The Oakland Berkeley Hills Fire

This report has beenpreparedby the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) in coop~

eration with the Oakland and Berkeley, California Fire Departmentsand the California State

Fire Marshal's Office. The project was sponsored by the National Wildland/Urban

Interface Fire Protection Initiative to further the goals of the Initiative, established in 1986.

Those goals are to create general public awarenessof the wildland interface problem, to

encourage formation of partnerships among problem-solvers and interest groups, and to

focus on the developmentof local solutions to wildland/urban interface fIfe problems. The

report is the fourth in a seriesof reports preparedand approvedby the Initiative sponsors. It

is not the intention of NFP A nor of the Initiative to have the report passjudgment on, or fix

liability for, the loss of life and property resulting from the Oakland/Berkeley fire. The

Initiative is sponsored by the U.S. Department of Agriculture Forest Service; U.S.

5 Department of Interior, including the Bureau of Land ManagemeQt, Fish and Wildlife

Service,National Park Service,and the Bureau of Indian Affairs; U.S. Fire Administration;

the National Association of State Foresters,and the National Fire Protection Association.

Contact information for eachof theseorganizationsis provided in thisleport.

the Wildland Fire 7

This analysis was undertakenas part of efforts to achieve the goals of the Initiative. The

Vegetation 7

purpose was to document the fire, determine to the extent possible the variables causing

Residentialconstruction 8

destruction, and make recommendations on how to prevent similar occurrences. Thomas

The Weather 9

Klem, director of NFPA's Fire Investigations Department,was report managerand techni-

cal editor and advisor. William Baden, senior fire service specialist at NFPA, is the NFPA

Initiative project managerand was the technical advisor for this report.

The Fire ll

Intensity 12 The infonnation in this report is provided to assistplanners,local officials, fire service per-

Response 13 sonnel, and homeowners in developing firesafe homes and communities in the

Cornmunications 14 wildland/urban interface. That interface is where wildland and residential systemsjoin and

Water 14 affect eachother. ~

Narrowroads 15

Mutual aid 15 This wildland fire is only one of many that occur throughout the world eachyear. It is the

Utilities 16 fourth such fIre the Initiative has reported on. Under the Initiative's sponsorship,the NFPA

Evacuation 16 will review, analyze, and document additional wildland/urban interface fires that cause

destructionto homesand other structures.



The preparation of this report would not have been possible without the assistanceand

cooperation of the Oakland and Berkeley, California fire departments,and the California

State Fire Marshal' sOffice. Particularly, we want to thank Fire Chief Lamont Ewell of the

~--- .

Oakland Fire Department, Fire Chief Gary Cates of the Berkeley Fire Department,State

Fire Marshal Ron Coleman,and former StateFire Marshal JamesMcMullen.



addition, on-site assistanceand technical guidanceand insight was provided to NFPA by

Division Chief Joe Garcia and Art Cota, California State Fire Marshal's Office, Jack Snell

and Ken Steckler, National Institute of Standardsand Technology, and various representa-

tives of the California Department of Forestry, California Office of Emergency Services,

cities of Oakland and Berkeley, and the Department of Forestry, University of California

Berkeley.



...24 Each of these organizations has made significant contributions to the technical accuracy of

of

the report. Further, the extraordinary work of Maureen Tobin in the preparation the docu-

ment, and Chris McCusker for design,layout, and graphics,are acknowledged.



Finally, Paul E. Teague,associateeditor of Design News and former editor of Fire Journal,

was principal writer.



PHOTOS: NASA. KTVU-TV/OAKLANO

COVER



In

A devastating conflagration Oakland suddenlylose a substantialtax drought had dried out overgrown grass,

base in these poor economic times, but bushes,trees, and shrubs,making them

occurred in the scenichills they have since discoveredthat 30 per- easily ignitable. The parched leaves of

abovethe cities 01Oakland and cent of the homeowners have decided closely spacedeucalyptusand Monterey

Berkeley, on

Calilornia, October not to rebuild in the Hills. pine trees touched in certain areas and

overhung homes in others. Untreated

20, 1991.Burningembers The conflagration that day was so wood shingles were the predominant

carried by highwindsIrom the intensethat fIre fighters were helplessin roof covering for homes in the area.

their attempts to suppress it, and the Unprotected wood decks extended out

perimeter01a smallbut grow- affected residentssuddenlyfound them- from many of the homesand over slop-

ing dull lire ignitedovergrown selves encircled in flames, blinded by ing terrain that was covered with easily

smoke,and helplesslylooking for escape ignitable combustible vegetation. That

and

vegetation led to the lurther routes.One crew of fIre fighters felt they

day, unseasonably high temperatures,

ignition01tree crowns andcom- would be overrun by the fire storm, but low relative humidity, and strong winds

bustibleconstructionmaterials01 made a defensivestand when they real- pervaded the area, further setting the

ized they could not escape. Theymanned stage for potential disaster. The only

adjacent homes, including a

their hoselines and gathered clusterof atypical factors not found in other major

manywith wood-shingle rools. trapped civilians into a home that soon









.

wildland fires studied over the years

becamethreatened, and fought for their were the prolonged drought and a

The result was a major wildland/urban lives. Using large caliber hose lines to December freeze the year before that

interface fire that killed 25 people protect themselvesand to prevent igni- killed much of the native and ornamental

including a police officer and a fIre fight- tion of the home, they successfullysur- vegetation,making them evenmore sus-

er, injured 150 others, destroyednearly vived the fIre. ceptible to fire and adding to the total

,449 single-family dwellings and 437 fuel load in the area.

partment and condominium units, While fIre officials labeledthe causeof

burned over 1,600acres,and did an esti- the original fIre "suspicious,"the reasons With these factors at hand, once open

mated $1.5 billion in damage. for the fire's rapid spreadwere neither flaming occurred, the fire was pushed

Furthermore, not only did the city of suspicious nor surprising. A five-year beyondits original boundariesby fierce

up. In addition,the suddenand massive

to

buildupof fire fighters,summoned the

fIfe froni neighboringdepartments, soo~

overwhelmed radio and telephonetraffi...

making it nearlyimpossiblefor the inci-

dent commanders to coordinate fire

fighting activities.



These were the conditions confronting

fire fighters on the scene.The massive

firestormconditions kept fIre fighters on

the defensive throughoutthe conflagra-

tion, giving them no chanceto mount a

sustained and effective attack until

weatherconditionsimproved. Their only

hope until then was to slow the fire

spread whereand whentheycould.



The weather,which greatly affected the

growth and helped sustainthe flTe,even-

tually changedand ultimately helpedthe

S. RINGMAN, SIPA PRESS flTe fighters bring the flTe undercontrol.

By earlythe flTstevening,the winds died

winds that averaged 20 miles per hour confronted and which they would face down to a five-mile-per-hour breeze,

and gusted up to 35-50 miles per hour. for over 6 hours. Indicative of this nudging the flames back over areas

The flames then fed on the unbroken described rapid growth development and already burned and giving fire fighters

chain of dry vegetation and the com- spread of the Oakland Hills fire is the the time they neededto begin to bring

bustible construction materials of the fact that 790 homes were consumedin the flTe undercontrol. Fire fighters drew

homes.The fire was virtually out of con- the fIrst hour of thefire! a perimeteraroundthe flTe earlythe next

trol within only a few minutesof its start. morning, declared it contained by f- ,/

On-scenefire fighters tried to retreatto It is not surprising that the fire quickly

third day,and had it undercontrol by the"

the border of the fire but found that it overwhelmed the initial fire fighters,

fourth day.

was moving fasterthan they could repo- who fought valiantly. No fire depart-

sition their apparatus. Then with the ment, however, could have effectively The wildfire in the Oakland and

additional affects of the topography of intervenedat this point in suchan intense Berkeley Hills was the worst in

the land, the fIre beganto move in sever- fire. Further complicating its control California's history. It, like all fires,

al directions involving more homesand were the narrow winding roads and the holds many lessons. While the 1990

vegetation and soonbuilding into a mas- fIre's turbulent fury and blinding smoke StephanBridge Road fire in Michigan

sive fIrestorm. Whenthis critical level of conditionsthat restrictedand evenhalted showed that wildland/urban interface

a wildland fIre is reached,not only is its the fIre fighters' accessto the fIre area. fIfes can spreadrapidly over flat terrain,

intensity difficult to suppress, also its

but Furthermore,the steepslopeswithin the the Oakland Hills fire reminds us that

potential for spreading far beyond its hills, some at a 30-degree pitch, also similar spread phenomenoncan occur

current boundaries is inevitable. A facilitated fire spreadand further ham- evenin urban areasnot typically thought

fire storm involves massiveburning and pered fIre fighting; Congestionon those of as being included in the

needsan abundant amountof air in order roads, downed power lines, and flying wildland/urban interface. Oakland is a

to sustainitself, and sincethe fIre had no embers swirling along exit paths from large city, and while there are wooded

natural bounds,thereis plenty of air and severaldirections at once causednear- areas within its boundaries, residents

fuel for its continuedrapid, uncontrolled panic conditions amongresidentstrying may have thought they were immune to

growth. Then, this phenomenon creates to flee the fire. Faced with this, some wildfires. Unfortunately,wildland/urban

its own "wind" to supply air to the fIre, residentsabandoned their cars and start- interface fires can affect city residents

and when thesewinds combine with the ed running, worsening the congestion. too, so they, like the population in rural

strong prevailing winds, a turbulence Unfortunately, 25 people, mostly those America, have to be aware of the dan-

results that causesthe fIre to be unman- with little warning,were overrun by the gersandbe prepared.

As

ageable. the combustibles bum, buoy- of

rapid spread the fIre.

ant forces carry burning embersupward In its aftermath, many have qUestioned

where they eventually cool and deposit Where defensive standswere made by whetherthis fIfe typifies the fire of .

th

the still flaming materials on unaffected the fIre fighters,high winds overpowered is

future.The answer that it might.

areascreatingnumerousadditional fIres. gas

fire streams, lines ruptured,electrical

This was the chaosthat f11'e fighters fIrst power failed, and water reservoirsdried





4

Thegeneralarea in

whichthe fire occurred

is near the cities of

and

Oakland Berkeley,

The

California. area

the

includes major

commuting routes,

24

Highways and13, to

CUBE

J. SMALLEY/PICTURE J. SMALLE

thesecities andto San (/PICTURE CUBE NIST







face.The "interface" is whereman-made their homesfrom wildfIres worsened.On

Francisco, less than 20 miles and

developments wildland fuels meetat the same day as the famous Great

from the site. Thehighways a well-defined boundary. It is also an Chicago Fire, October 8, 1871,a lesser

alsoconnectto the Caldecott area where, becauseof its dense fuels, known but equally intense wildfire

wildland fires can and do occur. The destroyed the community of Peshtigo,

that

Tunnel providescommuters impact of wildfIres in the wildland/urban Wisconsin.An isolated lumber town sur-

accessto the bedroomcommu- interface has increased proportionately roundedby woods,Peshtigohad wooden

with the dramatic surge of people mov- sidewalksas well as combustibleroofs.

nities further north. ing to theseareas. The numberof people A dry summerand fall made vegetation

The various residences within the movingto andbuilding in wildland areas to

more susceptible fIre, and high winds

Oakland and Berkeley Hills are located has grown dramatically over the last 25 spreadit rapidly. Whenthe fire wasover,

~ong the mountain-liketerrain that rise the

years increasing risk of a devastating the community had been leveled, and

from the base of their cities. To the fire. Our population has glorified the 800 people in and around Peshtigohad

casual observer,the homes are camou- tranquility of life in the woods.Nowhere died. That day approximately300people

is that more evident than in California. perishedin the GreatChicagofIre. This

flaged by vegetation and perhaps only

narrow windy roads are detectable. The But this tranquility is not without associ- combination of dry vegetation, com-

homesitesprovide a panoramic view of atedrisks. and

bustible construction, high winds has

SanFrancisco,Oakland,the GoldenGate been a factor in virtually every wild-

Before such wildlands were settled, land/urban interfacefIre.

Bridge, and the San FranciscoBay, thus

wildfIfes would commonlyoccur but the

providing an ideal setting for a home.

fires would have a cleansing effect on One wildland fire of more recent times

Becauseof its setting, the Oakland and

the forests,clearing out thick standsof was the Santa Barbara "Paint" Fire in

Berkeley Hills have been a magnet for

trees and consumingweakenedor dead June 1990, which had many similarities

people seekingto "get away from it all"

vegetation.They would spawnnew life to the fire in the OaklandHills. Preceded

while still having accessto it all. Many

into the forest. As man began to move by a four-year drought,the arson-caused

peopleworked a lifetime to afford hous-

closer to the forests, many of the fires fIre was ignited during a time of record

es in the area, most of which cost more

also beganto consume homesand some- heat and was spread by fierce winds,

than a million dollars each. The homes

times lives along with vegetation.With some as high as 60 miles per hour.

varied in designand construction,but, in

the

man's entrance, cleansingbenefit of Flammable wood shingle roofs were a

general, most were wood frame con-

the fires and other natural effects were major factor in the fire that killed one

struction and most were single-family

We

changed. beganto suppress fIfes,the person and destroyed $250 million of

detacheddwellings. There was, howev-

this

as we well should,but in a sense can public and private buildings, including

er, a 400-unit apartment complex near

the

have the effect of increasing severity 438 family dwellings, a 28-unit apart-

the entranceto the CaldecottTunnel and

of wildfires if other measuresare not mentcomplex,and 15businesses.

a cluster of hundreds of townhomes in

the Hiller Highlandarea. imposed.

Closerto Oaklandand also similar to the

Even in colonial times, when virtually 1991 fire was the wildfire northeastof

a'erhaps not known to those moving into

every settlement formed its own mini Berkeley, which began in September

.r already living in the Hills was that

wildland/urban interface, wildfire must 1923.It spreadquickly, moving from the

they were living in an area having the

have terrified the settlers.As towns and fields to structuresin the city within two

of

characteristics a wildland/urbaninter-

villages grew, the dangerto people and hours of ignition. The fire burned 130





5

acres, 584 buildings, and caused $10 and "backfiring" to remove adjacent urban fires are likely to be structural,

million in damages. fuels. This procedureworks againstthe people put their emphasison preparing

need to protect individual homes. for those fires and forget the dangers

Furthennore, in September1970, a fire Committing major resourcesto protect- they'll face in a fast-moving wildlance

in the East Bay Hills southeastof the ing individual homescan lessen abil-

the fire.

University of California Berkeley cam- ity to controlthe wildfire.

pus destroyed38 homes,damaged7 oth- for

To compensate thesespecialproblem

ers, and caused$3.5 million in damages. Another serious problem in wildland areas,someareasin California are legal-

Ironically, some of the homesdestroyed fIres is that wildland fIre-fighting tactics ly designated as hazardous fire areas

in that fire were rebuilt, then destroyed differ from structural fire-fighting tac- where special fire protection measures

againin the 1991blaze. tics, and expertsin one type of fIre may are required. The law defines a haz-

not be trained or equippedto handlethe ardous fife area as any land covered by

December1980 sawyet anotherfIfe, this othertype. The fIrst responding units in a grass,grain, brush,or forest, privately or

one emerging from Wildcat Canyon wildland/urban interface fire are some- publicly owned, that is so inaccessible

located just north of the 1991 fire in times from agencies primarily concerned that a fire there would be abnormally

Berkeleyto destroy6 homesandinjure 3 with wildland fires. However, they can hard to suppress.In practice, however,

peoplewithin 20 minutes. also come from agencies whose main areas wherebuildings canbe accessed by

experience and expertise is in battling to

pavedroads aren't considered present

After the 1923 wildflTe in Berkeley,the structuralfIres. abnormally difficult fire suppression

City Council passedlegislationrequiring

problems,and so they aren't considered

fire-resistive wood coverings for roofs, It is not unusual for people in major hazardous under the law. All the resi-

then rescinded the legislation before it cities like Oaklandand Berkeleyto have dences in the Oakland Hills fire were

could take effect. The Oakland area difficulty believing that a major wildfIre by

accessible paved roads,howevernar-

destroyed in the 1991 fire had no local can happen in their area. Most city row and winding, so they were not desig-

flTe protection regulations on flTe-resis- dwellers consider their surroundingsto fife

natedashazardous areas.

tive roofs. Ironically, this issue still has be more urban than rural. Since most

not beenfully resolvedin this country. Cross-training of fire fighters can go a







.

long way toward solving these tactical

a

In 1982,Berkeleydesignated sectionof

problems.Justas important,however,is

the city as the HazardousHill Fire Area.

passageof sensible fire safety regUla

This designation included a rigorous tions that prohibit dangerousbuilding

inspection program. In June 1991, four

practices and mandate regular inspec-

months before the fire, Berkeley passed

tions to ensure adequateclearance for

an ordinancerequiring ClassA roofs in a

vegetation.Too often,public supportfor

specific area. However, the area of the

those requirementsis lacking. Finally,

by

city consumed the fITewas not part of

residentshave a responsibility for their

that designated area.

safetyas well. At a minimum, they must

Aside from their susceptibilityto dry, hot make themselvesaware of the wildfire

air, abundantparched vegetation, high potential in their areas and seek out

winds, and combustibleconstruction,all appropriate vegetation and design for

these wildland/urban interface areas their landscaping.

sharedone other risk factor: a different

level of fire protection. One of the

ironies of the migration out of cities and

into rural areasis that amongthe things

people "get awayfrom" are city services

like fire protection. People take it for

granted in the city, tend to balk at its

extra cost in rural areas,and don't even

miss it until they need it, when suddenly

they realize it may not be as quickly

it

availableas theyhad assumed to be.



Fire protection agenciesface special

problemsin wildland/urbaninterfaceset-

tings. Established for

procedures control-

ling wildfires include sacrificing some

acresby preparinga perimeterfIre break





G

Severewildland/urban

interfacefires are

seldomdueto oneor

two physicalfactors.

a

Generally, combina-

tion of factors work in

tandem, spawning and

nurturing the catastro-

J. SMALLEY {PICTURE CUBE J. SMALlEY/PtCTURECUBE

phe.Those factors in

anygivenfire are rarely Besideshaving a high resin contentlike vegetationadjacentto combustiblepor-

the Monterey pine and chaparral, the tions of the homeswas a significantigni-

unique. eucalyptus has long, dry, shaggy bark tion scenarioin this flfe.

that can ignite easily. Further,its lower

The elementsat play in the Oaklandand

limbs often barely clear the ground and The chaparralis native to California and

Berkeley Hills included the usuaf high

provide a "ladder-fuel" arrangement that grows on more acrid sites. Its leavesand

temperature, low-humidity, and high-

can spreadfIre (by convectioncurrents) needleshold low levels of moisture,and

wind conditionstypical of all suchfIres;

quickly up to the crowns, which ignite, it has a widely known and well-deserved

a mix of easilyignitable duff-or forest-

greatly increasethe intensity of the fIre, reputation for ready flammability and

floor material; shrubs and trees; inade-

and rapidly spreadit beyondestablished fastrate of fIfe spread.

quate vegetation clearance; and.

fIre department perimeters. The eucalyp-

ood-frame homes, some with wood The burning of the chain of fuels in wild-

tus treeswere the most prevalentof the

hingle roofs and overhanging wood land fIres usually begins with the igni-

tall vegetationin the fIre area,and were

decks. Together they combined to pro- tion of grass, which is a light-weight,

estimatedto have releasedover 70 per-

ducea fIrestorm of suchgreatmagnitude easilyignited fuel.

cent of the energyproducedby the com-

that it could not be stopped.

bustionof the vegetation.

Grassy areas respond more quickly to

Monterey pine, chaparral, grass, and precipitationchanges than forestedareas

ornamentalspeciessuchas junipers and do. In the rITearea,a sharpfluctuation in

The fields of native oak trees that once cedarswere also commonin the mix of precipitation occurred in the spring and

occupied the Oakland/Berkeley Hills vegetationin the Hills. All but the grass of

summer 1991.Marchhad beena rainy

beganto be harvestedas the population have high resin content and can ignite month,providing the moisturenecessary

in

in the areagrew and prospered the late readily. Eachhas the ability, once ignit- for the grassto grow. But, the summer

1800s. In their place were planted mil- ed, to produce fire intense enough to was hot and dry, making the once-lush

lions of eucalyptustrees thoughtto be a ignite othercombustibles arecapable

and grass, which covered wide stretchesof

fast growing, hard wood, perfect for use of producing airborne embers that are the land, a rich source of dry fuel. Dry

as railroad ties and furniture. carriedfar from the burning site. a

grassenables rITeto move quickly over

Unfortunately,this was not the caseand the land, but it is when the grass fire

large standsof eucalyptustreesare com- The Monterey pine, also characterized comes in contact with "heavier fuels"

mon in the Hills. Farmers also planted by its low-growing limbs, is present that the chain continues. While grass

the trees to take advantageof their stur- throughoutthe Hills in thick stands.Not fires don't easily ignite tree canopies,

diness as windbreaks. The wind they only canthe Montereypine "crown" eas- they do ignite the ladder fuels, and the

protected against spread their seeds ily, it will also sustain a crown fire, flames thenquickly move up to the inter-

throughout the Hills, so that now the which again can out pace fire suppres- mediate limbs, eventually engulfing the

eucalyptuscoversthe areain thick, large sion crews. The juniper and cedar are tops of the trees.

stands. Man beganto encroach more and mostly presentas ornamentalvegetation

_~ore into the Hills and eventuallybegan around many homes. A dry-climate Another item that played an important

wu build homesthere and further brought species,the juniper also ignites easily role in the continuity of the fuel chain in

with him an assortment of additional and bums intensely.Cedarsare similar. this fire was the assortmentof brush,

vegetation. of

Placement theseand otherornamental which is also a heavierfuel and tendsto

smolder, burn longer, and spew off Clearances.One of the fundamentals of

embers.In the Hills there was an abun- residential fire protection in wildland

dance of scrub brush known as French areasis the creationof safety zones,or Combustible construction materials o~

broom.This fuel also helpedincrease the fire breaks, around individual homes. the homesin the fire areaalso played ~

of

intensityof and further spread the fIre. Reducingthe amountof fuel immediate- importantrole in the devastatingeffects

ly around the home helps prevent fire of the fire. Specifically,the combustible

Thenthere are the treesthemselves, very spreadto the structureor from the struc- materials used for porches, siding, and

heavy fuels which sustain burning for ture. In the OaklandHills area,however, roofing finish wereidentified.

long periods of time. When fire climbs many homeowners did not take that

the fuel ladderto the tree crown, it easily basic precaution. The result was that Roof construction in the Oakland Hills

ignites adjacenttree tops with heatradi- embersignited vegetation,which in turn area varied and included asphalt shin-

ated and convectedto them. Thoseareas ignited homes,and massiveembersfrom gles, ceramic tiles, and wood shingles.

of the Hills that experienced crown fife

a burning structures were driven by the Despitethe variety, the vast majority of

showed the area had an intense fire. winds to other areas where they, too, the homeshad combustibleroofs. Roofs

Heavier fuels, characteristically, once ignited the fuel chain that led to destruc- are not all created equal. Some offer

ignited, can bum for days until con- tion. more protection from fire than others.

sumed or extinguishedthrough a labor- Class A roofs protect againstfIre brands

intensiveeffort. Juniper and other vegetation were in weighing more than four pounds.Class

somecasesright up against and touching C roofs offer much less defense,with-

Further contributing to the available homes. Eucalyptus and Monterey pine standingbrands weighing no more than

fuels of this fire were the leaves and treestouchedeachotherand spreadover one third of an ounce, or aboutthe size

branches of the eucalyptus trees and the roofs of houses. Further, shrubs, of a kitchenmatch.Untreatedwood shin-

ornamental vegetation in the fire area small trees, and other vegetation were gle roofs offer evenlessprotection.New

that had beenkilled by an unusualfreeze allowed to grow under the overhanging treatments suchaspressure treatmentcan

the previous December.This made the wood decksof somehomes,providing a improve the ignition resistanceof wood

trees easyto ignite, which addedto the ready path for fire spreadto the build- roofing. Yet, even roofs whose wood

already abundant and volatile natural ings. Steepslopes also acceleratedthe shingleshave beendipped in fire retar-

fuel mixture in the area. fIre spread. dant (another current method) can lose

due

their protectivetreatment to weathera

of

Regardless the way in which this just The Hills residents who thought they ing. To maintaintheir protectivecoatin.

describedmix of fuels becomesignited, werefar awayfrom the rising smokecol- theseshinglesshouldbe treatedvirtually

it is not only the intensity of the resulting by

umnbeganto be bombarded a shower everyyear, which is, of course,impracti-

the

fIre that causes rapid spread,but also of burning embersthat ignited the vege- cal.

their ability to cause "spotting" that tation around their homes.Many tried to

makes wildfires so dangerous.Spotting extinguishthosefIres with gardenhoses The roof is the mostvulnerablepart of a

is the carrying of burning leaves and to no avail. building in a fire. That vulnerability is

embers by the wind or the convection if

dramaticallyincreased the roof iscov-

column from the fIre to unaffectedareas, Evidence of the benefit of adequate ered with untreatedwood shingles.Over

which then ignite combustible roofs, clearance was abundant in the aftermath time, rain, weathering, and the sun

ornamental shrubsand bushes, and other of the fIre. In some cases,homes facing crackedthe shinglesand curled them up

vegetation.Strong winds and the in-rush one street survived the fire, while homes so they became effective embercatchers.

of air needed for the fire's combustion also facing the street on the opposite In more than one case,a home with a

process are the driving forces behind block were destroyed. That is because wood shingleroof was severely damaged

spotting. The long leaves of eucalyptus the combined backyard distance, when or burnedto the ground,while homeson

trees are especially susceptibleto spot- not filled with an overgrowth of vegeta- either side of it with clay tile roofs were

ting. Their shapeand light weight give tion, slowed the fIre enough for effective relatively undamaged. Many of the roofs

them airfoil characteristics. They float fire suppression. Among the common were flat or sloped with overhanging

along easily in a wind. Spotting was a factors that surviving homes shared was eaves.Overhanging eavesposea danger

major factor in the spread of this fire, a large, clear yard. becausethey are exposedon the under-

and a major reason initial fire crews side to burning vegetation.Further, flat

could not containthe fIre. Thesenumer- Large thick stands of the trees can also roofs were able to collect fallen leaves

ous secondaryfires caused by spotting benefit through proper clearances. and needles, and burning embers.Roofs

can combine into a massive firestorm Thinning of the stands to reduce the like- on the three-story, wood-frame

and/or spreadfIre suppression forces so lihood of heat radiating from a fire and Parkwood Apartments were flat and

thin, over a suchwide area,that they are igniting adjacent trees has proven to be

illustrated such an ignition scenari6

ineffective. an effective method to slow the spread of when many of the roofs beganto bu.

a wildland flfe.

intensely.







8

Some roofs were built of clay tile and Fourth, homes on steep slopes were Rainfall in the Oakland and Berkeley

terminatedat the edge of exterior walls. extremely vulnerable. Due to preheating Hills area had been particularly low

IAThis type of roof covering performed of vegetation, the fIfe ran up steep slopes before the fire. For five years prior to

.-:nuch better in the perimeter areas like flames up an upturned match. Some 1991, the area had experienced drought

because fire fighters could extinguish of the slopes in the fIfe area were at a 58 conditions. Coupled with the lack of pre-

embers before the roof could become percent, or 30-degree,pitch. That made it cipitation was especially low relative

ignited. as difficult for fIfe fighters to traverse as humidity-the ratio of the amount of

it was easy for the fIfe to travel. Further, moisture in a volume of air to the total

Virtually every major wildland/urban building on a slope often means there is that the air can hold at a given tempera-

interface fIre in recent years has spread an open area under the house. This open ture and atmospheric pressure.

faster than it otherwise might have or has area poses a major exposure to flame

increased the amount of damage because fronts and radiant energy, and provides a Relative humidity and temperature are

of wood shitigle roofs. clear path for fIfe spread to the structure interrelated. As the temperature rises,

itself. In this fIfe, there was another criti- relative humidity drops. If the tempera-

There are five other noteworthy points cal factor in building on slopes. Once the ture rises by 200F, the relative humidity

about residential construction and this fIfe reached, ignited, and consumed the will drop by about 50 percent. Relative

wildflfe: humidity controls the moisture content of

home, structural collapse occurred,

allowing burning automobiles to roll fuels, and therefore their susceptibility to

First, most of the townhouses in the

from garages and down the slopes. These fIre. Fuels with 20 percent moisture can

Hiller Highlands subdivision were

automobiles blocked the roads for sup- catch fire; light fuels with 2 percent

attached. Vegetation spread throughout

pression crews and evacuating residents. moisture can bum like gasoline. Relative

many of the open areas and touched

humidity in the Oakland and Berkeley

some of the buildings. The fire took Fifth, the contribution of wood framing Hills on the day of the fIre was 16 per-

aboutan hour to move throughthe com- to the overall spread of the fire was cent, while the temperature was 920F, a

munity and destroy every building in

to

insignificantcompared the role of eas- record high that surpassedprevious highs

sight. But, largely due to the spacingof

ily ignitable vegetation, combu&tible by 6 degrees. The combination of

the units, the burning was more charac-

roofing and siding, and burning brands. drought and low relative humidity dried

teristic of an urban conflagrationthan a

Failure of wood-framingmembers to led out the vegetation, eliminating whatever

typical wildland/urban interface fire. structural collapse,but only after a long potential it might have had to resist or

.nce a unit or severalunits were ignited, and intense exposure that far exceeded slow down flames. Any open flaming

the raging fire easily negated the one-

conditionshumanscould havesurvived. held the potential of causing a disaster.

hour fire walls separating the units.

Soon,blocks of the building burned,and Wind. Of all the weatherelements affect-

that, too, affected the conflagration's ing wildland fIres,wind is the mostvari-

spread. Weathercontributesas much to the life able and leastpredictable.The shapeof

of a wildfire as the fuels do. the terrain and local heating and cooling

the

Second, lower floor of the Parkwood

Temperature,lack of precipitation, and affect wind behavior. In turn, wind

Apartments included a concrete-rein-

humidity provide the conditionsfor a fire affectsfIres by carrying away moisture-

forced garage for cars. That concrete

to start, and wind nourishes the blaze, the

ladenair, hastening drying of vegeta-

structure survived the fIfe well, and the

spreadingit throughspotting or by caus- tion, adding oxygen to a fire, carrying

cars parked inside incurred little or no

ing direct flame impingement on com- burning embers that ignite other com-

damage, showing the benefit of fire-

bustibles. bustibles, and pushing flames in the

resistiveconstruction.

direction of virgin fuels. Wind, in short,

Third, the fire provided further evidence Like the vegetativefuels themselves,the strongly influences the direction of

that double-pane windows appear to different weather characteristics work spreadof a wildfIre. Nearly 90 percentof

resist breakageand reducethe transmis- togetherto form a systemthat is either the large southernCalifornia wildfire~

sion of radiant energyin a fire, especial- hospitableor inhospitable wildfIre.

to in

documented the lastthreequartersof a

ly in the perimeter areas of the burn. century have taken place between

Moisture. The moisture content of fuels September and December-the season

Such windows in dwellings in the

is a critical variable. Naturally, the drier of the Santa Ana winds. Those winds

Oakland Hills for the most part helped

it

the fuel, the more susceptible is to fife. come less frequently to northern

protect the interiors of the homes. Even

The moisture in fuels comes from rain- California,but they do occurthere.

in areasof maximumfire intensity,they

fall andrelativehumidity. Averageannu-

showedtheir protectivepotential. In one

al rainfall along some parts of the Dry easterlywinds that average8 to 25

case, even when the outer panes of a

northernCalifornia coastcan be as low miles per hour, and dry northeasterly

.indow crackeddue to intenseheat, the

as 20 to 30 inches, althoughother areas winds that average 15 to 30 miles per

interior panesremainedintact.

in the state can experienceas much as hour are prevalentin northernCalifornia

150inches. from July throughSeptember. That peri-





9

od is one of critical fire danger. So- The Red Flag program deals with the minute, and then the next minute it was

called "Diablo" winds occur in the area extremeend of the fIfe rating system- behind them. The winds preheated

in May and October.Thesewinds occur when the CDF foreseesextremecondi- everything in their path. These condi-6-

when an inversion layer builds up in the tions they put up red flags and broadcast tions createda totally unmanageable sit-.

Bay area and forces air moving west warnings so fIfe officials can take extra uation rife with terror for residents

from the San JoaquinValley to speedup As

precautions. the CDF anticipated, the caught up in it and struggling to find a

as it movesdownthe west,or lee,side of Diablo wind phenomenon occurred way out of the area.

the hills. When it can go no furtherlater- October 20. Early that day, the winds

ally, it moves up and over the ridges and shifted to the northeastand the relative Another phenomenonthat led to rapid

then down. As it flows downward, it humidity dropped. Wind velocity spreadof the fIre was developmentof a

increases temperature.

in increased the high teensand low twen-

to thermal inversionlayer. The smoke and

ties. By the time the fIfe rekindled, the heat from a fire will rise only until their

Therewas virtually no wind on Saturday, wind in the Oakland Hills was blowing temperature equalsthat of the surround-

October19,the daybeforethe conflagra- at 17 miles per hour, with gusts to 25 ing air. Then,the smokeand heat flatten

tion, just a five-mile-per-hour breeze miles per hour. Somereports of condi- out and spreadhorizontally. The thermal

from the northeast. Nevertheless, the tions later in the day said winds were inversion layer during the OaklandHills

California Departmentof Forestry and gustingto 38-58miles perhour. fIre was at 3,500 feet. The layer trapped

Fire Protection(CDF) issueda Red Flag heat from the fire and spread it out,

warning that day and the following day. The Diablo winds are "foehn" winds that adding to the preheating of vegetation

The reasonwas that a stronghigh-pres- force the convection currents down in

and structures the area.

sure area in Oregonand the Great Basin against the natural flow that normally

on Saturday was threatening to send blows up the hills. The result in this fIfe By approximately7 p.m. on Sunday,the

strong northerly winds to the Hills area was wild turbulencethat sentembersin winds slowed to about five miles per

and lower the relative humidity. severaldirections.The phenomenon was hour. They also shifted and began to

Actually, precursorsof those winds had a swirling effect much like a tornado, blow over the areasalreadyburned.The

moved into the area a week before and picking up embers from one place and combination of decreasedvelocity and

replacedthe moisture-laden that nor-

air depositing them in another. From the changein directionto an areaof virtually

mally would have swept in from the perspective of the fire fighters on the no live fuel helped fIfe fightersbring the

Pacific. scene,the fIfe was in front of them one fIfe undercontrol.









10

KlVU-lV/OAKlANO

I

Originandspread.Thearea around the perimeter. Only one section growing fire. By 11:15 a.m., the fire

of fIre-line constructionwas undertaken. blew out of the canyonand within min-

where the fire started was a the

Fire fighting forcessoaked restof the utes it was out of control.

"box canyon"with steepslopes perimeterwith water from hoselines and

At fIrst, the fIre ran uphill from its point

andcontoursthat hadformed helicopterdrops.

of origin to Grizzly Peak Boulevard.

over the years from wind and Within and outside the burn there was Then, the winds changedand blew the

water drainage.Once ignited, densecoverageof Monterey pines, and fire in several directions at the same

duff underthose pines was abouta foot time. A classic foehn wind also pushed

are

fuelswithin a canyon pre- deep. Further,the heatfrom the fife pro- the fire downhill toward Buckingham

.heated, canmore easilyignite, duced greater-than-normalneedle cast Place as fast as it was going uphill. In

from the pine trees, which added fresh minutes,the winds shifted again and the

_nd are more apt to further kindling to accumulatedduff about the fire spread eastward toward the

ignite adjacentcombustibles. fire area. It is known by wildland fire ParkwoodApartmentsnearthe Caldecott

fighters that fire burns freely in the top Tunnel. Another wind shift sent the

Strongupslopewinds arealso common layer of duff in such fife scenarios,but flames southwest toward the townhomes

in canyons. Winds are drawnin from the smoldersdeepwithin the duff because of in the Hiller Highlands.Pine trees in the

bottom (especiallyon warm days)which the lack of oxygen. Water extinguishes areacrowned and other vegetationburst

and

further preheat dry fuels. The the surfaceflames but combineswith ash into flames. Soonhomeswere threatened

"walls" of the canyonthen containthe and charcoalto form a crust; the smol- to

and fIre fighters scrambled containthe

heatfrom a fIre. As a result,fIres in dering continuesunder the crust, some- the

fIre. Then,spottingspread fIre across

canyonsare an efficient mechanism for times for days. Highway 24 and pointed it toward Lake

intenseburning. Temescal. Meanwhile, another flame

When the fIfe fighters thought they had front rushed northwest toward the

The fIre in this canyonmight haveerupt- extinguished the fire early Saturday Claremont Hotel and into the city of

ed a day earlier than it did had the day evening, they left the scene. Early

not beenunusuallycalm for that time of Berkeley.

Sundaymorning, they returnedto "mop

year. On Saturday,October 19, a fIre of The spotting soon turned the fire into

up."

suspicious origin started near 7151 numerous large fIfes. The winds causeda

BuckinghamDrive; an areanear the top Overnight, however, the heat buried in downward acceleration as the fire

of the Hills near Grizzly PeakBoulevard. the duff at the fIre site intensified.So too descended along the ridge between

But the almost pleasant,five-mile-per- did the local winds. By IO:45.a.m. Marlborough Terrace and Hiller

hour breeze was too gentle to push the Sunday,while fire fighters were on the Highlands consuming everything in its

flames very far from their point of ori- scenemopping up, sparks burst out of path. The fIfe burned with suchintensity

gin. Sixteen engine companies, four the duff. They were quickly picked up by that it consumed 790 structures within

patrol wagons, and a helitac unit from~reaconvectivecurrentsandcarriedby strong the first hour, arid spread about 1.67

fire departments aggressively winds out of the northeast portion of the metersper second.

yttacked the 5-acre fire and brought it fIre areato nearbyvegetation. The winds

under control in about three hours. Fire (17 miles per hour, gusting to 25 miles The fIre also sweptaroundthe mouth of

fighters relied heavily on wet lines per hour) actedlike bellows on the now the CaldecottTunnel into the area south







11

of Highway 24. Parts of the Upper mind that the OaklandHills wildfIre was However,before reachingthe fIrestonn

Rockridgeareaignited due to winds and not particularly intenseand hot as wild- level, a fire passes through another

spotting. By noon, the fire had burned fIres go. WildfIres of this type, with the phase.The fuels combine with wind and

about40 percentof the areaultimatelyto mix of fuels primed to burn and the high to

temperature build a fIre into a confla-

be affected. Included at this time were winds to nourish and spreadthe flames, gration,typical of the kind that occasion-

the ParkwoodApartmentsand the Hiller can easily reach 2,000 degrees F and ally devastates cities. Examplesinclude

Highland townhomes. But as the fire can

spreadfasterthana person run. the Chelsea,Massachusetts, conflagra-

spread south and west, it slowed some- tion in the late 1970s and the Great

what becausethe land there was flatteI The Oakland Hills fire, as many other Chicago Fire of the last century.

and there was more open space. By 5 wildland/urbaninterfacefIres, developed Conflagrations need the right weather

and

p.m., coolertemperatures decreasing fIrestormconditions. Within 15 minutes and climatic conditions to continue

wind velocity halted the fire's advance, of ignition of the fIrst structure,the fire building in intensity. When the intensity

but the intensity of the fire, much of it developedinto at leastone and possibly reachesconflagrationand then fIrestonn

of

coming from thousands burning struc- two firestorms. proportions, the fire can develop a fire

tures,would require manymore hoursof front that will actuallymove away from

burning before it would subside. Firestormsdevelopwhenthe heat,gases, the directionof the wind.

and motion of a fIfe build up to the point

where they begin to create their own The OaklandHills fire achievedall three

Intensity weather and wind, independent of the of theseconditions. The hot, dry, high-

The fire that raged in the Hills was terri- external conditions. Firestorms pull air speedwinds, and dry, overgrown,close-

fying. It reachedtemperatures high as1,000

as into the baseof the ft;re,the fIfe beginsto ly spaced vegetation triggered a

degrees F, hot enough to boil feed itself, and towering convection ~onfl~gration that built up to firest°nf

mtenslty and eventually developedsev- -

asphalt.Temperatures reachedcremato- columns result in long-distancespotting

rium-level. Still, it's importantto keepin andtornado-likevortices. eral fife fronts. The combinationof spot-







12

ting and wind-driven flames spreadthe the streetat 7200and the houseat 7235. spread of the fire. Additional units

fIfe in severaldirections at once. But as They fought valiantly, holding positions responding to the area found adjacent

the fire swept west, it slowed when it until the last possibleminute. The wind areasbuniing too, and began to engage

reached flatter terrain and less open was so strong that it bent500-GPMhose those fires. However, they also found

space. Still, the topography in other streams(at 100 psi) 90 degrees. Seventy- that the fires were overrunning their

areas, such as Broadway Terrace, kept five-GPM streams were completelyinef- positions. That was the early picture

the fIfe burning fiercely. By 5 p.m., cool- fective. Air attackswere also ineffective, being relayed to the incident command

er temperatures and a dramaticdecrease at leastduring the fJrstthreehoursof the structurefrom all respondingunits. Such

in wind halted the fire's progress. In fIre due to strong winds, the continuous unprecedented and rapid fire spread

effect, nature gave the fire back to the fuel chain, and heavy smoke that made it impossibleto establisha coordi-

fIfe fighters so they could bring it under obscuredvisibility. Residents,off-duty natedattack.

control. In the 10 hours the fIfe roared teachers, and other civilians helped fIre

through the Oakland and BerkeleyHills fighters, and the Oakland and Berkeley Coordination of the attack by the inci-

it ignited one building every11 seconds. departmentsused wildland tactics like dentcommandwas alsohampered the by

bulldozing fIre breakswhere that seemed inability to directly communicate with

advantageous. Thosetactics only helped mutual aid fire departments arriving

alongthe eastand westflanks of the fIre. from aroundthe state.There was plenty

Public-protection-agency response the

to of fIre for all arriving units, however,so

fire was massiveand swift. But the fire fighters' fIrst reactionto the fIre wasto they beganto stakeout areasfor a defen-

was, too. Fire behavior was so extreme retreat to perimeter areas, attack the sive stand. The efforts of mutual aid

.~at fire fighters could not savethe resi- fIre, and summonhelp. While additional companies were complicatedhoweverby

9dence at 7151 Buckingham Boulevard, alarmswerebeing sent,however,the ini-tial the lack of compatibility of their hose

near the point of its origin. They were, crews could not establisheffective connectionswith Oakland's hydrantsys-

however, able to save the house across perimeter areas because of the rapid tem.







13



Fire

One fire fighter died while shielding a The steep hills interfered with radio

woman from a live power line that fell transmissions, especially those from

on both of them. A police officer waskilled hand-held radios. Finally, communica-a

while trying to lead residents ofthe tions between Oakland and Berkeley.

Hiller Highlands neighborhood to were hamperedbecausethe direct-dial

safety when they were overrun by the tactical line (TAC) that links East Bay

fIfe. was

fire departments down.



Despite the many hindrances, fIfe fight-

ers did their bestto control this blaze.In

Incident Command System (ICS) the end, however, the fire followed its

developed by the Southern California own course. There really was little fIfe

Fire Serviceand the U.S. ForestService fighters could do until the winds subsid-

in the 1970sallows for unification and ed.

coordination of multiple jurisdictions

to

responding a fIfe.



Virtually no water-supplysystemmighthave

for

beenadequate a wildfIre of this

magnitude. Eleven pressurezoneswere

in the district, nine of which were affect-

ed by the fire. There were one or more

reservoirs per zone, each with between

400,000 and one million gallons of

water.Pumpingstationslinked the reser-

voirs, and draw-downs from the reser-

voirs activated them. However,therewas

E. LEDESMA,SIPAPRESS

no auxiliary powersupply.

The coordinationof the activities of this

manyresponders was extremelydifficult The entire systemhad beendesignedf04

Commandand coordinationof fife units due to the intensity and rapid spreadof nomlal operations. Emergencyreserves

improved as time went on, but they were this fire. Coordination was worsened were in placeto minimize temporarydis-

never ideal. As weather conditions the

because communications systemwas ruptions, and f!re fighting reserveswere

improved,it became possibleto establish quickly overwhelmedby the volume of among them. The fire fighting reserves

perimeter areas. Fire crews were still telephoneand radio traffic generated by were designed for "nomlal" fires. This

subjectedto the full intensity of the fife, responding and

elements the public, who wasno nomlal f!re.

but they were now able to effectively werepleadingfor information.

suppress ignition of homes.Crews could

break the chain of combustiblesthat had During the first 12 hours of the fire,

earlier led to the total destruction of conimunications after fire spread,were

homes.Hosestreams became effective in the biggestproblem that public agencies

faced. The result was uncoordinated

extinguishing burning vegetation,wood

siding, and spotfifes on roofs. Still, they action,losing requestsfor resources,and

were helpless in extinguishingthe rapid to

an inability of field commanders get

an accuratepicture of overall suppres-

propagation caused by the ignition of

homeswith wood shingles. sion efforts and resources committed or

available.Field commanders resortedto

There is little doubt regardingthe effec- self-assigning their units where they

tive role fIre fighters played in the reduc- thoughttheywereneeded. The rapid spreadof fire causednumer-

tion of loss of life and property in this ous power failures. As housesincinerat-

fIre. The fIre scenariothey fIrst encoun- Oakland Dispatch Center had notelephone

ed, their water service lines ruptured.

tered stackedthe cards againstthem, yet lines reserved for outgoing The result was a drain on reservoirs,

in spite of this they fought the fire calls. As available incoming lines were sincethe water kept flowing. For exam-

flooded with calls, dispatcherscould not ple, ruptured water lines at the burning

assumingthey would not survive. Their

valiant efforts began to payoff as the make outgoing calls. Radio frequencies, Parkwood Apartments complex draine~;i

winds subsided and the fire spread including the mutual aid frequencies, reservoirsin that zone. That led to aban-WJ

sloweddown. were saturated.Somefield elements tried donmentof suppression efforts in other

reachingdispatchon cellular telephones. areasof the zone becausehydrants ran





14



The

dry. In one area,watertendersand other

fire engines transported water to fire

on

t companies the scene.



Eight pumping stations and 10 residen-

tial reservoirswere lost in the first half-

hour of the fIre due to power disruptions

to pumping stations. By 5 p.m. on

Sunday,the fIrst day of the fIre, 10 key

reservoirs were dry. It is estimatedthat

more than 20 million gallons of water

wereusedto extinguishthis fire.



Oakland's fire hydrants have one or

more standardthree-inch-thread outlets.

Other California cities and towns have

hydrantswith two-and-a-half-inch-thread

outlets. Except for those departmentsin

cities immediately adjacentto Oakland,

to whom Oakland had previously sup-

OAKLAND

R. WARWICK. TRIBUNE

plied the appropriateadapters, respond-

ing fIfe departments could not connectto

the hydrants.Those few departments that

did have the required adapters usually

left thembehind whenthey were overrun

by the fire, and therefore did not have

them when they got to their next posi-

tion.



.ven if the water supply system had

beengreater, therehad beenan emergen-

cy power supply, and the hydrants all

had the two-and-a-half-inch offi-

threads,

cials question whether it would have

mademuchdifferencein a fire as violent

as

and widespread this one.



Narrow roads

Another major hindranceto fIfe fighting

was the systemof narrow,winding roads

M. MAGOR, OAKLAND TRIBUNE

in the fIfe area, manyof which endedin

cul-de-sacs. Fire apparatus could not Road.Eight othersdied on narrowstreets requested one engine company each

pass each other or the cars filled with in the samearea. from Alameda,Alameda Naval Station,

fleeing residents. Traffic jams devel- Emeryville,LawrenceBerkeleyLab, and

oped,especiallynearthe large apartment Mutualaid SanLeandro.It then askedContra Costa

complex. Many apartment residents and SanFranciscofor 10 enginecompa-

abandoned their cars in frustration so Mutual aid for the Oakland Fire one

nies each.Berkeleyrequested engine

they could run to safety.The abandoned Department is secured through the companyeachfrom Albany, Emeryville,

cars,in turn, servedas roadblocksto fIfe Alameda County Fire Mutual Aid Plan. and Lawrence Berkeley Lab, and two

fighters and other residents. Downed Inter-regional resourcesare mobilized strike teams from Alameda County.

power lines further impeded evacuation through the State Fire and Rescue Between11:40 a.m. on October20 and 5

down the narrow roads. Someapparatus Coordinatorof the Office of Emergency p.m. on October23, fIfe officials placed

Services.

and private vehicles were trapped for(I'°urs 17separate for

requests mutual aid.

on theseroads.

Within an hour after the fire erupted, In total, the Oakland and Berkeley fire

Elevenof the fIfe victims died as flames Oakland requested mutual aid in the departments were assistedby 88 engine

caught up with them while they were form of air attack from the California strike teams, 6 air tankers, 16 helitac

trappedin a traffic jam on Chafing Cross Department of Forestry. The city also units, 8 communications units, 2 man-





15

agementteams, 2 mechanics,and more left on their own without waiting for and police officials hamperedevacuation

than 700 searchand rescue personnel. assistance. coordination.

offi-

Additionally, 767 law-enforcement

the

cers supplemented efforts of the two On the other hand, the fIfe fighters had to The majority of the fatalities occurred tot

cities' police departments, and the force some residents to evacuate. Other individuals who had little warning of the

California Office of Emergency residents returned to the area to check on pending disaster. As a result, their posi-

Services, Federal Emergency friends, relatives, valuables, and the sta- tions were overrun by the rapidly spread-

Management Agency, the Red Cross, tus of their homes, and fIfe fighters had ing fire. One fire fighter and a police

and the Salvation Army pitched in to to re-evacuate them. Some civilians, pos- officer sacrificed their lives trying to

help. ing as volunteers, entered the fire area save residents. The police officer gath-

and looted homeE. ered several individuals into his squad

car hoping that they would survive the

Utilities Evacuations were conducted on a per- fury of the fire. Unfortunately, their

sonal, one-on-one basis. Oakland chose escape route was blocked and the fire

When the power lines were knocked

not to use the Emergency Broadcast moved past them.

down by the fire, electricity was not

System, feeling it was inefficient. The

available to the pumping stations set up

lack of a common radio frequency at the

to refIll reservoirs. Also, as the fIre rav-

operational level between Oakland fire

aged homes it also destroyed gas lines.

The ruptured lines sent plumes of flame

upward from the meters. While the burn-

ing gas mayor may not have contributed

to fIre spread, officials were not able to

turn off the lines for several hours after

the fIre began.



Evacuation

Evacuation of the fIre areas was a major

problem. Imagine the situation: Swirling

winds blowing embers from all direc-

tions at once, making no area really safe;

thick clouds of smoke taking away visi-

bility; congestion as residents fleeing in

cars and on foot clogged narrow roads

that fIfe apparatus was trying to traverse.

It was a nightmarish scene. Evacuation

was impeded by narrow, steep roads,

high winds, and heavy smoke. In fact,

the smoke made it difficult to locate the

fire. Fleeing residents did not know

which way to go, and fIfe fighters had a

hard time directing them because they

could not see beyond their immediate

areas. The rapid fIfe spread made it hard

to distribute evacuation personnel effec-

tively.



During the early stages of the fIre, offi-

cials opted for fire control rather than

evacuation. However, residents turned to

fire fighters for evacuation assistance.

Police using loud speakers moved

through the area. Little time was avail-

able for anyone to instruct residents on

how to evacuate, what to take with them,

or how to secure their homes before they

left. Eventually, after sensing the grow-

ing magnitude of the fIre, many residents





16

KTVU-TV/OAKLAND



Fire is part of the natural ecolo- years, include mismanagingvegetation Life and Property from Wildfire. The

gy of forests andwildlands. It's by ignoring "ladder fuels," not cleaning standard was developed through NFP A's

out brush and allowing vegetation to broadly participatory consensus stan-

and

predictable, evencleansing. grow up to and over dwellings, building dards-making process, and presents fun-

For thousands years, wild-

of homes with wood shingle roofs and damental planning and design criteria for

untreatedcombustible siding, construct- fIfe agencies, planners, architects, devel-

fires haveperiodically raged ing combustibledecks on pilings buried opers, and government on development

throughwooded areas like the and on

in steepslopes, depending narrow in wildland/urban interface areas.

and

Oakland BerkeleyHills, roads that can hardly accommodate two-

way car traffic for accessand egress, Fires like the one in the Oakland and

clearingout combustible vegeta- making it virtually impossible for large Berkeley Hills will continue to burn

making room for new to

vehicleslike fIfe apparatus pass. wildland areas periodically, but future

wildland fires neednot be asdevastating.

growth. In fact, centuriesago, People need to be aware of the natural Residents in interface areas can take

NativeAmericans populating the fIre risks in wildland areas.Fire officials steps to make themselves and their

and others can offer guidance in con- homessafer.

Oakland Hills,whichthendid

struction,landscaping, and other factors

haveoaktrees, practicedburn- that reduce those natural risks. Many For the personwho intends to build in

ing in the area to improvehunt- like

suggestions theseareincluded in the interfaceareas,the fIrst stepis to choose

Recommendations sectionof this report, the housesite wisely. Flat sitesare better

ing. and in reports the Wildland/Urban than hills because fires move uphill

InterfaceInitiative has producedon pre- rapidly. Also, narrow, steep,or winding

Throughouttime, fIfe has beenan impor-

vious fIres, suchas the Black Tiger Fire roads slow and sometimes block fire

tant factor in nature's rejuvenation and

of July 1989nearBoulder,Colorado;the and

apparatus makeevacuation difficult.

man's efforts to modify the natural envi-

StephanBridge Road Fire of May 1990

ronment.Today,large numbersof people

in Crawford County, Michigan; and Next is the houseitself. The roof is the

and the homes they have built in these

"Firestorm 91," a study of a series of most vulnerable part of the house in a

lush, beautiful areashave addeda com-

fIres that occurredduring October1991 fIre. Noncombustibleroof coveringsare

ponent that makes wildfires far more

near Spokane, Washington. Further, a must. So, too, are noncombustible sid-

grave than they were 300 yearsago. The

there are publications similar to the ing, decking, and trim. The chimney

is

humanpresence not likely to diminish.

of

California Department Forestry,"Fire shouldextendabovethe roof line and be

For a large number of people, moving

Safe-Inside-And Out," that provide topped with a spark arrester. Eaves

out of the city and into areas like the

detailedinformation on lowering the risk should be boxed and vents should be

Oakland and Berkeley Hills provides a

from wildfIres. screened.No part of the house should

to

desirablecounterbalance the crush of

rest on poles or pilings.

city life. Sometimesthesepeople make

Based on data gatheredfrom those and

unsafe choices when they make such a

other fires, and on the experience and The yard can and should act as a fire

advice of fire officials, foresters, other break. Decorativemasonrywalls free of







.

Someof theseunsafechoices,asfIre and public officials, builders, architects,and are

vegetation an effective barrier. A 30-

forestry officials have pointed out for average citizens, NFPA has published foot safety zone around the house,free

NFPA 299, Standardfor Protection of of flammable vegetation, is preferred.





17

Special attention should be paid to the

ladder fuels. Low-lying brancpes must

be cut off and hauled away and grass

mustbe low in thatarea.Hardwoodtrees

are a good additionbecause they are less

flammable than conifers. All trees need

to be at least20 feet from eachotherand

any structure.Limbs shouldbe prunedto

a heightof 15 to 20 feet from the ground,

never over the roof, and not within 15

feet of or directly above a chimney.

Shrubs are best planted at least 15 feet

from the house.



Maintenance is important. Structures

should be kept free of vines and roofs

shouldbe clean,i.e., no leaves,pine nee-

dles, moss, or twigs. Keep leaves and

needles more than 30 feet from the

house. Residents should mow grass

closely when it has stoppedgrowing,and

collectthe clippings.



Not every dwelling in the Oakland and

BerkeleyHills wasburnedto the ground.

Several survived with minimal damage.

Hereis what theyhad in common:



1. Class A or Class B roof coverings.

Many were clay or concretetile, or cov-

ered with mineral-surfacedasphaltshin-

gles. Some had a mineral aggregate

overlay, and a few had metallic tile

roofs. These roof coverings were espe-

cially important at perimeterareaswhere

fire fighters could extinguish small roof

fues before theyignited the dwelling.



2. Stucco exterior walls. They are non-

combustible. Again, the delay in the

ignition of the home brought aboutmore

effectiveextinguishment.



3. Small double-panewindows. Just as

they keep out the cold air, they resist

breakage when subjected to fire and

reduce the transmissionof radiant ener-

gy.



Few overhangsor projecting elements

to

like roofs exposed burningvegetation.



Adequate clearances,or fire breaks.

Where there were cleared,clean separa-

tions betweenhousesand vegetation,or

between flfe

housesthemselves, did little

damage.

CUBE

J. SMALLEY/PICTURE









18



4.

~

5.

KlVU-TV/OAKLANO





Thewildfire in the Oakland and casein manysimilar settingsthroughout are in a unique position to ensurepublic

the United Sta.tes. safetybefore a disasterrather than after

BerkeleyHillsin October1991

it has occurred.That can mean enacting

was the worst in California's No one can predict exactly when or

unpopularregulationsattimes.

where the next fire will be, but nature

history. It killed 25 people, gives us clues.Prolongeddroughtcondi- Tragic lossesof homes in the wildlands

injured 150others, and tions, high temperatureswith low rela- are usually preventable.However,com-

tive humidity, and extreme winds bined efforts of the communityorganiza-

destroyedmorethan 3,000 blowing hot, dry air are amongthe warn- tions, fire services, federal, state and

structures. Yet,for all that ing signs of potential disaster.Fire offi- and

local governments, individual home-

horror andtragedy,it was a cials everywhererecognize these signs to

ownersarenecessary minimize losses.

and base their declarationsof "fire sea-

eelativelY smallfire by wildfire son" on themas well aslocal fIre history. The Oakland/Berkeley Hills fire has

standards.Thearea it burned The public mustlearn to recognizethose resulted in a greaterlocal and statewide

signsaswell. awarenessof the problems associated

was two-and-a-half-miles

with the wildland/urban interface.

square.Hadthe winds not sub- Just as every wildland/urban interface a

Nevertheless, continuingand expanded

fIre is the result of a combination of fac-

sidedSunday this

evening, fire to

effort must be undertaken inform the

tors rather than a single event, prevention nation of the potential hazardsinvolved

couldhavebeenmuchworse. of those fIres and protection against them to

in interfaceareas, inform them of how

requires the cooperation of everyone in the

they can assess hazardsin their area

The Oakland/BerkeleyHills was a pic- the community. Urban/interface resi- andto assistthem in eliminating the haz-

turesque setting for thousands of resi- dents must learn to adopt fIresafe habits

dents who called the area home. But in ards. Clearly, this effort cannot be

and fIre safe lifestyles. accomplished by just the individual

fact, the areawas ripe for a major disas-

ter and on October 20, 1991, it finally efforts of one of the listed groups.

Those who chooseto move to interface

The

happened. long history of fIres in the areas have an obligation to use good

area should have beenwarnings that we judgment in construction their homes,

of Thefire service

must be vigilant regardingthe identified in choosingtheir landscapingdesignand

factors constant in most of these prior Wildfires require different tactics than

materials, and in maintaining their

fIres. But we were not. Slowly over time structuralfIres do, and experiencefight-

homesandthe vegetation aroundthemin

the Hills were allowed to integrate the ing one kind of fIre is not readily trans-

a firesafe condition. Once a wildfire

factors that led to a build-up of a sub- ferrable to another. Yet, the very nature.

starts, the survival of individual

stantial fuel load about the homes. But of an interface fire requires knowledge

dwellings will depend, in part, on the

then, when the predictable yearly of bothtypesof fIre fighting.

preparationsthat were made for such a

"Diablo" winds that quickly dry out the catastrophe. The fire service should ensure that all

normally plush vegetationdon't produce

personnelreceive regular cross-training

.isaster, perhaps beginto believe that

we Legislators at the local and state level

in fighting both wildfIres and structural

W1tisaster cannotoccur. We might, in fact, havean obligationtoo. Theirs is to make

fires. That cros-s-training should be a

even forget that we are in a sure that well-known and proven fire

required component of the regularly

wildland/urban interface area. But this protection methodsand practicesare in

scheduled training activities in each

was not the casefor the Hills nor is it the place in their communities. Legislators



19

department that may be called on to fighting strategies,reporting protocols, Communitiesshould establish communi-

respond to a wildland/urban interface commandand functions of the Incident cations systemsthat allow allocation of

fire. Management System, staging areas, radio frequencies by function, opera-

deployment of personnel, supporting tional division, and supportservice.The

Urban departments, in particular, should activities,anddemobilization. systemshould be compatible with other

recognize the need for such tactics as local departments' systems and with

working inside the perimeter with hand Drafting detailed mutual aid plans is county and state systems.And, the sys-

tools to break up charred crust, churn up only a first step.The next crucial stepis tems should be able to transmit to all

vegetation, and mix water with vegeta- regular practice in carrying out those areas,regardless of topographical fea-

tion to ensure fires are totally extin- plans. tures such as hills. The public apathy

guished. This procedure is commonly aboutfIre in general,and wildland/urban

referred to as "mop-up." The fIre serviceshould schedule regular interface fires in particular, is under-

so

and frequentmutual aid exercises that standable.People have other things on

No single fIre departmentwill likely be when the next fire occurs that requires their minds, like raising families and

able to handlea wildland/urbaninterface mutual aid personnelthey will be pre- making a living. The fIre service has to

fire on its own. Local departmentswill paredto work together.Good communi- break through that apathy to educate

of

needthe assistance sisterdepartments cations facilities, systems, and people, including public officials, about

and agenciesin their areas,and perhaps are

procedures essentialfor the coordina- the potential dangersthey face and how

evenoutside their areas.Close coordina- tion of fire fighting resources. to prepare for them. The fire service

tion of the efforts of other responding Communitiesshouldplan those systems shouldfund and plan regularpublic edu-









.

is

departments essentialfor effective fIre for a worst-case scenario-because all cation campaigns, including the distribu-

fighting, life safety operations,and the too often in a wildland/urban interface tion of pamphlets, visits to homeowners,

safetyof the fIre fighters themselves. The

fIre the worstcasehappens. Oakland and even public meetings, to make

and BerkeleyHills fIre overwhelmed the homeowners awareof wildfIre risks and

Further,the fire servicein interfacecom- establishedcommunicationssystemand the stepscitizens can take to minimiz

munities should developa specificmutu- resulted in a lack of coordinationof all those risks. In particular, they should

al aid plan for coordinatingresources to responding forces.

attack wildfires. Plans should cover fire explain practical fuel-management steps

that residentsshould take and make reg-



20

FLAMMABLE

HIGHLY PLANTS

in

Theseplantsare amongthoseknown for the amountof deadfuel thataccumulates them,andthe high oil, high resin,or

low moisturecontentof their leavesandbranches.If you're plantinga new landscape,most shouldn'tbe used. Native

plantscanbe plantedsparinglyif spaced widely. All plantsareflammableif not prunedperiodically,andthe risk attached

to anyone plant canbe greatlydiminishedwith maintenance.



Trees: Acacia, Arborvitae, California bay, Cedar, Cypress, Douglas fir, Eucalyptus, Fir, Juniper, Palm, Pine, Spruce, Yew





Grasses, shrubs, ground covers: California buckwheat, California sagebrush,Dry annual grasses,Juniper, Laurel

sumac, Manzanita, Pampas grass, Rosemary, Scotch broom, Scrub oak, Spanish broom, Sugar bush, Toyon







WHATYOUCANDO



Your

Rearranging Plants

.Eliminate fire ladder configurations.

.Make sure the landscape within 30 feet of the house is adequately watered and well maintained. Keep vegetation next to

the house under 1-1/2 feet. Trees put the house at greater risk than low-growing shrubs and ground covers.

.Create a transition zone 30 to 50 feet from the home. Remove most major plants (leave enough shrubs to stabilize a

slope). You can hydroseed with so-called native grassesand wildflowers or plant low-volume herbaceous perennials like

gazania, poppy, and common yarrow. Keep watered and green year-round, or let dry out and cut back.

.Arrange plants 50 to 200 feet from house into islands (make distance between shrubs three to five times plant height).

.In heavily wooded areas, cut out weak or diseasedtrees; thin healthy ones if more clearing is needed.

.Get rid of stumps to prevent stump sprouting except when slope stability is a concern.







.Clean up leaves and other plant litter.

.Cut grassesto about 4 inches when they turn brown.

.Remove brush that grew with the winter rains.

.Clean off all vegetation from the roof. Clean gutters several times during the year.

.Keep plants near the house watered.

.Work with neighbors to clear common areas and prune heavy vegetation between houses.



Everyfew years:

.In early spring, prune or mow down low-growing ground covers. Fertilize and water afterward.

.Periodically cut back native vegetation plants severely.

.Budget for pruning, maintenance of trees you keep.

.Thin crowns of clustered trees (keep 10 feet apart).

.Trim limbs up off the ground 20 feet or more.

.Cut branches back 15 to 20 feet from the house.

.Prune out all dead branches; remove all dead plants.

.Along the driveway, clear out overhanging tree branches and prune back bushy shrubs for fire truck access.









21

ular visits to interface communities to of NFPA 299 provides important guid- Oakland/Berkeley Hills admitted to a

check for overgrown, closely spaced ancein this area,but it is fully effective lack of knowledge about the wildfire

vegetation that may brush up against only whenadoptedby local lawmakers. risks wherethey lived.

dwellings and other fuel-management

problems. Public officials should fund In the absence of clear and meaningful Potential homeownersshould determin~

those efforts to the fullest. Finally, the regulations for the common good, the the wildfire hazard potential of the

fIfe service should intensify its training practices of uninformed developers may immediateareabeforebuying or moving

efforts on conducting fire prevention create potential hazards. Fire protection into any home. This information can be

inspections,tailoring thoseefforts to the features, or their costs, may not be appre- obtained from the local fIre department.

hazards prevalent in wildland/urban ciated by uninformed buyers. However, NFPA 299 providesguidelinesfor rating

interfaceareas. decisions made at the early stages of a the wildfIre potential of anarea.

development will affect a home's fire

safety for many years in the future. Homeowners should contact federal,

Legislators state, and local fIfe and forestry agencies

Although the public determines accept- All developments should have more than for educational programs and materials

able levels of risk from fIre in wildland one ingress-egress route and employ to address the fire hazard in general.

looped road networks. Roads should be Information should also be shared with

areas, lawmakers react to the perceived

needs of constituents and enact the regu- wide enough for simultaneous access for children. Information and publications

lations controlling that level of risk. emergency vehicles and the evacuation covering numerous wildland home fire

of residents. In consideration of the long safety details are available free from

Therefore, it is generally up to home-

owners and fire protection agencies to wheelbase of tankers and other emergen- many sources, but until individual apathy

articulate and justify acceptable and cy vehicles, roads should be constructed is overcome the homeowner may not be

with an adequate curve radius. Homes motivated to take proper precautions.

unacceptable levels of risk. When losses

occur, they usually focus attention on the along dead-end roads and long drive- Here, the fire services can function as

risks, but preventive actions are prefer- ways provide extra privacy for residents fire protection resource centers for the

able. Legislation for such actions may but also provide the potential for fire public.

be necessary for homes that are to be apparatus to become trapped by spread-

ing fire. These roads and driveways It is the responsibility of the individual

located in high hazard areas.

should allow access by large emergency property owner to provide a defensible

Lawmakersshould take the initiative to vehicles. spacearound structuresto help prote.

examine existing laws, regulations, and to

them. Extra measures provide addi-

standards from other jurisdictions that Developersshould reconsidertheir fre- tional spaceare required for structures

are available for local use in mitigating quentuse of combustibleexteriorbuild- built on steepslopes or above canyons,

fire hazards associated with wildland ing materials,or at leastoffer options for and near combustible materials, and

ftres. more fire safe materials for potential exposures.

buyers who may not yet understand the

Lawmakers are encouraged to adopt differences. Whenhomeowners becomeawareof the

NFPA 299 as one part of the protection wildfire risk of their own areas, they

provided for new construction in the Developers should also consider the should join forces with other interested

wildlands. long-rangeimp~cations of siting unpro- individuals and groups to urge lawmak-

tected homes on slopes or where water ers to respondwith legislative assistance

Authorities should provide strongbuild- supplies for fire fighting are low or to require appropriate fire safety mea-

ing regulations restricting untreated nonexistent. sures by all of those who live in the

wood shingle roofs and other practices affectedareas.

known to decreasethe fire safety of a Developerscan provide a valuable ser-

structure in the wildlands. In the past, vice to newbuyers,who may initially be Theseare but a few of the recommenda-

untreated wood shingle roofs have distracted by other moving details, by tions that have beenproposedfollowing

repeatedly been shown to be a major fuel

creatingappropriate breaksor green- the fife. There are manyothersand cQn-

contributing factor in the loss of struc- belt areas. to

cernedparties are encouraged access

tures to wildfires, yet today some resi- of

the others.But regardless the specific

dential subdivisions actually encourage, public

General they

recommendation, haveone common

and somecasesevenrequire,wood shin- thread-prevention of devastatingwild-

gle roofs for aesthetic

reasons. The people who choose to live in the land fifes is not one group's responsibili-

scenic wildlands have the responsibility .

ty. It is all our responsibility

of taking necessaryprecautions when

facing predictable hazards. Informed

This eventhas also focused on the need homeownerswould be better prepared

to have constructionstandards homes

for for surviving a wildfire, but some

in the wildlands. The published version homeowners in the area of the





22