IWG2009.pdf //ef)
However, there is another avenue still open, still essentially untouched, where deployment of missile defense assets can be outlawed – space,
through a new space treaty. And that is still the big one. Because space-based interceptors are critical to linking together land- and sea-based com
ponents for a workable and cost-effective layered global defense system. As discussed extensively in sections 2 and 4, the space-based
interceptor (SBI) – which Clementine demonstrated for Brilliant Pebbles – is significantly closer to achieving concept development for wide-
ranging boost-phase kill capabilities than either land or sea systems. Arranged in at least one constellation of 1,000 to 2,000 interceptors
(watermelons in “life jackets”) placed in orbit 290 kilometers above the Earth (each deployed between 800 and 1,600 kilometers apart), the SBIs
acting in concert could (1) be on “alert” at all times; (2) “see” across a 360-degree space-Earth horizon to spot firings from either fixed, mobile,
or submarine platforms and issue instantaneous warnings within the entire constellation and to all other defense systems; (3) dispatch appropriate
SBIs out of the constellation to swoop down, streak out, or climb to meet the ballistic missile while it is still “hot” or in its early midcourse
trajectory before it can deploy its warheads; and (4) in the event of mission failure, enhance the long-range tracking capabilities of land- or sea-
based interceptors to engage the incoming warheads in the midcourse and terminal phases of the missile strike – hence, the term “layered
defense.” But that is not yet happening. The logic pyramid discussed in section 4 – which was turned upside down on its tip in 1993 – still
remains upside down after 12 years of geopolitical logrolling. Space-based capabilities still are not on the American agenda for the near future.
MAD compliance is still in place with the major nuclear-weapon powers.14 Not 14 In what some might regard as nervous reassurance to missile
defense foes that the George W. Bush administration plans no awkward surprises, Rick Lehner, director of communications, Missile Defense
Agency, issued these two back-to-back statements shortly after Election Day in 2004: the first, an op-ed appearing in the Kodiak Mirror,
November 17, 2004, was in response to a local critic about deploying space-based systems, and he states, “Not the least bit true. We closed our
space-based laser research and development office more than three years ago, and there is absolutely nothing even contemplated at MDA to
launch any space-based ‘lasers and interceptors aimed at targets anywhere on Earth.’” The second, a November 18, 2004, dispatch from Agence
France-Presse, reports on Russian plans to deploy a new generation of ballistic missiles to overwhelm any U.S. defenses and also describes the
U.S. ground-based missile defense projects in Alaska and California to protest against rogues like North Korea, as well as reveals plans to build a
similar site in Europe to protect against a Middle East strike. The French news agency also observes that the U.S. system is not designed to
protect against long-range attack from either China or Russia and then quotes Lehner that “This missile defense system [the proposed European
system] being deployed is not a threat to either the Russian or the Chinese strategic deterrent force.” [The meaning: that both nations will
continue to be able to conduct a first strike anywhere in the world before there would be any response. By every definition this is a continuation
of surprisingly, then, missile defense opponents are resurfacing their standard arguments, but this time honed on why space-based systems simply
cannot be allowed to happen; that missile defense will weaponize space, and that a new international regime (treaty) is needed. The logic of this
newly minted position of missile defense opponents is as simple as it is transparent. (1) If a new space treaty can be negotiated to outlaw missile
defense in space, the United States cannot acquire an effective global protection, which is necessary to guard against the overwhelming
preponderance of offensive nuclear missiles presently deployed or being developed all over the world (land- and sea-based systems cannot deal
with this alone). (2) Thus, a highly significant level of population vulnerability is assured, that is, this preponderance of offensive nuclear power
stays able to strike an unprotected American people, just as permitted under the old ABM Treaty (Mutual Assured Destruction). (3) By
constraining the United States from going full measure to protect its people, the MAD doctrine of hostage holding once again is guaranteed in a
new era of the “balance of terror” and pacifism’s successful 40-year legacy of denying protection to the American people is preserved. Perhaps
one of the best expressions of these views is presented in an October 2003 paper by Theresa Hitchens, vice president of the Center for Defense
Information and member of The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists editorial board: Emerging Bush administration plans and policies are clearly aimed
at making the United States the first nation to deploy space-based weapons. There are several drivers behind this goal, including… vulnerability
of space assets that are increasingly important to how the U.S. military operates, and the administration’s decision to pursue missile defense…
The Pentagon’s just-revised missile defense plans include… the potential for space-based systems, in particular for shooting down enemy
missiles in their boost phase as they begin to ascend… Although it is unclear if these plans are a deliberate foot in the door to the weaponization
of space, their implementation would have that effect. A decision to move forward with space-based missile defense systems would end today’s
policy of restraint… It is imperative that the missile defense program not be allowed to solely drive a decision to weaponize space, especially in
absence of serious consideration of the potential strategic, military and economic consequences.15 It is instructive to note that “serious
consideration” presumably does not include the consequences of not protecting the American population from ballistic missile attacks by forces
already in place, ones who would use space through which to launch their existing weapons. This omission, though perhaps unintentional,
nevertheless suggests that space-based missile defense is an impediment to protecting against other consequences deemed more important than
addressing the possibility of a sneak attack that could result in severe civilian casualties, one that would occur before the United States would in
theory respond with
a retaliatory strike: the MAD doctrine is clearly evident here – you nuke us and we’ll nuke you.
The use of the term “restraint,” as it is specifically applied here to a defense system against an aggressor’s offensive weapons, likewise, is
instructive. Because it pointedly implies that defending one’s self is provocative and destabilizing, which is the apex of pacifistic thought and a
close relative to both “passive resistance” and nihilism.
The question, though, is exactly how would space-based missile defense drive a decision to weaponize space? The answer is thin at very best.
First of all, space already is weaponized.16
Like the sea, space is a “medium,” which Webster describes as “a means of effecting or conveying something.” It could be life; it could be things,
natural and man-made.
The sea is finite to the Earth. It is fungible so that the medium itself has no boundaries as a substance but remains limited by its environment. It is
a medium through which or in which weapons can be passed or stationed. Webster describes weapons as “an instrument of offensive or defensive
combat… a means of contending against another.” Therefore, following these definitions, a fixed radio buoy transmitting data for military use is a
weapon, as is a torpedo which is made to pass through the sea, as is an aircraft carrier specifically designed to exist in the sea.
SDI 11
File Title

The sea has been weaponized for thousands of years and efforts to control that weaponization effectively through treaties have been quite limited,
mainly through extending the sovereign shorelines of littoral states to include an agreed-upon area of contiguous seabed (which one nation
occasionally steals from another). The one such effort in modern history to prevent weaponization of the seas was the failed 1922 Washington
Naval Treaty limiting capital ships of the major pow
ers but excluding aircraft carriers, which became the capital ships used by Japan to attack Pearl Harbor.
The medium of space is infinite in which is housed everything known so far to man. Within it reigns the cosmos (or under the quantum theory,
chaos), generally speaking an unfriendly place for unprotected living creatures.
It is thus extremely difficult to seek ways to control weaponization through regimes, agreements, and treaties. In space everything moves, so that
there are no fixed boundaries, save what could be staked out on celestial bodies, like the moon, which also moves.17 Thus, verification and
enforcement of treaty conditions is highly complex at best. This reality dictates the imperative that the United States must exercise the greatest
care in any discussions or actions relative to another space treaty, for the question arises, who will control whom and what and how?
SDI 11
File Title

                                                  Solvency: Tech Ready
And, Space-Based Missile Defense Can be Revived – the tech is available and just needs a jump-start
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 2k9
(Co-Chaired by Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Security Studies The Fletcher School,
Tufts University President, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Dr. William R. Van Cleave Professor Emeritus Department of Defense
and Strategic Studies Missouri State University “Missile Defense, the Space Relationship, and the Twenty-First Century,” pg online @
http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/IWG2009.pdf //ef)
Space-based Missile Defense For the United States, space is an indispensable first line of defense. Almost since the beginning of the space age
over 50 years ago, the United States has used this arena for intelligence and defense support, including deploying sensors in space to provide
early warning of a missile launch. Without space control, the United States cannot maintain dominance on the battlefield. Of all basing modes,
space-based defenses would provide the widest area of coverage and the greatest number of shots against enemy warheads, and it would have
the very desirable feature of always being present to destroy ballistic missiles launched from anywhere in the world. Unfortunately, for
most of the 30 years of the ABM Treaty, there was little or no experimental verification of the feasibility of space-based defense concepts that
had been identified in the early 1960s, as the underlying empowering technology advanced. Then, President Reagan, who was interested in truly
effective global defenses, included space-based defenses as a vital part of his missile defense vision. He thus challenged the American scientific
community to determine whether the technology for such defenses had advanced to the point that effective defenses, including in space, could be
built. By the end of the Reagan administration, creative experiments that avoided the specific con straints of the ABM Treaty had demonstrated
that the answer was clearly in the affirmative.10 The Reagan–Bush-41 administrations developed a concept that, but for the political issues
discussed elsewhere in the report and especially in section 4, could have begun operating as early as the mid 1990s as part of a global missile
defense, employing all basing modes against attacking missiles of every range. This missile defense architecture not only included Brilliant
Pebbles as the space-based interceptor (SBI) component of GPALS, but also a layered defense consisting of ground- and sea-based national and
theater defenses designed to intercept missiles launched from any point against the United States itself or its interests overseas. GPALS would
have defended against ballistic missile launches and limited ballistic missile strikes launched from any part of the globe.11 In marked contrast to
the more limited missile defense architecture that evolved subsequently, GPALS was a global defense. This architecture provided for a multi-
tiered defense beginning in boost phase against missiles just after launch and extending through midcourse and into the terminal phase. By 1990,
as a result of the technology investments of the preceding decade, the space-based elements were more technically mature and capable of rapid
development than the ground-based components of GPALS.12 Nevertheless, the promising space-based defense technologies developed more
than a decade ago, whose maturity was demonstrated by the 1994 prize-winning Clementine mission to the moon, have remained ignored if not a
priori rejected (see section 4).13 Indeed, President Clinton vetoed the Clementine follow-on mission in 1997 precisely because it involved the
next generation of advanced technology beyond Clementine. President Clinton’s principal National Security Council advisor on missile defense
told the media that the president exercised his line item veto authority to kill this follow-on mission, which was supported by the scientific
community, to send a probe to a deep space asteroid precisely because it involved SDI technology that would violate the ABM Treaty. Since the
treaty is now defunct, this criticism clearly does not apply today. Still, we have not even conducted such a demonstration or revived the Brilliant
Pebbles program, which would indeed move SBI technology ahead (more below). There are essentially two basic approaches to space-based
missile defense. The first is kinetic energy systems, including Brilliant Pebbles; the second is directed-energy weapons.

Tech FYI – 2 types of Missile Defense: Kinetic (Brilliant Pebbles), and Directed-Energy Weapons
SDI 11
File Title

                                                   Solvency/Kinetics FYI
And, Brilliant Pebbles is a Kinetic Weapon that uses thousands of interceptors to hit its target – its ready and
can be deployed – peer review and testing proves
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 2k9
(Co-Chaired by Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Security Studies The Fletcher School,
Tufts University President, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Dr. William R. Van Cleave Professor Emeritus Department of Defense
and Strategic Studies Missouri State University “Missile Defense, the Space Relationship, and the Twenty-First Century,” pg online @
http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/IWG2009.pdf //ef)
Space-based Kinetic Energy Missile Defense A space-based KEI is designed to hit a ballistic missile in its boost or ascent phase, when the
warhead(s) has not yet separated from the missile and is most vulnerable. It is also capable of midcourse and high-terminal phase intercepts.
Kinetic kill vehicles would be placed in low-earth orbit, where they would remain until a hostile missile launch was detected. For
intercepts in the boost or terminal phases, a kinetic kill vehicle would accelerate out of orbit toward the missile which would be destroyed by
direct impact. Midcourse intercepts would occur in space. By the early 1990s, the United States had developed technology for lightweight
propulsion units, sensors, computers, and other components of an advanced kill vehicle. This concept, Brilliant Pebbles, consisted of a
constellation of about 1,000 interceptors that combined their own early-warning and tracking capability with high maneuverability to engage
attacking ballistic missiles in all phases of their flight trajectory. Each interceptor, or “pebble,” was designed to identi fy the nature of the attack,
which might include up to 200 ballistic missile warheads, based on a defense that included 1,000 “brilliant pebbles;” and since it knew its own
location and that of all other pebbles, each could calculate an optimum attack strategy from its own perspective and execute an intercept
maneuver, while simultaneously informing the other pebbles of its action. This operational concept enabled a robustly viable, testable,
operational capability that survived numerous scientific and engineering peer reviews in the 1989-90 time period, including by some
groups that were hostile to the idea of missile defense in general, and space-based defenses in particular. Still, because of persistent policy
preferences, the opposition eventually gained the upper hand politically, and the program, which had been formally approved by the Pentagon’s
acquisition authorities, was curtailed by Congress in 1991 and 1992 and then cancelled by the Clinton administration.14 But the technology was
clearly established, supporting the Pentagon’s approved acquisition plan that each of the pebbles would operate autonomously because each
carried the equivalent of a Cray-1 computer and could perform its own calculations for trajectory and targeting analysis. Each also had its own
navigation sensors, allowing it to determine its location and the location of its neighbors – as well as to detect and track the target ballistic
missiles and calculate a good approximation of what its neighbors saw.15 These pebbles would act as sensor platforms until all or part of the
constellation was authorized to intercept hostile missiles. In fact, their infrared sensors provided the warning and tracking capability needed to
alert the Brilliant Pebbles constellation, enabling it to intercept ballistic missiles in the boost and subsequent phases of flight. The constellation
would provide a redundant and, for some applications, superior capability to the geosynchronous Defense Support Program satellites used since
the early 1970s as a key element of the U.S. Early Warning and Tactical Assessment system. Their small size, meanwhile, made them difficult to
target, while their relatively low cost made them easy to replace.
SDI 11
File Title

                                     Solvency: Layered Missile Defense
And, a layered system is effective, provides a back-up mechanism and deters potential threats
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 2k9
(Co-Chaired by Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Security Studies The Fletcher School,
Tufts University President, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Dr. William R. Van Cleave Professor Emeritus Department of Defense
and Strategic Studies Missouri State University “Missile Defense, the Space Relationship, and the Twenty-First Century,” pg online @
http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/IWG2009.pdf //ef)
A global layered defense capability is necessary to counter these threats. Near-term options exist for augmenting sea-based defenses and
deploying space-based defenses within the next decade, resulting in a comprehensive, global layered missile defense system. Layered
defenses provide multiple opportunities to destroy attacking missiles in all three phases of flight from any direction regardless of their geographic
starting point. Furthermore, a layered defense makes the countermeasures available to the offensive systems much less effective than would be
the case if interdiction was only possible in one (or two) phase(s) of the missile’s flight. Boost-phase intercepts, most efficiently conducted by
components deployed in space, are particularly desirable because a missile is most vulnerable during this segment since it is relatively slow
moving, presents a readily identifiable target (bright rocket plume), and has not released any of its warheads or countermeasures that would
complicate interception in subsequent phases. Boost-phase interception has the added advantage that the missile’s payload may, depending on
how early interdiction occurs, fall back on the attacking nation. This situation could deter the launching state if it is confronted with the likelihood
of serious damage to its own territory. In addition, depending on the number of assets deployed, a space-based boost-phase defense could always
be on station on a world-wide basis, unfettered by sovereignty issues of overflight and operations on another nation’s territory. Layered defenses
that include space-based interceptors might also dissuade adversaries in possession of ballistic missiles, or would-be possessors, from seeking
costly in vestments to acquire ballistic missiles that could not easily penetrate such a defensive shield. As a result, the United States would retain
maximum flexibility in a crisis situation in which the threat of ballistic missile attacks would be minimized. In order to build a global layered
missile defense, the United States must take several important steps in parallel.
SDI 11
File Title

                                             1AC Solvency/Plan Mech?
And, a New Program to re-constitute brilliant pebbles would solve quickly, avoid countermeasures and be
ready to deploy quickly
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 2k9
(Co-Chaired by Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Security Studies The Fletcher School,
Tufts University President, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Dr. William R. Van Cleave Professor Emeritus Department of Defense
and Strategic Studies Missouri State University “Missile Defense, the Space Relationship, and the Twenty-First Century,” pg online @
http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/IWG2009.pdf //ef)
Going Back to the Future Because space-based defenses offer the widest coverage and largest number of intercept
opportunities, and little if anything has been done to take advantage of space defense technologies that were mature
15 years ago, a new initiative is required to bring that technology and its potential up to date . We recommend a
streamlined technology-limited development program based on the Brilliant Pebbles program to demonstrate within
three years the feasibility of a constellation of space-based interceptors to intercept ballistic missiles in all phases of
flight – boost, midcourse, and terminal. To avoid conflicts with existing acquisition programs focused on ground- and sea-based
defenses while moving forward as rapidly as possible, this effort should be undertaken by a special task force of competent technical personnel
experienced in developing pioneering technology. Consequently, the United States should: Fund DARPA, which specializes in the innovation of
de• fense systems through advanced technology, to assemble a small team charged with rapidly reviving and deploying a modern space-based
kinetic-energy interceptor system in the manner of past successful programs such as the development of the first ICBM and the Polaris missile.
Of particular importance is a small, empowered, technically competent management and engineering team from government and industry, fully
supported with needed funds. Building on the • Brilliant Pebbles technologies created in the late 1980s and early 1990s as
well as advanced technologies produced since then in both the military and commercial sectors , the DARPA team should
develop and rigorously test within three years a space-based system to perform boost, midcourse, and terminal
interception tests against ballistic missiles of several ranges. The anticipated cost of this three-year effort, which could leave in
place a space test bed with limited intercept capability, is $3 billion to $5 billion. Direct the Air Force Space Command to work with DAR• PA to
develop the operational concept for a constellation of space-based interceptors, with an anticipated hand-off to the Air Force in three to five years
of an evolving capability that can be integrated into U.S. Strategic Command’s global architecture. Using an event-driven procurement
strategy deploy a • Brilliant Pebbles twenty-first century space-defense system with the goal of an initial capability
in 2012. Because of the number that would be deployed, Brilliant Pebbles would have multiple opportunities for
interception, increasing chances of a successful kill in either the boost or midcourse phase, or even in the early
terminal phase. These characteristics stand in sharp contrast to the GMD ground-based interceptors which, in the
limited numbers presently planned, may not provide more than one intercept opportunity. Moreover, Brilliant
Pebbles interceptors are small (1.4-2.3 kilograms and approximately the size of a watermelon), making them difficult to
detect and thus target; they also contain an inherent self-defense capability that further adds to their survivability. Brilliant Pebbles
was approximately midway through engineering and manufacturing development before it was cancelled, suggesting
that with the needed political will, an updated system could be developed and deployed in a timely fashion. For
example, based on the fully approved Defense Acquisition Board plan from 1991, 1,000 Brilliant Pebbles interceptors could be developed, tested,
deployed, and operated for 20 years in a low-to-moderate risk event-driven acquisition program for $11 billion in 1989 dollars, or $19.1 billion in
inflation-adjusted 2008 dollars.
SDI 11
File Title

                                                  Solvency: Space Tech
And, the Plan protects and improves space situational awareness, the aerospace industry and commercial
space development – treaties and restrictions fail
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 2k9
(Co-Chaired by Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Security Studies The Fletcher School,
Tufts University President, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Dr. William R. Van Cleave Professor Emeritus Department of Defense
and Strategic Studies Missouri State University “Missile Defense, the Space Relationship, and the Twenty-First Century,” pg online @
http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/IWG2009.pdf //ef)
Committing to Space The importance of space to the United States extends beyond missile defense. Space is an arena of crucial importance to the
United States for civil, commercial, and national security purposes. It is essential that the United States not only be able to use space for
missile defense, but also to have assured access to space as the means to protect its other vital space-based assets, including improved
situational awareness in space. And even though the United States remains at the forefront of space technology and exploration today, its
continued preeminence is not assured. At least 35 countries (several of which are hostile to the United States) have space programs, many of
which have already led to the deployment of assets in space and more will do so in the years ahead. Yet the United States is not providing
adequate resources for its military space programs. This is dangerous because the ability to attack and disrupt U.S. space assets, launch
systems, and associated ground support stations is expanding on the part of states and even non-state actors. For example, China is developing
advanced capabilities for space warfare, including lasers and direct-ascent capabilities that could be launched from China to destroy or disrupt
U.S. satellites. In addition, as discussed earlier, several states – as well as terrorist groups – currently possess or are pursuing the capability
to launch an EMP strike that would render useless many critical U.S. national security, civilian, and commercial space assets. Therefore,
if it is to remain a space power – and indeed a global power – the United States must not only be capable of detecting and deterring such attacks,
but also of possessing the means to defend against them, identify their source, and quickly recover and replenish vital assets. This means that the
United States should: Articulate a commitment to space dominance by immedi• ately making major new investments in the research and
development of space-based technologies to counteract the decline (20 percent to less than 8 percent) in the U.S. aerospace sector’s share of total
national research and development investment since the 1980s. The increased funding should support efforts to protect existing space- based
assets and field technologies to enhance and safeguard the commercial and national security uses of space, such as situational awareness. In
addition, given that numerous U.S. national security satellites are approaching obsolescence, successor generation systems are urgently needed.
This includes the capacity to replace disabled or destroyed space assets rapidly and underscores the need for robust, low-cost U.S. space launch
capabilities. Acknowledge the centrality of space to the development, • testing, and deployment of a missile defense system capable of protecting
the United States, its overseas forces, and its allies. Missile defense, together with space control and assured access, are capabilities central
to U.S. efforts for creating disincentives to states and terrorist organizations seeking WMD and their delivery systems. Reject efforts to
counter current American primacy in • space through legal regimes and arrangements. The experience of the ABM Treaty, together with
endeavors now underway to restrict weapons proliferation and deployment by international agreement, does not give credibility to efforts to
impose new international legal prohibitions against space-based missile defense. Such actions are more likely to place burdensome
restrictions on the use of space by the United States, rather than deterring others from developing their own space programs.
SDI 11
File Title

                                                    Plan/Solvency Mech
And, Brilliant Pebbles Tech is ready and can defeat counter-measures – the timeframe for deploying
operational tech is 5 years at-most
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 2k9
(Co-Chaired by Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Security Studies The Fletcher School,
Tufts University President, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Dr. William R. Van Cleave Professor Emeritus Department of Defense
and Strategic Studies Missouri State University “Missile Defense, the Space Relationship, and the Twenty-First Century,” pg online @
http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/IWG2009.pdf //ef)
The autonomy of Brilliant Pebbles interceptors in detecting launch and undertaking interception complicated the use of countermeasures against
their command and control. And because of the number of interceptors deployed in space, these defenses would have multiple opportunities for
interception, thus increasing their chances of a successful intercept in either the boost or midcourse phase, or even high in the Earth’s atmosphere
during reentry in the terminal phase. These characteristics stand in contrast to the current GMD interceptors, which may not provide more than
one independent intercept opportunity. Although the Brilliant Pebbles program was terminated in the early 1990s, advances in the commercial,
civil, and other defense sectors since that time would now permit even lighter mass, lower cost, and higher performance than would have been
achieved by the 1990-era technology base. Thus, lighter weight and smarter components could now empower a Brilliant Pebbles interceptor with
greater acceleration/velocity, making possible boost-phase intercept of even short- and medium-range ballistic missiles as well as high-
acceleration ICBMs, thus surpassing the capabilities of the 1990 Brilliant Pebbles.16 As noted above, the same sensor and kill-vehicle technology
can be used for ground- and sea-based interceptors – notably on the VLS-compatible, high-velocity Navy SM-3 interceptor. Reviving and
building on the Brilliant Pebbles concept and related technologies is essential for the deploy16 ment of effective SBIs, as well as improved
interceptors for use in other basing modes, especially at sea. One feasible option for testing and initial deployment of a revived space-based
interceptor system based on Brilliant Pebbles would be to deploy approximately 40 to 120 interceptors for a space-system test bed analogous to
the ground- and sea-based test beds. After demonstrating feasibility by testing against missiles of all ranges in all possible phases of their flight,
this test bed would have a limited capability and could be expanded to become part of a fully capable defensive constellation. In 1991 initial
operations were expected to be feasible in approximately five years; however at that time there was an in-place acquisition program with two
competing contractor teams. An appropriate Brilliant Pebbles team could be reconstituted and meet an approximate five-year target
date for initial operations. Motorola used commercially available technology to build and begin operating its 66-satellite constellation Iridium
communications system in roughly five years for approximately $5 billion. Iridium, now used by the Pentagon for communications to remote
locations, exploited many of the technologies, operational concepts, and acquisition management approaches that had been planned for Brilliant
Pebbles before it was cancelled in 1993. Consequently, the operational issues demonstrated by the Iridium experience would be valuable in
reconstituting a viable Brilliant Pebbles acquisition program, provided personnel with that experience were included on the team.
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File Title

                                                     AT: Fails/Spending
And, your costs and solvency estimates are significantly off – brilliant pebbles solves and is significantly less
then your evidence assumes
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 2k9
(Co-Chaired by Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Security Studies The Fletcher School,
Tufts University President, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Dr. William R. Van Cleave Professor Emeritus Department of Defense
and Strategic Studies Missouri State University “Missile Defense, the Space Relationship, and the Twenty-First Century,” pg online @
http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/IWG2009.pdf //ef)
While their application of the well-known “rocket equation” and attributes of orbital mechanics is no doubt correct, these more recent analyses
assumed heavier (and less capable) components than those of the Brilliant Pebbles design. Thus, they were led inevitably to much higher cost
estimates of far less effective SBI system concepts – just as had been the case for the SBI concepts that the Brilliant Pebbles replaced in the 1990
SDIO reviews. In short, these more recent studies were far less comprehensive than the 1989 season of reviews of the Brilliant Pebbles
design, the ensuing 1990 concept definition program, and the subsequent demonstration-validation program – until it was cancelled by an act of
Congress, notably not because of any technical or management criticism.23 For example, two seemingly comprehensive reports have been given
undue weight by many critics of space-based defenses: the first in 2003 by the American Physical Society (APS)24 and the second in 2004 by the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO).25 In fact, the APS and CBO reports both considered far less capable SBI system concepts and focused on a
more limited mission – defeating a few Iranian or North Korean ballistic missiles – rather than the much more demanding GPALS mission of
providing high confidence in destroy ing up to 200 Soviet/Russian-quality warheads launched from anywhere on Earth toward the United States
or its overseas troops, friends, or allies. Furthermore, these studies were focused only on boost-phase intercept, whereas Brilliant Pebbles
was designed to intercept ballistic missiles in all their phases of flight. In a report for the Marshall Institute, Dr. Gregory Canavan noted the
relevance of the Iridium26 experience with mass production and other attributes of the Brilliant Pebbles approach.27 He also pointed out that the
CAIG-approved $11 billion (1989 dollars) cost estimate for the RDT&E and 20-year operations cost for a constellation of 1,000 Brilliant Pebbles
interceptors was the only existing relevant set of government-developed cost estimates.
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                                        Directed Energy Weapons Mech
Should Pursue a Program of Space-Based Directed Energy Lasers to Augment Brilliant Pebbles
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 2k9
(Co-Chaired by Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Security Studies The Fletcher School,
Tufts University President, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Dr. William R. Van Cleave Professor Emeritus Department of Defense
and Strategic Studies Missouri State University “Missile Defense, the Space Relationship, and the Twenty-First Century,” pg online @
http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/IWG2009.pdf //ef)
Space-based Directed-energy (Laser) Missile Defense
Directed-energy defenses hold the potential in the longer term to provide a boost-phase defense capability. The 1991-92 GPALS system included
a follow-on space-based laser (SBL) layer after the Brilliant Pebbles deployment with capabilities that would complement it in two ways: (1)
lasers operating at the speed of light assure the earliest possible boost-phase intercept capability, maximizing the likelihood that debris from the
intercept would fall back on the launcher’s territory; and (2) while lasers would not be effective in destroying nuclear warheads in space, they
would be capable of the active discrimination of warheads from decoys, thus enabling intercept by Brilliant Pebbles or other midcourse defense
systems.
The SBL platform would intercept ballistic missiles by focusing and maintaining a high-powered laser on the missile while its rockets are burning
and it is very vulnerable to even a small perturbation that could ignite the rocket fuel and destroy the missile. A missile that is struck early in its
boost phase could dispense its deadly payload over the country of launch, thus creating in itself a possible deterrent to launching missiles against
the United States and its forward-deployed forces. (Countries contemplating the use of missile-delivered weapons of mass destruction would have
to consider the possibility that the payload would fall within their own borders). If the missile were engaged near the end of its boost phase, it still
might fly a ballistic trajectory, but one that would fall short of its intended target. And as noted above, SBLs could perform an active
discrimination mission, aiding SBIs and other midcourse-capable defenses in intercepting the attacking missile before it reenters the Earth’s
atmosphere.
Because any one space-based directed-energy platform may not be in sight of the area from which its target missiles are launched at a particular
time, a constellation of such platforms would be required to ensure that one or more of them would be in sight of potential launch areas in time to
engage the targets while they are vulnerable. A constellation of about 12 SBLs could provide global coverage against up to five ballistic missiles
simultaneously launched from anywhere to anywhere else more than about 120 kilometers away. Against theater-class medium-range ballistic
missiles, this constellation could destroy up to 10 simultaneously launched ballistic missiles while in boost phase. Against ICBMs, whose boost
phase lasts for three to five minutes, a minimum of 15 to 25 simultaneous missile launches could be intercepted.
An R&D program should be pursued to prove the requisite SBL technologies. When developed and fully
tested, SBLs would significantly augment the capabilities provided by the Brilliant Pebbles architecture.
However, as noted above, there is no current program to provide an SBI capability, and the SBL Integrated
Flight Experiment that was scheduled for 2012 has been cancelled. 29
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File Title

                                       2AC Commercial Space Add-on
     A) Space Innovation through Missile Defense Necessary for Technological Spin-offs, Commercial
        Technology Development and Military Superiority
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 2k9
(Co-Chaired by Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Security Studies The Fletcher School,
Tufts University President, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Dr. William R. Van Cleave Professor Emeritus Department of Defense
and Strategic Studies Missouri State University “Missile Defense, the Space Relationship, and the Twenty-First Century,” pg online @
http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/IWG2009.pdf //ef)
The United States is the leading space power, and as such it depends more on space than does any other nation, a situation that leads inevitably to
both vulnerabilities and opportunities. The U.S. position in space has grown out of numerous strengths developed over more than five decades.
These strengths fall into two broad, overlapping categories: (1) military force enhancement; and (2) commercial utilization of space. Because of
the dual-use nature of these technologies, it is not easy to separate their military applications from their commercial ones. Therefore, the
failure of the United States to remain in the forefront of space technologies would have both military and
commercial implications . Advances in the military or civilian sectors will overlap, intersect, and reinforce each other .
Consequently, the development in the United States of a dynamic and innovative private-sector space industry  will be indispensable to
future U.S. space leadership . Nevertheless, the ability of the U.S. military to contribute to, and benefit from, such a space
technology base will depend on its focus and priorities. The availability of technologies does not lead inevitably to their
exploitation. America may fail to move forward to exploit technological opportunities and breakthroughs. Such choices may be based on political
or other considerations, whether well founded or the product of mistaken assumptions about what competitors or adversaries will or will not do.
Just as control of the seas has been essential to the right of innocent passage for commerce, the ability of the United States to maintain assured
access to space and freedom of action in space will depend on space control . Given the already extensive importance of space for
commercial and military purposes, as well as its prospective role in missile defense, the United States must maintain control of space in the
twenty-first century. This commitment to space control is neither new nor destabilizing, despite claims to the contrary.
SDI 11
File Title

                                        2AC Space Leadership Add-on
     A) Missile Defense in Space Solves U.S. Space Leadership
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 2k9
(Co-Chaired by Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Security Studies The Fletcher School,
Tufts University President, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Dr. William R. Van Cleave Professor Emeritus Department of Defense
and Strategic Studies Missouri State University “Missile Defense, the Space Relationship, and the Twenty-First Century,” pg online @
http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/IWG2009.pdf //ef)
The United States is the leading space power, and as such it depends more on space than does any other nation, a situation that leads inevitably to
both vulnerabilities and opportunities. The U.S. position in space has grown out of numerous strengths developed over more than five decades.
These strengths fall into two broad, overlapping categories: (1) military force enhancement; and (2) commercial utilization of space. Because of
the dual-use nature of these technologies, it is not easy to separate their military applications from their commercial ones. Therefore, the
failure of the United States to remain in the forefront of space technologies would have both military and
commercial implications . Advances in the military or civilian sectors will overlap, intersect, and reinforce each other .
Consequently, the development in the United States of a dynamic and innovative private-sector space industry will be indispensable to
future U.S. space leadership . Nevertheless, the ability of the U.S. military to contribute to, and benefit from, such a space
technology base will depend on its focus and priorities. The availability of technologies does not lead inevitably to their
exploitation. America may fail to move forward to exploit technological opportunities and breakthroughs. Such choices may be based on political
or other considerations, whether well founded or the product of mistaken assumptions about what competitors or adversaries will or will not do.
Just as control of the seas has been essential to the right of innocent passage for commerce, the ability of the United States to maintain assured
access to space and freedom of action in space will depend on space control . Given the already extensive importance of space for
commercial and military purposes, as well as its prospective role in missile defense, the United States must maintain control of space in the
twenty-first century. This commitment to space control is neither new nor destabilizing, despite claims to the contrary.
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             Impact Work
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                                                         Competitiveness
Competitiveness prevents great power war --- now is key
Baru 2k9
(Sanjaya Baru 9, Professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School in Singapore Geopolitical Implications of the Current Global Financial Crisis,
Strategic Analysis, Volume 33, Issue 2 March 2009 , pages 163 – 168)
There is no doubt that economics alone will not determine the balance of global power, but there is no doubt either that economics has come to
matter for more. The management of the economy, and of the treasury, has been a vital aspect of statecraft from time immemorial. Kautilya’s
Arthashastra says, ‘From the strength of the treasury the army is born. …men without wealth do not attain their objectives even after hundreds of
trials… Only through wealth can material gains be acquired, as elephants (wild) can be captured only by elephants (tamed)… A state with
depleted resources, even if acquired, becomes only a liability.’4 Hence, economic policies and performance do have strategic
consequences.5 In the modern era, the idea that strong economic performance is the foundation of power was argued most
persuasively by historian Paul Kennedy. ‘Victory (in war),’ Kennedy claimed, ‘has repeatedly gone to the side with more
flourishing productive base.’6 Drawing attention to the interrelationships between economic wealth, technological
innovation, and the ability of states to efficiently mobilize economic and technological resources for power projection
and national defence, Kennedy argued that nations that were able to better combine military and economic strength
scored over others. ‘The fact remains,’ Kennedy argued, ‘that all of the major shifts in the world’s military-power balance have followed
alterations in the productive balances; and further, that the rising and falling of the various empires and states in the international system has been
confirmed by the outcomes of the major Great Power wars, where victory has always gone to the side with the greatest
material resources.’7 In Kennedy’s view the geopolitical consequences of an economic crisis or even decline would be
transmitted through a nation’s inability to find adequate financial resources to simultaneously sustain economic growth and
military power – the classic ‘guns vs butter’ dilemma. Apart from such fiscal disempowerment of the state, economic under-performance
would also reduce a nation’s attraction as a market, a source of capital and technology, and as a ‘knowledge power’. As power shifted from
Europe to America, so did the knowledge base of the global economy. As China’s power rises, so does its profile as a ‘knowledge economy’.
Impressed by such arguments the China Academy of Social Sciences developed the concept of Comprehensive National Power (CNP) to get
China’s political and military leadership to focus more clearly on economic and technological performance than on military power alone in its
quest for Great Power status.8 While China’s impressive economic performance and the consequent rise in China’s global profile has forced
strategic analysts to acknowledge this link, the recovery of the US economy in the 1990s had reduced the appeal of the Kennedy thesis in
Washington DC. We must expect a revival of interest in Kennedy’s arguments in the current context. A historian of power who took Kennedy
seriously, Niall Ferguson, has helped keep the focus on the geopolitical implications of economic performance. In his masterly survey of the role
of finance in the projection of state power, Ferguson defines the ‘square of power’ as the tax bureaucracy, the parliament, the national debt and
the central bank. These four institutions of ‘fiscal empowerment’ of the state enable nations to project power by mobilizing and
deploying financial resources to that end.9 Ferguson shows how vital sound economic management is to strategic policy and national
power. More recently, Ferguson has been drawing a parallel between the role of debt and financial crises in the decline of the Ottoman and Soviet
empires and that of the United States of America. In an early comment on the present financial crisis, Ferguson wrote: ‘We are indeed living
through a global shift in the balance of power very similar to that which occurred in the 1870s. This is the story of how an over-extended empire
sought to cope with an external debt crisis by selling off revenue streams to foreign investors. The empire that suffered these setbacks in the
1870s was the Ottoman empire. Today it is the US… It remains to be seen how quickly today’s financial shift will be followed by a comparable
geopolitical shift in favour of the new export and energy empires of the east. Suffice to say that the historical analogy does not bode well for
America’s quasi-imperial network of bases and allies across the Middle East and Asia. Debtor empires sooner or later have to do more than just
sell shares to satisfy their creditors. …as in the 1870s the balance of financial power is shifting. Then, the move was from the ancient Oriental
empires (not only the Ottoman but also the Persian and Chinese) to Western Europe. Today the shift is from the US – and other western financial
centres – to the autocracies of the Middle East and East Asia.’10 An economic or financial crisis may not trigger the decline of an
empire. It can certainly speed up a process already underway. In the case of the Soviet Union the financial crunch caused by the
Afghan war came on top of years of economic under-performance and the loss of political legitimacy of the Soviet state. In a democratic society
like the United States the political legitimacy of the state is constantly renewed through periodic elections. Thus, the election of Barack Obama
may serve to renew the legitimacy of the state and by doing so enable the state to undertake measures that restore health to the economy. This the
Soviet state was unable to do under Gorbachev even though he repudiated the Brezhnev legacy and distanced himself from it. Hence, one must
not become an economic determinist and historic parallels need not always be relevant. Politics can intervene and offer solutions. Political
economy and politics, in the form of Keynesian economics and the ‘New Deal’, did intervene to influence the
geopolitical implications of the Great Depression. Whether they will do so once again in today’s America remains to
be seen.


**Need competitiveness to maintain primacy through military tech

Paarlberg 2k4
(Robert L. Paarlberg Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College, and Associate at the Weatherhead Center
for International Affairs at Harvard University. Much of his research concentrates on international agricultural
policy.) “Knowledge as Power. Science, Military Dominance, and U.S. Security” International Security 29.1 (2004)
122-151. Page: MUSE)
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Can the United States maintain its global lead in science, the new key to its recently unparalleled military dominance? U.S. scientific
prowess has become the deep foundation of U.S. military hegemony. U.S. weapons systems currently dominate the conventional battlefield
because they incorporate powerful technologies available only from scientifically dominant U.S. weapons laboratories. Yet under
conditions of globalization, scientific and technical (S&T) knowledge is now spreading more quickly and more widely, suggesting that
hegemony in this area might be difficult for any one country to maintain. Is the scientific hegemony that lies beneath U.S. weapons
dominance strong and durable, or only weak and temporary? Military primacy today comes from weapons quality, not quantity. Each
U.S. military service has dominating weapons not found in the arsenals of other states. The U.S. Air Force will soon have five different kinds of
stealth aircraft in its arsenal, while no other state has even one. U.S. airborne targeting capabilities, built around global positioning system (GPS)
satellites, joint surveillance and target radars, and unmanned aerial vehicles are dominating and unique.1 On land, the U.S. Army has 9,000 M1
Abrams tanks, each with a fire-control system so accurate it can find and destroy a distant enemy tank usually with a single shot. At sea, the U.S.
Navy now deploys Seawolf nuclear submarines, the fastest, quietest, and most heavily armed undersea vessels ever built, plus nine supercarrier
battle groups, each carrying scores of aircraft capable of delivering repeated precision strikes hundreds of miles inland. No other navy has even
one supercarrier group.2 Such weapons are costly to build, and the large relative size of the U.S. economy (22percent of world gross domestic
product [GDP]) plus the even larger U.S. share of global military spending (43 percent of the world total in 2002, at market exchange rates) have
been key to the development and deployment of these forces. Yet economic dominance and spending dominance would not suffice
without knowledge dominance. It is a strong and rapidly growing S&T capacity that has allowed the United States to move far ahead of
would-be competitors by deploying new weapons systems with unmatched science- intensive capabilities.
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                                                               Economy
Economic decline risks massive WMD conflicts and extinction

BEARDEN 2K
[Thomas, (Lt. Col in US Army) “The Unnecessary Energy Crisis”, Free Republic, June 24, p. online /]
History bears out that desperate nations take desperate actions. Prior to the final economic collapse, the stress on nations will have
increased the intensity and number of their conflicts, to the point where the arsenals of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) now possessed
by some 25 nations, are almost certain to be released. As an example, suppose a starving North Korea launches nuclear weapons upon Japan
and South Korea, including U.S. forces there, in a spasmodic suicidal response. Or suppose a desperate China-whose long-range nuclear missiles
(some) can reach the United States-attacks Taiwan. In addition to immediate responses, the mutual treaties involved in such scenarios will
quickly draw other nations into the conflict, escalating it significantly. Strategic nuclear studies have shown for decades that, under such
extreme stress conditions, once a few nukes are launched, adversaries and potential adversaries are then compelled to launch on
perception of preparations by one's adversary. The real legacy of the MAD concept is this side of the MAD coin that is almost never
discussed. Without effective defense, the only chance a nation has to survive at all is to launch immediate full-bore pre-emptive strikes and try to
take out its perceived foes as rapidly and massively as possible. As the studies showed, rapid escalation to full WMD exchange occurs. Today,
a great percent of the WMD arsenals that will be unleashed, are already on site within the United States itself. The resulting great Armageddon
will destroy civilization as we know it, and perhaps most of the biosphere, at least for many decades.
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                                                               Innovation
Slowing tech innovation risks extinction

Heaberlin 2k4
(Scott W., Head of the Nuclear Safety and Technology Applications Product Line at the Pacific Northwest National
Laboratory, managed by Battelle, “A Case for Nuclear-Generated Electricity,”, Battelle Press, 2004, p.33)
Cohen looked at all the various population estimates and concluded that most fell into the range of 4 to 16 billion.
Taking the highest value when researchers offered a range, Cohen calculated a high median of 12 billion and taking the lower part of the range a
low median of 7.7 billion. The good news in this is 12 billion is twice as many people as we have now. The bad news is that the projections for
world population for 2050 are between 7.8 and 12.5 billion. That means we have got no more than 50 years before we exceed the
nominal carrying capacity of the earth. Cohen also offers a qualifying observation by stating the "First Law of Information," which
asserts that 97.6% of all statistics are made up. This helps us appreciate that application of these numbers to real life is subject to a lot of
assumptions and insufficiencies in our understanding of the processes and data. However, we can draw some insights from all of this. What it
comes down to is that if you choose the fully sustainable, non-fossil fuel long-term options with only limited social
integration, the various estimates Cohen looked at give you a number like 1 billion or less people that the earth can
support. That means 5 out of 6 of us have got to go, plus no new babies without an offsetting death. On the other
hand, if you let technology continue to do its thing and perhaps get even better, the picture need not be so bleak. We
haven't made all our farmland as productive as it can be. Remember, the Chinese get twice the food value per hectare as we do in
the United States. There is also a lot of land that would become arable if we could get water to it. And, of course , in case
you need to go back and check the title of this book, there are alternatives to fossil fuels to provide the energy to power that
technology. So given a positive and perhaps optimistic view of technology, we can look to some of the high technology assumption based
studies from Cohen's review. From the semi-credible set of these, we can find estimates from 19 to 157 billion as the number of people the earth
could support with a rough average coming in about 60 billion. This is a good time to be reminded of the First Law of Information. The middle to
lower end of this range, however, might be done without wholesale social reprogramming. Hopefully we would see the improvement in the
quality of life in the developing countries as they industrialize and increase their use of energy. Hopefully, also this would lead to a matching of
the reduction in fertility rates that has been observed in the developed countries, which in turn would lead to an eventual balancing of the human
population. The point to all this is the near-term future of the human race depends on technology. If we turn away from
technology, a very large fraction of the current and future human race will starve. If we just keep on as we are, with our
current level of technology and dependence on fossil fuel resources, in the near term it will be a race between fertility decrease and our ability to
feed ourselves, with, frankly, disaster the slight odds-on bet. In a slightly longer term, dependence on fossil fuels has got to lead to either social
chaos or environmental disaster. There are no other end points to that road. It doesn't go anywhere else. However, if we accept that it is
technology that makes us human, that technology uniquely identifies us as the only animal that can choose its future,
we can choose to live, choose to make it a better world for everyone and all life. This means more and better technology. It
means more efficient technology that is kinder to the planet but also allows humans to support large numbers in a high quality of life. That road is
not easy and has a number of ways to screw up. However, it is a road that can lead to a happier place, a better place.
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                                                               Hegemony
That’s key to hegemony

Khalilzad 95 – Rand Corportation
(Zalmay, “Losing the Moment?” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 2, pg. 84, Spring, Lexis)
The United States is unlikely to preserve its military and technological dominance if the U.S. economy declines
seriously. In such an environment, the domestic economic and political base for global leadership would diminish
and the United States would probably incrementally withdraw from the world, become inward-looking, and abandon
more and more of its external interests. As the United States weakened, others would try to fill the Vacuum. To
sustain and improve its economic strength, the United States must maintain its technological lead in the economic
realm. Its success will depend on the choices it makes. In the past, developments such as the agricultural and industrial revolutions produced
fundamental changes positively affecting the relative position of those who were able to take advantage of them and negatively affecting those
who did not. Some argue that the world may be at the beginning of another such transformation, which will shift the sources of wealth and the
relative position of classes and nations. If the United States fails to recognize the change and adapt its institutions, its
relative position will necessarily worsen. To remain the preponderant world power, U.S. economic strength must be
enhanced by further improvements in productivity, thus increasing real per capita income; by strengthening education and training; and by
generating and using superior science and technology. In the long run the economic future of the United States will also be affected
by two other factors. One is the imbalance between government revenues and government expenditure. As a society the United States has to
decide what part of the GNP it wishes the government to control and adjust expenditures and taxation accordingly. The second, which is even
more important to U.S. economic wall-being over the long run, may be the overall rate of investment. Although their government cannot endow
Americans with a Japanese-style propensity to save, it can use tax policy to raise the savings rate.

Nuclear war
Khalilzhad 95
(Zalmay, “Losing the Moment?” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 2, pg. 84, Spring, Lexis)
Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival
or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is
desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the
global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a
world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear
proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help
preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or
hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive
to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.
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                             2AC Israel/Iran Add-on (Missile Defense)
     A) Space weaponization is key to prevent Israel and Iran strikes

Dolman and Cooper 2k11
(Everett, PhD and Professor of Comparative Military Studies @ US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space
Studies and Recipient of Central Intelligence’s Outstanding Intelligence Analyst Award, and Henry, PhD and
Former Deputy for the Strategic and Space Systems, “Chapter 19: Increasing the Military Uses of Space,” Part of
“Toward a Theory of Spacepower,” Edited by Charles Lutes and Peter Hays, National Defense University Press,
http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/spacepower/spacepower.pdf)
Today, a massive exchange is less likely than at any period of the Cold War, in part because of significant reductions in the primary nations'
nuclear arsenals. The most likely and most dangerous threat comes from a single or limited missile launch, and from
sources that are unlikely to be either rational or predictable. The first is an accidental launch, a threat we avoided making
protections against due to the potentially destabilizing effect on the precarious Cold War balance. That an accidental launch, by definition
undeterrable, would today hit its target is almost incomprehensible. More likely than an accidental launch is the intentional launch
of one or a few missiles, either by a nonstate actor (a terrorist or "rogue boat captain" as the scenario was described in the early 1980s) or a
rogue state attempting to maximize damage as a prelude to broader conflict. This is especially likely in the
underdeveloped theories pertaining to deterring third-party states. The United States can do nothing today to prevent India from
launching a nuclear attack against Pakistan (or vice versa) except threaten retaliation. If Iran should launch a nuclear missile at
Israel, or in a preemptory strike Israel should attempt the reverse, America and the world could only sit back and
watch, hoping that a potentially world-destroying conflict did not spin out of control. When President Reagan announced his
desire for a missile shield in 1983, critics pointed out that even if a 99-percent-reliable defense from space could be achieved, a 10,000warhead
salvo by the Soviet Union still allowed for the detonation of 100 nuclear bombs in American cities—and both we and the Soviets had enough
missiles to make such an attack plausible. But if a single missile were launched out of the blue from deep within the Asian landmass
today, for whatever reason, a space-based missile defense system with 99-percent reliability would be a godsend. And if a
U.S. space defense could intercept a single Scud missile launched by terrorists from a ship near America's coasts before it detonated a nuclear
warhead 100 miles up—creating an electromagnetic pulse that shuts down America's powergrid, halts America's banking and commerce, and
reduces the battlefield for America's military to third world status8—it might provide for the very survival of our way of life.
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             ***Extra Space Weapons Work***
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                                          AT: Hardening/Defense CP’s
Defense in space doesn’t work - the US needs offensive capabilities

Smith 11
(M.V., Colonel, PhD in Politics and IR @ University of Reading, Citing Colin Gray, “Chapter 17: Security and
Spacepower, Part of “Toward a Theory of Spacepower,” Edited by Charles Lutes and Peter Hays, National Defense
University Press, http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/spacepower/spacepower.pdf, )
It is often said that defense is the stronger form of warfare. 33 This is not true in space — today. Defending satellites
and their data links is a difficult proposition at best. Satellites are delicate, fragile devices that can easily fall prey to
any number of space weapons that currently exist, such as lasers, radio frequency jamming, brute force weapons, and surface-to-space
missiles with kinetic kill vehicles—many of which are relatively small, mobile systems. While satellites in low Earth orbit are the most
vulnerable to lasers and lofted kinetic kill vehicles, satellites all the way out in the geostationary belt and in highly elliptical orbits share a
universal vulnerability to radio frequency jamming and electromagnetic brute force attacks. Satellites do not need to be physically
destroyed to be rendered ineffective. Satellites are commanded (as applicable) and provide their services to ground stations and users via
the electromagnetic spectrum. Hence, there is a rule: no spectrum means no spacepower. The rapid proliferation of jammers and electronic
intrusion devices around the world in recent years occurred upon recognition of this rule. Defenses to date are paltry at best. An
adversary with robust space denial weapons may be able to negate all friendly space systems in a matter of hours;
therefore, it is imperative for space powers to acquire the ability to find, fix, track, target, and destroy an adversary's space
weapons very quickly. Such systems may reside on land, at sea, in the air, or in space. It will require close coordination with terrestrial
forces to engage them against space weapons at the behest of the space commander.
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                                 2AC Space Development Add-on
    A. Space weaponization is key to keep space open for resource development

Dolman and Cooper 11
(Everett, PhD and Professor of Comparative Military Studies @ US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space
Studies and Recipient of Central Intelligence’s Outstanding Intelligence Analyst Award, and Henry, PhD and
Former Deputy for the Strategic and Space Systems, “Chapter 19: Increasing the Military Uses of Space,” Part of
“Toward a Theory of Spacepower,” Edited by Charles Lutes and Peter Hays, National Defense University Press,
http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/spacepower/spacepower.pdf, )
With great power comes great responsibility. If the United States deploys and uses its military space force in concert with
allies and friends to maintain effective control of space in a way that is perceived as tough, nonarbitrary, and efficient,
adversaries would be discouraged from fielding opposing systems. Should the United States and its allies and friends
use their advantage to police the heavens and allow unhindered peaceful use of space by any and all nations for economic and
scientific development, control of low Earth orbit over time would be viewed as a global asset and a collective good .
In much the same way it has maintained control of the high seas, enforcing international norms of innocent passage and property
rights, the United States could prepare outer space for a long-overdue burst of economic expansion.
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                                                 2AC WMD Add-on
     A. Space-Based BMD Deters CBW and EMP Attacks

The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 2k6
(The Independent Working Group - made up of over 25 Professors, Generals, Ambassadors and Analysts, in
“Missile Defense, the Space Relationship, and the Twenty-First Century: 2007 Report”,
http://www.claremont.org/static/IWGreport.pdf)
Yet there is ample reason for concern. The threat environment confronting the United States in the twenty-first
century differs fundamentally from that of the Cold War. An unprecedented number of international actors have now
acquired – or are seeking to acquire – ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. Rogue states, chief among
them North Korea and Iran, have placed a premium on the acquisition of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons
and the means to deliver them, and are moving rapidly toward that goal. Russia and China, traditional competitors of
the United States, continue to expand the range and sophistication of their strategic arsenals. And a number of
asymmetric threats – including the possibility of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) acquisition by terrorist
groups or the decimation of American critical infrastructure as a result of electromagnetic pulse (EMP) – now pose a
direct threat to the safety and security of the United States. Moreover, the number and sophistication of these threats
are evolving at a pace that no longer allows the luxury of long lead times for the development and deployment of
defenses. In order to address these increasingly complex and multifaceted dangers, the United States must deploy a
system that is capable of comprehensive protection of the American homeland as well as its overseas forces and
its allies from the threat of ballistic missile attack. Over the long term, U.S. defenses also must be able to dissuade
would-be missile possessors from costly investments in missile technologies, and to deter future adversaries from
confronting the United States with WMD or ballistic missiles. Our strategic objective should be to make it
impossible for any adversary to influence U.S. decision-making in times of conflict through the use of ballistic
missiles or WMD blackmail. These priorities necessitate the deployment of a system capable of constant defense
against a wide range of threats in all phases of flight: boost, midcourse, and terminal. A layered system –
encompassing ground-based (area and theater anti-missile assets) and sea-based capabilities – would provide
multiple opportunities to destroy incoming missiles in various phases of flight. A truly global capability, however,
cannot be achieved without a missile defense architecture incorporating interdiction capabilities in space as one of
its key operational elements. In the twenty-first century, space has replaced the seas as the ultimate frontier for
commerce, technology and national security. The benefits of space-based defense are manifold. The deployment of a
robust global missile defense that includes space-based interdiction capabilities will make more expensive, and
therefore less attractive, the foreign development of technologies needed to overcome it, particularly with regard to
ballistic missiles. Indeed, the enduring lesson of the ABM Treaty era is that the absence of defenses, rather than their
presence, empowers the development of offensive technologies that can threaten American security and the lives of
American citizens. And access to space, as well as space control, is key to future U.S. efforts to provide
disincentives to an array of actors seeking such power.

     B. Collapses the Economy

Dr. Lambakis 2k7
(Dr. Steven , Senior Defense Analyst at the National Institute for Public Policy, 2007. “Missile Defense from
Space,” http://www.gees.org/documentos/Documen-02177.pdf)
The economy could also be devastated by the electromagnetic pulse generated by a high-altitude nuclear explosion.
The resulting electromagnetic shock would fry transformers within regional electrical power grids. 8 The
interdependent telecommunications (including computers), transportation, and banking and financial infrastructures
that people and businesses rely on would be significantly damaged. Such an event would leave us, in some cases, with
nineteenth-century technologies. This situation could jeopardize the very viability of society and the survival of
the nation. Moreover, the paralysis leaders would experience would leave the country and its allies exposed to highly lethal twenty-first
century threats. The blackmail possibilities of these weapons are as mind-numbing as they are terrifying. A nuclear attack against a major
city could devastate our economy, with the toll rising above $4 trillion .
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                                                                                China Racing Now
And, China is building Satellites for Offensive Manuevers – will catch the U.S. in 2 years
Digital Journal 7/12/2k11
(“China's militarisation of space,” pg lexis//ef)
According to the October edition of Journal of Strategic Studies, a United Kingdom-published defence and security journal; "China's
constellation of satellites is transitioning from the limited ability to collect general strategic information, into a new
era in which it will be able to support tactical operations as they happen," the report said. "China may already be
able to match the United States' ability to image a known, stationary target and will likely surpass it in the flurry of
launches planned for the next two years." "The most immediate and strategically disquieting application [of
reconnaissance satellites] is a targeting and tracking capability in support of the anti-ship ballistic missile,
which could hit US carrier groups," "But China's growing capability in space is not designed to support any single weapon; instead it
is being developed as a dynamic system, applicable to other long-range platforms. With space as the backbone, China will be able to
expand the range of its ability to apply force while preserving its policy of not establishing foreign military bases."
During the 1995-96 Taiwan Straits crisis Beijing realised it could neither track nor respond to US war ships which were dispatched to the straits
after China conducted war games around the self-ruled island state, which China regards as a rebel province, and which it has been at odds with
over a number of years. China has increased its defence budget over the decade and those tracking its projects indicate
that China is not far behind the US and Russia in terms of its technology threshold . China recently unveiled its fifth
generation fighter jet, the Chengdu J-20, which is said to rival the US F-22 Raptor, the only fifth generation fighter jet currently in service.
Intelligence sources say that while the Chengdu is set to go into service somewhere nearing 2018, by that time the US would already be in
development of its sixth generation multiple role fighter jet. China maybe 10 to 15 years behind the US now, but its catching up fast.

And, New Chinese Satellite Tech can knock out our carriers – crushes heg and U.S. Military advantage
Aerospace American March 2k11
(“China's MILITARY SPACE SURGE,” pg nexis//ef)
      China's surging military space program is poised to challenge U.S. aircraft carrier operations
      in the Pacific, as Chinese military spacecraft already gather significant new radar, electrooptical
      imaging, and signal intelligence data globally. During 2010, China more than doubled its
      military satellite launch rate to 12. This compares with three to five military missions launched each year between 2006 and 2009. Since 2006, China has launched about
      30 military related spacecraft. Its total of 15 launches in 2010 set a new record for China and for the first time equaled the U.S. flight rate for a given year. Most U.S. public and media attention has focused on

      China's occasional manned flights and its maturing unmanned lunar program. ButChina's military space surge reveals a program where
      more than half of its spacecraft are like 'wolves in sheep's clothing,' posing a growing threat to
      U.S. Navy operations in the Pacific. India's navy is also concerned. "This is a really big deal. These military
      spacecraft are being launched at a very rapid pace" says Andrew S. Erickson, a Naval War College expert
      on China's naval and space forces. China is becoming a military space power within a global
      context." At least three or four different Chinese military satellite systems are being networked to support China's 1,500 km+ range DF-21D antiship ballistic missile (ASBM) program, say U.S.
      analysts. The DF-21D is being designed to force U.S. Navy aircraft carrier battle groups and other large U.S. allied warships to operate hundreds of miles farther away from China or North Korea than they do

                                                                                                                                                          The new
      today. The ASBM "has undergone repeated tests and has reached initial operational capability," Adm. Robert Willard, commander of the U.S. Pacific Command said recently in Tokyo.

      Chinese space capabilities, combined with development of the DF-21D, are already having an
      effect on the planning of future operations in the Pacific, says Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. "I'm trying to get
      people to think about how do we use aircraft carriers in a world environment where other
      countries [China specifically] will have the capability, between their missile and satellite
      capabilities, to knock out a carrier," Gates said recently at Duke University. "How do you use carriers differently in the future than we've used them in the past?" he
      asked.
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                                                         Now Key Time
And, U.S. Space and Tactical Weapons development is falling behind China – Multiple Indicators prove –
Prefer our Author – he’s done field studies IN CHINA
Fisher 2k11
(Richard, Rick Fisher is a Senior Fellow on Asian Military Affairs. Fisher is a recognized authority on the PRC military and the Asian
military balance and their implications for Asia and the United States, He has performed field research in China, Taiwan, Russia, India
and Pakistan, Fisher has worked on Asian security matters for over 20 years in a range of critical positions -- as Asian Studies Director
at the Heritage Foundation, Senior Analyst for Chairman Chris Cox’s Policy Committee in support of the report of the Select Committee
for US National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China, and a consultant on PLA issues for
the Congressionally chartered US China Security & Economic Review Commission. The author of nearly 200 studies on challenges to
American security, economic and foreign policy in Asia, Fisher is a frequent commentator on Asian issues for radio and television and
has testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the House International Relations Committee, the House Armed Services
Committee, and the U.S. China Security Commission, on the modernization of China’s military, “Too Little, Too Late?,” Defense
Technology International, pg nexis//ef)
Some potential developments are being hinted at. The PLA’s preparations to carry out the new «historic mission» given by the
Chinese Communist Party in December 2004, which includes a mandate to defend the party’s international interests, takes the PLA’s
challenge beyond its increasing A2/AD capabilities in Asia. The beginning of distant activities is seen in the PLA’s deployment of joint-force
packages for exercises in Russia (2008) and Kazakhstan (2010) and its participation in counter-piracy patrols off Somalia since late 2009. In
some cases Washington’s initial A2/AD response is meeting challenges. For example, one counter to the DF-21D 2,000-3,000-km
(1,240-1,865-mi.)-range ASBM has been the Navy’s UCAS-D unmanned combat aerial system program, for which the Northrop-Grumman X-
47B made its first flight on Feb. 2. The X-47B has an initial range of about 2,100 nm., but may not enter the fleet until 2020. On Feb. 20, China’s
Global Times carried a public disclosure that by 2015 the PLA would deploy a new family of 4,000-km intermediate-range ballistic missiles. This
family, the paper said, would carry out offensive missions, likely nuclear and non-nuclear strike, and defensive missions, probably meaning it
will carry improved terminally guided antiship warheads. Chinese sources have referred to future DF-25/26/27 missiles: One
may be the new 4,000-km missile. Future PLA medium- and short-range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles will be
faster and more maneuverable to counter defenses. A new air- and missile-defense interceptor family, sometimes called the HQ-19
(HHQ-26 for the naval version), reportedly has performance goals similar to the 400-km Russian S-400. By the 2020s the U.S. hopes to
resolve technology challenges for deployment of energy weapons. Indicators point to the possibility that the PLA is
not far behind in development of tactical lasers, high-power microwave weapons and rail guns. There is also heavy
Chinese investment in research centers for electromagnetic launch technology, the basis for rail guns,
electromagnetic aircraft catapults and spacecraft launchers. China is working on counter-stealth and counter-
network technology. At IDEX in February (see p. 17), China released details of the meter-wave (VHF) HK-JM and HK-JM2 radars, both
mobile and with detection ranges of 330 and 500 km, respectively. The radars could cue more accurate tracking systems. China
also unveiled the DWL002 ground-based electronic surveillance measure system, which could be deployed as a
passive coherent-location radar, using long-range broadcast signals to detect non-emitting targets. But these newer trends in
Chinese power are not sufficiently reflected in U.S. government documents —like the annual China Military Power
report—that influence debate over strategy and spending priorities. One possible result is that U.S. weapons
timelines will increasingly trail rather than lead PLA developments.
And, China is right behind the U.S. in Technologies Necessary for Space Weapons – they may catch the U.S.
Soon
Aviation Week and Space Technology 4/4/2k11
(“Revolutionary Enough?,” pg lexis//ef)
By the 2020s the U.S. hopes to have resolved science and technology challenges to allow deployment of
directed-energy weapons. However, many indicators point to the possibility that the PLA is not far behind in the
development of tactical lasers, high-power microwave weapons and rail guns. China’s laser research extends to the early
1960s, and informal sources suggest a tactical laser may equip the next class of PLA Navy destroyer. There is also heavy investment in
defense, corporate and academic research centers for electromagnetic launch technology, the basis for rail guns,
electromagnetic aircraft catapults and spacecraft launchers. China is working on counter-stealth and counter-network technology.
At the IDEX show in February, China released details of the meter-wave (VHF) HK-JM and HK-JM2 radars, both mobile and with detection
ranges of 330 and 500 km, respectively. The radars could cue more accurate tracking systems. China has also unveiled the DWL002 ground-
based electronic surveillance measure system, similar to the Czech Vera-E, which could be deployed as a passive coherent-location radar, using
long-range broadcast signals to detect non-emitting targets. China historically has demonstrated little to no interest in
negotiations or agreements that would limit its military power or options . Since the late-1980s Washington has failed to thwart
                                                                                            China’s refusal to
China’s goal of creating loosely controlled nuclear proxies in North Korea, Pakistan and Iran by diplomatic means.
consider useful dialog on its nuclear weapons and space weapon intentions indicates that the country’s broad
military buildup will continue without diplomatic or other external restraint .
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                                                       Taiwan War Risk
And, even if the risk of war is remote, we must plan and develop defensive systems – failure ensures a war
over taiwan
Popular Mechanics 2k10
(“China's Deadliest Game; Any Chinese move to take over taiwan would trigger a confrontation with the U.S.
navy and air force. is the U.S. prepared to counter this growing threat?,” pg lexis//ef)
CHANCES ARE THAT WAR BETWEEN CHINA AND the United States will not happen in 2015, or at any other time.
Under normal circumstances, a war for Taiwan would simply be too costly for either side to wage, especially given the chance of nuclear
escalation. But circumstances are not always normal. "I get criticized often for saying this, but I think Beijing is capable of acting
irrationally when it comes to Taiwan," says retired Rear Adm. Eric McVadon, who served as a naval attaché in
Beijing and is currently senior adviser of Asia-Pacific studies at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis in
Cambridge, Mass. "They are obsessed with Taiwan. On some given day, it's entirely possible for people to be
standing around a table in the Politburo in Beijing, and someone gets the ball rolling. And when it stops, we're at
war." The deciding factor could be anything from domestic unrest in China's increasingly rebellious rural provinces to a spike in aggressive,
vocal Taiwanese nationalism. However, like many Pentagon war games, this notional conflict is not concerned with potential
political triggers, but instead with evaluating China's raw military capabilities. The scenario is based on analyses by civilian
think tanks including RAND Corp., Chinese defense papers and interviews with senior Pentagon officials. The chance of war may be remote, but
the Chinese strategy to deny American access to battlegrounds near China's coasts-and the hardware to pull it off-
certainly exists. Since the Gulf War, the Chinese military has shifted from academic analysis of how to defeat U.S. aircraft carriers in the East
China and South China seas to buying and building the weapons to make the plan a strategic reality. This is not a Cold War-era buildup,
aimed at waging or deterring an apocalyptic last stand. This is a force engineered to win a limited local war-for
example, keeping the United States away long enough to win Taiwan. China's economic boom has allowed its
military to rapidly expand its inventory of cruise missiles, aimed at Taiwan, and multistage ballistic missiles with
enough range to hit much of Asia. The People's Liberation Army has also bought submarines-including at least 12 whisper-quiet diesel-
electric models from Russia-and is developing a large fleet of warplanes. But China's most dangerous new weapon could be an antiship ballistic
missile (ASBM), specifically designed to target a moving aircraft carrier. The United States has 22 carriers. To win a future conflict, China would
not have to destroy every one of them, just the pair that would be available to respond to a fight off China's coast. Senior Pentagon leaders
are becoming increasingly concerned about the Chinese arsenal. Adm. Robert Willard, head of the Navy's Pacific Command, told
Congress in March that "the PLA's continued military advancements sustain a trend of shifting the cross-strait military balance in Beijing's
favor." In June, in a speech at the Asia Society in Washington, D.C., Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, added that he has
"moved from being curious to being genuinely concerned" about the buildup. The man who would face the Chinese in battle, Adm. Patrick
Walsh, the current commander of the U.S. Navy's Pacific Fleet, sees preparation as a way to avoid a future fight. "When we look at these sorts of
developments, such as the ASBM, they are technological developments that we respect, but do not necessarily fear," Walsh says. "The key
element in any sort of deterrent strategy is to make it clear to those who would use a given piece of technology that we have the means to counter
it, and to maintain a technological edge." Right now the Chinese seem to have taken the lead in this new arms race. When
RAND released a report in 2000 describing the potential outcome of a Sino-American conflict over Taiwan, the United States won the war
handily. Nine years later, the nonpartisan think tank revised its analysis, accounting for Beijing's updated air force, its focus on cyber warfare and
its ability to use ballistic missiles to take out American satellites. RAND's new conclusion: The United States would ultimately
lose an air war, and an overall conflict would be more difficult and costly than many had imagined.
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File Title

                                                    AT: PAROS Treaty
Turn: PAROS guts Effective Missile Defense and Guarantees Russia and China an Assymetric Advantage in
Space
Ford 2k10
(Christopher A. Ford, a New Atlantis contributing editor, is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, New
Atlantis, Fall, 2010, “The Trouble with Cyber Arms Control,” pg lexis//ef)
A prime example of this point is the proposal for a treaty for the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS). The
treaty has been advocated for years by Russian and Chinese diplomats in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, and the
United States has since the days of Jimmy Carter consistently refused to enter into discussions about it, although the Obama administration has
now reversed this stance. It is unquestionably true that an anti-satellite war would disproportionately degrade U.S.
military capabilities, especially the ability to project global power . But that threat does not necessarily mean that it is
in our interest to accept these or other prominent proposals for a space arms control treaty. There may be value in
developing agreements on space-related "best practices," perhaps of the sort presently being negotiated under European Union
auspices -- a sort of code of conduct for activities related to space. But not all proposals for space arms control are
being made in good faith, and not all of them would, at least from a U.S. perspective, actually improve the
situation. Most notably, the PAROS proposals that have long been promoted by Russia and China -- which have garnered a
remarkable amount of support from other governments that should know better -- are actually designed to facilitate the Russian
and Chinese capacities to deny the United States access to needed space assets, including limiting our options for
ballistic missile defense. Both Moscow and Beijing have operational ground-based anti-satellite weapons (ASATs), with the
Russians having possessed such weapons for decades and the Chinese having demonstrated their own in 2007. The United States also has a
de facto ASAT capability in its current anti-ballistic missile weaponry, which we demonstrated in 2008 by destroying an errant
U.S. spy satellite before it could cause harm in crashing to Earth. But our potential adversaries are less dependent upon space
assets than we are. This makes ASATs a classically "asymmetric" capability, disproportionately useful against the
American hyperpower. It is no secret, then, why planners in Moscow and Beijing are so interested in ASATs,
and why we worry about their potential capabilities. From the perspective of arms control enthusiasts, our
vulnerability to attacks in space underlines the importance of space arms control . If we are disproportionately vulnerable,
after all, why not try to limit or ban space-based weapons? This analysis is not wrong, as far as it goes. But it is not at all clear that an
agreement could be crafted that would actually help. Indeed, it could be argued that the Russian and Chinese
PAROS proposals themselves represent tools of asymmetric conflict, because their ban on weapons "in outer
space" would pointedly leave unregulated the ground-based ASAT systems Russia and China possess -- all while
prohibiting any potential future deployment of an American capability those countries do not wish us to have:
space-based defenses against ballistic missiles. Nor is it clear that an alternative effort to control or prohibit all anti-satellite
technologies would be feasible, enforceable, or even desirable.
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                                            China Developing Space Weapons Now
And, China is speeding its development and deployment of space weapons and communication jammers
UPI 2/8/2k11
(“U.S. wary of China space weapons,” pg lexis//ef)
      Senior Pentagon officials are sounding concern over China's development of weapons designed
      to shoot down satellites or jam communication signals. U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense for Space Policy Gregory Schulte said China's
      project was becoming a "matter of concern" for the United States. Space, he told defense and intelligence officials while unveiling a 10-year
      strategy for security in space, "is no longer the preserves of the United States and the Soviet Union, at the time in which we could operate with impunity." "There are more

      competitors, more countries that are launching satellites ... and we increasingly have to worry
      about countries developing counter-space capabilities that can be used against the peaceful use
      of space." In 2007, China shot an obsolete weather satellite with a ground missile, creating so much space junk that crew members on the International Space Station had to change orbit to avert a
      collision last year. Schulte said in his remarks that U.S. concerns had prompted U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates to seek to include space in stability talks being pursued with the Chinese. The official said

                                         Beijing's counter-space activities include jamming satellite
      China's capabilities were going beyond shooting at spacecraft.

      signals. It is also in the process of developing directed energy weapons that emit a disabling
      burst of energy toward a target rather than firing a projectile at it.

China’s actions don’t match its words – Military documents prove it is developing weapons while it touts
arms control
MaGinnis
(Bob Maginnis Lieutenant Colonel US Army (retired) is an experienced and internationally known expert on
national security and foreign affairs. He currently serves as a national security and foreign affairs analyst, a
senior strategist with the US Army in the Pentagon which is a contracted position with BCP International
Limited, Human Events, pg lexis//ef)
Red Alert: China is sending misleading messages about its massive military buildup . Last week China's Communist regime
published the every-second-year edition of its defense white paper, "China's National Defense in 2010," which claims to promote transparency in
its defense planning and deepen international trust, and asserts that its security policy is defensive in nature. But the paper's messages are not
supported by the facts. Consider five of the many misleading messages imbedded in the 30-page defense white paper.
First, "China attaches great importance to military transparency, " the paper claims. The Pentagon takes issue with that
view in a report, stating, "The limited transparency in China's military and security affairs enhances uncertainty and
increases the potential for misunderstanding and miscalculation." China fails the transparency test by
understating its defense spending. The Pentagon's 2010 report on China's military estimates Beijing's total military-related spending for
2009 was more than $150 billion, but the white paper claims it spent about half that amount, $75.56 billion (495.11 billion RMB). The difference,
according to the Pentagon, is due to the fact that China's defense budget "does not include major categories of expenditure," but the report fails to
identify those categories. China's defense spending increased annually for more than two decades, but the white paper
states, "The growth rate of defense expenditure has decreased." That statement is refuted by China's official 2011
defense budget, which is $92 billion, up 12.7% from 2010, which grew from 7.5% during the previous year. The
Pentagon report also states China isn't transparent regarding its growing force-projection capabilities. For example, the
so-called transparent white paper does not mention Beijing's plan to deploy an aircraft carrier known to be under construction. A question about
the carrier was posed at the press conference announcing the white paper, but was never answered. Second, "The Chinese government has
advocated from the outset the peaceful use of outer space, and opposes any weaponization of outer space," according
to the white paper. China's anti-space weaponization view hasn't stopped it from developing its own space weapon,
however. The white paper makes no mention of China's 2007 successful direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons test,
which destroyed its own satellite in space. "The test raised questions about China's capability and intention to attack U.S. satellites," according to
a Congressional Research Service (CRS) report. The Pentagon's report states, "China continues to develop and refine this [ASAT] system,
which is one component of a multidimensional program to limit or prevent the use of space-based assets by potential
adversaries during times of crisis or conflict." The report also indicates China is developing kinetic and directed-energy
weapons for ASAT missions. Gen. Xu Qiliang, commander of China's air force, appears to confirm the Pentagon's analysis. He
said in 2009 that military competition extending to space is "inevitable " and emphasized the transformation of
China's air force into one that "integrates air and space" with both "offensive [read ASAT] and defensive" capabilities,
according to the Pentagon's report. Third, "China firmly opposes the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction [WMD] and their means of
delivery." The paper also states "nonproliferation issues should be resolved through political and diplomatic means" and then cites as examples
the nuclear crises with North Korea and Iran . Even though China is a signatory to various nonproliferation treaties, it is
arguably the world's biggest WMD supplier. A March 2011 CRS report states, "China has been a 'key supplier' of technology ...
providing nuclear and missile-related technology to Pakistan and missile-related technology to Iran ." CRS documents China's
proliferation activities beginning in 1982. It transferred sensitive material and tools for making atomic bombs to Pakistan such as uranium
SDI 11
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hexafluoride gas, ring magnets, and "high-tech diagnostic equipment." Pakistan then sold that technology to Iran, North Korea, and Libya,
according to then- CIA Director George Tenet. Fourth, "China pursues a national defense policy which is defensive in nature." The white paper
also claims, "China unswervingly takes the road of peaceful development." But China's weapons-building spree confirms it seeks a significant
offensive capacity, and its military action identifies it as a regional hegemon, not a peaceful neighbor. Three weapons platforms strongly suggest
China seeks a robust offensive capacity. In January, while Secretary of Defense Robert Gates visited Beijing, the Chinese military tested a J-20
fifth-generation stealth fighter. That sophisticated platform is primarily for undetected, long-range offensive operations and shares state-of-the-art
technology with the F-22 Raptor, America's best fighter. In December, Adm. Robert Willard, the commander of U.S. Pacific Command, told the
Asahi Shimbun, a Japanese newspaper, China is developing an anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) known as an "aircraft carrier killer." The 1,500-
mile range DF-21 ASBM is an offensive platform that uses a space-based maritime surveillance and targeting system that permits it to strike
moving warships at sea. China also plans to build a fleet of aircraft carriers this decade, according to the Pentagon report. It already has the ex-
Varyag--a former soviet Kuznetsovclass aircraft carrier in the Dalian shipyard--and a program to train pilots operating fixed-wing aircraft from a
carrier. China is using its sophisticated blue-water navy, which numbers 260 vessels, including 75 major warships and more than 60 submarines,
to expand its sphere of influence through intimidation, especially in the South China Sea, which some Chinese officials label a "core interest."
Last year, the New York Times reported Chinese officials told Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg that China would not tolerate "foreign
interference" in the South China Sea, and its actions back up that view. China's navy aggressively seizes fishing boats near contested South China
Sea islands hundreds of miles from the mainland and harasses Japanese aircraft and ships in the East China Sea near Japanese islands. That
aggression is not limited to regional players, however. Starting in 2000, China became provocative toward American naval forces. In 2001, a
Chinese fighter collided with a U.S. Navy aircraft, forcing the American crew to land at China's Hainan Island. Harassment on the sea is more
common. From 2001 to 2009, Chinese warships and aircraft harassed and threatened the USNS Bowditch, USNS Sumner, USNS Impeccable,
and the USNS Victorious. In 2006, a Chinese Song-class submarine surfaced dangerously near the aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk. In each case,
China violated international law. Finally, "China maintains that the global missile defense program will be detrimental to international strategic
balance and stability [and] no state should deploy overseas missile defense systems [ballistic missile defense] ..." This hypocritical comment is
targeted at the U.S., which has both land- and sea-based systems. America's sea-based Aeigis ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems often sail
near North Korea's coast, protecting our allies from China's rogue partner. Apparently China wants to limit America's BMD capability until it can
acquire one of its own. Currently China has a limited capability against tactical ballistic missiles with ranges up to 300 miles. But the Pentagon
report states China is "proceeding with the research and development of a missile defense 'umbrella' consisting of kinetic energy intercept at exo-
atmospheric altitudes, as well as intercepts of ballistic missiles and other aerospace vehicles within the upper atmosphere." China's 2010 white
paper is chock-full of misleading messages that deny transparency, promote distrust, and demonstrate the regime's hegemonic ambitions. Unless
China changes its actions, America has no choice but to conclude Beijing's intent is to become the world's dominant military power.
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             AT: Code of Conduct CP
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                                               2AC Orbital Debris D.A.
Turn: Orbital Debris Tracking

A. Code of Conduct Limits it

Washington Times 2/8/2k11
(“Report calls for restraints in space activity; Critics highlight Pentagon limits,” pg lexis//ef)
The Obama administration is working on setting up international rules for space launches and satellite operations that
critics say will limit the Pentagon's ability to deploy military systems to protect satellites from space weapons being developed by nations such as
China. According to a strategy report produced jointly by U.S. intelligence agencies and the Defense Department, the administration is seeking
"responsible" rules for space operations. The National Security Space Strategy (NSSS), made public Friday, states that "the United States will
support development of data standards, best practices, transparency and confidence-building measures, and norms of behavior for responsible
space operations." "We believe setting pragmatic guidelines for safe activity in space can help avoid collisions and other debris-producing events,
reduce radio frequency interference, and promote security and stability in the space domain - all of which are in the interests of all nations," the
14-page report states. The administration has signaled that it is preparing to accept the European Union's draft Code of Conduct for Outer Space
Activities with minimal changes to the document. An administration interagency review concluded last month that the code of conduct - aimed at
reducing the amount of space debris that could collide into satellites - would not damage U.S. national interests in space or limit research and
development into classified programs. The United States and France are expected Tuesday to sign a bilateral agreement to share data on space
debris. Peter Marquez, who served as National Security Council director of space policy for President George W. Bush and for President Obama
until Sept. 29, raised concerns about the U.S. strategy. He said it could lead other states to set limits on U.S. defenses in space. "Implementation
of the space strategy is going to be key. International norms could unintentionally limit U.S. deployment and
development of satellites that track orbital debris and other satellites in space," he said. "It leaves open the door also for
the United States to be forced to disclose the nature of its intelligence collection activities and capabilities from orbit."

B. More debris kill will destroy our satellites- they are key to hegemony and readiness

Imburgia 11
(Lieutenant Colonel Joseph S. Imburgia, (B.S., United States Air Force Academy (1994); J.D., University of Tennessee College
of Law (2002); LL.M., The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center & School, U.S. Army, Charlottesville, Va. (2009)) is a Judge
Advocate in the United States Air Force and is presently assigned as a legal exchange officer to the Directorate of Operations and
International Law, Defence Legal, Australian Defence Force, Canberra, Australia. He is a member of the Tennessee and the
Supreme Court of the United States bars, and he is a member of the Australian and New Zealand Society of International Law.
Prior to becoming a Judge Advocate, Lieutenant Colonel Imburgia was a Targeting Officer, United States Strategic Command,
Offutt Air Force Base, Neb., “ Space Debris and Its Threat to National Security: A Proposal for a Binding International
Agreement to Clean Up the Junk”)
These gloomy prognostications about the threats to our space environment should be troubling to Americans. The United States relies on
the unhindered use of outer space for national security.151 According to a space commission led by former Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld, “[t]he [United States] is more dependent on space than any other nation.”152 According to Robert G. Joseph,
former Undersecretary for Arms Control and International Security at the State Department, “ space capabilities are vital to our national
security and to our economic well-being.”153 Therefore, a catastrophic collision between space debris and the satellites
on which that national security so heavily depends poses a very real and current threat to the national security
interests of the United States. Since “the [1991] Gulf War, the [United States] military has depended on satellites for
communications, intelligence and navigation for its troops and precision-guided weapons.”154 Satellites are also used
for reconnaissance and surveillance, command and control, and control of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles.155
According to the United States Space Command’s Fact Sheet: Satellites provide essential in-theater secure
communications, weather and navigational data for ground, air and fleet operations and threat warning. Ground-
based radar and Defense Support Program satellites monitor ballistic missile launches around the world to guard
against a surprise missile attack on North America. Space surveillance radars provide vital information on the
location of satellites and space debris for the nation and the world. Maintaining space superiority is an emerging
capability required to protect our space assets. With the modern speed of warfare, it has become difficult to fight conflicts without the
timely intelligence and information that space assets provide. Space-based assets and space-controlled assets have created among U.S. military
commanders “a nearly insatiable desire for live video surveillance, especially as provided from remotely piloted vehicles like the Predator and
now the Reaper.”157 Moreover, military forces have become so dependent on satellite communications and targeting capabilities that the loss of
such a satellite would “badly damage their ability to respond to a military emergency.”158 In fact, the May 2008 malfunction of a
communications satellite demonstrates the fragile nature of the satellite communications system.159 The temporary loss of a single satellite
“effectively pulled the plug on what executives said could [have been] as much as 90 percent of the paging network in the United States.”160
Although this country’s paging network is perhaps not vital to its national security, the incident demonstrates the possible national security risks
created by the simultaneous loss of multiple satellites due to space debris collisions.
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                                 Code of Conduct links to Ptix
And, the code of conduct is unpopular with Republicans – links to Ptix

Washington Times 2/8/2k11
(“Report calls for restraints in space activity; Critics highlight Pentagon limits,” pg lexis//ef)
Republicans, meanwhile, question the administration's intentions to sign on to the EU code of conduct. "We are
deeply concerned that the administration may sign the United States on to a multilateral commitment with a
multitude of potential[ly] highly damaging implications for sensitive military and intelligence programs (current,
planned or otherwise) as well as a tremendous amount of commercial activity," 37 Republican senators said in a
letter to Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton. Among those who signed the letter were Senate Minority
Leader Mitch McConnell of Kentucky and Senate Minority Whip Jon Kyl of Arizona. The lawmakers asked what
impact the code of conduct would have on "the research and development, testing and deployment of a kinetic
defensive system in outer space that is capable of defeating an anti-satellite weapon, such as the one tested by the
People's Republic of China in 2007."
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             Neg
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                                                        Code of Conduct
CP Solves – Classified Activities can continue
Washington Times 2/8/2k11
(“Report calls for restraints in space activity; Critics highlight Pentagon limits,” pg lexis//ef)
The Obama administration is working on setting up international rules for space launches and satellite operations that
critics say will limit the Pentagon's ability to deploy military systems to protect satellites from space weapons being developed by nations such as
China. According to a strategy report produced jointly by U.S. intelligence agencies and the Defense Department, the administration is seeking
"responsible" rules for space operations. The National Security Space Strategy (NSSS), made public Friday, states that "the United States will
support development of data standards, best practices, transparency and confidence-building measures, and norms of behavior for responsible
space operations." "We believe setting pragmatic guidelines for safe activity in space can help avoid collisions and other debris-producing events,
reduce radio frequency interference, and promote security and stability in the space domain - all of which are in the interests of all nations," the
14-page report states. The administration has signaled that it is preparing to accept the European Union's draft Code of
Conduct for Outer Space Activities with minimal changes to the document. An administration interagency review concluded last
month that the code of conduct - aimed at reducing the amount of space debris that could collide into satellites - would
not damage U.S. national interests in space or limit research and development into classified programs . The
United States and France are expected Tuesday to sign a bilateral agreement to share data on space debris. Peter Marquez, who served as National
Security Council director of space policy for President George W. Bush and for President Obama until Sept. 29, raised concerns about the U.S.
strategy. He said it could lead other states to set limits on U.S. defenses in space. "Implementation of the space strategy is going to
be key. International norms could unintentionally limit U.S. deployment and development of satellites that track orbital debris and other
satellites in space," he said. "It leaves open the door also for the United States to be forced to disclose the nature of its intelligence collection
activities and capabilities from orbit." Rick Fisher, a senior fellow at the International Assessment and Strategy Center, said the strategy fails
because it does not adequately account for the Chinese threat to U.S. satellites. "One gets the impression from this document that the Obama
administration simply wants to ignore the Chinese threat in hopes it will just go away," he said. "There is apparently no consideration of
developing U.S. active defenses for space that would more effectively deter China." The Pentagon has worried about space-based debris for
years. However, those concerns increased in 2007 when the Chinese military tested a ground-based anti-satellite missile that successfully
destroyed a weather satellite, creating tens of thousands of pieces of debris. Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte, the deputy assistant secretary of
defense for space policy, told reporters Friday at a Pentagon briefing that the debris created by the Chinese missile test in space is still a problem.
"A good amount of the debris up in space is actually from the weather satellite that they struck," Mr. Schulte said. "And there have been any
number of times when we've had to maneuver, for example, the International Space Station to avoid debris from this weather satellite." "The
investment that China is putting into counterspace capabilities is a matter of concern for us," he added. "It's part of the reason why the secretary
of defense wants to talk about space as part of the stability dialogue with the Chinese." In recent months, the United States has reached out to the
Russian and Chinese governments to discuss rules for launching and maintaining satellites, said U.S. officials familiar with the diplomacy. The
Chinese have spurned offers to discuss space issues with the United States, while the Russians have started technical talks. At the Friday briefing,
Deputy Secretary of Defense William J. Lynn III said the Pentagon embraced international norms for space because space has become more
"competitive" and the risk for creating space debris that would collide into satellites has increased as well. "We thought we needed a multilayered
approach to deterrence that involved international norms, involved partnerships with allied nations, so as to induce restraint in space activities,"
he said. The strategy also asserts that the United States retains the right to self-defense in space. It says, "The
United States will retain the right and capabilities to respond in self-defense should deterrence fail. We will use force in a
manner that is consistent with long-standing principles of international law, treaties to which the United States is a party, and the inherent right of
self-defense." Republicans, meanwhile, question the administration's intentions to sign on to the EU code of conduct. "We are deeply concerned
that the administration may sign the United States on to a multilateral commitment with a multitude of potential[ly] highly damaging implications
for sensitive military and intelligence programs (current, planned or otherwise) as well as a tremendous amount of commercial activity," 37
Republican senators said in a letter to Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton. Among those who signed the letter were Senate Minority
Leader Mitch McConnell of Kentucky and Senate Minority Whip Jon Kyl of Arizona. The lawmakers asked what impact the code of conduct
would have on "the research and development, testing and deployment of a kinetic defensive system in outer space that is capable of defeating an
anti-satellite weapon, such as the one tested by the People's Republic of China in 2007." Proponents of the EU code of conduct praise the
agreement as a way of minimizing space debris that can disable intelligence, military and commercial satellites. The code of conduct is also an
alternative to a space arms-control treaty supported by China and Russia that the Obama and Bush administrations have opposed as being
unverifiable and counter to the U.S. national interest.
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