livre-terrorisme-EN

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INSTITUT DE RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES ET STRATÉGIQUES (IRIS)

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AVEC LE SOUTIEN DE ONE YEAR AFTER MADRID...

ONE YEAR AFTER MADRID...

COMMISSION EUROPÉENNE

Direction générale Justice, Liberté Sécurité

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EN PARTENARIAT AVEC

Europe face to

FRANCE INTER

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75220 Paris Cedex 16

face with

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MARIANNE

32 rue René Boulanger

F-75484 PARIS CEDEX 10

terrorism

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CONFERENCE SPEECHES

iris

INSTITUT DE RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES ET STRATÉGIQUES









With the support of the European Commission,

Directorates General for Justice, Freedom and

Security









Conference Speeches

Europe face to

face with

terrorism

Paris, 8 mars 2005







in partnership with

This book gathers the speeches pronounced in the

symposium « Europe face to face with terrorism »,

organised by the IRIS, with the support of the

European Commission and the NATO.



The IRIS thanks the actors who contributed to the

success of the conference.



IRIS The remarks expressed in these texts engage only

2 bis, rue Mercoeur their authors.

75011 PARIS

www.iris-france.org









Ouvrage publié sous la coordination éditoriale de Rodrigo Pintado

Conception et réalisaiton : Alexandre Tuaillon

Opening Speech by ARTHUR PAECHT ............................................... 1



CHAPTER I : RECRUITMENT OF TERRORISTS IN SPECIFIC

EUROPEAN ARENAS



ALAIN BAUER ....................................................................................... 7

The new channels of terrorism



GORKA LANDABURU ............................................................................

15

ETA: A Constant Threat for the Basque Society



PIERO LUIGI VIGNA ............................................................................ 23

Islamic terrorism in Italy



MLADEN VULINEC ............................................................................ 29

Fighting terrorism world-wide



CHAPTER II : MANAGEMENT OF "COMMUNITARISM"

AS A BASIS FOR THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM



FARHAD KHOSROKHAVAR ................................................................37

Efficiently combating the "communitarist" threat



GARY BUNT ...........................................................................................43

Cyber-terrorism: Using Internet as a recruitment tool

MARC BAILLIE .................................................................................51

Terrorism: a social phenomenon



FRANK ANDERSON .............................................................................

55

Moderating fears of the minorities



JEAN-PIERRE POCHON .........................................................................

61

Counter-terrorism in France: taking stock of the situation





CHAPTER III : COOPERATION WITHIN THE EUROPEAN UNION

AGAINST THE VARIOUS EXPRESSIONS OF TERRORISM



PHILIPPE HAYEZ ............................................................................ 71

A necessary cooperation in terms of antiterrorist intelligence



ALAIN MARSAUD ............................................................................79

The challenges of counter-terrorism



JOAQUIM NUNES DE ALMEIDA .........................................................

89

The role of the European Commission in counter-terrorism



FRÉDÉRIC VEAUX ............................................................................

95

Fighting terrorism efficiently

- L’EUROPE FACE AU TERRORISME -









Opening Speech



Arthur Paecht *









Before starting this conference, I would like to spare a thought for

Italian counter-espionage officer Nicola Calipari, who lost his life

protecting Giuliana Sgrena, and a thought for Florence Aubenas and

her guide Hussein Hanoun Al-Saadi, whom we hope to see released

as soon as possible.



In choosing the theme "Europe in the Face of Terrorism", we

implicitly observe that any attempt by individual European States to

fight this bane of modern times would be vain. And it would be equal-

ly vain to think that Europe could do without the other democracies,

and particularly the United States. The reverse is also true. This

cooperation with the United States will be even more efficient if the

European Union (EU) proves to be self-supporting and structured.



*Chairman of the Board of IRIS, Former Vice-Chairman of the French National Assembly.





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And this is why we are very pleased to have obtained, for this tion that the response of the European democracies to terrorism must

conference, the support of the European Union Directorate-General for be founded on respect for the principles enshrined in their constitu-

Justice, Freedom and Security, as a part of the pilot project in favour tions, in the European Convention on Human Rights and in internatio-

of victims of terrorist acts. The partnership agreement with France nal law. This is precisely what makes the task so complicated. It

Inter, Figaro Étudiant and Marianne will enable us to outwardly ampli- demonstrates the unanimity of a formula as simplistic as: "We must

fy our debates and give your presentations and proposals the audience terrorise the terrorists."

they deserve.

The three scheduled round tables will therefore be examining spe-

It is true that the subject is a complex one, and that it has been in cific subjects in order to obtain a detailed analysis of the problems

the news for several years and will be for decades to come. Sadly, no involved in terrorism, i.e. the recruitment of terrorists in specified

one can assume that eradication is anywhere in sight. Quite the contra- European areas; the management of communitarism as the basis of

ry, we can affirm that democracies are a long way from the end of their prevention of terrorism; and cooperation within the EU against the

troubles and that they will continue to be targets for international ter- various modes of expression, in order to develop a solid joint strategy.

rorism. International terrorism is a practical term for a presentation, Everyone is the potential target of a terrorist action, every category of

but one whose content cannot be precisely defined. There is not just person, every country and every ethnic group. There is no possible

one kind of terrorism, there are all sorts of terrorism. There is no typi- sanctuary, notwistanding indulgent and compromising attitudes whose

cal profile for terrorism, but many types of terrorist. And there is not effects will only be temporary and will inevitably turn back against

just a single motivation behind terrorism, but distinct causes which are their instigators. There is, however, an exception, a sort of obvious

all very different, usually without any structural connection, covering sanctuary for terrorists: it consists of certain television studios.

an infinite variety of truths.

The more cruel and the more inhumane the action is, the more ter-

Ultimately, only the means and methods used to fight terrorism are rorism needs the television media to make an impression on its targets

similar, whereas the objectives remain unclear, are not admitted and and put over its messages practically in real time, and with a world-

cannot be admitted. Furthermore, the motions put forward in an wide audience. Similarly, those television studios draw benefits from

attempt to justify terrorist acts are all unacceptable, without exception, the unbearable and inhumane images they broadcast. Today, television

and the consequence of all terrorist acts is to jeopardise the very exis- and terrorism form a diabolical duo which will make our struggle more

tence of democracies. This has already been stated in 1986, in and more difficult. This is an irreversible fact that we will have to take

Resolution 863 of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly into account in our future strategy.

concerning the European response to international terrorism. This

resolution renewed its unreserved condemnation of terrorism, which

denies democratic values and human rights, and reiterating its convic-



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CHAPTER I



RECRUITMENT OF TERRORISTS IN SPECIFIC EUROPEAN

ARENAS

The new channels of terrorism



Alain Bauer*









The terrorist enterprise or the criminal enterprise are enterprises

like any other. They operate according to the rules of the market, with

horizontal or vertical integration modes, special offers on new pro-

ducts, problems with dumping on the competition, which sometimes

involve eliminating the competition in a more physical manner than in

traditional trading. Criminal and terrorist enterprises also have pro-

blems with recruitment and with the training of personnel, which is

why we need to take the time to look into these subjects.



However, we need to begin by taking stock of the problems that

are still outstanding, the first of which is the debate on the definition

of the word "terrorism". As you know, one of the most lapidary defini-

tions, used both by the press and in philosophy, but which is nonethe-

less not without meaning, is to state that terrorists are always conside-

red as freedom fighters by some, and vice versa. Therefore, in the

actual definition of the terrorist mode, we are less interested in the pro-

cedures and methods used and in the variously justified explanations

of their acts, than we are in the targets and the victims. It is the victim



* Criminologist, Chairman of the Orientation Advisory Board of the Observatoire National de la

Délinquance.







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that makes terrorism what it is, according to whether or not he/she Thanks to the work of the magistrates, particularly French mag-

is likely to influence decision-making or the course of events. With istrates, we have seen changes in the systems and their demands,

regard to this, there have always been many scientifically disputa- particularly in Algeria with the transfer of the Armed Islamic Group

ble uses of the term "terrorism". We use it for anything and every- (GIA) to the Salafist Groups for Call and Combat (GSPC). These

thing, often wrongly, by combining into the term things which seem changes of orientation correspond to the progressive evaporation of

? as far as national liberation fronts are concerned ? to be "legiti- demands, where the debate used to concern power. Relatively little

mate" objectives, even though they have collateral effects and a attention had been given to the actual nature of the operators, until

totally illegitimate objective because, generally speaking, they do the day came when we noticed that a certain number of elements

not directly target the State system or the system in general, but ran- explained certain number of misconceptions and preconceived

dom victims, with the aim of affecting public opinion and not the ideas.

actual structure of the political power. This problem has, for a long

time, been causing a certain number of mistakes to be made. Since the creation, in the nineteenth century, of the Narodnaya

Volya (The People's Will) organisation, mother of the modern ter-

We have done a concerning the demands of terrorists and the rorist organisations mentioned above, we have noticed that terro-

staging of terrorist acts. Staging is a major element in the terrorist rists were not oppressed. They defended the oppressed ? at least that

system as such, whether terrorism is an operational mode used by is what they claimed ? but they tended to belong to the cultured

terrorist organisations or criminal organisations or ? as we will see ? middle classes. This is clearly still the case. It is an important indi-

whether it is the result of the hybridisation which now exists bet- cator of one of the basic problem sets, i.e. that education, schooling,

ween the two. This is because specialisation, in criminal terms, is access to knowledge and culture are pacifying elements. Where ter-

tending to disappear and join the conglomerate logic, in which the rorism is concerned, things are clearly more complicated than this.

idea of dabbling in a bit of everything has become the rule, and in In the case of terrorist operators, suicide bombers rarely come from

which some criminal organisations dedicated to services while the underprivileged classes - with the exception of the Liberation

others are dedicated to operations, and where it is possible to deal Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and certain cases in Morocco. It is

in human trafficking, drug trafficking and/or arms trafficking all at more the exception than the rule. Today, there is a relative change

the same time, and concurrently militate in favour of a revealed and of character among terrorists identified as such, and among those

uncompromising faith. There are therefore a certain number diffi- who have managed to confess what they were doing and where they

culties which result from these behaviour patterns. But we have to came from, and this is something that needs to be carefully

admit that little has been done ? or what has been done has been done observed: in terms of crime and in terms of terrorism, feminisation

too late ? to analyse the origin of the terrorist operators because they did not wait for the legislation on equality between men and

have been masked by the system of the terrorist organisation itself. women. There is a relatively rapid feminisation movement. In terms







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of pure violence, in countries concerned by terrorism, there are cases one of these in 1986 and 1995. And further attempts have been foiled

where gangs of young women are beginning to scare gangs of young since that time, on a number of occasions. A certain number of other

men. We do not know if we can call this progress, but it is certainly an countries are concerned as well. Some have set up a sort of local cor-

evolution. The same set of problems exists where the feminisation of don sanitaire using a principle that can be defined as "Don't do any-

suicide bombers is concerned. These women can be found among the thing on our territory, but you can do whatever you like elsewhere."

Palestinians and the Tamils, where there is an increasing number of This is a criticism that is often made of our friends the British. But

young women and girls who are willing to carry out terrorist acts, today, there are other countries that are similarly not very clear on this

which indicates a certain number of changes, including with respect to matter. This is the case of Scandinavia, and more particularly of

what was the idea of a woman's status in certain organisations close to Denmark, and of a certain number of countries which are currently

the Islamic or Islamist movements. asylums or havens and which appear ? and this is what the Spanish

reproach the French for in the case of Basque terrorism ? to be slowly

Other curiosities connected with the method of recruitment in turning into "logistical bases" for terrorism.

Europe are also observable. Until now, we have ? like the United States ?

been living with the idea that terrorism on the domestic territory could So we can say that these are profound changes in organised crime.

only be perpetrated through imported elements. Until now, this theory This is particularly the case in France where, unlike in Italy, there has

was more or less justified. They were indeed either purely imported never been a true "Mafia". We have had a few groups which bear a dis-

elements ? which was the case on the 11th of September in the United tant resemblance to the Mafia, in the South-East of France and a little

States ? or elements from the local diaspora, more or less rooted on the more in Corsica, but with a limited hold. The actual Mafia has never

national territory of the country concerned, but with only very few managed to take a hold in France, although they have tried on a few

roots. As years go by, the development of a native influence on trans- occasions. In any case, the Mafia comes to the French Riviera to spend

national terrorism is beginning to make itself felt. This is not the case its money, which is good for the local economy although the interest

where the ETA or the IRA are concerned. It was not the case for Direct of the problem could be debated with both the Russians and the

Action, for the Red Army Faction, for the Japanese Red Army, etc. All Italians.

of the latter organisations had national demands in an international

context. From now on, there are international demands on a local ter- Conversely, there is evidence, for the first time in our modern his-

ritory, which are no longer only due to operators from the countries tory, that we have a budding imported Albano-Kosovar Mafia. This is

directly concerned by these demands, or expatriates from these coun- a Mafia in which violence is the recurrent element. It confronts the for-

tries working on the territory concerned. ces of the State whereas the other Mafia organisations try to avoid

them. Wounding or killing a policeman guarantees that there will be a

Moreover, a certain number of territories are emerging that are not lot of big trouble for the perpetrators, and this type of action is usual-

directly visible in our approach to terrorism. First of all, there are the ly avoided. The Albano-Kosovars tend to adopt a logic of direct

territories that are directly concerned by terrorists actions. France was contact. But today they seem to be terrorised by the development of

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new crime organisations which are progressively turning towards All these problem systems are at the heart of what is, today, the

Europe and Southern Europe, such as the Chechnyan Mafias which, recruitment of terrorists in European arenas, because the scope of

according to the Albano-Kosovars who know about these things, this recruitment has widened. It is no longer necessary to import ter-

are "much more dangerous". rorists. They can be found locally. In terms of terrorism, we are

faced with approximately the same situation as that of the importa-

This seems to announce some thrilling times for criminologists tion of cannabis in the seventies. Thirty years ago, we depended

who, we must admit, have something of an "incestuous" relations- entirely on foreign sources. Today, for cannabis and synthetic

hip with criminals. Their objective is neither to arrest them nor to drugs, we have become self-sufficient. We might even become

judge them, but to try and understand how terrorists think and ope- exporters one day. I am not convinced that this is something to be

rate. Without terrorists, there would be no criminologists. Without contented with, but it is a true fact. Today, the restructuring pro-

criminologists, the terrorists would not be unmasked. So, as crimi- blems of what used to be a certain number of national movements

nologists, we have a relatively rich dialogue with these new opera- in international terrorism are "current affairs". The restructuring of

tors in Europe. This poses a certain number of problems for us the trans-national criminal environment is a real process that is

because, both in the case of the Albano-Kosovars and in that of the clearly almost complete.

Chechnyans, the terrorist gang is a physical reality. This is not a

subject involving the evolution of the organisational mode of trans- Today, it is all these subjects that we need to work on, and we

national criminal structures, it is culturally induced in the system need to move forward in order to analyse the changes in the old

itself. And this shows us just how much of a rapidly evolving com- national freedom organisations as they evolve, i.e. organisations

plex entity today's terrorisms are, and how similar the vision we such as ETA or the IRA; we need to analyse what is left of organi-

have of them is to the vision we had of the world before the Berlin sations such as Direct Action or the Armed Popular Autonomy

wall came down. Groups in France, and also Breton Irredentism; we need to analyse

the realities of the Basque movement on the other side of the French

Some think that the situation still consists of home affairs and

frontier; but we also need to see the effects, in a certain number of

foreign affairs. But this is all over now. Some think that Europe still

territorial areas that are relatively frequent targets ? particularly

needs to build itself. From the criminal point of view, it was built a

through the Security Services [Renseignements Généraux] or the

long time ago. Turkey has been a part of it from the very outset.

Secret Services [Direction de la Sécurité du Territoire (DST)] ?, of

This subject is not even on the agenda any more. From a policing

the development of Salafist organisations with respect to converts

point of view, Europe is further behind. And as far as Europe and

of French origin, and who come from first, second or third genera-

justice are concerned, they is still enjoying the thrilling times in

tion of African or North African immigration into France.

which it takes the six months for a rogatory commission to go

through all the bureaucratic phases necessary to go from one point

to another, assuming that it is not systematically sent back to the

starting point.

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ETA: A Constant Threat for the Basque Society



Gorka Landaburu*









I am a journalist from the Spanish Basque Country, and I have

been working as such since the beginning of the democratic transi-

tion in Spain, i.e. 1977, two years after the death of the dictator

Francisco Franco. I've lost a bit of my French, but I was born in

Paris over fifty years ago, because my parents were in exile from

Francoism. We have always fought against Francoism. Today, thir-

ty years after the dictator's death, there is a still a small dictatorship

in our beloved Basque country, known as ETA (Euskadi ta

Askatasuna, which means "Basque Country and Freedom").



The ETA terrorist organisation is an organisation that has been

acting in Spain for more than forty years. It is practically the oldest

organisation in Western Europe alongside the IRA (Irish

Republican Army), currently in a cease-fire state. Unfortunately,

ETA is still committing attacks. Even though ETA's action could be

considered to have a degree of justification at the end of Francoism,





* Basque journalist, Director of the weekly Cambio 16

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particularly with the support of many sectors of Basque and even Herri Batasuna, which enjoyed total freedom until 2003, is ETA's

Spanish society, there has been no reason for its existence in the last political arm ? like Sinn Fein for the IRA. Although declared illegal in

twenty-five years, since the beginning of the democratic transition in all villages of the Basque country, there are still political offices and

Spain. bars that are used as meeting places for sympathisers and as recruit-

ment offices for the younger elements. These youths, who are between

ETA has a dramatic history, if we consider the fact that it has 15 and 18 years of age, used to prove themselves in the demonstrations

committed over 900 attacks, most of which were after the death of the organised by Herri Batasuna, where confrontations with the police and

dictator. Like a diabolical machine, the terrorists have continued com- the fact that they were a part of a juvenile organisation under the wing

mit assassinations and attacks despite the fact that most of the Basque of the independence party earned them their first stripes as Basque

society rejects them. It is true, however, that ETA has not assassinated militants.

anyone in the last two years, but this is a part of another strategy that

we will discuss a little later on. In 1992, following the arrest of ETA's entire general staff, the ter-

rorist organisation asked Herri Batasuna, and more precisely the youn-

ETA is the only armed organisation still in action in Western ger members, to become much more involved in the struggle for inde-

Europe. Its survival is no doubt due to a certain amount of popular pendence. This was what caused the outbreak of what we called kale

support, and to the recruitment of young militants which has never borroka (urban violence, in Basque language), or low intensity attacks

stopped supplying the bases of this organisation for over forty years. which consisted in harrying the police, setting fire to buses, attacking

The ideological basis of ETA is not only Marxism-Leninism, but most street furniture or committing small-scale attacks against bank cash

of all the independence of the Basque Country. The common enemies machines or small businesses. The acts of this urban violence allowed

are the Spanish and French governments. ETA has furthermore always ETA to breathe and reconstruct itself, and caused a lot of worry for the

relied on the undeniable support of its political arm, Herri Batasuna, Basque society in general.

which currently represents the core of the electorate in the Basque

Country. It is from this electorate, particularly the younger elements, The Spanish government, whose prime minister was José Maria

that the terrorists have been able to renew their militants. For many Aznar, was obliged to modify the penal code in order to increase pri-

young people, belonging to the organisation is a privilege. It is a way son sentences for the people responsible for this urban violence, and

of "defending" the Basque homeland which is in danger, and most of declare all juvenile organisations close to the independentists illegal.

all it is an honour. The risk of militating as a part of ETA is that it often Of the 700 ETA prisoners who are currently in prison in Spain and in

leads to a prison cell, although this risk is mitigated by the conviction France, nearly 15 % are youths who perpetrated this urban violence. It

that one is taking part in the struggle "in favour of independence" and has been stated that there are currently 200 to 300 youths belonging to

"against the oppression" by the Spanish and French States. this radical world who are in refuge or hiding in France, ready to inte-

grate the ETA. These are youths who have escaped justice and the

Spanish police, and who have crossed the frontier. They are scattered

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all over France and they are waiting for the possibility of physical- rism problem in the Basque Country. ETA will never recognise that

ly integrating the terrorist organisation. it has been defeated. It will no doubt be necessary to make a move

towards negotiation in order to put an end to forty years of irratio-

It is true that the Basque terrorist organisation is declining due nal and absurd violence. Many of these politically unprepared

to police pressure, both in France and in Spain, and to the coopera- youths have been manipulated and must now face justice.

tion between the police forces of these two countries: its support

has become considerably reduced over the last few years. Despite None have repented because they are protected by the radical

its weakening, anti-terrorism experts affirm that ETA is liable to Basque world and its entourage which organises, in their own villa-

reappear at any time, because killing is not as complicated as all ges, the support and assistance committees for all prisoners.

that, particularly for an experienced organisation, and one that has Demonstrations and concentrations are organised in defence of the

people ready to continue the struggle to boot. prisoners, in which their parents and friends take part. Their photos

are on display everywhere, to make the public think that they are

These youths are not particularly well prepared from an ideolo- victims of injustice perpetrated by the Spanish authorities. All too

gical point of view, but they base their entire argument on inde- often, the tormentor is transformed into the victim. The world is

pendence and the struggle against the so-called oppression of the upside down. But the major skill of the independentists is that they

Basque people. What they are actually demanding is the right to have so very often taken advantage of the silence and fear of the

self-determination and the unification of the Basque Country with Basque society. We also observe that most of these youths with a

the French Basque Country and former province of Navarre. It police record come from families who, during Francoist period, had

should be said that all these youths are, like the ETA militants, contacts with or who formerly militated for the nationalist and inde-

considered as heroes or people working for good in their own cir- pendentist parties.

cles, whether political or family, even though they are responsible

for the most horrible attacks. On this subject, the ex-Councillor of Events are changing in the Basque Country. Today, it is the

the Interior and person in charge of the Basque nationalist govern- independentists who have their backs against the wall. Society has

ment told me, a few years ago, when the Basque autonomous poli- taken a stand. It is more difficult to defend terrorism, particularly

ce (which depended on the Basque government, i.e. a nationalist after the attacks in Madrid on the 11th of March 2004. The radical

government) arrested a young Basque militant; the interrogation world is running out of breath. More and more people want violen-

lasted barely 20 minutes because, after defending the independence ce to disappear in order to make room for political agreement. But

of the Basque country, the youth broke down both physically and a diabolical machine that was set up over forty years ago is difficult

mentally through lack of ideological preparation. to stop in one fell swoop. It will mostly depend on ETA, because

this organisation is heading towards a dead end which, sooner or

The problem is complex, although many political observers later, will lead to a permanent cease-fire. This is what the great

consider that we are apparently coming near the end of the terro- majority of the Basque society is claiming.

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The typical profile of an ETA militant is a male (in 9 cases out of One final anecdote to conclude. A simple local councillor, who is

10). They are usually unmarried and are getting younger and younger. a gardener in my village and who deals with public gardens, is a socia-

ETA militants used to be of rural origin, and mainly from the Basque list. Just because he is a socialist, he has to have two rural policemen

Nationalist world. More recently, in the last few years, they have been with him. So when he goes to work on the flowers in the public gar-

coming from the urban centre and world. There are no right-wing dens, he is constantly accompanied by his two rural policemen. This is

groups in the Spanish Basque Country. There us very little violence. one of the realities of the Basque Country, and one of the major victo-

The only violence is controlled and managed by the radical indepen- ries of ETA.

dentists. The fact that ETA has not taken any action in the last ten years

is because of the situation that has changed in Spain with a new

government, which is more open, more tolerant, ready to reach out to

the terrorists if they accept to negotiate a permanent cease-fire.



According to police experts, ETA is currently at 10 % of its capa-

city, particularly after last October's arrests in France. It is clear that the

general staff of ETA is in France, and has been hidden there for over

thirty years. But ETA's victory is that it no longer needs to carry out

violent and bloody attacks, because it has succeeded in threatening a

large proportion of Basque society. For a small country of 2.5 million

inhabitants, there are almost 1,000 of us, journalists, university profes-

sors, local councillors, lawyers and company directors, who for over

four years have been obliged to have permanent bodyguards. ETA has

assassinated journalists.



I, myself, survived one of those attacks. ETA has assassinated

company directors, magistrates, etc. This obliges the Basque police

and the Spanish government to take measures, because the threats

concern all important sectors of this society. Living 24 hours a day

with bodyguards may be bearable for many political personalities, but

for a lot of people who are not used to that sort of thing, it is very hard

to put up with. This is ETA's big victory. It does not need to commit

attacks. There is a threat on company directors, and on all these sec-

tors.

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Islamic terrorism in Italy



Piero Luigi Vigna*









It was not until after the attacks of 11 September 2001 that the

"international terrorism" offence was introduced into the Italian

Penal Code. Before then, the existing standards only punished acts

of terrorism that targeted the authority of the Italian State. However,

before the modification of Article 270 of the Penal Code, which

introduced the consequences of international terrorism in Italy,

many members of Islamic terrorist organisations had been con-

demned. But these offences ? conspiracy, clandestine immigration,

false document trafficking, etc. ? made no specific reference to the

finality of international terrorism. As already mentioned, this typo-

logy of terrorism had not yet been taken into account by Italian law.



In order to outline the recruitment potentialities of Islamic ter-

rorist organisations operating in Italy, it is useful to recall the fact

that the members of these organisations have been subject to inves-

tigation. So, as far as the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) is concerned,

the investigations and trials were carried out in Milan and in





* Procureur national anti-mafia, Italie.





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Naples. Note that five members of GIA were detained at Guantanamo Italian territory to develop a propaganda and recruitment activity and

bay because they had been captured on the battlefield in Afghanistan. logistical platforms for the members of the group. The recruitment

Another member, tried in Bologna, was arrested for terrorism in activity particularly concerns the Imams of certain mosques. As we all

Germany. As far as the Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC) is know, the latter play a central role not only from a strictly religious

concerned, the investigations took place in Milan. It is interesting to point of view, but also for the management of the politico-ideological

note, in the perspective we are concerned with, that one of the people management aspects of each Islamic community, in accordance with

charged, Maaroufi Tarek, was a Belgian national of Tunisian origin. It the principle of indissolubility between religion, the State and society.

turned out that he was an important Islamist ideologist of the Salafist It should be noted, thanks to the data collected during the investiga-

Group operating in England, Belgium, Spain, France, Germany and tions carried out on the various imams, that mosques have often been

Italy. used to broadcast propaganda messages intended for the community of

the faithful. Messages with a radical content and whose tone was

During the various investigations carried out on the Salafist strongly anti-West.

Group, offences of complicity in clandestine immigration also became

Henceforth, Italy is interested not only in the phenomenon of

apparent. Concerning the Moroccan Islamic Fighters Movement, a

recruiting Islamic fighters and exporting them, but also in the pheno-

Moroccan magazine, which was distributed at the end of the 1990s in

menon of suicide bomber activity on its own territory. On 28 March

front of the mosque of Cremona, was the official propaganda publica-

2004, a terrorist blew himself up in front of a McDonald's in a car

tion of the movement. The publication recommended a jihad to over-

bomb with four bottles of gas. On 11 December 2003, a Jordanian per-

turn the Moroccan institutions and eradicate Christians and Jews.

petrated a similar attack in front of a synagogue in Modena, causing

During the searches, police found false identity documents, manus-

the death of two terrorists only.

cripts concerning the utilisation and manufacture of weapons, military

training and clandestine fighting manuals, propaganda video-cassettes, Despite everything, these episodes are the obvious symptoms of a

etc. Finally, the investigations carried out on the Ansar al-Islam orga- new and preoccupying phenomenon. Self-taught suicide bombers

nisation, whose objective was to destroy civil society and have Iraq acting alone could be even more dangerous than those who belong to

occupy Kurdistan with Salafist regime similar to the Taliban regime in organised groups. Most of all, there could be more of them than we

Afghanistan, have demonstrated the existence of a recruitment net- could imagine, because the ingredients which make them do what they

work used to send Moudjahidin volunteers to training camps located in do ? frustration because of difficult economic conditions, suffering

the north of Iraq, following a route which started in Italy and included because of a lack of stable social and emotional ties, identity crisis due

stops in Turkey and Syria. to a refusal of the Western system of values ? are very widespread and

deep rooted within the community of first-generation immigrants that

These are the main investigations carried out in Italy, and which characterises the Italian reality. This can constitute an ideal recruitment

have demonstrated the capability of organisations operating on the basin.



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We have spoken about international terrorism. In Italy, there is the modes of financing terrorism. An example of this is the use of

also national terrorism. The Red Brigades, which had not spoken the opium traffic in Afghanistan. According to some investigations,

with arms since 1988, killed professor Marco Biaggi in 1999 and Al?Qaida imports opium and puts it on the European market. There

professor Massimo D'Antona in 2002. These men were professors are therefore links that still need to be explored. Thank you very

working for the State reform, particularly for the reform of the much. And sorry about my French.

employment market. The authors of these crimes were arrested and

condemned: it was a small structure consisting of about a dozen

people. However, there are new misdemeanours being committed

by anarchist movements which, not long ago, carried out explosive

attacks against the police and against the law court of a town near

Rome.



As far as counter-terrorism is concerned, I sincerely wish that

the international community will be able to formulate a unanimous

definition of terrorism, distinguishing terrorism from guerrilla war-

fare and revolution. These are theoretically very different pheno-

mena. Sometimes, during guerrilla warfare, acts of terrorism are

committed. But it is essential that we succeed, within the European

Union, in establishing a uniform law in this respect. Without this,

"justice is a strange story" to quote Voltaire. Truly equivalent laws

are necessary, because we are concerned by a phenomenon that

affects all countries.



In Italy, the National Anti-Mafia Directorate deals with the fol-

lowing offences: Mafia type associations, associations for drug traf-

ficking, kidnapping, associations for tobacco trafficking, human

trafficking, etc. However, we observe that there are connections

between the training of terrorist groups and Mafia type groups. I

recently discussed this subject with the Spanish anti-terrorism

Public Prosecutor, because we discovered connections between

ETA and the Camora: the former supply cocaine in exchange for

weapons from the Baltic countries. There are also links concerning

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Fighting terrorism world-wide



Mladen Vulinec*









When it comes to terrorism, the analysis cannot be restricted only

to the European Union or the whole European continent, but the situa-

tion of the entire world must be addressed. Why is that so? Because it

is absolutely obvious that this is a global problem and nobody can fight

terrorism alone. Combating terrorism within a bonded area, conside-

ring the fact of how easy it is nowadays to travel from one part of the

world to another, would not be successful. The issue of the recruitment

of terrorists on the European territory cannot be observed from a local

perspective and it must assessed from a wider point of view.



Terrorists are recruited and trained in different areas of the world,

including Europe. After years remaining "sleeper agents", they can be

used to commit terrorist attacks. That is why international cooperation

in combating terrorism should become a global effort. For example,

Al-Qaeda established some 40 training camps in Afghanistan. The

estimate number of people who trained in these camps ranges from

15,000 to 70,000. Promising trainees were selected for advanced trai-



* Assistant Manager of the "Public Safety and Terrorism" branch, Interpol.



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ning to combat for the Al-Qaeda organisation and become opera- Why have terrorists found Europe to be a hospitable environment?

tional agents, while others were sent home as sleeper agents respon- The four elements required for the successes of an organisation like

sible for establishing independent cells. Most graduates simply Al-Qaeda are: recruitment, funding, logistic and planning, and

return to their homes to continue their own corporations which are eventually training. Basic training was largely performed in coun-

more intensive and influential with the Islamic networks and tries such as Afghanistan, but top-level terrorists, i.e. September 11

Islamic schools that where established in the 1980s. pirates, were trained in Europe and in the United States. Also in

Europe, radical fundamentalist terrorists, recruiters and trainers are

Madrassahs produce radicals who believe that their life mission still not seen or legally treated as criminals, unless they murder

is jihad. They leave the schools with only an elementary knowled- someone or a European citizen. Even then, the punishment is very

ge of the world, but with a fanatical belief of the supremacy of light.

Islam and their responsibility to fight and ensure its spread. By

2000, there were some 6,000 Madrassahs with other 600,000 stu- Metin Kaplan, known as the Caliph of Cologne was jailed with

dents. The most developed, advanced and realistic training seems to a four-year sentence for conspiracy to murder a rival in Germany,

have been for improvised explosive devices. An Al-Qaeda camp in not for his conspiracy for mass-murder in Turkey or for trying to

Afghanistan ran an explosive course that lasted a month and a half. destroy the only democratic system made up of more than 90% of

This course included mixing chemicals, fertilizers, detonators, Muslim population.

nitric acid, etc. and electronic circuits. The Al-Qaeda camp in

Afghanistan also offered training to make explosive charges and in An example of a typical recruitment and training process is that

making and using TNT and other explosives. of Mister Trabelsi. Prosecutor Vigna mentioned a mosque in

Cremona, Italy. Mister Trabelsi resides there and made contact with

Links between organisations will become essential for the trai- his brother at the local mosque. In the course of discussion, he quo-

ning. Organisational links will give terrorists geographical and ted religious issues were taking place, including the importance of

course content flexibility that will have them await law enforce- Jihad. Based on this indoctrination process, Trabelsi decided to

ment. Radical fundamentalist groups already share some training undergo training in Afghanistan. Jihadees were contacted and the

skills. trip to Afghanistan was facilitated thanks to the providing of a false

passport. He travelled to Afghanistan via Kuwait and Pakistan. He

We all know that all the perpetrators of the September 11 attack trained in Khulm from November 1997 to April 1998. After the end

had some different links with western Europe and since these of the training, he returned to Italy and returned the false documents

attacks, the authorities in several European countries have arrested to the network which arranged his travel to Afghanistan. He is cur-

over hundreds Al-Qaeda operatives and recruits. rently serving an 8 year jail sentence in a prison for terrorist-related

activities.



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Trabelsi's case is only one among hundreds and thousands, but For citizens inside the European Union to be safe, Police and

terrorists often use stolen and counterfeited identity documents to Boarder Control need to know if any person who wishes to enter the

hide their real identity, to disguise travel movements such as in European Union is suspected of having committed a crime any-

Afghanistan or Chechnya and to gain access to countries with visa where in the world, is wanted for criminal prosecution by another

restrictions such as the European Union or the United States. For country or is in possession of stolen travel documents from any

example, recruits departing Europe for Afghanistan for training country in the world. Only Interpol, at this moment, can provide

were systematically given false travel documents. Documents may this kind of information rapidly and in a cost-efficient manner.

be used to help asylum application in sometimes more than one

country. Identity documents are also used to open bank accounts, The question that always rises after a speech is: "Is it really

obtain loans and other financial services to finance terrorist activi- possible for countries' police forces throughout the world to coope-

ties and attacks. We are all aware that the Governments are losing rate effectively in global anti-terrorist efforts?" The answer given

thousands of documents, that are either blank, genuine or stolen by Interpol is the following: "It depends on the country; if they are

from local offices or consulates, or stolen from the mail or hotels, ready to cooperate; the nature of the information to be shared."

etc. Many stolen documents were found in possession of illegal Interpol also goes one step further. We believe that any country

immigrants. whose police forces do not participate in the global anti-terrorist

effort, places its citizens to an unacceptable risk of terrorist attack

Assume a terrorist or a dangerous criminal possessing a stolen or increases the likelihood that will become a facilitating country

passport from inside or outside the European Union and which is where terrorists can plan and organise their attacks.

very valuable on the black market; which database will alert that the

passport is stolen? Answer: the Interpol database. The database was

created in 2002. It now has 51 member states participating in more

than 6 million stolen documents registered in our database. The

European Union and G8 have designated Interpol as the best place

to house information of the world is stolen and lost documents.



Currently, the European Union appears to believe that it should

concentrate mainly on national and European police institutions to

keep Europe safe from terrorism, trans-national crime and violent

crime. In fact, the national police and European police institutions

share one common weakness. Neither can fight international crime

successfully unless International Law Enforcement Community or

Interpol is used.

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CHAPTER II



MANAGEMENT OF "COMMUNITARISM" AS A BASIS FOR

THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM

Efficiently combating the "communitarist" threat



Farhad Khosrokhavar*







The "community" concept, which is one of the most common-

ly used concepts in sociology, is the result of a construction within

each society of Europe. In France, community has a meaning, a

connotation that is directly connected with what one might call the

concept of citizenship, in contradiction with citizenship where the

community puts forward a claim to express itself in the public

arena. In Germany and in England, the phenomenon has a totally

different structure.



Next we have the concept of "communitarism". This is a uni-

quely French expression. To my knowledge, there is no equivalent

word in any other European language. Not that the word doesn't

exist, but it doesn't have this particular meaning. "Communitarism"

means that one wants to claim the right to ask for privileges, speci-

fic or individual rights in the public arena, simply because one



* Political scientist, Head of Studies at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS).







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belongs to a specific community. This is in contradiction with what qualify with the term "communitarism", and which put forward a sort

one could call French style secular citizenship. of universal claim to be recognised in the public arena by sovereign

states. This is where the problem gets complicated. Take Islam, for

And now for the core of the debate: what is the role of the com- example, as it is the case I know best although these problems are not

munities in religious radicalisation, particularly in Islamist radicalisa- limited to Islam, quite the contrary: there are other religions and other

tion in Europe or in the Western world, including the United States? concepts of "the sacred" that are not necessarily religious, that can be

We must first of all distinguish between various types of community. in contradiction with the cultural and political arena of the West. So, as

It is indeed possible to distinguish between communities that we could far as Islam is concerned, we are confronted with communities that we

qualify as ideological, and those that are non-ideological. Non-ideolo- could characterise as integrist or fundamentalist, even though all those

gical communities concern, for example, what we in France vaguely expressions are connoted in a pejorative way. In order to remain neu-

call the Portuguese, Moroccan and Chinese communities, and what tral, we could use the expression "neo-orthodox" to describe them. The

other European countries call the Pakistani and Bangladeshi commu- role of these communities is a nagging question for the West, particu-

nities, etc. These are communities without any claim, at least as far as larly in Europe, where they claim to follow a more or less airtight form

their mass existence is concerned, to a religious identity that would be of Islam in order to retain some degree of legitimacy in the public

in contradiction with the standards that govern European Societies. arena.



Conversely, ideological communities ? i.e. communities which How do we deal with them legally, institutionally? How can we try

take advantage of a sacred perception in order to impose, on the public to find a sort of compromise with these communities, without jeopar-

arena, a certain number of restrictions or claims in the very name of dising the democratic credo ? the republican credo in France ? which

their purity or their "spiritual elite" character ? pose a problem in the governs social relations within European and Western democratic

European arena, and not just in France. Some of these ideological societies? This is the essence of the problem we are faced with. Are

communities self-destruct and do not interfere with what we could call ""communitarist" communities" dangerous for Western societies? Can

the public arena, i.e. non-involved citizens. For example, there are cer- "communitarism", in the name of the religion of Allah, lead to radica-

tain sects which state the claim that they have a certain vision of reli- lisation? The answer cannot be a simple yes or no. There is no clear

gion in order to isolate themselves from the rest of society. Sometimes, and concise answer, it varies depending on the cases.

they commit collective suicide and shock the public opinion in Europe

and in the West. These communities are dangerous for the people who "Communitarism" is in contradiction with the public arena in

become involved in them, but not necessarily for people outside the Europe, and particularly in France. But to say that "communitarism" is

communities, even though there are occasional mishaps. an open door to radical Islamism would be taking things too hastily.

There are cases where "communitarism" has been the vestibule to radi-

But there are other forms of ideological community which we can cal Islamism. But most of the time it was the people involved in these



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communities that left them and subsequently took the route of radi- cy, the result could be just as dangerous. The entire problem

calisation. Conversely, in closed communities, the logic of violent consists in maintaining vigilance and a certain form of "cold tole-

confrontation turns into a logic of an airtight confinement with the rance", with the implementation of a safeguard so that "communi-

"pure". This can obviously pose problems. Here is an real-life tarism" does not develop on the basis of proselytism. However, I

example: In Argenteuil, where I was carrying out field research in very much doubt that, in the European democratic arena, we would

certain suburbs, there was a population of workers who felt that be able to completely outlaw "communitarism" because it would

they had been robbed of their past and their future because they imply putting a policeman behind every member of these commu-

cohabited with a community that claimed to be Islamic and in nities and these sects. Consequently, I think the most rational poli-

which the people, particularly the youths, ostensibly behaved in an cy would, using an infiltration logic, and other means of persuasion

anti-French manner. Consequently, these people declared that they as well, be to try and observe the mode of development in the struc-

were going to vote for the extreme right wing. This is the sort of turing systems that are liable to lead to radicalisation, particularly

problem that is really at the core of the debate. from what we could call cells with a relatively small reach. What

happened not so long ago in the 19th arrondissement of Paris was

Must these communities be repressed? If we radically repress for example, an extremely dangerous phenomenon. At the same

all "communitarist" entities within the European arena, the result time we can say to ourselves that, in a certain way, French society

will sometimes be that the members of these communities who, for and European societies have managed to understand the magnitude

one reason or another would have stayed in a sort of airtight uni- of the danger and take efficient action.

verse, away from society, can become radicalised. If we do not rep-

ress them, it is perfectly possible for certain particularly fragile "Communitarism" must not be perceived as a sort of imprecise

people, under the influence of these "communitarist" forms, to sub- threat that can be subjected to an poorly defined repression by dem-

sequently move into radical Islamism. From a sociological, anthro- ocratic societies in the West. In a large majority of cases, "commu-

pological and political point of view, there is no single answer to nitarism" also serves the purpose of restraining radicalisation in the

this "communitarism" phenomenon in Europe. This means that all name of a religious ideal, particularly Islam. Conversely, we are

parties must be extremely vigilant. The essential problem in "com- confronted with a vigilance phenomenon that must be the keynote

munitarism", i.e. in ideological communities which are seeking of our action against these groups, in other words we must bear in

public recognition as being separate entities in Western societies, is mind that that "communitarism" can sometimes become dangerous,

that it can have a dual role as either the vestibule for radicalisation, and can jeopardise the democratic structures in societies, if for no

or as a barrier that prevents radicalisation. other reason than the fact that outbursts would put wind in the sails

of the extreme right wing in European societies.

There is nevertheless one problem that is still entirely unsolved.

If we want to adopt a repressive policy without discrimination, the

result could be very dangerous. Conversely, if we opt for a lax poli-

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Cyber-terrorism:

Using Internet as a recruitment tool



Gary Bunt*









This paper will attempt to analyse 'jihadi' recruitments and onli-

ne resource interfaces, and some of the assumptions and considera-

tions associated with cyber Islamic environments. This is a small

slice of Muslim perspectives online. The majority of Cyber Islamic

environments do not carry this kind of content and there is substan-

tial evidence of opposition to such activities too. This paper is part

of a wider exploration about militancy and activism online, which

goes beyond Muslim paradigms as well.



The sources exposed are drawn from jihadi sites, without

making any particular judgements about campaigns as to whether

they are 'Islamic', 'Muslim' and/or jihadi in orientation. The materi-

al is presented as it appears as a backdrop to the discussion. It is

really part of a much wider exploration of the World Wide Web,

including email lists, chatrooms, weblogs (or 'blogs'), audio and

multimedia materials.





* This is an edited transcript of Gary Bunt's presentation. Dr Bunt is a Lecturer in Islamic Studies,

University of Wales.





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Firstly we have to ask ourselves, in relation with site authors and (CDLR) website based in the UK4. The montage of the various video

readers, if we are talking about activists, about casual readers, or if we clips presented anti-Jewish, anti-American, [and] anti-UK lyrics and

talking about 'jihadi geeks'? Is the Internet an introduction to activism images which were skilfully brought together using a rap musical

or is it a reinforcement of it? accompaniment. This was an innovative application of the format; it

appeared online, and was also copied onto CD and distributed outside

Of course, when you are talking about Islam and when you are tal- of mosques. This is one example of the creative way in which the peo-

king about the Internet, both subjects are surrounded by fear, someti- ple could be drawn into a cause, using materials to develop empathy,

mes ignorance and sometimes stereotyping, and this is magnified when sympathy from readers with graphic or heroic images, often coupled

they are together. A typical example of a stereotypical image of online with supportive quotations from the Qur'an, in particular to an audien-

jihadi could be this image drawn from the Algerian Salafi site1. ce that might have a limited exposure to a particular view of Islam or

a nominal Muslim identity.

I use the term e-jihad (or Electronic Jihad) in my books to encom-

pass a wider range of understandings of the term Jihad, not just the Many related issues are associated with religious symbolism and

militaristic interpretation2. I explore a variety of themes such as loo- referencing, themes I am particularly interested in, and on which I am

king at ideas of religious authority, hacking and cracking, the idea of working at the Department of Religious Studies of the University of

spiritual striving, ideas about dialogues and interaction, as well as this Wales. I am going to show a few cases which have attracted attention

militaristic model. It suggested that these jihadi sites were widely read in the news recently.

by the youth in some Muslim minority and majority contexts, and evi-

dence in the variety of forms has suggested to me that some youth have Firstly, in the press last week, it noted that the Swiss Police arres-

been recruited [to jihadi activities] directly from reading particular ted three people suspected of running Islamist sites on the Internet that

websites online. carried images of hostages being killed, bomb-making instructions and

enhanced communications5. The name of the site was Islamic Minbar.

A key question to ask is what kind of 'marketing strategies' can be Despite this investigation by the authorities, the content is in fact still

put in place by these jihadi organisations. A very interesting example available and easy to access online6. I obtained these images last week

is this screen shot from a jihadi rap music track and video that came from the site. It slightly changed its name, but it shows the way in

out in February last year by a group called Sheikh Terra featuring Soul which the Internet is an effective tool because the material can be

Salah Crew3. This was significant in the way the track originally transferred quickly; it is very difficult to restrict a great deal of this

appeared through the Committee for the Defence of Legitimate Rights content. These materials are still out there; the chatroom is very acti-

1. Photograph of 'mujahid' with laptop, taken from Jihad-Algeria, http://www.jihad-algeria.com, 2 July 2004 [link deleted].

Images referred to in this paper are associated with the writer's presentation slides. 4. Committee for the Defence of Legitimate Rights, http://www.cdlr.net, February 10, 2004

2 . Gary Bunt, Islam in the digital age. E-jihad, online fatwas and cyber Islamic environments, London, Pluto, 2003. Also 5. For example, see Bettina Stadelmann, Associated Press/North County Times, 'Swiss police hold 5 suspected Islamic extre-

see http://www.virtuallyislamic.com mists linked to Web sites that showed hostage deaths', 4 March 2005,

3. Sheikh Terra featuring Soul Salah Crew, 'Dirty Kuffar', February 2004. The original URL is deleted, but the track can http://www.nctimes.com/articles/2005/03/05/news/nation/3405181909.txt

still be located on several websites, for example: The Investigative Project, 6. Islamic Minbar, http://www.islamic-minbar.com, [link deleted]

http://www.investigativeproject.org/videos/DIRTY-KUFFAR_Hi.wmv, July 14 2005 7. Azzam.com, http://www.azzam.com, accessed 29 November 2000, [link deleted]

8. Free Babar Ahmad, http://www.freebabarahmad.com, March 3, 2005

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ve; there are a lot of videos appearing on the site and substantial dis- are associated with al-Qaeda and other organisations are distributed

cussion about Jihad materials. on the Internet, often in PDF format, which is easy to distribute rap-

idly. They are well designed, detailed, there is lots of logistical

The second example of a 'live issue' is the current extradition information, religious justification sermons; there is practical infor-

case of a man called Babar Ahmad, who is alleged [by governmen- mation about weaponry and tactics. This one came out last week

tal authorities] to be associated with a website called Azzam Dhurwat al-Sanam which translates literally as "the tip of the came-

Publications 7. He is alleged to have run websites raising cash and l's hum9. It is produced by al-Qaeda in Iraq. It is a new magazine,

recruiting fighters for the Taliban and the Mujahidin. It is suspected but it is one of a sequence coming out from pro- al-Qaeda sources.

by authorities that he operated websites that linked him to Shamil It is very colourful, very dynamic in terms of its content. There is a

Bassayev, the Chechen leader. There is now a website campaign for message from Bin Laden, as well as tactical information and ser-

Mr Ahmad's release online8. mon-type material.



Whether this is true or not, these are some screen shots from the This material is dynamic and widely distributed on the Internet. You

site he is alleged to be associated with, which had a PO Box in might ask how this material is being published. It frequently

North London at that time when the site more active. It discussed appears on free web space such as that provided by companies such

that aspect of Jihad in Chechnya, Jihad in Afghanistan and associa- as Yahoo! and GeoCities, or through Internet Service Providers in

ted statements.. There is a transcript of an Arabic writer who explo- sympathetic locations. Efforts are made to close sites, but they fre-

res issues associated with militaristic jihad. There are lots of reli- quently relocate and publish elsewhere. The formats are sometimes

gious-type materials of justification of campaigns which are contai- encrypted, but very often they're available publicly.

ned on this site. There is an obvious declaration of war against the The types of profiles that you might consider in relation to readers,

Americans occupying 'the Land of the Two Holy Places'; there is a range from the radicalised people previously mentioned to those

message from Bin Laden. There are also very detailed technical who are interested in specific issues. We have to realise that some

documentation looking in depth at religious justification for cam- aspects of these issues relate to popular Muslim causes, it is just the

paigns and for fighting in the cause of Allah, using highly emotive suggested methodology and language through which the campaigns

language and trying to explain specific religious terminology from are expressed and filtered on these sites that can be controversial in

a very particular political religious viewpoint, bringing examples nature. They frequently focus on religious symbols and apply emo-

associated with the Prophet Muhammad as well. tive content, such as [photographs of] child victims of conflict,

together with the message of al-Qaeda or with the organisation they

The third example is an example of a [recently published] jiha- happen to be promoting. In some cases the sites indicate a sophisti-

di magazine. It is a very interesting phenomenon where magazines cated approach to the propagation of al-Qaeda, and include identi-

7. Azzam.com, http://www.azzam.com, accessed 29 November 2000, [link deleted]

8. Free Babar Ahmad, http://www.freebabarahmad.com, March 3, 2005 9. Al-Qaeda in Iraq, Dhurwat al-Sanam, Issue 1, March 2005 [original link deleted]





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fiable logos. The material could be seen (by some) as 'religious' in This kind of information includes news, propaganda, "alterna-

orientation, and might also be seen as 'cool' to a particular audien- tive" perspectives to world and local events, and is often data spe-

ce that is literate with the Internet. It has been suggested that the cific to particular religious activists and organisations. Another

content has been applied as a recruitment tool for financial and important thing is the integration of video clips and multimedia,

logistical purposes. reflecting broadband access and the development of multimedia.

We saw the first example with the film of the execution of Daniel

What is interesting too is that these often represent a 'cross-fer- Pearl in 2001, but now that strategy of putting film online has inten-

tilisation' of campaigns: a site about Iraq will have banners on other sified, based in part on the Chechen model, where the Chechens put

materials associated with Palestine, Kashmir, Chechnya and so-on. substantial videos online between 2001 and 2003. Other types of

Much like the rhetoric and activities of the Al-Qaeda entity and its content such as religious advice can include advice on campaigning

supporters, you can associate common concepts of jihad and reli- and can influence or radicalise people, where the ideas of religious

gious belief across the verse campaigning groups. The content is authority are couched in a jihadi framework. The content can also

frequently very high-tech as well, perhaps glamorous and even per- be presented as 'objective news', and the underlying idea is that this

haps "sticky". It is what they call "sticky" content in terms of is a site or a content which is particularly objective and better than

Internet design, when people want to go back to a site again and traditional sources.

again because it has got news, information, an alternative perspec-

tive on current affairs and content that you won't find through al- You can see that this is a very broad area of study. From a per-

Jazeera or through other broadcast channels. sonal perspective, there is a danger of information overload becau-

se there is so much material turning up in so many different lan-

Sites are updated regularly and material can be found in guages. It is important that increased research should be devoted to

European languages as well as languages from Muslim majority this issue and that greater exploration be given on the different very

contexts. There are many opportunities for dialogue and interactivi- creative and professional ways in which the multimedia applica-

ty on some sites. We have to be careful in consideration of how tions of the Internet have been applied to develop ideas associated

much dialogue is going on, compared with what is called lurking, with so-called jihad.

when people just go to a site and have a look to see what is happe-

ning and to see what people are talking about; they don't actually

get involved. It shouldn't be assumed that all the readers will be

politicised or turn into terrorists, but some pages and sites do make

a particular attempt to develop a sense of friendship and identity

with readers, including options for membership which offer access

to other areas of sites.



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Terrorism:

a social phenomenon



Mark Baillie*









Today, Europe is not confronted with terrorism but with a social

phenomenon: Islamist revolutionary integrism. Oussama Ben Laden is

the new Che Guevara.



In order to understand this social movement, I would like to use

two comparisons. Under the slogan or title of "exhortation", Mao

Zedong, the greatest strategist in guerrilla warfare, and who is still

considered as the spiritual father of the special forces that are fighting

against the revolutionary war, explained that there has to be a rela-

tionship "between the people and the combatants". The people, stated

Mao, are like water and the combatants are like the fish that live in it.

Mao advocated total integration between society and the combatant.

Even without this cooperation, a community provides the necessary

camouflage for combatants. Muslim communities in Europe provide

the water in which the fish can swim. We do not necessarily mean an

isolated, hostile society, a subversive "fifth column". But the fact that



* Consultant, Centre for Defence and International Security Studies (CDISS), Henley GB.



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they live in complete innocence, in total loyalty in their host coun- British daily newspaper The Guardian, in May 2004, found that 13

tries, provides the necessary camouflage for the fish, i.e. the terro- % of British Muslims considered that "further attacks on the United

rist combatants. States by Al?Qaida would be justified". This is a small percentage,

but it is enough to create the « water » needed by the fish.

We can compare this situation to that of Marxism in Western

Europe. In the 1960s and 1970s, in all European countries, Marxist Let us make another comparison, this time involving the

movements rode on the wave socialist sympathy to the point of acti- Sicilian Mafia, in other words a delinquent movement that is rooted

ve subversion. Those active terrorists, at that time, were able to in a country. Many sociologists and criminologists argue about the

exist because they lived in "water" that ranged from active travel reasons for the growth of the Sicilian Mafia, but there are neverthe-

companions to useful imbeciles who were friends of friends and less certain agreements on certain bases. First of all, there is a tra-

who would lend a person a bed for one night, let a person make a dition of mistrust with respect to authority. Currently, we can say

phone call, lend a person their car for half an hour, and might even that many Muslim communities in Europe come from repressive

go as far as not denouncing a person even though they were not and violent countries. For the Mafia, authority ? i.e. laws, the State,

sympathetic to his/her movement - the murkiest of waters-. Think etc. ? was considered to be foreign because Sicily has always been

of the support given by young Germans to the Baader-Meinhof under the control of a mother country. In the current case, we could

gang. compare this to the heritage of a colonial antagonism that exists in

all our western countries, except perhaps for Germany where autho-

At one time, a large percentage of people, over 10 %, said that rity is also considered as a foreign intervention. Furthermore, Sicily

they were prepared to put up a terrorist for one night. And also 11 % is physically and socially isolated from the mainland. Currently, we

said they were not convinced, they were in doubt. The Baader- can observe ethnic, linguistic and religious isolation of some com-

Meinhof gang operated for eleven and a half years. There were bet- munities, even though the isolation is not physical because we all

ween nine and twelve of them. Over this period, they had about a live in the same cities. There are close family ties in Sicily. There is

hundred collaborators, but fundamentally there were nine of them. no need to look any further, except that we might add the very

They spread chaos, terror everywhere in Western Europe, not just in strongly defined ethnic and religious links, which create this isola-

Germany. Their sole objective was to spread terror. This worked tion.

very well with very small resources, simply a little support from

East Germany, but not all that much. Think of the Red Brigades in What lessons can we learn from all this? They are not clear and

Italy. Many of those young Marxists, more or less subversive, are the solutions are not simple. We must nevertheless definitely take

currently in power in all our western countries, whose Ministers in advantage of what we have learnt in our fight against the Mafias in

Germany and in the United Kingdom. order to combat the Islamist revolutionary movement. We must try

to understand the enemy in the same light as the enemy sees itself,

Let us return to the current context. A survey carried out by the and not try to understand the enemy through the prism of the West

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prejudices. It is not by reading Thomas Jefferson or Voltaire that we

are likely to understand the threat that weighs on our societies. We

must understand the enemy in the way that the enemy describes

itself in its writings, its definitions and its motivations, and not pre-

tend that we can integrate it.

Moderating fears of the minorities

Furthermore, I feel that we are asking too much if we expect the

intelligence or police services to put an end to terrorism. It is the Frank Anderson*

same as if we expected the police to put an end to the burglaries in

and delinquency. It is a social movement that will have long-term

consequences. It is not a small phenomenon that we can crush,

reprimand or solve quickly. Only the rough force will not succeed

and the currently American demonstration encourages recruitment,

the motivation and the support of the jihadis everywhere in the When I received my invitation to come to this conference and

world. looked at the subject of the management of communitarism, it sent

me first to two dictionaries. First the English/French dictionary and

then English dictionaries, because communitarism is not a word

that appears in my daily discourse, nor does it often appear any-

where in American intellectual discourse or certainly political dis-

course. In the United States, it appears in its rare form in one of two

meanings. The first is a theory of political philosophy and its mea-

ning goes somewhere between the abnegation of the individual in

total socialism or collectivism and the ignorance of community

responsibilities in individual liberalism that may concentrate too

much on what an individual gets from, rather than owes to society.

The second meaning, which is the closest in American to the

European use of the word, relates to communitarism as somewhere







* Consultant, former Manager of the CIA Bureau in Saudi Arabia, United States.









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on the scale of experiences of minority communities after immigra- the victims and perpetrators of criminal activity at a greater rate than

tion; a new introduction into American society and whether they were the majority community.

adequately integrated or assimilated, or whether the solution to their

problems and to the greater society's problems with the minorities is The response to that has been in our history that we have had to

one of communitarism, meaning that you concentrate on the rights of deal repeatedly with minority communities who either commit or are

the community to live its separate life. Most recently in the United victims of crime greater than the larger community. In the United

States, this was reflected in a social movement celebrating the values States, we had to deal with it in three contexts; one which we recogni-

of multicultural diversity as opposed to assimilation into the greater ze and one which we don't. The one which we recognize in American

society. jurisprudence, in the prosecution of crime: one must prove that the cri-

minal had the motive to commit a crime, that he had the means to com-

We are not here to talk about political theory or sociological theo- mit the crime and that he had the opportunity to commit the crime. In

ry; it is the management of a minority community in countering the countering crime, rather than proving it, we need to develop practices

problem of terrorism. The indisputable fact that minority communities and policies that deal with all of this. Motive means an opportunity and

in Europe and in the United States have been either the source or/and in the management of communitarism we run some serious risks in

the sea in which terrorists' fish, has made them able to swim. With that seeking to deny the means and opportunity which terrorists or crimi-

in mind, is there some practical approach, to which we can turn, in the nals derive from being able to swim in the community. Overreaction

management of this problem? There has been, at least in the American tends to increase the motivation for a crime.

experience, a promising approach.

With that in my mind, I will speak about one decade-old practice

First, in the United States, there has been a political argument in the United States that has been proven at least promising. We began

about how to deal with terrorism, and did we make a mistake in the in the United States in the 1980s to implement a policy or practice cal-

1980s and 1990s in dealing with it specifically as a crime? Instead of led "Community Policing". It was not used to deal with terrorism, but

waging war against it, sending our armies out against it, what we start- it was employed to deal with what we call "juvenile gangs" and with

ed to do was to capture individual terrorists and bring them to justice. this high rate of crime in minority communities; either those who were

That approach has been profoundly criticized because obviously it did new immigrants or the failure of the United States to integrate our

not prevent the largest and most politically significant terrorist act in African-American community. Both our new immigrant communities

our history, the September 11 attacks, and we have shifted in philoso- and the African-American communities lived in places where there

phy and in practice to a war on terrorism. Without criticizing that, it was a elevated level of crime and places where the police and the soci-

ignores a successful experience in dealing with crime, and terrorism is ety at large was denied access in order to pursue criminals.

a crime. In terms of minority communities, it has historically been the

case in the United States that minority communities are both "Community Policing" was adapted in a number of municipalities;

it transformed the city of New York from one in which it was truly dan-

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gerous to walk at almost any hour of the night, into one that is once were approached by the Federal Government and asked to shift

again becoming a place that is a magnet for tourism and in which it significant resources into the war on terrorism, their first major

is safe to walk at almost any time of the night. Not as safe as some concern was that they were going to have to divert resources from

places in Europe, but certainly as safe as any city in the United this successful effort against crime, until it was pointed out, to some

States. The process was one in which the relationship between the extent by the Federal Government and to some extent by their own

police and the community had to be radically transformed. The analysis, that the policies that had worked in "Community Policing"

police had to become the allies of the vast majority of members of were exactly those that were going to work in the counter-terrorism

these minority communities who share two characteristics. One, effort. That was that they had to get into the community, they had

they are law-abiding. And two, their major ambition was to assimi- to create these links in the community, they had to exploit the fact

late without abandoning their culture, and to become the major that the vast majority of members of the minority were law-abiding

community. That required two things. and truly interested not in separation from the major community,

but in assimilation with an integration network.

First, a change in philosophy departing from the prosecution of

major crime to focusing on the prevention of crime through two A number of problems still remain and need to be dealt with.

devices; one was the vigorous prosecution of petty crime and two, Most of them have to do with the risk of overreaction that could

using the police as the major interface between the community and lead to the creation of motivation for more terrorism, rather than to

the rest of the Government, not just as an agency of social control, the reduction in means and opportunity for it.

but an agency of social service. The second thing required what we

in the United States call "informative action". There was very vigo- American history is promising in the overall sense, but it never-

rous, intensive recruiting in the minority community of police offi- theless has repeated incidence of overreaction based on fear of the

cers who could create close links between the community and law minority communities' difference. During the Civil War we were

enforcement effort. At the end of a 20-year period, a survey recent- worried about foreigners, yet the vast majority of casualties were

ly undergone by the Department of Justice and two-thirds of the suffered in the last years of the civil war by immigrants who got off

Police Departments across the United States in cities of over 50,000 the boats and were marched immediately into units of both armies.

inhabitants, reported that they had adopted "Community Policing" During World War One there were repeated and extensive inciden-

efforts and policies. The percentages of Police Chiefs reported that ces of discrimination and action against German immigrants in the

these policies had improved the way in which they were operating United States, despite the fact that there was never an incidence of

with the minority communities and improved their ability to fight proven espionage or sabotage on behalf of the German during

crime and more importantly had improved this problem of the fear World War One. During World War Two, the United States incarce-

of crime, the positive responses were in the high 90 %. rated tens of thousands of American citizens of Japanese decent out

of fear. That communitarist motive led the authorities o believe they

After 9/11, when the Police Departments of the United States could act against the interest of the whole society, despite the fact

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that there was not a single incidence of espionage or sabotage or

support to the Japanese war effort on the part of any Japanese-

American or immigrant from Japan in the United States. Counter-terrorism in France: taking stock of the

situation

Our conclusions are that the methods that need to be applied

tend to need to be based on moderating fears of the minority. Of Jean-Pierre Pochon*

course, public opinion polling in the Muslim community in the

United States and in the Arab-American community bears out their

consistency with other historical experience, and that the vast majo-

rity of the population of those communities seeks integration or

assimilation into the society, rather than a separation and opposition The fight against radical Islamist terrorism must be clearly dis-

with it. That majority is available for alliance with the police or the tinguished from Islam. We are not fighting Islam as a religion, we

rest of the majority in fighting against terrorism. The means are are fighting a perversion of Islam: radical Islamist terrorism.

available to interact with them in a way that will not increase the

motivation for terrorism. Since the attacks on the 11th of September 2001, the security

structures, and more particularly the intelligence services, have

Benjamin Franklin is an author that we need to keep very much been confronted with an unprecedented doubt. In the United States,

in mind in interacting with communities in the war against terro- aside from the psychological shock, these attacks put an end to the

rism. His line was: "any people who will trade liberty for security feeling that the American territory was a sanctuary and highlighted

get neither and deserve neither". In our attempt to fight against ter- weaknesses in the defence policy, particularly the considerable lack

rorism, if we are willing to trade not only our liberties, but certain- of cooperation between the federal and local structures, and above

ly the liberties of the minority communities among us in order to all between the various intelligence agencies.

gain our security, in the end we will find that we neither get nor

deserve either liberty or security. In this respect, the episodes of the Franco-Moroccan Zaccaria

Moussaoui and of the two hijackers on board the American Airlines

flight in 1977, which was supposed to crash into the Pentagon, are

of paramount importance. The American parliamentary recorders of

the of the Investigation Committee concerning the role played by

the intelligence services to prevent the attacks on the 11th of



* Honorary Director of the Police, former Director of Intelligence at the Direction Générale de la Sécurité

Extérieure (DGSE). The author's views are his own and do not concern any other person or entity.







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September wrote: "If the arrest of Zaccaria Moussaoui and a possi- certain ignorance of the culture of the Arab and Muslim world, the

ble hijack threat had been made public, that could have been striking inadequacy of the ability to imagine and therefore to pre-

enough to cause the conspiracy to capsize. In time, the hunt for vent, to the point that the American Congressmen have titled one of

Almihdhar and Alhamzi, and the investigation into Moussaoui the chapters in their report: "Institutionalizing Imagination."

could also have generated decisive progress and caused the conspi-

racy to capsize." The final anomaly is legal. But it is not any less important that

the others. It concerns the organisation and the priorities of the

These examples synthesise a certain number of operational Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). In 2000, according to the

anomalies that should cause us to think about the efficiency of our same sources, there were still twice as many agents working in the

own anti-terrorist systems. These anomalies are organisational, fight against drugs than in counter-terrorism. The legal instruments

technical and legal, and they highlight the need to immerse intelli- available to the services are inadequate and above all ? and this is

gence into a real institutional context in which history, but also poli- paramount ? there is no efficient interference with the magistrates.

tics or legislative action, are such that they will amplify or reduce We could refer to the Moussaoui affair in great length. It is true that

its efficiency from a repressive point of view, but also and above all the answers provided by the Patriot Act and by the creation of the

from a preventive point of view. The first anomaly is organisatio- Homeland Security Department provide the means of making four

nal. It is true that the best information technology in the world, that observations. The vocation of the Homeland Security Department

which the American community has in particular, cannot produce was to protect the territory and the population of the United States

the best results unless there is a real structured organisation to use against terrorist attacks. This result has, to date, been obtained

and share the information. Technology cannot, in itself, improve a despite the omnipresence of the radical Islamist threat. Conversely,

deficit of cooperation or competition within communities due to the the reform did not concern the main agencies or the intelligence

large number of agencies, information protection rules which pre- community, i.e. the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the FBI,

vent sharing, limited accessibility rules concerning the respective and it is not by naming a National Director of Intelligence that any-

databases and sub-optimal use of the information, poor communi- thing will be changed.

cation that may exist between the intelligence community and the

political authorities, etc. Faced with the shock of the beliefs and practices on which radi-

cal Islam thrives, and with the complexity of the problems that are

The second anomaly is technical. It concerns the deficit in lin- raised, technological investment always appears as a solution to the

guistic skills, particularly where translators of rare languages are security problem. Conversely, the various parameters of the human

concerned. It concerns the colossal importance of the flows of capital ? linguistic competence, international experience, operatio-

information to be processed, the weakness of the analysis ? accor- nal intelligence in the field, knowledge of civilisations, follow-up

ding to the American recorders, no national synthesis was dedica- of immigrant communities that represent a risk, identification and

ted to terrorism between 1997 and the 11th of September 2000 ?, a processing of human sources ? are still insufficiently used. Faced

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with the radical Islamist threat, all countries are affected. None has the set up legal operations before the attacks occurred, giving the repressi-

feeling that it is protected. This goes to show just how much we French ve operations a far more preventive dimension. As for the Police

are taken aback by the analysis that the United States has been con- Criminal Investigation Department, confronted with domestic terro-

ducting in an exceptional manner, particularly through the Congress rism ? the Basques, the Bretons and the Corsicans ?, it was not possi-

Investigation Commissions, on their security and intelligence services ble to put as much into the Islamist files as the specialist magistrates

since the 11th of September. And what are we French doing? How is wanted. This new form of terrorism demanded a specific and global

our country facing up to this threat? How is counter-terrorism opera- approach, and a dialogue that was easier to establish between informa-

ting? What role is there for intelligence ? tion services, essentially more flexible than the legal services.

Paradoxically, the quickest to adapt to the new contexts of the fight

In order to understand this system, it is necessary to take a quick against terrorism were the Home Office services, the Intelligence

look into the past. The current French system is based on real events Services (RG) and the Secret Services (DST).

that have occurred and that have enabled the intelligence services to

gain actual experience of international terrorism acquired through suf- During operations and investigations, a strong relationship deve-

fering, particularly where radical Islamists are concerned, and to loped between the Dedicated Public Prosecutor's Office (Parquet) and

empirically establish, over the years, the appropriate legal and securi- the intelligence services, particularly the DST, due to its intended dua-

ty-based countermeasures. In September 1986, after a wave of attacks lity which makes it both a criminal investigation department and an

of Middle-Eastern origin perpetrated in Paris, a series of bills were intelligence service. The privileged relationship between the intelli-

promulgated and enabled the creation of several special services gence services and the dedicated magistrates, and also this institutio-

responsible for steering the efforts of the French authorities in matters nal legal and legislative context, turned out to be decisive advantages

of terrorism: the Antiterrorist Coordination Unit at the French Home in the policy for prevention of radical Islamist terrorism. Having been

Office and Central Antiterrorist Service at the Ministry of Justice, the confronted with Algerian terrorism as early as in 1994, the French

latter service having now led to the creation of the 14th Section of the intelligence services understood very early that radical Islamist terro-

Public Prosecutor's Office (Parquet). The mission of these new struc- rism represented a new complex and global threat which would over-

tures has been to centralise and maintain the cooperation between all flow from Algerian terrorism and would not remain confined to the

the players in counter-terrorism. They have turned out to be very deci- French territory. We were unable to convince our friends of this analy-

sive. sis before the attacks perpetrated by Al-Qaida, i.e. not until the 11th of

September 2001.

In the legal sphere, the 1986 reform resulted in a reduced-group

centralisation of magistrates specialised in all procedures related to ter- In November 1994 and June 1995, the preventive operations car-

rorism. In 1995 and 1996, this legal arsenal was adapted to the new ried out by the Intelligence Services in Paris highlighted the specific

constraints of terrorism and enabled investigation procedures to deve- and original characters of the radical Islamic networks. Early in 1995,

lop into far more specifically targeted actions, and made it possible to the French knew about the risks of attack on the French territory, but

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no one had the operational information concerning the Afghan manent dialogue of these magistrates with the intelligence services;

channels used by the former militants of the Armed Islamic Group specific skills and positioning of the proximity gridding for the

(GIA). On the basis of these interrogations, the DST sent a synthe- intelligence service (RG) and secret service (DST) on the national

sis report to the Dedicated Public Prosecutor's Office in order to territory; importance of human information; regular analysis of the

open a criminal investigation concerning these Afghan channels. threat to the national territory carried out by specialist structures;

This approach turned out to be decisive. It has enabled the French and national and international operational and analytical coopera-

services and the DST to learn a lot more about the Afghan net- tion. At the European level, cooperation in terms of intelligence is

works, identify the combatant channels, reconstitute their progress backed by a lot of experience, and operates very well both ways, but

all around the world, and will eventually make a considerable there is still room for a lot of improvement.

contribution to the legal neutralisation of these networks. As an

Both on an national and an international level, complementary

essential part of this search for information, human sources have

is paramount. Not only is it essential but it must also be much bet-

been for us, and still are, the absolute priority of the services in

ter organised. This complementarity must be the result of the expe-

order to understand and legally dismantle the terrorist networks.

rience, the skills and the talents of the various services in France.

This alone is the most efficient way of meeting the challenge posed

In March 1996, the case of the Roubaix Gang provided the

by radical Islamist terrorism. It would in any case paradoxical to try

means of confirming this internationalisation hypothesis concer-

and fight a terrorist, trans-terrorist, trans-national, destructured,

ning the Algerian Islamist threat. This group stood out from the

horizontal, flexible and terribly imaginative sphere with centralised

usual groups of the GIA in that it was made up of second-genera-

and vertical bureaucracies which, it is true, rarely have the gift of

tion immigrants from the Maghreb and original French nationals

imagination.

converted to radical Islam who had fought in Bosnia and in

Afghanistan. The connections that were highlighted in this way There is no model for fighting terrorism. There is a French sys-

with individuals in Italy, in Belgium, in Algeria, in the United tem, presented very briefly here, which is the result of a culture, its

Kingdom, in Canada and in the United States confirmed the inter- experience and its history. For us French, this does not mean that

nationalisation of radical Islamist terrorism in a very striking man- were are, on the pretext of efficiency, exempt from criticism,

ner, if needed. However, the information cannot be sufficient in thought and analysis. It would be a very serious mistake to believe

itself. It must be inserted in a national environment which provides that we were. The American example of an in-depth analysis of the

fluidity of transmission to the people in charge and the deciders, security system, which was carried out at a time of extreme crisis,

fluidity which is as close as possible to real-time transmission. is exemplary. The urgency and the importance of the challenges with

which we are confronted transcend our feelings of relative efficien-

The French system for fighting against terrorism relies on: cy, exceed all traditional compartmentalisation at private, public,

flexibility of the common law legal arsenal; centralisation of infor- civil, military, national and international levels, and demand rapid,

mation among specialist magistrates; permanent proximity and per- flexible and imaginative answers from us and from the deciders.

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CHAPTER III



COOPERATION WITHIN THE EUROPEAN UNION

AGAINST THE VARIOUS EXPRESSIONS OF TERRORISM

A necessary cooperation in terms of

antiterrorist intelligence



Philippe Hayez*









Counter-terrorism is a priority effort for the intelligence servic-

es. In the 1994 Official Report on defence, we already qualify ter-

rorism as the "main non-military threat". The pertinence of this

matter is directly related to the environment concerned, i.e. Europe,

considering the fact that it is quite obviously in this environment

that we need to consider the questions of counter-terrorism and how

to deal with the problem of terrorism.



Cooperation in counter-terrorism is absolutely essential. The

targets are common, identical, whether they are a railway station in

Spain or in France, a place of prayer in Italy or in the Netherlands,

a foreign embassy in Paris or in Athens, expatriates in Saudi Arabia,

surfers in Indonesia, journalists in Iraq or humanitarian workers in

Caucasus. As far as we are concerned, the target is the same.

The European area, as a common area where all frontiers are





* Deputy Director of Intelligence, Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (DGSE).

The author's views are his own.



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permeable, is quite obviously unique. What might be less obvious, 2001, is the size of the threat, and this has led to a change of concept

and which fully justifies more intensive cooperation, is the radical in the cooperation between intelligence services. Intelligence serv-

nature of the threat represented by terrorism. It is not just a threat ices have always cooperated with each other where political allian-

against our populations, against our political autonomy. It is also a ces are concerned. But they have always been wary of other intelli-

threat against our vision of the world. The stakes therefore consist gence services because one of the forms of threat against our natio-

in avoiding radical changes our vision of the world due to the nal interests formerly came from this source. Since 2001, we can

events that we have been experiencing over the last few years, and consider that this relationship has been reversed. Foreign intelli-

which are not new. This is something that imposes cooperation at gence services are no longer a threat, they are above potential part-

all levels, not just at the levels of the intelligence services, the poli- ners. Today, our analysis of the relationship with intelligence serv-

ce services or the legal services, but also at a political level. ices is not so much commanded by a logic of mistrust as it is by a

logic of availability and value analysis.

Cooperation on the field of intelligence is what we call an oxy-

moron, in other words a figure of speech that contains a degree of How can we operate ? We must proceed in an efficient and

contradiction. Intelligence is not readily compatible with coopera- organised manner, without seeking any form of notoriety or any

tion. It is first of all an extremely regal activity, as close to the State specific symbolisation. Cooperation between intelligence services

as anything can be. It is furthermore a secret activity, it is someti- must not symbolise anything. It must be efficient as an intelligence

mes ambiguous in legal terms, and it is hardly compatible with legal service must be efficient because it is already a concession with

processing in a case which is covered by the media. respect to many legal rules.



There is an intrinsic difficulty in involving the intelligence What is the role of foreign intelligence in counter-terrorism? It

services in cooperation. It is more complicated than for other cor- is a little known reality and is not defined in any Articles, in France.

porations. But counter-terrorism nevertheless involves such coope- The DGSE is the only institution whose articles define external

ration because it cannot be conceived without the use of intelligen- action, although such action remains sparse. The service was crea-

ce as an essential tool. This is because the terrorist threat cannot be ted in 1982 by a decree that states that its job is to seek and utilise

considered simply as a war, a criminal activity or a political act in information concerning the security of France. Terrorism is among

another state. It is the result of a mix of all these things. For this rea- these matters. Historically, our service has been working on terro-

son, it is essential that intelligence, which is specialised in working rist matters since the beginning of the eighties. We did not wait for

on clandestine practices, should make some headway in the reality the major attacks in Paris in the mid-eighties to set up an operatio-

and the possible difficulties of cooperation in the field of counter- nal internal structure to fight terrorism. We took part in solving the

terrorism. problem of the Algiers Airbus in December 1994, and more recent-

ly in the cases surrounding the Paris-Dakar rally in 2000 and the

What has been changing in the last few years, particularly since threats that concerned the contestants. The latter are two examples

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of direct contribution that do not show obviously for the permanent pool out forces, our know-how, our networks and our technical

work of research and analysis of the DGSE. capabilities, in order to attempt to deal with the objectives that

threaten all our countries and our populations.

What does cooperation within the intelligence services consist

of? What is the scale of such cooperation? Like others, People in We are also outlining an international division of work. It is

intelligence take planes and meet each other. They even have secu- clear that we have past investments, a heritage, priority lines ?

re communication lines to speak to each other. They do what eve- although this does not mean that we can put all of this into counter-

ryone does when cooperation is necessary, i.e. they exchange ana- terrorism ?, and this means that one service or another is necessari-

lyses concerning the terrorist phenomenon, and they have been ly more competent in Europe on the subject of a given compartment

doing this for a very long time. This means that we can take an of the planet; so we are progressively creating this fairly flexible

objective step back from the facts. It is useful to pool the analysis work-sharing principle. International cooperation has rocketed in

of one group or another, and of their motivations. terms of volume. The DGSE has nearly 200 foreign partners, the

police service, the security service, military intelligence, which

To do this, we have been operating an early warning network goes to show how much we are involved in cooperation activities.

for threats for a very long time. In substance, our services are

equipped to work 24 hours a day. They are permanently linked up How can we reinforce this cooperation ? The first and most

to their counterparts all over the world. This is obvious on a natio- obvious is the credibility of the intelligence services. The only rea-

nal level with the UCLAT, and it is also obvious on an international son why we cooperate in Europe, outside Europe or nationally is

level. We are therefore in a network that has no cause to be envious that we exist and we are credible. Our foreign partners are very

of financial or information agencies, if for nothing other than size. harsh judges when it comes to examining our rigour, our validity

This already enables the exchange of intelligence. Moreover, we are and our capabilities. It is essential that our services should maintain

taking part in various groups whose geometry is adaptable to ana- their intrinsic value. It is important for the DGSE to retain and

lyze the terrorist threats and the answers thaht should be given. develop its know-how ? it is a fully-fledged craft of its own ? and

Concerning anti-terrorist themes, we also have links with services its assets.

in countries confronted with terrorist phenomena. This means that

we have a network that, as you can well imagine, is very dense It is also an external network. The intelligence service works

indeed. abroad using French civil servants whose job is specifically tailored

to this task. It is also a network of partners. It is also, and this is

The main characteristic of cooperation in terms of intelligence, something that we are not sufficiently aware of on a national level,

and particularly in the anti-terrorist field, is what we call operatio- a tool for technical intelligence, which is extremely rare and only

nal cooperation. With a certain number of services, we have esta- exists on the scale of the largest world agencies, which I think is an

blished operational cooperation understandings that enable us to important asset for Europe. It is also an operational intelligence

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capability, because counter-terrorism is not just police analysis or more precisely to the Home Office ? for the purposes of counter-ter-

processing, it also consists in going into risk areas under difficult rorism. It is therefore clear that we cannot permit ourselves to do

operational conditions. This means that, in order to retain and deve- anything without thinking, because we have a threat which is more

lop this asset, it is necessary for the allocation of human, financial imposing and it is necessary for public opinion to follow. However,

and legal means to be in proportion with the stakes. And this must we must take care of a responsible pedagogy.

be sustained if we are to remain credible.

On this subject, there is a temptation to create a national centre

The second condition for reinforced cooperation, is national for dealing with threats. It is a fact that such organisations have

harmony between services. The ways in which the intelligence already been flourishing for several years abroad (United States,

services are organised in Europe differ, so the link between the Spain, Germany and in the United Kingdom). These answers result

external intelligence services and the security services, which gene- from an analysis - the American commissions have revealed - a

rally depend on the Home Office, is not consistent. There is no pos- large number of alerts would not be taken into account due to the

sible rationality in this field. In France, we have a specific model. non-coordination between the intelligence services or the weakness

Other partners, even in Europe, have completely different models of a given link. This seems to be in Europe a problem infinitely less

of integrated agencies which group together policing and military serious than the mobilisation of all energies for common operations.

functions, with or without technical intelligence functions in the

other. Finally, the last track concerns the question of European

Community processing. What do we do - concerning the intelligen-

So we have to live with this. The important thing, rather than

ce services and particularly the foreign intelligence service - at the

proposing a single model, is harmony in terms of efficiency, com-

EU level in Brussels? There again, there is still a lot to be done: We

mitment and means. In France, this harmony exists. We have very

would be aware if a European intelligence agency were within our

close relations with our partners of the Home Office, i.e. the DST

immediate reach. However, even beyond the measures of a political

and the Direction Centrale des Renseignements Généraux. Today,

nature which have been taken in this respect over several years, we

for example, we have a jointly run small enterprise, which was

have created a small joint investment which is relatively little

founded last autumn with both these services to imagine together at

known : The European Union Situation Centre.

the beginning and to carry out operations of research. All our net-

works have been mobilised for this purpose. We are pooling our

It was created in 2001, under Javier Solana, and groups toge-

complementary aspects in order to try and process the essential

ther a certain number of representatives of the intelligence services

objectives more efficiently.

aiming to support and to supply common analyses that are useful

for this self-sufficient player, namely the High Representative of the

But national harmony also requires the adhesion of public opi-

Common Foreign and Communal Policy (CFSP). In this respect,

nion. Recently, in the United Kingdom, the House of Lords did not

last spring, the governments made the decision to give this Centre

approve a bill that gave new powers to the intelligence services ? or

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an anti-terrorist dimension and, since a few weeks ago, it has been

receiving representatives of the Home services with this in mind.



It is too early to judge its action, but this small participation

aims to pool not just alerts, but the analyses concerning these terro-

rist phenomena that are not simply security problems because they

obviously comprise a concept which is quite political.

The challenges of counter-terrorism



Alain Marsaud*









It is impossible to discount the post 11 September effect which

hit the United States and the whole world. But there is also a post

11 March effect which may have hit Europe more specifically. Each

and everyone felt, probably in a new and harsh way, just how much

the situation had changed concerning the fight against terrorism,

and how important it was for all of us, in this field, to create some-

thing of a veritable revolution. It is first of all a revolution of the

mind, and more particularly of the minds of political decision-

makers, but also a revolution that will soon reach the legislations

and structures working in this area.



On this subject, it is no doubt better to implement a veritable

threat culture, which is something that we have not necessarily

developed yet today in France and in Europe. Europe is currently

becoming larger and we must accept that it will never be sheltered



* Member of Parliament, President of the Study Group on Civil Defence at the National Assembly, former

anti-terrorist magistrate.

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from conflicts, including and most of all those which originate out- setting up semi-political semi-operational entities to fight against

side this area. Europe will be subject to vindications of all kinds, the manifestations of terrorism. There is a political prerequisite ? of

due both to its status, which is currently considered as privileged which we must convince ourselves ? which consists in giving two

whether or not this may be true, and to its foreign policy or absen- answers in an emergency context: the first consists in reassuring the

ce thereof, which will be judged in some cases as too ambitious and public opinion; the second is to provide an answer to the question

in others as simply too prudent. Furthermore, even if Europe is not posed by the terrorist fact or act.

targeted as a political entity, its individual sovereign nations will

obviously be targets and European citizens will, we must also be The State, in a terrorist operation that takes place on its territo-

aware, clearly also be victims of violent actions outside Europe, ry, does not respond. It finds itself alone in this action, and it is seen

simply because they are Europeans randomly targeted by terrorist by the public eye through the obviously distorting prism of the

events. media, both national and international. It is the State, and the State

alone, that assumes, in the face of the citizens, the responsibility of

History has affected our nations specifically. For this reason, its successes or its failures, and it must answer for them politically.

our reactions to the terrorist phenomenon, whether empirical or And we all remember what happened after the 11th of March in

sometimes dictated by a form of ideology, are not all as constant Spain. The necessity or reflex of cooperation only springs up in the

and have sometimes led us to follow very different routes. Our tra- aftermath. It is afterwards that we realise that it is probably neces-

ditions and our cultures, particularly legal ? and this is the all- sary to cooperate, and that we need our neighbours. But will the

important point ? have influenced our behaviours and we must State be capable of finding the remedy to its various ailments in this

convince ourselves that the fight against the terrorist threat is one of international cooperation? The answer is not obvious.

the strong elements of national sovereignty.

Furthermore, as far as counter-terrorism is concerned, we are

What operations and what pooling of our means, within the confronted with an unwritten subsidiarity principle, and this ques-

European Union (EU), shall we implement? The history of the last tion deserves to be put to the French. In the presence of a given ter-

thirty years has taught us that State terrorism, but also regionalist or rorist situation, who reacts or acts in the best way, the State or the

independentist/separatist inspired terrorism, and terrorism conside- EU?

red as fundamentalist, will always strike citizens or state symbols

either with the objective of punishing them, or in order to influence It is obviously necessary to distinguish between cases accor-

their external or internal line of conduct. Based on this, the state, ding to the nature of the terrorism, particularly if it is purely natio-

usually in an emergency context and also in an improvisory basis, nal or separatist with an exogenous character. This will establish

has often implemented a certain number of preventive or repressi- whether or not cooperation is appropriate: it is quite clear that

ve measures which range from completely revising legislation ? France can hardly call upon the solidarity of neighbouring countries

which was the case in 1986 ? to restructuring the services, or even when it is dealing with violence from the Corsican "Front de

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Libération Nationale Corse" (FLNC). For Iparretarrak or for ETA, tional independence or autonomy of the legal institutions for all

things are a little more complicated. It is obviously tempting to countries that omitted to integrate the legal tool in their counter-ter-

implement one's own policy, i.e. a national policy, and this is main- rorism strategy.

ly due to the demands of citizens and the public opinion, or the

media which will inevitably, and sometimes on the basis of pure Thus, a few years ago, the Court of London refused to extradi-

assumption highlight the failure of intelligence, the police and the te to France one of the suspected authors of the attacks committed

legal investigations and the legal processing. in Paris in 1995. It also refused to sign or validate the temporary

custody documents, although this is not exactly what happened.

France, after some errors and hesitation in the eighties, has Furthermore, the House of Lords voted and, with a considerable

managed to reconstruct a legislative system and an operational majority, refused to give the police intelligence structure and the

organisation without taking any notice of what was happening next legal structure the option of house arrest for people who are under

door, be it in Germany with the Red Army Faction (RAF) or in Italy relatively strong suspicion of taking part in a terrorist action or

with the Red Brigades. This is because France was obliged, at the organisation. So as far as counter-terrorism is concerned, there

same time, to retort to terrorism from the Middle-East perpetrated seems to be much more than just the English Channel between us

not only on its own territory, but also against its citizens retained in and the United Kingdom. And what separates us from the United

the Middle-East. It also had to face what one might call the spiritu- States is probably even more substantial.

al offspring of the RAF, i.e. Direct Action, and also the separatists

of the FLNC and the Basques. We hardly had time to discuss the The difficulty in setting up a European arrest warrant also illus-

problems with our neighbours, considering the political urgency on trates these hesitations. In Italy, recently, but also in the United

the one hand ? our "house was on fire" ?, and perhaps also because Kingdom and in Denmark, this European arrest warrant has been

of the lack of interest that our neighbours had in our plight, basi- having trouble entering the respective legislations, minds and prac-

cally because they did not feel concerned by our avatars, particu- tices. There really still is a lot to be done in order to pool our skills

larly by our Middle-Eastern avatars. and our experience. But what operations are we going to imple-

ment? And what pooling of our means within the EU are we going

The construction of our anti-terrorism tool and our legislation to be able to implement in times to come? The EU initially set up

was an independent process. And this is why everyone is now the solidarity clause in favour of countries struck by terrorism. All

waking up and trying to establish a comparison with what is hap- this is defined in Article 142 of the draft European Constitution.

pening elsewhere. It was only later that our northern neighbours ?

Belgium, Holland, Denmark, etc. ? discovered that the threat on Various action plans following the 11th of September and the

their own territories was finally not unlike the one we had known at 11th of March 2004 have attempted to develop this new concept of

that time. In addition to the sovereignty of the State in the operatio- home security in Europe. But if we read the European Constitution

nal field, there is also ? and this must be emphasised ? the opera- carefully, Article 1?5 of the treaty recalls the fact that among the

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essential functions of the State, there are particularly those which what we are really looking for is solidarity among the States and the

serve the purpose of maintaining public order and safeguarding mutual pooling of means? It is problem of good will. We really

national security. Finally, all these problems are covered entirely by must recognise that what was possible and accessible in a Europe

national sovereignty and this does not enter into the common lot of of fifteen nations will be much more difficult to do in a Europe of

the European Union. But it is more complicated than that, because twenty-eight nations.

Article 1?15 states that the competence of the European Union in

terms of foreign policy and common security covers all questions What priority objectives must be specified in this revised action

concerning the security in the Union. Should we therefore consider plan against terrorism, which particularly results from the well-

that security in the Union is different from that of the States which known note from the General Secretary to the EU Council, but

constitute it? This basically means that there is a bit of everything above all from the well-known note from the Permanent

in this treaty. Representatives Committee (COREPER) to the Council on the 11th

of June 2004? Briefly, it is first necessary to improve the coopera-

Finally, the European Council has recently made an apparently tion between the various authorities in charge of home security.

crucial decision: it has designated a coordinator for counter-terro- This is where we find the problem of Europol, which will no doubt

rism, whose name is Gijs De Vries. What will the main preoccupa- need to gain in legitimacy and demonstrate its ability to collect

tion of this senior civil servant be? Simply to find his place in the information from national services. It will also be necessary for

legal and functional jungle of the various competent organisations. Europol to give this information back to the players concerned, and

But this will largely depend on his willingness, and also on the this is a problem of know-how which is still present as far as distri-

willingness of the civil servants in the member States. At the end of bution is concerned. This is where we come across the problem of

the day, all this is confusing: there is a possibility that the States the multilateral or bilateral relationship in dealing with the terrorist

might find what they have put into the Union on the one hand, but threat.

on the other hand, in case of difficulty in counter-terrorism, they

might try, depending on the circumstances and events, to rummage This point was furthermore discussed during the conference on

and obtain not what they have put in themselves, but what others counter-terrorism held in Ryad on the 5th and 6th of February 2005,

have contributed. And perhaps that is what cooperation is all about. concerning the proposal by the Saudi authorities to set up a world

centre against terrorism. However, we observe that, in view of the

The European Councils of the 4th and 5th of November 2004 scepticism of certain delegations, it was decided that precedence

adopted a programme known as the The Hague Programme in order would be given to a two-sided debate rather than to a pooling of

to reinforce freedom, security and justice in the EU. This was the information and know-how. With regard to this, imagine what

result of a whole series of decisions that were defined by fifteen would happen at a European level, if information from a infiltrated

chapters and twenty-eight measures and commitments, and various source working inside a terrorist organisation were disclosed, thus

obligations. Was it really necessary to go into so much detail, where putting the agent at risk? Nobody here could conceive that this

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cooperation could reach such a level of confidence, even in years to demanding and permanent fight against proliferation, and the moni-

come. toring of the industries that manufacture these dangerous materials,

but it also and above all concerns the protection of populations as a

When we see the difficulties involved in distributing non-dis- part of trans-national civil security plans. It is probable that the

soluble information within the heart of the Federal Bureau of potentiality of an attack of this type is only a matter of time, unfor-

Investigation (FBI) concerning the attacks on the 11th of tunately, as the head of the MI5 suggested last year. We no doubt

September, and the fact that this is a federal agency in a single State, need to dedicate considerable means to the prevention, and even

we can understand the stakes that are at hand in the case of Europol. greater means to the processing of these phenomena and this expe-

And we can assume that it will be the same for Eurojust, which is rience, in the same way as in Singapore today, as this would provi-

Europol's legal cousin. Should we therefore consider from the out- de us with particular enlightenment.

set that Europol and Eurojust should settle for disclosable informa-

tion only, or perhaps even nothing more than executive summaries? The EU is a territory which does not have any real frontiers,

Furthermore, we will one day have to consider the problem of what unlike the United States in particular. The latter have begun a vast

is known as the firewall, i.e. the barrier between intelligence and its discussion on the concept of homeland security, which aims to

use for judicial purposes. make a relatively well defined territory into a sanctuary. And this

term homeland security could be replaced by a more appropriate

And the experience of the 11th of September shows that failu- term such as "security for society", "human security", "internal

res in counter-terrorism are largely due to our hesitations and our security", or even "cooperative" or "comprehensive security".

shyness in this area. France seems to be in advance considering the Whatever the case, the idea is to set up conceptual, institutional and

politically decided involvement of its intelligence services in the technological elements for the purpose of protecting a specified ter-

judicial processing of terrorism. But it us true that there are obvious ritory. So let us do what is necessary to define this territory. The EU

risks involved in such an approach, and this experience could be can take inspiration from this current discussion on this concept in

analysed in a common pool. In any case, this deserves to be discus- the United States.

sed at the highest level of the EU.



It is also necessary to prevent and fight against the financing of

terrorism, although I belong to the minority that believes that terro-

rism operates with little funding, even sometimes in poverty, and at

best with the help of Western Union. The EU is no doubt being

over-careful, perhaps too imaginative in proportion to the potential

risk of NRBC (nuclear, radiological, bacteriological and chemical

warfare) which is still only semi-virtual. It no doubt involves the

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The role of the European Commission

in counter-terrorism



Joaquim Nunes De Almeida*









On the subject of counter-terrorism, the European Commission

makes political or legislative proposals. This is not an operational,

policing or intelligence unit in the traditional sense of the term, but

a unit for formulating policies and legislations on these subjects. In

the current institutional framework, the European Commission has

a legislative right of initiative in the same way as any member State.



The proposals that we submit to the Council are subject to the

rule of unanimity. The twenty-five member States must be unani-

mous for one of our proposals or a proposal from any of the mem-

ber States to be approved. The European parliament is simply

consulted on legislative proposals in this field. And unlike in the

traditional field of Community law, the Commission does not have

the right to call a member State before the Court of Justice because

it has not complied with any of its obligations to transpose legisla-

tion, or for an offence under the law of the Union in this area. This

is more or less the specific institutional framework in which we are

at the moment, i.e. that of the Treaty of Amsterdam.



* Head of the Internal Counter-Terrorism Justice, Freedom and Security DG, European Commission.





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of the other member states without making any changes to their

From this action framework, and on the request of the Heads of content, which would be left to the national initiative. There is also

State and Government Leaders, the European Commission has the matter of enabling the repressive services to access the VIS sys-

developed an administrative and political plan for the next two tem that was set up for visas. VIS is a databank concerning visas,

years. For this purpose, the The Hague Programme, which was whose main objective is to combat clandestine immigration.

adopted in November 2004 by the Heads of State and Government

Leaders, defined the priorities in terms of justice and home affairs In addition to these initial questions, it is also necessary to dis-

for the next five years, thus replacing the Tampere programme cuss how we are going to ensure that the guarantees are respected

which was dogma in terms of justice and home affairs at the on a European level, particularly for the protection of the data and

European level after 1999. The The Hague Programme asks us to the existence of a common protection standard within that data.

present legislation on the principle of availability of information.

The basic idea is that, in a Union that shares the same values and It is difficult to imagine having a European legislation concer-

the same principles, the exchange of information between repressi- ning information availability without there also being a common

ve services should be as good as within the States themselves, or standard or a common legislation covering the protection of data in

that there should be a single area for exchanging information. This what is known as the third pillar in EU jargon and which, basically,

is the political objective. The legislation that we are to present by corresponds to the legal and security aspects, in the political, penal

the end of this year will enable this principle to be implemented and police areas. There is currently a European directive covering

from 2008. the protection of data, but which only applies in the commercial

field. We will also analyse the possibility of creating an instrument

Currently, my Unity is analysing, in cooperation with the that is better adapted to the necessities of the repressive and legal

experts of the member States and with other sources of expertise, services in the area of data protection, because we are confronted

what information should be available. This is because, before defi- with a strong legal obstacle in the exchange of information between

ning a principle of availability of information, it is necessary to member States, but also with other States.

know what information one requires and wants available, and to

what information one can have direct or indirect access. The European Commission can intervene on elements of legis-

lation in this area, but the main difficulty in this is due to the mat-

The DG is also working on the possible interconnection bet- ter of trust between the services of each of the member States,

ween DNA databases. So the question is to know whether we because this trust cannot be created by decree. There are still also a

should harmonise the content of the DNA databases on a European number of large cultural obstacles in Europe. In other words, for

level, because the DNA databases of each of the member states are example, we may well gain access to a database in Greece, but it

very different, or whether we should simply find a search engine will still be in Greek. The European Commission wants to settle this

that provides repressive services with access to the DNA databases type of problem by legislation, because it is the only means it has.



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Concerning crisis management, the Commission ? contrary to and Government Leaders to define a strategy concerning recruit-

popular belief ? currently administers many alerting systems for ment and radicalisation. For these tasks, the Commission will also

many motives that do not necessarily concern a terrorist cause, but be required to present a contribution.

which are liable to be sued in the case of a terrorist attack. The

Commission also manages a civil protection system which combi- What will change, from an institutional point of view, with the

nes the resources of each of the member States that wish to come to coming into force of the European Constitutional Treaty? The

the aid of the member State that has been the victim of a catastro- Commission would still have the power of initiative in this area, but

phe, whether natural or of human origin. The Commission also has Member States would not have an individual right of initiative: it

rapid alerting systems for contagious diseases or epidemics whose would be necessary for a quarter of the Member States to agree on

origin is not always known. The Commission also manages joint a proposal in order for them to be allowed to present it at the

alerting systems for problems concerning failures in the nuclear Council. The normal procedure in the area justice, freedom and

sector, and joint alerting systems for zoological, animal or agricul- security will require a qualified majority and the joint decision of

tural epidemics, which may be of a certain interest in this field. the European Parliament, with important exceptions in this field,

more particularly the exception concerning operational police

Following the Madrid attacks and the tsunami in South-East cooperation. Furthermore, European law in this field would be sub-

Asia, it is becoming more and more necessary to discuss improved ject to legal proceedings by the European Commission taken

coordination between the member States, in order to pool these against member States because they have not complied with their

rapid alerting systems so that the Commission has a better crisis obligations to transpose legislation in terms of justice, freedom and

management system that is not fragmented, and which should also security, defined for adoption on a European level.

be linked to the repressive services of the member States. The idea

consists in conveying information which, due to the skills of the

Commission in terms of agriculture, environment, health, etc.,

could be of interest to the police services of the Member States.

However, the interface of these rapid alerting systems and of the

Commission's crisis management centre with the repressive servic-

es is still undefined. We have suggested to the Council that Europol

could be used as the hub for this interface between the

Commission's crisis management and the actual police action.

Finally, the The Hague Programme describes a new political deba-

te in the construction of Europe, which concerns the radicalisation

of terrorism or of its modes of recruitment in Europe. The The

Hague Programme asked the European Council of Heads of State

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Fighting terrorism efficiently



Frédéric Veaux*









Counter-terrorism raises a certain number of questions. It is

indeed a fact that in this combat, the Rule-of-Law State

("Rechtsstaat") ? and the European Union (EU) is also concerned

by this situation ? is confronted with an essential problem: how to

protect citizens from the principles that underlie the Rule-of-Law

State? If enough efficient means are not made available to combat

terrorism, the credibility and the authority of the institutions are

likely to be weakened. But at the same time, an excessive reaction

on the part of these institutions can result in a feeling of rejection of

those institutions by the citizens, which can even go as far as sym-

pathy with the terrorist groups.



Europe is currently confronted with four different forms of ter-

rorism: Islamist terrorism, which we have discussed at length

during this symposium, separatist-inspired ? not "nationalist" ? ter-

rorism, terrorism connected with extremes, whether right-wing or

left-wing, and particularly the threat of the European extreme left,

which has anchor points in Italy, Spain, Germany, Belgium and also





* General controller, head of the French National Antiterrorist Division.





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in France, and finally the fourth group which contains everything manner, first of all from the legal action point of view, thanks to the

else, such as the threats or the attempt of extortion to which the innovations of the law dated 9 September 1986 which created the

French state was subjected in 2004 by the AZF Group. centralisation of investigation and judgement of terrorism cased at

the Paris High Court.

This terrorist threat is not virtual. Simply consider the number

of people incarcerated in France for terrorism: on the 31st of As far as police action is concerned, there is no single service

December 2004, 361 people were incarcerated in France on a pre- in France that is responsible for the repression of terrorism. There

ventive or permanent basis for actions connected with terrorism. are obviously two distinct main fields of action, i.e. intelligence and

153 if these individuals were related to Basque terrorism, 79 with repressive action, which involve several dedicated services. As far

Corsican terrorism and 103 with Islamist terrorism. Faced with this as intelligence is concerned, France has the Direction Centrale des

challenge, France has, particularly since 1986, given itself the Renseignements Généraux et la Direction de la Surveillance du

necessary legal and institutional tools to provide an answer to ter- Territoire (DST). For the actual repressive action, most of this

rorism in a Rule-of-Law State, on the one hand by constituting a action is assigned to the Division Nationale Antiterroriste, and to

specific repressive legal arsenal, served by a specific organisation, the DST which is in charge or everything that concerns the repres-

legal and police structures engaged in counter-terrorism, and on the sion of Islamist terrorism, particularly with respect to its Jihadist

other hand by taking full part in cooperation at an international international component. The action of all these services is coordi-

level, both European and world-wide. nated at the French Home Office with the Direction Générale de la

Police Nationale, by the Unité de Coordination de la Lutte

France initially has a specific organisation and legislation Antiterroriste (UCLAT).

which are a source of inspiration for our European neighbours. The

keystone of this system consists of the law dated 19 December In addition to these counter-terrorism instruments, the French

1986, whose underlying idea is that specialisation, centralisation State has also been involved for many years in international police

and coordination are the three lines which enable us to gain in effi- and legal cooperation, on a European and world level. Today, bila-

ciency in counter-terrorism. Subsequently, the new penal code defi- teral and multilateral cooperation has become an essential instru-

ned qualified acts by terrorists as autonomous offences to be punis- ment in counter-terrorism, although it continues to be implemented

hed by increased penalties, thus creating a specific offence desi- in the traditional enclosures. Within the EU, we should note the effi-

gnated Terrorist Conspiracy, which is greatly envied by many other ciency of the system of liaison officers and magistrates that has

countries. This incrimination enables us to fight efficiently, particu- been in place for a few years now.

larly against all the logistical support networks for the terrorist

groups. Furthermore, the progressive adaptation of French law to The double shock of the 11th of September 2001 and the 11th

the specificity of the terrorist offence has led the State to organise of March 2004 has caused us, and is therefore still leading us ? i.e.

the institutional services in charge of fighting this threat in a special both the intelligence services and the repressive services ? to dis-

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cuss modes of cooperation that will be useful and efficient on a This structure, which consists of six French policemen and six

European level. As such, the example of cooperation between Spanish policemen, is actively working today. A lot of information

France and Spain in the area of the fight against the Basque terro- will no doubt be drawn from this experiment in a field where coope-

rist organisation ETA, can serve as a model and a reference. ETA ration is freely used, and where the difficulty sometimes resided in

currently has a total of 850 deaths in Europe on its hands, all vic- finding a reason for acting on both sides of the frontier. This is

tims of its criminal actions. It is unfortunately and « fortunately » because, although the criminal actions are committed on Spanish

the bloodthirstiest organisation in Europe: unfortunately because of territory, the management, structure and training are located on

the suffering and pain inflicted upon the Spanish people; "fortuna- French territory. This implementation of the joint investigation

tely" because we can already see that Islamist terrorism has not suc- team needs to rely on a certain number of principles, which will

ceeded in taking the first place that is still held by ETA in the EU. guarantee its success, and these principles are not easy to apply.

ETA is also more than 520 detainees in Spain and nearly 150 detai- First of all, it is necessary to provide an added value to the traditio-

nees in France at the end of 2004, some of which are French citi- nal forms of police and legal cooperation which, until now, have

zens. After a period of some hesitation, police cooperation and legal had no failings. The additional mutual aid provided by the execu-

cooperation between France and Spain are now total. Moreover, tion of international rogatory commissions, requests for provisional

this cooperation in the fight against ETA can no longer remain limi- arrest issued by the legal authorities of each country, the coopera-

ted to just these two countries today, as proven by the arrests recent- tion systems set up by the various police forces, French or Spanish,

ly made in Belgium and Germany. is perfectly efficient. So we must insist on the added value of this

new system.

The legal instruments set up within the EU are perfectly at

home in this system, particularly the European arrest warrant and However, these operations must be set up with a guarantee that

the joint investigation team. Although there are some legal difficul- individual and collective liberties of EU citizens will be respected,

ties in the implementation of the European Arrest Warrant, these and that the acts accomplished by the members of this structure, i.e.

difficulties are a positive factor because they eliminate the idea that the joint investigation team, are perfectly legal. This is because it is

this measure is automatic, which some people might be tempted to no use creating new structures if tomorrow, the Supreme Court of

put forward in order to dispute its utility. Transposition into the law Appeal, for example, had to sanction the actions carried out by this

of the concept of a common investigation team has been put into joint investigation team. It is also necessary to open the route in the

effect with the creation of the first joint team as a result of an agree- implementation of the legal instruments of the Union in this matter.

ment signed on the 15th of September 2004 between the Prosecutor Other areas of cooperation also deserve our attention.

of the National Court of Madrid and the Public Prosecutor of the

Paris High Court, as a part of the investigations carried out against As for the financing of terrorism, with the difficulties connec-

the ETA terrorist organisation. ted with the various expressions of terrorism, it is not possible to

deal with it in the same way when faced with an Islamist, Basque,

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Corsican or extreme left wing mode of expression. Another thing We must also keep in mind the fact that our systems have tech-

that is true is that, in order to carry out terrorist operations on nical and legal flaws, and that legislative and regulation texts are

European territory, the financial and physical means that need to be still few and far between. It us therefore necessary to permanently

set up are not necessarily enormous. We unfortunately saw this in assess these systems as the EU does.

Madrid on the 11th of March 2004. We see it every day in Corsica

and we saw it for the 11th of September attacks: the estimates Finally, we must consider the consequences of multiplying the

concerning the means required to set up the matter operation have places in which cooperation actions are developed. It is true that

been considerably reduced. intelligence must be distinguished from repressive action, and this

is no doubt so that it can combine with it more efficiently. As for the

Over and above these precise questions, we must continue to bilateral cooperation, it continues to demonstrate its efficiency, but

develop cooperation in the area of exchanges of information we must absolutely centralise, coordinate and specialise. For this

concerning ADN, fingerprints and visas, frontier checks and the reason, we must give Europol all the room it deserves.

security of identity documents, health and safety threats and

nuclear, radiological, bacteriological and chemical threats, and the

monitoring of the arms and explosives supply channels. For the lat-

ter aspect, we have noticed that monitoring the Balkan channels

was not entirely efficient, as sadly demonstrated by the attacks on

the 11th of March where, finally, it was a simple story of a theft of

explosives near Madrid. This is also the case when we raid ETA and

FLNC hideouts, where we find a few pots of chlorate rather than

large stocks of explosives as we used to find in the past.



We must also reinforce our ability to act inside the frontiers of

Europe, but also outside them, particularly by developing technical

assistance strategies for the most threatened countries, whether it is

to assist them in their way of fighting terrorism, or when citizens of

our Member States are subjected to acts of terrorism outside the

Union. Each of the States, but why not the EU as well, in a coordi-

nated manner, must be able to take fairly rapid action abroad, in the

same way as our American friends. There is no need to list the

French and European victims in various places of the world since

the 11th of September.

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