Sumitted by: Amar Sood, 3rd semester, M. Planning, Dept of Urban Planning.
GLOBAL FORUM FOR DISASTER REDUCTION (GFDR) is dedicated to the promotion of
sustainable disaster reduction through a synergy of knowledge and skills. It endeavours to be a
platform for collating knowledge and information and its dissemination to the society. The USP of
GFDR is the creation of a vital, extensive and comprehensive data base, updated constantly to
accelerate the process of reconstruction and rehabilitation towards sustainable development.
GFDR aims to create a pool of global knowledge, experience, practices and skills for application
at the local level. Hence the motto, global vision local action.
GFDR’s core area of activities would include : providing consultancy regarding incorporation of
disaster management concepts in business plans and creation of a network of professionals to
provide specialized disaster information and training.
WORLD CONFERENCE ON DISASTER REDUCTION
The First – Ever International Conference on Disaster Reduction, focusing on corporate sector’s
role and responsibility will be held in India with an objective to connect government agencies,
relief organizations and the corporate world.
The conference focuses on the crucial role the corporate sector could play in mitigating human
suffering wrought by disasters, by effectively collaborating with the government, international and
national relief organizations.
While disaster reduction is a collective responsibility of the entire society, the corporate sector is
better placed to deal with it than others. The vibrant global corporate sector can play a vital role in
The conference will facilitate convergence of the best rains in disaster management from across
the world. Eminent experts with national and international exposure share their knowledge and
experience and present case studies to prove how the world is sitting pretty on a pile of disasters,
It will launch an exhaustive reference manual-cum-diary of “Standard Operating Procedures
(SOPs)” for Disaster Reduction. SOPs will draw from the vast knowledge of the key participants,
professional disaster managers on the latest technology and best practices available in the world
to meet the disasters.
Overall, the conference aims to create awareness about disasters, which come unannounced and
help the people in their preparedness with the message that prevention is safer and cheaper than
firefighting and to make them proactive rather than reactive.
CITY PLANNING AND DISASTERS
Role of Corporate Sector
1.0 URBAN PLANNING
Definition And Purview
Urban Planning or Town Planning can be defined as:
The art and science of ordering the use of land and the character and citing of buildings and communication
routes so as to secure the maximum practicable degree of economy, convenience and beauty. (Principles and
Practice of Town and Country Planning, Lewis Keeble, 1969).
Urban planning encourages the systematic development of a city. It is a system through which comprehensive
plans that guarantee people a healthy and cultural lifestyle, the rational use of the land and facilities, which form
the city's core, and the development of an orderly urban landscape can be effectively achieved. Specifically,
urban planning deals with, among other things, urbanization zones, zones to be urbanized in a regulated
fashion, land use in zoning areas, roads, parks, sewerage, other urban facilities, land readjustment projects,
urban renewal projects, other urban development enterprises, and district planning to make the best use of an
area's special characteristics in order to develop a favorable urban environment.
When planning for a city, the various dynamics of the city come into play that has to be considered, for they
demand space and infrastructure. These include the major activities of the cities such as trading, administration
etc, the economic centers of the city, and residential areas for the population of the city, physical and social
infrastructure required for the activities and the population and other such elements. Other considerations such
as sustainability, safety, aesthetics etc, are also taken into account.
1.1 RECENT TRENDS IN PLANNING
In an ever-evolving world, the needs of the society and its dynamics are also changing. Hence, the approach to
plan for such societies is also undergoing metamorphosis. Planning, in India, started with the five-year plans
initiated with the central government determining the direction of development. City level master plans first came
into being with the adopting of the Delhi Master Plan of 1962, the aegis of which can be traced to the Interim
General Plan of 1959.
The Master Plan approach was adopted from the British system of planning and basically deals with the spatial
aspects of the city in terms of a landuse plan. The master plans, if implemented properly and timely, are an
excellent tool to achieve planned development of cities and surrounding areas. Plagued with the inadequacies in
the approach and its implementation, newer ways of planning for the city are being adopted. One of them is the
City Development Strategy, which aims towards developing a financial implementation plan. In the overall
planning scenario, some paradigm changes have occurred:
1. Prescriptive to Proactive planning – Planning, from the its beginnings in the five-year plans, was being done
by the higher echelons of the bureaucracy prescribing the direction of growth and development with little or
no contact with the people who were to be affected. The lack of awareness hence, generated a sense of
distrust towards the intentions of the planners, which eventually, along with other factors, led to failure of
many plans. Today, the approach is more towards a participatory nature of planning where the community
and the private sector is involved from the inception to the implementation stage of a plan.
2. Long term to Short term planning – A major reason of failure of the master plans was the time taken for the
formulation of a master plan and the duration for which a plan was made. The data collection stage took
about 1-3 years, which made the data itself old, and the plan was made for upto 20 years, enough time for a
number of changes to occur to make the plan defunct. The approach has changed from making such long
duration plans to shorter duration plans of upto 5 years.
3. From Top down to Bottom-up approach – This is a paradigm change in the planning process that has
occurred only very recently, although the seeds were sown from the first five-year plan. The focus of
planning has changed towards meeting distributional equity – growth with justice and improvement in the
quality of life resulting in bottom-up approach. Decentralization, thus involves delegation of decision-making
powers with corresponding devolution of resources. Decentralization thus helps in a balanced regional
development at one level, as well as helps in removing disparities between regions at the regional level.
Top-down planning, on the other hand, was creating imbalances between regions by concentrating
development in one region or concentrating development initiatives in one sector within a region.
Planning for an urban area hence involves a number of aspects, which are working in the city. It not only deals
with the actual infrastructure on ground, but also with the financial, institutional, administrative, legal and social
1.2 CORPORATE SECTOR PARTICIPATION IN URBAN PLANNING & DEVELOPMENT
Need for Participation
In planning of urban areas, policies are usually made by public bodies while shelter provision has substantial
contributions by the private sector through individual and corporate efforts. The public sector is focused on social
goals of equitable access to land, public health, education and environment whereas the private sector
developers have main goal of expedient urban development as a means of increasing returns on investment.
Furthermore, under the New Economic Policy of India directives based on principles of market economy,
funding from different government bodies to its subordinate organizations will gradually diminish. The only viable
alternative for public bodies is to foster an environment to help develop a more efficient, financially sustainable
system for urban development with basic services.
Thus, under the model for Public-Private Partnership, the strengths of public and private sectors would
be combined so that each one’s strength off-sets the weakness of the other to meet development requirements.
Public Private Partnership models
A Public-Private Partnership is a contractual agreement between a public agency (central, state or local) and for-
profit corporation. Through this agreement, the skills and assets of each sector (public and private) are shared in
delivering a service or facility for the use of general public. In addition to the sharing of resources, each party
shares in the risks and rewards potential in the delivery of the service and/or facility.
- Partnerships are means to increase the availability of financial, human and technical resources.
- The partnership involves mutual commitment for mutual benefits.
In this, role of public and private sector actors is clearly defined. This could be in form of public agencies
restricting their role by supply of land, provision of infrastructure, facilities and handling over the developed land
to private developers under stipulated terms and conditions and private sector on their part, providing requisite
on-site infrastructure along with development of built spaces for different uses. Public-Private partnership can
happen through varying degree of participation at various stages of plan preparation, implementation and
monitoring of the project. These partnership models can be described as follows:
(i) Build / Operate / Transfer (BOT) or Build / Transfer / Operate (BTO)
The private partner builds a facility to the specifications agreed to by the public agency, operates the facility for a
specified time period under a contract or franchise agreement with the agency, and then transfers the facility to
the agency at the end of the specified period of time. In most cases, the private partner will provide some, or an,
of the financing for the facility, so the length of the contract or franchise must be sufficient to enable the private
partner to realize a reasonable return on his investment through user charges.
At the end of the franchise period, the public partner can assume operating responsibility for the facility,
contract the operations to the original franchise holder, or award a new contract or franchise to a new private
partner. The BTO model is similar to the BOT model except that the transfer to the public owner takes place at
the time that construction is completed, rather than at the end of the franchise period.
(ii) Build – Own – Operate (BOO)
The contractor constructs and operates a facility without transferring ownership to the public sector. Legal title to
the facility remains n the private sector, and there is no obligation for the public sector to purchase the facility or
take title. A BOO transaction may qualify for a tax-exempt status as a service contract if all Internal Revenue
Code requirements are satisfied.
(iii) Buy – Build – Operate (BBO)
A BBO is a form of asset sale that includes a rehabilitation or expansion of an existing facility. The government
sells the asset to the private sector entity, which makes the improvements necessary to operate the facility in a
(iv) Contract Services
(A). OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE
A public partner (central, state, or local government agency or authority) contracts with a private partner to
provide and/or maintain a specific service. Under the private operation and maintenance option, the public
partner retains ownership and overall management of the public facility or system.
(B) OPERATIONS, MAINTENANCE AND MANAGEMENT
A public partner (center, state, or local government agency or authority) contracts with a private partner to
operate, maintain, and manage a facility or system proving a service. Under this contract option, the public
partner retains ownership of the public facility or system, but the private party may invest its own capital in the
facility or system. Any private investment is carefully calculated in relation to its contributions to operational
efficiencies and savings over the term of contract. Generally, the longer the contract term, the greater the
opportunity for increased private investment because there is no more time available in which to recoup any
investment and earn a reasonable return. Many local governments use this contractual partnership to provide
wastewater treatment services.
(v) Design – Build (DB)
A DB is when the private partner provides both design and construction of a project to the public agency. This
type of partnership can reduce time, save money, provide stronger guarantees and allocate additional project
risk to the private sector. It also reduces conflict by having a single entity responsible to the public owner for the
design and construction. The public sector partner owns the assets and has the responsibility for the operation
(vi) Design – Build – Maintain (DBM)
A DBM is similar to DB except the maintenance of the facility for some period of time becomes the responsibility
of the private sector partner. The benefits are similar to the DB with maintenance risk being allocated to the
private sector partner and the guarantee expanded to include maintenance. The public sector partner owns and
operates the assets.
(vii) Design – Build – Operate (DBO)
A single contract is awarded for the design, construction, and operation of a capital improvement. Title to the
facility remains with the public sector unless the project is a design / build / operate / transfer or design / build /
own / operate project. The DBO method of contracting is contrary to the separated and sequential approach
ordinarily used in the United States by both public and private sectors. This method involves one contract for
design with an architect or engineer, followed by a different contract with a builder for project construction,
followed by the owner’s taking over the project and operating it.
A simple design – build approach creates a single point of responsibility for design and construction and can
speed project completion by facilitating the overlap of the design and construction phases of the project. On a
public project, the operation phase is normally handled by the public sector under a separate operations and
maintenance agreement. Combining all three passes into a DBO approach maintains the continuity of private
sector involvement and can facilitate private – sector financing of public projects supported by user fees
generated during the operations phase.
(viii) Lease / Develop / Operate (LDO) or Build / Develop / Operate (BDO)
Under these partnerships arrangements, the private party leases or buys an existing facility from a public
agency; invests its own capital to renovate, modernize, and/or expand the facility; and then operates it under a
contract with the public agency. A number of different types of municipal transit facilities have been leased and
developed under LDO and BDO arrangements.
(ix) Lease / Purchase
A lease / purchase is an installment purchase contract. Under this model, the private sector finances and builds
a new facility. The public agency makes scheduled lease payments to the private party. The public agency
accrues equity in the facility with each payment. At the end of the lease term, the public agency owns the facility
or purchases it at the cost of any remaining unpaid balance in the lease.
Under this agreement, the facility may be operated by either the public agency or the private developer during
the term of the lease. Lease/purchase arrangements have been used by the General Services Administration for
building federal office buildings and by a number of states to build prisons and other correctional facilities.
A public agency contracts with a private investor / vendor to design and build a complete facility in accordance
with specified performance standards and criteria agreed to between the agency and the vendor. The private
developer commits to build the facility for a fixed price and absorbs the construction risk of meeting that price
commitment. Generally, in a turnkey transaction, the private partners use fast-track construction techniques
(such as design-build) and are not bound by traditional public sector procurement regulations. This combination
often enables the private partner to complete the facility in significantly less time and for less cost that could be
accomplished under traditional construction techniques.
In a turnkey transaction, financing and ownership of the facility can rest with either the public or private partner.
For e.g. the public agency might provide the financing, with the attendant costs and risks. Alternatively, the
private party might provide the financing capital, generally in exchange for a long – term contract to operate the
Public Private Partnerships in Urban Planning : India
Successful public-private partnership models are being followed worldwide today in various fields of Urban
Development. In many parts of the world, urban facilities like electricity and power, water supply, roads,
sanitation, etc are being run through contractual agreement between the public and the private enterprises. In
India, though, this concept has gain popularity in the recent past whereby various urban services like roads,
highways and electricity are being successfully implemented by the means of a public-private partnership model.
Flyway, Greater NOIDA
t and very successful example being the construction of the toll plaza near Greater NOIDA. DND Flyway grew o
bridge the growing population of Delhi with its neighbours across the Yamuna.
Today, 30% of Delhi's population lives in the Trans-Yamuna area and there was a need to build a major conn
facility between the areas growing on both sides of the Yamuna. The project has been supported by India
international engineers, contractors, operators and investors. The Flyway, an outcome of innovative technica
financial engineering, has been built with due care for environmental concerns. The Noida Toll Bridge Compan
(NTBCL) has been promoted by Infrastructure Leasing and Financial Services Ltd. (IL&FS) and New Okhla Ind
Development Authority (NOIDA), as a special purpose vehicle (SPV) to develop, construct, operate and mainta
DND Flyway on a Build Own Operate Transfer (BOOT) basis.
2. Rajasthan Urban Infrastructure Development Programme (RUIDP)
Rajasthan is the largest state of the country (areawise). At the time of its formation the population of the state was
1.60 crores which has now increased to 3 ½ times and has been recorded at 5.65 crores as per the 2001 census.
Out of this a population of 1.32 crores (23.38%) is residing in the urban areas ant the six major cities viz Ajmer,
Bikaner, Jaipur, Jodhpur, Kota & Udaipur having a combined population of 1.32 crores constitute nearly 40% of
Rajasthan's urban population.
Because of the rapid growth and urbanization, there has been an increased pressure on the urban infrastructure
facilities. Keeping this in view the Government of Rajasthan (GoR) has with the loan assistance from Asian
Development Bank (ADB), taken up Rajasthan Urban Infrastructure Development Project (RUIDP) to provide
integrated quality infrastructural facilities in six divisional headquarters of the State. The GoR has formed RUIDP
and entrusted the works of the infrastructure development in the six cities to RUIDP.
This integrated urban development project, under which assistance is being given to the state of Rajasthan;
helps meet basic human needs by developing urban services for water supply and sanitation, solid waste and
waste water management, and slum and environmental improvements. The project also supports street
improvement and traffic management, and strengthens other civic services required to improve the quality and
safety of urban life. The project provides assistance towards capacity building and community participation at the
state and local levels to support the effective devolution of urban management, taking into account the importance
of good governance. In addition, assistance for Project implementation is provided.
Public participation and coordination is important in various works under the project especially for improvement of
slums, utilization of sewer lines, solid waste management, and reduction of non revenue water, proper
maintenance of assets created in project, cleanliness of places of historical importance and their conservation.
People's participation is ensured by involving NGOs and CBOs in all phases of the project cycle starting from
identification of works, implementation and monitoring. At the same time, full cooperation and support of various
public representatives and State and Central Government departments (e.g. PHED, PWD, IRRIGATION, JDA,
UITs, Dist. administration, FOREST Dept. etc.) has always helped in smooth implementation of activities of the
The project involves high degree of private sector participation in form of the various technical consultants like
Louis Berger Inc., Tata Consulting Engineers, Consulting Engineering Services, Shah Technical Consultants Pvt.
3. Performance Based deferred payment structure (PBDPS)
Karnataka Urban Infrastructure Development Financing Corporation (KUIDFC) is also an urban development
project undertaken through a new type of public-private partnership model called the PBDPS. The system has the
following features :
• Payments are made only for services that meet desired levels and only on demonstration of meeting
• The premise for performance based contracting is to pay only for achieved performance and quality targets.
• It involves procurement of service and not of works alone.
• Entails transferring risks to private contractors.
• Will require major reform in revenue generation and budgeting at ULB level.
The PBDPS model has the following advantages :
• Designed to allow developers to utilise their own designs and methodologies to meet contracting agency’s
service/performance targets, and to achieve appropriate performance quality levels.
• The payments are typically spread over the life of the period of operations, though would be structured to
match developer/contractor to recover capital cost in first few years.
• The annuity model of payments, successfully adopted by the National Highways of India (NHAI), in its road
expansion programme is one variant of PBDPS.
Public Private Partnerships in Urban Planning : Global
1. Water and Sanitation Services in Cartagena, Colombia
Facilitated by the recent legislation by the state of Cartegena opening the door to private sector participation, and
spurred on by the worsening financial crisis of its wholly-owned company, the Empresa de Servicios Públicos
Distritales de Cartagena, on 5 March 1994 the municipal council of Cartagena authorised the mayor to close
down the municipal water company and to establish a joint venture in partnership with a private company that had
a reputable experience in the delivery of water supply and sanitation. Following an international tender, the
Spanish water utility, Aguas de Barcelona (AGBAR), was selected as the private sector partner in the new public-
private partnership. Aguas de Cartagena (AGUACAR) was created on 30 December 1994 as a joint venture
between the Municipality of Cartagena and AGBAR. It was the first public-private partnership for the delivery of
basic public services to be created in Colombia.
There has been a noticeable improvement in the delivery of water and sanitation in Cartagena since the
introduction of private sector participation in 1995. When operations began there was a water deficit of 60,000m3
which caused periodic cutoffs in supply. AGUACAR soon eliminated this deficit by reducing the level of
unaccounted for water from 60 per cent in December 195 to 40 per cent by December 1999. The reliability of
water supply rose over the same period from 80 per cent to 99 per cent. AGUACAR carried out $30m in
investment during 1995-1999. Some 260 km of new pipeline was added to the network over the same period,
bringing the total to 700 km. Some 30,000 new connections were made, bringing the total to 95,000. Some
220,000m3 of water is now treated per day and water quality has markedly improved. The number of employees
was reduced from 494 to 262, bringing the employee/connection ratio down to an acceptable level of four
employees per 1,000 connections.
Key lessons learnt :
• The joint venture arrangement confuses the regulatory role of the public sector
The clarity of the regulatory role that the municipality normally exercises under the purchaser-provider split found
in most PPPs is dulled by the joint venture arrangement. This is because the municipality “wear two hats”. At one
and the same time it is the purchaser (as owner of the assets) and the provider (as a shareholder in the joint
• The absence of a municipal career service calls into question the sustainability of PPPs
The lack of job security and constant rotation of senior and middle-ranking staff within the municipality produces a
structural imbalance within the PPP. The institutional memory of the partnership becomes embodied in the private
partner. This superior knowledge soon translates into a power imbalance within the PPP.
• A public-private partnership can exist in the absence of municipal capacity
The Municipality of Cartagena lacks the minimal technical support in its negotiations within the joint venture. To all
intents and purpose it is a “sleeping” partner. However, by wilfully neglecting capacity building for its own
organisation, the municipality is running the risk of very negative consequences for the long-term sustainability of
• Co-ordination of activities by external regulatory bodies is necessary for municipal capacity building
The question of regulatory co-ordination emerges as a major issue of institutional change. A plethora of regulatory
and supervisory agencies exist for water supply and sanitation - Comisión de Regulación de Agua Potable y
Saneamiento Básico (CRA), Superintendencia de Servicios Públicos (SSP), Contraloría Nacional and Contraloría
Departamental. There is a problem of co-ordination, conflict of interest, and overlapping jurisdiction among them.
Furthermore these bodies do not co-ordinate their activities with the municipality, which in turn is required to carry
out its own audit, interventoría, of the activities of AGUACAR.
• Legal mechanisms for citizen participation are of little use if they are not implemented
Extensive national legislation exists in Colombia to promote citizen participation in local government. But in
Cartagena many of the plethora of institutional mechanisms for safeguarding transparency and defending the
rights of ordinary citizens exist only on paper. The municipality is required to establish a citizen watchdog
committee for monitoring basic public services, including water and sanitation, Comité de Desarrollo y Control
Social. It exists but appears not to function. The municipal-wide Master Plan for the development of the city, Plan
de Ordenamiento Territorial (POT) was drawn up without citizen participation, even though the procedural norms
require such consultation.
Skills development in order to combat corruption among municipal authorities emerges as a major concern from
this case study. The anti-corruption strategy being actively pursued with the support of NGOs emphasises the
training of community leaders rather than of the municipal authorities themselves. When asked how the
municipality can be strengthened in its work in favour of the urban poor in the water and sanitation sector, almost
all community leaders emphasised the need to eradicate political corruption, especially among municipal
councillors. A major task to ensure the success of public-private partnerships is for a massive training program for
community leaders (in the JALs and JACs) who liase between the municipality, AGUACAR and local citizens.
Without such training, community leaders remain very susceptible to manipulation by corrupt municipal
councillors, with deleterious efforts for the partnership as a whole. The same danger applies to the citizen
watchdog committees for monitoring public services.
2. Solid Waste Management partnership in Biratnagar, Nepal
The concept of private sector participation in the delivery of municipal services was introduced to the city of
Biratnagar in the 1997-98 in the solid waste sector. No other municipal public-private partnerships existed or
have been developed since. The partnership itself has progressed from a dubious arrangement on the verge of
collapse, to one where the operator has developed the confidence of the council for the services provided.
Notwithstanding this achievement the partnership is still vulnerable and the municipality has not taken any
significant steps to bring about a sustainable and viable arrangement.
Establishing a Solid Waste Management Partnership
A partnership for integrated solid waste management services in Biratnagar was first discussed in 1996 when an
international businessman proposed to the municipality that they enter a joint venture with his US-based
company, Americorp Environmental Services Incorporated (hereafter ‘AES Inc’). It is now known that he came to
Biratnagar Sub Municipal Corporation (hereafter referred to as ‘the municipality’) after the Kathmandu
Metropolitan City declined his proposal to establish a private-public partnership for the management of solid
waste in Kathmandu. In Biratnagar, he found a willing partner, a municipality keen to enhance their own
resources with those of the private sector and eager to delegate responsibility for solid waste services.
The means by which the municipality arrived at an agreement amongst themselves or with AES Inc. is not clear,
but in 1997 the proposal was accepted and a contract was finalised. The arrangement incorporated a joint
venture called BMC-Americorp Environmental Services Group (hereafter called Americorp) in which the
municipality was given, without investment or risk, a 10% share in the company. Decision-makers in the council
were attracted and convinced of the benefits a private sector partner could bring - not only in technology, skills
and financial resources – but also that the partnership would become a profit making concern and bring additional
revenue into the council.
Nature and Scope of agreement
Issue Contract Provision Comments
Parties to the
agreement Biratnagar Sub-Municipal AES Inc. supported their
Corporation (the municipality) proposal with a letter of
Americorp Environmental recommendation from the US
Services Group (AES Inc.) (the Embassy.
A joint venture BMC-Americorp Without any investment, the
in which the 90% ownership is municipality was given 10%
AES Inc. and 10% of the share share in the BMC-Americorp
ownership is with the venture.
The landfill site and the
recycling plant are to remain in
the ownership of BMC-
Americorp for the life of the
and scope of The provision of integrated solid There is no specification of
the waste management services method, standards of
agreement including: storage, collection, cleanliness to be achieved,
processing, recycling and reuse or types of waste to be
and final disposal of household collected.
waste including the design and The implication of the scope
management of a sanitary of the agreement are that the
landfill. whole waste cycle would be
Household level services are to self sustaining after an initial
be provided to the entire period (despite the lack of
municipal area every 3 day. sanctions available to the
requirements The private operator commits: The method and timing of the
NRs. 121.5 million ($1.73m); a municipal subsidy payments
‘modern safety tank suction is not specified.
cleaning tanker’; and computer
hardware and software for the
municipality for revenue
The municipality makes no
capital investment, but is
required to provide NRs. 2.5
million (approx. $36,000) per
annum for the first 2 years of the
contract to subsidise operating
costs in the start-up period. The
cost to be decreased
proportionately over this period
as service charges are
collected. The rate of decrease
shall be ‘mutually agreed upon’.
The municipality is responsible This is the primary area of
for collection of the service revision between the contract
charge and penalties (at a and the agreement being
commission of 5%). Americorp implemented. The
to provide assistance in a municipality currently plays
computerised billing system. no role in collection.
The domestic service charge is
set at NRs. 20 per month (for
the collection of 2 containers)
plus the initial purchase of the
containers (NRs. 100).
Differential charging is provided
for various residences,
hotels/tea stalls and shops, and
requirements, Not mentioned Although the objective states
Worker that there will be no negative
Conditions, impact on the environment,
and health no requirements are
and safety specified in the contract. (e.g.
requirements enclosing trucks or covering
loads). The contract is silent
on worker salaries and
conditions, and health and
Rights of each
party Not mentioned
measurement, The contract stipulates that a There are no performance
monitoring monitoring and evaluation unit standards specified in the
will be established with the contract. No provision is
membership of both partners. made for penalties for non-
quantitative outputs are
defined (such as the amount
of waste to be collected).
requirements Municipality to request
exemptions on behalf of the
resolution and Problems shall be mutually
arbitration solved by the parties, and if not,
shall be solved in accordance
with the rules and regulations of
the Nepal Arbitration Act.
The situation that has developed in Biratnagar over the last 3 years during the implementation of the partnership
arrangement is a complex one filled with uncommon practices. Yet despite this, the Mayor reports that the
majority of councillors are quite satisfied with the performance of the partnership - and that the council is in favour
of further private sector initiatives in service delivery. From an objective viewpoint however, there would appear
to be fundamental problems with this solid waste initiative that are not being addressed by municipal decision-
makers. Foremost among these is that the partnership, under the current terms, is unviable and unsustainable.
This view is largely supported by the operator.
While many aspects of the Biratnagar case are unusual and unlikely to be widely replicated, the very existence of
this PPP is instructive as it describes the sort of irregular partnerships that can develop. It therefore provides
important lessons for development professionals and municipal officials alike. A number of the key issues are
discussed further in this section.
• Financial and Technical Viability
One of the key characteristics of the arrangement, and one that differs from the norm, is that the private sector
role in municipal solid waste management in Biratnagar has not led to a convincing commercialisation of the
service. Typically, PSP is associated with improved commercial practices that include long term planning and
rectify municipal accounting systems and do not capture costs or present grants and transfers in a transparent
manner. However the partnership approach in Biratnagar has not led to strategic planning and budgeting for solid
waste services in the municipality; the sector has not been ‘ring fenced’, a process which would isolate all the
costs of the municipality providing solid waste services (including direct and indirect staff salaries, vehicles, repair,
leases, interest on loans etc); and it has not led to an informed examination of the potential sources of revenue
needed to support this improved level a service.
The lack of rigour on the municipal side is exacerbated by the less-than-commercial actions of the operator.
Currently the only reason the arrangement can continue is that the private partner is willing to underwrite the
costs of this loss making investment as part of a long term strategy to gain a stake in municipal environmental
services in Nepal. The private sector operation is somewhat misleading and unreplicable and incomparable with
other solid waste initiatives. The municipality does not appear to have taken on the importance of the sustainable
financial management of the operations, but has inadvertently supported the under-reporting of Americorp costs.
Moreover, there is little evidence to suggest that there is an understanding that solid waste management is rarely
a self-financing operation and that it generally requires some public investment or subsidy from the municipalities
own revenue sources. On the contrary, most actors in Biratnagar both private and public continue to make
decisions on the understanding that at some point in the future there is significant profit to be made in solid waste
The Biratnagar case also illustrates the sort of inappropriate technical (and consequently financial) options that
might be proposed by operators inexperienced in the specific needs of developing cities. The initial technical
scheme and its associated costs offered a contextually inappropriate and financially unviable proposition, there is
little question in hindsight that they were incongruous in the socio-economic context of Biratnagar. Based on
figures provided by the UN, Nepal appears to have one of the lowest rates of urban solid waste generation (at
0.50 kg/capita/day) and is only expected to increase to 0.60kg/capita/day by 2025. The high proportion of people
living below the poverty line and the low levels of waste produced by this group account for this figure. The waste
generated per head in Biratnagar is therefore only 50% of that generated in urban Thailand. These figures are
consistent with the pattern of waste generation in relation to GNP per capita and consistent with small cities in
Latin America. Despite this, the operator suggested and the council accepted, a proposal relevant for waste
generation rates of highly developed cities.
One of the simple lessons of the Biratnagar case thus relates to the lack of viability of high technology proposals
and high levels of investment proposed at the outset. The lesson is then developed by the modifications that
have been necessary to bring capital inputs in line with local conditions. Modifications proposed or implemented
to date include the lower technology, lower cost options of:
• the landfill site: the original proposal for a sanitary landfill (lined, gas emission and leachate management
system) has been abandoned;
• the vehicles: the original proposal for modern compactors has been replaced by simple tractor trailers.
• the containers: The provision of 25 litre waste bin containers to all households has been reduced to smaller,
lower quality containers purchased at a lower cost but charged at the same rate.
Typically, in municipalities in low-income countries such as Nepal, expenditure on solid waste management is
predominately made up of collection and transportation costs and not on disposal. As a result costs are biased
toward the micro-level of service. Biratnagar is no exception, the practice of dumping waste free of charge has
continued into the contract to date and, at present, there is little to no cost associated with the disposal stage of
the service. The cost of disposal elsewhere in the region of $0.25 per capita per annum suggest that operational
costs are likely to increase significantly when the practice of dumping is ceased. It is likely therefore that solid
waste operations within the town will require significantly more subsidy or a different financial arrangement for the
partnership to continue once disposal costs are introduced.
At this stage however, the disposal stage is not being presented in this manner. The ambitious proposal of the
operator is to run a self sustaining compost plant and recycling operation on leased land. This includes the
construction of facilities and services for this purpose. However research by Blore shows that the most valuable
waste in South Asian cities is generally reclaimed at source and this limits the potential of recycling schemes.
Picking over such waste is frequently considered to be a marginal economic activity.
• The problems of franchising solid waste services
Given the fact that the original entrepreneur had no intention of operating the service over any period of time, it is
hardly surprising to find that the contract proposed was favourable towards the municipality and that the
municipality is allocated very little risk. However, the agreement established in practice is far more onerous for
the operator than the initial contract envisaged. Not only does the private operator now have the responsibility for
collecting the tariffs for household collection services, by extension they take on the full risk of non-payment of
service charges. In terms of municipal solid waste management, this franchise arrangement is unusual and this
form of contract is rarely appropriate as it is generally very difficult for operators to collect fees from householders.
More commonly, the municipality pays the contractor/operator a fixed fee and the municipality recovers the cost
from user charges (often a cess or property tax) or general revenues (such as inter-governmental grants) –
effectively creating a management form of contract. It is also not clear whether the municipality is aware that the
current system whereby the operator is responsible for collecting tariffs is considered unviable elsewhere, or
whether they are taking this approach to test the genuineness and capacity of the operator.
Another problem that has arisen for the operator is that the contract does not adequately specify the means and
processes which will ensure that operational charges are levied and paid by service users. The operator argues
that it is vital that there is a means of addressing non-payment through sanctions and enforcement. The
municipality is also considering the introduction of a range of penalties and sanctions that might be imposed on
defaulters. This might include refusing users other municipal services (e.g. citizenship applications, business
licensing, land purchase, asset transfer and planning permission) unless payment for refuse collection is made.
The more significant proposal under discussion is for the municipality to integrate the waste collection charge into
the wider system of municipal tax collection without transferring the risk of non-payment to the municipality. The
municipality stresses that it needs more capacity to formulate appropriate penalties and enforce sanctions. They
argue that it is necessary for municipalities to have more autonomy to impose new penalties and fines and that
amendments to the Local Self-Governance Act are required to enable municipalities to act.
• Tariffs and Collection
Neither the municipality nor the operator has demonstrated an understanding of the mechanics and implications
of tariff structures and the (substantial problems of) and mechanisms for effective cost recovery for slid waste
services. The simple tariff structure in place at present differentiates between domestic customers’ twice-weekly
service and commercial customers’ daily service but the level of the tariff is not commensurate with the service
provided. A simple comparative study indicates lower charges per household than other selected municipalities.
At NRs. 20 ($0.28) per month (1% of an average low-income household monthly income) the current tariff is one-
third of a similar service provided by the Vientiane Municipality in Laos (which operates a cost-recovery approach)
and where the equivalent cost is $0.62 per month (2.5% of an average low-income household monthly income).
In India, tariffs for household collection are generally in the order of IRs. 20 ($0.45) per month in small cities and
IRs. 40 ($0.90) in large cities where the costs are higher and processes more commercialised.
• Contract preparation
The preparation and development of the contract in Biratnagar was not undertaken with the diligence and
thoroughness essential for private sector participation initiatives. The lack of feasibility studies or comparative
studies detailing the various options for the private sector role initially led to an inappropriate and unviable
approach and arrangement. The municipality simply reacted to the proposals placed before it by the entrepreneur
concerned who convinced officers and elected members that he possessed sufficient technical expertise and
could therefore propose optimal solutions. In the absence of sufficient technical information on solid waste
management the municipality was easily misled by the private party in the original contract negotiations as to
what kind of waste service would be practical, cost effective and feasible. At the same time there was inadequate
financial information on solid waste costs (although there was some data on area-wise expenditure) and a lack of
access to comparative costs of municipal solid waste management initiatives elsewhere.
This lack of a thorough financial appraisal meant that neither the municipality nor the operator undertook any
affordability or willingness-to-pay studies which would support or challenge the viability of the overall proposal and
which would have enhanced their understanding of an appropriate tariff and collection system within the city.
During the contract preparation stage, there was no attempt to seek tenders to validate the proposal or to
introduce other mechanisms that would enhance transparency and accountability or ensure the financial
capability and soundness of the operator selected. Owing to the solicitous nature of the proposal (and the
recommendation rendered by the US Embassy), the municipality did not conduct standard contracting procedures
including financial checks and guarantees.
With respect to the contract, there was no consideration of a standard form of contract for PSP in municipal solid
waste management (available through international agencies), no effort was made to contact other municipalities
involved in such an initiative. Local legal counsel were consulted but unlike many PPP initiatives studied the
municipality did not obtain consultancy support or legal advice was sought during the contract preparation (or any
other) stage. The lack of preparation at an early stage is undoubtedly the root cause of the major problems which
arose in relation to the fraudulent representative and thence the unsustainable nature of the current arrangement.
• Subsidies for waste operations
While a subsidy is specified under the contract agreement (NRs. 2.5 million annually for two years) the operator
has not been able to obtain the full municipal subsidy intended to help cover their operating costs in the initial
stages (to date the operator has only been paid 30%, ostensibly because collection services only cover 25% of
the town. An obvious oversight is that the contract does not specify the terms and conditions upon which this
subsidy will be released. Inadequate specification of these conditions has meant that the municipality has been
able to withhold the full release of funds until the operator has reached all the target households. The private
contractor meanwhile argues that that the subsidy is required as the means to extend the service.
There appears to be a general consensus that, despite the constraints, the private operator has been able to
perform more efficiently than the municipality. This can be attributed to more effective supervision of staff and
operations, the flexibility possible outside the public sector and the labour relations prevailing in the private sector.
Perhaps the most tangible and significant evidence of improved efficiency can be seen from a cost benefit
analysis of the street cleaning operations before and after private sector involvement. The contractor undertakes
street cleaning in the core city at 20% less cost than the municipality, at the same time the quality of service is
reportedly higher and public satisfaction greater.
Efficiency has been significantly enhanced by delegating further responsibilities to the private operator. The
viability of the door-to-door collection scheme has been greatly enhanced by the operator assuming responsibility
other waste activities. This has enabled some economies of scale but even more importantly has led to an
integrated approach with one service (i.e. street sweeping) mutually supporting another (i.e. household
collection). The Mayor of Biratnagar suggests that further delegation is a more effective means to establish the
financial viability and future sustainability of the partnership. To this end, he proposes to extend further municipal
management contracts to the private operator for street sweeping, but sees this as a form of support which could
take the place of the contractual obligation to pay the agreed subsidy. While the private operator would welcome
additional contracts that intrinsically promote their household collection as well, they argue that the municipality
has a contractual obligation to pay this subsidy and that they took over the Americorp activity on that basis.
Failure to pay the subsidy is in their terms in breach of contract.
• Lack of Capacity
The Biratnagar case demonstrates that the capacity of both the municipality and the operator has been
problematic. Neither the municipality nor the operator have had experience in managing an integrated solid waste
management programme. Both parties have had to learn from experience and to experiment with systems and
procedures. The main areas of capacity requirement have been concerned with contract formulation and
negotiation, technical analysis of waste management operations, financial analysis and management, integrated
waste management practices, public consultation processes, alternative waste management systems, role of
NGOs and CBOs and community participation in waste operations. These issues are discussed in detail in the
capacity section below.
• Labour Issues
In most Hindu parts of South Asia, waste workers are drawn from a socially and economically marginalised caste.
In Biratnagar these castes form an identifiable part of the low-income community in the city. They live in an
inadequate and insanitary environment and work for low wages with little or no job security in conditions harmful
to their health. Typically, the solid waste sector absorbs some of the child labour in the city and Biratnagar is no
Labour issues can be argued from diverse viewpoints. On the one hand it is possible to argue that the gradual
shift to private sector operations taking place in Biratnagar does little to benefit workers and that it has not
significantly improved the opportunities available to waste workers. For former municipal employees the operator
is said to provide the same terms and conditions as the public sector (except workers are supervised and
therefore do work their 7 hours) but for the remainder of the work force, employment is provided on a temporary
basis. Job insecurity therefore forms a key aspect of the workers lives. Temporary workers interviewed report
that they receive less pay than their colleagues on a permanent municipal arrangement, and argue that conditions
of work are better in the public sector.
From the operator’s perspective, one of the primary operational issues concerns labour. The operator stressed
that the lack of a work discipline and motivation creates
ongoing difficulties in achieving satisfactory performance. The operator argues that sweepers do not perform
their duties properly, are not reliable and are frequently given supplementary informal payments to keep
operations going. However, unlike the public sector which employs staff on a permanent basis (and the staff
seconded to work for Americorp), temporary staff can be penalised by retrenchment and the operator has used
this threat successfully to achieve better performance and changing attitudes. Both the private sector operator
and municipal officers argue that casual labourers work more efficiently than permanent labourers who are more
secure and complacent about work tasks and discipline.
The exact nature of employment conditions in relation to performance and to other sweepers was not possible
within the scope of this study, however it was clear that the private operator employer has not brought any socio-
economic benefit to these groups. However the flexibility within the private sector offers greater opportunity for
improvement in terms and conditions than does the public sector. In this regard there are many lessons in South
Asia for the operator to draw upon to improve incentives and work practices.
• Scaling Up
Despite the achievements of the arrangement, the Mayor of Biratnagar argues that the current scope and content
of the partnership will be limited in the middle to long term. He argues that Americorp alone does not have the
resources and technical capacity to undertake all the waste-related activities required by the city. The current
Mayor, like his predecessor is ambitious and optimistic about the financial opportunities of the waste sector. He
envisages a situation where waste is treated as a resource: ‘waste will not be allowed to leave the municipal
area, other waste will be imported and the income earning potential of waste as a commodity will be maximised’.
The Mayor’s long term strategy is to develop a range of activities and involve a range of actors to address all
aspects of solid waste management. By its nature, this would involve a more complex set of partnerships, rather
than being reliant upon a single bi-lateral arrangement. These includes for instance:
• an emphasis on private service providers appropriate to the task (e.g. community based organisations for
household collection and larger industrial enterprises for upstream recycling activities).
• an emphasis on economies of scale. (e.g. upstream activities such as recycling and disposal could cover 2-3
towns in order to achieve economies of scale.
• an emphasis on heavy waste such as iron, steel and other products which typically leave Biratnagar for use
and recycling elsewhere.
However in relation to the existing service there is also some question over the capacity of the operator to
replicate the initiative and significantly increase the scale of the operation. In particular, the makeshift and ad hoc
nature of the operations and the personal attention paid to each facet of the operation by the General Manager,
suggests that significantly greater coverage and replication may not be sustainable without increased
3. Private Sector Participation in Water and Sanitation services in Stutterheim, South Africa
Objectives of private sector involvement
At the time the partnership in Stutterheim was established, a primary goal of the city council was to streamline
municipal functions. The council at the time (particularly the Chair of the Public Works Committee) aimed to
redirect conventional forms of management to address the resource deficiencies of the council. To this end, the
council envisaged partnerships with actors outside the government and co-ordination with other municipal bodies.
Amongst other issues they sought to tackle the problems of small municipalities that can not sustain sufficient
technical capacity to run a properly skilled water and sanitation service. As the engineering department was
going through a difficult stage (beset by uncertainty in contracting practices), service was deteriorating, and a
partnership arrangement with the private sector for water and sanitation services solved both particular and
strategic problems. The objective of private sector participation was to buy in the technical skills needed to
improve the efficiency, management and delivery of water and sanitation services to the population of
Stutterheim. However, the objective at that time did not include capital investment, and the pre-democratic council
was only concerned with bulk supply to low-income areas. Decisions were set within the context of political
change in South Africa.
Establishing the Contract
In 1992, the council in power agreed to pursue private sector involvement in a range of municipal functions. In
order to initiate the process the council agreed to test the market and advertised nationally for expressions of
interest for the management of water and sanitation services in the town. In the early nineties there was little
direction for public-private partnerships in South Africa (nor was there any significant assistance available
internationally) and the process of preparation, tender and evaluation process was carried out with the same
methodology as that undertaken for the construction of civil works.
The council at the time was dominated by business acumen, the councillors were willing and able to identify gaps
in council skills and were then agreeable to the appointment of (and fees for) consultants to fill these gaps and
manage the formulation of a contract. However it should be noted that expertise in public-private partnerships
were not available in South Africa in 1993. As late as 1995, the WRC in their guidelines for private sector
participation noted “the complexity and nature of long term contracts makes it imperative for local authorities to
appoint a multi-disciplinary team of professional advisers … It should be noted that very few firms in South Africa
have all the expertise that is likely to be required and the experts will have to be drawn from different firms. The
disciplines needed cover business and financial management, legal as well as engineering and technical fields.”
The proposal for the form of contract was presented by WSSA in their tender. An investigation into alternative
contract types was not pursued. The contract was considered appropriate because it met the key technical,
managerial and efficiency objectives of the council and did not include a significant investment component.
The partnership arrangement in Stutterheim is an affermage contract for 10 years. The affermage (or lease) form
of contract farms-out or contracts out to the private sector responsibility for providing management, operation and
maintenance. Unlike the management form of contract, the private operator must provide working capital, but
capital investments remain the responsibility of the authority.
The scope of the contract in Stutterheim includes the management, operation and maintenance of the water and
sewerage system, replacement of pipework due to normal wear and tear and record keeping. It also includes for
customer management services as a future option. In addition, WSSA has an obligation for some rehabilitation
works on the existing system: to replace a fixed amount of pipework annually, to replace all meters (older than 7
years) by the 5th year of their contract and to replace any malfunctioning electro-mechanical equipment. Thus,
maintenance, replacement and ongoing repair are the responsibility of the Operator, while upgrading and
expansion is the responsibility of the Stutterheim Council.
Responsibilities and Coverage
WSSA Responsibility Municipal (STLC) Responsibility
• Primary Raw water supply and water Upgrade and new infrastructure
treatment from sources (4 sources) Safety, maintenance and repair of dams and water
to Stutterheim town, Mlungisi and sources.
the semi-rural villages of the Bye law enforcement
Amatola District Council.
• Secondary Secondary distribution and Pumping and secondary distribution network to and
reticulation within Stutterheim town within Mlungisi.
• Tertiary Operation and maintenance of Operation and maintenance of neighbourhood level
neighbourhood level distribution network distribution within Mlungisi area
within Stutterheim town area
Operation and Maintenance of Operation and maintenance of sewerage network in
sewerage network in Stutterheim Mlungisi.
town. Provision of capital equipment for all tasks
Treatment of effluent for all areas. (including new tankers for sanitation services);
Operation of conservancy tanker
services to all areas (including 80%
of the population of Mlungisi).
WSSA is responsible for operation Stutterheim TLC is responsible for meter reading,
and maintenance of meters and billing, collection and account complaints.
Stutterheim serves, potentially, as both teacher and student in Municipal Service Partnerships. As one of the
three early public-private partnerships in South Africa, Stutterheim can provide important feedback and lessons
for peer learning. Conversely, it needs significant support at this time if it is to overcome the barriers hindering
efficiency improvements and pro-poor arrangements. The process of demarcation provides a potential turning
point for the contract and an opportunity for WSSA and the Stutterheim Council to build – in the last years of the
contract – an effective and sustainable partnership approach, convergent with the principles of reconstruction and
development. Stutterheim also serves, potentially, as a pilot for the development of linkages between Local
Economic Development and Municipal Service Partnerships in South Africa. It is up to the contract parties, the
supporting institutions and other parts of civil society to seize this opportunity and explore the possibilities that the
partnership may offer.
Corporate Sector Initiatives in Disaster Management : India
Even though corporate sector participation is a relatively new concept in India, but the recent disasters which
struck various parts on India have seen a tremendous response from the private sector and community groups
who extended their hand towards the relief works. A few of such initiatives have been cited as follows :
1. Outbreak of Plague in Surat:
Just when plague was believed to have been wiped off from the face of the earth, the sudden resurgence of
bubonic plague in Beed district of Maharashtra and pneumonic plague cases in Surat city of Gujarat state, in
September-October 1994, took the central, state and local administration and health officials in the country by
surprise. It also caused a global concern. The casualities were a total of 146 presumptive (seropositive) cases
and 54 deaths considered as due to plague occurred between 19 September and 22 October 1994 (WHO
The plague created widespread panic in the city and approximately 60 per cent of Surat’s population fled. It was
a severe blow not only to Surat’s economy which suffered a loss of several millions of rupees every day but also
to the national economy because it affected industrial production, tourism, export, etc. India’s international image
suffered a severe blow. Some of the foreign airlines temporarily stopped their flights to and from India and some
countries banned the import of food grains from here and quarantined passengers from India for exhaustive
medical check ups.
As the local administration, in this case the SMC, was responsible for providing public health facilities to the
citizens, the public, media, researchers and health officials squarely blamed the local body not only for a grossly
inadequate response during plague but also for its general lack of performance. It was therefore considered
imperative, for the moment though, to call in for private sector involvement in order to control the spreading of
the disease. Therefore, the private initiative started on a temporary basis during the plague epidemic to cleanse
the filth and remove dead carcasses accumulated in the water logged areas, but looking at the performance the
participation was strengthened and regulated in the post-plague period. At present, privatisation initiatives are
limited to: i) hiring of private vehicles with driver for garbage collection ,ii) contracting out cleaning of certain
roads and iii) employing private sweepers for transporting municipal refuse from collection points to disposal
sites. Private contractors, at present, handle almost 40 per cent of the solid waste generated in the city
everyday. However, private contractors work under strict supervision of the municipal staff and penalties are
imposed on them for not performing their assigned work.
The control of epidemic in the city and maintenance of sanitary and infrastructure facilities in the post-plague
period by the private sector enterprises has been one of the most quoted examples of public-private partnership
in urban areas. The level of services has improved to an extent that today Surat claims to be one of the cleanest
cities in the country.
2. Gujarat Earthquake
Gujarat Earthquake has been one of the best shows of mankind in the country. Not only did the government
agencies, but also the private sector enterprises, school and colleges, community groups and various NGOs in
their own ways; got together and made the seemingly wiped out cities after the disaster living. As per the private
sector initiatives, various engineering firms like the Hindustan Construction Company Ltd. and other contacting
companies had deployed heavy engineering equipment, skilled manpower and engineers to facilitate the efforts.
Besides, the entire cadre of its officers and employees donated a minimal days wage as a token of support.
Besides that, the top companies like Reliance and the Tata Group shed out large funds in order to carry out the
relief funds and also provided new facilities like the mobile hospital vans. Also, various other private sector
enterprises shed out huge funds which had made the relief and rehabilitation process a very successful one
giving life back to thousands who had lost both their shelter and livelihood.
Corporate Sector Initiatives in Disaster Management : Global
1. Tsunami and Earthquake in Asia and Pacific region :
A devastating earthquake of 9.0 magnitude on the Richter' scale struck the area off Sumatra's northwestern
coast on December 26, 2004. The earthquake also caused the creation of tsunami waves that invaded the
coasts of Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India, Maldives, Thailand and Malaysia, and even east African countries have
At least 295,000 people died in the disaster, with 1,500,000 displaced and over 500,000 homeless. (source:
IFRC, February 9)
Ericssion, which is a private sector enterprise, extended its help to the entire region struck by the disaster.
The help was in two ways: by restoring damaged telecommunications and by supporting humanitarian
organizations working with the recovery and rescue efforts. Ericsson also donated a complete mobile telephony
system to the Indonesian government. And a number of satellite phones, heavy-duty waterproof phones and
standard phones were given by Ericsson and Sony Ericsson to relief organizations, as well as a cash donation.
Local Ericsson companies in Thailand, Sri Lanka, India and Malaysia have also initiated contributions, mainly in
donations and providing support for the telecommunications infrastructure. Ericsson Response has sent a
complete container-based GSM system to enable communications between different aid organizations, mobile
phones in Indonesia and Sri Lanka. The aid has helped tremendously in getting back the communication routes
and helping the people who have been left homeless.
2. Earthquake in Luzon (Philippines) 1990 :
On July 16, 1990 an earthquake of a magnitude 7.2 on the ritcher scale hit Luzon in Phillipines causing
tremendous damage to life and property. There were 1,666 deaths, about 1,000 persons were reported missing
and over 3,000 were injured. Most casualties occurred in Baguio City and surroundings. The rainy season,
which began soon after the tremor, produced new casualties, some as the result of reactivation of earthquake
induced slides. Nearly 100,000 houses were damaged, 40% of them were completely destroyed. All these
happened in a wide area including Baguio, the coastal area south of San Fernando in La Union, along the
Lingayen Gulf and in the area between Dagupan and Tarlac where intense liquefaction occurred. Seven bridges
collapsed, eight others were seriously damaged and about 20 were affected by various types of lesser damage.
The road network of Central Luzon and the Baguio region was significantly damaged.
The business sector mobilized relief and rehabilitation resources. The resources mobilized went beyond
cash, medicine, blankets and old clothes. Corporate aircraft as well as ten-wheelers and communication facilities
were deployed free of charge. Search and rescue groups from among the mining companies were pressed into
service. Teams of psychiatrist-trained groups were organized to handle the psychosocial needs. In the
succeeding months, after an assessment of the economic and infrastructural damages, the private sector again
dug into its collective pocket to fund rehabilitation activities, including resettlement projects and programs to
rehabilitate livelihood, schools and other community lifelines.
AUTHORS Amar Sood : firstname.lastname@example.org
Annu Talreja : email@example.com
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON DISASTER MANAGEMENT
1.1 INTERNATIONAL DECADE FOR NATURAL DISASTER REDUCTION
On 11 December 1987 at its 42nd session, the General Assembly of the United Nations designated the 1990's as
the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR). The basic idea behind this proclamation of the
Decade was and still remains to be the unacceptable and rising levels of losses, which disasters continue to incur
on the one hand, and the existence, on the other hand, of a wealth of scientific and engineering know-how which
could be effectively used to reduce losses resulting from disasters.
The objective of the IDNDR is to reduce through concerted international action, especially in developing countries,
the loss of life, property damage and social and economic disruption caused by natural disasters such as
earthquakes, windstorms, tsunamis, floods, landslides, volcanic eruptions, wildfires, grasshopper and locust
infestation, drought and desertification and other calamities of natural origin.
The General Assembly called on all governments to take appropriate measures and actions during the Decade,
and in particular to:
1) Formulate national disaster mitigation programs.
2) Take part in concerted international action to reduce the effects of natural disasters.
3) Establish, where appropriate, national IDNDR committees (in co-operation with the relevant scientific and
4) Encourage support from the public and private sectors.
5) Take measures to increase public awareness of risk and the value of preventative measures.
By 1994, over 150 countries had established national IDNDR focal points or committees, which included
representatives of governments, disaster 'professionals' and many non-government organizations. This
'networking' has facilitated the transfer of knowledge to those countries and communities most at risk. In addition,
much effort has been put into new scientific and engineering developments. Typical examples are work on
hazard-resistant structures (houses, factories, bridges, flyovers, etc.), and the development of electrical
measuring techniques to predict earthquakes.
IDNDR works through IDNDR National Committees and Focal Points which exist in 138 countries. The IDNDR
secretariat, located in Geneva, is part of the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. The IDNDR Scientific and
Technical Committee is an advisory body with experts in economics, social science, engineering, public health,
industry, geology, meteorology, etc. A UN inter-agency group works regularly with the IDNDR secretariat, as well
as a contact group of Geneva-based diplomatic missions.
In 1994 an international conference was held in Yokohama to look at the IDNDR's initial progress and chart a
course for the remainder of the Decade. This brought many of the governments and other bodies active in the
field together for the first time. The conference demonstrated how much of the IDNDR's work was shifting from
'rapid-onset' disasters (for example, floods and landslides) to 'slow-onset' disasters (principally drought), more
complex multiple disasters involving a range of hazards and causes, and the social consequences of disasters.
1.2 WORLD CONFERENCE FOR NATURAL DISASTER REDUCTION
The WCNDR was held at Yokohama between 23 to 27 May 1994. To make people aware of how much they can
do to make themselves safer from natural disasters, the United Nations launched the International Decade for
Natural Disaster Reduction. The World Conference on Natural Disaster Reduction was an important milestone in
IDNDR awareness-building process.
The conference was initiated with the background of the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction and
1. Recognizing the rapidly rising worldwide toll on human and economic losses due to natural disasters.
2. UN resolution to launch a far-reaching global undertaking for the 1990s to save human lives and reduce the
impact of natural disasters.
3. To adopt an integrated approach for disaster management in all its aspects and to initiate a process towards
a global culture of prevention.
4. Sustainable economic growth and sustainable development cannot be achieved in many countries without
adequate measures to reduce disaster losses, and that there are close linkages between disaster losses and
environmental degradation, as emphasized in Agenda 21 (Report of the United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 3-14 June 1992, vol. I, Resolutions Adopted by the
5. Reaffirming the Rio Declaration, which stresses the need for the international community to assist States
afflicted by natural disasters and other emergencies that are likely to produce sudden harmful effects in the
environment of those states.
The conference adopted the Yokohama strategy and plan of action. The basic principles for the strategy were:
1. Risk assessment is a required step for the adoption of adequate and successful disaster reduction policies
2. Disaster prevention and preparedness are of primary importance in reducing the need for disaster relief.
3. Disaster prevention and preparedness should be considered integral aspects of development policy and
planning at national, regional, bilateral, multilateral and international levels.
4. The development and strengthening of capacities to prevent, reduce and mitigate disasters is a top priority
area to be addressed during the Decade so as to provide a strong basis for follow-up activities to the Decade.
5. Early warnings of impending disasters and their effective dissemination using telecommunications, including
broadcast services, are key factors to successful disaster prevention and preparedness.
6. Preventive measures are most effective when they involve participation at all levels, from the local community
through the national government to the regional and international level.
7. Vulnerability can be reduced by the application of proper design and patterns of development focused on
target groups, by appropriate education and training of the whole community.
8. The international community accepts the need to share the necessary technology to prevent, reduce and
mitigate disaster; this should be made freely available and in a timely manner as an integral part of technical
9. Environmental protection as a component of sustainable development consistent with poverty alleviation is
imperative in the prevention and mitigation of natural disasters.
10. Each country bears the primary responsibility for protecting its people, infrastructure, and other national
assets from the impact of natural disasters. The international community should demonstrate strong political
determination required to mobilize adequate and make efficient use of existing resources, including financial,
scientific and technological means, in the field of natural disaster reduction, bearing in mind the needs of the
developing countries, particularly the least developed countries.
Approaching the mid-point of the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction, the World Conference has
identified, on the basis of national reports and technical discussions, the following main accomplishments and
1. Awareness of the potential benefits of disaster reduction is still limited to specialized circles and has not yet
been successfully communicated to all sectors of society, in particular policy makers and the general public.
This is due to a lack of attention for the issue, insufficient commitment and resources for promotional activities
at all levels.
2. Activities during the first years of the Decade in training, technical applications and research at local, national
and international levels and in regional cooperation, have had positive results in some regions in reducing
3. These new efforts in the field of disaster reduction have not systematically been part of multilateral and
bilateral development policies.
4. Education and training programs and facilities for people professionally involved and the public at large have
not been sufficiently developed with a focus on ways and means to reduce disasters. Also the potential of the
information media, industry, scientific community and the private sector at large has not been sufficiently
5. A number of positive results have been achieved during the first five years of the Decade, although unevenly
and not in the concerted and systematic way.
6. The concept of the disaster reduction should be enlarged to cover natural and other disaster situations
including environmental and technological disasters and their interrelationship which can have a significant
impact on social, economic, cultural and environmental systems, in particular in developing countries.
The Yokohama strategy and plan of action for natural disaster reduction calls for emphasis and implementation of
the following points:
A. Development of a global culture of prevention as an essential component of an integrated approach to
B. Adoption of a policy of self-reliance in each vulnerable country and community comprising capacity building
as well as allocation and efficient use of resources.
C. Education and training in disaster prevention, preparedness and mitigation.
D. Development and strengthening of human resources and material capabilities and capacity of research and
development institutions for disaster reduction and mitigation.
E. Identification and networking of existing centres of excellence so as to enhance disaster prevention, reduction
and mitigation activities.
F. Improvement of awareness in vulnerable communities, through a more active and constructive role of the
media in respect of disaster reduction.
G. Effective national legislation and administrative action, higher priority at the political decision-making level.
H. Making available the existing technology for broader application to disaster reduction.
I. Integration of the private sector in disaster reduction efforts through promotion of business opportunities.
The WCNDR was a consolidated beginning in the area of disaster reduction. The major challenges put forward by
the conference were the recognition of disaster management in the policies and planning of governments all over
the world. The other aspect emphasized by the conference was the inter-regional cooperation between states to
1.3 INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR DISASTER REDUCTION
The ISDR is the successor of the IDNDR. The mission of the IDNDR was to influence decisions and help in
creating long-term, pro-active disaster prevention strategies. The scope of the challenge was - and remains -
enormous, but during its ten-year life, the IDNDR succeeded in coordinating a new, global approach to improving
the resiliency of local communities.
As its name implied, the IDNDR officially came to an end in 1999. However, during its ten-year span of activities,
it achieved such important successes - especially in terms of forging vital links among the political, scientific and
technological communities - which the United Nations created a successor body to carry on its work. This new
body of coordinated action programs, with a small secretariat in Geneva, is ISDR. In January 2000, the General
Assembly established two mechanisms for the implementation of ISDR the Inter-Agency Secretariat and the Inter-
Agency Task Force on Disaster Reduction.
Based on its invaluable experience and expertise built up over ten years, particularly in developing countries, the
ISDR is extremely well-placed to foster the multi-disciplinary and inter-sectoral relationships necessary to bring
about the all-important shift from the mainly reactive mindset of today to the pro-active mindset of tomorrow,
where prevention and risk management are paramount. It has already established a global network of public,
private and local community partners with whom it is developing risk prevention strategies, integrating them into
long-term sustainable development plans. The ISDR has two overall objectives:
Enabling all communities to become resilient to the effects of natural, technological and environmental
hazards, reducing the compound risks they pose to social and economic vulnerabilities within modern
Proceeding from protection against hazards to the management of risk through the integration of risk
prevention into sustainable development
In accordance with the above objectives, the ISDR secretariat formulated in 2001 a framework for action for the
implementation of the ISDR with four main objectives and two sub-objectives:
Increase public awareness to understand risk, vulnerability and disaster reduction.
Promote the commitment of public authorities to disaster reduction.
Stimulate multidisciplinary and intersectoral partnerships, including the expansion of risk reduction networks.
Improve scientific knowledge about the causes of natural disasters, as well as the effects that natural hazards
and related technological and environmental disasters have on societies.
Continue international cooperation to reduce the impact of El Niño and other aspects of climate variation.
Strengthen disaster reduction capacities for the development of early warning systems.
In pursuing these objectives, the framework for action outlines the following areas of common concern:
Recognition and incorporation of special vulnerability of the poor and socially marginalized groups in disaster
Environmental, social and economic vulnerability assessment with special reference to health and food
Ecosystems management, with particular attention given to the implementation of Agenda 21.
Land-use management and planning, including appropriate land use in rural, mountain and coastal areas, as
well as unplanned urban areas in mega-cities and secondary cities.
National, regional and international legislation with respect to disaster reduction.
The ISDR recognizes that in today’s world, societies are confronted with rapid change. Therefore, the value of
disaster risk reduction can only be realized through rigorous identification and continuous evaluation of the
relationships that exist between the beliefs and conditions in which people live, the changing environment people
inhabit and depend upon for their livelihoods, and the forces of nature. Most importantly, disaster risk reduction
relies on the consequences of collective decisions made and individual actions taken or not taken. The following
contexts and processes condition the emergence of a disaster reduction culture:
1. Political context.
2. Sustainable development in its three related contexts: socio-cultural, economic and environmental.
3. Regional considerations linking disaster reduction and sustainable development.
The ISDR Secretariat is committed to continually review past, present and future initiatives in cooperation with its
key partners. The aim of a regular review is twofold: to compile, synthesize and disseminate information on
activities related to disaster risk reduction; and to initiate the development of a framework for guiding
implementation and monitoring of progress to be used by governments, civil society and other relevant actors.
The ISDR lists some priority areas for proactive action:
1. Disaster and risk reduction to be an essential part of the broader concerns of sustainable development
2. Review of current development practices to reduce vulnerability.
3. Political commitment by public and private policy makers and local community leaders, based on an
understanding of risks and disaster reduction concepts, is fundamental to achieving change.
4. The international community’s duty to advocate policies and actions in developing countries.
5. Long-term commitment to support local disaster reduction endeavors is as important as funding emergency
assistance following high profile disasters.
1.4 WORLD CONFERENCE ON DISASTER REDUCTION
The United Nations General Assembly convened a World Conference on Disaster Reduction, to be held in Kobe,
Hyogo, Japan, from 18 to 22 January 2005. The Conference was to take stock of progress in disaster risk
reduction accomplished since the Yokohama Conference of 1994 and to make plans for the next ten years. The
following four documents are the main outcome of the World Conference on Disaster Reduction. They represent a
strong commitment of the international community to address disaster reduction and to engage in a determined,
results-oriented plan of action for the next decade:
1. Review of the Yokohama Strategy and Plan of Action for a Safer World.
2. Hyogo Declaration.
3. Hyogo Framework of Action 2005-2015: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters.
4. Common Statement of the Special Session on the Indian Ocean Disaster: risk reduction for a safer future.
The major areas that have been highlighted in these initiatives attempt to achieve a holistic view of disaster
management starting from the grass root level to the national and international level:
1. Developing Community Resilience.
2. Involve all stakeholders.
3. Governance: Organizational and Legislative framework.
4. Disaster Planning.
5. Increased Regional and International cooperation.
6. Awareness, Education and Training.
7. Risk Assessment and Early Warning.
The WCDR recognized the relationship between disaster reduction, sustainable development and poverty
reduction. Any disaster can wash away all that has been done for the development of an area.
AUTHORS Amar Sood : firstname.lastname@example.org
Annu Talreja : email@example.com
COMMUNITY BASED DISASTER MANAGEMENT INITIATIVES
Community-based disaster management can be seen as risk reduction programs designed primarily by and for
the people in certain disaster-prone areas. Disaster mitigation using government and institutional interventions
alone is insufficient, because such an approach pays little attention to addressing community dynamics,
perceptions, or priorities. At the same time, local communities are often either unaware of these formal disaster
management interventions; or they find the interventions inappropriate, due to the lack of recognition of the
community’s vulnerabilities and capacities; or they lack the external resources or technical support to
supplement their own initiatives and capacities.
Just as every individual, family, organization, business, and public service within a community will be affected by
a disaster, each has a role to play in managing disaster. Looking at it practically, the multitude of actions that
must be taken to implement an effective disaster management program requires the participation of the entire
Another reason for implementing community-based approaches is that communities are knowledgeable about
the disasters that happen to them and are able to anticipate them in some cases. They may not be scientific, but
the richness of experience and indigenous knowledge is a resource to be recognized. These resources need to
be tapped and developed. In many cases, we learn that with proper training and information, the communities
are able to safeguard and minimize the disaster risks. It is essential that local capacities be strengthened to
assess risks and develop mitigation strategies that are based on the communities’ human, financial, information,
and material resources.
Over the last two decades there has been a growing realization that disaster management is most effective at
the community level, where specific local needs, resources, and capacities are met. It is at the local level that
the physical, economic, and social risks faced by the poor can be adequately assessed and managed. Recently,
there have been some initiatives in this direction. For the last four years, the Asian Disaster Preparedness
Center (ADPC) has been holding regional and national training programs on “community-based approaches to
disaster management.” In the coming years, this training activity will be transferred to national, provincial, and
local levels, in partnership with national and local organizations. A number of regional disaster research
networks, such as La Red in Latin America, Duryog Nivaran in South Asia, and Peri Peri in southern Africa, are
also working on local-level vulnerability issues.
1.1 INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Community-based disaster management requires an enabling and supportive institutional framework. In the last
two decades, particularly during the 1990s, which was observed as the International Decade for Natural Disaster
Reduction, several countries in the Asian region undertook the establishment of new or revamped institutional
arrangements for disaster management. Recognizing the cross-sectoral nature of the action required both in
preparedness planning and response, and even more so in mitigation, these arrangements took the form of
interministerial national councils or coordinating boards. Such multidepartmental bodies were also set up at the
state/province, district, city, and village levels. For example, the Philippines and Indonesia established the
National Disaster Coordinating Council and the National Coordinating Board for Disaster Management,
respectively. These are supported by a network of regional, provincial, city, and barangay (village) disaster
coordination councils. Coordination with NGOs and United Nations agencies as well as initial efforts to involve
the private sector were another theme. However, since these were new initiatives often led by ministries or
departments responsible for relief distribution or civil defense, they found it challenging to provide leadership for
the work of a wide range of ministries. Likewise, the development of national, provincial, and district-level
disaster management and mitigation plans has been a new effort during the decade. For example, such plans
were developed in Cambodia and Sri Lanka through a consensus-building consultative process. The
consolidation of this framework and the disaster management planning efforts for community-based work
focused on vulnerability reduction has still to take place. Having been closely involved with these efforts, ADPC
will continue to work closely with the governments and other stakeholders in the ongoing development of these
1.3 COMMUNITY-BASED INITIATIVES
1. BANGLADESH RED CRESCENT SOCIETY
The Bangladesh Red Crescent Society has Community Based Disaster Preparedness Program in Cox Bazar.
The coastal areas and offshore islands of this district are regularly visited by cyclones and tidal bores. The
objective of the program is to enable the community to deal with the impact of cyclone-related disasters, using
participatory methods aimed at strengthening people’s self-help capacities. Examples of some community-based
initiatives include the formation of Village Disaster Preparedness Committees; development of an extensive
awareness-raising campaign; training of the community in disaster preparedness, community first aid, and
cyclone warning signals; shelter maintenance; and implementation of disaster preparedness measures such as
installation of drinking water and food storage facilities and construction of raised poultry sheds.
The well-known Cyclone Preparedness Program (CPP) of the Bangladesh Red Crescent Society demonstrates
the importance of usable and understandable information and a good network to disseminate this information.
The CPP has developed a comprehensive system to pass on special weather bulletins containing cyclone-
warning signals from the Bangladesh Meteorological Department to households. Other CPP activities include
training of volunteers, public awareness campaigns, and cyclone drills and demonstrations.
CARE Bangladesh also implements a number of community-based initiatives. CARE Bangladesh used food-for-
work projects to help communities with community “flood proofing” after the 1998 floods. This includes the
raising of house plinths to a five-year flood level and of schools and community centers to a 20-year flood level,
raising hand pumps, and building foot paths, as well as initiating village-level savings schemes that are used as
a safety net to meet immediate post-disaster relief needs.
Under the Asian Urban Disaster Mitigation Program of ADPC, CARE Bangladesh is implementing the
Bangladesh Urban Disaster Mitigation Project. The project will begin with the establishment of community-based
flood mitigation and disaster preparedness systems in two demonstration project sites, the municipalities of
Gaibandha and Tongi. The project aims to improve the capacity and skills of urban communities to manage risk
and apply mitigation skills. It is expected that the best practices and lessons learned from the two demonstration
project sites will be replicated in other municipal areas of Bangladesh.
2. KATHMANDU VALLEY RISK MITIGATION PROGRAM
The Katmandu Valley Risk Mitigation Program, being implemented as a part of ADPC’s Asian Urban Disaster
Mitigation Program by the Nepal Society for Earthquake Technology (NSET) and Geo Hazards International,
has also focused on enhancing the safety of rural and urban communities by retrofitting and reconstructing
vulnerable school buildings. The program involves the active participation of community leaders in the
vulnerability assessment process and of local masons, traders, and development committees in construction.
Involvement in this program promotes the message of the need for seismic strengthening of all vulnerable
buildings and develops the skills of masons and technical personal in building safer buildings. A unique feature
of the program is the partnership between the high quality of technical input produced by NSET and the
community participation and contributions mobilized through the School Management Committees.
3. CENTER FOR YOUTH AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT – RACHANA
Once the initial phase of relief and restoration was over, CYSD set out to initiate long-term livelihood restoration
activities in the region. RACHANA, the disaster response cell of CYSD came into being during this process.
Activities carried out by the cell included livelihood restoration, revival of education, reconstruction of community
infrastructure, and disaster preparedness. After three years of reconstruction work in the region, during 2002-03,
the centre decided to shift its focus to improving the preparedness of people to face disasters.
CYSD’s response to the cyclone was twofold. First, it rushed to the victims with relief and other support, and
facilitated a quick response to salvage the situation. Secondly, it facilitated a collaborative civil society response
to the emergency by various NGOs active in the state for wider impact. The effort eventually led to the formation
of an NGO alliance called Orissa Disaster Mitigation Mission (ODMM).
The centre also undertook ‘food for work’ (FFW) programmes in the affected areas with a view to fulfilling the
twin goals of employment generation and community asset reconstruction. The FFW programme not only helped
ensure temporary food security in the villages, it also helped restore and build a large number of community
assets. Activities undertaken included avenue and community plantations, repair of community institutions,
reconstruction of earthen saline embankments and construction of check-dams, canals, and pond, construction
of houses for destitute families, roads, etc.
CYSD has always emphasized community ownership as the key to the success of any development initiative.
Accordingly, the centre has not only promoted people’s institutions in the cyclone-affected areas, it has also tried
to strengthen their capacities with a view to ensuring the sustainability of the interventions and building up the
desired social and economic capital.
The efforts have resulted in the formation of a number of functional groups and community organizations like
village development committees (VDCs), farmers' groups, women’s and girls' groups in the operational areas.
Special care has been taken to form women’s self-help groups for taking up micro-credit and entrepreneurship
Community Institutions Promoted by CYSD in the Cyclone Affected Areas
Village Development Committees (VDC) 89
Farmers Groups 120
Women Self Help Groups (SHG) 198
Rural Artisan Cooperatives 22
Shelter Management and Maintenance Committees 19
Disaster Mitigation Teams (DMT) 72
Nari Suraksha Committes (Committees for Women ) 72
Sanitation Groups 72
SHGs Promoted By CYSD in Jagatsinghpur District
(As on 31 March 2003 and 2004)
Total No. of SHGs Total Members Total Savings Total Loan Disbursement
(In Rupees) (In Rupees)
2003 2004 2003 2004 2003 2004 2003 2004
189 198 3,208 3,261 1,927,475 2,500,000 3,610,545 2,413,255
In view of the high vulnerability of coastal villages to frequently recurring natural disasters like floods and
cyclones, the centre took initiatives to launch community based disaster preparedness (CBDP) plans in the
The CBDP programme involved four strategic phases. In the first phase, a training programme for trainers (TOT)
was organized for project persons, who were expected to conduct the training programmes on CBDP at the
village level. In the second phase, community level consultations were organized to enable people to understand
the concept of disaster preparedness, prepare village-level contingency plans, and form Disaster Mitigation
Teams (DMTs). The third phase aimed at building a cadre of DMTs who would carry forward activities such as
warning and information dissemination, rescue and evacuation, First-aid and emergency heath care, relief and
shelter management, formulating and updating community contingency plans (CCP), etc. The fourth phase
involved development and updating of CCPs and organization of mock-drills on hard skills relating to search,
rescue and evacuation in each and every village.
4. COMMUNITY-BASED FIRE MANAGEMENT IN LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (Lao PDR)
Community-based fire management (CBFiM) is a new strategy that is attracting increasing interest in the
Southeast Asian region because it ties the idea of participatory community involvement (community forestry)
with forest fire management. It was initiated by Global Initiative of the World Conservation Union (IUCN) and the
World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) as the Project FireFight South East Asia.
The Lao People's Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) is the only landlocked country in Southeast Asia. It is situated
between 13º54'N and 22º31'N and between 100º05'E and 107º42'E in the centre of the Indochina Peninsula.
China and Myanmar border Lao PDR in the mountainous north, Viet Nam to the east, Thailand to the west and
Cambodia to the south. Lao PDR is a country rich in natural resources and culture, and it contains both
biological and cultural diversity. The people are extremely dependent on forests, and much of the country's
revenue comes from forest products. Numerous laws and policies already exist regarding forest fire
management and community involvement in land management activities.
There is a strong push for decentralization from the top levels of the Lao Government. With the support of
UNDP, round table meetings in 2000 encouraged the development of work plans at the provincial and district
levels rather than at the central government level. In March 2000, the Prime Minister of Lao PDR signed an
instruction that called for "building up provinces as strategic units, districts as planning and budgeting units and
villages as implementing units" (Instruction No. 01/PM [11/03/2000]).
The plan would make villages, districts and provinces "the masters of their own development and destinies, by
empowering the grassroots level to participate in their own socio-economic development, thus lessening their
dependence on the central level". However, a more likely scenario will be that community-based management of
resources will require support from the district, the province and, ultimately, the central government. Although
the province or district may write a plan, they will still need approval from their superiors. As the new Prime
Minister (PM) Decree states, the communities will implement plans and, in the case of CBFiM, take part in
managing their own land.
A 1999 report by the Lao Government suggested the following plans to deal with fire and summarized the main
goal of the laws:
• motivate the shifting cultivators to understand how to prevent, detect and control fires;
• provide sustainable land-use and job opportunities for shifting cultivators;
• prepare standard working groups and set up an organization for the coordination of regional fire control
organizations or other government agencies;
• prepare materials/guidelines for forest fire prevention and suppression (Bouaket, 1999).
5. DURYOG NIVARAN – South Asian Network for Disaster Mitigation
After the Gujrat earthquake of 26th January 2001, it was assessed that the impact of the disaster was quadrupled
by the fact that people following one livelihood were not able to adapt to another due to lack of skills.
One of the worst affected communities was the one working in salt pans. In most of the pans, the labourers are
migrants from within and outside the state of Gujarat. Due to the earthquake, most salt pans and salt industries,
a major contributor to the local economy, was badly hit. The salt industry in Gujarat is a place of employment to
about 85,000 labourers of whom almost 33% are migrant workers. Most of the salt migrant workers suddenly
lost their employment and income due to the earthquake, and since they did not have any other skills, most
found it extremely difficult to survive.
Under these conditions, it was clear that if these people had an alternate livelihood option through skills, disaster
mitigation could have been easier. By providing vocational skills to the people, the most severe effects on the
livelihood of the people (especially the vulnerable groups) could be eased out as better and new skills could
facilitate the livelihood and provide proper reconstruction activities.
ICECD joined hands with International Organization for Migration (IOM) to provide vocational/ technical
(livelihood) training to 200 salt migrant workers affected by the earthquake and residing in Rajkot, Jamnagar as
well as Kutch districts with whom IOM was interacting. IOM/ICECD collaborated with other IOM partner NGOs,
working in salt pan areas, and helped them in identifying people for the various selected training programmes.
These partner NGOs were:
• PRAYAS, Rapar
• PARYAVARAN VIKAS KENDRA (PVK), Maliya
• SAMARTH CHARITABLE TRUST, Rapar
• SETU, Jodiya
For effective implementation of the project, it was necessary to have clear objectives and identity/assess
villages/areas and the needed trades/technical training. Approach, strategies and awareness methods were
streamlined and implemented as per the needs and local scenario.
1. To assist migrants/salt workers in upward mobility with jobs and make them better equipped to find jobs.
2. To provide people with opportunity to develop alternate livelihood skills for own use and community use.
3. To enhance disaster preparedness among migrant salt workers.
Some of the potential trades identified for the training programmes were:
• Pre-cast cement products
• Electrical fitting and repairing
• RCC technology
Tool kits were provided to all the participants, which would enable them to work as skilled/semi-skilled workers in
their own village, nearby villages and towns. The participants were also provided certificates.
Affected migrant salt workers have now got immense opportunities to put themselves on the path of progress
because a number of interventions have been undertaken through various government and non-government
organizations. ICECD - IOM livelihood training programmes have helped people to acquire new skills and
improve their existing skills, which would help them to have alternate livelihood options and also help them to
cope with disasters in a better way in future.
AUTHOR Amar Sood : firstname.lastname@example.org
CORPORATE SECTOR INITIATIVES IN DISASTER MANAGEMENT
The private sector is comprised of thousands of organizations, large and small, which provide goods and services
to the American public through commercial or non-profit channels. They range in size from family businesses and
neighborhood social service providers to multi-national corporations, international religious denominations and
disaster relief organizations. Examples of private sector organizations include businesses, shareholder-owned
utilities, trade associations, labor unions, chambers of commerce, professional societies, community based
organizations, non-profit disaster service agencies and schools and libraries.
They are inextricably intertwined with the public sector in creating and protecting regional assets such as, the built
environment, local productivity, regional "brand value", legacies such as the natural environment, arts and culture,
and R&D. Because of this integration, the impact of natural disasters, technological accidents, or acts of terrorism
is felt by all sectors. The resulting breakdown in community systems is manifested as:
Loss of function (businesses, housing, mobility)
Loss of value (property damage and devaluation, productivity, tax base)
Loss of reputation (tourism, business retention, regional financial ratings)
Loss of economic viability (diversion of funds, jobs, insurability, gross regional product)
Private sector organizations are at once victims and resources when disasters strike. There are laudable cases of
independent action among businesses and non-profit organizations in which the impact of natural disasters is
being mitigated through corporate or even industry-wide preparedness, employee training, or response planning.
However, the disaster management community has traditionally underestimated both the dysfunction that can
result when the private sector is among the victims, and the benefit that could result if private sector resources
and capabilities were better integrated with public sector efforts. In turn, the private sector has traditionally
underutilized the valuable findings of disaster researchers, the disaster mitigating or hazard monitoring
technologies of physical scientists, and opportunities to minimize their losses and liabilities by changing
operational practices, materials or training.
1.1 CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (CSR)
CSR is a broad concept that is open to interpretations. The United Nations (UN) explains and defines it as follows:
The social responsibility of the private sector goes beyond the sector’s day-to-day operation of producing a
certain range of products and services in the most efficient and economical manner. The social responsibility of
the private sector (also referred to as corporate social responsibility) concerns the relationships of a company not
just with its clients, suppliers and employees, but also with other groups, and with the needs, values and goals of
the society in which it operates. All these groups can be regarded as stakeholders in the company. Stakeholders
can be identified as those individuals or groups of individuals that have an interest, or take an interest, in the
behaviour of the company both within and outside its normal mode of operation. They therefore establish what the
social responsibility of the company entails or, at least, how they perceive it to be (UN 2000: 2).
CSR is best seen as a continuum. There is no neat dividing line between its different elements or between it and
commercial work, and no clear start and finish. Three broad stages along this continuum can be identified:
1. Compliance – companies should at least comply with national regulations and multinational companies in
particular should benchmark their local practices against internationally agreed laws, conventions and
2. Risk minimization – beyond basic compliance, companies should be aware of their real and potential socio-
economic, political and environmental impact. Building on this awareness, they should develop and
implement policies and procedures to minimize any damage that might result from their own operations or
those of their business partners.
3. Value creation – beyond compliance and doing minimal harm, companies can create ‘positive societal value’
by engaging in, for example, innovative social investment, stakeholder consultation, policy dialogue and
building civic institutions, alone and with other companies.
The private sector is already heavily involved commercially in disaster reduction. Engineers, consultants, software
designers, insurers, transporters and suppliers of goods and services of many kinds are among those for whom
risk and disasters are business opportunities. Such commercial activity has increased in recent years, especially
in emergency management, for two main reasons:
1. The necessary replacement of the old command-and-control style with more integrated, collaborative
approaches involving a range of organizations.
2. The sheer scale of many international humanitarian crises, especially those resulting from conflict.
The role of the private sector in disaster management has now become a strongly contested issue. Commercial
involvement is outside the scope of this study but two particular areas of business commercial involvement can
overlap with CSR work. Many of the key informants we contacted referred to these areas, thinking that they might
be relevant to the research.
The first is the role of insurance and other financial mechanisms in mitigation. An interesting and potentially fruitful
debate is taking place on how to link insurance with mitigation through public-private partnerships. In particular,
the World Bank’s Disaster Management Facility is trying to stimulate new initiatives through its Prevention
Consortium and Market Incentives for Mitigation Investment (MIMI) project (World Bank 2000; 2001a; 2001b).
Interest and efforts here are concentrating on introducing market incentives that would make insurance and other
finance to reduce or transfer risks more widely available. The research project did not examine this essentially
commercial approach in any detail but it has looked at some initiatives that link building safety with insurance
premiums and at insurance companies’ support for relevant non-commercial activities.
The second area is business contingency planning and continuity initiatives. These were also excluded from the
study as they are directed towards improving the private sector’s commercial performance. However, examples of
business continuity initiatives linked to wider community mitigation programs are discussed.
1.2 CSR AND THE UN
There have been calls for greater private sector involvement in disaster reduction for a number of years. The
United Nations International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR) was at the forefront of these calls.
Throughout the IDNDR, the international aid community maintained consistently that the primary responsibility for
disaster reduction rests with national governments, but recognised the need for collaborative efforts between
governments, UN agencies and other actors of all kinds.
It became apparent by the middle of the IDNDR that it had accomplished relatively little towards its grand aims:
‘the meagre results of an extraordinary opportunity’ in the words of the official statement from the mid-term
conference in Yokohama in May 1994. Attempts were therefore made to encourage other actors, including
companies and NGOs, to become more involved. The Strategy and Plan of Action for a Safer World published by
the conference appealed to commercial rather than altruistic interests when it called for ‘Integration of the private
sector in disaster reduction efforts through promotion of business opportunities’, seemingly unconcerned by the
fact that the private sector might not perceive its best business opportunities lay in the ‘least developed countries’
which IDNDR believed deserved ‘special attention’. Voluntary contributions from the private sector were now
‘strongly encouraged’: the official IDNDR effort was beset throughout the Decade by a funding crisis.
A session of the Yokohama conference was devoted to the subject: how the public sector, private sector and
voluntary organisations can work together (WHO 1994). The published report of this session spoke of building ‘a
new paradigm for emergency management … based on formal partnerships between all parts of society’ and
argued explicitly for strong cooperation between public, private and voluntary sectors (WHO 1994: 11) without
being able to explain what this might mean in practice. The IDNDR’s concluding conference in Geneva in July
1999 similarly embraced the rhetoric of partnerships:
Partnerships involving public and private organizations can be particularly effective in linking stakeholders and
implementing plans. The private sector may be able to promote mitigation by providing incentives, for example, by
ensuring compliance to building codes that would reduce insurance premiums as a condition for coverage
The Framework for Action published in 2001 by the IDNDR’s successor structure, the International Strategy for
Disaster Reduction (ISDR), echoes this partnership theme:
Enhanced partnerships and networking are required in order to ensure cooperation, complementarity of action,
synergy and solidarity between governments, private sector, civil society, academia and international agencies.
The UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, proposed the idea of a Global Compact in 1999. After discussions with
representatives of business, labour and civil society, it was launched the following year. It contains nine principles
based on existing international agreements and conventions: they cover human and labour rights, and
environmental issues. It is a voluntary code that companies are encouraged to subscribe to and, having signed, to
provide evidence of concrete steps they have taken and become public advocates for the Compact. The initial
targets are to have 100 multinational and 1,000 other companies committed to ‘internalizing’ the nine principles by
2002, and to set up a ‘learning bank’ on the internet containing information on the steps companies have taken. At
the time of writing a number of international business associations had subscribed and the UN claimed ‘several
hundred companies’ had done so, together with international labour and civil society organizations.
UNDP Initiatives in India
Disaster Management is an all-encompassing endeavour. Taking into account the high vulnerability profile of India
and its susceptibility to natural disasters being further compounded by frequent occurrence of man-made disasters
viz. fire, chemical etc., the GoI-UNDP Disaster Risk Management Programme envisages active association and
involvement of all stakeholders in various disaster prevention, mitigation and preparedness measures.
Recognizing the role of corporate sector in awareness generation and disaster preparedness and mitigation planning,
the disaster management framework envisages sensitization, training and co-opting of corporate sector and their
nodal bodies/organizations in disaster planning process and response mechanisms. Moreover, the corporate sector
has the potential of assisting both the business community in protecting itself and the community at large in reducing
its vulnerability to recurring natural disasters. In addition to this, the corporate sector can be a precious source of
technical knowledge, as for example in the case of identification and research on technological solutions to prepare
for and respond to natural disasters. As part of an overall disaster risk management strategy especially targeted at
the corporate sector, a work-plan for involvement of the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) and its member
industries was developed in association with the Ministry of Home Affairs and the representatives of the CII. The
following areas of action were identified for substantial involvement of Corporate Sector:
1. Organization of sensitization programmes for building the knowledge, attitude and skills of the industries
in adopting and implementing disaster risk reduction measures to make the industrial structures and
2. Training of industrial personnel in various facets of disaster management and response viz. first-aid,
search and rescue, evacuation etc.
3. Association of corporate sector in development of IEC materials for awareness generation campaigns.
4. Conduct periodic mock-drills to examine and enhance preparedness levels.
5. Preparation of an inventory database on human and physical resources and equipments available with
the corporate sector for the web-enabled. India Disaster Resource Network.
6. Development of on-site and off-site disaster management plans by the industries. The process of
developing DM plans is being explained to the industries during sensitization programmes.
7. Organization of an annual event (national/international) for seeking involvement of all stakeholders in
disaster risk reduction activities.
1.3 TYPE OF CORPORATE INVOLVEMENT IN DISASTER REDUCTION
There is no standard typology of the different kinds of private sector involvement in social responsibility, or its
engagement with other actors (such as NGOs), which is the form taken by much CSR work. Relationships
between private sector and other organizations are often categorized according to the degree of confrontation or
collaboration. There can be three broad types of relationship between the private sector and NGOs – adversarial,
neutral and co-operative – each of which comprises a further variety of types that again can be categorized
according to different criteria. Within the area of co-operation, which is of most interest to this research project,
relationships can be categorized in different ways: according to their purpose, the scope and content of private
sector activity, or the degree of participation in such activity. However they are configured, these typologies
attempt to cover the whole spectrum of corporate social responsibility issues, which are very diverse: they include
social and environmental impact, business ethics, ‘fair trade’, labour standards and human rights.
TYPE & CHARACTERISTICS OF CSR INVOLVEMENT / RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER ACTORS
IN DISASTER REDUCTION
TYPE OF INVOLVEMENT EXAMPLES CHARACTERISTICS
Philanthropic / Charitable Donations and grants, in cash or in Altruistic (although business may derive other benefits, e.g.
kind (goods, services, facilities) to good publicity, this is secondary).
other organisations and groups Business controls the agenda: it decides what to do, whom to
working in disaster reduction, or assist, and how to assist.
directly to beneficiaries. Typically one-to-one relationships between (business) giver
and (non-profit/community) receiver; other stakeholders not
May be formal (i.e. based on grant agreement) or informal.
Typically short-term and one-off interventions, but may be
Contracting other organisations or Business controls the agenda and manages the resources.
Contractual groups to carry out work for Altruistic.
publicbenefit. Based on formal, legal contract for work.
Typically short-term or one-off initiatives.
Typically one-to-one relationships; other stakeholders not
Sponsorship of other organisations Business controls agenda and manages resources.
or groups. Self-interested: business gains through publicity, provision of
goods and services that meet (any public benefits arising
from the work secondary).
Based on formal, legal agreement.
Typically one-to-one relationships.
Working partnerships with other Greater emphasis on dialogue, shared aims, mutual respect
Collaborative organisations and groups for public (the extent to which this happens in practice varies).
benefit. More likely to involve a range of stakeholders.
Ideas can originate from any of the stakeholders.
Diversity of partnership arrangements (formal and informal).
All stakeholders should benefit from partnership (‘win-win’
scenario) but may not benefit equally.
Control of resources can give some partners greater control
over the partnership.
Better opportunities for longer-term interventions.
Business response to lobbying Responsive: agenda driven by other organizations and
Adversarial about human and environmental groups.
impact of business activities. Public relations more important than public benefits.
Unilateral Business undertakes its own non- More likely to be short-term, one-off initiatives driven by
commercial actions independently urgent need and compassion (e.g. emergency relief).
of other actors.
SOURCE: John Twigg, Benfield Greig Hazard Research Center, University College, London
Yet CSR is not the same as altruism. It can generate many benefits for the community but its ultimate purpose is
to help the company (however indirectly) and, as one Canadian businessman points out, ‘Corporations feel no
sense of responsibility for solving the world’s problems. It’s just not their role’. The main business advantages
usually cited in favour of CSR are:
It increases staff morale and motivation, and helps employees to acquire new skills and experience, all
leading to a more committed and productive workforce.
It enhances company/brand reputation.
It strengthens relationships with customers and local and national authorities.
In reality, business managers’ commitment to corporate social responsibility varies considerably and is guided by
different motives ranging from the traditional view of CSR as a means to secure financial gains (or protect the
financial losses that might arise as the result of public criticism of corporate practice) to seeing CSR as an
essential component of a company’s own sustainable development or even as the key to future organizational
The private sector is quicker to act where business interests and broader social concerns coincide. The response
to HIV/AIDS is a notable example. No business is immune from HIV/AIDS. The epidemic has significant
implications for individual businesses through its impact on their workforces (absenteeism, high staff turnover,
reduced productivity) and on the environment in which business operates, especially in reducing market
demands. Businesses have responded individually with education and prevention programs among their workers,
and more widely in the community, supporting people living with HIV/AIDS and organisations working with them.
There has also been a collective response in the form of national and international business coalitions, of which
the Global Business Council on HIV & AIDS, founded in 1997, is a prominent example. A similar process may
now be commencing in conflict prevention and resolution: conflict too has a major impact on companies, directly
and through its effects on the societies in which they.
EXAMPLES OF CSR INVOLVEMENT IN NATURAL DISASTER REDUCTION
NAME (or type) COMPANY (s) TYPE OF CATEGORY
LOCATION DATE DESCRIPTION
OF INITIATIVE INVOLVED BUSINESS OF BUSINESS
COMPANY IS INVOLVEMENT
Asian Urban Philippines 1997 Various Various Collaborative Corporate NGO
Disaster (through manages
Mitigation business- programme of
Program sponsored local-level
Awareness and global 1988 Chemical Chemical Collaborative Managed by
Preparedness manufacturers’ manufacturer UNEP; supports
for Emergencies associations in adoption of
at Local Level USA and APELL process
(APELL) Europe to identify risks
Benfield Greig UK 1997 Benfield Greig Reinsurance Contractual Sponsorship of
Hazard Group university
Research research centre.
Blue Sky: USA 1992 15 local Various Collaborative Programme of
Strengthening companies voluntary
Homes Project incentives to
Caribbean Caribbean 1993- Various Various Collaborative Creation of
Disaster 99 NGO in
Project Republic with
on its board.
Cascadia USA/Canada 1996 Various Various Collaborative Membership
Workgroup private, public
sectors to raise
Corporate The 1990 Various Various Collaborative Business
Network for Philippines involvement in
Disaster and support for
Disaster Honduras 1998 Dole Fruit production Unilateral Purchase of
preparedness emergency food
supplies in local
Disaster USA 1995 Various Various Collaborative Local-level
Business sector initiatives
Alliance to protect
East African E Africa 1999 Various Various Collaborative 2 IFRC-led
initiative on conferences to
management awareness and
Ericsson Global 2000 Ericsson Telecommunication Collaborative Mainly support
Response to relief
now also some
and training of
FireFree USA 1997 SAFECO Insurance Collaborative Public
risk, with public-
Florida Alliance USA 1998 Various Insurance Collaborative Public
for Safe Homes education
risks and steps
that families can
take to make
Global Business Global 1997 Various Various Collaborative International
Council on HIV network to raise
& AIDS awareness of
arising from it.
Red R UK / Global 1980 Various Engineering Collaborative Companies
provide funds to
the NGO RedR;
are sent on
1.3 FUTURE CHALLENGES
There has been much talk of partnerships between the private, public and non-profit sectors to reduce the
impact of natural disasters, but there is little understanding of what this means in practice and still less of
how to go about it.
Most of the experience of CSR in disaster reduction (and the best-documented experience) comes from
countries in the North, especially the USA, which have a supportive enabling environment that is unlikely
to be present in many developing countries.
Existing CSR initiatives address the immediate causes of vulnerability (unsafe conditions) but not its
deeper socio-economic and political causes where CSR cannot counterbalance the effects of the private
sector’s prime goal of profitability.
The private sector’s main concern is the bottom line of profitability. CSR is not altruism: its ultimate aim is
to benefit the business concerned, however indirectly. In general, business does not feel itself responsible
for natural disasters, seeing this as an issue for government.
Inter-sectoral initiatives are over-reliant on public sector and international aid funding. This is a particular
constraint in developing countries whose governments lack resources; and natural disaster mitigation
currently has low priority among international donors. Government has a key role to play in initiating and
supporting partnerships involving the private sector.
The different cultures of private, public and non-profit sectors can inhibit collaboration. Private-sector
enterprises respond most readily to initiatives that other businesses lead or are active in. Public sector
organisations and NGOs need to make a particular effort to be seen as credible. Many inter-sectoral
partnerships involve business mainly as a funder. This is a narrow and often unequal basis for
partnership that may hinder the development of more extensive collaboration.
Business is likely to be more comfortable with traditional and relatively simple types of support, such as
grant-making and publishing public information materials, and less willing to engage in more innovative or
Sustainability is a major challenge to CSR works in this field. Funding régimes and business attitudes
favour one-off interventions over strategic plans. It is hard to obtain private sector funding for broad-
based, collaborative and long-term initiatives. Business prefers one-off grants supporting those elements
of programmes that are most useful to its own interests. Levels of corporate support are vulnerable to
falls in profits.
AUTHOR Amar Sood : email@example.com
DISASTER MITIGATION AND PREPAREDNESS
A case study of wholesale traders’ association
Disasters management, in recent times, has gained great awareness in terms of preparedness and awareness
in order to minimize the large scale losses that have been encountered due to various natural disasters. This
paper would attempt to draw a strategy to create awareness amongst the vulnerable groups in order to minimize
the losses that may occur in the face of a natural disaster.
1.1 STUDY AREA
The area chosen for study is a high density wholesale market area and deals primarily with the trading of
garments and textile goods. The unplanned and insufficient infrastructure, the location, high densities and the
nature of trading activity all put together make the area highly prone to various kinds of disasters, both natural
Ashok Nagar market is the largest wholesale market for ready-made garments in the entire Asia. The market
area is located right on the banks of river Yamuna and is placed in one of the most densly populated areas of
Trans-Yamuna (i.e, East Delhi). The area falls in sub-zone E of Delhi Master Plan and even after decades of the
inception of the inception of the Master Plan in Delhi, the zonal plan for this part of the capital is still under
preparation leading to the most haphazard kind of development. The daily transactions (of garment products) of
the market (domestic and international) is estimated to be in crores of rupees and is assumed to be much more
than the three CBDs of Chandni Chowk, Karol Bagh and Connaught Place put together. Therefore, the area
becomes very important to ensure proper mitigation efforts in order to minimize losses, both economic and life.
Fig. 1 : Location map of Zone
E in Delhi Masterplan
1.3 OBJECTIVES OF STUDY
The study primarily aims at assessing the existing conditions in the market area, assess the risks involved due
to various natural and man-made disasters and thereby formulate strategies in order to create awareness
amongst the various stakeholders.
• To analyze the existing conditions with respect to existing activity pattern, population densities, traffic
movement and infrastructural facilities.
• To assess the various risks involved due to different types of disasters, natural or man-made.
• To formulate strategies and an action plan in order to create awareness towards different types of disasters
to minimize the losses.
* NOTE : The study is based primarily on secondary data from various sources and observations of the authors.
1.5 A BRIEF OF THE STUDY AREA
• Land use and Activity pattern
Predominantly residential use
Major commercial activity along the Gandhi Nagar main road, Shahdara road and around Mahila Colony.
Maximum intensity of commercial use is seen towards the north of Gandhi Nagar road, i.e, Ashok market
and surroundng areasRetail shopping conceterated majorly along the Gandhi Nagar main road and the
Wholesale towards the north of Gandhi Nagar main road.
Manufacturing units and godowns catering to the Gandhi Nagar market (especially Ashok market) are
located around Raghbarpura and Mahila Colony respectively.
The upper floors of retail shopping activity used majorly for the purpose of storage of goods.
Since wholesale activity does not require much of frontage for the purpose of marketing their goods, it also
functions on the upper floors.
Residential activity continues on the upper floors of manufacturing units and godowns.
• Traffic Movement
The main access to the area is through the 30 mts. ROW marginal bundh road and the Koria pul bridge
the Gandhi Nagar market is accessed primarily through te 24 mts. ROW Gandhi Nagar main road which
also has access to good public transport system due to the presence of a number of bus and auto rickshaw
All the other markets are linked to Gandhi Nagar through the 09 mts. ROW Shahdara road.
• Population and Area
Site area = 1.8 hectares.
No. of shops: retail = 320@ 30sq.m.
No. of Wholesale shops = 480@ 16 sq.m.
No. of Workshops = 160@100 sq.m.
Total built-up area = 33,280 sq.m.
F.A.R = 1.84
Fig. 2 : Pictures showing the state of
No. of vehicles = 360 @1.5 ecs. infrastructure in Ashok Nagar Market
1.6 RISKS INVOLVED
• Floods : The area being located right on the banks of R.Yamuna is highly prone to floods. The low-lying
topographical position of the area further makes it sensitive towards foods and water logging. An unplanned
drainage system also goes to an end of causing frequent water logging during the monsoons.
• Fire Hazards : Since the market area deals primarily with the trading of garments and textiles, improper
handling of goods makes it highly prone to fire hazards. Exposed – overhead electrical cables and high FAR
coupled with enormously high built density contribute further to this end.
• Earthquake : The area is prone to large amount of losses in face of an earthquake since Delhi lies in Zone
IV of seismic belt. The densities in the area are of the order of 300-400 persons per hectare which are one of the
highest in Delhi. Further, practically zero enforcement of development regulations and building codes make the
development pattern highly vulnerable.
• Road Accidents : The high traffic volumes and insufficient transport infrastructure in terms of ROWs of
various roads and availability of public transport have resulted in frequent road accidents.
• Medical Disasters : The area has no planned sanitation system with a network of open sewers and open
drains running along the length of the road. This has resulted in the spread of a number of epidemics and water-
borne diseases in the past.
1.7 ACTION PLAN
The actions for disaster risk management need to be formulated and implemented at various hierarchical level of
communities, organizations and government agencies. A brief outline of such strategies has been given below :
• Awareness Generation : It is an established fact that the environmental laws ans policies are most
stringent in our country. But, at the same time, implementation of these policies is weakest; the prime reason
being the accountability of the general public. This accountability can be strengthened by only making our
people aware as to how these laws and policies are formulated to benefit the people first. Such awareness
programmes would constitute of :
Programmes for common people giving them information about best building practices in order to minimize
the damage because of floods and earthquakes.
Programmes for professionals like architects and engineers for introducing safe building methods in
earthquake and flood prone areas.
Programmes for godown owners introducing safer methods to store large quantities of highly fire prone
materials like cotton and silk.
• Urban Infrastructure Management : Infrastructure, especially roads and sanitation system needs a lot of
improvement in the area. This needs to be planned by the Delhi Development Authority, the Municipal
Corporation of Delhi and also the Slum Department. The initiative should also come in by the traders’
associations themselves where they can establish an initial ‘seed capital’ for the improvement of infrastructure at
a micro level.
• Empowerment of traders’ associations and groups : The traders’ associations, as of now, are non-
recognized bodies unlike the housing co-operatives. If these bodies are formalized and given certain legal
powers, improvement at the grass-root level can be made possible as these traders are the people who are
most accustomed to the problems of the area.
• Review of Planning Guidelines : The Planning guidelines applicable in the area, i.e. the Delhi Master Plan,
the National Building Codes and the building guidelines on the flood plains of R.Yamuna need serious reviewing.
Especially, the Delhi Master Plan which practically has no serious control over building activities on a large part
of the flood plain. The implementation machinery of these guidelines also needs to be strengthened.
AUTHORS Amar Sood : firstname.lastname@example.org
Annu Talreja : email@example.com
ROLE OF CORPORATE SECTOR IN URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE MANAGEMENT
A case of Surat
In the present set up the SMC is the most important organisational unit responsible for the provision of basic
amenities in the city. The local authority was established as a small municipality in 1853. In 1952 Surat became a
borough municipality and in 1966 it was accorded the status of a Corporation.
The SMC is governed by the provisions of the Bombay Provincial Municipal (BPMC) Act, 1949. The SMC, in
accordance with the provisions of the BPMC Act, has two wings, the elected and executive. The elected
deliberative wing consists of the General Body, Standing Committee and other Special Committees. The General
Body comprises elected representatives and is headed by the Mayor and Deputy Mayor, who are elected from
amongst the elected members. The Standing Committee comprises some elected members who are appointed
by the General Body and is headed by a Chairman selected from amongst the members themselves. The
executive wing of the SMC comprises the Commissioner and other municipal officials. The Commissioner is
appointed by the state government and is the administrative head of the Corporation. The BPMC Act provides at
least 25 obligatory functions, which include basic sanitation, public health, water supply, collection, removal and
treatment of solid and liquid wastes, etc. It is incumbent on the Corporation to make adequate financial and other
provisions for all the obligatory functions. The BPMC Act also provides a list of 42 discretionary functions which
can be performed by the Corporation in case it so desires and is financially capable.
1.1 PROGRAMME CONTEXT - OUTBREAK OF PLAGUE, SEPTEMBER, 1994
Just when plague was believed to have been wiped off from the face of the earth, the sudden resurgence of
bubonic plague in Beed district of Maharashtra and pneumonic plague cases in Surat city of Gujarat state, in
September-October 1994, took the central, state and local administration and health officials in the country by
surprise. It also caused a global concern. The independent team established by WHO concluded that the clinical,
epidemiological and serological findings pointed to the Y- Pestis as the likely causative agent for the Surat
outbreak. "A total of 146 presumptive (seropositive) cases and 54 deaths considered as due to plague occurred
between 19 September and 22 October 1994" (WHO, 1995).
"Plague is a disease of great antiquity, recorded in the ancient writings of India as well as in the bible. Three great
pandemics have swept the world claming many millions of lives and causing untold misery. The last pandemic,
which began in the late 19th century, claimed about 13 million lives in India alone. A remarkable decline in the
number of cases and deaths due to plague was observed in the 20th century in all parts of the world, including
India, where no case has been reported since 1967." (WHO, 1995)
The plague created widespread panic in the city and approximately 60 per cent of Surat’s population fled. It was a
severe blow not only to Surat’s economy which suffered a loss of several millions of rupees every day but also to
the national economy because it affected industrial production, tourism, export, etc. India’s international image
suffered a severe blow. Some of the foreign airlines temporarily stopped their flights to and from India and some
countries banned the import of food grains from here and quarantined passengers from India for exhaustive
medical check ups (Ghosh and Ahmad, 1996)
A high level interregional meeting on prevention and control of plague, organised by WHO in New Delhi in March
1995 observed that environmental conditions pertaining to breeding of rodents, fleas and mosquitoes and the
access to safe water and sanitation play a dominant role in the origin of many epidemics including cholera,
malaria and plague.
As the local administration, in this case the SMC, was responsible for providing public health facilities to the
citizens, the public, media, researchers and health officials squarely blamed the local body not only for a grossly
inadequate response during plague but also for its general lack of performance. It was commented that "They
(municipal officials) play with the lives of the people with impunity. Thanks to the utter negligence of the health
department of the SMC, the fastest growing city in the country has become a home as well as a transit point for
many diseases. ÖÖ Pneumonic plague struck this year, but malaria, dengue fever, jaundice, gastroenteritis claim
scores of lives in the diamond city every year" (Dasai, 1994).
The immediate cause of the plague in Surat was constant rain and repeated floods which lashed the city for more
than 2 months causing large scale water logging in the low lying are because of the faulty and clogged drainage
system. Hundreds of cattle and other animals died due to the flood and water logging. The municipal officials
were not prompt in removing carcasses and this created enormous sanitation problems. It was only when the
flood receded that the community members initiated the cleaning operation. The godowns storing food grains
remained under water for a considerably long time. It is believed that the plague spread because poor people
consumed those cereals which might have been infected by rodents or the people who were cleaning water
logged areas came in contact with infected rodents or carcasses and contracted the disease. The northern part of
the city, most affected by plague and from where the largest number of deaths were reported, did not have
access to any type of sewerage system provided by the municipal authority. Despite being one of the richest civic
bodies in the country the SMC failed to provide basic sanitation and clean drinking water to a vast majority of its
citizens. As in any natural calamity or epidemic, the poor living in slums or dilapidated houses on the outskirts of
the city, where potable water, sewerage system and garbage disposal were most inadequate, were the worst
affected. "Three-fourths of those who died were migrants from Saurashtra and Maharashtra. As many as 80 per
cent of deaths and serologically positive cases had a working class background" (Shah, 1997,p-223).
As a knee-jerk reaction the Municipal Corporation undertook a massive cleaning operation in the wake of the
plague outbreak. The central and state government departments, and doctors in public and private hospitals,
came to the rescue of the municipal government. The civic authorities launched a seven-point action plan for
restoring normalcy at the earliest involving government, non-government, community organisations and the
private sector. The big industrial groups in the city loaned their excavators and trucks to the SMC to clean the
4000 tonnes of garbage which had accumulated over the days. Private agencies were also hired to help in
removing the garbage. The SMC gave utmost priority to cleaning dirt and debris, disposal of carcasses, pumping
of stagnant water, spraying of DDT and anti-rodent operations, etc. Residents in different localities also came
forward and burned the garbage, sprayed DDT on pools of stagnant water and cleaned their surroundings.
However, all the above were short-term measures to bring the plague epidemic under control at the earliest.
Municipal authorities failed to provide immediate solutions to persisting problems of infrastructural deficiency in
the city. After the massive cleanliness operation, the city administration again returned to its earlier callous self
and Surat gradually slipped back into the old days of garbage and filth.
In May 1995, the Government of Gujarat launched a major programme to clean up Surat on a permanent basis. A
new Commissioner, Mr. S. R. Rao, took charge of the Municipal Corporation. Under his leadership, environmental
cleanliness became the paramount concern of the civic body. Within one year through well orchestrated methods,
administrative, legal, punitive and community motivation, the SMC increased the cleaning of accumulated
garbage from 450 tonnes or 50 per cent of the amount generated at the time of plague to almost 94 per cent of
the 1100 tonnes of garbage generated everyday in 1995.
A three member environmentalist group of Intach - Waste Network visited Surat in November, 1994, just after the
plague, as a part of their Clean – India Campaign. They had commented that despite its wealth, Surat was an
unbelievably filthy city with huge amounts of industrial waste spilled around everywhere and flowing into the
polluted canals and streams. However, at their repeat visit to Surat in August 1996, the group noted the
spectacular improvement in overall cleanliness in the city and concluded that " Surat, is perhaps, the second
cleanest city in India, after Chandigarh" (Patel 1996). The transformation of Surat from one of the filthiest to one of
the cleanest cities in the country was primarily the result of dramatically successful efforts and new initiatives
taken by the SMC.
1.3 POST PLAGUE ACTIONS AND RESULTS : PUBLIC HEALTH PROGRAMMES OF THE SMC
SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT
The most important initiative launched in the post-plague environmental management efforts by the SMC was to
monitor, regulate and streamline garbage collection and disposal. The emphasis was on garbage collection
because the wide-spread realisation after the plague was that filth and garbage, which had accumulated in the
city, was the breeding ground of the dangerous epidemic. It was also realised that sanitation and public health are
inseparable, and need to be tackled in an integrated manner. Therefore, to keep the city healthy garbage control
was adopted as the key environmental management initiative.
The garbage collection and disposal system operating before the epidemic was inadequate in terms of both
manpower and equipment. It was also riddled with lack of motivation and commitment among the employees and
the absence of an efficient monitoring and management process at the Corporation level. These deficiencies were
addressed at length while planning an efficient garbage management system.
The whole city has been divided into 52 sanitary wards, which fall under the six administrative zones. A sanitary
inspector is in-charge of each sanitary ward for cleanliness actions. Meticulous ward level planning has been
done for garbage collection and disposal. Selection of points for placing garbage bins; number of garbage trolleys,
bins and containers required; estimated amount of garbage generated; number of trucks and trips required to
collect and ferry it to dumping points; number of sweepers and supervisors required, their duty time, shifts, etc.
were critically considered while chalking out the micro plan for garbage management. The special needs of critical
spots like vegetable markets, eating points, congested areas with heavy traffic flow were given special
consideration while formulating the ward level plan.
INSTRUCTIONS AND EDUCATION
Households, industries and eateries were given individual cleanliness instructions. While the municipal sweepers
were to collect garbage from house to house in a trolley and transport it to the nearest municipal garbage
collection point, all the commercial establishments including shops and roadside eating joints were instructed to
maintain a dustbin in front of their shops and to ensure that cleanliness was maintained around their shops.
Restaurants and hotels were instructed to maintain bins for collecting refuse and they also had to pack and
dispose the garbage at the designated sites.
The field employees issue regular instructions and information to housewives on how to sort, pack and dispose
garbage. In the slum localities regular programmes were conducted to disseminate knowledge on cleanliness and
Each area is cleaned at least once in 24 hours. Usually cleaning is carried out in two shifts during the day, i.e.,
from 6:30 a.m. to 11:00 a.m. and 2:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m. The main roads and market places are swept at night
while the public land in residential and institutional areas is cleaned during day time.
However, the city does not have any modern system of garbage disposal. At present also all garbage is being
disposed off in landfills. The 1,000 tonnes of garbage which is collected from all garbage points located in
different parts of the city, is transported by trucks to the dumping site where after being covered with earth it is
levelled by bulldozers. The transportation of refuse is strictly in covered trucks to avoid spilling. Pesticides and
insecticides are also dispensed in and around each garbage bin to check the proliferation of germs.
STAFF AND MACHINERY
The Sanitation Department of the SMC always had the reputation of being understaffed. It came to our notice,
during our earlier survey immediately after the plague, that there were only 2,600 sweepers on the municipal pay-
roll. This number was utterly inadequate to clean 111.17 sq. km. of area. The staff strength in the Department has
been increased considerably in the last two years. Now there are 4,701 sweepers, 122 supervisors, 130 sanitary
sub-inspectors and 55 sanitary inspectors work under 18 chief sanitary inspectors (Table 2). Each sweeper
covers approximately 35,000 sq. ft area every day. However, there is variation in the number of staff of different
categories in different wards and zones. The entire Public Health Department of the SMC functions under the
Deputy Commissioner, Health and Hospitals. Ward level staffing pattern of sanitation departments shows that for
each ward with an approximate area of 3.4 sq. km. and a population of 60,000, there are, on an average, 50 or
more sweepers, 3 supervisors, 2 sanitary sub-inspectors and one sanitary inspectors. The infrastructure has also
grown significantly in the last two years. SMC has deployed 136 vehicles for garbage collection and dumping.
However, with only one big disposal site of around 20 acres at Bhatar the city genuinely suffers from inadequate
garbage dumping space.
Staffing Pattern of Public Health and Sanitation Department of the SMC
Department Chief Sanitary Sanitary Supervisor Sweeper
Inspector Inspector Sub - Inspector
Sanitation 18 55 130 122 4,701
Solid waste management 2 6 15 35 -
Market 2 2 8 2 53
Immunisation 1 3 48 - -
Health Centres - 15 24 - 132
Birth and death registration 2 - - - -
Filaria / Malaria - 24 52 18 -
Total 25 105 277 167 4,886
Source: Surat Municipal Corporation, 1998
Infrastructure Available for Solid Waste Collection and Disposal in the SMC
Total No. of Vehicles: a. Trucks - 26
b. Dumper Placers - 70
c. Tractors - 40
Total - 136
Total No. of Containers: 600
Number of Dustbins: 445
Garbage Disposal sites:1 in Bhatar in South-West Zone and 4 small sites in other zones
Source: Same as above
1.4 PRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPATION
Although private initiative started on a temporary basis during the plague epidemic to cleanse the filth and remove
dead carcasses accumulated in the water logged areas, it was strengthened and regulated in the post-plague
period. At present, privatisation initiatives are limited to: i) hiring of private vehicles with driver for garbage
collection ,ii) contracting out cleaning of certain roads and iii) employing private sweepers for transporting
municipal refuse from collection points to disposal sites. Private contractors, at present, handle almost 40 per cent
of the solid waste generated in the city everyday. However, private contractors work under strict supervision of the
municipal staff and penalties are imposed on them for not performing their assigned work.
1.5 REGULATORY ASPECT
Monitoring of garbage disposal at the ward level is observed strictly by the Corporation supervisors and sanitary
inspectors. Each area is cleaned at least once in a day and some vulnerable areas are cleaned twice a day.
However, despite this rigorous cleaning scheduled it was observed that a section of the public and certain
industries were not adhering to the rule of throwing garbage only in bins. This was considered a serious violation
of municipal bye-laws. A collective decision was taken by the officials to enforce discipline by punitive actions.
The SMC introduced the practice of spot "administrative charges" for such offences. The rationale was that the
charges were for additional service that the SMC would have to render for removing garbage thrown by the
offender. The present rates of administrative charges are illustrated in Table 4.
Present Rate of Administrative Charges
Charges per day (in Rs.)
Type First time offence Second time offence Third time offence
Residential 50 100 150
Commercial 100 200 300
Small industry 300 600 900
Industry 500 1,000 1,500
Source: Surat Municipal Corporation, 1998
Note: 1 US$ = Rs. 39 approximately in March 1998.
The charges were much higher when first introduced. It was reduced recently as the people seemed to have
inculcated the habit of throwing garbage in municipal garbage bins. Garbage is no longer strewn around the
refuse container. Rag-pickers who mainly collect refuse from municipal containers used to throw garbage around.
Now the sweepers on duty keep strict vigil and rag-pickers are allowed to sort wastes from the container only if
they clean and sweep the surrounding area later.
• Introduction of administrative charges has automatically increased social vigilance at the community level.
People participated in the entire exercise not merely by disposing their own refuse in garbage bins but also by
ensuring that no one throws garbage on the streets or in front of one’s house. Some effort towards public
participation was made by the SMC in June 1997. The elite of the city were invited to a meeting and the
responsibility of an area was assigned to a leading citizen who was made answerable to the public in case of
lack of cleanliness in the area. The effort, however, was not very successful.
• The level of civic consciousness has also increased among the citizens. The most tangible result of the same
was extremely clean roads and neighbourhoods. During the survey in March 1998, we found the area around
every garbage bin spotlessly clean. Sweepers were sitting close to the containers because no bad smell was
emanating from them and an adequate amount of insecticides has been sprinkled around the containers. This
was a reversal of what was observed during an earlier survey in December1994.
• Insecticide use was observed to be very high in Surat by the environmentalist group which visited the city in
1996. The group reported that Gammexane, BHC which is an extremely harmful pesticide for human health
and environment, was being used at the rate of 1,100 tonnes annually. The rag-pickers and sweepers who
come in direct contact with them were the worst sufferers. However, the amount of insecticides used has
been drastically reduced in the recent past and more environment friendly insecticides are being used.
• The immediate effect of all these measures has been that the amount of garbage collected daily has
increased tremendously. In 1994, before the plague outbreak, only 450 tonnes of the 900 tonnes accumulated
garbage was lifted daily for disposal. Table 5 shows that yearly collection of garbage has increased over time
in almost each of the six zones and as a result the average daily collection has increased from 839.3 tonnes
per day in 1995 to 905.47 tonnes in 1997. The trend in the first three months of 1998 shows that it has further
increased to 917.11 tonnes per day.
Zone-Wise Collection of Solid Waste in SMC (in tonnes)
Zones 1995 1996 1997 1998
(upto 16 March)
Central 1,34,927 1,38,849 1,41,893 25,949
North 21,201 33,293 31,026 7,092
South 44,468 44,317 39,760 10,756
East 62,171 48,453 57,987 10,774
West 20,751 21,457 30,627 6,047
South - West 22,836 27,894 35,202 8,165
Total 3,06,354 3,14,263 3,30,495 68,783
Average daily collection 839.30 860.99 905.47 917.11
Source: Surat Municipal Corporation, 1998
• Sweeping and cleaning of roads has also improved remarkably. Before May, 1995 the level of sanitation was
about 35 per cent while solid waste removal was 40 per cent. With micro planning and an additional per
capita investment of Rs. 47 only, the area covered by sanitation has increased to 95 per cent and cleaning of
solid waste was increased to 97 per cent every day.
• In comparison with other metropolitan cities, Surat has progressed rapidly in garbage management as is
depicted in Table 6. It may also be observed from Table 6 that the efficiency level of garbage collection is
highest in Surat. Despite having the highest number of sweepers and highest value of mechanical assets,
Mumbai, with only 78.69 per cent efficiency level, lags far behind.
• The intangible effects have been the tremendous boosting of morale of employees, officials and residents of
the city. A sense of belonging and pride has developed among the citizens who were earlier indifferent to the
city’s well being and almost resigned to the fact that filth and dirt was a part of life.
Garbage Disposal Parameters in Selected Major Cities of India , 1995
City Collection Generation Efficiency No. of Dustbins & Mechanical Manual Mechanical Private
per person per person sweepers collection Assets loading loading contractor
gms. / day gms. \ day (Rs. in million) % % %
Ahmedabad 409 518 78.96 6,827 552 1,135 - 100 -
Baroda 259 463 55.94 2,500 572 335 - - -
Surat 491 517 94.97 4,173 647 542 40 60 50
Mumbai 469 596 78.69 16,671 18,967 2,941 - - 70
Pune 353 480 73.54 1,880 3,050 296 40 60 -
Chennai 478 591 80.88 6,323 11,600 2,647 100 - -
Bangalore 444 554 80.14 6,670 8,860 1,312 100 - -
Source: Priti H. Parikh, 1997, "Solid Waste Management in Indian Cities", Unpublished M. Plan. Dissertation,
School of Planning.
Public Health Activities
1.7 HEALTH CARE
The concept of "public health mapping", followed by the SMC in the post plague period, through an integrated
approach of urban management, boils down to the "single concept of public health management" (Rao). It was
developed by the SMC as the primary strategy for improving the city’s health status. The sanitation and solid
waste disposal initiatives are an integral part of preventive public health activities. Simultaneously, preventive
health care measures, promotional and curative health care systems were strengthened for an effective control of
disease and reduction in mortality and morbidity among the city population. The Health Department of the SMC is
headed by the Deputy Commissioner (Health and Hospitals), who is assisted by a Medical Officer and a Deputy
Medical Officer and a number of doctors and other supporting staff. Unlike other municipal governments in the
country, which have very limited health related activities except birth and death registration and providing
immunisation, the SMC maintains a network of hospitals, urban health centres, maternity homes, mobile
dispensaries and pathological laboratories.
The Health Department, which includes sanitation and solid waste management as well, is the largest department
in the SMC both in terms of manpower and financial allocation. However it has been observed that the health
infrastructure is still inadequate for the rapidly growing population of the city. The 310 government, municipal and
private hospitals in the city equipped with 5,044 beds, serve 20 lakh people resulting in the availability of only 2.5
beds per 1,000 population.
The Health Department of the SMC has separate wings for epidemic control, filaria and malaria control, leprosy
control, vaccination, etc. However, the functioning of the Health Department could not keep its mark. In the pre-
plague days, SMC’s health infrastructure was not only inadequate but also suffered from various limitations like
inadequate medical and para-medical personnel, irregular supply of medicines etc. (Ghosh and Ahmad, 1996).
Strengthening of the health infrastructure, revival of work ethics among the health workers, meticulously planned
disease monitoring system and an extensive sanitation drive followed by the SMC have worked wonders for the
city’s health indicators in the last two years. Surat used to suffer from several seasonal epidemics like malaria,
typhoid, jaundice, gastro-enteritis and influenza before plague. Water borne diseases had the highest reported
cases. The preventive health care measures in the new order put emphasis on the chlorine testing of drinking
water. Besides testing of water at the water plants all the supervisors have been provided simple kits for chlorine
testing. They compulsorily test water in slums under their jurisdiction and additional five samples at household
level. Supply of chlorine tablets to individual households where water quality is not satisfactory is also ensured.
The areas not supported by municipal piped water supply are catered to by municipal water tankers. To avoid
ground water pollution any choked or over flowing drain is cleaned within 24 hours.
A unique system of health monitoring has been introduced which entails close surveillance of health indicators on
a regular basis. It provides an early warning system before outbreak of any epidemic. The meticulous system
invokes recording of daily inputs from the 275 health surveillance centres in the whole network of municipal
hospitals and health centres in the prescribed format by the health and sanitation workers. In each ward
information is taken every day from the five best practising private doctors in the area about reported cases of
different diseases in their dispensaries. This daily reporting system facilitates constant preparedness towards
tackling eventuality and epidemics of any kind. So much so that even the health department has set up a constant
monitoring and control team of trained professionals for plague preparedness. The team reportedly dissects rats
and sends blood slides for examination to the National Institute of Communicable Diseases on a regular basis.
The constant monitoring of disease pattern and provision of better health care and sanitation facilities have had a
tremendous effect on mortality and morbidity rates in the city. The incidence of water borne diseases and malaria,
which were the two most common diseases in the city in the pre-plague period, have come down to a significant
extent in the post-plague period. The birth rate, death rate and infant mortality which were showing a downward
trend in the last three decades, further improved after plague.
Trend in Environmental Pollution Related and Water Borne Diseases in Surat
Diseases 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
eported caseDeaths eported caseDeaths eported caseDeaths eported caseDeaths eported case Deaths
Acute Diarrhoeal Diseases 4,335 20 4,224 15 3,090 10 3,608 3 2,282 1
Acute Respiratory Infection 26,915 40 38,467 31 31,610 14 45,123 18 51,126 3
Enteric Fever 629 7 564 0 309 0 135 0 102 0
Viral Hepatitis 1,639 33 1,635 15 579 13 653 20 674 10
Tuberculosis `2,118 114 1,628 32 1,569 30 1,621 85 1,270 27
Viral Encephalitis 0 0 0 0 4 1 0 0 0 0
Source: Surat Municipal Corporation, 1998
Incidence of Malaria in Surat 1989- 1998
Year Blood samples collected (No. Examined Cases Positive cases
1989 1,24,273 12,4,273 41,007 33.00
1990 1,69,257 1,69,257 53,838 31.81
1991 1,88,268 1,88,268 43,421 23.06
1992 2,56,371 2,56,371 46,003 17.94
1993 2,19,922 2,19,922 33,493 15.23
1994 2,29,072 2,29,072 21,540 9.40
1995 2,40,088 2,40,088 12,211 5.09
1996 3,91,710 3,91,710 15,873 4.05
1997 5,85,868 5,85,868 9,744 1.66
1998 50,715 50,715 496 0.97
Source: Surat Municipal Corporation, 1998
Birth Rate, Death Rates and Infant Mortality Rates in Surat City
Year Birth Rate Death Rate Infant Mortality Rate
1971 33.90 12.10 68.00
1981 30.20 8.60 50.00
1991 29.90 5.30 23.00
1997 21.92 4.43 21.45
Source: Surat Municipal Corporation, 1998
These developments in the health profile of the city which are primarily the result of the recent initiatives are
evident in Table 7, 8 and 9.
This success of sanitation and public health activities involved moderate additional expenditure. It may be
observed from Table 10 that there was a sudden increase in public health expenditure from Rs. 251.3 million in
1993-’94 to Rs. 329.99 million (20.69% of the total expenditure) in 1994-’95, the year the plague epidemic struck
the city. Therefore, the annual health and sanitation expenditure as a proportion of the total expenditure has
gradually stabilised to around 11 per cent in the post plague period. (Figure 3)
Expenditure on Health, Sanitation and Family Welfare in SMC (Rs. in millions)
Year Total Municipal % increase Health % increase
Expenditure * & Sanitation Expenditure
1993-’94 1259.79 - 251.30 -
1994-’95 1595.36 26.63 329.99 31.31
1995-’96 2191.09 37.34 324.75 -1.58
1996-’97 3240.79 47.91 350.10 7.80
1997-’98 ** 3607.65 11.32 388.72 11.03
1997-’98 *** 2563.84 -28.93 279.52 -28.09
1998-’99 ** 4518.23 76.23 488.83 74.88
Source: Budgets of Surat Municipal Corporation.
Note: * means Revenue + Capital Expenditure
*** actual upto 9.3.98
1.8 WATER SUPPLY, SEWERAGE AND DRAINAGE
The SMC, at present, produces around 320 MLD of water which covers 62 per cent of the total area of the city
and 71 per cent of the total population. The per capita water supply is 135 litres per day. In the last two years the
Corporation has taken many steps to improve the water supply system in the city. A weir-cum-causeway has
been constructed to create a big reservoir upstream of river Tapi which has become a perennial source of water.
However, even now most of the extended area which was added to the city in 1986 is not covered by potable
water supply system. Although hand pumps have been provided in these areas, they spew non-potable water, as
the ground water is brackish due to nearness to the sea. A fleet of 300 water tankers have been pressed into
service by the Corporation to provide drinking water in the areas devoid of a proper water supply system.
To cover the remaining 38 per cent area and 29 per cent population, the Corporation has proposed the extension
of water supply projects in a phased manner (Table 11). Expenditure on water supply projects has increased from
Rs. 93 million in 1993-’94 to Rs. 529 million in 1997-’98, recording an increase of 468.8 per cent. In the budget
prepared for the financial year 1998-’99 the expenditure has been further enhanced by 36.11 per cent and the
amount earmarked for such projects is Rs. 720 million, which is nearly 16 per cent of the total municipal
expenditure proposed for the year (Table 12).
Water Supply – Present Coverage and Future Projections in SMC
Area % of Total Area Population % of Total Population
(sq. kms.) (in million)
1997 69.23 61.66 1.57 71.15
1998 112.27 100.00 2.32 100.00
1999 112.27 100.00 2.44 100.00
2000 112.27 100.00 2.56 100.00
2001 112.27 100.00 2.68 100.00
Source: Surat Municipal Corporation, 1998
The existing sewerage system covers only 26.16 per cent of the area and 61 per cent of the population which is
inadequate and much needs to be done to extend the services to the population and area presently devoid of
sewerage facilities. The existing sewerage network in the core city area, covering an area of 8.26 sq. kms.,
installed in 1958, is inadequate for the growing population of the area. To complicate the situation further, there is
a near complete absence of sewerage treatment plants in the city. Only two zones have limited treatment facilities
the rest of the untreated sewage flows to the nearby creek. The large part of the city which doesn’t have access to
sewerage network depends on storm water drainage for sewage disposal. Sullage from individual toilets with
septic tanks, community toilet blocks in slums and poorer localities either flows through the storm water drain or is
cleaned by the Corporation and disposed at the creek, from where it ultimately flows to river Tapi.
SMC has chalked out detailed plans for providing sewerage network to the rest of the city. However, before the
extension of the existing drainage and sewerage network, the Corporation aims at augmenting the water supply
system whereby it can cover the entire area and population of the city. The expenditure on sewerage projects has
grown from Rs. 82.8 million in 1993-’94 to Rs. 381.2 million in 1997-’98. The 1998-’99 budget provides Rs. 320
million for the sewerage and drainage projects. Besides, the Corporation is also looking for institutional funding to
meet the additional financial requirements for sewerage projects.
Expenditure on Water Supply Sewerage and Drainage in SMC (Rs. in Million)
Year Water Supply Sewerage and Drainage
(Revenue + Capital) (Revenue + Capital)
1993-’94 92.9 82.8
1994-’95 157.3 164.4
1995-’96 207.2 190.8
1996-’97 510.6 252.4
1997-’98 (upto 9.3.98) 529.8 381.2
1998-’99 (proposed) 720.00 320.00
Source: Surat Municipal Corporation, 1998
1.9 SANITATION AND HEALTH SERVICES IN SLUMS
With progressive economic activities and tremendous job opportunities Surat has attracted skilled and unskilled
labourers from all over the country. Even though they contribute significantly to the city’s economy, the city’s
infrastructure is too inadequate to provide housing and basic amenities. The poorer migrant labourers end up
residing in authorised and unauthorised slums with no proper drinking water and sanitation facility. The survey of
slums sponsored by the SMC and conducted by the Centre for Social Studies, Surat, in 1992, showed that there
were 0.43 million slum population, distributed over 93 thousand households across 294 authorised and
unauthorised slum pockets with an average family size of 4.6 persons per unit (Das,1994). Slums constituted 27.5
per cent of the total population of the city in 1992 as compared to 17.3 per cent in 1973. It is estimated that, at
present, 40 per cent of the city’s population lives in slums and 80 per cent of these are migrants from other states
or from other parts of Gujarat. These slums are usually sited on encroached municipal or private land. A majority
of the slums are located along major transport corridors, along the bank of river Tapi, canal line and near factory
premises. Most of these are marginal lands in low lying areas without proper drainage. People in slums live in
extremely congested and unhygienic conditions and as many as 10 to 20 labourers some times share a single
room on a shift basis. The acute sanitation and problems related to provision of basic services which prevailed in
the pre-plague period can be observed from Table 12
Basic Amenities in Slums of Surat
Amenity 1973 1992
Private taps (%households) 7.00 18.9
Private latrine (% of households) 2.00 20.93
Individual Electricity connections (%households) 7.79 25.01
Private ownership of land (% households) 33.32 37.30
Drainage facility (% slums) 16.00 40.00
Private water connections in slums (No.) 2,062 23,040
Public stand posts (No.) 343 1,299
Households per public stand post (No.) 45 72
Persons per stand post (No.) 236 334
Private latrines (No.) 550 19,667
Public toilets (No.) 655 558
Households per public toilet (No.) 23 168
Persons per public toilet (No.) 377 777
Source: Ghosh and Ahmad, 1996.
Improvement of sanitation in slums was one of the most important focuses in the post-plague sanitation drive. The
strategies adopted by the Corporation were both in-situ development and relocation. The decision was to provide
community facilities rather than individual facilities. Community water hydrants, pay and use community toilets,
paved open drains, paved roads and streetlights have been provided on a priority basis in a majority of slums in
the last three years. For constructing community toilet blocks specialist NGOs like Sulabh International and
Paryavaran were invited. They constructed 57 toilet blocks, with 10 to 20 seats in each block, totalling 794 seats.
All previous community toilet blocks constructed by the Corporation, which were in a dilapidated condition due to
lack of maintenance, have been demolished. The newly constructed pay-and-use community toilet blocks are also
being maintained by the same NGOs. They charge a minimal amount from male users but not from female and
children below 12 years of age. The provision of amenities in slums for the last two years can be seen from Table
Besides in-situ development of slums, resettlement of slum dwellers situated in vulnerable sites to an improved
location was another strategy adopted by the SMC. In the last two years 3150 slum households have been
relocated in nearly ten thousand square metre of area, spread in different parts of the city. These resettlement
colonies have been provided with electricity, public stand-posts for water, community toilet blocks, roads and
Gokul Nagar in Bhatar area of Athwa zone is a resettled slum, which we visited during the survey, is almost 12
kms. from the city. Slums have been shifted from the Nanpura area of the Central zone to widen roads. About 600
households have been given land in this settlement which is a reclaimed municipal dumping site. The slum
dwellers have made their new huts according to their own capacity. Land was given free, but no assistance came
from the SMC for construction of huts. They pay Rs. 170 as tax to the SMC for the land and other facilities.
Housing condition is still bad because most of the occupants are economically very poor and are holding small
jobs as rickshaw pullers, porters or petty job holders. The SMC has provided 15 community toilets for ladies and
an equal number for males. Six community water stand-posts serve 600 households. They were shifted here two
years ago. They are trying to adjust to the new settlement. Even though their new dwellings and living
environment are much better than the place where they had lived before, there are still some practical difficulties
faced by them. Their complaint was that the number of toilets and water stand-posts provided by the Corporation
wasn’t enough. They also complained that the area was not well connected to other parts of the city where a
majority of the residents have to go for work. Sufficient job opportunities are also not available for those who earn
their living through petty jobs. There is no municipal health care centre or primary school for children in the area.
Despite these difficulties they are optimistic that the SMC will gradually remove all their difficulties. They are
happy that at least now they own a piece of land and a hut, which they can improve gradually.
The Sanitation drive is very intensive in all types of slums. During our repeat visits to the slums in Ved road area
which were the worst affected by plague in 1994, we observed a total change in these settlements not only in
terms of physical infrastructure and cleanliness but in the attitude of the people as well. Each slum now has paved
roads. The drainage system has been improved considerably and the area which was submerged under 10 feet
of water no longer faces any water logging during the rainy season. Each area is spotlessly clean with the
municipal sweepers cleaning the outer streets and lanes and the people themselves taking charge of the inner
lanes. The civic consciousness has been so enhanced that the slum dwellers no longer throw garbage on the
roads. Each dwelling unit keeps a small dustbin in which the household stores the refuse and it is cleaned daily by
the sweeper in charge of the area or by the people themselves.
Health care services and surveillance system presently being followed by the SMC is more rigorous in slums than
in the other parts of the city. Setting up of urban health centres duly equipped with doctors and health workers is a
new initiative which has been introduced in the city. There are 14 such centres which cater primarily to the poorer
areas. In the budget of the present financial year, 8 additional health centres are proposed to be set up in different
parts of the city. Each municipal health worker is responsible for the health requirements of 5,000 households.
She takes care of all facets of health care - promotional, preventive and curative. She is also responsible for
immunisation of children in slums and poorer localities. She takes care of all health needs of the people of the
locality assigned to her and can refer any patient directly to the hospital in case of an emergency. These health
and sanitation measures have had a positive impact on the environmental sanitation and health status of the slum
dwellers. This was evident not only from the municipal health records but was also observed by us during our field
visit. The same sentiments were echoed by the residents themselves during our conversations with them.
According to them, their children no longer fall prey to malaria and gastro-enteritis as often as before.
Environment Improvement of Slums in SMC, 1996-’98
Zone Slums Tenure Roads Street Street r
Washing Sewerage torm water Drai line / Stand- Total
(No.) (No.) (meters) Paving Light Place (meters) (meters) Expenditure
(meters) (No.) (No.) (in Rs. ‘000)
West 6 1,059 2,046 0 429 2,227 - 1,082 201 5,985
Central 11 5,125 306 669 649 0 0 0 78 1,702
North 34 8,480 8,902 3,464 915 0 0 0 788 14,069
East 6 7,438 2,804 430 900 0 3,171 17,518 0 24,823
South 6 41,325 3,216 874 607 2,530 - 97,506 162 1,04,895
South West 7 2,857 668 570 966 113 - 6,363 109 8,789
Total 70 66,284 17,942 6,007 4,466 4,870 - 1,22,469 1,338 1,57,092
Source: Surat Municipal Corporation, 1998
1.10 COMMUNITY CO-OPERATION
To extend the sewerage and drainage facilities in the congested slums, where the inner lanes were barely 3 feet
wide, the Corporation needed the co-operation of the people in the form of their consent to demolish some parts
of their dwelling units. The slum dwellers, in most cases, not only agreed but also came forward to sacrifice parts
of their land and dwelling for the common good. In many cases they themselves demolished parts of their huts in
order to facilitate the project of the SMC for widening of inner lanes for carrying the service lines. Shah Bhagal is
one such renovated slum where we interacted with the local people during the recent visit. The inner lanes of the
slums, which used to be 3 feet wide where one person could barely walk, have been widened to almost 10 feet.
The open drains which used to carry both sullage and storm water have been laid under the ground. The people
were very happy as there was no water logging in recent monsoons, whereas before renovation the area used to
be under as much as 6 feet of water during the rainy season. As a consequence of these measures, the incidence
of water borne diseases has also declined considerably.
AUTHOR Amar Sood : firstname.lastname@example.org
Disaster Management Initiatives
Natural disasters affect everyone alike although the nature of impact varies from region to region and sector to
sector with the coping capacity of an individual sector being the differentiating factor. The catastrophic fallout of
natural disasters on the community and the people is very well documented by now. At the same time, it is their
impact on the existence, survival and viability of the economic muscle of a nation, community and region, i.e. the
corporate sector, which also merits equally focused attention. The critical and catalytic role the corporate sector
can play in mainstreaming disaster management into not only its own functioning but also in other sectors and
among the community is now being appreciated and duly recognized as an inalienable part of corporate social
Confederation of Indian Industry had taken the initiative of constituting a Disaster Management Committee in May
2001 at the national level. The CII Disaster Management Committee aims to facilitate the promotion of Disaster
Prevention, Preparedness and Mitigation at all levels of government, corporate sector and community. It will also
explore the possibility of raising volunteer force(s) to deal with disasters both man-made and natural as done in
Disaster Management Objectives
• Facilitate the promotion of Disaster Preparedness Concept at the
Central Government level
State Government level
District Authorities level
Corporate Sector level
• Explore the possibility of raising a volunteer force to deal with disasters both man-made & natural as done in
• Creating awareness for disaster preparedness and inculcating the speedy response needed for disaster
mitigation both man-made & natural by holding Talks / Lectures / Conferences and Disaster Mitigation
Summit comprising International Conference & Exhibition.
• Advise C I I National Council.
• Creating Disaster Preparedness Movement in the country and identifying role of the stake holders in cities,
towns and villages
Disaster Management Initiatives
Extending its support in the area of disaster management since 1999 especially in disaster response,
rehabilitation and reconstruction, CII has partnered with the Government initiatives and development
organizations like the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) for effective implementation of disaster
risk reduction activities and has been regularly organizing summits and symposiums to promote the same. The
“Public-Private-People (PPP) Partnership for Natural Disaster Risk Management” is the off-shoot of these
initiatives. The arena of issues dealt by CII includes :
• AWARENESS GENERATION :
(i) to make people aware of their vulnerabilities and the need for prevention, mitigation and preparedness
(ii) preparation of a booklet containing information on various hazards and the steps to be taken for mitigating the
same by CEOs of industries.
(iii) co-opting CII as a member of the Steering Committee for Mass Media Campaign.
(iv) Sponsoring awareness generation capsules in print and electronic media.
• TRAINING :
(i) training of industrial personnel, nearby community and volunteers in disaster management.
(ii) Development of training modules and identification of Master Trainers.
(iii) Linking the trained personnel with the Disaster Management Teams under the District Administration.
• MOCK DRILLS :
Conducting mock-drills at regular intervals to enhance preparedness levels and linkages with the District
Administration and other Emergency Support Functions (ESF) departments/ agencies, especially targeted at
chemical, mining and pharmaceutical sectors.
• DEVELOPMENT OF ON-SITE AND OFF-SITE DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLANS :
The development of on-site and off-site plans has also been initiated by industries in consultation with the district
administration. At some places, these plans have already been formulated and shared with the administration for
linking with the District DM Plans. The process of development of on-site and off-site DM plans entails
identification of the hazards to which the industry, the neighboring areas and the region is susceptible; estimation
of vulnerable zones using credible worst case scenarios; enumeration of characteristics of socio-economic
conditions of human population viz. number, concentration, health conditions, social infrastructure and support
systems in the vulnerable areas; listing of critical facilities in these areas; analysis of risks posed by each industry
based on readily available information on the likelihood of severity of consequences; prioritization of industries on
the basis of estimated risks; ranking of risks; compilation of information on community safeguards, response
capabilities and previous accident records; assessing probability of occurrence of disasters; enumeration of
resources available within the premises, in the neighborhood and likely to be mobilized along with their sources to
meet the eventualities likely to occur; conducting mock-drills to test the viability of the DM plan etc.
In Gujarat Province, the Gujarat State Petroleum Corporation and the Gujarat State Petronet Limited have well-
developed on-site and off-site DM plans. Similarly, the Ankleshwar Industrial Association has been assisting its
member industries in development of on-site plans and conducting mock-drills.
• PREPARATION OF INVENTORY OF RESOURCES :
Inventorization of resources is a pre-requisite for mounting a speedy and effective disaster response. An on-line
web-enable resource inventory has been developed and commissioned to capture the resources in terms of
specialized equipments, machinery, manpower etc. in the India Disaster Resource Inventory (IDRN). The web-
enabled inventory IDRN already has more than eighty thousand records of resources available with Government
machinery at the Central and Provincial (State) levels across 550 districts in the country.
• SENSITIZATION PROGRAMMES :
As per the work plan, a number of sensitization programmes have already been conducted in different provinces
(states) in association with the State Government authorities and the Ministry of Home Affairs and over one
thousand five hundred senior functionaries and personnel from industries across the country have been
sensitized to induce a mindset of disaster risk reduction and mitigation. These sensitization programs have been
conducted in New Delhi, Chennai, Coimbatore, Jamshedpur, Bhubaneswar, Guwahati, Dimapur,
• ORGANIZATION OF AN ANNUAL EVENT :
To promote Public-Private-Partnership and to facilitate technology transfer and information exchange in the field
of disaster management with other institutions, organizations and corporate sector bodies within and outside the
The CII launched the ‘India Partnership Forum’ in February, 2001 in New Delhi in partnership with the United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to promote and strengthen multistakeholder dialogue on Corporate
Social Responsibility (CSR) issues and a common understanding of good corporate citizenship particularly
through evolution of a common code. The Forum also seeks to promote and pilot new and innovative initiatives in
corporate partnership for development.
1.2 WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM
Coinciding with the 2001 Annual Meeting of the World Economic Forum, an earthquake devastated Gujarat, India.
Forum members in the engineering, construction and logistics fields were ready to put their resources to work but
found there was no established mechanism for getting this help to relief workers on the ground.
Faced with this, Forum members recognized that as global corporate citizens, the private sector must do more
than simply fund relief organizations. In their view, business should proactively participate in a multi-sector effort
to prevent and mitigate the effects of disasters.
In response, Forum members established the Disaster Resource Network (DRN) – a point of contact and
coordination for companies that want to provide support to disaster management efforts in developing countries.
The vision of the Disaster Resource Network (DRN) is to make it easier for businesses to donate talent or in-kind
goods and services to disaster relief and recovery operations in developing countries and to ensure that their help
is delivered in a coordinated and effective manner.
The DRN today is a Swiss non-profit private foundation, coordinates the donations of goods and pro-bono
services contributed by members of the World Economic Forum. The in-kind donation of time and administrative
expertise from these corporate executives keeps overhead costs to a minimum. The DRN solicits additional
financial and in-kind support from companies around the world that want to make a difference when disaster
In just three years, through its global alliance of business partners, the DRN has contributed resources to
humanitarian relief efforts on four continents. Its work demonstrates how much can be accomplished when in the
face of disaster business is organized to effectively dispatch assistance to the site.
• To increase the impact of corporate contributions to disaster relief and recovery efforts by helping companies
target more money, goods and services to unmet needs and by assuring accountability.
• To create Emergency Teams that deploy business know-how, human resources, equipment and technology
at the request of the United Nations to speed the flow of live-saving supplies and improve coordination of
relief and recovery efforts.
• To stimulate business participation in long-term economic recovery efforts through national and regional
coalitions with government and community agencies that are responsive to local needs, create jobs, assure
accountability, and reduce future disaster-related economic risks.
Disaster Management Initiatives
• Radios for Tsunami survivors, Asia, 14 June 2005
Six months after the devastating tsunami that struck South-East Asia, thousands of people still lack electricity or
any direct means of communication – a reality that complicates life for both survivors and humanitarian
assistance workers isolated in out-of-the-way villages and camps. For those in and around Banda Aceh, this
changed on 14 June with the arrival of 500 Lifeline Radios donated to Mercy Corps by the Freeplay Foundation.
Constructed to operate in the harshest of conditions and climates, Lifeline Radios are easy to use, receive
excellent AM/FM/SW reception and play for many hours on wind-up energy or solar power. Mercy Corps will
distribute the radios to staff and survivors in remote locations providing them access to broadcast updates about
public health concerns, reconstruction activities and aid programmes operating in the area.
Warehoused in Johannesburg, the Freeplay Foundation contacted the Disaster Resource Network (DRN) for help
securing free ocean transport for the radios. The DRN in turn contacted China Ocean Shipping (Group)
Company (COSCO), a diversified company headquartered in Beijing, China, that focuses primarily on global
shipping and logistics services.
In an exception to company policy restricting the transport of tsunami donations to shipments originating in China
and destined for ports in East-Asia, COSCO agreed to help. The process required the cooperation and
involvement of key executives and managers on three continents. The DRN is pleased to recognize COSCO for
bringing this vital resource to the people of northern Indonesia who face the enormous tasks of recovery and
• Indonesia quake, Asia, 28 March 2005
A magnitude 8.7 earthquake struck near the island of Nias off the coast of Sumatra in Indonesia on Monday, 28
March, just 100 miles southeast of December’s deadly tsunami. The DRN is in touch with a number of relief
organizations on the ground and will provide assistance as needed. Nias, population 700,000, lies about 870
miles northwest of Jakarta.
• Tsunami, South-East Asia, 26 December 2004
Within 24 hours of an earthquake in the Indian Ocean, DRN was coordinating support to the stricken areas of
The DRN airport emergency team managed the handling of all relief supplies at Colombo airport, Sri Lanka, and
successfully prevented the airport from becoming a bottleneck to relief efforts.
Nine DRN volunteers from DHL Worldwide, Aramex, DNATA and TNT directed the unloading of aircraft, sorting
and temporary storage of supplies, and the onward transport of those supplies to responsible humanitarian
agencies in Sri Lanka.
Under the direction of the DRN team, 150 local volunteers moved over 4,000,000 pounds of supplies through the
Over the past year, DRN has lead a group of transportation and logistics firms to establish a team of air cargo
volunteer professionals for emergency deployment such as this. The team was deployed in Colombo on 28
December 2004 at the request of the United Nations Joint Logistics Centre (UNJLC).
The UNJLC requested a second DRN team on 30 December 2004 to resolve serious congestion at the Banda
Aceh provincial airport in Indonesia. Wilfried DeBrouwer, UNJLC Team Leader responsible for air coordination,
noted that the UN is “extremely pleased with the effectiveness of the DRN team in Colombo”.
Banda Aceh is located less than 100 kilometers from the epicenter of the 8.9-magnitude earthquake which
triggered the tsunami.
DRN India worked cooperatively with government and local humanitarian agencies to put into effect the disaster
response plans that have been collaboratively developed over the past two years. Due to the DRN's involvement,
these plans now incorporate the resources of the private sector in India, and internationally.
On 29 December 2004, DRN offered to provide staff augmentation to the United Nations Office for Coordination
of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA) offices in New York to assist with the monitoring and coordination of private
sector resources and contributions.
DRN has identified volunteers from major international engineering firms to assist with water, sanitation and
structural assessments upon request.
• Hurricane relief, Grenada, West Indies, 7 September 2004
Hurricane Ivan left some 60,000 people homeless on the island of Grenada. Approximately 90% of the houses
were damaged or destroyed, forcing as many as 8,000 people into temporary shelters. Fallen debris seriously
impeded the restoration of utility and transportation services, making it difficult to get the materials and equipment
in to repair and rebuild homes, restore utilities and re-open roads.
Immediately following the storm, with the help of donors such as Parsons Brinckerhoff, Nestec, Lowes, Home
Depot and Danaher Tool Group, the DRN secured three shipments of hand tools (chainsaws, safety goggles,
rope, tree branch loppers). The kits were soon transported to relief workers on the ground free of charge by DHL.
Several weeks later during a visit by Chris Weeks, Director of Operations, the DRN was alerted to the plight of T.
A. Marryshow Community College, where equipment losses from the storm had decimated the Science and
Construction Department. In response, the DRN contacted Grainger International and with funding from its donors
arranged a line of credit through which the College can purchase discounted equipment and supplies.
• Emergency medicine, Ascención, Paraguay, 2 August 2004
The Ycua Bolanos' supermarket fire killed 426 and injured more than 292 people. The need for antibiotics and
burn treatment supplies was immediate and critical.
In response, the Emergency Committee of the United Nations contacted DRN with a request for assistance.
Working with local health officials in Paraguay, the DRN quickly began sourcing donations for medications in short
supply at local hospitals.
Pfizer and Bristol-Myers Squibb played key roles in helping the DRN secure an A-list of pharmaceuticals through
the Partnership for Quality Medical Donations and Direct Relief International.
In the end, each donated drug was accompanied by a half-page report detailing dosage requirements and
precautions associated with its use. A process was set up to alert the DRN as the need for specific
pharmaceuticals emerged. DHL was again on hand to provide air and ground transport until the situation
• Earthquake, Morocco, 24 February 2004
The earthquake that struck northeastern Morocco killed more than 500 people and injured another 400 in the
remote villages of Ait Kamara, Bediyane, Sidi Youssef and Izafzafran. Within hours, the DRN mobilized industry
partner DHL to transport 60 tons of medical supplies, tools and clothing to relief workers from the International
Federation of Red Cross & Red Crescent Societies and the Moroccan Red Crescent. In just five days, some
1,000 tonnes of food were distributed to the affected areas.
• Airport Emergency Team (AET), Dubai
When disaster occurs, getting relief supplies quickly and effectively to the affected area is critical. A number of
organizations and governments spring into action. Airports soon become overrun with shipments of emergency
equipment, staff and supplies. Inexperience and lack of coordination on the ground can create unnecessary
delays. To help remedy this, the DRN assembled a team of 60 volunteer logistics experts and heavy equipment
Based in Dubai, the hub for relief operations in both the Middle East and Africa, the Team is positioned to deploy
immediately to any disaster site in the region. Equipped with two all-terrain forklifts and subsistence supplies
(food, clothing, water, tents, cooking equipment) for 7-10 days, the AET offers essential services to relief workers
on the ground. The Team will be deployed at the request of United Nations Disaster Assessment Team through
its Joint Logistics Centre.
1.3 US DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN
The National Response Plan is an all-discipline, all-hazards plan that establishes a single, comprehensive
framework for the management of domestic incidents. It provides the structure and mechanisms for the
coordination of Federal support to State, local, and tribal incident managers and for exercising direct Federal
authorities and responsibilities. The NRP assists in the important homeland security mission of preventing terrorist
attacks within the United States; reducing the vulnerability to all natural and man-made hazards; and minimizing
the damage and assisting in the recovery from any type of incident that occurs.
COMMUNITY EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM (CERT) PROGRAM
The Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) program helps train people to be better prepared to
respond to emergency situations in their communities. When emergencies occur, CERT members can give critical
support to first responders, provide immediate assistance to victims, and organize spontaneous volunteers at a
disaster site. CERT members can also help with non-emergency projects that help improve the safety of the
NUCLEAR INCIDENT RESPONSE
We provide expert personnel and specialized equipment to a number of federal emergency response entities that
deal with nuclear emergencies, nuclear accidents, and nuclear terrorism.
URBAN SEARCH & RESCUE (US&R)
Urban search-and-rescue is considered a "multi-hazard" discipline, as it may be needed for a variety of
emergencies or disasters, including earthquakes, hurricanes, typhoons, storms and tornadoes, floods, dam
failures, technological accidents, terrorist activities, and hazardous materials releases.
GUIDE FOR MOBILE EMERGENCY MANAGERS
Disasters may require resources beyond the capabilities of the local or State authorities. In response to Regional
requests for support, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) provides mobile telecommunications,
operational support, life support, and power generation assets for the on-site management of disaster and all-
Disaster Management Initiatives
Local and State governments share the responsibility for protecting their citizens from disasters, and for helping
them to recover when a disaster strikes. In some cases, a disaster is beyond the capabilities of the State and
local government to respond.
The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, Public Law 93-288, as amended (the
Stafford Act) was enacted to support State and local governments and their citizens when disasters overwhelm
them. This law establishes a process for requesting and obtaining a Presidential disaster declaration, defines the
type and scope of assistance available under the Stafford Act, and sets the conditions for obtaining that
assistance. This paper explains the declaration process and provides an overview of the assistance available.
THE PROCESS OF DECLARING AN EMERGENCY SITUATION
The Stafford Act (§401 and 501) requires that: "All requests for a declaration by the President that a major
disaster or emergency exists shall be made by the Governor [chief executive] of the affected State." A State also
includes the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the Commonwealth of
the Northern Mariana Islands, Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of the Marshall Islands. The
Governor's request is made through the regional FEMA office. State, local, and Federal officials conduct a
preliminary damage assessment (PDA) to estimate the extent of the disaster and its impact on individuals and
public facilities. The information gathered during the PDA documents the severity and magnitude of the event and
is included in the Governor's request. Normally, the PDA is completed prior to the submission of the Governor's
request. However, when an obviously severe or catastrophic event occurs, the Governor's request may be
submitted prior to the PDA. Nonetheless, the Governor must still make the request and damage assessments are
As part of the request, the Governor must note that the State's emergency plan has been implemented and the
situation is of such severity and magnitude that the response is beyond State and local capability and Stafford Act
assistance is necessary. The Governor shall furnish information on the nature and amount of State and local
resources that have been or will be committed to alleviating the results of the disaster, provide an estimate of the
amount and severity of damage and the impact on the private and public sector, and provide an estimate of the
type and amount of assistance needed under the Stafford Act. In addition, the Governor will need to certify that,
for the current disaster, State and local government obligations and expenditures (of which State commitments
must be a significant portion) will comply with all applicable cost-sharing requirements.
Based on the Governor's request, the President may declare that a major disaster or emergency exists, thus
activating an array of Federal programs to assist in the response and recovery effort.
ASSISTANCE AVAILABLE UNDER A MAJOR DISASTER DECLARATION
Not all programs, however, are activated for every disaster. The determination of which programs are activated is
based on the needs found during the joint preliminary damage assessment and any subsequent information that
may be discovered.
Federal disaster assistance available under a major disaster declaration falls into three general categories:
• Individual Assistance - aid to individuals, families and business owners;
• Public Assistance - aid to public (and certain private non-profit) entities for certain emergency services and
the repair or replacement of disaster-damaged public facilities;
• Hazard Mitigation Assistance - funding for measures designed to reduce future losses to public and private
property. In the event of a major disaster declaration, all counties within the declared State are eligible to
apply for assistance under the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program.
• Some declarations will provide only individual assistance or only public assistance. Hazard mitigation
opportunities are assessed in most situations.
AUTHOR Amar Sood : email@example.com
NATIONAL DISASTER MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY
Proposal and Best Practices
Since the onset of Delhi Development Authority in 1951 followed by a number of State Development Authorities
and Town Planning Organisations; our country has witnessed about 192 development plans. But the state of our
cities and even the metros like Delhi is no different. The problem, always sighted as implementation of the plans.
India is known to have the most elaborated and stringent set of environmental laws, but the health of people is
deteriorating day by day. The problem, implementation and monitoring of the laws and policies . There are two
things which are quite evident from this; one, that the law in principle is different from the law in operation. And
two, that people seem to matter very little in law-making, which explains the apparent futility of sharing relevant
policy and legal documents with them. The Right to Information might mean the duty to publish, but on 'technical'
subjects like planning for complex coastal ecology government servants believe there is little point in honouring
that duty. This second lesson triggers further thought: Why should people be involved in shaping legal and policy
approaches to disaster management, and (if the why is answered in favour of the people) then how are we to go
about involving the people? Why should people be brought in for a community approach to disaster
management? The answer should be easy to appreciate.
If tribals in the Andamans could survive the tsunami, it was because their existing warning systems worked well in
comparison to our non-existent modern systems. The fact that traditional houses of wood and stone survived the
Uttarkashi earthquake not so long ago while modern buildings collapsed offered a similar lesson. In the flood-
prone rural North-East, you can find houses on bamboo stilts that allow flood waters to flow under them rather
than through or over! One need not multiply examples to just make a small point: Native intelligence is significant
and technical expertise needs to treat this as complementary. This intelligence needs to be tapped for devising
approaches to management of disasters. Further, policies and laws for disaster management need to provide
space for such intelligence to be counted.
Do the existing or proposed laws and policies have the necessary room for community participation? Take the
example of flood control and management. Under the present legal regime most of the important aspects of flood
management have been vested in the State officials; these are tasks like identification of areas suitable for flood
works, initiating the schemes for such works, requisition and acquisition of lands, etc. While the laws dealing with
structural measures for flood control provide for limited involvement of people especially by way of inviting
comments or objections and mandating service of notice to those affected, the laws with respect to relief works for
the victims of natural calamities vest complete powers with the State officials for any works that they may be
proposing to undertake. When it comes to the Town and Country Planning laws, apart from the fact that most do
not even envisage disaster management as a possible subject, some isolated provisions in mostly 'hidden' laws
facilitate reaction to a draft plan document at best, and do not necessarily involve the people in plan-making
stages. All this coupled with the increasing incident and magnitude of destruction created by a few recent
disasters has forced the government to evolve a Disaster Management Authority which can take up the
responsibility of dealing with such catastrophes at national level.
1.1 NDMA : The Proposal
The National Disaster Management Authority is to be constituted to formulate mitigation strategies at a central
level. The authority would be chaired by the Prime Minister of India and serviced by the Ministry of Home Affairs.
The other members of the NDMA would include:
1) Gen N.C.Vij, former Chief of Army staff who is also the Deputy Chairman of the Authority.
2) Prof S.P. Sukhatme, former Director of IIT Bombay and ex Chairman of the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board,
3) Mr K.M. Singh, Former Director General - C.I.S.F
4) Mr.M.Sashidhar Reddy, former Andhra Pradesh Minister for Environment.
The NDMA will have the responsibility for laying down the policies and plans for disaster management. The
Authority will approve the National Disaster Management Plan. It can lay down guidelines to be followed by
Ministries and Departments of the Central Government and any state authority in drawing up the State Plan.
The Authority will also coordinate the enforcement and implementation of the policies and plans for disaster
management and arrange for, and oversee the provision of funds for mitigation measures, preparedness and
It may also frame guidelines for the minimum standards of relief to be provided to persons affected by disaster
and give directions regarding relief in loan repayment or grant fresh loans on such concessional terms as may be
The Authority may also take such measures for prevention of disaster, of mitigation of its effects, or for
preparedness and capacity building for dealing with a threatening disaster situation or disaster.
1.2 BEST PRACTICES
• Uttar Pradesh :
Uttar Pradesh being a large state with varied geo-climactic conditions, it was decided that TA activities be focused
on the overall policy issues at state level, and all other TA inputs be centered on improving flood management
and mitigation within the state, particularly the eastern districts, which are more vulnerable to floods. There was
some work done towards planning for Industrial hazards in Kanpur district as well.
A major achievement in the state was the preparation and presentation to the government of various options for
institutional arrangements for disaster management in Uttar Pradesh. This was reviewed by concerned officials
and consensus emerged in a workshop on ‘Institutional Arrangements and Planning for Disaster Management in
Uttar Pradesh‘ in December 01. This was the basis for an enhanced Commissionerate of Disaster Management
with enhanced technical manpower that was endorsed and is now being submitted to the Uttar Pradesh Cabinet
for acceptance. So too, the establishment of a Disaster Management Cell in UP State Institute for Rural
Development was actively pursued and accepted by the Government of India including funding for two positions
of disaster management faculty.
The GoUP Steering Committee as well as the Executing Agency was particularly interested in assistance in
preparing model Disaster Management Plans at Village and District level that could be used throughout the state,
and in utilizing TA expertise to assist in the preparation/review of a State-level Disaster Management Plan.
Following this, technical assistance was provided in Uttar Pradesh towards demonstrating the process of
developing and linking disaster mitigation and management planning at various levels, as has been explained
below. Two plans have been prepared for Kanpur and Maharajganj districts, which represent typical hazard prone
districts in the state. These plans were reviewed and endorsed in district level meetings and workshops.
A second priority of the GoUP was improved capacity at the District level, both in comprehensive disaster
management and in specific, calendar-related activities for mitigation and preparedness. The TA has therefore
placed special emphasis on information exchange, standardized disaster assessment procedures and reporting at
district and community levels. District plan workshops were held at District levels and several village level action
plans were drafted through pilot workshops at village level and the same were shared with local NGOs at district
level through two workshops.
• Uttaranchal :
Uttaranchal is a disaster prone state. Landslides, forest fires, cloudbursts and flash-floods are seasonal in nature
and they strike at a certain period of the year with high frequency. Earthquakes are the most devastating disaster
in the mountains and are unpredictable. So far, in the recent years (1990 onwards) Uttaranchal has experienced
two major earthquakes (>6 magnitude) in Uttarkashi (1991) and Chamoli (1999) and a series of landslides/cloud
burst such as Malpa (1998), Okhimath (1998), Fata (2001), Gona (2001), Khet Gaon (2002) and Budhakedar
Technical Assistance to the Executing Agency: Shortly after the TA commenced, Uttaranchal state was carved
out of the parent state of Uttar Pradesh, and with it, for the first time in India, the Ministry of Disaster Management
at state level was established. The executing agency within the state for the TA was the office of the
Commissioner of Disaster Management, under the Ministry and TA consultants worked with the officials within the
Ministry and the Uttaranchal Academy of Administration to draw up a framework for the establishment of the
Disaster Mitigation and Management Center (DMMC), as a ‘think tank’ to the Ministry to support all government
ministries/ officials with regard to hazard information and mitigation/response options. In Uttaranchal, a new
administrative structure for disaster management has been put in place as shown below.
Since its establishment, the TA provided tremendous support to the DMMC. The visionary and enthusiastic
disaster management work undertaken by the DMMC and leaders of the former UP Academy of Administration
(now Academy of Administration, Nainital) has meant that the new State Government of Uttaranchal was
receptive to this Technical Assistance.
A significant outcome of the TA in this component has been the recognition given to, and empowering of, the
leaders of disaster management in the state. The TA facilitated networking of like-minded individuals from
National Committee for Disaster Management, UPAA, IIT Roorkee, experiences of groups in similar Himalayan
topology, specifically those of NSET Nepal and various others, which has a real likelihood of producing a
sustainable change in the level of preparedness for disaster in UA.