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                                             GENERAL LIABILITY
 October 2011                                                                                                                    Volume 2 | Issue 8
                           Editors: Joanna L. Crosby | Linda Tai Hoshide | Michael W. Morrison | Kathleen A. Sweitzer

 In This Issue...
  New York Appellate Court Applies “Unfortunate
  Events Test” to Determine Whether Multiple
  Instances of Abuse Constitute Multiple
  “Occurrences”                                              1

  Illinois Appellate Court Holds Even Vague Allegations
  of Wet Walls Allegedly Caused by Window Sealant
  Creates a Duty to Defend                                   2
  Illinois Appellate Court Finds Pollution Exclusion
  Ambiguous as to Whether it Bars Coverage for
  Pollution Permitted by the Illinois EPA                    3
  Oklahoma Appellate Court Finds Plain and
  Unambiguous EIFS Exclusion Defeats Application of
  “Efficient Proximate Cause” Doctrine                        4
  Federal Court in California Finds Great Expectations
  of Insured Do Not Defeat Plain Language of
  Endorsement                                                5

  California Court of Appeal Confirms Insurer’s Right to
  Intervene to Contest Liability and Damages in Third-
  Party Liability Action                                     6
  Contact Information                                        7

                                   New York Appellate Court Applies “Unfortunate
                                   Events Test” to Determine Whether Multiple Instances
                                   of Abuse Constitute Multiple “Occurrences”
Authored By

                                       n Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. National       sexual assaults allegedly occurred over the course of
                                       Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA,        seven years, beginning in August 1996 and allegedly
                                       No. 2010-03862, 2011 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6432 (N.Y.   continuing until May 2002.
                                   App. Div. Sept. 20, 2011), a New York court held that,
                                   because instances of sexual abuse had occurred over        National Union had issued three consecutive
                                   a seven-year period at different times and in different      commercial general liability policies to the Catholic
                                   locations, they were not temporally or spatially related   Diocese as the Named Insured, each with a $750,000
                                   enough to constitute a single “occurrence.”                “each occurrence limit” that would apply in excess of
                                                                                              a $250,000 per occurrence self-insured retention. The
                                   In Catholic Diocese, National Union Fire Insurance         policies were in effect from August 31, 1995, through
Jessica Swaysland,                 Company of Pittsburgh, PA (“National Union”)               August 31, 1998. National Union argued that the alleged
Associate in the Chicago           appealed the ruling of the trial court, which denied       instances of abuse were not sufficiently temporally or
Office                               National Union’s motion to declare the alleged acts        spatially connected to constitute one “occurrence” and,
                                   of sexual abuse constitute multiple occurrences. The       accordingly, policies in place spanning the entire seven-
                                   claim at issue arose from the alleged sexual abuse of      year period should potentially be implicated and the
                                   Alexandra L., a minor, by Reverend James Smith. The        insured should be required to pay its SIR for each year

                                           CALIFORNIA | ILLINOIS | NEW JERSEY | NEW YORK
                              Continued from Page 1

                              potentially implicated. The appellate court agreed.          unfortunate event and a single occurrence.” The court
                                                                                           held that, because the instances of abuse allegedly
                              In so doing, the court held that, in the absence of an       occurred over a seven-year period, and at different
                              aggregation of claims provision in the relevant policy       times and locations, “it cannot be said that there was
                              evidencing an intent to aggregate claims for purposes        a close temporal and spatial relationship between
                              of subjecting them to a single SIR, the court was            the acts of sexual abuse … under the circumstances,
                              required to apply the “unfortunate events test” in order     [National Union] demonstrated, prima facie, that
                              to determine whether the multiple instances of abuse         the alleged acts of sexual abuse constituted multiple
                              constituted one “occurrence” or multiple “occurrences.”      occurrences.” As a result of this determination, the
                              To apply this test, the Catholic Diocese court stated        court further held that multiple policies were triggered
                              that “courts must analyze the temporal and spatial           spanning the seven-year period and liability should be
                              relationships between the incidents and the extent to        allocated on a pro rata basis to each with each policy’s
                              which they were part of an undisrupted continuum to          SIR being applied.
                              determine whether they can … be viewed as a single

                               Tressler Comments
                               Generally, courts have applied two other tests, along with the “unfortunate events test,” in order to define an
                               “occurrence.” As implied by its name, in the “cause test,” courts will examine the cause or causes of the bodily
                               injury and/or property damage. Pursuant to this test, multiple injuries or instances of property damage will be
                               treated as one “occurrence” if they are the direct result of a single action or event. This test is applied by the
                               majority of jurisdictions in the United States. The “effects test” is also employed by courts, albeit a minority,
                               and it involves a focus on each injury or incident of damage to determine the number of “occurrences.” The
                               “unfortunate events test,” utilized by New York courts, is often viewed as a variant of the “cause test” and the
                               underlying principle is that the cause of the injury or damage must be an event close to the injury or damage
                               itself. When a claim arises that involves multiple instances of injury and/or damage, insurers must determine
                               which test is utilized in the applicable jurisdiction in order to appropriately determine their potential obligations
                               to their insured – particularly when an insurer has issued successive policies to its insured.

                              Illinois Appellate Court Holds Even Vague Allegations
                              of Wet Walls Allegedly Caused by Window Sealant
Authored By
                              Creates a Duty to Defend
                                 n Milwaukee Mutual Insurance Company v. J.P.              damage” or an “occurrence.” Thereafter, MMIT filed a
                                 Larsen, Inc., No. 1-01-316, 2011 Ill. App. LEXIS 872      complaint for declaratory judgment and a motion for
                                 (Ill. App. Ct. Aug. 15, 2011), the Illinois Appellate     summary judgment, and Larsen filed a cross-motion for
                              Court, found a vague general allegation of damage            summary judgment. MMIT’s motion was denied, and
                              to property other than the insured’s work product is         Larsen’s cross-motion was granted. MMIT appealed.
                              sufficient to trigger the duty to defend.
                                                                                           On appeal, in determining whether the third party
                              Milwaukee Mutual Insurance Company (“MMIT”)                  complaint alleged “property damage,” the court focused
                              appeals the trial court’s order denying its motion for       on the fact that PDH, in its action against Weather-
                              summary judgment and granting summary judgment               Tite, had alleged that, due to faulty construction, the
Hilary Zimmer, Associate in   in favor of its insured defendant, J.P Larsen, Inc.          condominium common elements, individual units and
the Chicago Office              (“Larsen”). Larsen was sued in a third party action by       unit owners’ personal property were damaged and that,
                              Weather-Tite, Inc. (“Weather-Tite”).                         “[a]part from the property damage, the Association
                                                                                           will have to make repairs to correct the design and/
                              Weather-Tite had hired Larsen to apply sealant to            or construction defects.” Although the only allegations
                              windows Weather-Tite had installed in condominium            against Weather-Tite in PDH’s Complaint were for
                              buildings called Prairie District Homes (“PDH”). The         breach of the implied warranties of habitability and
                              third party complaint alleged in relevant part that,         workmanship and breach of an express warranty, the
                              in the event PDH was successful with its breach of           general language in the Complaint that alleged PHD “has
                              warranty claims against Weather-Tite, Larsen was liable      and continues to experience severe water infiltration…
                              for contribution as a joint tortfeasor. Larsen tendered      ”to areas other than Larsen’s work product was found
                              its defense of the third-party complaint to MMIT,            sufficient to require Larsen’s defense. Specifically the
                              which was denied when MMIT determined there was              court found this allegation was imputed against Larsen
                              no coverage under the CGL policy where the complaint         vis-à-vis the third party complaint in which Larsen was
                              alleged only construction defects and not “property          alleged to be a joint tortfeasor based on negligence.

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                             Continued from Page 2

                             According to the court, the damages alleged constituted      the installation of a faulty window system resulted
                             “property damage” and were not merely construction           “in significant and continuing water leakage into the
                             defects (which would constitute uncovered economic           common elements and residential” units, was damage
                             losses) because the costs associated with the “property      throughout the building that was not constructed by
                             damage” suffered by the individual unit owners was in         Larsen.
                             addition to the sum related to the construction defects
                             and “not intangible or merely associated with the            Thus, an “occurrence” was pled because the underlying
                             repair or replacement of the faulty window caulking          pleadings alleged that Larsen’s negligent workmanship
                             and sealant.” With respect to whether an “occurrence”        caused an accident in the form of significant and
                             was alleged, the court indicated that it has repeatedly      continuing water leakage, which is more than an
                             stated that damage to something other than the               allegation that the window sealant and caulking were
                             project itself does constitute an “occurrence” under a       defective. Therefore, the court determined there was a
                             CGL policy and, in PDH’s complaint against Weather-          duty to defend.
                             Tite (which was imputed to Larsen), the allegation that

                              Tressler Comments
                              This decision illustrates a liberal construction of the pleadings and reliance upon the allegations in the Complaint
                              to invoke the duty to defend even if the Third Party Complaint against an insured does not allege “property
                              damage” caused by an “occurrence.”

                             Illinois Appellate Court Finds Pollution Exclusion
                             Ambiguous as to Whether it Bars Coverage for Pollution
Authored By
                             Permitted by the Illinois EPA

                                 n Erie Insurance Exchange v. Imperial Marble             or threatened discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration,
                                 Corporation, No. 3-10-0308, 2011 Ill. App. LEXIS 1005    release or escape of ‘pollutants’ … [a]t or from any
                                 (Ill. App. Ct. Sept. 15, 2011), the Illinois Appellate   premises, site or location which is or was at any time
                             Court held that a pollution exclusion was ambiguous          owned or occupied by, or rented or loaned to, any
                             as to whether the emission of hazardous materials in         insured.” Erie disclaimed coverage and declined to
                             levels allowed by the Illinois EPA constituted pollution     defend Imperial in the underlying suit based on the
                             under the exclusion.                                         expected or intended injury exclusion and the pollution
                             In Imperial Marble, the plaintiff, Erie Insurance Exchange
                             (“Erie”) filed a declaratory judgment action seeking          On appeal, the insured challenged the trial court’s
Rae Franklin, Associate in   a declaration that it did not have a duty to defend or       findings that the pollution exclusion barred coverage.
the Chicago Office             indemnify its insured, Imperial Marble Corporation           Imperial argued that because its emissions were
                             (“Imperial”), under a CGL policy issued in connection        allowed under its IEPA permit, the emissions did not
                             with an underlying class action. The class action            constitute pollutants or hazardous emissions and that
                             involved homeowners who were seeking damages for             the exclusion therefore did not apply. In analyzing
                             personal injury and property damage allegedly due to         whether Erie had a duty to defend, the appellate court
                             emissions from Imperial’s manufacturing operations.          examined the allegations in the complaint. The court first
                             Imperial manufactured cultured marble vanities,              concluded that the complaint’s allegations of “ongoing,
                             countertops and other synthetic products using styrene       continuous, repeated, regular and uninterrupted”
                             and methyl methacrylate, among other chemicals,              invasion of the claimants’ persons and property by
                             in its manufacturing process, which created odorous          “odors and air contaminants” alleged an “occurrence”
                             emissions. Imperial operated under a permit issued by        as defined by the policies. Because the alleged injury
                             the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (“IEPA”),       and damage were unexpected results of Imperial’s
                             which authorized certain levels of emissions.                intended emissions, they constituted an accident under
                                                                                          the policy. The court employed the same analysis to
                             The policies Erie issued to Imperial contained an            determine whether the expected or intended injury
                             expected or intended injury exclusion, which barred          exclusion barred coverage, which focused on whether
                             coverage for injury or damage expected or intended           the injury was expected or intended, as opposed to
                             from the standpoint of the insured. The policies also        whether the act that caused the injury was expected or
                             contained a pollution exclusion, which barred coverage       intended. The court concluded that because Imperial
                             for injury or damage “arising out of the actual, alleged     operated pursuant to an emissions permit, it could not

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                            Continued from Page 3

                            be considered to have expected or intended to injure or      operations. Based on the allegations in the complaint
                            damage the underlying plaintiffs’ persons or property.        and the language of the pollution exclusion, the court
                                                                                         concluded that the policy’s pollution exclusion was
                            With respect to the pollution exclusion, Imperial            arguably ambiguous as to whether the emission of
                            asserted that its emissions were not excluded because        hazardous materials in levels permitted by an IEPA
                            its operations were in compliance with its IEPA permit.      permit constituted traditional environmental pollution.
                            The insured argued that although it dispersed emissions,     Instead of deciding whether the emissions constituted
                            they did not qualify as hazardous or pollutants when         environmental pollution, the court simply found the
                            dispersed in amounts in compliance with its permit,          pollution exclusion to be ambiguous. Resolving the
                            especially where the complaint contained allegations         ambiguity in favor of the insured, the court held that
                            that injuries resulted from Imperial’s normal business       Erie had a duty to defend Imperial.

                             Tressler Comments
                             This case represents another example of a court bending over backwards to favor an insured, especially when
                             the duty to defend is at play. It is hard to imagine how emissions from an industrial operation would not be
                             considered to be pollution within the plain terms of the pollution exclusion at issue in this case. This case also
                             reinforces the notion that the duty to defend in Illinois, as in most jurisdictions, is very broad and any perceived
                             ambiguity in policy language will be construed against the insurer and in favor of the duty to defend.

                            Oklahoma Appellate Court Finds Plain and
                            Unambiguous EIFS Exclusion Defeats Application of
                            “Efficient Proximate Cause” Doctrine
Authored By

                                n National American Insurance Co. v. Gerlicher,          Gerlicher sued Pinion for construction defects. Pinion’s
                                No. 108114, 2011 Okla. Civ. App. LEXIS 79 (Okla.         insurer, National American Insurance Company
                                Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2011), the Oklahoma Court of           (“NAICO”), agreed to defend Pinion subject to a
                            Appeals ruled that a broadly worded EIFS exclusion           reservation of rights, but filed a declaratory judgment
                            precluded coverage for lawsuits brought against a            action seeking a determination that its policy did not
                            building contractor for water intrusion, high humidity       provide coverage. NAICO claimed that its EIFS Exclusion
                            and mold. The court ruled that even though there may         applied to preclude coverage. Gerlicher (to which Pinion
                            have been multiple causes for the claimed damage, the        had assigned its coverage claim) argued that because
                            EIFS did not have to be the sole alleged cause of the        EIFS was “but one of the three primary causes” of
                            damage in order for the exclusion to apply.                  damage to the building identified in the expert report,
Mary McPerson, Partner in                                                                the court should apply the “efficient proximate cause”
the Orange County Office      The Gerlicher Company (“Gerlicher”) purchased a              doctrine and find that the exclusion did not apply.
                            commercial building constructed by general contractor        The trial court sided with NAICO and found there was
                            Pinion Construction, Inc. (“Pinion”), which included         no duty to defend or indemnify for various reasons,
                            an Exterior Insulating Finishing System (“EIFS”).            including application of the EIFS exclusion. Gerlicher
                            Subsequently, Gerlicher identified significant problems        appealed.
                            in the building related to water intrusion, high humidity
                            and mold.                                                    Oklahoma’s Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that the
                                                                                         EIFS exclusion in NAICO’s policy precluded coverage.
                            According to a “Moisture Intrusion and Causation             The court rejected Gerlicher’s attempted reliance on
                            Assessment Report” prepared for Gerlicher by an              the “efficient proximate cause” doctrine. Under that
                            environmental testing company, “there are at least           doctrine, when at least two identifiable causes combine
                            three issues that work in tandem,” which caused the          to form a single property loss, and one is covered under
                            moisture problems: (1) vinyl wall covering on the interior   the policy while the other one is excluded, a claim for
                            side of the exterior wall system, which created a vapor      that loss will be covered. While the “efficient proximate
                            barrier; (2) the brick row ledge that was sloped towards     cause” doctrine has been applied in Oklahoma in the
                            the wall instead of away from the wall system, causing       insurance coverage context, and is generally found to
                            water to collect against it and the EIFS wall system;        be a question of fact for jury resolution, the court ruled
                            and (3) the EIFS system interfaced at the windows had        that it did not apply in this case. Rather, the court held
                            deteriorated caulking and holes and cracks along the         that even if multiple factors had caused or contributed
                            brick row/EIFS wall system, which allowed moisture to        to the resulting damage, the exclusion still barred
                            enter the wall cavities.                                     coverage because the plain language of the exclusion

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                          Continued from Page 4

                          stated that coverage was excluded for property damage       negated the application of the efficient proximate
                          “that arises out of, is caused by, or is attributable to    cause doctrine and was enforceable under Oklahoma
                          [EIFS] whether in whole or in part.”                        law. The court refused to “engage in a strained and
                                                                                      unnatural construction of the exclusion, something
                          Finding the wording of the exclusion to be plain and        that Oklahoma law does not permit.”
                          clear, the Court held that this specific policy language

                           Tressler Comments
                           This decision supports an insurer’s reliance on an EIFS exclusion to deny coverage, even when the loss at issue
                           may have had multiple causes, one or more of which otherwise might have been covered. It is important to
                           carefully consider the exact language of the EIFS exclusion and whether that language makes the exclusion
                           applicable when the property damage arises out of, is caused by, or is attributable to EIFS “in whole or in

                          Federal Court in California Finds Great Expectations of
Authored By
                          Insured Do Not Defeat Plain Language of Endorsement

                              n McMillan Construction Services, L.P., v. Arch         injury’ . . . or ‘property damage’ to which this insurance
                              Specialty Insurance Co., No. 10cv25922011 U.S.          applies, and which are in excess of the ‘Self Insured
                              Dist. LEXIS 96698 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2011), the        Retention’ . . .” Illinois Union argued this made the
                          court held that an insurer had no duty to defend an         policy indemnity only, as it did not include any duty to
                          additional insured because a conspicuous, plain and         defend.
                          clear Self-Insured Retention Endorsement removed the
                          duty to defend.                                             McMillan asserted two main counterarguments. First,
                                                                                      the company claimed they reasonably expected Illinois
                          In the underlying litigation, plaintiff McMillan             Union owed them a duty to defend. But, because
                          Construction Services (“McMillan”) was sued in a            McMillan had not argued that the policy language was
Joshua Marx, Associate    construction defect case in San Diego. Defendant            ambiguous, the court found McMillan’s expectations
in the Los Angeles Office   Illinois Union Insurance Company (“Illinois Union”)         and intent irrelevant. Moreover, even if intent were at
                          issued an insurance policy to subcontractor Pacific          issue, the court noted the only relevant intent was that
                          Window Corporation (“Pacific Window”). That original         of the original contracting parties – Illinois Union and
                          policy was amended to name as an additional named           Pacific Window. McMillan Construction was not added
                          insured Magna Window Corporation (“Magna”).                 as an additional insured until seven months after the
                                                                                      contract’s execution.
                          After Magna entered into a written contract with
                          McMillan for work on the underlying construction            Second, McMillan argued there was a duty to defend
                          project, the policy was amended again to name               because the SIR Endorsement was unenforceable as it
                          McMillan as an additional insured. When McMillan            was not conspicuous, plain and clear. While the court
                          was sued in the construction defect case, it tendered       agreed that California law requires all endorsements
                          the claim under the Illinois Union policy. Illinois Union   to be conspicuous, plain and clear, it held that the SIR
                          denied a duty to defend to McMillan, and McMillan           Endorsement in this case met that standard. Analogizing
                          sued for declaratory relief, breach of contract and         to the ruling in General Star Indemnity Co. v. Superior
                          bad faith. Illinois Union then moved for summary            Court, 47 Cal. App. 4th 1586 (1996), the court held
                          judgment, arguing that its policy did not contain a duty    that block lettering at the top of the SIR Endorsement
                          to defend.                                                  stating: “THIS ENDORSEMENT CHANGES THE POLICY.
                                                                                      PLEASE READ IT CAREFULLY” was conspicuous, and that
                          The policy contained a Self-Insured Retention               the language changing the policy was clear. Applying
                          (“SIR”) Endorsement deleting the standard insuring          the plain language of the SIR Endorsement, the court
                          agreement and replacing it with the following clause:       concluded there was no duty to defend, and therefore
                          “we will pay those sums that the insured becomes            no breach of contract or bad faith.
                          legally obligated to pay as damages because of ‘bodily

                           Tressler Comments
                           While this is a straightforward ruling, it is likely that the large general contractor in this case actually had no
                           idea that the original policy issued to the subcontractor had no duty to defend language. Rather, the general
                           contractor likely assumed that like most CGL policies, this policy also provided a duty to defend. But this
                           otherwise reasonable assumption was not enough to defeat the clear language of the endorsement limiting
                           coverage to indemnity only. Nevertheless, this may have been a closer case had the general contractor been
                           the original contracting party.

Page 5                                     
                                   California Court of Appeal Confirms Insurer’s Right to
                                   Intervene to Contest Liability and Damages in Third-
                                   Party Liability Action
Authored By
                                   In Western Heritage Insurance Company v. Superior             that Western was only allowed to litigate the amount of
                                   Court, No. B232495, 2011 Cal. App. LEXIS 1285, (Cal.          the plaintiffs’ damages. On appeal, the plaintiffs did not
                                   Ct. App. Oct. 10, 2011), the California Court of Appeal       contest the right of Heritage to intervene, but argued
                                   reversed a trial court order that allowed an insurer to       that trial court’s ruling was proper because Western
                                   intervene in an action against its insured but contest        did not move to set aside the default and because
                                   only damages, not liability issues.                           its defense was being provided under reservation of
                                   Western Heritage agreed to defend its insured, a home
                                   healthcare provider, and the insured’s employee, a            The California Court of Appeal recognized that the
                                   home health caregiver, who was involved in a car              right of an insurer to intervene in a liability action
Katherine L. Liner, Partner        accident that killed one of the insured’s home health         against the insured is well established under California
in the Orange County Office          clients. As a result, the employee was allegedly              law. The fact that the insurer can be liable for a
                                   negligent in operating the vehicle and failing to provide     judgment entered against its insured is sufficient to
                                   medical attention, which was required pursuant to             justify intervention. Further, the court indicated that
                                   home healthcare service contract. The insured was             an intervener is not limited by decisions made by a
                                   allegedly vicariously liable in hiring an incompetent         party with which it is aligned or that party’s defaulted
                                   caregiver. There was no dispute that the employee was         status. Therefore, the entry of the employee’s default
                                   within the course and scope of employment. However,           did not limit the insurer’s rights. Western Heritage was
                                   the defense was afforded subject to the insurer’s              entitled to protect its interests and litigate liability and
                                   reservation of rights to decline coverage based on            damages. As explained by the court, there would be no
                                   an exclusion for auto accidents in its general liability      purpose in allowing an insurer to intervene to protect
                                   policy.                                                       its interests but limit the scope of the insurer’s defense
                                                                                                 because of the insured’s default.
                                   Defense counsel filed an answer to the complaint on
                                   behalf of the employee without first making contact            The court rejected the argument that an intervening
                                   with her. Later, when the employee failed to respond          insurer is somehow “subrogated” to the rights of the
                                   to discovery, her answer was stricken and default             defaulting insured. In addition, the court rejected the
                                   was entered against her, thereby preventing her from          idea that the reservation of rights created a conflict
                                   contesting liability or damages.                              of interest. Based on the principle that an intervening
                                                                                                 insurer cannot raise coverage issues in the liability
                                   Thereafter, Western was allowed to intervene to               action, the court pointed out that there was no danger
                                   protect its interests in any potential judgment based on      that issues would be resolved in a manner that would
                                   the employee’s liability; however, the trial court ruled      enable the insurer to later deny coverage.

                                    Tressler Comments
                                    The court of Appeal made clear that an insurer is not bound by a default entered against the insured. Earlier
                                    cases implied that an insurer must intervene or be bound by the judgment (Clemmer v. Hartford Insurance Co.,
                                    22 Cal. 3d 865 (1978)) and move to set aside a default, at least as to the insurer, if it intervenes (Jade K. v. Viguri,
                                    210 Cal. App. 3d 1459 (1989)). According to the court of appeal in Western Heritage, an insurer that intervenes
                                    to protect its interests after the insured has defaulted is not required to move to set aside the default because
                                    the default has no effect on the intervening insurer. In addition, to the extent a third-party claimant may argue
                                    that the nature of a reservation of rights could create a conflict, the court of appeal foreclosed such an argument
                                    by making clear that coverage issues are never part of the liability action, only a subsequent coverage action or
                                    a direct action to collect on a judgment.


         evin Sullivan, Associate in New Jersey Office, was the author of the article entitled, “To be or not to be in the ‘Business of’ Advertising:
         New Jersey Appellate Division Holds that Application of Publishers Liability Exclusions is a Question for Fact-Finder,” which appeared in
         the September 2011 edition of the Commercial General Liability Dispatch. We inadvertently gave author credit to Kenneth Sullivan, a
  partner in our Chicago office.

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      If you have any questions concerning this bulletin or the Tressler General Liability & Excess
      Insurance Group, please contact our editors:

      Joanna L. Crosby - Newark Office                                    973/848-2908                    
      Linda Tai Hoshide - Los Angeles Office                              310/203-4816                    
      Michael W. Morrison - Chicago Office                                312/627-4019                    
      Kathleen A. Sweitzer - Chicago Office                               312/627-4130                    

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This newsletter is for general information only and is not intended to provide and should not be relied upon for legal advice in any particular circumstance or
fact situation. The reader is advised to consult with an attorney to address any particular circumstance or fact situation. The opinions expressed in this dispatch
are those of the authors and not necessarily those of Tressler LLP or its clients. This announcement or some of its content may be considered advertising
under the applicable rules of the Supreme Court of Illinois, the courts in New York and those in certain other states. For purposes of compliance with New
York State Bar rules, our headquarters are Tressler LLP, 233 S Wacker Drive, 22nd Floor, Chicago, IL 60606, 312.627.4000. Prior results described herein do
not guarantee a similar outcome. The information contained in this dispatch may or may not reflect the most current legal developments. The articles are not
updated subsequent to their inclusion in the newsletter when published.

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