Abstract and Outline
For the paper entitled:
Networking the Global Maritime Partnership
Topic 11. Multinational Endeavors
Topic 2. Networks and Networking
Topic 5. Organizational Issues
Mr. George Galdorisi
Dr. Stephanie Hszieh (Point of Contact)
Mr. Terry McKearney
Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center San Diego
53560 Hull Street
San Diego, California 92152-5001
Networking the Global Maritime Partnership
Few strategic concepts have spurred more discussion than the notion of the global maritime
partnership (originally called the 1000-ship Navy), a concept first introduced by then-U.S.
CNO, Admiral Michael Mullen, at the International Seapower Symposium in September 2005.
In the ensuing two-plus years this concept has been broadly discussed in the international
defense media and at conferences and symposia, including those sponsored by the CCRP.
Recently, at the September 2007 IFPA Fletcher Conference, Admiral Mullen, now Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, took this idea even further, suggesting global security partnerships.
The C4ISR challenges to networking a global maritime partnership are not trivial and will not
succeed if the “power to the edge” concepts exposed by the CCRP are not addressed and if we
fail to understand the lessons learned from past networking and coalition partnering in the
This paper will address that rich history and demonstrate how lessons learned from past
networking and coalition naval efforts can inform the global maritime partnership today. We
will share the results of a “beta-test” among the five AUSCANNZUKUS nations, currently
entering its seventh year, which provides one example of how to address these C4ISR
Networking the Global Maritime Partnership
1. Paper introduction
a. If we treat today’s challenges as brand new and without a historical context we
have one eye blind.
b. Today, there is a growing consensus (not just Admiral Mullen) that navies need
to work together. In the modern age, “working together” means networking (Dr.
David Alberts addressed this issue directly at the 7th ICCRTS when he noted “In
today’s world, it is inconceivable that anything could be accomplished outside of
c. So…we want to network navies at sea
i. Have we networked at sea before?
ii. Have maritime coalitions worked at sea before?
iii. The answer to both is yes!
d. What have we learned from history?
e. How can we apply it today?
2. Network Centric Warfare and the Global Maritime Partnership
a. Information warfare is built on the capabilities of these information and
communication technologies that allow for instantaneous communications and
the ability for everyone on shore and at sea to share a common tactical picture.
i. Alberts, Garstka, and Stein, Network Centric Warfare
ii. Alberts, Garstka, Hayes, Signori, Understanding Information Age
b. The Global Maritime Partnership (GMP) will leverage these new technological
capabilities to build a maritime coalition to secure the global maritime commons.
i. Rapidly established, ad hoc coalitions of naval forces that are able to
come together as needed to provide security in the maritime domain.
ii. “The power to create a voluntary network of maritime forces is within our
grasp, we have the capability to seize on our inherent nature of
cooperation at sea and, together, overcome transnational actors who
threaten the very fabric of global safety and security.”
Admiral Michael Mullen
U.S. Navy Chief of Naval Operations
RUSI Future Maritime Warfare Conference
December 13, 2005
c. Quick history of the GMP (It was known as the Thousand Ship Navy) from
Admiral Mullen’s introduction of it at the 2005 International Seapower
Symposium to the 2007 IFPA/Fletcher Conference where the newly christened
Global Maritime Partnership was extended to include global security
3. The Global Maritime Partnership is in response to the changing global environment.
a. Globalization and the increasing need for the Global Maritime Partnership
i. The world’s maritime fleets need to work together to guard against
piracy, terrorism, and to respond to catastrophic maritime incidents
(South East Asian tsunami), and other challenges to global maritime
security. The global war on terror and the ever-increasing dependence of
the world economy on the free flow of trade on the world’s oceans have
increased the need for peace-loving nations to work together to provide
maritime security. Add to that the growing need for multi-lateral
responses to catastrophic disasters – Southeast Asian tsunami – has
increased the need for cooperation among various navies.
ii. Naval operations in this era will be marked by ad hoc naval coalitions that
are often “pick up games” and “come as you are” events.
b. Challenges to the netted navy in a global world/ “power to the edge”
i. The phenomenal advancement of computer technology that has made the
netted navy possible has been a force multiplier for the US Navy.
However, when it comes to working with other friendly navies, current
network technology has often proved to be a hindrance. Professor Paul
Mitchell has addressed this issue at CCRTS events and also in print:
“Is there a place for small navies in network-centric warfare?
Will they be able to make any sort of contribution in multinational
naval operations of the future? Or will they be relegated to the
sidelines, undertaking the most menial of tasks, encouraged to
stay out of the way– or stay at home?…The “need for speed” in
network-centric operations places the whole notion of
multinational operations at risk.”
Professor Paul Mitchell
Director of Academics
Canadian Forces College
Naval War College Review – Spring 2003
ii. Some of the problems that the US Navy has experienced in working with
coalition forces in a networked environment.
a. Incompatibility of network equipment. Different hardware
and software limit the ability to communicate efficiently.
b. Disparities in the level of networking. US Navy is highly
networked but has to work with navies like the (some
third-world navy with antiquated radio communications
c. Information assurance requirements sometimes get in the
way of being able to pass on important information to
iii. This issue has been addressed in CCRP publications and during previous
CCRTS events, most notably, in Dr. David Alberts’ comments at a recent
ICCRTS where he noted, “We have been humbled by the magnitude of
the challenge of networking with coalition partners.”
4. Learning from the past
a. The challenges and issues facing coalition operations in a network centric
warfare environment are not new. There have been many lessons over the two
and a half millennia of coalition warfare and networking at sea that we can draw
upon to help us understand where we are now and how not to let technological
advances overtake our desire to interoperate.
i. “Most think that bigger, faster, and more is best when talking about
providing technology to naval forces. But this is not always the case.
What matters is not how much you communicate, but rather getting the
right information to the right people at the right time.”
Professor Nicholas Rodger
2007 Royal Australian Navy King Hall Naval History Conference
b. Maritime coalitions have existed for at least two and a half millennia and navies
have communicated at sea for at least that long.
i. Greco-Persian War (499 BC – 449 BC)
In 479 BC the Coalition of Greeks (Hellenes) under the command
of a Spartan general destroyed a fleet of Persian ships in the
The Greek fleets combined ships from various Greek city states
The Persian fleet consisted of ships from its own territories and
captured Greek territories, Egypt, Syria, and Phoenicia
ii. Battle of Actium (31 BC)
Battle between the fleets of Mark Antony and Octavius for the
control of the Roman empire
Mark Antony’s fleet included Egyptian warships under the
command of Queen Cleopatra
iii. Mongol invasions of Japan (1274 & 1281)
Mongol fleet consisting of Mongol, Chinese, and Korean troops
attempted to invade Japan
Both attempts ended in disaster as typhoons destroyed the
iv. Campaign of Lepanto (1571)
Christian fleet defeated the Turkish fleet and stopped further
Turkish incursions into the Mediterranean
The Christian fleet was composed of ships from Spain, Venice,
Genoa, Savoy, Malta, and the Papal fleet
v. Battle of Trafalgar (1805)
Combined Fleet of French and Spanish ships were defeated by the
English fleet lead by Admiral Nelson.
vi. World War I (1914 – 1918)
Imperial Japanese Navy ships fought along with allied ships in the
Mediterranean against German U-boats
vii. World War II
American, British, Dutch, and Australian coalition in the Pacific
in the early part of World War II.
W.G. Winslow, Fleet that Gods Forgot: The U.S. Asiatic Fleet in
World War II
H.P. Willmott, Empires in the Balance: Japanese and Allied
Pacific Strategies to April 1942.
c. Over time, the need to communicate at sea has morphed to the need to network at
sea. Networking at sea has been going on for well over a century.
i. “The basic notion of networking is not new. Networks have existed ever
since the first human communities emerged in mankind’s dim
prehistory…What is different today is the speed, precision, capacity and
reach of the most advanced networks. That is truly unprecedented – so
much so that they are transforming civilization.”
Dr. Loren Thompson
Networking the Navy:
A Model for Modern Warfare
ii. Defining networking at sea
The ability for commanders to have a jointly-held tactical picture
The ability to coordinate operations in a manner that leverages the
individual capabilities each coalition partner brings to the force
iii. First Sea Lord Admiral John Fisher (1904) [Norman Friedman, “Netting
and Navies: Achieving a Balance,” paper presented at the 2006 Royal
Australian Navy Seapower Conference, Sydney, Australia.]
Early originator of networks at sea
Developed two Admiralty War Rooms to track local and global
shipping to combat piracy
Information from embassies and scouts was fed into the war
rooms to provide information on attacks on commercial shipping
Admiral Fisher used this common operating picture provided by
war rooms to direct a battle-cruiser to counter these attacks
iv. World War II (1939 – 1945)
British convoys and US aircraft formed a successful intelligence
based network to defeat German U-boat attacks
v. Cold War [Loren Thompson, Networking the Navy: A Model for Modern
Warfare (Arlington, VA: Lexington Institute, 2003).]
(1950s) Networking of Sound Surveillance Systems (SOSUS)
with ASW aircraft to combat Soviet submarines
(1990) The U.S. Navy’s Copernicus C4I initiative incorporated
information technologies to provide a common tactical picture
d. History is replete with examples where the introduction of new technology has
actually hindered effective communication and networking because the
ramifications of that technology were not fully understood and that technology
was not thoughtfully introduced:
i. The telegraph
ii. The wireless
e. One way to ensure that the global maritime partnership can be networked is to
understand the technology being introduced and to develop this technology in
concert with likely coalition partners. This is good theory, but are there lessons
learned and best practices the CCRP can draw on, especially in the introduction
of C4ISR technologies?
5. We have “beta-tested” and will share one methodology for networking navies more
effectively. This “beta-test” among the five AUSCANNZUKUS nations, currently
entering its seventh year, provides one example of how to address these C4ISR
a. Development of TTCP to meet the needs of coalition communications
The preliminary results from this three-year effort, a project
entitled “Network-Centric Maritime Warfare Study” have been
briefed at various conferences and symposia, including CCRTS.
ii. AG – 6
The preliminary results from this follow-on three-year effort, a
project entitled, “FORCEnet and Coalition Implications” have
been briefed at various conferences and symposia, including
iii. We will tie together these two studies and demonstrate the benefits of
undertaking multinational analysis and modeling and simulation at the
laboratory level in order to enhance the ability of nationally-developed
technologies to be compatible when a global maritime partnership
operates at sea.
6. Conclusions: Our conclusions will stem from the completed analysis and modeling and
simulation and will be offered as one model for international cooperation in the C4ISR
arena and one way to more-effectively deliver “power to the edge.”