From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia William Perry
William Perry
William James Perry retary of Defense for Research and Engineering
(1977-1981).
Perry is currently the Michael and Barbara Berberian
Professor at Stanford University, with a joint appoint-
ment in the School of Engineering. He is also a senior fel-
low at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution. He is a
senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for Inter-
national Studies and serves as co-director of the Nuclear
Risk Reduction initiative and the Preventive Defense Pro-
ject. He is an expert in U.S. foreign policy, national secu-
rity and arms control.
Former Secretary Perry also has extensive business
experience and currently serves on the boards of several
high-tech companies and is Chairman of Global Technol-
ogy Partners. He is a member of the National Academy
of Engineering and a fellow of the American Academy of
Arts and Sciences. Among Perry’s numerous awards are
the Presidential Medal of Freedom (1997), Knight Com-
19th United States Secretary of Defense mander of the Order of the British Empire (1998) and
the Grand Cordon of the Order of the Rising Sun (2002),
In office awarded by the Emperor of Japan.
February 3, 1994 – January 23, 1997
President Bill Clinton
Early life and career
Deputy John M. Deutch
John P. White Born in Vandergrift, Pennsylvania, he graduated from
Butler Senior High School in 1945 and served in the Unit-
Preceded by Les Aspin ed States Army as an enlisted man from 1946 to 1947, in-
Succeeded by William Cohen cluding service in the Occupation of Japan. Perry later re-
ceived a commission in the United States Army Reserve
19th United States Deputy Secretary of Defense
through ROTC, serving from 1950 to 1955.
In office Perry received his B.S. (1949) and M.A. (1950) degrees
January 21, 1993 – February 3, 1994 from Stanford University, and a Ph.D. in mathematics
President Bill Clinton
from Pennsylvania State University in 1957. He was di-
rector of the Electronic Defense Laboratories of Sylva-
Preceded by Donald J. Atwood Jr. nia/GTE in California from 1954 to 1964, and from 1964 to
Succeeded by John M. Deutch 1977 president of ESL, Incorporated, an electronics firm
that he helped found. From 1977 to 1981, during the Jim-
Personal details my Carter administration, Perry served as undersecre-
Born October 11, 1927 (1927-10-11) tary of defense for research and engineering, where he
Vandergrift, Pennsylvania had responsibility for weapon systems procurement and
research and development. Among other achievements,
Political party Democratic
he was instrumental in the development of stealth air-
Alma mater Stanford University craft technology. Not all of the programs he developed
Pennsylvania State University were as well-received, however. As journalist Paul Glas-
tris wrote in the Washington Monthly:
William James Perry (born October 11, 1927) is an Ameri-
can businessman and engineer who was the United States As under secretary, Perry effectively controlled
Secretary of Defense from February 3, 1994, to January which emerging technologies and weapons systems
23, 1997, under President Bill Clinton. He also served as would receive R&D funds and which systems the
Deputy Secretary of Defense (1993–1994) and Under Sec- Pentagon would procure. Among the regrettable
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From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia William Perry
high-tech weapons systems he gave the green light
to: the MX missile (still no basing system), the TV-
guided Maverick missile (fighter pilots become sit-
ting ducks when they launch them), the F-18 fight-
er (costs more, performs worse than the planes it
replaced), the Aquila Remotely Piloted Vehicle
drone (worse than the Israeli version, 16 times as
expensive), the DIVAD gun (no amount of money
could make it work), and the Apache helicopter (the
Pentagon recently grounded the entire fleet).[1]
On leaving The Pentagon in 1981 Perry became managing
director until 1985 of Hambrecht & Quist, a San Francisco
investment banking firm "specializing in high-tech and
defense companies."[1] Later in the 1980s and up to 1993,
before returning to the Pentagon as deputy secretary of
defense, he held positions as chairman of Technology
Strategies Alliances, professor in the School of Engineer-
ing at Stanford University, and a co-director of the
Preventive Defense Project at Stanford’s Center for Inter-
national Security and Cooperation. He was also a member
of the Packard Commission.[1]
Secretary of Defense
Perry entered office with broad national security expe-
rience, both in industry and government, and with an
understanding of the challenges that he faced. A hands-
on manager, he paid attention both to internal opera- Perry in Rwanda, 1994.
tions in the Pentagon and to international security is-
sues. He worked closely with his deputy secretaries (John was one of Perry’s most important duties. The problem of
M. Deutch, 1994–95, and John P. White, 1995–97), and how to deal with a large projected Defense budget short-
he met regularly with the service secretaries, keeping fall for the period 1995–2000, an issue that weakened Per-
them informed and seeking their advice on issues. He de- ry’s predecessor Les Aspin and contributed to his res-
scribed his style as "management by walking around." ignation, persisted when Perry took office. Immediately
Perry adopted "preventive defense" as his guide to on presenting his 1995 budget request, which he termed
national security policy in the post-Cold War world. Dur- "a post-Cold War budget," Perry stated that Defense re-
ing the Cold War the United States had relied on deter- quired a few more years of downsizing and that its in-
rence rather than prevention as the central principle of frastructure needed streamlining as well. The proposal,
its security strategy. Perry outlined three basic tenets of he said, maintained a ready-to-fight force, redirected a
a preventive strategy: keep threats from emerging; deter modernization program (including a strong research and
those that actually emerged; and if prevention and de- development program), initiated a program to do busi-
terrence failed, defeat the threat with military force. In ness differently (acquisition reform), and reinvested de-
practical terms this strategy relied on threat reduction fense dollars in the economy.
programs (reducing the nuclear complex of the former Perry asked for $252.2 billion for FY 1995, including
Soviet Union), counter-proliferation efforts, the NATO funds for numerous weapon systems, such as a new air-
Partnership for Peace and expansion of the alliance, and craft carrier, three Aegis cruisers, and six C-17 cargo air-
the maintenance of military forces and weapon systems craft. The budget projected a further cut of 85,500 in ac-
ready to fight if necessary. To carry out this strategy, Per- tive duty military personnel, leaving a force of 1.52 mil-
ry thought it necessary to maintain a modern, ready mili- lion. Ultimately Congress provided $253.9 billion TOA,
tary force, capable of fighting two major regional wars at about $2 billion more than in FY 1994, but actually a 1.2%
the same time. cut in real growth.
In February 1995 Perry asked for $246 billion for the
Defense budget Department of Defense for FY 1996. This proposal became
entangled in the controversy during 1995 over the House
As always with Secretaries of Defense, the formulation of
Republicans’ Contract with America, their efforts to
the Defense budget and shepherding it through Congress
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From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia William Perry
spend more on defense than the administration wanted, lion (FY 2001). For FY 1997 Congress eventually provided
and the continuing need for deficit reduction. Perry cau- $244 billion TOA, including funds for some weapon sys-
tioned Congress in September of the possibility that Pres- tems not wanted by the Clinton administration.
ident Clinton would veto the FY 1996 Defense budget bill Although he had not thought so earlier, by the end
because Congress had added $7 billion in overall spend- of his tenure in early 1997 Perry believed it possible to
ing, mainly for weapon systems that the Defense Depart- modernize the U.S. armed forces within a balanced feder-
ment did not want, and because of restrictions on con- al budget. Perry argued for the current force level of just
tingency operations Congress had put in the bill. Three under 1.5 million as the minimum needed by the Unit-
months later he recommended that the president veto ed States to maintain its global role. Further reductions
the bill. When Congress and the administration finally in the Defense budget after 1997 would require cuts in
settled on a budget compromise midway through FY the force structure and make it impossible for the United
1996, DoD received $254.4 billion TOA, slightly more than States to remain a global power.
in FY 1995, but in terms of real growth a 2% cut.
The question of a national missile defense system fig- Streamlining the military infrastructure
ured prominently in the budget struggles Perry experi- Perry devoted much time to restructuring defense acqui-
enced. Aspin had declared an end to the Strategic De- sition policy and procedure, pursuing measures on ac-
fense Initiative program, but long-standing supporters quisition reform begun when he was deputy secretary.
both inside and outside of Congress called for its res- Six days after he became secretary Perry released a doc-
urrection, especially when the Defense budget came up. ument that laid out a variety of proposed acquisition
Perry rejected calls for revival of SDI, arguing that the procedure changes, including simplification of purchases
money would be better spent on battlefield antimissile under $100,000; maximum reliance on existing commer-
defenses and force modernization, that the United States cial products; conforming military contracts, bidding, ac-
at the moment did not face a real threat, and that if the counting, and other business procedures to commercial
system were built and deployed it would endanger the practices when possible; eliminating outdated regula-
strategic arms limitation treaties with the Russians. The tions that delayed purchases; and announcing military
secretary was willing to continue funding development purchase requirements on data interchanges normally
work on a national system, so that if a need emerged the used by private business to increase vendor competition.
United States could build and deploy it in three years. In June 1994 the secretary signed a directive ordering
President Clinton signed the FY 1996 Defense bill early in the armed forces to buy products and components to the
1996 only after Congress agreed to delete funding for a extent possible from Commercial off-the-shelf sources
national missile defense system. rather than from defense contractors, signaling a major
Shortly before he introduced his FY 1997 budget re- departure from the traditional "milspec" over 30,000 mil-
quest in March 1996, Perry warned that the United States itary specifications and standards that actually inflated
might have to give up the strategy of preparing for two the cost of military items.
major regional conflicts if the armed forces suffered fur- In March 1996 Perry approved a new DoD compre-
ther reductions. The Five-Year Modernization Plan Perry hensive acquisition policy that emphasized commercial
introduced in March 1996 reflected his basic assumptions practices and products. Program managers and other ac-
that the Defense budget would not decline in FY 1997 and quisition officials would have the power to use their pro-
would grow thereafter; that DoD would realize signifi- fessional judgment in purchasing. The plan canceled
cant savings from infrastructure cuts, most importantly more than 30 separate acquisition policy memoranda and
base closings; and that other savings would come by con- report formats and replaced existing policy documents
tracting out many support activities and reforming the with new ones that were about 90% shorter. Perry con-
defense acquisition system. sidered these reforms one of his most important accom-
For FY 1997 the Clinton administration requested a plishments, and saw savings generated by the new prac-
DoD appropriation of $242.6 billion, about 6% less in tices as part of the key to adequate funding of the mil-
inflation-adjusted dollars than the FY 1996 budget. The itary in an era of continuing tight budgets. In a further
budget proposal delayed modernization for another year, effort to save money Perry resorted to base closures and
even though the administration earlier had said it would realignments. In May 1994 he and General John M. Sha-
recommend increased funding for new weapons and likashvili, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, an-
equipment for FY 1997. The proposal included advance nounced that Defense would go forward, as required by
funding for contingency military operations, which had law, with a 1995 round of base closings. In doing so De-
been financed in previous years through supplemental fense would consider the economic impact on the affect-
appropriations. Modest real growth in the Defense bud- ed communities and the capacity to manage the reuse of
get would not begin until FY 2000 under DoD’s six-year closed facilities.
projections. The procurement budget would increase
during the period from $38.9 billion (FY 1997) to $60.1 bil-
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From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia William Perry
In March 1995 Perry released DoD’s 1995 base realign- pean countries to become full NATO members and Rus-
ment and closure (BRAC) plan, recommending 146 ac- sia’s determined opposition. Individual nations could join
tions. He estimated that implementing BRAC 95 would the Partnership for Peace under separate agreements
bring one-time costs of $3.8 billion and net savings of $4 with NATO, and many did so, enabling them to partici-
billion within a six-year period. pate in NATO joint training and military exercises with-
out becoming formal members of the alliance. Perry con-
Foreign relations ferred several times with Russian Defense Minister Pavel
At the time of his appointment it was not expected that Grachev in an effort to allay Russia’s worries about and
Perry would involve himself aggressively in foreign poli- secure its membership in the Partnership for Peace. The
cy. He quickly belied this impression. Within days of tak- issue remained outstanding when Perry left office in ear-
ing office he left Washington on his first trip abroad to ly 1997, by which time NATO had developed tentative
confer with European defense ministers. In April 1994 the plans to admit a few former Warsaw Pact members dur-
Economist, in an article entitled "Perrypatetic," observed: ing the summer of 1997.
"The man who has started to sound like a secretary of
Russia
state is in fact the defense secretary, William Perry. . . .
He is popping up in public all over the place and mov- Although he recognized that the reform movement in
ing into the strategy business in a big way." In fact, Perry Russia might not succeed, Perry did everything he could
traveled abroad in his three-year tenure more than any to improve relations with Moscow. He stressed the need
previous secretary. Unlike most of his predecessors, Per- for continuing military cooperation with and aid to the
ry paid attention to the other nations in the Americas, states of the former Soviet Union to facilitate destruction
hosting the first Conference of Defense Ministers of the of their nuclear weapons. He used the Cooperative Threat
Americas at Williamsburg, Virginia, in 1995 and attend- Reduction Act of 1992 (the Nunn-Lugar program), which
ing the second conference in 1996 in Argentina. His ex- provided funds for the dismantling of nuclear weapons in
tensive travel matched his direct style. In his travels, he Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, to diminish the
emphasized personal contact with rank and file members nuclear threat. He urged Congress to continue the threat
of the armed forces. His frequent trips also reflected the reduction program, defending it against claims that in re-
demands of the large number of foreign crises that oc- ality it provided foreign aid to Russia’s military. By June
curred during his term, including several requiring the 1996 when Perry traveled to Ukraine to observe the com-
deployment of U.S. forces. pletion of that country’s transfer of nuclear warheads
to Russia, the only former Soviet missiles still outside of
NATO Russia were in Belarus. Perry testified in favor of U.S. rat-
ification of the START II treaty, completed in 1996; in Oc-
tober 1996 he spoke to a session of the Russian Duma in
Moscow, urging its members to ratify the treaty.
Asia
In Asia, like former defense secretary Caspar Weinberger
a decade earlier, Perry endeavored to improve relations
with both the People’s Republic of China and Japan. He
was the first secretary of defense to visit China after the
Tiananmen Square protests of 1989, when PRC author-
ities forcibly crushed a dissident movement. While not
ignoring long-standing problems such as the PRC’s
weapons sales abroad and its human rights abuses, he be-
lieved that the U.S. and the PRC should cooperate militar-
ily. He made some progress, although when China threat-
Perry and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Ken-
neth Bacon and Linda Kozaryn, American Forces Press Service ened Taiwan just before the latter’s presidential election
reporter, during a flight to Europe, 1995 in March 1996, the United States sent two aircraft carrier
task forces to the area to counter the Chinese.
Perry strongly supported the North Atlantic Treaty In 1995 a young girl was raped by three U.S. service-
Organisation. He made major efforts to promote its Part- men stationed in Okinawa, Japan. The crime led to de-
nership for Peace Program, which the Clinton adminis- mands that the United States diminish its military pres-
tration saw as a way to link NATO with the new Eastern ence on the island. Late in 1996 the United States agreed
European democracies, including Russia, and as a com- to vacate 20% of the land it used on Okinawa and to
promise between the wishes of many of the Eastern Euro- close some military facilities, including Futenma Marine
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From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia William Perry
Corps Air Station. The Japanese agreed that the 28,000 stop the bloodshed; the United States was the only nation
U.S. troops stationed on Okinawa could remain. that could lead a NATO force to implement the peace; and
the risks to the United States of allowing the war to con-
Bosnian War tinue were greater than the risks of the planned military
The most serious ongoing international crisis was in Bos- operation.
nia. When Perry took over in 1994, the Bosnian Serbs The first U.S. troops moved into Bosnia in early De-
were besieging Sarajevo, the Bosnian capital, but the cember 1995, and by late January 1996 the full comple-
Serbs were forced to draw back in face of a UN ultimatum ment of 20,000 had been deployed. Although Perry had
and warning of air strikes. Shortly thereafter the Serbs said earlier that they would leave Bosnia within a year,
threatened to overrun the Muslim city of Goražde in east- in June 1996 he hinted at a longer stay if NATO decided
ern Bosnia. Perry at first ruled out U.S. military action, the peace in Bosnia would not hold without them. The
but in April 1994 U.S. fighter planes participated in UN air secretary agreed to a study proposed in September 1996
strikes at Goražde, causing the Bosnian Serbs to retreat. by NATO defense ministers for a follow-on force to re-
In a major statement on Bosnia in June 1994 Perry at- place IFOR. Finally in November 1996, after the presiden-
tempted to clarify U.S. policy there, declaring that the tial election, Clinton announced, with Perry’s support,
conflict did involve U.S. national interests, humanitarian that the United States would provide 8,500 troops to a
and otherwise, but not "supreme" interests. To limit the NATO follow-on force. The U.S. force would be gradually
spread of violence in Bosnia, the United States had com- reduced in 1997 and 1998 and completely withdrawn by
mitted air power under NATO to stop bombardment of June 1998.
Bosnian cities, provide air support for UN troops, and
carry out humanitarian missions. Perry and the White Haïtian Crisis
House resisted congressional pressures to lift an arms Perry also inherited from Aspin the problem of what to
embargo imposed earlier by the United Nations on all do about Haïti, where a military junta continued to refuse
sides in the Bosnian conflict. During 1994–95 some sen- to reinstate the deposed president, Jean-Bertrand Aris-
ators, including Republican leader Robert Dole, wanted tide. In the spring of 1994, debate persisted in the United
the embargo against the Bosnian Muslims lifted to enable States Congress on whether to intervene militarily to
them to resist the Serbs more effectively. Perry thought oust Raoul Cédras, the military leader, and restore Aris-
this might provoke Serb attacks and perhaps force the tide to power. President Clinton said that the United
commitment of U.S. ground troops. In August 1995 Clin- States would not rule out the use of military force and
ton vetoed legislation to lift the arms embargo. (In fact, also suggested that military teams to train local security
the Bosnian Muslims had been receiving arms from out- and police forces might be sent to Haïti. In the meantime,
side sources.) Meanwhile, although it had stated consis- large numbers of refugees fled from Haïti in boats, hop-
tently that it would not send U.S. ground forces to Bosnia, ing to gain admittance to the United States. U.S. vessels
in December 1994 the Clinton administration expressed intercepted most of them at sea and took them to the
willingness to commit troops to help rescue UN peace- Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba.
keepers in Bosnia if they were withdrawn. In May 1995, In spite of continuing pressure and obvious prepara-
after the Bosnian Serbs had taken about 3,000 peacekeep- tions in the United States for an invasion of Haïti, the
ers hostage, the United States, France, Germany, and Rus- junta refused to yield. On September 19, 1994, just after
sia resolved to provide a larger and better-equipped UN former President Jimmy Carter negotiated an agreement,
force. the United States sent in military forces with UN ap-
Applying strong pressure, in November 1995 the proval. Haïti’s de facto leaders, including Cédras, agreed
United States persuaded the presidents of Serbia, Bosnia, to step down by October 15 so that Aristide could return
and Croatia to attend a conference in Dayton, Ohio, that to the presidency. By the end of September, 19,600 U.S.
after much contention produced a peace agreement, for- troops were in Haïti as part of Operation Uphold Democ-
mally signed in Paris in mid-December. It provided for racy. At the end of March 1995, a UN commander took
cessation of hostilities, withdrawal of the combatants to over, and the United States provided 2,400 of the
specified lines, creation of a separation zone, and the sta- 6,000-man UN force that would remain in Haïti until Fe-
tioning in Bosnia of a Peace Implementation Force (IFOR). bruary, 1996. Given the opposition to the mission when
The North Atlantic Council, with Perry participating, had it began, the primary U.S. concern was to do its limited
decided in September 1995 to develop a NATO-led force job and avoid casualties among its forces. With the final
to implement any peace agreement for Bosnia, setting withdrawal of U.S. troops, and Aristide’s duly elected suc-
the force size at 60,000 troops, including 20,000 from the cessor installed in office in February 1996, the Pentagon
United States. In congressional testimony in November and the Clinton administration could label the Haïtian
Perry explained why U.S. troops should go to Bosnia: The operation a success up to that point.
war threatened vital U.S. political, economic, and secu-
rity interests in Europe; there was a real opportunity to
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From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia William Perry
North Korea and naval forces in the area to counter the threat. Perry
North Korea posed another serious problem for Perry, warned Iraq that the U.S. forces would take action if it did
who backed the administration’s policy of pressuring its not move its Republican Guard units north of the 32nd
Communist regime to allow monitoring of its nuclear parallel. Subsequently the UN Security Council passed a
facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency resolution requiring Iraq to pull its troops back at least
(IAEA). Between February and October 1994 the United 150 miles from the Kuwait border.
States increased its pressures on North Korea. Perry Iran, too, behaved aggressively, placing at least 6,000
warned in March that the United States would not permit troops in March 1995 on three islands at the mouth of the
the development of an arsenal of nuclear weapons. War Persian Gulf claimed by both Iran and the United Arab
was not imminent, he said, but he indicated that he had Emirates. Perry stated that the Iranian moves threatened
ordered military preparations for a possible conflict. shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, a waterway on which
Soon thereafter Perry stated that the United States would moved a significant part of the world’s oil production.
propose UN economic sanctions if North Korea did not The United States worked with its allies in the Persian
allow international inspection of its planned withdrawal Gulf area to bolster their capacity to defend themselves
of spent fuel from a nuclear reactor fuel containing suffi- and to use their collective strength through the Gulf Co-
cient plutonium to produce four or five nuclear weapons. operation Council. Most important, in Perry’s judgment,
North Korea began removing the nuclear fuel in May was the determination of the United States to maintain a
1994 without granting the IAEA inspection privileges, strong regional defense capability with aircraft and naval
and later said it would leave the IAEA. ships in the area, prepositioned equipment, standing op-
On October 21, 1994 the United States and North erational plans, and access agreements with the Persian
Korea signed an agreement after lengthy negotiations in Gulf partners.
Geneva, Switzerland, assisted again by former President Provocative moves again by Iraq forced the United
Carter. The United States, Japan, South Korea, and other States to take strong action. When Saddam Hussein inter-
regional allies promised to provide North Korea with two vened in September 1996 by sending some 40,000 troops
light water nuclear reactors, at an eventual cost of ’$4 bil-
$4 to assist one side in a dispute between two Kurdish fac-
lion’ to replace existing or partially constructed facili-
lion’, tions in northern Iraq, he demonstrated that he was not
ties that could produce plutonium for nuclear weapons. deterred by a U.S. warning against using military force.
North Korea then agreed to open its nuclear facilities to Perry made clear that while no significant U.S. interests
international inspection, and the United States pledged were involved in the factional conflict, maintaining sta-
to lift trade restrictions and provide fuel oil for elec- bility in the region as a whole was vital to U.S. security
tric power generation. Perry considered this agreement and there would be a U.S. reaction. On both September 2
better than risking a war in Korea and a continuation and 3, U.S. aircraft attacked Iraqi fixed surface-to-air mis-
of North Korea’s nuclear program. He promised that he sile (SAM) sites and air defense control facilities in the
would ask Congress for money to build up U.S. forces south, because, Perry explained, the United States saw
in South Korea if the agreement broke down. Again a the principal threat from Iraq to be against Kuwait.
critical situation had moderated, but implementing the Another tragic incident on June 25, 1996 revealed the
agreement proved difficult. By the end of Perry’s term continuing tension in the Middle East and the dangers in-
some issues remained outstanding, and tension between volved in the U.S. military presence. Terrorists exploded
the two Koreas flared up from time to time. a truck bomb at the Khobar Towers apartment complex
housing U.S. military personnel in Dhahran, Saudi Ara-
The Middle East bia, killing 19 and wounding 500. In September 1996 an
In the Persian Gulf area Iraq continued to make trouble, investigative panel set up by Perry recommended vigor-
with periodic provocative moves by Saddam Hussein ous measures to deter, prevent, or mitigate the effects of
triggering U.S. military action. After the 1991 Gulf War, future terrorist acts against U.S. personnel overseas, and
acting in accord with a UN resolution, the United States further, that a single DoD element have responsibility for
organized a coalition to enforce no-fly zones in Iraq, force protection. The panel found that the unit attacked
north of 36° and south of 32°. In a tragic accident in April at Dhahran had not taken every precaution it might have
1994 two U.S. Air Force F-15 aircraft, operating in the no- to protect the forces at Khobar Towers. Eventually the
fly zone north of the 36th parallel in Iraq, shot down two Defense Department moved units from Dhahran to more
U.S. Army helicopters after misidentifying them as Iraqi. remote areas in Saudi Arabia to provide better protec-
This incident, with its high death toll, highlighted dra- tion.
matically the complexities in dealing with Iraq in the af-
Somalian conflict
termath of the 1991 Gulf War. Further, in October 1994,
when several elite Iraqi divisions began to move toward U.S. involvement in Somalia, a problem during Aspin’s
Kuwait’s border, the United States mobilized ground, air, tenure, ended in 1994. Under the protection of U.S.
Marines on ships offshore, the last U.S. forces left Soma-
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From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia William Perry
lia before the end of March, meeting a deadline set earlier As he left the Pentagon, Perry listed what he thought
by President Clinton. Later, in February 1995, more than were his most important accomplishments: establishing
7,000 U.S. troops assisted in removing the remaining UN effective working relationships with U.S. military lead-
peacekeepers and weapons from Somalia in a marked- ers; improving the lot of the military, especially enlisted
ly successful operation. In another mission in Africa in men and women; managing the military drawdown; in-
1994, the United States became involved in humanitarian stituting important acquisition reforms; developing close
efforts in Rwanda. A civil war between two rival ethnic relationships with many foreign defense ministers; effec-
groups, the Hutu and Tutsi, resulted in widespread death tively employing military strength and resources in Bos-
and destruction and the flight of hundreds of thousands nia, Haiti, Korea, and the Persian Gulf area; dramatical-
of refugees from Rwanda into neighboring countries, in- ly reducing the nuclear legacy of the Cold War; and pro-
cluding Zaire. Although not part of the UN peacekeeping moting the Partnership for Peace within NATO. His dis-
operation in Rwanda, the United States provided human- appointments included failure to obtain Russian ratifica-
itarian aid in the form of purified water, medicine, site tion of the START II treaty; slowness in securing increas-
sanitation, and other means. In July the Pentagon sent in es in the budget for weapon systems modernization; and
aircraft and about 3,000 troops, most of them to Zaire. the faulty perceptions of the Gulf War illness syndrome
The U.S. forces also took control of and rebuilt the airport held by some of the media and much of the public. At a
at Kigali, Rwanda’s capital, to aid in distribution of food, ceremony for Perry in January 1997 General Shalikashvili
medicine, and other supplies. noted the departing secretary’s relationship with the
troops. "Surely," Shalikashvili said, "Bill Perry has been
Accomplishments and resignation the GI’s secretary of defense. When asked his greatest ac-
Clearly, Perry bore a heavy load during his term as Sec- complishment as secretary, Bill Perry didn’t name an op-
retary of Defense between 1994 and 1997. Fine-tuning eration or a weapons system. He said that his greatest
the budget, downsizing the military, and conducting hu- accomplishment was his very strong bond with our men
manitarian, peacekeeping, and military operations pro- and women in uniform."
vided him with a full agenda. In January 1996 he talked Perry’s career in the Department of Defense actually
about experiences over the past year in which he never spanned eight years of profound changes—four years as
thought a Secretary of Defense would be involved. At the Undersecretary for Research and Engineering in
top of the list was witnessing participation of a Russian 1977–1981, a year as Deputy Secretary from 1993 to 1994,
brigade in a U.S. division in the Bosnian peacekeeping and three years as Secretary.
operation. The others—Dayton, Ohio, becoming synony-
mous with peace in the Balkans; helping the Russian de- Later career
fense minister blow up a Minuteman missile silo in Mis-
souri; watching United States and Russian troops train- After he left the Pentagon, Perry returned to San Francis-
ing together in Kansas; welcoming former Warsaw Pact co to join the board of Hambrecht and Quist as a senior
troops in Louisiana; operating a school at Garmisch, Ger- adviser. He also rejoined the faculty at Stanford Univer-
many, to teach former Soviet and East European military sity, becoming a professor at the Freeman Spogli Insti-
officers about democracy, budgeting, and testifying to a tute for International Studies, co-director of the Preven-
parliament; dismantling the military specifications sys- tive Defense Project at the Stanford University Center for
tem for acquisition; cutting the ear off a pig in Kaza- International Security and Cooperation, and a member of
khstan; and eating rendered Manchurian toad fat in Chi- the advisory board of the Roosevelt Institution.
na. These things, Perry said, demonstrate "just how much Mr. Perry serves on the board of directors of Los
the world has changed, just how much our security has Alamos National Security, LLC, the company that oper-
changed, just how much the Department of Defense has ates the Los Alamos National Laboratory and the board of
changed, and just how much my job has changed." directors for LGS Innovations, a wholly owned subsidiary
Shortly after President Clinton’s reelection in of Alcatel-Lucent engaged in government services. Perry
November 1996, Perry made known his decision to step is an Advisory Board member for the Partnership for a
down as secretary. He spoke of his growing frustration Secure America, a not-for-profit organization dedicated
over working with a Congress so partisan that it was to recreating the bipartisan center in American national
harming the military establishment, and said that he did security and foreign policy. Perry is also a member of
not think the results of the 1996 congressional election the Board of Sponsors for the Bulletin of the Atomic Sci-
would decrease the partisanship. He later explained that entists. He is Member of the Supervisory Council of the
his decision to retire was "largely due to the constant International Luxembourg Forum on Preventing Nuclear
strain of sending U.S. military personnel on life-threat- Catastrophe. Perry also sits on the Advisory Board of the
ening missions." Commonwealth Club of California and the Board of Direc-
tors of the Center for a New American Security, a Wash-
7
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia William Perry
Government offices
Preceded by Director of Defense Research and Engineering Succeeded by
Malcolm R. Currie 1977–1981 Richard D. DeLauer
Political offices
Preceded by United States Deputy Secretary of Defense Succeeded by
Donald J. Atwood Jr. 21 January 1993 – 3 February 1994 John M. Deutch
Preceded by United States Secretary of Defense Succeeded by
Les Aspin Served under: Bill Clinton William S. Cohen
1994–1997
ington, DC- based think tank that specializes in U.S. na-
tional security issues.
Honors
In 1999, Perry was awarded the James A. Van Fleet • United States: Presidential Medal of Freedom,
Award by The Korea Society. 1997.[4]
On January 5, 2006, he participated in a meeting at • United Kingdom: Knight Commander of the
the White House of former Secretaries of Defense and Order of the British Empire, 1998.[4]
State to discuss United States foreign policy with Bush • Japan: Grand Cordon, Order of the Rising Sun,
administration officials. 2002.[4]
In March, 2006, he was appointed to the Iraq Study
• France: Ordre National du Merite.[5]
Group, a group formed to give advice on the U.S. govern-
• Croatia: Grand Order of King Dmitar Zvonimir
ment’s Iraq policy.
1998.[6]
On June 17, 2006, Perry gave the featured commence-
ment speech to engineering and science graduates at the
University of California, Santa Barbara. See also
On October 1, 2008, Perry joined the financial board • Timeline of United States and China relations
of the Thailand based manufacturing company, Fabrinet, 1995-1997
on which he continues to serve.
On October 16, 2008, Perry was award the Sylvanus
Thayer Award by the United States Military Academy. Notes
In 2007, Secretary Perry joined three other eminent [1] ^ Glastris, Paul The powers that shouldn’t be; five
statesmen, former Secretaries of State George P. Shultz Washington insiders the next Democratic
and Henry Kissinger, and former Senator Sam Nunn in president shouldn’t hire, Washington Monthly (Oct.
calling for the United States to take the lead in reducing 1987)
and eliminating nuclear weapons. Their op-ed, "A World [2] “A Hiroshima for Global Peace” Plan - Formulation
Free of Nuclear Weapons", published in the Wall Street Project (outline of the project)
Journal, reverberated throughout the world, and is one of [3] Aya Kano, Hiroshima Prefecture’s “Global Peace”
the key factors that has convinced political leaders and Plan
experts internationally that the conditions are in place [4] ^ Perry bio.
to achieve that goal. In 2010 the four produced the docu- [5] Spoke.com: Perry bio.
mentary Nuclear Tipping Point. The film is introduced by [6] 116 - 3.9.1998 Narodne novine (Croatian)">[1].
General Colin Powell, narrated by Michael Douglas and
includes interviews with California Governor Arnold Sch-
warzenegger and former Soviet President Mikhail Gor- References
bachev. • DoD biography
In 2011 he joined a team of former government offi- • William Perry at the Mathematics Genealogical
cials from various countries, formed under the auspices Database
of the Governor of Hiroshima Prefecture Hidehiko Yuzaki
to prepare a plan for the total abolition of nuclear
weapons. This project is titled Hiroshima for Global Peace.[2] External links
[3] • Lessons in Leadership, podcast of William Perry
speaking at Stanford University
Persondata
Name Perry, William
8
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia William Perry
Alternative names Place of birth Vandergrift, Pennsylvania
Short description Date of death
Date of birth October 11, 1927 Place of death
Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=William_Perry&oldid=461982699"
Categories:
• 1927 births
• American Unitarian Universalists
• Clinton Administration cabinet members
• Living people
• Los Alamos National Laboratory personnel
• Pennsylvania State University alumni
• Stanford University alumni
• Stanford University faculty
• Fellows of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences
• People from Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania
• Politicians from Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
• Presidential Medal of Freedom recipients
• Recipients of the Order of the Rising Sun
• Honorary Knights Commander of the Order of the British Empire
• Ordre national du Mérite
• United States Deputy Secretaries of Defense
• United States Secretaries of Defense
• Pennsylvania Democrats
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