Military Aircraft Certification Seminar 2008
Recognising Other Certification Bodies as
Competent Authorities
David Barker
Head DMSD-Policy
Why is this important?
• First another question
– What current UK Military Registered Aircraft
have NOT relied on data produced by or for
other competent Authorities to support the
Safety Case?
– Hawk Mk1 (but not 128), some UAVs
• Future acquisition will predominately be:
– Multinational programmes or
– "Off-the-shelf" from other Nations
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Contents
• Policy
• Assessment of Other Military Certification
Bodies
• International Collaboration
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Contents
• Policy
• Assessment of Other Military Certification
Bodies
• International Collaboration
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4 Pillars of Airworthiness
• JSP553 Chg 6 – Notes to Users
• The principles of Airworthiness are underpinned
by four ‘Pillars of Airworthiness’:
– A Safety Management System
– Recognised Standards
– Competence
– Independence
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Airworthiness Strategy
• JSP553 Chg 6 Para 4.5.1 - The IPTL is to:
– Formulate an Airworthiness strategy that builds on the 4 Pillars
of Airworthiness to include:
• The Safety Management System - the description of roles,
responsibilities and the boundaries of the system. See Ch 2.3.
• Recognised Standards – that should include the use of recognised
standards for both the design and maintenance related activities.
• Competence – detail the arrangements for assurance of the
competence of staff and also the competence of organisations
involved in the military air environment. This should refer to
organisation approvals as appropriate.
• Independence – detail the arrangements for independent
assessment. See Para 2.58.
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Use of Safety Justifications from Other
Certification Bodies
• JSP553 Chg 6 Para 4.52
– “Where the air system to be acquired has previously been
certified, or is to be certified, by a competent certification body
(non-UK MOD) the IPTL may base the Safety Case on data that
already exist; for example data from US or EU military bodies or
civilian agencies such as the FAA, CAA (UK) or EASA. If these
data are to well-known standards such as MIL SPEC/STD, FAR,
BCAR, or CS, the IPTL may decide to provide justification, in the
Safety Case, as to why he is content to dispense with or reduce
the scope of additional safety analyses and independent tests
and trials.”
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Certification Basis
• The Certification Basis used by other certification bodies
may not be wholly suitable for meeting UK MOD
requirements.
– e.g. A400M has a civil baseline but with military specific
requirements not covered by CS25
• Differences in the operating environment and usage are
to be fully addressed in the Safety Case.
– e.g. A400M tactical usage
• Need access to the safety and certification data
– Quite often difficult
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The IPTL shall ensure that:
• The proposed approach is included in the airworthiness
strategy and approved by the appropriate DG and in particular:
– Show that the proposed approach is equivalent to that required by
UK policy
– Show the arrangements to demonstrate the competence of the
proposed certification body
• The Safety Case for the air system to be acquired:
– Addresses the differences in the operating environment and usage
from those in the certification basis of the competent certifying
body
– Addresses the risks and mitigations of not complying with UK
standards
– Fully articulates that this approach results in a design which has
risks mitigated to a tolerable and ALARP level
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Competence of Certification Bodies
(Civil)
• ICAO
– Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme, launched 1999
– Each ICAO member State is required to host an audit at least
once every six years
• In Europe - EASA
– European Regulation EC 1702-2003 Part 21 Section B
• Procedures for Competent Authorities
• UK MOD – MARSB
– Has accepted that the results of the civil system are appropriate
for use by the MOD providing the differences are understood and
addressed.
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ICAO Safety Management Manual 2006
In determining an acceptable level of safety, it is necessary to consider
such factors as the level of risk that applies, the cost/benefits of
improvements to the system, and public expectations on the safety of
the aviation industry….
Even where the risk is classed as acceptable (tolerable), if any
measures that could result in the further reduction of the risk are
identified, and these measures require little effort or resources to
implement, then they should be implemented..
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ICAO Safety Management Manual 2006
The acronym ALARP is used to describe a risk that has been reduced to
a level that is as low as reasonably practicable. In determining what is
“reasonably practicable” in this context, consideration should be given to
both the technical feasibility of further reducing the risk, and the cost; this
could include a cost-benefit study
Showing that the risk in a system is ALARP means that any further risk
reduction is either impracticable or grossly outweighed by the costs. It
should, however, be borne in mind that when an individual or society
“accepts” a risk, this does not mean that the risk is eliminated. Some level
of risk remains; however, the individual or society has accepted that the
residual risk is sufficiently low that it is outweighed by the benefits.
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Competence of Certification Bodies
(Military)
• Much more difficult
– No agreement between Nations regarding military aviation regulations,
processes and procedures that enable a common approach to
airworthiness.
– Each Nation operates an aviation safety system independently of each
other and individually each is responsible for the regulation of its
aircraft.
– Harmonisation in any multinational programme is only achieved at
individual project level and repeated for each new project.
– This generates many shortcomings and is a primary cause for delay and
additional cost.
• DMSD are developing a strategy and policy to centrally assess and
approve other military certification bodies.
• DMSD are driving forward Airworthiness harmonisation in the EU.
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Contents
• Policy
• Assessment of Other Military Certification
Bodies
• International Collaboration
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USA (1)
• Work in hand with the USAF
– Reaper is the ‘guinea pig’
• Guidance taken from Part 21 Section B
• Extension to the Generic Aviation Safety GSN developed
(design) as basis for assessment
• Initial visit to Wright-Patterson AFB made mid-2008
• Follow up with Reaper PO planned
• Evaluation of other Project Offices will be needed shortly
– JCA
– Rivet Joint (Helix)
• USAF keen to harmonise approach with the UK
• Strategy and policy to be developed in parallel
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USA (2)
• USAF, US Army, US Navy and US Marine Corps
(CHECK) all approach Airworthiness differently
• All the above and FAA briefed on the UK’s
approach
– Favourably received
• US Army could be next (Chinook)
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Goal Structure for Generic Aviation Safety
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Goal Structure for Design Safety Case
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Goal Structure for Design Safety Case
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Goal Structure for Design Safety Case
Some of the aspects to be considered:
Who is the Design Organisation?
How are Roles and Responsibilities documented?
How is DO competence established?
Are associated Processes and Procedures documented?
How is design configuration managed?
How is independent assessment of the Airworthiness and Safety
aspects of the design conducted?
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Goal Structure for Design Safety Case
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Goal Structure for Design Safety Case
Some of the aspects to be considered:
Design, Airworthiness and Safety Requirements and
Acceptance Criteria
Who determines requirements and criteria?
What steps are taken to validate the requirements and that
criteria have been met?
How are Safety Hazards and Risks identified and managed?
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Goal Structure for Design Safety Case
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Goal Structure for Design Safety Case
Some of the aspects to be considered:
Who is the Certification Authority (CA)?
What relationship is there with the Regulator?
Has the CA access to resources independent from the
Design Organisation?
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Goal Structure for Design Safety Case
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Goal Structure for Design Safety Case
Some of the aspects to be considered:
Who are the stakeholders engaged in the Preliminary
Hazard Analysis and System Safety Analysis?
How is Safety and Hazard analysis conducted?
How is handling approach fed back into the design and
considered in subsequent design reviews etc.?
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Continued Airworthiness
• A similar GSN approach could be used
• DMSD plan to develop the strategy and policy in
the near future
• Important for JCA
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Contents
• Policy
• Assessment of Other Military Certification
Bodies
• International Collaboration
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How Can International Collaboration Help?
• Fosters an understanding of different Nation's
approaches
• Helps with the exchange of best practice
• Development of common standards, processes
and procedures
– Potential for mutual recognition of each Nation's
certification
– Potential to reduce the burden on industry for multi-
national projects
– Potential to save large amount of time and cost
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International Collaboration - NATO
• FINAS – USAR WG
– "Airworthiness Code" being developed from CS23
(STANAG 4671)
– Ratification due ~ Nov 2007
– Will be implemented in UK via DS 00-970 Pt9
– Will next consider UAVs <150kg and rotorcraft
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International Collaboration - OCCAR
• OCCAR Nations are: UK, GE, IT, FR, SP, BE
• Joint Military Airworthiness Group formed 2006 (UK Chair)
• Assist OCCAR with the preparation of their internal documentation
to ensure contracting for airworthiness is adequately covered.
• Main Objectives:
– Define joint key principles for airworthiness procedures and
requirements for OCCAR Programmes – based on European
Regulation (EC) 216/2008 Annex 1 - Complete
– Prepare documentation suitable for inclusion into the OCCAR
Management Documentation – To be completed early 2009
– Prepare documentation suitable for inclusion into OCCAR and national
contracts - To be completed early 2009
• Industry engaged through ASD
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International Collaboration - ETAP
• ETAP Nations are: UK, GE, IT, FR, SP, SW
• Certification WG formed 2004 (FR Chair)
• Common Military Flight Test Permit Procedure
(MFTPP) completed early 2008 (no AMC)
– Now included in Def Stan 05-123 Part 2
• Certification WG work to be subsumed in to the
EDA airworthiness harmonisation activity
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International Collaboration - EDA
• UK proposal in early 2008 for the EDA to coordinate
Airworthiness Harmonisation within the EU
• EDA National Armament Directors Steering Board (9 Apr
08) agreed to set up an Ad Hoc Programme Group
(AHPG)
– To define a viable and agreed roadmap
• 2 meetings of the AHPG have been held
– Draft Roadmap produced
– To be submitted to the EDA Ministers SB in Nov 08 for the
formal setting up of a Forum on Airworthiness Harmonisation
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EDA Roadmap High Level Goals
• Common regulatory framework;
• Common certification processes;
• Common approach to organisational approvals;
• Common certification/design codes;
• Common approach to preservation of airworthiness;
• Arrangements for mutual recognition;
• Formation of a European Military Joint Airworthiness
Authority
• Entirely consistent with the SBAC vision
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QUESTIONS?