26 MAY 1999 by S2eyq9k

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									                                The Combined Joint Civil-Military Task Force
                                            NGO Support Team
               CIMIC Information Centre, Kasarna Marsal Tito, Zmaja od Bosne, 71000 Sarajevo, BiH (071)667.523, fax 667.524



                                                                                                       05 December 1999

                      SUCCESS IN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS REQUIRES
                            CIVIL-MILITARY CO-OPERATION
                                             By
                               Major Anthony D. Sinnott, USMC


INTRODUCTION

The Case for Change
         Peacekeeping has become in recent years the chief demand for military action from the United
States, and, given the dynamics in international power structures, US involvement in peacekeeping, as
international intervention, is likely to increase as an important use of military power to support
national strategic objectives. In order to be successful leaders in contemporary peacekeeping
scenarios, military leaders must leverage civil-military co-operation. For most traditional military
thinkers, this will require something of a paradigm shift. Peacekeeping is not warfighting, and civil
affairs in the conceptual framework of peacekeeping does not fit into the historic models taught in our
service schools. Yet, commanders who understand what it means to have civil-military co-operation,
and are predisposed to use it, will soon realize how essential it is for peacekeeping work.

        Civil-military co-operation (CIMIC) is one of the most powerful new concepts for military
thinkers and leaders to master as a pre-requisite for successful decision-making in the peacekeeping
arena. Civil-military co-operation allows top level decision-makers to leverage the comparative
advantages of military organizations together with civilian and governmental humanitarian and
development organizations. This co-operation has synergistic effect. In the face of competing
demands on scarce resources in peacekeeping scenarios, experienced leaders in military, government,
and non-government positions are keen to build this functional capability into their organizations.

        The impetus for intervention arises from arrays of international political agreements, economic
and cultural linkages, together with western public valuation of human rights as superseding national
sovereignty. With recent experience in the Balkans as precedent, this is unlikely to diminish but will
increase as a function of more coercive intervention policies. Thus the growing need for a responsive,
adaptive, and sophisticated civil affairs capacity in the armed forces of the United States as well as the
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). As a new area of military thinking, the strategic,
operational, and tactical dimensions of civil-military co-operation remain in the stages of fundamental
development. Success in all these levels is fully dependent upon our conceptual foundations. The
underlying concepts will guide the development of practical operational planning and efficient tactical
execution. CIMIC enables leaders to embrace the principles of economy of forces and mass in
peacekeeping, and it ranks high as a necessary element of planning and execution.

        CIMIC has become a common term in NATO lexicon. Here I will explain some of the
fundamental principles of CIMIC in peacekeeping operations. I will also illustrate through some of
the successful applications of these ideas we have realized in the Balkan theatre.


PEACEKEEPING AND CIVIL-MILITARY CO-OPERATION

A New Conceptual Framework
         We can conceive at least five phases of peacekeeping relative to the status of conflict: pre-
conflict vigil, armed conflict, post-conflict crisis, post-conflict stabilization, and post-conflict vigil.
Seen as a continuum, the military dimension rises and falls from the forefront inversely to the civil


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                                The Combined Joint Civil-Military Task Force
                                            NGO Support Team
               CIMIC Information Centre, Kasarna Marsal Tito, Zmaja od Bosne, 71000 Sarajevo, BiH (071)667.523, fax 667.524



dimension. This inverse relationship means that as we move from conflict toward peaceful conditions,
there is a shift in resources for action from military and government sources to civilian and non-
government sources, and vice versa. The activity that eases the process of this transfer is civil-military
co-operation. Civil-military co-operation (known as CIMIC in the NATO jargon) is an operational
aspect of civil affairs theory that implies a partnering of active roles for the military with organizations
of government and civil-society in a common mission. As peacekeeping evolves as a viable and
necessary military capability, we require an improved, robust framework for thinking and acting in a
co-operative role with government agencies, non-governmental organizations, and international
organizations.

Developing a Theory of Civil-military Co-operation
         I wish to offer a new strategic paradigm for military decision-makers in peacekeeping
missions that is based upon a process of information, analysis, decision, and action that addresses civil
implementation in a post-conflict environment. This conceptual framework poses significant contrasts
in information requirements, objectives and missions, staff functions and relationships, and
measurement of success when compared to those that drive military decisions and execution in armed
conflict. Nonetheless, the system required to produce information inputs for decisions is very much
the same in each instance. When military leaders recognize and act on the need for this change, they
can produce effective and efficient results by leveraging their military organization’s comparative
advantages to become an indispensable partner for humanitarian and government organizations who
share the theatre (collectively referred to as “the international community”). Inherent advantages lie in
their information network, low-cost technical resources, logistics network and lift capacity, and
organizational responsiveness. Adaptive commanders can leverage these advantages in order to
positively influence and strengthen the activities of the international community.

        Although the theory of land war is not applicable in a direct and literal sense to the theory of
civil-military co-operation (i.e. civil-affairs), there are important parallels. In extended peacekeeping
or peace-stabilization missions, as with other types of missions, it is essential to remain focused on the
intended end-state rather than doctrinal prescriptions. This implies flexibility in decision-making
based upon the realities of the unique situation. We are still coming to terms with how we can best
employ our military strength in the role of civil-military co-operation for peacekeeping. It is evident
to everyone with first-hand experience that some improvements can be made. Yet, the basic analytical
techniques, decision support structures, and framework for military planning and resource allocation
can be used effectively in the context of a new approach to strategic and operational leadership in
peace-keeping. Top leadership must recognize the need for flexibility in their thinking about their
theory of operation in order to re-direct their organizational apparatus and realize the same
effectiveness in the aftermath of armed conflict as they may have enjoyed in battlefield situations.

New Situations Call for New Thinking
         The post-conflict environment we have been experiencing in the Balkans is different in
fundamental ways to historical precedent. Because of this, the international community is still coming
to terms with the how best to utilize the mix of military and civilian resources available to cope with
such crises of armed conflict. In order for military commanders to be effective in crisis intervention in
scenarios like the Balkans, they must embrace a new way of thinking about the role and method of
employment of their military power. The classic model of the civil affairs mission is centered on the
idea of reducing interference in the mission of the combatant commander from civilian activities that
result from war. Commonly, civil affairs specialists are trained to advise on subjects such as
managing refugee movement and targeting dilemmas (e.g., when the enemy takes a position in a
religious landmark or national museum). Nowadays, military power is employed in an extrapolated
post-conflict scenario where show-of-force is necessary to preserve basic peaceful conditions. This is
not an unusual application of military power. But the role of the military as an agent for
reconstruction and development is not yet codified. One key factor that will also lead to improved


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                                The Combined Joint Civil-Military Task Force
                                            NGO Support Team
               CIMIC Information Centre, Kasarna Marsal Tito, Zmaja od Bosne, 71000 Sarajevo, BiH (071)667.523, fax 667.524



utilization of military capacities in peacekeeping is a better understanding of the opportunities
presented by the relationship between top military leadership and the civilian chief of mission.

New Decision Support Requirements
         The sort of information necessary to drive good decisions in a post-conflict mission of
reconstruction and development are very different from those required for combat decisions. The level
of sophistication and detail are also different. Much of the in-depth analysis will come from civilian
sources. This becomes clear when we realize that effective reconstruction and development decisions
require and understanding of the socio-economic situation within the area of responsibility (AOR).
Civil affairs specialists are best used as the liaison to the civilian analysts and agencies that produce
this sort of sophisticated analysis. They can interpret such information to produce knowledge that is
useful to the combatant commander. The commander, in turn, will need to ask himself where he will
apply his resources to support or compliment the activities of humanitarian relief, infrastructure
reconstruction, and socio-economic development organizations in his AOR. This support will often be
rendered to NGOs who specialize in such work.

New Agent Relations
         This is a very different thought process than the one required for effective battlefield
decisions. Most commanders are not yet comfortable with the idea that they can not exercise
command authority over all resources in their respective AOR. The natural course of military
decision-makers is to review reconnaissance reports and other intelligence products in consultation
with internal staff specialists before issuing instructions to civilians in one’s AOR. Experience shows
us that this will lead to frustration. In peace-keeping operations, the post-conflict reality is that most
of the organizations working to help civilian populations recover from war, or armed conflict short of
war, will not fall under the authority of the combatant commander. They generally enjoy freedom of
movement and activity within international legal limits. Even marshal law may not alter this
relationship. Rather, these non-governmental and international organizations will fall under the
authority of their donors (i.e., governments) and such monitoring missions of the international
community as may be in the AOR such as the European Commission Monitoring Mission (ECMM).
Once a commander recognizes this reality, he can have an effective approach to dealing with these
agencies. With a common understanding of the positive contribution of NGOs and a co-operative
climate of command military units can become viable partners in the reconstruction and development
effort. Military leaders can leverage significant operational advantages by adapting their
organizational functions to address questions that are relevant to civil-military co-operation decisions.

New Objectives and New Decision Parameters
         Extended civil affairs missions as we see in the aftermath of conflict in the Balkans call for
new objectives. These are intangible objectives that sometimes defy specific definition. Commanders
must be prepared to accept nebulous directives such as “develop conditions conducive to spontaneous
return of refugees and the peaceful return of displaced persons to their desired homelands.” This is a
hypothetical example, but not too far from the reality we have experienced recently. As with combat
missions, there are implications in such a mission. We can deduce that refugees will want to return
home when things are peaceful, there is little threat to their persons or property, they can find a
reasonable way to earn a living, and their children can return to school, etc. This leads us to the
implicit tasks of restoring law and order as well as basic infrastructure, but it also implies that the local
economy and supporting institutions must have some level of self-sustained functioning. This is a
larger task that requires resources beyond the military. In these situations, the lead organizations are
those that specialize in reconstruction and development. The civilian chief of mission assumes a
greater leadership role, and the intervening military necessarily moves to a supporting role.

         Within the new paradigm, the reconnaissance assets are required to gather bits of information
that are seldom if ever considered in military reconnaissance reports. For example, their field


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                                The Combined Joint Civil-Military Task Force
                                            NGO Support Team
               CIMIC Information Centre, Kasarna Marsal Tito, Zmaja od Bosne, 71000 Sarajevo, BiH (071)667.523, fax 667.524



missions might include assessing the level of basic infrastructure support for the local population (e.g.
water supply, sewerage, power supply, sustenance, health care capacity, or political climate). The
intelligence section would process this sort of report into a useable information product. Meanwhile,
the planning cell or operations section would generate a situation analysis (e.g., as regards
reconstruction and development progress or political compliance with international law) in areas of
interest to the commander. Covering the land situation in Bosna i Hercegovina (BiH), one could
expect the planning cell to prepare a situation analysis that explains the status of industrial activity and
agrarian economy in BiH relative to their pre-war conditions. We would also expect a status report
that includes an assessment of compliance with the terms and conditions of the General Framework
Agreement for Peace (such as acceptance of refugees into their original homelands). The essential
elements of information would help decision-makers to learn such things as where resources are
needed to rebuild the economy and what decisions are needed to enforce or encourage freedom of
movement and property rights. In BiH, we would need to learn where the idle, damaged or destroyed
factories lie. We need knowledge on variables like employment, output tonnage, sales volume, tax
generation, raw materials requirements, power usage, water supply and evacuation, mines and booby-
trap obstacles, etc. We would also be interested in determining the level and magnitude of corruption
in public offices and bureaucracies and the implicit power structures that influence public resources
and policies. Reconstruction efforts can not be organized until decision-makers that control resources
understand the potential beneficial impact that reparations might have. They will need to learn how
many people might be employed if facilities were to be renovated with more modern equipment, for
instance. In the Balkans, they might also want to determine how many of the potential employees
would be formerly displaced persons or refugees (DPRE). It is also essential for leaders to be aware
of the economic and social relationships with neighboring countries within the AOI.

         This kind of information product is most helpful when it is also offered to humanitarian
organizations and government agencies. Normally, the leaders of governmental (GO), non-
governmental organizations (NGO), and international organizations (IO) will be devoting their
resources where they will render the most benefit. In order to help influence these efforts, military
leaders need to have specialized, relevant information and analysis to support their conclusions and
recommendations. Otherwise, we can only offer them conjecture or naïve opinion. Conversely,
military leaders need this sort of sophisticated analysis as the basis of their own decisions about where
and how to use their own resources. The type of resources we are considering here might be field-
engineering units but definitely include intellectual assets of civil engineers, water treatment
specialists, physicians, veterinarians, attorneys, educators, and business minds that typically populate
civil affairs units. Furthermore, good information can help civil affairs specialists to generate useful
recommendations for the combatant commander in directing the combat resources at his disposal for
improving security and safety.

       In the peacekeeping operational environment, military leaders are most effective when their
own organizations are prepared to accept and handle information from civilian sources involved in
humanitarian work. In the Balkans, some of these sources have included the World Bank, the US
Agency for International Development (USAID), the International Management Group (IMG), and the
United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR).


CIMIC AS APPLIED IN THE BALKANS

Dimensions of the Stabilization Force Mission
        The mission of the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Hercegovina is to support the
implementation of the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) as agreed in Dayton, Ohio,
in 1995. This mission can be summarized as twofold. Firstly it is to implement the military
dimensions of the GFAP (also known as the Dayton Accord) and secondly to accelerate the


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                                 The Combined Joint Civil-Military Task Force
                                             NGO Support Team
                CIMIC Information Centre, Kasarna Marsal Tito, Zmaja od Bosne, 71000 Sarajevo, BiH (071)667.523, fax 667.524



implementation of the civil dimensions of GFAP with resources provided by the troop committing
nations (TCN) within the coalition.

         The BiH scenario is vastly different from other transitional economies of Eastern Europe. In
those countries (e.g. Poland, Hungary, Romania), there was no significant military dimension to the
problem but only the civil dimension. In BiH we have both. So the first responsibility of FSOR is
basic safety and security. The second role is to support the civil-implementers of GFAP within the
limits imposed by GFAP with whatever resources are available when not actively devoted to the
military mission. In the event, SFOR becomes a proxy civil-implementer itself.

        It is important to note that the underlying theme of the GFAP is to create the conditions
conducive to heal the nation, and a salient goal is to encourage the voluntary repatriation of refugees.
This means their homeland has to be attractive to them as a final destination. It has to at least offer the
opportunity to enjoy a rising standard of living in a place secure from any gross threat to life, liberty,
or property.

Task Organizing for the BiH Mission
         To the second mission thrust of civil-implementation a task force has been organized as a
headquarters element that reports, by way of various chiefs and deputy chiefs of staff, to the
commander of SFOR. This is somewhat redundant with another headquarters staff section known as
CJ-9 (Civil Operations), but there are no major difficulties as a result. The Combined-Joint Civil-
Military Co-operation Task Force (CJCMTF or CIMIC Task Force) holds most of the liaison officers
between the military and civilian hierarchies and, more importantly, several cadres of technical subject
matter experts. These are comprised of small groups of attorneys, veterinarians, physicians,
businessmen, educators, and engineers (civil, construction, mining, water treatment, etc.). Through
these specialists, SFOR can directly or indirectly contribute to the implementation of the Accord as
well as the subsequent mandates of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC). In accelerating the
implementation of GFAP, their duties compel them to write laws, monitor husbandry of donated
livestock, assess reparation and upgrade requirements for industrial or public facilities, develop
business opportunities, or otherwise assist civil-implementers in the international community with
their intellectual capacities. As one NATO general from Germany put it, this is not quite [traditional]
soldiering. However, it is central to the growing field of civil affairs. Furthermore, it demonstrates
the flexibility necessary in the thinking of commanders who wish to see success in peacekeeping
missions of this magnitude.1

         The CJ-9 of SFOR is established to function as the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC),
as we know it in Civil Affairs doctrine. As such, the CJ-9 shop acts much as an ordinary military
operations section might. They monitored various activities in the country (or area of operation),
determining to which aspect of GFAP each activity pertained and how it had been affected, then
finally reporting to the general officers of SFOR on the evolving status of each aspect of the Accord.
What the CJ-9 could not do with any effect is plan activities related to GFAP in advance; they never
had the resources. Important to note is the military has no authority over civilians in the BiH scenario
except where military matters are concerned. The chief value of CJ-9 was found in the information
they produced from all of the bits gathered from monitoring and reconnaissance sources and liaisons
throughout SFOR. They attempted to realize the full potential of this information product by
establishing a liaison office to the civilian international community. This office was the Civil-Military
1
 The war in BiH from 1990 to 1995 was devastating, killing over 250,000 people, displacing over one million
and ruining all major infrastructure in most areas of the country. The reconstruction and relief requirement has
been colossal. Added to this is the development requirement in order to transition from a communist, centrally
controlled economy into a free-market democracy. As of April 1999, there were 454 registered civilian
organizations, both domestic and international, working in humanitarian relief, development, and
democratization in BiH. They sponsored over 2,200 distinct, on-going projects and activities.


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                                The Combined Joint Civil-Military Task Force
                                            NGO Support Team
               CIMIC Information Centre, Kasarna Marsal Tito, Zmaja od Bosne, 71000 Sarajevo, BiH (071)667.523, fax 667.524



Co-operation Information Centre (truncated to CIMIC Information Centre or “CIC”). The CIC acted
as the primary conduit of relevant military information to all organizations that lack a dedicated liaison
officer. But, in fact, they have become a shared resource for both military and civilian decision-
makers by exchanging information with their personal contacts throughout the international
community. Over time, the CIC of SFOR has become the defacto CMOC due to its responsiveness
and easy accessibility for civilians in the area of operations. The exception to this doctrinal model is
the circuitous chain of command and communication that lies between the CIC and the commanding
general. It is not yet an “arm’s length” resource for his decision making. Changes are under way that
may improve this relationship.2 There are many lessons being learned in Bosnia and Hercegovina
today that will improve our peacekeeping effectiveness, just as every battlefield experience generates
the basis for valuable warfighting improvements.

         The lessons being learned in the CIMIC Task Force today should have profound effect on
Civil Affairs doctrinal changes. These changes will strengthen our peacekeeping capacity. With such
capacity, our political leaders can have greater confidence to intervene where crises threaten
international interests or for other legitimate reasons. This may save many lives and significantly
reduce the costs associated with reconstruction and development in the aftermath of hostilities.

Mobilizing Military Assets and Resources for Reconstruction and Development
         There are two main areas where the military can be of primary assistance: physical support
and intellectual support. Physical support is most obvious in disaster relief operations with airlift and
ground transportation support and civil engineering hardware & supplies. Some of these capabilities
are vital to reconstruction operations. Moreover, modern civil-affairs units possess subject matter
expertise in the areas of engineering, public health, veterinary medicine, business & economy,
education, and law that comprise vital operational tools not only for reconstruction and development
but also for more intangible tasks of democratization and privatization in transitional economies.

         The best examples of military success in reconstruction and development result from close
working partnerships among funding organizations, NGOs, and military units. These can be exercised
through formal vehicles such as memorandums of understanding or simple request procedures on a
case by case basis. In Bosnia and Hercegovina, for instance, the British Department for International
Development (DFID) work closely with Multinational Division Southwest units of SFOR while the
US Agency for International Development (USAID) combine efforts with American MND-North
units. Such combinations connect financial resources with executors in the field. Field units can be
mobilized quickly to respond to current information in a fluid environment. This is especially useful
in situations where refugee returns are involved. Naturally, civilians who decide to return to their
homes in the aftermath of war do not necessarily co-ordinate their decisions with any authorities--
especially military--before making the move. When military leaders want to respond to an
unanticipated situation they need flexible resources. One example may be helpful.

         In late August 1999, MND-SW learned that some two-hundred refugee families had suddenly
repatriated to claim their houses in the Hambarine municipality of northwest BiH. Their homes lacked
basic infrastructure support such as power and water supply. Without electricity, they would not be
able to survive the coming winter. Because of the established relationship with DFID and a liaison
with the Technical Assistance Unit (TAU) of the European Commission, the battlegroup commander
in that area was able to work out a solution. The Know-How Fund of DFID provided the resources
and MND-Southwest troops provided labor to re-establish the electrical grid in the returnees’
2
  Since June 1999, the CIC has reported not to CJ-9 but to the CIMIC Task Force. While this arrangement
further removes the CIC from the SFOR commander, it offers administrative conveniences. Pending changes in
SFOR organizational structure should bring this resource closer to the generals. In so doing SFOR will improve
their operational responsiveness and decision quality through better access to current, specialized information
from the international community.


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                               The Combined Joint Civil-Military Task Force
                                           NGO Support Team
              CIMIC Information Centre, Kasarna Marsal Tito, Zmaja od Bosne, 71000 Sarajevo, BiH (071)667.523, fax 667.524



neighborhood before autumn. In the spring of 2000, the TAU will modernize the electrical grid for the
remainder of the city.

Satisfying Specialized Information Requirements
         While the military can provide some levels of information to the international community in
relief operations, the sort of information necessary to drive many reconstruction and development
activities is beyond the capabilities of most military units to generate and provide. This is because we
are normally organized and trained to handle information relevant to military decision-making. Our
systems are well-prepared to provide sophisticated, specialized information to military leaders at all
levels. Reconstruction and development work typically requires a very different sort of information.
To meet this need, the international community, in co-operation with international military
organizations like SFOR, has developed specialized organizations that gather data and generate
detailed, sophisticated information products addressing every important aspect of GFAP and
supporting relief and development work. Two of these agencies are the Repatriation Information
Centre (RIC) and a section in the International Management Group (IMG). The RIC is sponsored by
numerous donors to produce and manage an information base of detailed studies of the municipalities
in BiH. This information is used in assessing both domestic political leaders’ compliance with GFAP
and the potential obstacles to successful return of displaced persons (DP). On the other hand, IMG
maintains an expansive information base on the thousands of projects that have been initiated or
completed in the AOR. This information is valuable to donors (mostly governments) for verification
and feedback as well as civil implementers looking for opportunities to collaborate on project work.
Both of these organizations produce detailed reports on request for no fee. This sort of sophisticated
information product is difficult and costly to produce and it also offers obvious value to military
decision-makers in BiH.


A REPLICABLE OPERATIONAL MODEL FOR CIMIC

Defining the Mission: the Starting Point for All Action
        Using what we know about the BiH scenario and the CIMIC conceptual basics, we can now
look at a hypothetical illustration of putting these ideas to work in military peacekeeping commands.
An assessment of the general situation is the intellectual grist for defining the mission. An
organization can only be moved to concerted action for measurable effect after the situation is viewed
and a decision is made to act on that situation. First of all, the commander must decide what he wishes
to change about the situation before him. At the theatre level, military commanders would naturally
have the mission of implementing terms of treaties, accords, or other mandates that have been
determined at the political level. In the BiH instance, the SFOR mission is clearly to support the
implementation of GFAP. The next subordinate level commanders can then take this over-arching
mission and develop practical mission statements that can guide their operational and tactical
commanders to action. Let us assume the SFOR commander has defined the basic mission thus:
SFOR will provide security and promote an environment in BiH that encourages legitimate, free-
market, economic development in order to induce a standard of living that encourages refugees and
displaced persons to return home.

         In the very next step, unit commanders must provide a mission statement (preferable very
concise and simply defined). For the rest of this paper we will assume the CIMIC Task Force
commander has announced, “we will support the revitalization of industry in the six largest of the
Priority Municipalities. These are: Sarajevo, Mostar, Banjaluka, Prijedor, Zenica, and Brcko.” This
establishes two geographic objectives in Republika Serpska and two in the Federation of BiH. It
pushes action in all Multi-national Divisions (MND). Also, it touches the largest population centers,
thus offering the highest pay-off target areas when viewed in terms of sustainability in civil



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                                The Combined Joint Civil-Military Task Force
                                            NGO Support Team
               CIMIC Information Centre, Kasarna Marsal Tito, Zmaja od Bosne, 71000 Sarajevo, BiH (071)667.523, fax 667.524



implementation. The potential benefits can touch the lives of thousands of BiH citizens in the near
term.

Initial Staff Action
         The primary staff of the CIMIC Task Force is fully capable of producing effective information
and coordinating activities without changing the fundamentals of their organizations and equipment.
We will look at the pivotal role of the intelligence and planning (or operations) cells.

         We use the Task Force intelligence cell (J-2) as a shop for gathering information relevant to
CIMIC Task Force objectives as identified in the mission statement. Military intelligence officers
make the shift to providing the command with information useful for the decisions of CIMIC
Functional Team leaders and their subject matter experts (e.g., engineers, businessmen, educators,
etc.). Leveraging the various sources of information inherent in reconnaissance teams and liaison
offices can do this. The J-2 can develop primary intelligence requirements (PIR) as a general basis for
CIMIC decisions along with some essential elements of information (EEI) in order to define the
special situation in the geographical objectives.

         At the same time, the operations cell (J-3) can be used in a new way that is still very similar to
a combat-unit planning cell. They need only shift their capacity for situation analysis and course of
action development to the new, CIMIC paradigm. They can then focus energy on defining the
economic situation by firstly gathering information from the J-2, CJ-2 (headquarters command
intelligence section), the liaison officers, as well as outside sources. Secondly, they could provide a
concise special situation statement about the industrial sector in BiH that (1) describes the pre-war
level of employment and GDP generated and (2) the current level of employment and GDP in the
sector. They could also outline (3) the status of privatization law, (4) the status of the infrastructure
factors necessary to make a factory viable again, (5) the accessibility and qualitative characteristics of
the skilled and unskilled labor pools, (6) the nature of educational and vocational training resources in
the six communities. They could further be tasked to (7) identify the specific industrial sites that are
optimal for rejuvenation and (8) the legal ownership status of the factories in the six geographical
objective cities.

Generating Options through Open Professional Relations
        Conferences and round-tables provide efficient and effective forums both for generating
creative options and for influencing co-ordinated action through sharing of high-quality, pertinent
information. Information products are useless unless disseminated to influential users. A conference
generates most benefit when it is open to decision-makers outside the military.

        Conferences and roundtable meetings of military, NGO, IO, and GO representatives also will
help CIMIC leaders (9) answer their own questions about the specific, existing NGO and IO programs
and projects active in those six cities. Likewise, (10) the embassies that might be interested in
sponsoring such work in those cities. Such meetings would help generate (11) the options for
participation in those programs or influencing their support for industrial development projects or (12)
the scope of work and magnitude of funding of various programs. Such IO and NGO programs are
constitute the lion’s share of development and reconstruction work. Because of this, the NGOs and
IOs are determining forces in producing viable peacekeeping activities. Commanders who establish
strong professional relationships with outside organizations open the door for concurrent, parallel
planning. This is the seedbed for synergy. Military leaders commonly refer to assets that offer
synergistic effect on the battlefield “combat multipliers.” In this sense, CIMIC is a peacekeeping
multiplier.




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                                The Combined Joint Civil-Military Task Force
                                            NGO Support Team
               CIMIC Information Centre, Kasarna Marsal Tito, Zmaja od Bosne, 71000 Sarajevo, BiH (071)667.523, fax 667.524



Estimates of Supportability
         We continue by following the same logic as with military operations planning. The special
staff and liaison sections would produce brief estimates of supportability for each optional approach to
solving the problem or accomplishing the goal (i.e., course of action). The work of CIMIC staff
sections is highly specialized; it requires independent intellectual attention to produce valuable
estimates and reports for the consideration of decision-makers in the command. These estimates could
be presented in a manner preferred by the command group in a briefing room, for instance,
alternatively in a short report.

         Afterward, the J-3 could generate (12) the most supportable courses of action for the Task
Force. The command group then would have options in selecting (13) the desirable course of action to
accomplish the mission of supporting industrial revitalization in the BiH. Then the J-3 would develop
a co-ordinated plan to explain in general terms, how the plan is expected to unfold and the timelines
for specific actions of the task force. Any plan must remain simple enough to account for chance and
flexibility based upon new information. A plan that is overly detailed robs an organization of the
ability to learn from unexpected events and new information as the situation develops. Yet, a general
framework for action is essential for concerted effort and synergistic results. A familiar analogy for
military leaders in combat arms is found when we call assets that lend synergistic strength “combat
multipliers.”

Collaborative Decisions between Civilian and Military Leaders
        Co-operative efforts between civilian and military organizations leverage the comparative
advantages of each group. Perhaps the most essential element of successful civil-military co-operation
is the mutual support between the military and civilian organizations in the area of operations.
Concurrent, parallel planning that includes key civilian organizations should be a goal of every
military leader involved in CIMIC activities. The liaison functions of the Task Force are critical to
this aspect of CIMIC. This sort of planning can only be achieved when professional relationships
have been established with key civilian leaders at various levels prior to the inception of the planning
cycle.

         In our example, we have a mission and initial planning and other activities including a liaison
conference designed to bring key civilian players into the decision-planning cycle. After the
conference, CIMIC military leaders and liaisons can initiate meetings among IOs, NGOs, embassies,
and government agency officials to establish both options and recommended courses of action. Once
agreement to collaborate is achieved, commanders can task the functional specialists (i.e., CIMIC
Functional Teams) to perform detailed assessments or other work on behalf of the organizations or
institutions involved. Co-operative CIMIC projects are thus born, and funding sponsorship is not an
issue that impairs efficient progress.


CONCLUSION

Gung-ho Military Leadership for Synergy
         Military leaders in the peacekeeping environment would be wise to acknowledge the prowess
of civilian organizations in this arena. Then, from this vantagepoint, their military organizations can
establish strong, productive liaison with the international community in order to improve the quality of
decisions and problem solving for all participants in the peacekeeping effort. This sort of attitude and
exchange bolsters the total effectiveness of the peacekeeping efforts through synergy. When
organizations work co-operatively, the outcome is more productive than if they had worked on the
same problems separately. The Marines call this attitude gung-ho (a linguistic corruption of the
Chinese term for “work together”). Peacekeeping gung-ho based on open, positive inter-
organizational relationships saves lives and resources while improving outcomes.


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                               The Combined Joint Civil-Military Task Force
                                           NGO Support Team
              CIMIC Information Centre, Kasarna Marsal Tito, Zmaja od Bosne, 71000 Sarajevo, BiH (071)667.523, fax 667.524




Reinforcing Success
        The basics are already present in military organizations for the sort of approach to
peacekeeping that takes advantage of CIMIC. How best to make more effective use of civil affairs
and other military resources in the Balkans and other theatres of operations is one of the most
compelling questions faced by senior officers. The successes of the CIMIC Task Force of SFOR can
provide the model for effective peacekeeping action in the future. Military leaders need only take a
few simple steps that adjust our way of thinking in order to declare CIMIC missions, define staff work
products, and expected results. The upshot will be to exploit complimentary strengths for more
effective peacekeeping efforts.



Major Anthony D. Sinnott recently completed an eight-month tour, based in Sarajevo, BiH, as the
chief of the Non-governmental Organization Support Team of SFOR. He is currently a civil affairs
officer of the 4th Civil Affairs Group in Washington, DC.




Major A. D. Sinnott, USMC (left) with Mr. Phillip Cooper of the United Nations Development Programme
and LtCol John Merrit, UK Army, in Sarajevo in October 1999.




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