The Battle For Iraq

INDICE









The Middle East’s New Era and The Lebanon Crisis Pag. 3





Iraq: The Exit Strategy Pag. 12





The Impact of the Iraq War on Israel’s Perception of Security Pag. 23





Terrorist Challenges to Saudi Arabian Internal Security Pag. 23





The Iraq War and the Middle East region: an overview Pag. 46





How Inevitable is an Islamist Future? Pag. 61

RICERCA Congiunta CeMiSS

Global Research for International Affairs Interdisciplinary

Center (IDC), Herzliya









LA BATTAGLIA PER L’IRAQ1









1

Parte di questi papers è apparsa o potrà apparire sul MERIA Journal, rivista elettronica sul Medio Oriente,

con indicazione che evidenzia la collaborazione con il CeMiSS, come da accordo.





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THE MIDDLE EAST’S

NEW ERA AND THE LEBANON CRISIS









The Middle East is unlike everywhere else. Different rules apply there. This is

why the region has proven so intractable to reform, democracy, peace, or resolving

problems. By the same token, these factors have made it so violent, unstable, and the

locale of so many crises. Without understanding how the region works, none of this

makes sense.

The critical underlying issue is the debate over how to explain why the Arab

states and Iran are far less developed than the West. The effective approach—one

adopted pretty much everywhere else in the world--is to say that what is needed is hard

work, good organization, peace, democracy, spending on infrastructure and education,

citizen rights, equality for women, free enterprise with reasonable state supervision, and

so on. This is the successful path taken by Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and many

other countries.

But the overwhelmingly dominant response in the Middle East has been to argue

that the reason for strategic weakness and economic backwardness is mainly external,

due to Western imperialism and the existence of Israel. Two authoritarian ideologies—

Arab nationalism and Islamism—claim they will win this struggle by mobilizing their

societies for the battle. This approach justifies war, high military spending, a closed

society with few individual rights, statist economies, support for terrorism, and other

things that only widen the very gap they are supposed to mend and bring much suffering.

One of the most remarkable features of this pattern of Arab politics is that the

regimes in power today are almost all—except for Iraq—the same as those in 1970.

Almost all of them are dictatorships. Their survival is not a result of success but in spite

of their failures. Poor performance is covered up by the excuse of foreign enemies; the

demand for freedom is countered by the requirements of fighting this war or by branding

them as the sabotage of Western puppets.







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The new heroes of the Arab street

Instead of seeking practical results by social, economic and political progress—

that would give an advantage to liberal reformers--the constant search has been for some

heroic force that will win what is an unwinnable, and quite costly, struggle. Somehow,

miraculously, the idols will destroy Israel, expel Western influence, unite the Arab (or

Muslim) world, and rapidly transform their societies into utopias enjoying both material

advantages and spiritual exaltation.

It is the same dream of finding an alternative to mainstream modernity that

motivated Communism and fascism in the West. Yet such radical rejectionism has

dominated far more in the Middle East, in both politics and intellectual life.

Since in the 1950s, there has been a series of candidate-heroes who each had their

turn on the stage, basking in the masses’ cheers, until their failures provoked

disappointment, but not disillusion with the whole concept. At first, they were

nationalists: Gamal Abdel Nasser, Hafiz al-Asad, Yasir Arafat, and Saddam Hussein, the

leaders respectively of Egypt, Syria, the PLO, and Iraq. But this line ended with

Hussein’s defeat in Kuwait in 1991 and certainly with his overthrow by the Americans in

2003.

Increasingly, hopes turned to radical Islamists, who launched bloody and

destructive but failed revolutions in Egypt and Algeria. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini,

who led the Iranian revolution in 1979, first appeared as the Islamist equivalent of

Vladimir Lenin. For a while, Usama bin Ladin was the darling. But now he is “out,” and

Hizballah and Hamas are “ïn.”





A New Alignment

This brings us to the present moment. The fighting in Lebanon marks a new era in

the region, one already visible in trends beforehand. The new candidates for regional

power are the members of a four-part alliance, consisting of Iran, Syria, Hizballah, and

Hamas. It is a most curious alignment, consisting of a Persian Shia state, an Arab state

ruled by non-Muslim (Alawite) radical nationalists, a Shia Arab Islamist movement, and

a Sunni Arab Islamist one. What bring this quartet together, however, are common







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interests, worldview, and goals.

The ideology actually is shared by Iran, Hizballah, and Hamas. Syria is motivated

by more mundane regime interests. Damascus has no other ally but Tehran, which has

long supplied it with low-cost oil as well. Iran and Syria support the same forces in

Lebanon—which, in turn, back Syrian hegemony over that country—and among the

Palestinians. They are both very anti-American and oppose any Arab-Israeli peace. The

two support different sides in Iraq but this has caused no trouble between them. By

joining an “Islamist” alliance, the Syrian government also ingratiates itself with the very

group that is its biggest domestic threat, thus defusing it at least for a while.

For the other three, however, there is a common outlook, which brings them even

more tightly together. The fact that Iran is the main source of funding for Hamas and

Hizballah contributes to this closeness. They also share a common ideology, which

parallels rather closely that of Usama bin Ladin though they differ greatly from him in

tactical terms. This trio’s world view is not only extremist it crosses the line into being

crackpot, making it all the more dangerous.

According to their ideology, America and the West seeks to dominate the world

and destroy Islam in league with the evil, omnipotent Zionist conspiracy and even Satan.

God wants the properly minded Muslims to destroy this abomination, a victory which

would bring heaven on earth. Islam as presently practiced by most Muslims is wrong, if

not heretical; all rulers of Muslim states are illegitimate. A regional, even global,

revolution is needed to enshrine a strict version of Islam as the ruler of society over

Muslims and perhaps everyone.

But even this is not all. Along with the vision comes a strategy. If Muslims are

willing to risk or embrace martyrdom in an all-out war, they will no doubt emerge

victorious. The reason for past defeats and present weakness is not the balance of forces

or imbalance of technology but merely cowardice on the part of the masses and treason

on the part of the leaders. U.S. power is merely a paper tiger whose nature will be clearly

seen if it is only challenged. The same applies to Israel.

The attacks from Lebanon, then, are meant as a practical demonstration that the

Islamists’ weapons and determination can inflict a defeat on Israel. The destruction

wrought on Lebanon as a result is either a matter of indifference or merely used to furnish







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additional proof of Israel’s evil nature. Of course, the fact that it is Lebanon that is being

bombed—and not Syria or Iran—makes this course more attractive for the two state

authors of the crisis.





A New Non-Arab Regional Hegemon

The key factor in this alliance is Iran, a country so large and distant that it views

itself as untouchable. Currently, Iran is under an especially extreme president who

follows an adventurous policy, but his colleagues are not more moderate but merely more

cautious. If Iran is this powerful before obtaining nuclear weapons, what damage will it

bring when it has atomic arms in its arsenal?

Tehran’s emergence is remarkable. For the first time in modern history,

significant Arab forces are being directed by non-Arab Persians, while Sunni groups—

notably Palestinian Hamas and Islamic Jihad but with others increasingly attracted to

Tehran’s gravitational pull--are flocking to the banner of a Shia ruler. Iran has also

developed considerable assets among the Shia majority in Iraq (though the Iraqi

government itself has no intention of becoming an Iranian client) and other countries.





Power Vacuum in the Arab World

In part, this new Iranian role is made possible by another amazing development:

for the first time in a half-century, no Arab leader or country has any influence outside

his own borders. For a half-century, there was a battle for leadership of the Arab world,

with Egypt, Syria, and Iraq the main contenders, and Libya providing comic relief.

During the presidency of Gamal Abdel Nasser (who died in 1970), Egypt largely did

fulfill such a role.

Yet Nasser’s successor, Anwar Sadat, found this ambition too costly and

unrewarding for Egypt. When Egypt made peace with Israel, the Arab League boycotted

it and Cairo’s leadership pretensions steadily declined. Iraq made the strongest bid to play

that role, conducting both the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war and the 1990-1991 invasion of

Kuwait in that context. But Saddam Hussein’s defeat in the latter conflict punctured his

claim. The Soviet Union’s collapse pulled the rug out from under the radical Arab states.

Saudi Arabia’s money bought it influence but leadership was far beyond its capabilities.







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During the second half of the twentieth century, however, Arab states frequently

sponsored revolutionary and terrorist groups against each other. Egypt invaded Yemen,

Syria took over Lebanon, and Iraq tried to annex Kuwait. Yasir Arafat’s PLO was at

times a client of Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. And within that organization, many of the

member groups were sponsored by an Arab state. For example, al-Saiqa was Syrian-

backed and the Arab Liberation Front answered to Baghdad.

Now, however, matters are quite different. Iraq is trying to put itself together,

while its Kurdish and Shia majority has even renounced the idea that Iraq is an Arab

state. Egypt is about to undergo a leadership transition and Syria, whose young inept

ruler, Bashar al-Asad, does not measure up to his dictator father, Hafiz-- is a client of

Tehran. No Arab ruler has had any real influence over the Palestinians, Lebanon, the U.S.

overthrow of Saddam Hussein, Iraq since then, or just about anything else.

That is why the leaders of Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, and even Saudi Arabia

are so worried about the turn events are taking. A powerful Iran and Syria and a growing

radical Islamist movement which wants to wage war on Israel and America threaten them

both directly--through revolutionary efforts and terrorism at home--and indirectly by

stirring up regional instability.

Yet with portions of their citizens wildly applauding the new heroes, these

regimes are not going to go too far in combating them, at least not outside their own

borders. On the contrary, they reinforce many of the radicals’ propaganda themes, in

effect worsening the situation even further.





Hope for Palestinian-Israel Peace is Dead

The Palestinians are increasingly radicalized, rejecting any possible peaceful

solution with Israel and following an extremist Islamist leadership. Believing total victory

possible—and not even distant—Hamas is preparing for decades of warfare. Its

passionate appeals carry most Palestinians, especially since the rival nationalist Fatah,

has almost precisely the same basic stance. Any serious peace process isn't just dead for

the moment--it is years from even beginning.









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While Egypt and Jordan will maintain their peace with Israel, the situation is

largely similar on the regional level. While Arab states have largely dropped out of the

issue, they still find it very useful as a tool for regime maintenance. In 2001, a year after

Israel had offered the return of the entire Golan Heights for peace, Syria’s vice-president

was asked why the regime did not do more to solve the country’s problems. He answered

that the Arab-Israeli conflict permitted no changes at home. Yet the regime had rejected

Israel’s offer to return the whole Golan Heights in exchange for peace the previous year.



Similarly, after Israel twice offered to accept an independent Palestinian state in

exchange for full peace (the Camp David summit and Clinton plan), the Palestinian

leadership instead launched a six-year-long war of terrorism culminating in the election

of Hamas. When Israel withdrew from the Gaza Strip in 2005, that area was turned into a

base for attacking and firing missiles at it. The same thing took place after the Israeli

withdrawal from Lebanon. The problem is not what was offered but the preference of

Syria, Fatah, Hamas, Iran and Hizballah for a total victory that meant Israel’s extinction.





Radical Islamists believe they are winning

Anyone who thinks Iran, Syria, Hizballah, and Hamas might be moderated has

obviously not read their leaders’ speeches or their publications. They share a world view

that is perhaps the most horrendous since the fall of Berlin in 1945. The Jews dominate

the world and are responsible for all its wars and problems. Israel should be wiped off the

map in an act of genocide. The West is decadent and greedy. The Americans seek to

enslave the Arabs and destroy Islam. Any type of terrorism is justifiable against these

demonic forces. All the other regimes in the region should be overthrown.

These are not people with grievances that might be assuaged by kind words or

compromises. Moreover, the fact that they firmly believe—never mind if it is in large

part incorrectly—that they are winning, that the tide of history is with them, and that they

are carrying out God’s will. Such views also do not incline the radicals toward

moderation.

But that’s not all. The visible decline of Arab nationalism, their ideological rival,

encourages the Islamists, as does the discontent of the masses with a corrupt, ineffective







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status quo. The fact that Iran has more powerful weapons and is closing in on nuclear

ones is taken as a sign of their strength, as is the growth of Muslim populations in Europe

and the West which often have an important radical component.

Especially important in the new impetus for radical Islamism is the growth of the

Muslim Brotherhoods, still another political force which parallels the new alliance

without being part of it, or even indeed of supporting it at all. As strict Sunni Muslims,

the Brotherhoods (except for Hamas, which is the movement’s Palestinian branch), do

not like Iran or any adulation for Hizballah.

Nevertheless, the Brotherhoods in Egypt, Syria, and Jordan are heartened by their

local movements’ good electoral showings in Egypt and the Palestinian Authority

elections. They are very enthusiastic about the Sunni Muslim insurgency in Iraq—which,

after all, spends its time killing Shia Muslims. Nevertheless, all these factors, conflicting

as they might be at times, contribute to a radical Islamist triumphalism..





Democracy a dead issue

While two authoritarian doctrines, Arab nationalism and Islamism, fight it out

over power, the pro-democratic, liberal movements are miniscule. Part of the problem is

that their two competitors really agree on just about everything except whether

nationalism or Islamism is the superior guide to fighting the self-fulfilling battle with the

foreigners. Arab regimes manipulate the masses’ passions to enforce the fairly

incompetent status quo, but at the same time reinforce the Islamists’ claims, and vice-

versa.

To cite one small example of how this works, Egypt receives $2 billion a year in

U.S. aid, yet the state-controlled newspapers regularly tell their readers that America is

secretly organizing all the terrorism in Iraq. This propaganda, of course, increases

support for the radical Islamist insurgency in Iraq as well as radical Islamists who

identify the Egyptian government as a client of Washington. Such patterns are repeated

many times over on a daily basis.

All the institutions of the Arab world, with few exceptions, are controlled by the

state: schools, mosques, media, and so on. And those not controlled by the Arab

nationalist dictatorships, like professional associations, have been captured by the







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Islamists. There is little scope for the reformers to operate, between being shut down and

shouted down. Moreover, the successes of Islamists when election even approach being

fair—notably for the Palestinian Authority, in Lebanon, and in Egypt—are seen as

warning that democracy would only lead to theocracy. Recognizing this situation, the

United States has scaled down its democratization policy and abandoned any strategy

along those lines.

As a result, with a few limited exceptions in places like Kuwait and Bahrain,

democratization is pretty much a dead issue. How can the reasoned voices compete with

the frenzied ones, which enjoy official support at home or through foreign funders in

places like Saudi Arabia or Iran?

Courageous reformers watch in horror as their worst nightmares seem to be

coming true. Here is how one frustrated liberal Arab put it during the Lebanon crisis:



“I have been watching some 20 Arabic-speaking television channels….Either

these hundreds of people who appeared on the screen and talked passionately about `our’

dignity…`our’ national pride and the victory that God will grant `us’ were mad or I

am….”



This response is irrational in terms of achieving peace, better lives, and more

individual rights. But it makes sense as institutionalized demagoguery which the

nationalists use to stay in power and Islamists employ to get into power. Given this

system’s continuing effectiveness, the situation is likely to continue for decades.









International Community Paralyzed or Appeasement-Oriented



With Lebanon taken hostage by Hizballah and Iranian influence growing, the

international community is paralyzed. Europe, Russia, and China, among others, don’t

want a confrontation. It is easier to find excuses for extremists and to claim dialogue or

concessions will make their challenge disappear.









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For example, there is much criticism of Israel but no pressure on Syria and Iran

to stop supplying Hizballah with arsenals of advanced arms or stop pushing that group

and Hamas toward terrorist attacks against Israel. Any real international force in Lebanon

would have to block cross-border attacks on Israel and stop the influx of arms. That

would require fighting Hizballah, and battle is not something the West is ready to do.



This behavior’s impact is the opposite of what the West needs and even most

Arab regimes want. Instead of showing firmness, it sends a message that terrorism works

and recklessness pays. The extremists see this as proving their ideas are right and their

methods work. Millions of Arabs and Muslims believe it. Support for radical Islamists

and recruits for terrorism increase.



Rather than moving toward peace, moderation, or democracy, the region is at best

staying in the same rut and at worst heading for even more intensive radicalism, violence,

and disorder. Doing anything to solve these problems requires understanding this

dreadful situation and how the West is contributing to it.









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IRAQ: THE EXIT STRATEGY









Strategy regarding the coalition military presence in Iraq is one of the most

important decisions facing the West today. Yet the issues and alternatives have often

been obscured.

This chapter presents an analysis on why a phased withdrawal of coalition forces

should be conducted in the next two years and some guidelines for such a policy. It

argues that the coalition presence can neither end nor win the war in Iraq, that the reasons

for staying longer do not fit the facts, and that a withdrawal will not bring about certain

outcomes feared by some Western policymakers.





ARGUMENTS FOR A SUSTAINED LARGE-SCALE TROOP PRESENCE

The claim that coalition forces should stay in Iraq for a long period of time is

based on four assertions:

First, the coalition presence will ensure Iraqi political stability. The extended

presence of foreign armies is needed to help consolidate Iraq’s government. Otherwise,

radical Islamist forces loyal to Usama bin Ladin or to Iran will take over.

Second, the stationing of foreign forces will create a pro-Western Iraq: The

coalition’s protection will win over Iraq’s people and government who will be grateful

for the help. Under coalition protection, democracy will advance and living standards

rise. As a result, they will support the government, be grateful to their liberators, and hate

the insurgents. Thus, the military effort will ensure a pro-Western Iraq in future.

Third, fighting by coalition forces will gain time to build up an indigenous army

able to take over the battle. If coalition forces leave before Iraq’s armed forces are ready,

the country will collapse.

Fourth, military victory is possible: Coalition forces can contain and defeat the

insurgents, discouraging them by showing their triumph is impossible.







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The problem is that each of these points, even if meaningful during the earlier

phase of the Iraq situation, is now badly flawed, resulting in strategies that bring an

outcome opposite to the desired one.





REDEFINING THE MISSION

The purpose of the invasion of Iraq was mainly defined as the removal of

President Saddam Hussein, including making sure that such a dangerous regime did not

have or obtain weapons of mass destruction. This goal, of course, was achieved by the

initial military operation.

Once the dictatorship was defeated, the mission shifted to ensuring that a stable,

democratic government emerged there. This task was made difficult by a bloody

insurgency of Sunni Arabs led at first by Saddam sympathizers, communal nationalists,

and increasingly by Islamists including leading figures from al-Qaida. Thus, the coalition

forces turned to battle that threat.

The insurgents had to be stopped from taking over Iraq and turning it into an anti-

Western jihadist state. Meanwhile, the insurgents disrupted development in Iraq--

sabotaging oil pipelines and electricity systems for example—and the country’s political

stability. They had to be fought to prevent them from achieving victory, to minimize their

destructive impact, and to give time for the Iraqi government and military forces to

organize so that they could carry the burden.

In this context, there are two absolutely critical questions for policymakers, and

thus for military commanders.

First, is the political goal in Iraq to ensure the highest possible degree of

democracy or the greatest possible degree of stability in a government?

Of course, these two factors are not in complete contradiction. Democracy does

contribute to stability and the Iraqi government has been elected on the basis of a

constitution determined democratically. There is a tendency, though, to extend the

political goal to micro-managing Iraq’s internal society and political orientation.

Beyond ensuring that Iraq does not become a radical Islamist state or repressive

dictatorship, however, this is an unnecessary entanglement. It threatens to extend the

coalition military presence for too long and create tensions with the Iraqi government and







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majority. If the coalition forces will seek to stay until Iraq’s government is “perfected”

this will be counterproductive for both sides. But if maintaining the presence of troops

and a determination to remake Iraq into an ideal democratic society become ends in

themselves, the West will face a disaster far beyond the problems it has confronted up to

now.

Second, when will Iraq be ready to take over the fighting so that coalition forces

could be reduced and largely leave?

Here, the view has been cautious and based on very conventional military

thinking. The problem is that waiting until Iraq has well-trained regular armed formations

in large numbers will keep coalition forces in Iraq for many years. In addition, it sets up a

vicious circle:

--As long as Iraq’s government and army can rely on foreign forces it will not be

forced to take the steps needed to defend itself.

--Rather than depending on regular formations—slow to be formed and lacking

high levels of motivation—it can mobilize the country’s majority Shia community whose

very lives depend on defeating the insurgents.

--To some extent, though less than propaganda would make it seem, the coalition

presence heightens the appeal of the insurgents who can pretend they are fighting a

foreign occupation rather than seeking to take over the country and turn it into a Sunni

Islamic republic in which the majority is repressed and oppressed. It also rationalizes

foreign Arab involvement in backing the insurgents.

--Finally and perhaps most important, the coalition forces are incapable of using

the tactics needed to end the insurgency. Only a show of overwhelming force and

determination to root out the insurgents—including massive arrests and house-to-house

searches can root out the insurgency. The coalition forces are incapable of doing this—

they lack the knowledge of Iraqi language, society, and would stir up patriotic hatred

against themselves—and unwilling to do so—since victory would require a degree of

brutality which both Western governments and publics would not accept.

Thus, the presence of the coalition forces, far from ensuring the defeat of the

insurgency, rather contributes to the ongoing incapability of the Iraqi regime to defend

itself and the continuation of the insurgency.







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VICTORY AND DEFEAT

Critical to the situation is the fact that the coalition forces can neither win a

victory or suffering a defeat in Iraq.





Why cannot the insurgents win?

A. Because they represent only about 20 percent of the population, with the

other 80 percent strongly opposed to them.

B. Since they can operate only in limited areas, lacking economic resources

(especially oil), and are surrounded by hostile zones.

C. Given the fact that this is a life-and-death struggle, the Shia and Kurds will

not surrender no matter how high are their losses or how long the war continues. From

the start, then, the terrorists in Iraq stand against the interests of more than 80 percent of

the population who are not Sunni Muslims, while even many Sunni Muslims oppose a

return to the old regime or the type of society imposed on Afghanistan by the Taliban.

The terrorist assault forces the Shia and Kurds into a high degree of solidarity.





Why cannot the insurgents be defeated?

A. They have too much support, even if it is partly won by intimidation, to be

defeated or disappear. This is to a real extent a communal revolt backed by several

million people who offer safe haven to the insurgents and a steady stream of recruits.

This also applies to international support, with Syrian sponsorship, Saudi and smuggled

Saddam Hussein money, and volunteers from many countries. To the extent that Sunni

Arab Iraqis tire of the struggle and are disgusted by the insurgents’ behavior, there is

nothing they can do about it.

B. They will not give up. These are ideological fanatics who are willing to

see many people killed and the infrastructure wrecked. Believing that God is on their

side, they are indifferent to the balance of forces. They are happy to suffer losses, then

deemed martyrs to inspire others to continue the struggle.

C. The coalition will not and cannot do what is needed to defeat them. The

U.S. strategy is to counter and limit insurgent attacks in the hope of proving to them (and







15

Sunni Arabs) that they cannot win. But the insurgents are not going to be convinced of

the futility of fighting because of their ideological world view. The number of casualties

or the length of time the war continues will not deter them.

To defeat insurgent forces consisting of Saddam Hussein loyalists, al-Qa’ida

terrorists, and Shia Islamist extremists cannot be done with mild methods. Such people

are not going to be persuaded to lay down their arms, nor can any effort assure them of

Western good will or convince them to trust in an electoral process which they knew they

will lose. Force is their only route to power; anti-Westernism their best way to mobilize

the Sunni masses to their side.





Precisely because of their willingness to murder people--especially those who

work with the government--wreck Iraq’s economy and society, and go on fighting

forever, these forces cannot be defeated by the coalition unless it is willing to wipe them

out physically. It can keep them from expanding their area of control but at a minimum

they will be able to keep the Sunni areas in turmoil. Equally, coalition forces cannot end

their ability to sabotage reconstruction or keep the country in a constant state of

instability.

As a result, no matter how high is the level of coalition forces, the fighting could

easily continue at the same level for 10 or 20 years.





WHO CAN WIN THE WAR?

It is important to remember that this is not a conventional war but a

counterinsurgency and cannot be won by regular military forces fighting an enemy on the

battlefield. Stopping individual attacks or patrolling the streets will merely maintain the

current level of violence. Only if the insurgency is rooted out socially and wiped out

physically will it cease.

This task can solely be done by an Iraqi force willing to use the brutality needed

to crush the insurgency. Victory requires that such a force be driven by a high level of

passion and motivated by the prospect of itself holding power. Such a victory is not going

to be accomplished by a minimally motivated, largely untrained infant army of Iraqis

which barely exists, will not quickly become a great fighting force, and according to







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current plans, will be too small and constrained by American-dictated rules of combat to

be victorious.

In a real sense, the coalition is preparing a well-disciplined, conventional-type

army to protect the national territory in general and to continue a defensive battle of

containing terrorism. What Iraq needs instead is a semi-irregular force that will go into

Sunni neighborhoods, grab thousands of people, extract information on the terrorists, and

take them into custody by whatever means are necessary.

Such a force is not going to be created by several years of training, a value-neutral

army filled with soldiers motivated by their need for a job rather than by a readiness to

kill and die for their regime. It must be a national army which also has undertones of

being a communal-ideological militia that will do anything to secure the rule of a

government seen to be representing the Shia relative domination in Iraq. This is

something like the peshmerga force which the Kurds possess rather than a Western army.

The basic U.S. strategy on creating an Iraqi army might be called “gradual

preparation.” It is a very good approach if one has unlimited time to build an army from

the ground up, providing a comprehensive training. But this also means that it will take a

long period before the army is ready, requiring a long presence for large numbers of

coalition forces. Optimistic official reports conceal the fact that even in late 2006 Iraqi

armed forces are still at their very beginning and at this rate would need a minimum of

five years before they are ready to take over the main combat role. It is clear that the

situation is not getting better, the most that can be said is that it is not getting worse.

Meanwhile, though, the continuation of the war wears down Iraqi society and

undermines even the limited forces which have been created. Unable to provide security,

the regime is discredited and coalition guarantees prove to be of only limited worth,

damaging Western credibility. Why should Iraqis being victimized daily by terrorists

view a continued coalition presence as benefiting them? Even though this situation is not

the coalition’s fault, Iraqis argue that it will neither solve the problem for them by

crushing their tormenters nor let them do so in their own way.

At the same time, the continued Western presence, either inevitably or through

hostile manipulation of the truth, offends nationalistic and Muslim sensibilities, allowing

the insurgency to mobilize more support than it could otherwise. A withdrawal will







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destroy the insurgents’ fiction that they are fighting in a patriotic and Islamist struggle

against foreign occupiers rather than a civil war whose goal is to force the great majority

of unwilling Iraqis to live under a Saddam-style or Sunni Islamist state.

What is needed instead might be characterized as letting the Iraqis who know how

to do so use “Middle Eastern methods;” the coalition “getting out of the way;” and letting

the Iraq government “sink or swim.” As long as the regime has the option of depending

on the coalition, it will not fully mobilize its own people. Equally, it cannot use the

means necessary to win. And only by fully Arabizing and “Muslimizing” the war can the

Baghdad government get its neighbors to stop supporting it.





REFUTING ARGUMENTS AGAINST A COALITION WITHDRAWAL

One of the most apparently strongest but actually hollow arguments against

withdrawal is that a large-scale foreign military presence is vital to ensure that the West’s

worst enemies--Saddam loyalists, Iran's clients, or al-Qa’ida’s forces--not take control of

Iraq. In fact, though, these forces cannot take over the country. The insurgents can be

decisively defeated by a mobilized pro-regime populace.

Actually, by staying longer, the coalition seems to prove the terrorists’

argument—that this is an occupation to steal the oil and enslave Muslims--correct. But

once the coalition actually leaves, bin Latin’s followers will not be celebrating. Attacked

by the mobilized forces of the Shias out for revenge, they will be too busy fleeing to

spend any time gloating. But this is a victory that will never be won by smaller, more

restrained Western forces.

A second argument is the belief that the coalition military presence allows the

United States to tinker with Iraqi politics to provide an ideal system before leaving. A key

element in this program is pressing the Shia leadership into concessions to the Sunni

which will hopefully convince the latter to abandon the insurgency. Instead, though, this

manipulation creates resentment among the Shia majority without doing anything

effectively to weaken the insurgency.

As for the worst nightmare, Iraq becoming an Iranian client, the best guarantors

against this outcome are the Iraqi Shia themselves. Once they rule Iraq, why should they

submit to being bossed around by non-Arab Iran, against whom many Shia troops fought







18

and died in the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war? Indeed, as Iran continues to try to subvert Iraq

and back puppet groups against the new government, this policy will turn Iraq’s people

against Tehran far more than the West ever could. The only thing that would give Iraqi

Shias an incentive to follow Iran is if they believed that only such help could assist them

in throwing out the coalition or preserving a Shia-led regime against Western opposition

or military failure.

The third argument against a phased withdrawal is the credibility argument.

Refusing to leave Iraq, U.S. policymakers believe, is the only way to ensure America

retains a high level of credibility with its adversaries in the region. To pull out--as

happened in Vietnam--or to let its allies be defeated--as in the shah's Iran--would signal

radical forces that they could attack U.S. interests with impunity and disregard its threats.

This sounds like a persuasive argument but is not. The main benefit in terms of

credibility achieved by the United States was its willingness and ability to overthrow

Saddam Hussein. Being bogged down in an endless war in Iraq is a no-win situation for

the U.S. standing in the region. Under the current situation, the United States is so over-

extended in Iraq--and its enemies know it--as to be incapable of taking tough action on

any other issue in the region or problem in the world.

The military presence is used to criticize and mobilize forces against America, its

lack of victory portrayed as proof of its weakness, and every misdeed magnified as proof

that the United States is evil and has bad intentions toward Arabs and Muslims. Iraq has

become a focal point for an anti-American jihad and a not-so-covert war waged against

America by Syria and Iran. Both Iran and Syria—aided by money and volunteers from

Saudi Arabia and others who want to fight the Americans--are directly sponsoring a war

against the United States. And yet the United States is too preoccupied to do anything

serious about this challenge. Once American forces are not tied down in Iraq—with the

new government as living proof of what the United States can do to dictators—the focus

will shift back to the enormous deterrence power possessed by Washington against

enemies who go too far in provoking it.

The same point applies to the war on terrorism. Sunni Muslim terrorists have

moved their main operations to Iraq where they seek to relive their glory days in

Afghanistan fighting the Soviets. Usama bin Ladin has bragged that the American







19

presence in Iraq and its inability to defeat the insurgents is his best recruiting tool.

Whenever the Americans leave, the terrorists will say they defeated the United States and

try to use that claim to build more support for Islamist revolution elsewhere. But if the

coalition stays, the terrorists will rally people with this war and claim victories in it.

One cannot conduct state policy based on what terrorists will say about it.

Moreover, keying the withdrawal to the building of stability and democracy, American

gives the insurgents control of the situation. All they need do is maintain the violence and

sabotage stability in order to force the United States to remain while pretending that they

were forcing the Americans to leave.

Even in matters concerning influence with the Iraqi government, a withdrawal

will not bring much in the way of losses. At present, coalition influence on the Iraqi

government is limited and attempts to press for change lead to friction. Moreover, since

Western troops are directly involved in large numbers, such matters as incompetence,

corruption, and human rights’ violation reflect directly on the coalition, simultaneously

endangering its forces and discrediting it as the patron of a regime with shortcomings.

If the coalition overstays its welcome—a point which is certainly approaching--

increasing Shia anger and even violence against the coalition presence may be a response

arising from a rational sense of self-preservation. Shia Iraqis could well conclude that the

coalition cannot protect them from murderous Sunni terrorists, forcing them to take

matters into their own hands. But what if they come to believe that in order to wipe out

their enemies, they have no choice but to throw out the Americans first?

There remains one additional argument against a withdrawal which is now also

obsolete: that such a policy would mean abandoning the Iraqi people to a terrible

dictatorship. But now that Iraq does have an elected government which accurately

reflects the views of the majority, this is not valid. Even if that regime is not as perfectly

democratic as one would like, that fact, too, is representative of popular preferences. It is

realistically the most that can be accomplished in the current era, and certainly a big

improvement over the overthrown dictatorship it replaces.









20

HARNESSING IRAQI SELF-INTEREST: THE MISSING ELEMENT

Despite all the problems listed above, many—perhaps most—of Iraqis are still

supportive of the coalition presence. Aside from wishing this situation would lead to a

better life generally, most Shia know that it helped put them in power. That is why Shia

and Kurdish leaders have been patient, urging followers to avoid clashes with the

Westerners and mobilizing Shia support against those, extremist Shia, like Muqtada Sadr,

who want to fight the coalition forces.

Yet it is unlikely that this patience will last indefinitely. Indeed, there are signs of

a trend in the opposite direction:

--Rather than welcome coalition presence as a way of achieving democracy,

Iraq’s leaders will want to prevent interference, especially when they violate human

rights, democracy, and honest governing practices. They do such things both out of

greed, inexperience, and a belief that only tough methods would be effective in governing

the country.

--Rather than feel coalition forces are protecting them from the insurgency, Iraq’s

new leaders want to ensure they do not restrict their ability to destroy the insurgency by

using brutal methods. The continued presence of foreign forces will ensure the

insurgency continues; their departure will let Iraq’s new army defeat it.

Indeed, if there was a time that a large-scale foreign presence was necessary to

allow a post-Saddam government to form, that moment will not be long sustained. A

protracted U.S.-led war in Iraq will not win over the people, assure stability or defeat the

insurgents. On the contrary, it will have the opposite effect. The coalition must now shift

gears and prepare for this outcome which will come as a relief—a chance to declare

victory and bring the troops home.

Like it or not, only a test of arms will decide the country’s future course, whether

it be a civil war or an all-out battle between an Iraqi government and its opponents.

Maintaining the regime’s dependency on foreigners to do most of the fighting will allow

it the luxury of internal disputes, passivity, and a lack of mobilization of its own

resources.









21

THE LOGIC OF A PHASED WITHDRAWAL

In a battle against a highly motivated, overwhelming majority of Iraqis acting in

their own interests, the insurgents are going to be wiped out. But with the American

forces continuing to be their enemy and the vast majority of Iraqis standing aside as

spectators, the war will continue. This factor is the key to a more successful policy: let

the Iraqi regime act in its own interests and using its own methods to destroy the

insurgency.

Everyone knows that the coalition will eventually withdraw at least its main

fighting units. As long as the coalition bears the brunt of the fighting, however, the Shia

will bide their time, holding back their militias and saving mass mobilization for a later

confrontation, possibly among themselves or against the United States. For if the United

States overstays its welcome by too long—and that day, though not tomorrow, is not

distant--far larger numbers of Iraqis may unite against its presence. As long as Iraq's next

rulers have not been decided through trial by combat too many people will have an

incentive to wreck the country, prevent any restoration of order, hate the Americans, and

murder average Iraqi citizens.

The worst outcome of all is if a U.S.-led coalition is trapped in Iraq for an

extended period of time, having to fight a war without real progress while Iraqi forces

develop at an agonizingly slow pace. This would damage Western credibility, encourage

terrorist forces, and eventually alienate the Iraqi majority who would be more inclined to

anti-Western feelings and hoping that Iran can be a more effective ally.

What is necessary, then, is an accelerated, though secret, timetable for turning

over key sectors to Iraqi forces and reducing coalition troop levels. The Iraqi government

must be persuaded that the coalition is serious about this strategy so that it must fill the

gap.

The reason for such a strategy is not due to cowardice, foolishness or

appeasement but because it is the best among an unattractive choice of options. Instead,

the coalition could adopt an indirect strategy, combining support of economic

reconstruction alongside providing military training and supplies to the government. The

goal is a strategic relationship with the new Iraq, stronger than the Western link to Egypt

and more along the lines of the alliance with Jordan.







22

THE IMPACT OF THE IRAQ WAR

ON ISRAEL’S PERCEPTION OF SECURITY









This paper will deal with the effects and implications of the Iraq war, and the current

situation of insurgency in that country, on Israel’s perception of its national security. I

will examine the extent to which the war has impacted on and transformed the three tiers

of threat facing Israel – namely the irregular, conventional and non-conventional levels of

warfare. I will outline the nature of each of these three levels of threat, observing the

impact of the Iraq War on it. I will then move toward some general conclusions on the

Iraq War of 2003 and the events that have followed it as viewed through the perception of

Israeli thinking on the region. In dealing with each area, I will observe the responses

emerging from the Israeli strategic and policy-making echelon to the new situation

opened up by the war of 2003.





Israel is a country unique among members of the modern states’ system in that the basic

legitimacy of its existence as a sovereign body is rejected by its neighbours. The

dominant political currents of the Middle Eastern region place the perception of Israel as

a foreign, illegitimate implant in the Middle East at the center of their view of the world.

The struggle against Israel, of course, takes many forms, not all of them military, but all

of them with significance to Israel’s strategic perceptions. In order to grasp Israel’s

national security stances, it is crucial that this basic existential predicament of the country

is kept in mind.





In this regard, it is also important to bear in mind the unique nature of the Middle East

state system as a whole - and the security environment in which Israel operates. The

Middle East is the most heavily armed region of the world. It is an area which has

proved until now remarkably impervious to the waves of political change which have

swept the world in the last decade and a half. The same dispensation, the same regimes,

the same prevailing ideas, often the same individuals (or their sons) dominate the region

as did so in the late 1970s.







23

The region remains stymied by economic stagnation, and the failure of the regimes to

develop the natural resources and populations under their control. The economies of the

region are in poor shape,. Growth is slow, corruption rampant. Economic stagnation is

matched by high population growth, and educational failure. The societies of the Middle

East are largely closed systems. The ideas of nationalism, and politicised religion are

dominant, with liberal reform movements very weak. For these unelected regimes,

legitimacy is a key issue. In the key ideological systems of Arab nationalism and

Islamism, rejection of the right of Israel to existence is a key factor. Thus, the creation

and mobilising of anti-Israel sentiment is a vital tool for the regimes. The rejection of

Israel's right to exist, the use this rejection is put to by regimes to build their own

legitimacy, and the objective failure of the regimes to develop their own societies, and

hence their unwillingness or inability to present a real project for the realisation of their

'politicidal' ambitions regarding Israel are all crucial.





Let us now turn to observe in detail the specific security challenges which Israel faces,

and its response.





Israel faces strategic challenges and threats on three basic levels, which will now be

outlined. These three levels cannot be seen as hermetically sealed from one another.

Rather, there is considerable cooperation between the primary actors involved at each

level, and the ‘state of play’ at each level influences that in both of the others.





Threat #1. Irregular, guerrilla and terrorist operations of Palestinian and Lebanese Shi’ite

non-state paramilitary organisations. This threat has since 1973 accounted almost

exclusively for actual loss of Israeli life deriving from the Arab-Israeli conflict. Israel

has since 2000 been involved in a low intensity conflict with Palestinian irregular

formations in the West Bank and Gaza areas, and to a lesser extent within Israel proper.

There is evidence both of involvement of non-Palestinian irregular groups in this ongoing

conflict (Hizballah aid to terrorist elements within Fatah), and of state support for

Palestinian irregulars, (Syrian and Iranian support for the Palestinian Islamist







24

organisations Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, financial aid to the families of

Palestinian suicide bombers from Saddam’s Iraq.)





Hopes are now high, of course, for a return to the diplomatic process between Israelis and

Palestinians, which has lain essentially dormant since 2000. Israeli strategists, however,

remain unconvinced of the likelihood of conflict resolution in terms of the reaching of a

final status accord. Given the essential incompatibility remaining in important elements

of the Israeli and even the moderate Palestinian conception of how a final status

agreement would look -on such matters as the demand for 'return' of Palestinian refugees

and their descendants, or future arrangements in Jerusalem, it is considered that some

form of 'conflict management' is likely to remain a necessity for the foreseeable future.





Israel has developed a number of measures for 'conflict management', which I will now

observe in detail.





The first of these is the plan for 'disengagement' from the Gaza Strip and part of the

northern West Bank. The disengagement plan is above all an attempt to regain the

initiative - to prevent a static situation in the conflict, which would not be considered to

be to Israel's advantage. Israeli policymakers are concerned to demonstrate to the

Palestinians that violence will not bring them the ability to dictate terms to Israel. Nor

will they be permitted to benefit from a general descent into chaos leading eventually to a

situation of inter-communal violence throughout the area of Israel, the West Bank and

Gaza (the scenario advocated by Palestinian advocates of the so-called 'one state

solution.') Rather, disengagement allows Israel to use its military superiority to dictate an

arrangement on the ground to its own liking.





The disengagement plan has developed in such a way as to lead to the de facto drawing in

of Egypt into the process, in addition, of course, to the extensive involvement of the US.





The plan, nevertheless, still has large queries hanging over it, and it is not at all clear if it

will indeed result in the positive outcome hoped for. In the first place, the absence of an







25

Israeli security presence in Gaza may result in increased Palestinian attacks, using

mortars and rockets developed in a Gaza Strip now bereft of Israelis, or smuggled in

through the southern border of the Strip. As recent comments by the Hamas leadership

indicate, there is also a possibility that the implementation of disengagement may be

interpreted by the Palestinians as constituting a victory for the tactics of violence and

terror adopted since 2000. According to this interpretation, while a decade of Palestinian

involvement in negotiation failed to bring about the dismantling of a single settlement,

the tactics of violence have forced Israel to undertake a strategic retreat. Regarding the

actual likelihood of a decline in terror as a result of the disengagement, it should be borne

in mind that hardly any successful infiltrations from Gaza took place throughout the four

years of conflict since September 2000. The Strip is surrounded by a fence which has

proved a very effective measure in frustrating the ability of Gaza-based paramilitaries

from reaching into Israel to attack Israeli Jewish communities.





A second means of conflict management conceived of by Israel is the Security Barrier.

Though the construction of the Barrier has not yet been completed, and this project has

led to Israel being subjected to unprecedented condemnation by much of the international

community, the effectiveness of the Barrier as a security device is beyond dispute. In

areas where it has been completed, it has reduced successful Palestinian incursions to

close to zero. Attacks on Israeli communities close to the Green Line, such as Hadera,

Afula and Netanya, a frequent occurrence since September 2000, have ceased since the

completion of the northern section of the Barrier. Recent successful incursions, such as

the suicide bombing in Beersheva on August 31, 2004, were possible because the Barrier

in the area in question has not yet been built or is incomplete.





The route of the Barrier is problematic, and has led to legal proceedings both in the

Israeli Supreme Court and in the International Court of Justice in the Hague. The ICJ

ruling has been rejected by Israel as politically-motivated. The ruling dismissed Israel's

claim that the Barrier is a necessary means of self-defence. The court maintained that

self-defence would be an admissible justification only in a conflict between sovereign

states. Furthermore, the ICJ maintained that other less disruptive means were available to







26

Israel to safeguard its security. The Israeli Supreme Court, meanwhile, accepted the

justification for building the Fence, but has ruled in favour of the claimants in certain

areas, requiring that the Fence be re-routed to take better account of the needs of the local

Palestinian population affected by its construction.





A third notable aspect of Israel's strategy has been the use of targeted assassinations of

senior members and operatives of Palestinian organisations engaged in armed conflict

with Israel and the use of terror. These have attracted particular controversy because of

occasions, such as the assassination of senior Hamas operative Salah Shehadeh, when

civilian bystanders have also been killed as a result of IDF operations. Such

assassinations take place when the arrest of suspects is impossible. The IDF strives to

ensure correct targeting and minimal risk to bystanders, goals which have been achieved

in the vast majority of the 150 operations of this kind carried out in the course of the last

four years of conflict.





Other than the disappearance of the financial support offered by Saddam to the families

of Palestinian ‘Shahids,’ the immediate physical results of the War on this tier of conflict

are clearly minimal. None of the insurgent organisations involved in low intensity

conflict with Israel, (with the exception of the tiny Palestine Liberation Front) was a

direct client state of Iraq. As such, the launching of the Iraq War, the conclusion of its

conventional phase, and the insurgency that has followed, have had little tangible effect

either on the resources available to Palestinian insurgents, or on their willingness or

otherwise to continue their fight with Israel.





It is important here to bear in mind the larger implications, however, of US strategy in

Iraq. The war was presented as part of a larger attempt to root out what were perceived

as the sources of ‘terror’ in the region. While the nature of the enemy, beyond the

Saddam regime, was never accurately clarified by the US, the perception of US

involvement in a wider strategy of regional transformation, involving an attempt to create

western-style democracies in the region and thus ‘dry up’ the sources of support for terror

groups, has certainly entered popular consciousness. As such, US success in creating a







27

stable, pro-western regime in Iraq may have some implications in inclining Palestinian

leaders toward accepting the de facto US ascendancy in the region, and hence the futility

of continued war against Israel, perceived as a US client state. A perceived defeat for the

US in Iraq, on the other hand, could play a similar role to Israel’s perceived defeat by

Hizballah in Lebanon in 2000, but on a far larger scale. A model would exist for the

frustration of western strategic designs by irregular forces. Such an outcome would

strengthen Islamist and rejectionist Arab nationalist forces throughout the region, and

probably also among the Palestinians. Israel thus has a clear interest in US strategic

victory in Iraq, but this has little practical implication in terms of Israeli policy on this

tier.









Threat # 2. The challenge to Israel emanating from conventional Arab military forces.

Conventional military contests, of course, formed the main element of the Arab-Israeli

conflict in the period 1948-73. Throughout, Israel has sought to offset its quantitative

inferiority vis a vis the Arab states in terms of territory, geography and population, by the

maintenance of a qualitative edge, credible deterrence and a secure supply of quality

arms, notably from domestic defence industries. Since the end of the Cold War and the

collapse of the Soviet Union, the Israeli advantage in this regard over its neighbours has

been widening. This, combined with the treaty-based peace arrangements achieved with

two of Israel’s four immediate neighbours, greatly reduced the perceived likelihood of

conventional confrontation between Israel and any combination of Arab states in the

period preceding the 2003 Iraq War.





The war has further decreased the likelihood of conventional, state to state conflict

between Israel and neighbouring states. In effect, it has freed Israel from the threat of

conventional conflict against a combination of Arab armies on its eastern front. The

possibility of an Iraqi-Syrian coalition entering Jordan and threatening Israel was a

central threat scenario occupying strategists prior to 2003. The removal of Saddam has

effectively put an end to this. Since 1967, Israeli strategy towards its eastern front

centered on the need for Israel to hold the Jordan Valley, in order to preserve strategic







28

depth to offset a threat of this kind. The virtual disappearance of this threat could lead to

a more flexible Israeli stance regarding territorial concessions in this area. The possibility

of this, however, should be offset against the continued threat of Palestinian terror and

irregular warfare, and the current Israeli perception of the absence of a Palestinian

negotiating partner.





More broadly, the disappearance of the Baathist regime in Iraq also has implications

regarding Syria. Relations between Baghdad and Damascus had been warming since the

accession to power of Bashar al-Assad. The fall of Saddam removes Syrian strategic

depth, leaving the country now faced by rival states on three of its borders. American

anger at Syria’s failure to effectively control the passage of anti-American insurgents

across its borders further emphasizes the weakness and vulnerability of the regime.





As such, the implications of the war for Israel’s conventional stance are notable, and

wholly positive, though given the limited nature of the conventional threat facing Israel

prior to the war, of limited significance.





Threat #3. The attempts to develop a non-conventional capability by Israel’s enemies. In

this regard, in the period preceding the War of 2003, Israel perceived a threat from three

neighbouring states. These were: Iraq, Iran and Libya. The willingness of Saddam’s Iraq

to employ non-conventional weapons was made apparent in the Anfal operations in Iraqi

Kurdistan in 1988. His desire to strike at Israel was also demonstrated in 1991. Libyan

hostility to Israel and WMD ambitions were also well-documented. Israeli policy-makers

have long considered, however, that the central threat in this regard emanates from

Teheran. The combination in Iran of long-standing nuclear ambitions (preceding the

Islamic revolution of 1979), an advanced scientific and technological sector relative to

the region, and extreme hostility to Israel deriving from the Islamist ruling ideology gives

the Iranian threat unique gravity.





Israel is particularly vulnerable to attack by weapons of mass destruction. The country is

small - 20,000 square km. Two thirds of the population is resident within a 75km radius,







29

in three metropolitan areas. Israel's small population makes it very dependent on the

rapid mobilisation of reserve forces in time of war - a process which could be devastated

by the employment of non-conventional weapons.





Regarding the effects of the Iraq war on the WMD threat to Israel - the toppling of

Saddam has obviously nullified the Iraqi challenge. The decision by Libyan dictator

Muammar Qhadafi in December 2003 to dismantle his country’s non-conventional

weapons program, and allow U.N. weapons inspectors access to key sites is a direct result

of the toppling of Saddam. Regarding Iran, the war has had no effect on Iranian WMD

ambitions. Israeli strategists regard this issue as perhaps the central threat facing the

country.





Iran is making rapid advances in both missile technology and WMD development. The

Shihab 3 missile, with a range of 1300 km, is already operational. The development of

the Shihab 4 and 5 is in progress. Iran possesses one of the most advanced chemical

warfare programs in the developing world.





Of course, the Iranian nuclear program is the most serious source of concern.





IAEA inspectors were invited to inspect Iranian nuclear facilities in September, 2003.

The inspections clearly revealed that centrifuges had been used to enrich two types of

uranium to 20% or more. This is far more than the 2-3% required for the production of

nuclear fuel, and non-proliferation experts agree that uranium enriched to 20% could be

used to make a very primitive nuclear device. The discoveries thus place Iran in clear

violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), to which it has been a signatory

since 1970. The treaty allows for signatories to develop nuclear energy for peaceful

purposes, but requires them to declare all facilities and make them open to the IAEA for

inspection.





A report by IAEA Chairman Mohammed al-Baradai in June, 2004 concluded that Iran

may already possess all the elements necessary to test a nuclear weapon. While







30

ostensibly maintaining cooperation with the IAEA, and the ‘EU three’, (France, UK and

Germany) Iran has refused to give up its independent nuclear fuel cycle production

capability, which, as mentioned above, it maintains is for peaceful purposes only.





The June report was accompanied by trenchant criticism of Iran, and this was followed

by the issuing of a resolution by the IAEA Board of Governors on September 18, 2004,

which openly called on Iran to ‘immediately suspend all enrichment-related activities’.

The report set November 25 as the date for further review of Iran’s nuclear posture. On

November 22, Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Khrazi announced that Iran was ceasing

all enrichment activities, for a three month period, having reached agreement on this with

the ‘EU three.’





Western sources suspect that Iran has stockpiled large quantities of uranium

hexafluorode, a precursor to enriched uranium, in anticipation of the freeze. (cnn) US

officials want the Iranian nuclear file referred to the UN Security Council, preparing the

way for sanctions. For the moment, however, European countries are supporting the

lesser measure of the continued monitoring by the IAEA of Iran’s bid to become a

nuclear power. It is becoming clear that without decisive action by the international

community, a nuclear Iran may well be an inevitability.





Given the growing power of conservative and radical Islamist elements in the Iranian

regime, and the regime's ongoing support for proxies engaged in terror against Israel, this

prospect is of deep concern to Israeli strategists and policymakers. Israel's central fears

relate not so much to the prospect of an imminent launch by Iran of a WMD attack on

Israel. It is considered that the regime's own survival instincts are likely to be sufficient

to make such a move improbable. Rather, the concern is that possession of nuclear arms

will embolden the Iranians and their allies in their already extensive use of low-intensity

and terror warfare against Israel, setting the stage for increased uncertainty and volatility

in the Middle East.









31

Conclusions





The operational doctrine of the IDF is currently in the midst of a process of

transformation, reflecting advances in military technology, the changing nature of Israeli

society, and the changing order of gravity of the three tiers of threat faced by the country

(notably, the declining importance of threat # 2, and the continued, or increased gravity

of threats #1 and #3). The Iraq war at the time of writing appears to have altered the

strategic picture in the region by removing the Saddam regime without bringing about

any deep paradigmatic shift in the nature of regional politics. The essential contours of

regional politics, of Israel’s threat perception and the nature of its response thus remain

untransformed by the war, though in important specific areas, as outlined above, its

impact has been felt.





Israel's national security posture is shaped by the combination of the rejection of its

legitimacy that still forms a key aspect of regional politics, combined with the undisputed

technological and military superiority possessed by Israel, which makes the actual

likelihood of conventional state to state warfare very low. As has been noted, despite the

swift conclusion of conventional hostilities in Iraq, the eventual outcome of the 2003

invasion is still far from certain. A failure to establish a stable, pro-western regime in

Baghdad will be perceived as a major victory for those regional forces hostile to Israel,

which could have the result of increasing the intractability of the Israeli-Palestinian

conflict by emboldening radical forces. A clear victory for the coalition, on the other

hand, will form a major contribution to regional stability. But such an outcome is not

expected by Israeli strategists to substantially alter the basic contours of Israel's threat

perceptions and responses to regional challenges









32

TERRORIST CHALLENGES TO

SAUDI ARABIAN INTERNAL SECURITY









Since May 2003, Saudi Arabia has been threatened by a terrorist insurgency inspired by

Usama bin Ladin.[1] This is not to suggest that Saudi Arabia was not plagued by violent

internal opposition in the past. One could actually start an examination of this insurgency

with the 1979 attack on the Grand Mosque in Mecca, or the attack on the U.S. Office of

the Program Manager/Saudi Arabian National Guard (OPM/SANG) in 1995, but

compared to the rate and nature of the current wave of attacks, those were isolated

incidents. An examination of incidents since the year 2000, however, reveals that there

were a series of under-reported incidents that predate 9/11--a small bomb here, the killing

of an officer there. Since May 2003, hardly a week goes by without some kind of attack

or confrontation. According to Saudi officials speaking at a counter-terrorism conference

in February 2005, over the past two years a total of 221 people, including 92 terrorists

were killed in terror attacks and clashes.[2] In December 2004 alone there were three

significant attacks: the December 6 assault on the U.S. Consulate in the Red Sea port of

Jeddah, the December 29 car bomb attacks at key security installations in Riyadh, and

another attack in which the Ministry of Interior was hit by a remote-control car bomb,

following which the bomber engaged in a gun battle with police. Later that evening two

suicide bombers drove into the Special Forces Training Building.[3] These attacks

demonstrated that al-Qa'ida was still alive and kicking despite several key Saudi

successes in killing or capturing al-Qa'ida leaders.[4]





Saudi Arabia is not the only Gulf country beset by these ills. Since January 2005, Kuwait

has been witness to a series of terrorist incidents, some involving Saudis sympathetic to

Usama bin Ladin. Al-Qa'ida sympathizers in the Kuwait armed forces have been arrested

and accused of plotting to kill U.S. soldiers during joint maneuvers. Kuwait houses nearly

37,500 U.S. troops and military contract personnel supporting operations in Iraq. Large

arms caches and plans have been discovered, although the cells in Kuwait seem to be less

"articulated," meaning that they have not achieved the level of terrorist operation







33

specialization in areas such as finance, bomb making, etc.[5]





Even other Gulf countries are not immune. In January 2005, reportedly hundreds of

Islamists were arrested in Oman in unclear circumstances relating to what Omani

officials termed "endangering the national order," that involved intercepted arms and an

apparent plan to sabotage a cultural event in Muscat.[6] In Qatar as well, a suicide bomber

killed one Briton and injured several other people watching a performance of the mostly

British Doha Players Theater in March. In April, explosive devices were found in a

residential compound.[7]





Needless to say, these countries are oil producers whose stability is key to the world

economy. Their location on the edge of the Persian Gulf sets them astride a major oil

artery and across the Gulf from Iran, an adversary of the US and a country assured of

becoming armed with nuclear weapons within the next few of years.





Saudi Arabia is beset by many acute problems, such as the need for economic and

political reform, corruption, unemployment, and a burgeoning population. These are

concerns of a strategic nature, and they need to be addressed, even if they are close to

insurmountable, since Saudi legitimacy is based on an ideology of religious extremism,

and a new vision of a tolerant Islam is too slow in the making. Reform will not

immediately stop the insurgency, nor will it rob the insurgents of support. Indeed, Kuwait

is an example of a country seemingly on the road to democracy (it has an elected

legislature), yet it has also suffered from terrorist attacks. But in Saudi Arabia, it is

unclear how ready the current leadership is for serious change, despite the restricted

municipal elections of early 2005, and a succession struggle is looming.





The failure of tries and true methods





Today the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia faces a full-scale Islamic-based insurgency. This is

an immediate and present danger to the regime, or, as military analyst Anthony

Cordesman has written, "The Kingdom's most urgent security threat…"[8] The regime can







34

ill-afford a long-drawn out insurgency that would cripple its economy, from the oil-

industry to the pilgrimage. Putting down this insurgency must therefore be the regime's

first priority, as well as Washington's.





The insurgents have been compared to the Ikhwan tribal forces of the early twentieth

century who helped Ibn Sa'ud conquer most of the Arabian Peninsula, but who eventually

rebelled when they objected to the Saudi leader's contacts with Christians and his

limitations on their cross-border raiding.[9] But today's threat is much greater, not the least

because the methods used to quell the Ikhwan rebellion in the 1920's are not working this

time around, and, more importantly, the loyalty and efficacy of the Saudi security forces

are in doubt.





The Saudis are historically adept at co-opting their opposition. Usually marriages with

families of rebellious shaykhs, jobs, and financial rewards have sufficed to calm even the

most determined rebels. But these methods, although they are being employed once

again, do not seem adequate to quell the present and immediate challenge.





The Saudi ambassador to Washington, Bandar bin Sultan, has held up Ibn Sa'ud's

treatment of the Ikhwan as a paradigm for how to deal with the threat. In an article in his

uncle Khalid Al Faysal's newspaper, al-Watan, Bandar called for "war" against the

insurgents, just as Ibn Sa'ud fought the Ikhwan, and he mentions their defeat at the "Battle

of Sabila" on March 30, 1929.[10] But to learn what really happened with the Ikhwan,

Bandar should take a look at scholar John Habib's classic study of that movement.





Following the defeat of the Ikhwan at Sabila (it was really just a short-lived skirmish),

Ibn Sa'ud did not pursue the rebels and kill them. Instead he created alliances and so

isolated the leadership. When he finally caught up with them, he demonstrated

magnanimity and let them live out their lives in prison, which, given the circumstances of

the rebellion, Habib judged to be relatively lenient. Others were pardoned and received

high positions, such as Majid bin Khuthayla, who was made responsible for Ibn Sa'ud's

camels. It was Bin Khuthayla who was authorized to form repentant or loyal units of the







35

Ikhwan into what would later become the Saudi Arabian National Guard.[11] Ibn Sa'ud's

handling of his enemies is summarized by Habib:





Ibn Sa'ud's ability to consolidate his hold over the country, after the rebellion, was due in

no small part to his ability to rise above small and petty rivalries and sometimes over

major clashes, to forgive his enemies and to give them a share and vested interest in the

regime.[12

In other words, Ibn Sa'ud removed the wind from the movement's sails by co-optation,

not by war, as Bandar suggests.

But the tried and true methods of co-optation do not seem to be working this time around,

even as Ministry of Interior Na'if bin 'Abd al-'Aziz meets with tribal leaders in an attempt

to enlist their support.[13]

Even if Bandar's historical analogy is wrong, his prescription may be right on. In al-

Watan he states that his call for war against the terrorists "does not mean delicacy, but

brutality." He concluded his article with a call to kill them all.[14] Co-optation, as with the

Ikhwan, does not seem to be the solution for this insurgency. Indeed, in the month-long

amnesty offered by the regime in June 2004, only six terrorists gave themselves up.





In both Egypt and Algeria, governments have successfully put down Islamic insurgencies

(more successfully in the former than in the latter). This was due to a determined

government and a concerted effort, what Israeli scholar Emmanuel Sivan terms "the stiff

and increasingly effective resistance of existing governments."[15]

The Egyptians have definitely crushed their Islamic insurgency. One method used in

1992 was to enter the Cairo suburb of Imbaba, which was an Islamist stronghold, and

attack the Islamists. The Egyptians moved later to crush the Islamists entirely. It was not

a nice affair, but it did turn public opinion against the terrorists. The Mubarak regime is

still in power, and terrorism has nearly ended.[16] Algeria seems well on the way to

ending its Islamic terrorist nightmare. Apparently, nothing succeeds like suppression.









36

Are the Saudi Security Services up to the Task?





The Saudi security forces are notoriously unreliable, incompetent, or, worse, both. Since

the 1950's, not a decade has gone by without arrests carried out within the ranks of the

security forces.[17] It is worth going into some detail on sympathy for the terrorists within

the security forces, because if the Saudis are to be able to crush this insurgency, they

must have the military tools to do so.





It appears that the regime continues to identify supporters of Bin Ladin in the armed

forces. In September 2003, it was reported by two Bin Ladin websites that forty workers

at Saudi Arabia's Dhahran airbase had been arrested on suspicion of ties to al-Qa'ida and

for expounding on the necessity of jihad. Alleged detainees included the commander of a

helicopter wing, Lieutenant Colonel Salih 'Abd al-Hadi al-Qahtani, and two others with

the rank of major.[18]

The ability of terrorists to escape once being surrounded by security forces, points again

to extreme incompetence, collaborators, or both. On May 6, 2003, 19 terrorists, after

escaping following a shootout with Saudi security forces, participated in the massive

attack that followed a week later. Weapons found at the site of the attack were traced to

Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG) stockpiles. It is clear that the May 12, 2003

nearly simultaneous bombings of three compounds needed significant cooperation from

the SANG men guarding them. Several terrorists wore SANG uniforms. At the

compound of the Virginia-based Vinnell Corporation, which has a contract to train the

SANG, the bombers detonated their bomb inside the compound, just outside the main

housing block, which they reached in less than a minute. It was clear that they knew

where the switches were to operate the gates, and where the most densely inhabited

housing complex was located. They drove directly to it with their 200-kilogram bomb.[19]

Several injured Vinnell employees have asserted that the attackers were assisted by

SANG members. They allege that SANG members knew about the bombing in advance

and gave inside help to the terrorists. On that day security was especially lax, despite

repeated security warnings. An "exercise" organized by SANG removed dozens of

security staff, the compound was left wide open, machine guns were unloaded, and







37

guards unarmed.[20]





During the attack of November 8 on a residential compound in Riyadh, there were gun

battles between terrorists and security forces. All of the terrorists got away. They had

arrived in a car with the markings of the Special Security Forces, one of the main units of

the security apparatus engaged in hunting down al-Qa'ida. It seems clear that the use of a

Special Security Forces car meant that this was an "inside job," and that al-Qa'ida has

infiltrated parts of the security forces.[21]

On May 1, 2004, in an attack in the Hijazi coastal city of Yanbu', it took nearly an hour

for security forces to confront the terrorists, who succeeded in wounding more than 30

members of the security forces before being killed themselves. [22]

The late May 2004 attacks in al-Khobar in the Eastern Province were blatant and

seemingly easy to carry out. The attackers took their time, separating Muslims from non-

Muslims, killing 22 people, conversing and eating breakfast with Muslims in the

complex, and then – again – slipping easily away, two and a half hours before the assault

on the complex by Saudi forces, according to Arab News. They found shelter in a nearby

mosque, where the imam, Mazin al-Tamimi, was alleged to have given them aid. A few

hours later, they skirmished with security forces before escaping once again.[23]





On June 6, BBC cameraman Simon Cumbers was killed and reporter Frank Gardner

seriously wounded while filming in the Riyadh neighborhood of al-Suwaydi. Authorities

considered the neighborhood to be filled with al-Qa'ida sympathizers, and residents

included 15 of the country's 26 most wanted terrorists. Its most famous resident was the

leader of al-Qa'ida in Saudi Arabia, 'Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin. Its clerics preached a

virulent anti-western message, no doubt fanning the popularity of Bin Ladin.[24] Many of

the residents were recently urbanized nomadic bedouins. Residents of the neighborhood

were not afraid to identity themselves to journalists as they expressed their hatred of

Americans and their support for al-Muqrin and al-Qa'ida. "These (kidnappers) are holy

warriors, heroes, who never waver," said one Mizahen al-Etbi to a reporter.[25] This is not

surprising in a country where over half of 15,000 Saudis polled said that they supported

Bin Ladin.[26]







38

The Saudi terrorists continued to play with the authorities. The three escapees from the

al-Khobar attack went looking for their wounded comrade, Nimr al-Biqami, in the

Riyadh hospital where he was under police guard. Dressed as women, they waltzed

through the Ministry of Interior medical complex, shouting Biqami's name. When they

could not locate him, they fled--once again--unharmed.[27]





The Saudis eventually tracked down al-Muqrin and three accomplices, killing them in a

shootout in mid-June. Al- Qa'ida soon announced that Salih al-'Awfi would assume

command in the Arabian Peninsula. Al-'Awfi reportedly trained with the Saudi military,

and later reached the rank of sergeant in the prison service, overseen by the Ministry of

Interior, which supervises internal security in the kingdom.[28] It would not be surprising

if al-'Awfi still maintained connections with internal security organizations.





The terrorists also boasted that during the mid-June 2004 kidnapping of Paul M. Johnson,

an American defense contractor they later beheaded, they used uniforms and vehicles

supplied by sympathizers in the security forces, and were able to set up a fake

checkpoint. If true, particularly the latter claim, it is an indication of a total lack of

coordination between the security forces-a definite possibility-or, even worse, the

existence of collaborators at a very high level.[29] Saudis themselves seem to have a poor

view of their army, although apparently their view of the security forces is much

better.[30]





It was recently made public in an official US military publication that in 2004 a Saudi

military official with ties to al-Qa'ida was apprehended by the FBI and the US Air Force

Office of Special Investigations after completing a course at an Air Force technical

school. The officer allegedly had knowledge of al-Qa'ida plans and safe houses in the

kingdom.[31]





For the security services to be up to the task, al-Qa'ida sympathizers need to be rooted out

from within, as happened in the Egyptian and Algerian armies. Moreover, the authorities

have to conduct house-to-house searches, confrontationally, if necessary, in







39

neighborhoods like al-Suwaydi, just as the Egyptians did in Imbaba. The successful anti-

insurgency campaigns of the Egyptian and Algerian governments were not hearts and

minds campaigns. The Saudis' feeble attempts at an amnesty for the terrorists yielded few

takers.





But there are indications that the Saudis are finally getting the message. They have been

more aggressive in searching out terrorists and forcing them into confrontations. In early

April, security forces surrounded a group of terrorists in the Qasim regions' city of al-

Rass, around 300 kilometers northwest of Riyadh. The confrontation went on nearly 48

hours before 14 terrorists were killed.[32]





The insurgents seem to have suffered a blow, but continue to carry out attacks on a

weekly and sometimes daily basis. Two terrorists and two security officials were killed in

a clash in late April in Mecca, and similar incidents occurred in April and June.[33]





Returnees from the jihad in Iraq are a major concern. Western intelligence estimates that

there are several hundred Saudi nationals now amongst the insurgents; other estimates are

in the thousands. According to one analysis, Saudi citizens represented 61 percent of the

154 foreign Arabs killed in Iraq. Said one official, "They are coming back with security

experience, ranging from skills in how to lose people who are trailing them, as well as

having the qualities of guerilla fighters. They also know how to do surveillance."[34]





Fragmentation of religious and Monarchical Authority





The legitimacy of the Al Sa'ud rested to a great extent, for many years, on the

approbation of the establishment clerics. But since the death of the Wahhabi éminence

grise, General Mufti 'Abd al-'Aziz bin Baz in 1999, the prestige of these clerics has

dropped. The government has thus turned to two formerly imprisoned clerics, Salman bin

Fahd al-'Awda and Safar bin 'Abd al-Rahman al-Hawali-known as the "Awakening

Shaykhs" for their leadership of the Saudi Islamic "awakening" (sahwa) in the 1990's--to

support them in its efforts against terrorism.[35] This fragmentation of religious authority







40

makes the efforts of the Al Sa'ud to combat extremism all the more difficult. This

difficulty is compounded when establishment clerics continue to rail against Jews and

Christians, despite apparent government efforts to rein in these types of statements.





The royal family itself is plagued by a succession crisis that probably does not contribute

to unified decision making. King Fahd is about 83 years old and is incapacitated since

suffering a stroke in 1995 (as of this writing, he has been hospitalized for nearly three

weeks, reportedly with pneumonia), and Crown Prince 'Abdallah is 81 years old. Even if

'Abdallah were to live long enough to succeed Fahd, one wonders if he will have time

enough in office to really crack down on extremists and carry out reforms. To complicate

matters further, the decision as to who will be 'Abdallah's crown prince remains to be

settled. The most likely candidate, Minister of Defense Sultan, is about 80 years old.





Nevertheless, the Al Sa'ud have weathered crises before. When the family is threatened,

the princes pull together, and one hopes that this current threat will overcome internal

disagreements. Saudi Arabia is not Iran. Iran has a long tradition of mass political

activity. Saudi Arabia does not, and therefore it is reasonable to assume that barring mass

deprivation, it is unlikely that the kingdom faces a popular revolt.





Moreover, the possibility of a military coup of the type that used to plague Arab countries

for much of the twentieth century is an unlikely one. The armed forces are quite large and

dispersed, each headed by rival members of the royal family, and it is difficult to see

anyone or any group with the capabilities to organize over such a large area and amongst

such great numbers. The government does seem to have its priorities straight. During the

latest oil boom, the royal family made sure to distribute a two-month salary bonus to the

security forces. [36]





Saudi Arabia is not in the midst of a civil war. It is suffering a severe security crisis,

something, say, on the level of the troubles in Northern Ireland, perhaps even less so. [37]





While real reform and a new-found legitimacy are necessary for the monarchy's survival







41

in the long term, the current insurgency needs to be crushed quickly, and different and

stronger methods need to be applied. It otherwise will undermine the country's economy

and wreak havoc with the world oil market. In Usama Bin Laden's recorded statement in

mid-December 2004, he gave encouragement to the terrorists, encouraged them to attack

oil installations, and said that oil should be at $100 a barrel. A recent report by the Center

for Strategic and International Studies notes that al-Qa'ida in Saudi Arabia has been

eroded over the years, but it still remains a threat which is unlikely to disappear for years

to come.[38] In December 2004, Crown Prince 'Abdallah spoke of fighting the enemy for

twenty, thirty, or forty years.[39] A long-term insurgency does not bode well for the Saudi

economy, or for that of the west. Crushing this insurgency must therefore be the top

priority, ahead of issues of reform. U.S. policymakers need to take this into account.









NOTES

[1]

In two long messages, Usama Bin Ladin has expounded on the importance of armed

activity against the Saudi regime. See the English translations of his statements of August

22, 1996, and December 16, 2004, at www.jihadunspun.com.

[2]

Arab News, February 6, 2005.

[3]

Raid Qusti,"Two Explosions Hit Riyadh," Arab News, December 30, 2004; "Car

Bombers Target Saudi Security Units," Washington Post, December 30, 2004.

[4]

JE Peterson, "Security and Political Challenges in Saudi Arabia," December12, 2004

(http://www.jepeterson.net/id12.htm).

[5]

Financial Times, January 11, February 3, 2005; Daily Star, January 17, 19, 31,

February 2, 2005; Reuters, January 30, 31, February 1, 5, 2005; Michael Knights,

"Backing Kuwait's Stand against Terrorism," PolicyWatch, No. 955, Washington Institute

for Near East Policy, February 11, 2005.

[6]

AP, January 26, 2005; Reuters, January 30, 2005. Thirty-one were eventually put on

trial in April for trying to reestablish the Ibadhi Imamate through an armed organization.

They were convicted in May, but pardoned in April. Gulf News, March, 27, April 19, 20,

2005; AFP, May 2, 2005; Oman Observer, May 3, 2005; BBCNEWS, June 10, 2005. For







42

more on this incident, see JE Peterson, "Oman: Omanis, Ibadis, and Islamism,"

February28, 2005 (http://www.jepeterson.net/id12.htm). In March, an Omani was sentenced to life

imprisonment for attempting to kill two Britons. Gulf News, March 22, 2005.

[7]

Tony Thompson, "Qatar Blast Kills Britain," The Observer, March 20, 2005; Gulf

News, April 20, 2005.

[8]

Anthony Cordesman and Nawaf Obaid, "Saudi Arabia Internal Security, A Risk

Assessment: Terrorism and the Security Services - Challenges and Developments,"

Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington, DC), May 30, 2004, online at

http://www.csis.org/burke/saudi21/sis_ariskassessment.pdf

.

[9]

See John Habib's classic study of the Saudi Ikhwan, Ibn Sa‘ud’s Warriors of Islam:

The Ikhwan of Najd and Their Role in the Creation of the Sa‘udi Kingdom, 1910-1930

(Leiden: Brill, 1978).

[10]

Bandar bin Sultan, al-Watan, June 1, 2004, translated by MEMRI, online at

http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=countries&Area=saudiarabia&ID=SP72504

.

[11]

Habib, Ikhwan, Ibn Sa‘ud’s Warriors of Islam, pp. 152-54.

[12]

Habib, Ikhwan, Ibn Sa‘ud's Warriors of Islam, pp. 154-55.

[13]

Simon Henderson, "Why Americans Die in Riyadh," FrontPageMag.Com, June 21,

2004, online at http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=13850.

[14]

Bandar bin Sultan, al-Watan, June 1, 2004, translated by MEMRI, online at

http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=countries&Area=saudiarabia&ID=SP72504

.

[15]

See Emmanuel Sivan, "Why Radical Muslims Aren't Taking Over Governments,"

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 2 (May 1998), pp. 9-16. Sivan

points to further successes against Islamic insurgents by Saddam Husayn in Iraq (1980,

1991), and in Syria (1982).

[16]

Ami Ayalon, "Egypt," in Ami Ayalon (ed.), Middle East Contemporary Survey 1992

(Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), p. 368; Lee Smith, "The Saudi Civil War: Who is

Fighting? Who Will Win?," Slate, June 18, 2004, online at http://slate.msn.com/id/2102628/.

[17]

See Joshua Teitelbaum, "A Family Affair: Civil-Military Relations in the Kingdom of

http://www.iue.it/RSCAS/RestrictedPapers/conmed2003free/200303Teitelbaum12.pdf

Saudi Arabia," . This paper is

currently being revised.

[18]

Yoni Fighel, "Saudi Arabia Confronts Bin Laden Supporters," International Policy







43

Institute for Counter-Terrorism, online at http://www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=498.

[19]

John Bradley, "Conspiracy of Silence in Riyadh?," Daily Star, November 22, 2003;

"Terror Weapons Linked to Armed Forces," San Francisco Chronicle, May 19, 2003;

Peter Finn, Al-Qaeda Link to Saudi National Guard," The Age, May 20, 2003.

[20]

Mark Hollingsworth, Independent, May 17, 2004; Mark Hollingsworth, "US Bomb

Victims Sue Saudi Royal Family for 'Negligence'," Independent on Sunday, May 8,

2005.

[21]

John Bradley, "Conspiracy of Silence in Riyadh?," Daily Star, November 22, 2003.

On the Special Security Forces, see Anthony Cordesman and Nawaf Obaid, “Saudi

Arabia Internal Security, A Risk Assessment: Terrorism and the Security Services -

Challenges and Developments," Center for Strategic and International Studies

(Washington, DC), May 30 2004, online at http://www.csis.org/burke/saudi21/sis_ariskassessment.pdf.

[22]

Huge Pope and Chip Cummins, "Saudi Suffer Fresh Terrorist Attack," Wall Street

Journal, June 1, 2004.

[23]

Saeed Haidar, "Manhunt Continues for the Three Escaped Terrorist," Arab News,

June 1, 2004; Al-Sharq al-Awsat, June 1, 2004.

[24]

Dave Montgomery, "Anti-Western Sentiment Rises in SaudiNeighborhood," Kansas

City Star, June 14, 2004; Mohammed Rasooldeen, "Al-Muqrin Remained a Brutal Killer

All His Life," Arab News, June 20, 2004.

[25]

Salah Nasrawi, "Saudi Anti-Extremist Campaign Not Working," Washington Post,

June 19, 2004. For more on al-Suwaydi, see John Bradley, "The Slum Where BBC's

Frank Gardner Was Shot," Yemen Times, June 14, 2004, online at

http://www.johnrbradley.com/art_13.html

.

[26]

Henry Shuster, "Poll of Saudis Shows Wide Support for Bin Laden's Views,"

CNN.com, June 9, 2004, online at http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/06/08/poll.binladen/.

[27]

Michael Theodoulou and Daniel McGrory, "Disguised Gunmen Try to Free Terror

Leader," Times (London), June 9, 2004.

[28]

Al-Quds al-'Arabi, June 21, 2004; Brian Whitaker, "Sacked Sergeant Is New al-Qaida

Chief in Saudi Arabia, Guardian, June 22, 2004; "New al Qaeda Cell Leader Trained

with Saudi Military," CNN..COM, June 21, 2004, online at

http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/06/21/alaoofi.ap/index.html

.







44

[29]

"Al-Qaida: Sympathizers Aided Abduction," AP, June 20, 2004.

[30]

Henry Shuster, "Poll of Saudis Shows Wide Support for Bin Laden's Views,"

CNN.com, June 9, 2004, online at http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/06/08/poll.binladen/.

[31]

James Gordon Meek, "Saudi Military Official linked to al-Qaida trained with Air

Force," New York Daily News, February 1, 2005; Brig. Gen. Eric Patterson, "A Year in

Reflection: OSI Tempered for the Future," Global Reliance, November/December 2004,

p.3.

[32]

UPI, April 3, 5, 7, 9, 2005; AP, April 4 , 6, 2005; Arab News April 4, 5, 8, 10, 2005;

Reuters, April 5, 2005; Washington Post, April 6, 2005.

[33]

Reuters, April 21, June 1, 2005; AP, April 21, May 13, June 18, 2005.

[34]

William Wallis and Mark Huband, "Saudi Arabia Fears Attacks from Insurgents

Battel-Hardened in Iraq," Financial Times, December 20, 2004; Reuven Paz, "Arab

Volunteers Killed in Iraq: An Analysis," PRISM Series on Global Jihad, No. 1/3, March

2005; Donna Abu-Nasr, "Saudi Youth Export Holy War,” AP, March 9, 2005; Susan B.

Glasser, "'Martyrs' in Iraq Mostly Saudis," Washington Post, May 15, 2005; Eric Schmitt,

"US and Allies Capture More Foreign Fighters," New York Times, June 19, 2005.

[35]

On Hawali and 'Awda, see Joshua Teitelbaum, Holier Than Thou: Saudi Arabia’s

Islamic Opposition (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000).

[36]

Hugh Pope, "Oil Boom Buys Time for Saudis," Wall Street Journal, November 15,

2004.

[37]

JE Peterson, "Security and Political Challenges in Saudi Arabia," December12, 2004

(http://www.jepeterson.net/id12.htm).

[38]

Reuters, January 11, 2005.

[39]

Simon Henderson, "Lights, Camera, Inaction? Saudi Arabia's Counterterrorism

Conference," PolicyWatch, No. 956, February 11, 2005, Washington Institute for Near

East Policy.









45

THE IRAQ WAR AND THE MIDDLE EAST REGION:

AN OVERVIEW









The US invasion of Iraq in April, 2003, the toppling of the Saddam Hussein regime and

the subsequent situation of insurgency and extreme instability in Iraq have served to

radically alter the strategic picture in the Middle East. Both in terms of the regional

balance of power, and in terms of the dominant ideas in the region, the Iraq invasion has

changed the Middle East - in significant and unexpected ways. This document will look

into those regional processes and conflicts which have been affected by the Iraq invasion

and subsequent events. We will outline the key changes to have taken place in each

specific area, and will then go on to consider the effect of the war on broader regional

trends.





In order to understand the effect of the Iraq War on the region, it is first of all crucial to

have a clear picture as to the effects of the war on Iraq itself, and the current state of

affairs in the country.





It is now generally acknowledged that serious errors have taken place from the outset in

planning for the transformation of Iraq following the rapid and decisive allied victory in

the invasion of April, 2003. Some argue that the very conception of the invasion was

flawed from the outset. The result is a current situation of insurgency and virtual civil

war in the country. Contrary to the hopes of the planners and supporters of the war, an

intact Iraqi civil society has not emerged from the ruins of Saddam Hussein's Iraq.

Rather, Iraq has split along fault lines based on ethnic and religious loyalty. Attempts by

the US and its allies to assist in the construction of workable institutions in Iraq have

been hampered by this salient reality. The first and crucial aspect to be aware of with

regard to post-invasion Iraq is that the difficulties experienced by the occupying forces

have not been as a result of a unified Iraqi national resistance to the presence of foreign







46

troops. Although for a moment in the earliest stages of the insurgency, some cooperation

did take place between Sunni and Shia opponents of the US, this rapidly degenerated as

Sunni insurgents began to engage in sectarian killings against the Shia.





The sectarian breakdown in Iraq, combined with a Sunni Arab insurgency against both

US and allied forces and Iraq's Shia majority community, and the growing strength of

radical Shia forces have now combined to make areas of Iraq close to ungovernable. A

de facto process of ethnic cleansing is under way. 100,000 Iraqis per month are currently

being forced to leave their homes. Around two million Iraqis have been forced from their

homes since the 2003 invasion. The possibility that the situation in Iraq might descend

into Bosnia-style chaos has been a factor in the awareness of western policymakers since

the first days of the occupation. However, there is now an increasing sense that a general

breakdown is becoming more likely. 2006 saw further declines in levels of personal

security and in openly proclaimed sectarian allegiances in Iraq. Thus, the year saw the

bombing by Sunni Arab insurgents of the Shia Samarra Mosque - one of the most revered

sites for Shia Muslims. The implications of such an audacious act are immense, and

many date the starting of civil war in Iraq from this date. Levels of sectarian mistrust

have reached unprecedented levels according to all available polls. A recent poll found

that 85% of Iraqi Arab Sunnis had an unfavourable view of the performance of Prime

Minister Nuri al-Maliki. Maliki is a Shia, and the lists associated with him were

victorious in the elections of December, 2005. The resentment can no longer be

characterized as mainly deriving from a Sunni sense of loss of power following the fall of

Saddam. In the course of 2006, Shia Iraqis began to respond in earnest to the attacks on

Shia which until then had formed a part of the Sunni Arab insurgency against the US and

its allies.





The resulting levels of carnage have led to a situation where by most measures, a civil

war in Iraq is no longer a possibility, but is rather already an existing reality. Iraq is now

one of the most violent places on earth. Basic utilities such as heating, transportation and

fuels for household cooking are scarcer now than they were two years ago. The Iraqi

security forces, while growing in technical proficiency, remain compromised in terms of







47

their own perceived sectarian loyalties.





Significant parts of Iraq, such as the Sunni Anbar province, and the Shia Sadr City area of

Baghdad, remain no-go areas for personnel linked to the occupation. These areas have

also not benefitted from the notable gradual improvement in Iraqi GDP in the recent

period. Rather, they remain afflicted by large-scale unemployment which in turn feeds

into involvement in sectarian violence.





Thus, despite the successful holding of elections, and the real gains made in various areas

of daily life, the situation in Iraq is grave. It is the fact of Iraq's division along sectarian

lines, the failure to provide security, and the various errors made since the invasion of

2003 which have led to the current situation.





Iran and Syria: Beneficiaries of the crisis in US policy in Iraq





There is a general sense in US policymaking circles that events in Iraq have reached a

point of crisis, and that in order for a further slide towards chaos to be avoided, a

significant change in policy is needed. The end of 2006 saw the beginnings of a serious

debate in this regard. The Iraq Study Group, convened by former Secretary of State

James Baker III, and former Congressman Lee Hamilton delivered its recommendations

at the end of 2006. Its central message was for the US to engage with regional powers

currently hostile to it, but who could conceivably help the situation in Iraq precisely

because of their connection with forces within Iraq contributing to the disorder there.





The writers of the ISG Report considered that the best way for these countries to be

drawn into a process whereby they might become willing to help the US on Iraq would be

if they could be offered inducements on issues important to them. The report specifically

recommended engagement with Syria and Iran.





A later National Intelligence Estimate, excerpts of which were released in February,

2007, painted a similarly very grim picture of the situation in Iraq. The estimate echoed







48

the ISG Report's focus on the Iranian role in fomenting unrest (though it did not endorse

the Report's recommendation of 'engagement' with Iran as a response to Iranian support

for Shia Islamist forces in Iraq.)





Thus, there is a general consensus that the grave difficulties being faced by the US and its

allies in Iraq serve to benefit Iran and its ally Syria. But how precisely is this process

being played out, and what specific areas is it likely to influence?





Iran





The United States considers that Iran is offering extensive, active aid to Shia insurgents

in Iraq. Iran, however, denies these charges. According to recent US statements, Iran has

been offering arms and assistance to insurgent groups in the southern part of the country.

In the last months, US forces have detained Iranian officials in Iraq suspected of offering

aid to the insurgents. Among the evidence offered by the US to support this claim is the

recent discovery of explosively formed armor-piercing projectiles with serial numbers

indicating the charges were made in Iran. Defense Secretary Robert Gates has cited other

evidence of Iranian involvement, including documents captured when U.S. forces

conducted a raid last month in northern Iraq and arrested six Iranians. Iran continues to

dismiss the accusations.



What is certainly the case, however, is that Iran's influence within post-Saddam Iraq is

not limited to military involvement in the insurgency. Rather, Teheran has emerged as a

key political holder of influence within Iraq. According to a report by a prominent

institute in the UK, Iran has bought influence by sponsoring Shia political organisations

within Iraq. All the leading Shia politicians in Iraq, including radical cleric Moqtada al-

Sadr, have close links with Iran. The largest Shia militias - Sadr's Mahdi army and the

Badr brigades attached to the Supreme Council of Islamic Revolution in Iraq - are aided

by Iran.



Iran is perhaps the key beneficiary of the current Iraqi situation. In removing the Taliban

regime in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein in Iraq, the US and its allies intended to take





49

down key terror-supporting states. By so doing, however, they also took down key rival

states to Shia Islamist Iran. The result, especially because of the later difficulties in

stabilizing Iraq, has been to hugely boost Iranian confidence. High oil prices and Iran's

continued defiance of international will over its nuclear program have combined with

Iranian key influence inside Iraq to lead some analysts to dub Iran as the true victor of the

'war on terror.' On a regional level, as we shall go on to see, perhaps the key result of the

Iraq war so far has been to rise to regional centrality of the Islamic Republic of Iran and

its allies, with the consequent counter-emergence of a bloc of states opposed to the

Iranian push for regional dominance.









Syria





In the initial period following the US invasion of Iraq, a number of clearly positive

regional developments took place. The decision by Libya to abandon its WMD program

was the first of these. But the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon was also largely a result

of the American presence in Iraq, and the impetus given to pro-democracy forces in

Lebanon by both the example of the elections in Iraq in January, 2005, and the likelihood

that the Syrians would not dare to intervene to crush pro-democracy forces because of the

close proximity of US forces.





However, it is now clear that Syria did not give up on its intention of maintaining

influence in Lebanon following the withdrawal. Rather, through its sponsorship of

Hizballah, and through the apparent continued clandestine presence of its operatives on

Lebanese soil, Damascus continues to make its presence felt in Lebanon. The Syrians

succeeded in riding out the brief moment when the toppling of Saddam looked set to

offer a possible threat to the future of other regional authoritarian regimes.









50

At present, the Syrian regime is determined above all to prevent the establishment of an

international tribunal to be tasked with investigating the murder of former Lebanese

Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri. There are strong suspicions of senior Syrian involvement

in the killing, which sparked the movement that led to the withdrawal of Syrian forces

from Lebanon. As such, the regime is understood to have placed the frustration of the

tribunal as a policy goal of the utmost importance.





The US considers that Syria has an interest in keeping the insurgency in Iraq going.

Were American efforts at creating stability in Iraq to succeed, this would be likely to lead

to subsequent pressure on the regime in Damascus. As such, the Americans consider that

Syria is deliberately allowing the transport of men and supplies for the insurgency across

the Iraqi-Syrian border.





Western efforts to engage Syria are continuing. In October 2006, British Prime Minister

Tony Blair sent a special envoy to Damascus to meet with President Bashar al-Asad. It

was the first visit by a senior British envoy since the invasion. According to Arabic

media sources, the envoy proposed Syria's cooperation on five issues: Cooperation in

Iraq and supporting the cabinet of Prime Minister Nuri al-Malki; Cooperation on the

Palestinian issue, Syrian efforts to combat terrorism; Cooperation on Lebanon and

supporting the cabinet of Prime Minister Fouad al-Siniora; and Syrian-Iranian relations.

While Syria has expressed willingness to improve relations with the Iraqi government

(diplomatic ties between Syria and Iraq have been revived) and to support a Palestinian

unity government, progress on the key issues of Lebanon and Iranian relations has proved

elusive.





In February, 2007,, Washington authorized U.S. charge d'affaires in Damascus Michael

Corbin to discuss with Syrian officials a growing Iraqi refugee crisis despite the

continuing freeze on high-level contacts with Damascus. Officials made clear this did

not, however, represent a break with standing U.S. policy not to have high-level

diplomatic dealings with the regime of Syrian President Bashar Assad. Washington

withdrew its ambassador from Damascus in February, 2005, following the murder of







51

Hariri.





Syria's relations with Iran are close and do not appear currently susceptible to fissure.

Rather, the sense that US intentions have been frustrated in Iraq is likely to strengthen the

Syrian-Iranian bond, with the Syrians feeling that they have ridden out the threat

represented to their regime by the invasion of Iraq and subsequent events, and that they

are aligned with a rising radical force in the region.





The US decision to participate in a conference also attended by Syrian and Iranian

representatives in March, 2007 was a further significant indication of a growing US

susceptibility to engagement with Iran and Syria.





Egypt and Jordan: concern at rise of Shia in Iraq





Egyptian officials recently expressed their country's support for the US plan to increase

its deployment in the Baghdad area with around 21,000 fresh combat troops. Cairo is of

course a major beneficiary of aid from the US, and a lynchpin for stability in the region.

Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul-Gheit asserted that Egypt ""understands...the

need for the orientation of the strategic outlook of the United States…We are

supportive of the plan because we are hopeful that it will lead to the stability,

unity and cohesion of the Iraqi government." This latest statement by a senior

Egyptian official indicates a renewed confidence on the part of the regime. Egyptian

public opinion has been staunchly opposed to the war from the start, and the task of the

regime has been to successfully navigate between the conflicting demands of the US -

which is Egypt's key ally and patron - and Egyptian public opinion, which was and

remains fiercely opposed to the war.





This situation was further complicated by the fact that the US invasion of Iraq was

depicted as part of a broader strategy of encouraging regional democratization. Egypt is

of course not a democracy, and the regime rules over a rapidly growing population in

which the forces of Sunni Islamism remain strong. The regime of Hosni Mubarak was







52

thus concerned to convey to the US that encouragement of democratization in Egypt was

likely to have the opposite to the intended effect - namely, it was likely to lead to the

increasing empowerment of Islamist forces, who are better able to mobilize public

support than is any other political force in the country.





Egypt has indeed found itself the subject of public pressure from the US in the last years

over the need for reform and liberalization. Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice, for

example, has consistently called for the release of Ayman al-Nour, a prominent Egyptian

liberal politician who stood against Mubarak in the presidential elections of 2005 and

who was subsequently jailed. But the current sense is that the travails in Iraq have led

the US to scale back sharply its aspirations regarding the likely democratization of the

regime.



The growing confidence of the government of Egypt is now being reflected in an

increasing assertiveness by the government of Egypt on the issue of Iraq, and specifically

on the sectarian violence in the country. President Mubarak's remark in 2006 that Shia

Muslims across the region were more loyal to Iran than to their own countries received

much publicity. But more substantively in subsequent months, Egyptian spokesmen and

leaders have sought to press the Iraqi government of Nouri al-Maliki to undertake

reforms including the speeding up of constitutional reform, and the revoking of an Iraqi

law that dismissed senior members of Saddam Hussein's Baath party from the

government. Former Egyptian foreign minister Amr Moussa, in his position as chairman

of the Arab League, has urged the government to pass a law that specifically says Iraqis

should be treated equally based on their citizenship, not their religion or ethnicity.



Such moves reflect the extent to which the debate has shifted. Whereas in the initial

months following the invasion, there was a sense that the US involvement in Iraq could

lead to far-reaching regional change in a positive direction, the prevailing current sense is

that the main regional outgrowth of the destruction of the regime of Saddam Hussein has

been the emergence to the center of regional politics of the Sunni-Shia divide, and the

attempt by Iran to wield greater regional influence as a result. Egypt possesses no

substantial Shia population of its own, but the emergence of this issue enables the regime





53

to resume a more assertive stance regarding regional processes - of a type to which it is

accustomed. This stance can be depicted as constructively critical of US policy, and at

the same time in keeping with the prejudices of part of the Egyptian public.



Egypt is not alone among the Arab countries professing concern at the rise of the Shia in

Iraq, the growth of Iranian influence and what this means for the region. Jordanian king

Abdullah II has also expressed his concern at a possible tectonic shift in regional politics,

with Shia-Sunni rivalry assuming a central position. However, unlike Egypt, Jordan has

been directly affected by the situation in Iraq. There are said to be anywhere between

700,000-1 million Iraqis currently resident in Jordan. This is a massive addition to a

country of just 5.6 million people, which is almost entirely lacking in natural resources.



Jordan is also deeply concerned at the strategic implications of the crisis in Iraq. As a

small, Sunni Arab kingdom wedged between Israel and the PA territories on the one

hand, a possibly Shia-dominated Iraq on the other, and Syria to the north, the kingdom

has much to be legitimately concerned about. If civil order in Iraq breaks down totally,

Jordan could well find the disorder spilling across the border. If an ascendant, Shia state

emerges from the ruins of Saddam's Iraq, Jordan's position could be even more

uncomfortable, should such a state make common cause with Iran.





Saudi Arabia/Gulf monarchies





Saudi Arabia is deeply concerned at unfolding events in Iraq, and in particular at the

possibility of a general US failure. As a state committed to an extremist version of Sunni

Islam (Wahabism) but with a sizeable Shia minority in its oil-rich eastern province, and

with a 500 mile border with Iraq, Saudi Arabia stands to pay a heavy price should general

civil war break out in Iraq. The Saudis have tended to stress the Iranian threat, both

because this brings them credit in Washington, and because of the long-standing, bitter

rivalry between revolutionary Shi-ite Iran and conservative Sunni Saudi Arabia. In early

2007, a Washington Post article by a long-standing advisor to the Saudi government,

Nawaf Obeid, spoke of the possibility that in the event of a US withdrawal from Iraq, the

Saudis might intervene to "stop Iranian-backed Shiite militias from butchering Iraqi





54

Sunnis." While the likelihood of a conventional intervention by the Saudis is low, given

the very limited military capabilities of the kingdom, nevertheless the Saudis could

provide military aid, and certainly large-scale funding to Sunni groups within Iraq. Saudi

fears that a post-Saddam, post-US Iraq would be likely to fall into the Iranian orbit are

compounded by additional concerns of possible internal unrest as a result. Possible

internal tensions could take two forms. Firstly, Saudi Arabia is home to a large

population of Sunni Wahabi extremists who consider that the monarchy has departed

from the true path of Islamic rigor, and who wish to bring it down. These elements have

been angered by the growth of Shia power and sectarianism in Iraq. They see the Shia as

apostates, and pressure would be likely to grow for the kingdom to intervene were

tensions in Iraq to erupt. The second source of tension is of course the Saudi Shia

themselves. Concentrated in the oil-rich Eastern Province, Saudi Shia have made

considerable progress in the last two decades, though their lives remain under the careful

observation of the Saudi security services. But Saudi Shia undoubtedly fear the

possibility that the reforms of the past 15 years could be reversed in the current

atmosphere of growing sectarianism.





A major danger, then, is that Saudi Arabia, feeling cornered by the growing power of Iran

and the Shia in Iraq, could begin offering extensive support to Sunni jihadists in Iraq.

There is no clear evidence yet that the Saudis have begun to play such a role, but recent

statements such as that of Nawaf Obeid confirm Saudi Arabia's very deep fears at the

possibility of further deterioration in Iraq.





The most significant product of these fears has been a much increased Saudi presence in

regional diplomacy. Having peered into the abyss, the Saudis appear determined to

prevent further de-escalation in relations between the west and Iran, deriving from the

void left by the disappearance of Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Thus, an unexpected regional

development as a result of the Iraq War has been increased overt Saudi involvement in a

number of key conflicts. In the arena of Israel and the Palestinians, for example, the

Saudis have been deeply worried by attempts by the Iranians to draw Hamas closer into

their orbit. As a result, Saudi Arabia has both sought to strengthen its own relationship







55

with Hamas, and also to mediate between Fatah and Hamas to avoid internecine

Palestinian bloodletting. The Mecca Agreement of February, 2007 is a notable result of

this process. The Saudis have also been involved in attempts to mediate between the

various factions in Lebanon.





Israel/Palestinians





Saddam's Iraq had offered a great deal of verbal support to the Palestinian cause. This

verbal support was accompanied by financial rewards offered by the government to the

families of suicide bombers in the course of the second Intifada. All this was brought to

an end by the war. However, the results of the war have not been unambiguously

positive from Israel's point of view. Israel is deeply concerned at the rise of Iranian

influence in the region, in part made possible as a result of the Iraq war and the

subsequent complications. The strategy of regional democratization which accompanied

the war helped to pave the way for the rise of Hamas to power in the Palestinian

Authority, with the very great complications this has meant for hopes of a revived

diplomatic process between Israelis and Palestinians.









Turkey





For Turkey, the primary issue throughout the period of the invasion of Iraq has been the

fear that an independent Kurdistan might rise from the ruins of Saddam's Iraq. Because

of this fear, Turkey was vociferously opposed to the war. Then Prime minister Bulent

Ecevit warned that "This operation may lead to Turkey's dismemberment. It will disrupt

all the balances in the Middle East." Warnings of this kind continued right up to the

beginnings of the US invasion. Practically, Turkey's opposition to the invasion continued

throughout, surviving the change of government in November 2002, and resting on

massive public support.









56

The months leading to the invasion saw unprecedented strains opening up in Turkey's

relations with the US. As it became clear to Ankara that the US was serious in its

intentions, the Turks began to formulate a policy regarding their essential interests in a

post-Saddam Iraq. In a leaked document bearing the signature of Prime Minister Ecevit

and titled 'B.020', these red lines are outlined. Most importantly, the document notes that

the establishment of a 'separate administration' by 'ethnic minorities in Iraq' would be 'a

cause for intervention on our part.' The document also made clear Turkey's deep

opposition to the inclusion of the oil rich cities of Kirkuk and Mosul in any future

Kurdish entity. Turkey feared that the rise of de facto Kurdish sovereignty in northern

Iraq could pave the way for demands from Kurds in south-eastern Turkey for this region

to secede from Turkey and join the Kurdish entity.





In a parliamentary vote on March 1, 2003, Turkey rejected US requests for the entry of

US forces into Turkey as part of the invading force. This was a decision of enormous

significance on the part of Turkey. It caused deep anger on the part of the US

Administration. It meant that the US was thwarted in its desire to have around 30% of its

invading force approach Iraq from the north. As a result of this vote, Turkey's influence

in Washington has been seriously weakened.





In the period since the war, Turkey has watched with trepidation as Kurdish autonomy

and power has grown in northern Iraq. The Red lines outlined in the Ecevit document

prior to the war have not been rescinded. The Turks are watching the situation in Kirkuk

with particular attention - the area has been described by PUK leader and Iraqi Presdent

Talabani as the 'Jerusalem of Iraq." In practical terms, the Turks have adopted the cause

of their ethnic kinsman in northern Iraq - the Turkmen - in order to wield influence within

the area. Ankara has alleged discrimination against ethnic Turks in areas controlled by

the Kurds. The Turkman population is particularly high in the Kirkuk area. However,

this population has failed to unify politically, with Shia Turkmen preferring to align with

Iraqi Shia, and others often exhibiting greater anger toward their Arab neighbors than

toward the Kurds.









57

Turkey is currently undergoing a process of major internal political change. The AKP

government is better disposed to greater engagement with Middle Eastern countries than

in the past. The deep Turkish anger regarding events in Iraq is part of a more general

transformation in Turkey's regional alignments.





Regarding northern Iraq, Turkey has become increasingly dependent on US and Kurdish

forces for challenging PKK guerrillas in this area. However, limited cooperation in this

regard has not removed deep Turkish concerns regarding the future of the area.

Confrontation is not inevitable in this regard, and it may be that the Kurds will choose to

tailor their aspirations to fall short of sovereignty and thus avoid confrontation. It should

be noted that both the KDP and PUK organisations maintain offices in Ankara, and Jalal

Talabani is known to have expressed interest in the possibility of Turkish-Kurdish

cooperation on the basis of shared secularism and opposition to the support of Arab states

for Iraqi Sunni nationalist/Islamist extremism. Poor and oppositional Turkish-Kurdish

relations are not a given. Washington would certainly welcome rapprochement between

the two - since both Turkey and the Kurdish autonomous zone in northern Iraq are allies

of the US.





But the possibility of events taking an opposite course, with a growingly Islamic Turkey

forging alliances in the region and becoming increasingly estranged from the west, is also

plausible.





Conclusions





As we have seen, the invasion of Iraq and the subsequent insurgency have impacted

significantly on the diplomacy of the region as a whole, and on a number of sub-regional

political processes. The United States is currently engaged in an attempt to achieve a

restoration of order in the area of Baghdad, with the injection of extra forces and the

introduction of some new tactics. Reports are currently varied regarding the extent to

which this new 'surge' is proving effective, or is likely to succeed. There is also current

concern in the US at the possibility of 'mission creep', as the number of extra US troops







58

deployed in Iraq increases above the original allocation of an extra 21,000. US military

officials say the increased American force level will begin declining in August unless

additional units are sent or more units are held over.





But whether or not the 'surge' succeeds in significantly reversing US fortunes in Iraq, it is

already possible to draw up a preliminary ledger regarding the main regional products of

the war.





Firstly, it may be said that the most optimistic prognoses for the post-war period - that a

re-made Iraq could serve as a model for a wider regional process of democratization,

have not been realized. The key political process in Iraq itself today is one of politics

arranged according to communal loyalties, not democratic citizenship. As far as the

region is concerned, the main outcome of the war has been the rise of Shia Iran as a

regional force - introducing intra-Islamic sectarianism as a serious factor in the

diplomacy of the region for the first time in modern history. Today, the region is defined

by the expansionist efforts of an Iranian led bloc which includes, apart from Iran itself,

Baathist Syria, Hizballah, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad organization.





As a result of the emergence of this bloc, the US has largely abandoned pressure for

democratic reform on other regional players. Rather, what has emerged is a counter-bloc

centered on the US's main Sunni Arab allies. Saudi Arabia has enormously increased its

involvement in regional diplomacy as a result of the rise of Iran following the war in Iraq.

Egypt and Jordan have also been trenchant in their criticisms of the rise of Shia influence

regionally and of Iran. The fact that the US is backing the emergence of a Shia-

dominated Iraq may yet serve to further complicate this process, depending on the

eventual political complexion of the new Iraq - most importantly - will it draw close to

Iran, or become part of the pro-western system of Arab states.





Turkey's anger and increasing estrangement from the west is a further significant regional

result of the Iraq War. Turkish opposition to the war and its subsequent fear of the rise of

an autonomous Kurdish state served to cast light on and accelerate already existing







59

processes in Turkey's outlook to the region - namely, a greater orientation toward the

Middle East and a growing dis-satisfaction with the results of Turkey's traditional pro-

western orientation.





The emergence of what may be called a new Mid-East Cold War with a pro-western,

largely Sunni bloc ranged against Iran and its allies is the central regional result of the

Iraq War. This new, central dynamic is then in turn impacting on more local processes

and conflicts such as the situation in Lebanon and the Israeli-Palestinian situation.





The Middle East, as a result of the Iraq War, is a far more volatile, unpredictable area.

The old pattern of political allegiance - which saw the central divide in the region as

between Israel and the Arabs, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as the central engine of

regional instability has been severely challenged by new cross-currents.





Since the Iraq War is not yet over, it is too soon to draw any final conclusions regarding

its ultimate impact on the region. However, what may already be concluded is that the

war has ushered in a profoundly new strategic balance in the Middle East.









60

HOW INEVITABLE IS AN ISLAMIST FUTURE?







Since the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the world has been waiting for the other shoe to

drop. Over 25 years later, however, the world is still waiting, trying to figure out where,

when, and how it will happen: where will the next Islamist takeover occur? Equally as

important: will that lead to a chain-reaction of Islamist takeovers throughout the region?





The 1950s and 1960s trained the world to expect violent and sudden coups in the Middle

East. In addition to numerous failed attempts (like the PLO’s attempt to overthrow

Jordan’s King Hussein in 1970), Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Libya, Iran, and Yemen saw regimes

successfully overthrown, some countries experiencing several such takeovers before a

strongman established himself well enough to maintain power. In 1960, 1971 and 1980,

Turkey also experienced military takeovers, though each time power was eventually

restored to civilian governments.





With this experience as background, what surprised so many people about the 1979

Iranian Revolution was not that the Shah’s government was unable to maintain power.

What was novel was that unlike all previous takeovers and coups, the ideology purported

by those assuming power was no longer nationalist with Third Worldist undertones. Even

if many groups, often with totally divergent agendas, took part in the Iranian Revolution,

it was the Islamists—headed by Ruhollah Khomeini—who symbolized the revolution and

eventually monopolized its outcome. Moreover, while some Arab nationalists upon

coming to power had declared their desire to unite the various Arab states into one larger

Arab nation, the Islamists’ declared goals were much more threatening. By proclaiming a

goal of exporting Islamic revolutions around the world, Khomeini and his followers

openly threatened the entire global order.





Waiting for Khomeini









61

So, over 25 years later, why is the world still waiting for the next revolution? The answer

is certainly not because the Islamists were uninspired by events in Iran. The years

immediately following the Iranian revolution were filled with serious Islamist attempts to

overthrow the regimes in power. Indeed, Islamists did enjoy one minor victory, as they

succeeded in taking power in Sudan, and a temporary one with the Taliban taking over

most of Afghanistan. More crucial than these minor successes, Islamist parties have

become the primary opposition group in every Arab country.





Still, in every country outside of Sudan, the regimes in power managed to thwart the

Islamists’ efforts. For example:

• In Syria, Islamists attacked the regime several times—including an

attempt on Hafiz al-Asad’s life in 1980 and a full-fledged coup

attempt in 1982—before the Syrian army flattened the city of al-

Hama, killing 20,000 of its inhabitants in the process.i

• In Egypt, Islamists assassinated President Sadat in 1981, and

attempted to do the same to Mubarak in 1995. The regime

instituted a harsh crackdown of the Islamists, and by the late

1990s, had managed to reign in their challenge.

• Islamists had strong showings in Algeria’s national elections and

were poised to win a second round in 1992, but were prevented

from taking power by the army.

• In Turkey, the army allowed an Islamist party to come to power

via elections (Refah Party in 1996), but the Islamists were unable

to co-opt the army. When they crossed certain policy redlines, the

army instigated their resignation.

• In Saudi Arabia, Islamists have been staging a full-fledged

insurgency since May 2003. While the country’s security forces

are infiltrated by Islamist sympathizers, recent counter-insurgency

operations have begun to turn the tide in the Kingdom.ii





Looking at the experience of the past quarter century, one can conclude that in each





62

country the regimes learned their lesson from the Iranian Revolution: in order to maintain

power, a ruler must be willing to do whatever is necessary.





For all regional rulers, the use of brute force—mass detentions, imprisonment,

executions, torture—is only one tool they use to defeat their Islamist opponents. No less

critical for these regimes’ efforts to keep Islamists at bay has been their ability to co-opt

them. One effective tactic of many leaders has been to co-opt the Islamists by giving

them limited power. In Jordan, Morocco, Yemen, Algeria, and Kuwait, this has meant

allowing Islamists to run openly for parliament, and on occasion, hold the portfolio for a

minor, non-security oriented ministry. In order to contain the Islamists, however, the

kings or presidents have neutered their various parliaments, leaving them with only

limited constitutional and legislative powers. The final say in all critical matters is usually

left with the sovereign.





The third major strategy leaders have employed has been to drape themselves in the cloak

of Islamic legitimacy, thus undermining the Islamists’ main claim. Leaders in many

countries have put on pious appearances and practices in attempt to steal back the

religious card. In addition to his frequent public displays of Islamic sources, the late King

Hassan II of Morocco claimed to be a direct descendent of Muhammad himself, and took

on the title Amir al-Mu'minin (“Commander of the Faithful”). The Hashemite Dynasty of

Jordan has made a similar claim to direct descent. After Shi’a Islamists attacked the

Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979, Saudi Arabia’s King Faud took on the title “Custodian

of the Two Holy Mosques,” a title borrowed from the Islamic Caliphate. Finally, Egypt

and Saudi Arabia have leaned on their official religious institutions to issue rulings and

give sermons in support of the regime and its various policies.





That leaders today struggle to illustrate their Islamic credentials tells us much about the

state of the region, and how successful Islamists have been in framing the basic debate in

the Middle East. In most other developing regions, populist rhetoric is usually focused on

other messages, such as development, progress, improving the plight of the poor, etc. It is

rare to find a South American, Eastern European, or East Asian politician trying to use







63

his religiosity as a primary election issue.





Indeed, while they have been routed by the regimes in their attempts to gain political

power, it is essential to note that Islamists have been terribly successful in winning “the

war of ideas.” As Emanuel Sivan has written, “Radical Islam has made tremendous

inroads into the hearts and minds of Arabic-speaking Muslims. In the socio-cultural

realm, militant Islamic discourse maintains a hegemony in the public debate among

Arabs, replacing Pan-Arabism and Marxism. Islamism has a profound impact on gender

roles, fertility, consumption habits, as well as on the marginalization of local Christians

and the censorship of movies, plays and books.”iii Indeed, in Cairo, Istanbul, or any other

major metropolis in the region, the number of women covering their head is far greater

than it was a generation or two ago. While such an observation is not a perfect measure, it

does serve as a rough barometer of political attitudes.





This strategy of dawa (literally, the call to adopt Islam, but often used to refer to

proselytizing activities) has two purposes. First, it is an attempt to transform Middle

Eastern societies through non-political, grassroots social change. At the same time, this

grassroots approach is a long-term strategy for achieving the goal that has otherwise

eludes the Islamists: seizing political power. By slowing convincing ever-growing

numbers of people that Islam is the answer for all of society’s problems, they hope to set

the groundwork for their future rise to power.





Analyzing the potential for a takeover





With this in mind, the obvious question arises: though the regimes have deftly contended

with the Islamist challenge so far, if Islamists are making inroads amongst much of the

population, can they hold out forever? In other words, are there prospects for an Islamist

takeover sometime soon? The follow-on question is no less critical: would an Islamist

takeover on one country lead to a chain-reaction of Islamist takeovers throughout the

region?









64

The best way to answer this question is to consider how such a takeover could

specifically occur. Until today, Islamists have used four strategies to try and obtain

power: terrorism, coups, civil wars, and democracy. The next section of this article will

analyze the prospects for all four.





Coups

While several Islamist groups have tried to infiltrate the regimes in order to stage a coup

de tat, accept for Sudan, these efforts have all failed and are likely to continue failing.

Having either gained power via such coups themselves, or at a minimum, having seen

them occur next door, every regional leader knows how to ensure he does not lose his

head in a putsch. First, leaders have frequently purged their armed forces of suspected

Islamists and other potential foes. In addition to removing undesirables, regimes often

appoint their most loyal supporters to key positions to ensure the army is led by those

who share the regime’s interests. Often, this has meant counting on the same ethnic or

tribal groups from which the leader himself originated.





Second, and most important, every country’s leadership has succeeded in dividing and

conquering their own armies. Armed forces in the region are characterized by

redundancy, meaning, for instance, that there is never one or two intelligence services,

but twelve. Armies are also characterized by a total lack of institutional communication,

especially amongst branches of the armed forces. Joint exercises are virtually unknown.iv





While occasionally Islamists are successful in infiltrating up to a certain point in the

army, the biggest potential threat they pose is that of assassinating the regent—not in

replacing him. Maybe the best example of this is Sadat’s assassination in 1981. While

Islamists were able to get close enough to kill Sadat, they lacked the capability to gain

power, and then had to bear another dictator who made sure the Islamists were properly

hounded.





With this in mind, it is highly unlikely this strategy will prove successful in the future.

Should the unlikely become possible, it is even more difficult to imagine that one such







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Islamist takeover would lead to another coup in a neighboring country. Evidence for this

can be found in the fact that Sudan’s Islamist takeover was an isolated affair, with no

ripple effect on the region whatsoever.





Terrorism

Although terrorism has lately become the most widely used tactic by Islamists, it is even

less likely to succeed than is a military coup in bringing the Islamists to power. The key

reason is because blowing things up or shooting people does not give Islamists a way to

come to power—i.e. it will not cause the regime to fall.v Experts have often surmised that

Islamists pursue terrorist strategies in order to create chaos, which would harm the

country’s economy (especially the lucrative tourism sector). Should the country’s

economy collapse, so the logic goes, public discontent would rise and this would

undermine the regime’s stability.





If this was their strategy, then it has largely backfired. Terrorist attacks against tourists or

local targets has only strengthened the regimes, as shedding the blood of innocents and

undermining people’s livelihoods certainly has not endeared Islamists to the local

populations. The outpouring of anger against Islamists in Egypt after the 1997 massacre

of tourists at Luxor and similar expressions of anger by Jordanians in 2005 reveal

terrorism’s ineffectiveness. Furthermore, this public outcry gives the regime all the

legitimacy it needs to conduct aggressive security operations, including the mass arrests

of Islamists. When the security services arrest or kill large numbers of the Islamists’

leaders and membership—without giving them the opportunity to portray themselves as

martyrs of unjust repression—this inevitably leads to a weakening of these organizations.





This said, there is one important caveat: when terrorism is used against Western targets

(especially the United States or Israel), then it has been very effective in increasing

popular support for the organization. Al-Qa’ida, Hizballah, and Hamas have all become

widely popular because of their spectacular terrorist attacks.





Still, it would appear that even here, this strategy has not been wildly successful for







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achieving their aims. First, just because their terrorism receives wide popular support

does not mean that the populations at large want to live under Islamist rule. The history

of Hizballah since the late 1990s is a case in point. Following Israel’s withdrawal from

Southern Lebanon in May 2000, the organization won wide accolades inside Lebanon

and around the region for what was perceived as its victory against the Israeli army, with

many Arab pundits suggesting that Hizballah had succeeded in accomplishing what no

Arab country or regular army had. As a result, Hizballah did well in national and

municipal elections, most importantly in 2004 when it ran against Amal, its main Shi’a

rival.vi





However, its electoral success never exceeded the Shi’a community, as no other sect is

interested in having an Islamist Shi’a government turn Lebanon into a state run according

to Shari’a (Islamic law). Moreover, as time has passed, Hizballah’s glory has waned.

Without any Lebanese territory to liberate, it is difficult to legitimate its attacks on Israel,

which non-Shi’a Lebanese realize could likely lead to massive and painful Israeli

retaliation. As a result, one hears increasing calls for Hizballah to be disarmed, and

Hizballah’s refusal to do so has pitted it against many other Lebanese groups. Also,

without a war to fight, Hizballah must give its answers to Lebanon’s numerous domestic

problems. As mentioned, Hizballah’s answers are often not in accordance with the desires

of most Lebanese. This was most clearly shown on March 8, 2005, when Hizballah

staged a massive rally of several hundred thousand under slogan of “fidelity to Syria,”

which was meant to counter calls for a full Syrian withdrawal from Lebanese territory.

This slogan, considered positively offensive by most Lebanese, provoked a rare show of

unity amongst the other religious communities, which then held a counter-rally on March

14. This counter-demonstration was so successful that it drew over one million people

(representing more than one-quarter of Lebanon’s 3.8 million citizens).vii In the end,

Hizballah’s policies have led many to question where its loyalties lie.





Finally, even terrorism inside Western countries (like Sept. 11, the London and Madrid

bombings) is somewhat counterproductive for the Islamists’ cause. While it may help

whip up support amongst Middle Easterners, it has forced the victims of terrorism to join







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forces on certain operational and policy levels that were simply not imaginable before.

These attacks have also forced Western countries to pass legislation which bestowed for

law enforcement agencies far-reaching powers to let them better find and arrest potential

terrorists. Finally, these attacks have forced otherwise apathetic citizens to re-evaluate the

Muslim communities in their midst, and to reconsider their immigration and visa policies.

If Islamists had any aspiration of quietly taking over Western countries, the terror attacks

have made that impossible. As Daniel Pipes wrote:





...terrorism obstructs the quiet work of political Islamism. In tranquil times,

[Islamist] organizations... effectively go about their business, promoting their

agenda to make Islam ‘dominant’... Terrorism impedes these advances,

stimulating hostility to Islam and Muslims. It brings Islamic organizations under

unwanted scrutiny by the media, the government, and law enforcement.... The

July 7 bombings dramatically (if temporarily) disrupted the progress of

"Londonistan," Britain's decline into multicultural lassitude and counterterrorist

ineptitude.

Some Islamists recognize this problem. One British writer admonished

fellow Muslims on a Web site: "Don't you know that Islam is growing in

Europe??? What the heck are you doing mingling things up???" Likewise, a

Muslim watch repairer in London observed, "We don't need to fight. We are

taking over!" Soumayya Ghannoushi of the University of London bitterly points

out that Al-Qaeda's major achievements consist of shedding innocent blood and

"fanning the flames of hostility to Islam and Muslims."viii





Civil War or Revolution

While revolution and civil war worked in Iran and Afghanistan (respectively), they are

unlikely to work elsewhere, mainly because as the experience in Algeria and Syria

teaches, the Islamists are simply outgunned by the state apparatus. It has the intelligence

capabilities and the major weapons systems the Islamists lack, and most importantly, they

are willing to fight without fear of appearing cruel (a limitation which significantly

hampers Americans in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as Israelis against the Palestinians).







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This gap has grown even wider as many Middle Eastern regimes no longer attempt to

fight their rivals via domestic proxies. The Kurds have historically been the region’s most

exploited group in this regard, as the Iranians, Syrians, and Iraqis have all armed the

Kurdish communities in the neighboring countries in order to use them as a thorn in the

side of their rivals. Today, this fighting by proxy is increasingly less used, with the main

exception being Iran’s involvement in today’s Iraq. Thus, without massive, overt external

military and economic aid, the chances of winning a civil war or rebellion are slim.





Furthermore, the terrible bloodshed in Algeria has scared the Islamists in many countries,

especially in Northern Africa, and so they are even less likely than before to try to use

force of arms to take power. As Bruce Maddy-Weitzman has said:





I can tell you that at least in Morocco the Islamist parties are deathly afraid of

looking like they are trying to assume power. They saw what happened in

Algeria. They understand that any grab for power or even a perceived move

toward gaining it will lead to a very sharp reaction by the authorities. My sense is

that Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood also understands the weight of the Egyptian

power structure--the regime, bureaucracy, and military. Thus, they, too, are not

looking for power…. because they know this would lead to chaos.ix





Yet, it is not impossible that many of the Islamist groups which today abjure violence

will reconsider returning to this strategy one day in the more distant future. Such a

scenario is most likely should two conditions come to pass: 1) that the Islamists come to

believe that the regimes have outsmarted them and left them no alternative for gaining

power (in particular, via democratic elections); and 2) that they have the support of the

overwhelming majority of the population and at least some of the key elites (e.g.

economic, military). Perceived regime weakness, especially due to external pressure,

could also tip the scales in this regard. It is this second condition, of course, which makes

the Islamists’ dawa activities potentially so menacing.









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Should such conditions come to pass and such a rebellion succeed, there would be a

decent chance of this strategy being repeated elsewhere, especially where conditions were

ripe, because it could convince Islamists that this strategy, which at present seems futile,

has the potential to succeed.





Democracy

Precisely because all violent options for obtaining control are very likely to fail, most

local Islamist groups around the world now seek to take advantage of democratic

openings to gain control of the state apparatus. And it appears that such a strategy might

yet bear fruit. In most countries, should there be open elections today, Islamists would

either win them or come in second, well ahead, for example, of liberal reformers.





Recent elections in Egypt, for instance, saw the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) gaining 19

percent of the vote (88 seats out of a 454-member parliament). The MB potentially could

have done even better, but the country’s security forces employed considerable violence

(which led to 11 deaths) in an attempt to keep voters from getting to the polls in certain

districts. Much more importantly, the MB only contested a third of all available seats—

largely out of a desire not to embarrass Mubarak’s party, which could have led to a future

crackdown.x This means that of the 148 contested seats, the majority (88) went to the

MB.





In Yemen, parliamentary elections were held on April 27, 2003. The Islamist party, al-

Tajmu al-Yamani li al-Islah (the Yemeni Congregation for Reform) took second place,

winning 23 percent of the vote (which translated into 46 out of 301 seats). In Kuwait,

while there are no official political parties, of the Majlis al-Umma’s (National Assembly)

50 members, an estimated 21 are Islamists, with 14 government supporters, 3 liberals,

and 12 non-partisans. In Jordan, after the parties allied with King Abdallah II, the

Islamist party—the Islamic Action Front—won the second largest bloc 18 of 104 seats. In

Morocco, the Justice and Development Party (Parti de la Justice et du Développement)

took third place.xi









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Amongst Palestinians, Hamas has for over a decade been the second most popular

organization (behind Fatah), with opinion polls showing support ranging between 20-40

percent. Due to the movement’s boycott of the 1996 Palestinian Legislative Council

elections (because they were the product of the Oslo Accords), only about a handful of

Islamists won seats (as independents). In 2005, however, Hamas participated fully in

local elections, winning anywhere from a quarter to a third of the overall vote, and

gaining majorities in most of Gaza and the Hebron area. According to internal

documents, in the January 2006 elections, the organization’s “realistic” scenario is to win

80 out of 231 seats.xii





Similar pictures can be found throughout the region. While Islamists often are not

allowed to run except as independents, in professional unions and student councils, more

often than not, Islamists sweep the elections.





Why do Islamists do so well throughout the region? The primary reason is the ineptitude

of the present regimes in providing for their citizens. Unemployment is rife, the

economies have stagnated for over four decades. Militarily, these regimes have been

humiliated by Israel and the United States, or even worse (as far as many constituents are

concerned), they often did not even try to aid their “brother” countries in their fights.xiii

For all the problems the countries in the region face, the Islamic opposition has a simple

solution: Islam is the answer.





Islamist organizations have then attempted to prove that they can govern more effectively

by building alternative health care, schooling, and welfare systems, often relying on

Saudi or Gulf Arab largess. To their credit, their welfare and health care systems are

generally considered to be relatively much more effective at meeting the needs of the

local populations than those of the government.





Maybe the main reason for the Islamists’ record of efficiently providing for residents is

that they by and large have avoided the one pitfall which has been key to every regime’s

total ineffectiveness: pervasive corruption. Here the Islamists have all wisely portrayed







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themselves as beyond corruptibility, and this has been a key to their rising popularity.





Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi or AKP) is a case in

point. The party (which is a moderate breakaway faction of its hard-line predecessor, the

Islamist Welfare Party) won the November 2002 elections by a landslide, taking 363 of

550 seats. AKP was so successful that it became the first party to form a non-coalition

government since 1987. The important point about AKP’s victory, however, is that many

of those who voted for the party were not necessarily religious themselves. Instead, a

large number of the electorate voted for AKP because they were frustrated by widespread

corruption amongst politicians and the inability of the various established parties to

provide solutions for the country’s longstanding social and economic problems. Indeed,

in a poll taken three months before the elections, 93 percent of respondents said they

were dissatisfied with the state of their country (the second highest of all 44 countries

surveyed); 91 percent were dissatisfied with Ecevit specifically (the lowest marks of any

world leader by his citizens). In addition, 79 percent of Turks believed their politicians

were corrupt, and only 7 percent thought the national government had a positive

influence on their lives.xiv





All of the above, and especially Turkey’s experience with AKP, demonstrates that

democracy is a very viable pathway to power. Moreover, while AKP’s ballot box success

did not spark a chain reaction, should an Islamist party come to power in the Arab world,

the situation may be different. The main question, therefore, is how close to ultimate

control can this path lead the Islamists?





In Turkey, the regime actually allowed Islamists in the form of the Welfare (or Refah)

party to come to power via elections in 1996. For almost two years, up until February

1998, the army (which serves as the guardian of the secular state and democracy) gave

Refah a fairly free hand to make policy as it saw fit. It was only when the Refah-led

government decided to cross certain redlines, especially by re-aligning the country’s

foreign policy, that the army instigated the government’s downfall. Still, in 2002, the

army allowed for the AKP to take power, and until today, has not interfered. One key







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reason for AKP’s post-election success in maintaining power has been that it is not an

Islamist party per se, but rather a party which is pushing for religious freedom for

individuals, such as allowing women to wear headscarves. Should they attempt to impose

the practice of Shari’a, AKP would likely find itself right next to Refah.





As stated in the beginning, in many Arab countries, the answer is that kings or presidents

have neutered their various parliaments, leaving them with only limited constitutional and

legislative powers. Wherever there is limited experiments in democracy, the final say in

all crucial matters remains fully in the hands of the country’s ruler. The regimes have

then shrewdly used the very real threat of Islamists gaining power as their response to

Western demands for greater democratization. It is highly unlikely—but not

inconceivable—that this status quo will change any day soon, as no monarch or president

in the region willingly wants to forfeit power. The main chance for a change in the status

quo is during periods of transition (for instance, when Mubarak passes away). Still, even

these moments have not made a major difference in the recent past: three regimes have

smoothly overcome such interregnums without making significant concessions to

democracy advocates.





Conclusion





Given that democracy is the most likely way in which Islamists can come to power,

today’s most important debate is how should the U.S. and Europe deal with this

contingency.xv This debate is taking added urgency due to the success of Hamas,

Hizballah, and the MB in Egypt, as well as because the vigorous American policy of

pressing for democratic reform in the region. What is clear is that the threat of an Islamist

takeover via the ballot box is very real in certain countries, and this will have enormous

ramifications for the region as a whole and Western interests in the region.









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NOTES





i

One of the best accounts of the Syrian assault on al-Hama is in Thomas Friedman, From Beirut to

Jerusalem (Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, 1989), chapter 4.

ii

To read more on this see Joshua Teitelbaum, “Terrorist Challenges to Saudi Arabian Internal Security,”

MERIA Journal, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Sept. 2005).

iii

Emmanuel Sivan, "Why Radical Muslims Aren't Taking Over Governments," Middle East Review of

International Affairs (MERIA) Journal, Vol. 2, No. 2 (May 1998), pp. 9-16.

http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1998/issue2/jv2n2a2.html

iv

For more on this subject, see Barry Rubin and Thomas A. Keaney (eds.), Armed Forces in the

Contemporary Middle East: Politics and Strategy (Frank Cass, 2001).

v

Here it is important to define terrorism. Not every car bombing or shooting is an act of terrorism, as

sometimes it could be an assassination attempt of a political or military target. I suggest using the definition

given by Boaz Ganor, head of the Institute for Counter-Terrorism, who defines terrorism as the “intentional

use of, or threat to use violence against civilians or against civilian targets, in order to attain political aims.”

One might also add that the general intention of this violence is to intimidate or create general panic

amongst a civilian population. For more on this see Boaz Ganor, "Defining Terrorism: Is One Man’s

Terrorist Another Man’s Freedom Fighter?" ICT website, September 24, 1998.

.

vi

For more on Hizballah’s success, see Rodger Shanahan, “Hizballah Rising: The Political Battle for the

Loyalty of the Shi'a of Lebanon,” MERIA Journal, Vol. 9, No. 1 (March 2005).

vii

See Michel Touma, “The State of Democratic Reform in Lebanon,” Policy Brief Series: Democratization

in the Middle East (Foundation for the Defense of Democracy, forthcoming).

viii

Daniel Pipes, “How Terrorism Obstructs Radical Islam,” New York Sun, August 23, 2005

.

ix

Roundtable Discussion, “The State of Democracy in Middle East States,” MERIA Journal, Vol. 9, No. 3

(September 2005)

x

International Herald Tribune, December 8, 2005.

xi

Statistics come from http://www.electionworld.org

xii

Ha’aretz, December 11, 2005.

xiii

Between 1965-2000 Middle Eastern economies annual growth was only 3.0%, with Sub-Saharan Africa

as the only region doing worse. When the region’s high population growth rate is figured in, annual per

capita growth rate was a mere 0.1%. As of today, 29% of the region lives on less than $2 a day.

xiv

Pew Research Center, “How Global Publics View: Their Lives, Their Countries, The World,

America,” December 4, 2002, pp. 27, 32, 36, 43 ; Bulent

Gokay and Bulent Aras, “Turkey After Copenhagen: Walking a Tightrope--Part II,” Turkish Daily News,

February 11, 2003.

xv

For examples, see Sa'ad Eddin Ibrahim in the New York Times, Tarek Heggy in the Washington Times,

and Barry Rubin in the Jerusalem Post.









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