Fitch Ratings India Private Limited
“Risks in Indian Loan-Against-Shares based Securitizations”
Conference Call
December 19, 2008
Moderator: Good evening ladies and gentlemen. I am Sandhya, the
moderator for this conference. Welcome to the Fitch Ratings
Conference Call. Today’s topic is “Risks in Indian Loan-Against-
Shares based securitizations.” For the duration of the
presentation, all participants’ lines will be in the listen-only mode.
I will be standing by for the question and answer session. Now, I
would like to hand over to Mr. Dipesh Patel. Thank you and over
to you sir.
Mr. Dipesh Patel: Thank you moderator. Good afternoon everyone. My name is
Dipesh Patel and I head the structured finance team here in India.
I am joined by my colleague Deep Mukherjee, the author of the
LAS-based securitization report that we published on Tuesday.
Deep and I would like to welcome you to today’s teleconference
which will be in three parts. First, I will provide a brief introduction
and I will then hand over to Deep to highlight the key risks that we
see in LAS-based securitizations. Deep’s remarks will then be
followed by the Q&A session.
By way of an introduction, for the last year or so, a number of
arrangers have been discussing LAS-based securitization. For
the arrangers, the securitizations provide a way of managing their
balance sheet risk exposure to a particular obligor or industry,
while for promoters, they are able to obtain funding by essentially
monetizing their existing shareholdings. These motivations that I
have just mentioned have led to many LAS transactions being
done, some of which have been rolled up and converted into LAS-
based securitizations. With the sharp fall in Indian equity markets,
many of these LAS-based securitizations have been exposed to a
number of risks, not just credit and market risk but also execution
and legal risks that previously may not have been fully
appreciated. There is even being confusion amongst the parties
to the securitization as to which party is supposed to do what and
when. As such, LAS-based securitizations are complex in nature
and expose several inherent risks. With that, I am going to hand
over to Deep who will talk you through the key risks that we see in
LAS-based securitizations.
Mr. Deep N.
Mukherjee: Thank you Dipesh. I would like to welcome everyone once again.
LAS securitization is different from a conventional single loan sell
down and the key differences arise because of the underlying
nature of the asset which is LAS. It is significantly different from
corporate loans, be it secure or unsecure which ultimately go
through single loan sell-down and the second point of difference is
once securitized, LAS requires a much higher involved level of
monitoring and actioning than would be required for a
conventional corporate loan. Having said that, let’s focus on how
LAS as an asset class is different. There are four key points that
we have identified where LAS is significantly different from a
corporate loan. The first one being the seniority level of LAS.
Now, this transaction in the event of default of the underlying
corporate whose shares are kept as collateral, this loan would be
no senior to the equity holders of the company. So, there is the
inbuilt structural subordination in case of LAS transactions.
Whatever obligation or loan repayment obligation remains is not of
the corporate but of the promoter. So, that is one thing which lot
of times there may be some confusion. Second is the nature of
the collateral. Now, a conventional collateral, be it cash or real
estate assets or bank guarantee, the probability of default of the
borrower and the value of the collateral is not correlated in most
cases or if at all there is a correlation, it is very nominal, but in
case of LAS, the probability of default of the borrower and the
value of the collateral or the share collateral shows a high
negative correlation. To explain, if the promoter to whom the loan
was extended is likely to default or the probability of default
increases, it is often found that the value of the share of the
company owned by the promoter significantly takes a hit. To that
extent, the collateral value is eroded. So, the key take away from
this is that the comfort level associated with a share collateral may
not be in most cases as much as that associated with a
conventional collateral, be it a real estate asset, cash, bank
guarantee, and the like. Third point how LAS is different is the
recovery process. Now, one of the key arguments in favor of LAS
that is typically forwarded is the ease of recovery in the event of
default of the borrower. Now, there is some truth in this
understanding, but this truth is usually validated under benign
market conditions and when the stake that is being or when the
collateral forms a very small percentage of the overall market cap
of the stock. If either of this gets violated which is to say if the
market condition becomes very stressful or even in benign market
conditions, the quantum of stock that is to be offloaded because
the promoter has defaulted is a significant portion of the overall
market cap of the company, then recovery process in terms of
recovery rate as well as recovery timing becomes difficult to
predict. To that extent, there have been cases reported in the
media that it was difficult to obtain a suitable value of the share as
there were no buyers or there were very limited buyers as seen in
the last one year. Last but not the least point of difference in LAS-
based transactions is pointed by Dipesh, the execution risk. Now,
this typically arises out of two or three factors. One is since the
collateral and the triggers associated with LAS is market value
dependent. A constant monitoring is required. Once the triggers
are called, how the borrower responds to it, based on which
followup actions maybe required. A lot of times it may have been
experienced that the infrastructure either by the trustee or by the
lender may not have been fully attuned to the efforts of monitoring
the transaction or raising timely triggers or following up on that
triggers in the event the borrower has not been able to meet that
trigger call. So, all these things almost create or add to the set of
risks that is found in the usual corporate loan. So, having looked
at the four points and how LAS differs, we would now dig deeper
into the five assets of risks which we have identified which are
found to asset such transactions.
The five types of risks that we would be talking about are credit
risk, market risk, structural risk, execution risk, and legal risk.
Now, at this point of time let me tell you whereas we would be
discussing the risk in a discreet sort of fashion, more out of trying
to put a structure to the conversation, the fact remains that all of
these interplay and influence one another. So, that has to be kept
in mind. As I progress through the discussion, I would definitely
endeavor to bring out the interaction between the various risk
factors.
I would start with the credit risk. What we strongly believe is that
irrespective of the structure, one of the most important things
remains at evaluating the financial strength and resources of the
borrowers. Now, it may have been the experience of market
participants that in lot of cases, the financial strength of the
borrower was not fully ascertained because of the lack of
information, but the fact remains that irrespective of the value of
the share collateral, and the share collateral to loan ratio, one
needs to thoroughly ascertain whether the borrower would have
money on his own to pay the loan in a timely fashion. What we
would usually like to focus apart from the financial strength is the
ability of the borrower to meet the share calls as and when they
arise which is basically evaluating the quantum of unencumbered,
unpledged shares available to the borrower, whether the borrower
can garner other resources in which to pay back the loan, whether
the borrower has access to nondiscretionary cash flows, which is
whether the borrower has access to operational cash flow from
either the existing corporate or some other corporate by which it
would likely to repay the loan. The second point on the credit risk
we would focus is on the credit worthiness of the underlying
corporate whose shares are placed at collateral, the key reason
being that in the event of default of the underlying corporate, the
value of the share collateral for all practical intents and purposes
become zero. So, to that extent, it is essential. For promoter
lending, there, the added value for rating is one can find some
comment and some idea on the corporate governance as well as
the managerial capability of the promoter by means of an
evaluation of the credit worthiness of the underlying corporate
whose shares are pledged as collateral. Third point is the nature
of the borrower’s stake. By nature of the borrower’s stake, we
would mean the size of the stake the borrower has in the company
and the strategic importance of the stake. Now, talking of size of
the stake, it is not like a monotonous or unilateral factor. To
explain, it necessarily doesn’t mean that higher the stake of the
borrower in a particular company whose share has been placed
as collateral the lower is the risk profile. On the contrary, there
can be several cases. Let me explain. Say a promoter has a very
low percentage of stake in the company, understandably the
corporate control that the borrower would exercise on the
corporate is low, but to that extent since the borrower has a very
low percent of stake in the company, if a borrower defaults and it
is unlikely or the likelihood is lower that the share price as such
would tank very significantly. On the contrary, if the borrower has
a overwhelmingly high stake in the company and if such a
borrower defaults, it is likely that the share price or the price of the
collateral in this case would fall very significantly to the extent that
recovery would become very difficult. Similarly, other aspect that
we would focus is a strategic importance. Strategic importance, a
lot of times, it is almost independent of the size of the stake to the
extent that even a very small stake can be important to the sense
that say someone owns say hypothetically 28% or 29% of stake in
a company and has placed, and I am just making up this number
as a matter of example, 5% of the stake has been placed as share
collateral. Now, losing that 5% stake would make the holding of
the promoter or that entity at any rate less than 26%, so there is a
strong motivation behind the corporate, that borrowing entity to
retain the control of the shares. On the contrary, if someone owns
85% or 90% of the stake or so for that matter losing 5% wouldn’t
significantly reduce the corporate control. The strategic
importance of the stake is not only restricted to the motivation of
the borrower to pay back, it is also essential as sometimes the in
the event of default of the borrower ,a stake of strategic
importance is likely to find ready buyers which would ease the
recovery process significantly.
Coming to the next key risk factor that we will discuss is the
market risk. Now, at this point of time, let me tell you that there is
a huge linkage between the credit risk in this structure and the
market risk. For example, a borrower has taken a loan for a
period of one year and has paid his or her stake and the reason
possibly they have taken the loan is because there is a cash flow
issue in the first place. Now, had anyone waited for a whole year,
chances may have been that the borrower would have been able
to pay up, but say two months down the line, an adverse market
movement erodes the collateral value, the loan recall trigger or the
cash call trigger may be activated, and then the borrower would
not be in any position to pay up the loan, so here we see an
example where the market risk is actually triggering credit risk and
this is a very key aspect of such structures. One of the things that
affect the market risk is, of course, the collateral to loan value
which we are given to understand is quite a popular measure of
evaluating such structures. What Fitch believes is that we would
like to stress, we would like to put more focus on the collateral or
share collateral to loan value at the point where the structure
starts to unwind as opposed to the share collateral to loan value at
the time of origination. What it would mean is that the first time
when money starts coming into the structure because the
collateral value has eroded, the collateral to loan value at that
point of time is more important as opposed to the point where you
keep on getting more and more shares of the company. So, that
is one view and second thing that we would like to focus here is
that the ratio of collateral, share collateral to loan of various LAS
structures needs to be standardized with some measure of market
risk. The paper as a matter of example discusses how the share
collateral to loan value needs to be standardized by the VAR
(Value-at-risk) of the share so that one can compare between two
structures, which is to say, as mentioned in the paper, share
collateral to loan value of 3 for a company whose VAR is 8%
would provide significantly more cushion as opposed to a share
collateral to loan value of 3 for another company whose VAR is
say 20%. Other elements of market risk which affects
subsequently the recovery in the event of default are the liquidity
of the stock and distribution of the interest in the stock.
We have discussed so far two aspects credit risk and market risk.
We would now like to focus on the structural risk. The structural
risk the way we want to define is the risk that the LAS structure
faces because of the very nature or the very fashion in which the
structure has been created. Of course, one of the key factors of
such structure is the collateral to loan ratio which I think we have
already discussed on the market value. The other aspect of the
structure that one needs to focus is, is there a inbuilt curing period
in the structure, which is to say that if on day T the loan, the
original underlying transaction of the asset, the LAS asset has a
scheduled maturity on day T and my PTC maturity is on day T
plus 1, in the event that on day T I find out that the borrower has
defaulted, I will have very minimal time to pay back the PTC
investors which would lead me to a distress sell of the collateral to
the extent that I may not be able to recover the amount that I was
expected to. This can be to a sense mitigated if it says that there
is a gap of say X number of days between the scheduled maturity
of the underlying LAS assets and the scheduled maturity of the
PTC. Other factors that go into the structural risk is the quantum
of pledged shares, I mean if you end up with a very high portion of
pledged shares from say a very high portion of the overall market
cap, it is unlikely that you would be able to recover the money or
the recovery rate or the recovery timing would unlikely to be very
satisfactory, even if the market conditions are slightly swift.
So, now we will go to the fourth type of risk which affects the
structure and this is the execution risk as we have previously
mentioned, and to speak something on the execution risk, it is
generally our understanding that when these structures have
evolved over a period of time, in the initial phases this risk was not
well identified. So, a lot of cases happened where the ability of
the concerned party to monitor the market value of the collateral
was almost assumed as given. Similarly, there are other
assumptions as to who would raise the trigger calls, what would
be the followup actions if the borrower fails to meet the trigger
calls, it was assumed that they are a given and would be done,
but quite a few experiences have been to the contrary where the
monitoring may not have been satisfactory, the triggers because
of which were raised, because of the erosion of the market value
of the collateral has not been timely, the parties which were
supposed to raise the trigger may not have been aware of
followup actions in case the borrowers didn’t meet up the call, to
the extent…and there were anecdotal sort of discussions on
cases where the borrower has ultimately defaulted and several
borrowers who may have invested in such a product had different
view on the followup actions, so that definitely delayed the timely
payment aspects of the structure.
Last but definitely not the least is the legal risk. Again, legal risks
typically arise because some of the shares that may have been
pledged were under a lock-in period, under some regulatory
guidelines or there may have been cases where even the shares
were not under lock-in period but there were other contractual
agreement which required the promoter to continue with the
holding for some time, so in the event when the promoters
defaulted, the very issue of whether the shares were at all
transferable to a third party, for that matter the ability to sell such
collateral in open market was a huge issue, in Fitch view, the
shares need to be unencumbered, any share which is in the lock-
in period or under any contractual agreement is considered highly
illiquid. One needs to check in such conditions is whether the
borrower can promptly transfer the shares without clearance or
authorization from a third party. Other issues that…other legal
issues may exist which are external to the borrower as such. For
instance, there are sectoral caps of holdings of FII. If the FII
holding in that particular sector is already closer to the limit, then
in the event of default when the lender wants to sell the stake, the
number of…potential number of buyers may be significantly
reduced which may again affect the recovery price and the
recovery timing. So, these are the five key aspects which
definitely interplay among one and another, whereas we have
identified five key aspects where the nature of the products and
the nature of underlying collateral is such that there are a host of
external factors which are external to the borrower as well as to
the lender and the structure as such which can asset it, which
would include market sentiments, overall movement of the
economy and a host of other things, and all these external factors
along with the factors that are…five factors that we have
described creates a situation where the expected risk profile or the
credit rating of such an instrument can be downgraded or can
potentially be downgraded by several notches if any of these
events happen. This is something which we call the cliff risk
which is the risk that a product gets downgraded by several
notches if any of those events happen. What this cliff risk does is
that if presented with such LAS structures, it is unlikely that Fitch
would rate them in AAA or AA levels because if you are rating
some instrument as a AAA or AA level, it is not only the probability
of default of the instrument at that point of time, it is also
associated with certain behavior of credit transition matrices,
which we believe that in the absence of a corporate guarantee,
such structures on a standalone basis are unlikely to exhibit. So,
with that, I would like to open up the session for the question and
answers.
Moderator: Thank you very much sir. We will now begin the Q&A interactive
session. Participants who wish to ask questions, please press *1
on your telephone keypad. On pressing *1, participants will get a
chance to present their questions on a first-in-line basis.
Participants are requested to use only handsets while asking a
question. To ask a question, kindly press *1 now. First in line, we
have Ms. Aparna from News AT. Over to you ma’am.
Ms. Aparna: This is a question to Mr. Mukherjee. Sir, I wanted to know how
many instances of cash call or loan recalls have been observed by
you in the past few months. Has there been a dramatic rise
because of whatever is happening in the share markets? And
another question I have is these LAS securitization transactions,
how large is the market in India and will banks as such have any
kind of major risks because of NPAs and stuff like that? Thank
you.
Mr. Deep N.
Mukherjee: Okay. First, let me see if I have understood. Your first question is
the number of transactions which we are seeing, is that what you
are saying, the first question.
Ms. Aparna: Yes.
Mr. Deep N.
Mukherjee: Okay. Just to clarify, as we have also mentioned in the report that
so far Fitch hasn’t rated any LAS transactions or LAS-based
securitizations. To that extent, we cannot comment on the
number of transactions that have been done.
Mr. Dipesh Patel: And just to add to what Deep said, we have not rated any
transactions and can’t give you an idea about how many deals
have had either share or cash top-ups. Just from reading the
financial press, one can see that there have been instances where
those share and cash top-ups have happened. In terms of how
large the market is, again, we haven’t rated any of these LAS-
based securitizations. So, we can’t answer that question, but it is
fair to say that quite a few LAS transactions were done in the last
year or so, but there has only been some issuance of LAS-based
securitizations.
Ms. Aparna: Okay. Thanks a lot sir.
Mr. Deep N.
Mukherjee: Thanks a lot Aparna.
Moderator: Thank you very much ma’am. Next question comes from Mr.
Shashi from Delhi. Over to you please.
Mr. Shashi: Again a question to Mr. Mukherjee. Mr. Mukherjee, while talking
about market risk, you mentioned that when rating LAS
securitization, when you are looking at the collateral to loan value
ratio, one should probably look at the value of the ratio at the time
of the unwinding instead of looking at the value at the time of
origination, but when you are rating such a transaction or a
securitization, the unwinding is something which will happen in
future. So, how do you propose to estimate the value of the
collateral to loan value ratio at that point of time?
Mr. Deep N.
Mukherjee: Actually what happens is one usually sees three types of triggers.
It is not the case for all deals but generally there are three types of
triggers present. The first trigger is a share recall trigger where
from the time of origination, the value of the collateral falls by the
trigger then the share recall trigger would say that provide enough
share so that the loan collateral to share value returns to the
original. If the value of the loan collateral, share collateral falls
further by a Y percentage, then usually what one sees in a lot of
structures is the borrowers would be required to pay that cash to
the extent that the collateral to loan value comes back to the
original limit. At that point of time, the lender may not be
interested in taking more shares. So, it is at this point where the
borrower is supposed to pay back in cash to make good the ratio
back to the original level. That is what we call the point of
unwinding the structures and that is usually contractually
determined at onset as in where the unwinding would start and of
course lastly there is a total loan recall trigger where the collateral
price falls by another percentage Z, the borrower may expect the
whole loan to be called back by the lender. So, it is contractually,
usually contractually determined, so that’s it.
Mr. Shashi: So, you mean you were actually referring to the predetermined
threshold level right?
Mr. Deep N.
Mukherjee: Yeah, predetermined threshold levels.
Mr. Shashi: That answers my question sir.
Mr. Deep N.
Mukherjee: Thank you, thanks Shashi.
Moderator: Thank you very much sir. Next in line, we have Mr. Dipankar from
PTI. Over to you sir.
Mr. Dipankar Desai: Hi, Dipankar Desai from PTI. Just wanted to understand from my
Mr. Mukherjee going forward how do you see this LAS market and
what is the risk for the credit generating companies involved in
this?
Mr. Deep N.
Mukherjee: Credit generating company?
Mr. Dipankar Desai: Yeah, those who provide credit based on LAS, what kind of risks
they can foresee in the next three to four years down the line?
Mr. Deep N.
Mukherjee: I would not be able to comment on the market going forward.
Again, talking of the risks that they face would usually the versions
of the risks that we have discussed in the paper.
Moderator: Sorry for the interruption sir. Sir, there is a continuous breakage
in the line.
Mr. Dipesh Patel: Hello…can you hear me moderator?
Moderator: Go ahead sir. Thank you.
Mr. Dipesh Patel: Yes, just to add to what Deep said, I think in the next year or so,
people who have provided credit under the loan against share
transaction should be very mindful of each of the risks. Now, each
transaction, each LAS-based transaction is exposed to different
risks of different magnitudes. So, the key message that we want
to emphasize is that these transactions are exposed to multitude
of different risks, each one has to be analyzed to determine what
is the most relevant and what is the most pertinent to that
particular transaction.
Mr. Shashi: Okay, fine Dipesh.
Moderator: Are you done with your question sir?
Mr. Shashi: Yeah.
Moderator: Thank you very much. Participants who wish to ask questions
may kindly press *1 on the telephone keypad. I repeat
participants who wish to ask questions may kindly press * followed
by 1 in the telephone keypad. Next in line, we have Mr. Rajesh
from Reuters. Over to you sir.
Mr. Rajesh: Mr. Mukherjee, could you please tell us what is the size of this
load against transaction of shares market in India and have you
noticed any increase in defaults on such transactions and if yes,
where do you see…how much of defaults you see coming in the
near future?
Mr. Deep N.
Mukherjee: Yeah, as we have mentioned Fitch has not rated any LAS
transaction so far. Data on the borrowers book on LAS is usually
difficult to identify but as reported in the press technical defaults
have occured.
Mr. Rajesh: Okay. Thanks a lot.
Moderator: Thank you very much sir. Next in line, we have Ms. Sunidhi from
Indian Express. Over to you ma’am.
Ms. Sunidhi: Thank you. Sir, I just wanted to understand you said that the
rating is based on predetermined threshold limits. In times like
these where global markets have gone for a tailspin, how relevant
are these ratings for the guarantor, the person who is giving the
loans against such securities?
Mr. Deep N.
Mukherjee: If I have understood your question, you are saying whether the
predetermined threshold limits are the drivers of ratings. I would
just like to reiterate, it may be just one of the multitude of factors
towards determining the final rating.
Ms. Sunidhi: Okay.
Mr. Deep N.
Mukherjee: It is never just one factor on which rating would depend. you can
have a strong threshold limit and if the other factors are not that
satisfactory, it is unlikely that a rating could be given. One needs
to look at a multitude of factors.
Ms. Sunidhi: Okay. And how relevant have your ratings been in markets like
these?
Mr. Dipesh Patel: We haven’t rated any of the transactions, any of these LAS
securitizations, but as we reiterated again, according to the
reports, you cannot focus on just one aspect or one particular
check that will facilitate here. That is just one aspect of a
multitude of the different risks. Even if you have very high
collateral to loan ratio, it does not mean that all the other risks
have been mitigated and addressed. So, whenever we are
presented with any loan against share based securitization, we
will focus on all the five risks.
Ms. Sunidhi: Okay.
Mr. Deep N.
Mukherjee: In fact, there are several cases where the transactions may have
been riskier is because all the multitude of risks may not have
been fully considered, be it the legal aspects or execution aspects.
So, it is not just the raw numbers or the value of the share
collateral ratio and the borrower has enough financial resources.
It is all this which ultimately adds up, but any of them missing or in
an unsatisfactory level can adversely impact the structure.
Ms. Sunidhi: Thank you.
Moderator: Thank you very much ma’am. Next in line, we have Mr. Sameer
from Cholamandalam. Over to you sir.
Mr. Sameer: Hello…
Mr. Deep N.
Mukherjee: Hello Sameer.
Mr. Sameer: Yeah, good afternoon. This question is for Mr. Deepak, am I
right?
Mr. Deep N.
Mukherjee: Deep and Dipesh, but you can ask the question anyway.
Mr. Sameer: Yeah, alright, okay. See as an originator let’s say if we are going
for LAS securitization, then do we have this option of securitizing it
on non-recourse basis and is Fitch conducting any rating for the
non-recourse securitization (a), and how big is the market in India
in that case?
Mr. Deep N.
Mukherjee: We will repeat the last answer first the market it is difficult to have
certain figures to pinpoint the market size but based on the reports
in financial media, we are made to understand it could be
significant. Now, answering to your first question, it would depend
entirely on the legal documentation that is provided and whether
the quantity of information that has been provided is sufficient or
not. So, based on that, one would be deciding on the rating or
whether to even go ahead with the rating. So, it is very much on a
case-by-case basis. One can’t make a blanket call of yes/no.
There can be various flavors in the legal documentation and each
one of those is important. So, yes, what you are saying would
definitely be worth a consideration, but, whether it is a yes or no, it
would depend on the specific details.
Mr. Sameer: And how big would be the market?
Mr. Deep N.
Mukherjee: Difficult to say based on publicly available information
Mr. Sameer: Right. Okay, thank you.
Moderator: Thank you very much sir. Next in line, we have Mr. Anshul Garg
from Cholamandalam. Over to you sir.
Mr. Anshul Garg: Hello…
Mr. Deep N.
Mukherjee: Hello Anshu.
Mr. Anshul Garg: Good evening. I am Anshul from Cholamandalam DBS related to
this product itself. My question is that those shares are
considered to be as a riskiest collateral by all the regulators, RBI,
SEBI, Ministry of Finance, but isn’t it that this is the most lucrative
product for the promoters to raise money for their equity
contribution in their current projects and their future products. So,
like the government is supporting the debt side of the balance
sheet, shouldn’t it support this kind of product also so that this
gives boost to all the economy and because if there is no equity
contribution, then raising debt also becomes difficult and like they
have now come out that all the loans should be rated by the rating
agencies, similarly this product can also be rated and it can be
given a boost.
Mr. Dipesh Patel: Sorry, do you want to clarify your question?
Anshul Garg: Yeah, that is what I am asking that how can Fitch and other rating
agencies help in giving a boost to this product?
Deep N. Mukherjee: No..as a rating agency we do not promote any products….
Mr. Dipesh Patel: As to your point about the involvement of regulators…whether
they decide to get involved is a decision they would make entirely
on their own.
Moderator: Are you done with your question sir? Participants who wish to ask
questions may kindly press *1 on their telephone keypad. At this
moment, there are no further questions from the participants. I
would like to hand over the floor back to Mr. Dipesh Patel for final
remarks.
Mr. Dipesh Patel: Thank you moderator. I just want to end by thanking you for
joining today’s teleconference and if any of you have any further
questions then please feel free to get in contact with either Deep
or myself. Our contact details are shown on the first page of the
report that was published. So, thank you once again for your
attendance and have a good weekend.
Mr. Deep N.
Mukherjee: Thank you.
Moderator: Thank you very much sir. Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for
choosing WebEx Conferencing Service. That concludes this
conference call. Thank you for your participation. You may now
disconnect your lines. Thank you.