Principles of Joint NATO Air Defence
Integration of NATO and National contribution offers optimum solution. Integrated,
combined and joint AD architecture based on NATINADS is required. New NATO member
must be integrated in to the NATO AD.
Level of integration depends on factors as the treat, available forces, operational environment
etc. Level of integration could be:
Basic Integration – cooperation between segregated AD systems of the different services
under their operational C2
Functional Integration: AD capabilities of the different services components under operational
command of the responsible AD commander while operational control remains unchanged.
Full Integration: AD capabilities of the different services components under operational C2 of
the responsible commander.
Interoperability
Technical interoperability - systems can be linked together to exchange information in timely,
reliable, secure and accurate manner.
Procedural Interoperability – achieved through standardization, doctrine, concepts, tactic,
Techniques, Procedures and terminology.
Essential elements
Air surveillance – permanent surveillance maintain desired level of control of the air. The air
surveillance depends on combination of sensors (mobile, static, deployable, active, passive,
surface, air, space situated, national NATO civil, military…). The increased need for
deplorability requires wider variety and deployability Capabilities of sensors.
Command and Control – must be capable of processing of large volume of data from multiple
sources. A network must enable capability providing a joint Common Operational Picture
(COP) on real or near to real time bases. Definition of common message and cryptographic
standards and procedures and effective management of sophisticated datalinks are highly
required. Coordination of radio frequency among NATO/national Frequency Management
authorities is required and dual use of civil/military communication must be considered.
Active Air Defence – active AD platform should be capable of fulfilling several types of
missions using a wide variety of weapons simultaneously. Mix of surface and airborne
platforms should provide multilayer active AD system.
Passive Air Defence – increase survivability, degrade enemy targeting capability. (Emission
Control (EMCON), Operational Security (OPSEC) CBRN….)
Air Policing
Check AAP – 6
Preserving the integrity of the NATO Airspace is Alliance collective task
AP is a peace time task. To fulfill this task are required capabilities to detect, track and
identify all (mil/civil) aerial objects approaching NATO airspace, evaluate, change, limit or
deny violation and infringements, intercept aerial object, additional political and other
measures.
Air Traffic Management agencies coordination is fundamental condition of effective
execution of AP. AP may contribute to solving/assisting in air emergency situations. Key
elements of AP is Air, Surveillance and control system (ASACS), Air C2 and appropriate AD
assets based on 24/7 basis. AP Interoperability is achieved by Integrated AD system.
Definition of AP
AP is a peacetime mission involving the use of the Air Surveillance and Control
System (ASACS), Air C2 and appropriate AD assets including interceptors for purpose of
preserving the integrity of the NATO Airspace portion of Alliance Airspace.
Additional info.
ACCS NATO Air Command and Control Systém It is designed to combine the
tactical planning, tasking, and the execution of all air defensive, offensive air and air support
operations in a single system.
The system will provide for the management of the functions of air traffic control,
surveillance, air mission control, air space management, force management, and command
and control resource management. At the planning and tasking level the system will be fielded
in Combined Air Operations Centres (CAOCs). At the execution level, ACCS will be fielded
in control centres that will provide facilities for aircraft control and production and
dissemination of the Joint Environment Picture.
ACCS will add unparalleled value over legacy systems by:
Providing a foundation for the whole spectrum of Joint Air C2 operations from long-
term mission and airspace planning to real-time management of sensors, weapons, and
communications networks.
Guaranteeing stability, reliability, maintainability and, in the worst case, graceful
degradation, while maintaining a high standard of system safety.
Allowing extensive scalability from tactical operations on laptops to air campaign
management with hundreds of operators in high-end computing centres.
Supporting, with the same design and implementation, deployed operations in shelters
or transport cases, and under adverse environmental conditions
Ensuring interoperability with all relevant military and civilian communications
standards.
Air. Allied Air Commands Izmir (Turkey) and Ramstein (Germany) provide the capability to
have Air Component Commands dedicated to meet NATO's level of ambition. These
structures also provide the necessary command and control for air policing and the NATO
Integrated Air Defence System (NATINADS) in the geographical northern and southern
regions of NATO.
Supporting the Allied Air Commands are four static Combined Air Operations Centres
(CAOCCs) to direct NATO air operations – two static CAOCs in Finderup (Denmark) and
Larissa (Greece); and two deployable CAOCs in Udem (Germany) and Poggio Renatico
(Italy). If deployed, the parent CAOC will retain a residual capability to maintain standing
peacetime functions.
Air Policing and the requirement to have air defence assets available at short notice. For this purpose
NATO has at its disposal a comprehensive system of air surveillance and airspace management
means as well as Quick Reaction Alert assets for intercepts (QRA(I)). By means of radar sites, remote
data transmission and central command and control centres the Alliance ensures constant control of
its entire airspace from the north of Norway to the eastern tip of Turkey. 365 days a year, NATO
exploits these facilities to react within seconds to air traffic incidents in the Allies’ airspace. This
structure of weapon systems, control centres and procedures is referred to as the NATO Integrated Air
Defence System (NATINADS).
Within this architecture, HQ AC Ramstein has a central task to accomplish in the north of Europe. The
headquarters’ assigned area of responsibility is subdivided into two so-called Air Policing Areas, each
of which is controlled by a multinational Combined Air Operation Centre or CAOC. This is where all
data from the air monitoring centres collated and combined with the data from the civilian air traffic
authorities to provide a permanently current air picture, which shows all the flight activities in the area
of responsibility.
If any situations occur that are not in compliance with regulations and rules stipulated by the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the Commander of a CAOC, a two- or three-star
general, is authorized to initiate a scramble of the QRA(I) aircraft assigned to NATO by the member
nation in whose airspace the incident takes place. In cases of two NATO member states agreeing a
respective convention, the QRA(I) aircraft are also permitted to cross boundary to fulfil their mission.
Reasons for possible incidents may be a disruption of radio communications between the aircraft and
the air traffic control or that aircraft alter the pre-established route, altitude or speed. In these instances
the QRA(I) approaches the aircraft that caused the incident from astern to obtain the information
needed. The constant high readiness posture of associated radar sites, command posts and QRA(I)
aircraft has so far ensured that no serious disruption to international air traffic has occurred in the HQ
AC Ramstein area of responsibility.
CAOC 2
To achieve a CAOC interim deployable capability, the 32nd US Air Operations Group (AOG)
and CAOC 2 at Kalkar were commissioned to provide personnel and material. For a better co-
ordination and preparation of deployed missions, , the CAOC 2 Detachment was established
at Ramstein in September 1996 together with 32nd AOG. In 1997, CAOC 2 Kalkar, CAOC 2
Detachment and the 32nd AOG located at Ramstein successfully passed their deployment
verification and have since provided the so-called Interim Deployable CAOC Capability
(IDCAOC).
With the adjustment of the Peacetime Establishment (PE) and Crisis Establishment
(CE) in 2000, the ICAOC lost the “Interim” status and was converted to a CAOC. To
accelerate the process of ACCS implementation, CAOC 2 Kalkar redeployed to the Uedem
Paulsberg site and declared full operational capability in March 2006 using the Integrated
Command & Control (ICC) system for command and control. Since the closure of CAOC 4
Meßstetten on 30 June 2008, CAOC Uedem’s Air Policing Area comprises the airspace of ten
European nations from the BENELUX countries in the west, Germany, Poland, the Czech
Republic and Slovakia in the centre, to the Baltic Nations Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia in the
northeast. On 1 March 2010 CAOC 2 and CAOC 2 Detachment were amalgamated to stand
up CAOC Uedem. With this move, CAOC Uedem also took over the specific responsibilities
for the Interim Deployable Capability.
CAOC Uedem provides Commander Allied Air Command Ramstein with the tools to
perform near real-time airpower management. With the closure of the CAOC 2 Detachment on 28
February 2010, CAOC Uedem took over their responsibilities for the deployable capability. When
required, CAOC Uedem may need to forward deploy as IDCAOC (Interim Deployable CAOC) to
fulfil this milion.
CAOC Uedem is facing a period of fundamental technical and organizational change, the
main factor in this process being the forthcoming introduction of the new battle management
system called Air Command and Control System (ACCS).
The ACCS hardware supports both the stationary facility, the “Below-Ground-Building”
(BGB), at Uedem and the deployable mission of CAOC Uedem, either as a “stand alone” or
“reach back” entity or “embedded” in a Joint Force Air Component (JFAC) structure. For CAOC
Uedem the transformation process will be accompanied by a significant increase in personnel.
NATO Policy on theatre Ballistic Missile Defence
Slide 1
TBMD is protection of deployed forces and high value assets within theater from BM
attack. TBMD is based on 4 areas:
Battle Management, Command Control Communication and Intelligence (BMC3I)
Active Air Defence
Conventional Counter Force
Passive Air Defence
BMC3I is supporting platform to enable operation. BMC3I requires processes, procedures
and information for coordination and synchronization of AD. Active Air Defence is active
measure taken to destroy or nullify missiles treat. Multi-layered defence system covering the
three intercept phases Boost, Midcourse, Terminal phase. Conventional Counter Force is
mean of neutralizing opponent BM capabilities. Passive Air Defence is passive measures
taken in order to minimize effectiveness of missile attack.
Slide 2
Desired Effect:
No
No Treat No Lunch No Impact
Consequence
Counter/Anti
Deterrence CCF Active AD Passive AD
Proliferation
Political Dimension Military dimension
There are four of desired effects of TBMD which have their oven aspect and
dimensions. As is seen in political dimension has desired effect of No threat aspect of
Counter/Anti Proliferation In political dimension e.t.c.
NATO Policy on Cruise Missiles Defence