NSC-68 1
NSC-68 was a 58 page classified (secret) report written in February-April 1950 by Paul
Nitze (he was a high-ranking U.S. government official who helped shape Cold War
defense policy over the course of numerous presidential administrations) and issued by
the U.S. National Security Council on April 14, 1950 during the presidency of Harry
Truman. The report, written in the aftermath of the decision to build a hydrogen bomb,
was declassified in 1977 and has become one of the classic historical documents of the
Cold War era.
The document, inspired by George Kennan (he was an American advisor, diplomat,
political scientist, and historian, best known as “the father of containment” and his “long
telegram” in 1946, “portrayed the Soviet Union in the most aggressive light possible and
called, among other things, for a massive American rearmament,” in the words of
Michael J. Hogan. Perhaps more than any other document of the period, NSC-68 can
claim to be the bible of American national security policy and the fullest statements to
that point of the new ideology that guided American leaders” (A Cross of Iron: Harry S.
Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945-1954). The document
outlined the National Security Strategy of the United States for that time and analyzed the
capabilities of the Soviet Union and of the United States of America from military,
economic, political, and psychological standpoints.
The report argued that the Soviet Union had a systematic strategy aimed at the spread of
Communism across the entire world, and it recommended that the United States
government adopt a policy of containment to stop the further spread of Communism.
NSC-68’s principal thesis was that the Soviet Union intended to become the single
dominant world power and remake international society through Communist expansion
of Soviet authority. NSC-68 would shape government actions in the Cold War for the
next 20 years and has subsequently been labeled the “blueprint” for the Cold War.
NSC-68 called for a massive buildup of and an increase in funding for the armed forces
in an effort to contain the Soviets. NSC-68 outlined a drastic foreign policy shift from
defensive to active containment and advocated aggressive military preparedness. While
the writers of NSC-68 provided no financial recommendations on how to implement
policy, the policy paper encouraged peacetime military spending.
Using phrases like the “Kremlin’s design for world conquest,” NSC-68 painted the Soviet
Union as driven solely by such a design, in the process dismissing evidence that did not
fit that image. Written in the bowels of the State Department by Nitze and a small staff,
with Acheson and Truman being updated regularly, it reflected the desires of Acheson
and Nitze for more military spending, not the realities of U.S.-Soviet relations. When the
report was sent to top officials in the Truman administration for review before its official
delivery to the President, many of them scoffed at its arguments. William Thorp
questioned its contention that the “U.S.S.R. is steadily reducing the discrepancy between
its overall economic strength and that of the U.S.” Thorp stated: “I do not feel that this
position is demonstrated, but rather the reverse…the actual gap is widening in our favor.”
He pointed out that in 1949 the US economy had increased twofold over that of the
Soviet Union. Steel production in the US outpaced the Soviet Union by 2 million tons,
NSC-68 2
and stockpiling of goods and oil production far exceeded Soviet amounts. As for Soviet
military investment, Thorp opened: “I suspect a larger portion of Soviet investment went
into housing.” William Schaub of the bureau of the budget was particularly harsh. In
every arena—the Air Force, the Army, Navy, the stockpiling of atomic bombs, the
economy—the US was far superior than the Soviet Union. Kennan, although “father” of
the containment policy, also disagreed with the document, particularly its call for massive
rearmament. But foremost in opposition was President Truman himself. Long after the
Soviets had detonated an atomic device Truman had sought to cut military spending
(begging the question of whether NSC-68 could truly be laid at the feet of that
achievement by the Soviets). It would appear that NSC-68 did not change his mind. He
returned it to circulation and wanted an estimate of the costs involved. In the ensuing
two months little progress was made on the report. By June, Nitze had practically given
up on it. But on June 25, 1950 North Korean forces moved across the 38th parallel in
their attempt to unify the two Koreas. The Korean War had begun. In light of this, NSC-
68 took on new importance. As Acheson later remarked: “Korea…created the stimulus
which made action.” The Korean War had come to the rescue of those seeking to
increase military spending.
Truman officially signed NSC-68 on September 30, 1950, but by then the massive
rearmament program was already being implemented. In subsequent months and years,
“the new ideology…dominated the national security discourse. Indeed, national security
concerns became the common currency of most policy makers, the arbiter of most values,
the key to America’s new identity.”
1. Who is Paul Nitze?
2. Who is George Kennan?
3. What was the main purpose of NSC-68?
4. What did the document generally outline?
5. What was the principle thesis of NSC-68?
6. List three things NSC-68 called for
a.
b.
c.
7. Explain Willard Thorp’s argument.
8. Why did Kennan disagree with NSC-68?
9. What boosted the passage of NSC-68?
10. When did Truman sign NSC-68?