Thomas Chadefaux
Department of Political Science
University of Michigan
7730 Haven Hall, 505 S. State Street
Ann Arbor, MI 48109
734-272-5083 – chadefau@umich.edu
www.umich.edu/~chadefau
EDUCATION
University of Michigan
Ph.D., Political Science (expected April 2009)
Specialization: International Security, Interstate Wars
Methodology: Game Theory, Bargaining Models, Agent-based Models
Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva
M.A., International Politics (2003)
Institut d’Etudes Politiques, Strasbourg
B.A., Public Administration (2001)
Kyoto University, Japan
Kyoto University International Education Program certificate (2000)
RESEARCH
Dissertation: The Value of Power: When Do States Fight Over Their Relative Strength?
Committee: James D. Morrow (co-chair), Robert Axelrod (co-chair), Allan C. Stam,
Barbara Koremenos, Tilman Borgers (UM Economics)
States often negotiate or fight over their relative power. For example, they negotiate over
their armament (e.g., Iran’s nuclear weapons) or their ability to launch an offensive attack
(e.g., the Cuban missile crisis), and they fight to increase their future bargaining power
(e.g., reputation in the Vietnam War). Why do states negotiate over their relative power?
When do these negotiations avoid costly conflicts and when, on the contrary, do they
break down into war? To answer these questions, I analyze bargaining models in which
current gains affect future power, such that relative power is defined endogenously as the
outcome of states’ strategic interactions. I derive two main results: (i) commitment
problems caused by rapid changes in power never lead to war when states can bargain
over their relative power; (ii) states can prefer war to peace when present gains affect
future power. The results challenge and refine existing rationalist explanations for war,
and provide micro-foundations for offensive realism.
Working Papers and Work in Progress
“Bargaining Over Power: When Do Shifts in Relative Power Lead to War?”
Under review at the AJPS (submitted May 14, 2008)
“War as an Investment: When Do States Fight Over Their Relative Power?” (2008)
“War Under Complete Information: The Problem of Increasing Returns” (2008)
“Explaining the Pattern of Alliances: Rate of Returns and Chain-Gangs vs. Passed Bucks”
(2008)
“Negotiating the Agenda: Domestic Elections and International Negotiations” (with
Barbara Koremenos, 2007)
“The Right to Remain Silent? Strategic Revelation of Information in International Politics”
(2007)
“Is Power Scarce? An Economic Analysis of Coercion” (2007)
“Bargaining Rigidities and the Rationality of War” (2006)
Conference Presentations
Midwest Political Science Association: 2005, 2006, 2008
American Political Science Association 2005, 2008
British Political Science Association 2004
SELECTED FELLOWSHIPS, GRANTS AND AWARDS
Southern Political Science Association: Prestage–Cook Award (Declined), 2008
University of Michigan: Travel Grants, 2005 – 2008
University of Michigan: Rackham International Student Fellowship, 2005
University of Michigan: Summer Collaboration Grant, 2005
Kyoto University: International Education Scholarship, 1999 – 2000
Institut d’Etudes Politiques: Bourse de Merite, 1997 – 1999
TEACHING EXPERIENCE
Introduction to World Politics (PS 160)
Graduate Student Instructor, Fall 2005 — Winter 2007. Introductory course in
International Relations (Prof. Morrow). Led a total of 8 sections of 25 students each
Modeling Political Processes (PS 391)
Graduate Student Instructor, Fall 2007. Upper-level course in game theory (Prof. Clark).
Led three sections of 25 students each
RESEARCH EXPERIENCE
Professor George Tsebelis, University of Michigan (Winter 2007 – present)
Research Assistant. Drafted chapters of a textbook on comparative politics and veto
players. Helped in the collection and analysis of data on veto players, civil conflicts and
interstate wars
Professor Barbara Koremenos, University of Michigan (Winter 2006 – present)
Research Assistant. Wrote game-theoretic models and assisted in the collection and
analysis of data on international agreements
Professor Cedric Dupont, Graduate Institute of International Studies (Fall 2003)
Research Assistant. Organized the UNCTAD conference “Developing Countries and the
Trade Negotiation Process”
TEACHING QUALIFICATIONS
International Relations
Survey course: Graduate and Undergraduate
International Security: Graduate and Undergraduate
Foreign Policy: Graduate and Undergraduate
International Political Economy: Undergraduate
International Organization: Undergraduate
Methodology
Game Theory: Graduate and Undergraduate
Bargaining Models in International Relations: Graduate and Undergraduate
Mathematics for Social Scientists: Graduate and Undergraduate
PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS
American Economic Association, 2007 –
American Political Science Association, 2004 –
Midwest Political Science Association, 2005 –
ADDITIONAL SKILLS
Languages
English (fluent), French (native), German (fluent), Japanese (intermediate)
Computer Software
Programming (Java, Repast, Netlogo, Bash), typesetting (Latex), Statistics & Mathematics
(Stata, Maple)
REFERENCES
Robert Axelrod James D. Morrow
Walgreen Professor Research Professor
Ford School of Public Policy Center for Political Studies
University of Michigan University of Michigan
(734) 764 - 3490 (734) 615 - 3172
axe@umich.edu jdmorrow@umich.edu
Barbara Koremenos William R. Clark
Associate Professor Associate Professor
Center for Political Studies Center for Political Studies
University of Michigan University of Michigan
(734) 764 - 6134 (734) 763 - 9715
koremeno@umich.edu wrclark@umich.edu