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					Simple Models at HQ 1(UK) Div
         Op TELIC
           John G Owen
        Principal Operational Analyst
        Directorate of Land Warfare

             21st ISMOR
             3 September 2004
• Two UK Operational Analysts deployed to HQ
  1(UK) Armd Div in Kuwait 29 Jan 2003
• Presence of 2 – 4 analysts maintained at UK-led
  HQ ever since
• Roulement every 3 – 4 months

• Initial team: John Owen and Jarrod Cornforth
• Overview presentation given at 20th ISMOR
• OA in support of warfighting planning
   – Narrower scope but greater depth than last year

• Interaction with Commanders and Staffs
• Combat-related questions and tools

(Other work – POW numbers, ammo consumption, logistic
  reach, campaign duration, Helo risk from AD, building
  staff tools and databases – will not be covered)
          HQs and Locations
• OA Team attached to 1(UK)Armd Div Main
• Initial location Camp RHINO:
  DSG, 3 Cdo Bde, 7 Bde, 16 Bde, JHF HQs
• Attached to G3(Plans) – but also tasked by other
  Div HQ cells and other HQs
• Tasking from other HQs declined after
  deployment from Camp RHINO – comms difficult
                Getting Started
• J Cornforth had worked with Div staff, especially
  DSG, in recent past
     • Relationships and trust existed
     • Use of OA seen as normal
• J Owen substituted for designated Analyst
     • ‘Unknown quantity’ to HQ
     • Unfamiliar with the routines of this particular HQ
     • HQ extremely busy – difficult conditions to introduce self and
• Analysts should exercise with the HQs they
  might be supporting operationally
  – this includes ‘reserve’ analysts
                 Tasking Cycle
• Question posed to OA by staff officer
     • Often derived from Commander’s tasking of staff
     • Not tasked directly by Commanders
     • Any HQ cell (Div and Bdes) could ask for OA support
• Timescale: ‘by xx:00 today’, ‘before next Div
  update’, ‘by this time tomorrow’
     • 2 – 24 hours
     • (Applies to combat modelling tasks only – some logs and
       software tool tasks had longer timescales)
• Working to staff, not Commander
     • Questions fairly specific and limited
• Initial brief from officer posing question
      • Analyst needed general situational awareness to understand
        context and clarify question
• Some follow up meetings with other staff
      • To gather information (e.g. Intelligence data)
      • Staff time generally very limited
• Did not conduct wargaming with military ‘players’
      • Some Bde HQs conducting their own wargaming – but no OA
        support, no quantification of combat
• Generally working ‘for’ rather than ‘with’
      • Insufficient perceived added value from closer collaboration
      • Analyst time also limited – prioritisation of tasking
• 5-minute verbal brief to staff officer
      • Main results and assumptions
• Written response also prepared
      • Question, Headline answer, Assumptions, then more detailed
        method and results
      • Usually accepted – sometimes read and passed on
      • Important for Analysts as a record of work
• Some briefing to larger groups
      • Including Comd Gp – GOC, Bde Comd, principal staff
      • Always at request of staff officer who had already seen results
      • Verbal brief – HQ very short of projectors for slide shows!
• Analysts must be able to brief concisely
      • Identify the critical assumptions and limitations that the
        audience must be told
              Combat Questions
• What is the correlation of forces in this area?
• What is the OA assessment of this
  proposed/possible plan?
      •   Usually at Bde level
      •   Risk?
      •   Casualties and equipment losses?
      •   Impact of changing ORBAT
• Update previous assessments given different
• Very ‘traditional’ military OA
      • Conventional warfare
• UK force Bde or a part of
      • Except for 7 Bde, a ‘light’ force
• Iraqi force:
      •   Up to nominal Div strength
      •   Mostly old equipment – T-55 generation
      •   Below TOE strength because of poor maintenance
      •   Attrited by air before ground battle (but how much?)
      •   Largely infantry force in some sectors
      •   How hard, and how coherently, will they fight?
• Much of the Div and Bde planning – and hence
  OA – for contingencies in which Iraqi formations
  did fight as such
      • Worst case for potential (short-term) losses
      • Even if unlikely, has to be considered
                        Tools Used
• Balance Analysis Modelling System (BAMS)
     • Static Scoring
• Wartime Planning Tool (WPT)
     • Deterministic heterogeneous Lanchester model
• Simple Model of Infantry Close Combat (SMICC)
     • Duration and outcome distribution of Sect – Coy battle
     • Data from historical analysis
• For each tool:
  – Is it a simple model?
  – Was it used or abused?
Force Value = (Number of Equipments) x (Equipment Score)

• Compare total scores for correlation of forces
      • A quick ‘first cut’ method

• Very quick and simple to use
      • Equipments not previously scored can be added if there are close

• Equipment Scores are for ‘contribution to the all-arms battle’
      • Based on old NATO Central Front
      • Heavy, mechanised forces, Bde and above

• On borderline of validity with TELIC scenarios
   – size and composition of forces
                          WPT (1)
•   Deterministic heterogeneous Lanchester model
•   10 weapon categories, depth fire, AH and FW
•   Attrition rate adjustments for terrain, posture, barriers
•   Data set derived from more detailed modelling
•   BG/Bde battles – with sequencing of units
•   MS Excel implementation
    – Added personnel casualties calculation
    – Added unit defeat levels and participation levels
• Risk and variability by sensitivity testing
• Adjustment to tank attrition rates for T-55
                     WPT (2)
• A simple model?
    •   Simple to use
    •   Simple to add facilities around basic model
    •   Re-calibration a big task
    •   Represents a complex situation – complexity
        inherent in the aggregations
• Use and abuse?
    • Battles generally ‘lighter’ than calibration
    • Size and force composition at low end
    • Was T-55 adjustment correct?
                  SMICC (1)
• Section – Company infantry engagements with
  armour and artillery support
• Select values for conditions of battle
  – Terrain, level of support, defence posture
• Distribution of battle outcomes, durations, losses
• Based on historical analysis
• Implemented in Visual Basic

• Used for some questions relating to 3 Cdo Bde
• Would have been used if ‘proper’ wargaming
  with Bde undertaken
                 SMICC (2)
• A simple model?
    • Very quick and simple to use
    • Equations and coefficient values complex
    • ‘Black box’ unless substantial additional HA
• Use and Abuse?
    • HA based; human factors implicit in equations
    • Used in its intended domain
               General (1)
• Op TELIC was at the borders of validity of
  the tools
  – Not a comfortable place
• Saving grace:
  – UK casualties heavy and battles lost only if
    Iraqi determination and cohesion at highest
                    General (2)
• Models for rapid use in operational HQs must be
  simple to use
     • Not necessarily simple in structure
• Analyst must understand the tools thoroughly to
  avoid abuse
• Still a need for combat modelling
• Combat models cannot be improvised
     • Data sets are required
• Need for scoring systems, model calibrations for
  high-tech vs lower-tech forces and for light, not
  armoured forces